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DRAFT CABLE

1. The tempo of the drawdown in U.S. forces has added a note of immediacy to several questions regarding the Phung Hoang Program. The questions themselves align into two basic categories: (1) those which deal with the continuation of the U.S. military advisory support, and (2) those which deal with the organization of the follow-on effort in the post-withdrawal period.

2. With regard to the first issue, it appears to some Washington analysts that while the tempo of the cuts could be dealt with by itself, when combined with the fact that the cuts are based on tour length (DEROS) the process genuinely threatens the effectiveness of the Phung Hoang Program. These same analysts recommend that the Phung Hoang advisor program be exempted from the DEROS process if possible so that some continuity can be achieved. In any case, a reasonably accurate estimate of the number of advisors planned for 1 November is required as soon as it can be calculated.

3. With regard to the second issue, there are several questions that must be answered in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the counter-subversive program that will ultimately replace the U.S. military advisory effort within Phung Hoang. The questions as we see them are as follows:

- (a) Who will advise the police on their counter-subversive responsibilities?

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- (b) Who will advise the Field Police on their counter-subversive responsibility?
- (c) Who will advise the Special Police on their counter-subversive responsibility?
- (d) Who will advise the various other elements of the GVN who have an anti-VCI responsibility, i. e., the MSS, the Province Chiefs, the District Chiefs?
- (e) What will become of the PRU? If it continues to exist, who will advise it?
- (f) What will be the relationship between all counter-subversion advisors, especially between U. S. police advisors, U. S. special police advisors, and U. S. Field Police advisors?
- (g) Who will take responsibility for the training facilities currently used to support the anti-VCI program?
- (h) Who will take responsibility for making intelligence estimates of VCI strength and capabilities?

4. It appears at this end, based on the opinions of those who have had some contact with the Phung Hoang Program, that the answers to the above questions not only require a plan for a follow-on program to Phung

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Hoang but also must deal head-on with the constraints that have been placed on USAID operations. While in the past the U.S. military advisory effort provided a buffer between USAID and the counter-subversive activities of the National Police, the removal of that buffer requires that we face the problem of counter-subversive advisory roles rather more squarely. If it is believed in the field that the operational constraints placed on USAID and CIA are such that a cohesive advisory effort is jeopardized, then the issue must be taken up by the NSC so that it can be resolved as soon as possible. With regard to this particular issue of organization on the U.S. side, it has been suggested that overall responsibility for the advisory effort should perhaps reside in a senior official of the Mission, where coordination of the various U.S. elements could take place most expeditiously. The Deputy Ambassador's office would look to us like a logical place, particularly in view of Mr. Whitehouse's background and expertise.

5. Because of the clearly urgent need to make the necessary decisions on how the U.S. will structure its future advisory support to the GVN's obviously essential task of combating organized internal subversion, we need your response to this cable and the questions it raises as expeditiously as possible, but no later than 17 March.

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VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DATE: 3 March 1972

TO: Mr. Colby

Executive Registry
72-1310

FROM:

SUBJECT: Phung Hoang

REMARKS: Attached is a copy of a draft cable which Mr. Carver presented to the Sullivan Committee. We will advise you as to the degree of agreement of the draft and provide you with a copy of the final version.

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