

# THE STAMFORD FORUM FOR WORLD AFFAIRS

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November 30, 1959

Executive Registry

11-9596

Mr. Allen Dulles, Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E. Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Early in 1959, the Stamford Forum for World Affairs had three programs concerned with longer range considerations of U. S. foreign policy. The recommendations resulting from those meetings are described in the enclosed booklet on pages 2 and 3. The distinguished speakers and panelists who participated in those meetings are shown on page 6. Further, it should be said that without the active interest of such members of our Advisory Committee as Frank Altschul, Walter N. Maguire, George Shuster and Walter Wheeler, the Forum could not have carried out such a unique project.

The year 1960 offers an unusual opportunity for attention to world affairs. In keeping with the Forum's longer range concerns many will be thinking of the decade ahead. It is also an election year in which it is important that broad non-partisan or bi-partisan issues shall predominate over any narrower partisan considerations in foreign affairs as the American electorate moves toward decisions most eventful for the entire world. In this spirit, we should like to invite you to address the Stamford Forum for World Affairs.

We have set aside three Sunday afternoons, January 24, February 28 and March 27, but should you be inclined to accept our invitation and these dates are inconvenient we would be willing to rearrange our schedule. We would still hope for a Sunday afternoon and that you could either open or close our 1960 series.

The Forum in its fourteen years has had many worthwhile projects, mostly concerned with current problems. Building on the program this year which emphasized longer range considerations, we hope in our 1960 series to examine further what should be our national goals in world affairs and whether we have the will to achieve them.

We know that you can make an outstanding contribution to this program and hope that you might choose our platform from among the many offered you for one of your authoritative expositions. We should be happy to cooperate in efforts to see that your address reaches as much as possible beyond the confines of our meeting place.


Mr. Allen Dulles

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November 30, 1959

We very much hope for a favorable response to our invitation. It is likely that Mr. Altschul will be in touch with you with any further information which may assist you in your decision.

Sincerely yours,



Wilbur Miller, Chairman

WM:na  
Enc.

*Some*  
*Recommendations*  
*for*  
**LONG-RANGE**  
**FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING**



THE STAMFORD FORUM  
FOR  
WORLD AFFAIRS



OCTOBER, 1959

## ***Recommendations For Long-R***

Convinced of the need to emphasize longer range considerations in planning the foreign policy of the United States, the Stamford Forum for World Affairs, aided particularly by the Advisory Committee, the Resources Committee and the Board of Directors and after consultations with outstanding experts in Foreign Policy, respectfully asks consideration of the following broad recommendations:

**(I) To insure more effective representation overseas, we recommend:**

- (A) that Congress appropriate sufficient money for the operation of all U. S. embassies so that career diplomats or others eminently qualified may fill all ambassadorial posts without need of private fortunes.
- (B) that Congress appropriate on a long-term basis so that recently improved practices for in-service training among Foreign Service personnel may be further extended and a long-range program developed to attract and to hold outstanding young persons in a State Department career.

**(II) Recognizing that we may not have used economic assistance as effectively as we might have, either as a weapon in the cold war or as an instrument in building a peaceful world, we recommend:**

- (A) that economic assistance be planned, and financial appropriations be made where necessary, on a long-range basis.
- (B) that long-term, low-interest loans be made more readily available, particularly for the benefit of underdeveloped countries.
- (C) that for economic and technical assistance, more use be made of international organizations such as the UN-specialized agencies.
- (D) that U. S. government personnel administering economic assistance programs be, in so far as possible, career personnel with high standards of in-service training and specialized experience.
- (E) that in both the planning and operation of economic assistance programs, full advantage be taken of eminently qualified technical consultants from universities, foundations, industry and labor.
- (F) that proper incentives be devised to stimulate increased participation of private groups, including business and foundations, in economic programs of value to the free world.

**(III) Recognizing that de facto recognition of foreign governments has been our policy during much of our**

## ***Change Foreign Policy Planning***

nation's history, although a de jure policy has sometimes been used to express disapproval of certain governments, we recommend:

that our recognition policy be realistic. It should be made clear to our citizens that recognition does not necessarily denote approval of a government but is based on the belief that important benefits will be derived by our nation and our people.

**(IV) Besides bilateral recognition policy there are also important questions concerning membership in the United Nations. In this regard, we recommend:**

that in view of recent developments such as the possibility of a world-wide atomic test monitoring system on the one hand and the Tibetan experience on the other, the advantages and disadvantages of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations be thoroughly explored to chart a course of action of maximum value to the continued survival of the free world.

**(V) To insure a more valid American Image overseas and to offset propaganda directed against us as well as certain inaccurate impressions emanating from our own country, we recommend:**

that the Department of State be encouraged to stimulate and coordinate public and private resources in the most effective program possible for informing our allies, those who oppose us and the neutral nations so as to bring a more real focus on our national life and on our objectives for the future in a world changing its ways with revolutionary rapidity.

**(VI) Secretary of State Herter on May 7, 1959, told the American people:**

"Foreign policy is not an obscure art for a few specialists. It is of importance to all of us. Therefore, it must be of interest to all of us. Our foreign policy, to be successful, requires your continuing understanding and support."

**To this end, we urge that newspapers, magazines, radio and television provide increased opportunity for citizen understanding by offering more information about world affairs. We also recommend that for increased citizen interest, understanding and support, the leaders in the Department of State be encouraged:**

- (A) to offer more frequent and better delineated statements of policy to the American people.
- (B) to use the fullest candor limited only by minimum requirements of national security so that the American people are confident that they have a maximum of significant facts, be they favorable or unfavorable to the continued survival of the free world.

## *The Stamford Forum World*

In November 1958, the Stamford Forum for World Affairs issued a prospectus, "How Can the Citizen Influence Foreign Policy?" It was suggested that broad, long-term foreign policy objectives be considered:

What are America's long-term goals in World Affairs? Are they obscured by day-to-day improvisations to meet Soviet inspired diplomatic offensives... or don't they exist? Can goals in a leading democracy of the twentieth century be specifically formulated and stated publicly as Mr. Khrushchev has proclaimed the Soviet objectives for 1970?

Perhaps more than anything else, a long-term World Affairs program for the United States needs to be enunciated. At least broad principles and overall objectives require definition. Then as progress is made, a feeling of accomplishment, of progress, can better permeate the American mentality. Short-term improvisations to the initiative of our opponents may well contribute to a feeling of individual helplessness in the American electorate with a mixture of uneasiness and complacency an inevitable but frightening by-product.

The Forum Board believe there are several things that should be done. Among these:

to concentrate on longer-term Foreign Policy objectives at citizen level;

to encourage the use of more far-seeing practical idealism and less short-sighted expediency in dealing with other countries;

to dramatize that Foreign Policy is dynamic and must be worked at continuously;

to bring our Congressional representatives into closer and more regular contacts with our citizenry on international affairs.

One approach to accomplishing the Forum objectives was suggested:

### TWENTIETH CENTURY SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY

Our science and technology have been our strength. We have relied on them as our deterrent against aggression. This may no longer suffice.

## *Affairs Project For 1959*

We need a formula wherein we can blend the enlightened concern of informed citizens dealing with facts as realistically as scientists do and operating in their daily lives at the national or international level, with the awakened concern of citizenry at the local level. Cumulatively, it is this citizenry operating at the local level which has the power to support, to deny, or to cause re-examination by our elected leaders of a foreign policy to determine whether it serves our national interests.

If the "experts" lose touch with "the people," their influence is lost. If the people are governed by romantic and unrealistic concepts, the world may be lost. Twentieth century technology with all the changes it brings in the daily lives of our people forces a twentieth century reappraisal of the ways for democratic decision making. Imagination, time, enlightened enthusiasm, experience and the right people working properly together can perhaps achieve a meaningful response to this twentieth century challenge to democracy.

The formula for citizen participation was described:

### THREE SUNDAY AFTERNOONS...

would be reserved by the membership and boards plus a newly created Resources Committee of the Stamford Forum for World Affairs to hear from, to question, to discuss and to meet informally at tea with outstanding personalities in world affairs. An informal buffet dinner would follow for off-the-record discussion among the guest speakers, the Resources Committee and the Forum Boards.

Opportunity would thus be created to proceed from broad on-the-record considerations to candid off-the-record discussions from which might best emerge broad recommendations for Foreign Policy.

Membership in this committee is to be enlisted from among those residents of the Greater Stamford Area who participate in the management of or control resources important in the several strengths of America—church, communications, foundations, business, industry, federal and international agencies, associations and other educational activities.

## *Subjects and Major Participants*

JANUARY 25, 1958

### WHAT SHOULD BE MAJOR LONG-TERM AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES?

*Speakers:* Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. Charles Burton Marshall, Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment.

*Panelists:* Dr. George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College; Dr. John W. Nason, President of the Foreign Policy Association; Mr. Frank Altschul, Vice President and Secretary of Council on Foreign Relations.

MARCH 1, 1959

### THE AMERICAN IMAGE OVERSEAS

- a) Our Diplomatic Representatives
- b) Economic vs. Military Aid to Meet the People's Needs

*Speakers:* Dr. Henry M. Wriston, President of the American Assembly; Mr. August Hecksher, Director of the Twentieth Century Fund.

*Panelists:* Mr. Thomas H. Carroll, Vice President of the Ford Foundation; Mr. Griffiths Johnson, Vice President of the Motion Picture Association of America; Mr. Arthur Lanckton, Vice President of Mobil International Oil Co.

APRIL 12, 1959

### DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION . . . THEORY AND PRACTICE

*Speakers:* Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University; Honorable Ernest A. Gross, former Deputy U. S. Representative to the UN and now in legal practice.

*Panelists:* Rev. Donald Fisher Campbell, first Chairman of the Stamford Forum for World Affairs; Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, Stated Clerk of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.; Mr. Oscar A. de Lima, former Chairman of the Board of the American Association for the United Nations.



## *Highlights From Talks*

In judging our recommendations, it is important to bear in mind the highlights of remarks by our speakers.

### **LONG-TERM FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES**

It was suggested that the long-term goal of our Foreign Policy is "to seek a world environment in which our permanent revolution can go on with the least disruptive influences from outside." More specifically, we should

- .... seek to prevent the spread of Communist power and doctrine
- .... attempt to maintain other democracies
- .... help new nations establish a viability of their own
- .... create alliances for our own defense
- .... maintain our own defensive strength
- .... encourage a United Europe
- .... work for reduction of armaments
- .... work for a more open world in trade and travel
- .... work to keep peace in the world

These goals point up the problems of reconciling our long-range interests with our short-term objectives. Further, we must ask, "What can the U. S. do when it cannot lay down the law?"

Plans for action in most situations must be devised with an understanding of the problem of "multiple causation" or a bundle of considerations for which there is a lack of precedents. For example, do we give aid to Pakistan and run the risk of antagonizing India? in countering Russia, do we give aid to a corrupt state? to a state that doesn't collect its own taxes? to a friendly dictatorship? What do we do in Algeria — support the people in their struggle for independence and weaken our alliance with France or vice versa? Broad policy must then be tailored for individual situations. Yet in establishing specific policy about specific problems it is important relative to our broad, long-term goals to keep in mind:

- 1) the thermonuclear equation
- 2) the great and expanding number of new states which have the franchise but cannot make policy
- 3) the problem of world development, particularly in competition with Russia
- 4) the tone of our policy and the relative emphasis given to such deterrent doctrines as "massive retaliation"

### THE AMERICAN IMAGE OVERSEAS

(a) **Diplomatic Representatives.** The Foreign Service of the United States has been upgraded in many ways in the last five years. Now, 80% of the personnel with identifiable language skills are placed where advantage is taken of their specialized training, 84% have a working knowledge of at least one foreign language and 60% can speak one foreign language fluently. In-service training and selection-out practices have been increased to insure better use of top-flight personnel. In view of the size and complexity of our diplomatic missions, this increased emphasis on high-caliber Foreign Service career personnel is very necessary. Yet *more* Congressional attention should be given to adequate appropriation of funds to insure that new personnel can be attracted to and properly trained for the Foreign Service.

The day is past when we should have political ambassadors. About 70% of our ambassadors are career personnel. The remainder, although appointed from outside the Foreign Service, have not all been "political" as illustrated by such outstanding men as Dr. J. B. Conant, David E. Bruce and Ellsworth Bunker. Yet for embassies such as London, Paris, Rome and Rio, the President must consider only appointees who can afford to spend \$75,000 to \$100,000 a year out of their own pockets for maintenance of such embassies. To remedy this situation and to make possible career men for any top embassy spot, Congress would need to appropriate additionally less than \$2,000,000 a year. Our present practice is tenable perhaps only because the Deputy Chiefs of Mission are now 100% professionals. It is time for the American people to take stock—to insist on paying our own way for the best possible diplomatic representation overseas.

(b) **Economic vs Military Aid to Meet the People's Needs.** Despite the report of the improvements in the Foreign Service in the past five years, the American Image has become blurred over the past ten years. The decline in the American Image has not been due so much to Russian propaganda as to the way we ourselves have responded to fast moving events in world affairs. Americans have misconceived the threat of Communism, misapplied the strength of Capitalism and messed up Colonialism, all because we have not understood economic aid as a weapon. Our pacts and agreements on armaments for many countries are inadequate in the face of the Russian economic offensive into which they have put tremendous drive the last four or five years. They have shown greater flexibility in their loan, barter and aid policies, their techniques appear simpler, their society more dynamic. From us the

people abroad too frequently see a capitalism too complex for them, which is not running at capacity to meet needs they consider important and whose representatives show great concern about low and balanced budgets while enjoying relaxed and fat living.

A new image of America can be created by greater recognition of the need for a real focus on our life as a nation and of the fact that we cannot have great poverty and great wealth side by side in the world. To increase the effectiveness of America in the great world struggle, economic aid should be considered from the long view and appropriation policies altered accordingly, economic assistance must be at a higher level, international agencies should be used to a greater extent in our aid programs and more highly trained manpower should be used at almost every level in our assistance programs.

#### DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION—THEORY AND PRACTICE

The recognition policy of the United States since its founding has been by and large *de facto* (as a matter of fact) rather than *de jure* (as a matter of legality). The shifts in policy have reflected our changing self-interest. From Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State until Mr. Seward, the U. S. recognized a new government if it were running the country. Under Mr. Seward, the policy was changed to indicate that revolutions in a republic ought not to be accepted. This policy prevailed until the 1880's. The government under Woodrow Wilson would not recognize people coming to power by assassination. In the 1920's, policy diverged along three lines: 1) Latin American changes were not recognized very quickly, 2) countries further away, such as Portugal, were recognized within twenty-four hours after a governmental change, 3) the Soviet Union did not win recognition of the Bolshevik government for 16 years although the Menshevik government had been recognized after only 5 days. Since 1933, the policy for the most part has been rapid recognition as shown within the last year for Iraq, Venezuela and most recently Castro in Cuba.

In the United Nations, there are several member governments which have not recognized one another, as for instance, Israel and the various Arab states or Russia and Jordan.

Now in a world fragmented by the cold war and the iron curtain there is a new major issue relative to recognition policy — that of the divided states such as China, Korea, Vietnam and Germany. A major question for those of us who do not wish to perpetuate such divisions is, "What processes can

be devised to achieve the unification in freedom of the peoples of the world?" The Soviets, on the other hand have used recognition as a political weapon in their cold-war strategy. Then there is the neutralist or non-aligned view which is perhaps indicated in the extreme by India and Burma who refuse to recognize the government of the Republic of Korea which is UN recognized.

Among the problems of divided states, a most controversial question for us in recent years has been what to do about divided China. For the U. S., there are two questions: 1) whether to continue to oppose the admission of Communist China to the U.N., 2) whether to recognize the government of Communist China. The UN question far transcends in importance the bilateral concerns of Communist China and the United States. It is important that the U. S. not place itself in the position of undermining confidence in the United Nations should a majority of UN members wish to admit Communist China — a possibility somewhat less likely since the recent Himalayan Pearl Harbor in Tibet. Rather should ways be explored to have the two Chinas represented in the UN since, as is obvious from relations among other members, recognition among UN members is not necessary. There are some advantages to having Communist China account for her aggressive actions within the framework of UN procedures. Therefore, the U. S. should consider carefully the terms on which Communist Chinese UN admission or bilateral recognition is opposed, for the most important long-term assets in such questions is the maximum effectiveness of the United Nations.

In judging the action of other countries of the United Nations, it is important to ascertain whether their action reflects their best self-interest as they see it. The lack of a consistent policy of recognition in our own history indicates we have operated largely on a similar self-interest principle and so would be expected to sympathize with other nations similarly motivated.

### ***Audience Response***

The panelists opened the question period of the afternoon sessions after the presentation of the talks by our speakers. They also directed the discussion in the smaller evening meetings. Questions from the large afternoon audience stimulated further discussion. The written questions procedure — while detracting from the spontaneity of vocal interchange in the second and third meetings — gave a more comprehensive indication of audience interest and concern. The written questions also could be carried from the audience of several hundred to the smaller

evening meetings of approximately fifty Resource Committee, Advisory Committee and Board members who questioned the speakers or expressed themselves with candor and frequently with some vigor.

In such activity at our first evening meeting of this relatively well-informed group, there were several who pointed to a general concern as to lack of information about and a lack of U. S. leadership in Foreign Affairs. It was felt that if our leaders in Washington would give out more information on specific questions such as thermonuclear developments and would propose programs to gain the initiative rather than reacting defensively so frequently, the American people would back whatever appropriations seemed necessary for military security, foreign assistance, etc.

Further, from comments of various participants in the first evening discussion, the following views may be cited: Our objectives must be related realistically to the world we live in. Even without the competition from Russia, with whom we should at all times be willing to negotiate, our well-being would depend on the well-being of others. Our programs should be planned with this uppermost in our minds. Therefore, a war on illiteracy, poverty and disease is important to us in our survival as a free and prosperous nation. This war is most acute in some of the new and emerging states where time may be required for them to develop to the point where they can consider economic and political systems such as ours. We want and need them for our friends. Our assistance should be rendered with this understanding of the interdependency of the free world and should be administered with a real sense of decency and good will. We should consider greater use of the United Nations specialized agencies for our assistance activities, where possible. But making friends is not always a question of money. The genuine courtesies extended at a personal level by our individual representatives, official or otherwise, can be most important. To attract friends or to compete with a vicious opponent in a fast changing world, we must "put our own house in order," we must demonstrate the worth of our system and maintain our strength to compete by expanding our domestic economy, solving our social problems, etc.

In the second and third evening meetings where the topics were more specific, the discussions were more closely confined to various aspects of the speakers' remarks or elucidations thereof. From three such meetings, it was possible to devise recommendations as described elsewhere herein.

**THE STAMFORD FORUM FOR WORLD AFFAIRS**  
1101 BEDFORD STREET STAMFORD, CONN.  
DAvis 4-9522

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Dr. Stanley High	Dr. George N. Shuster
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