

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300080015-6

NSC BRIEFING

14 October 1954

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN MERGER

Afghanistan Foreign Minister requests U. S. aid to bring about Afghanistan-Pakistan merger. He claims this is only way to keep Afghanistan out of increasing Soviet economic envelopment and matter of life and death for his country. However, Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, who has already been approached, reportedly suspicious of this plan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300080015-6

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300080015-6

PROSPECTS FOR AFGHAN-PAKISTAN CONFEDERATION FROM NIE-AFGHANISTAN

ACTUALLY SOME TALK IN AFGHAN AND PAK-
ISTANI OFFICIAL CIRCLES OF SOME FORM
OF CONFEDERATION

(THIS PLAN URGED ON PAKISTAN BY AGHA
KHAN)

HOWEVER, RESPONSIBLE KARACHI AND KABUL
AUTHORITIES UNLIKELY TO AGREE ON MERGER
BECAUSE OF BASIC INTERNAL COMPLICATIONS
AND SOVIET AND INDIAN OPPOSITION

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300080015-6

NIE - AFGHANISTAN

Principal Conclusions

1. AFGHAN ROYAL FAMILY CAN PROBABLY MEET ANY CHALLENGE TO ITS AUTHORITY IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
2. AFGHAN SHORTAGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MAY BECOME CRITICAL IN NEXT THREE YEARS. IF FOREIGN EXCHANGE DIFFICULTIES SURMOUNTED, AFGHAN WOULD HAVE REASONABLY GOOD PROSPECTS FOR MODEST DEVELOPMENT.
3. AFGHANISTAN/SIGNIFICANTLY STRATEGIC IS BUFFER STATE, SEPARATING USSR FROM NON-COMMUNIST WORLD BUT DOMINATED BY NEITHER.
4. HOWEVER, AFGHANISTAN IS HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO SOVIET PRESSURES.

~~SECRET~~

5. SOV ATTENTIONS TO AFGHAN PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC INCREASED IN LAST YEAR. THIS PART OF GENERAL EFFORT TO COUNTER WESTERN GAINS ELSEWHERE IN AREA. SOV ATTENTIONS LIKELY TO INCREASE, ESPECIALLY IF AFGHAN PARTICIPATES IN WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT OR ACCEPTS SUB STANTIAL WESTERN MILITARY AID.

6. GROWTH OF SOV INFLUENCE WOULD REDUCE AFGHAN FREEDOM OF ACTION, BUT USSR WILL PROB NOT GAIN CONTROL OF COUNTRY WITHIN NEXT FEW YEARS. SMALL AFGHAN PRO-COMM ELEMENT TOO WEAK TO OVERTHROW REGIME. USSR COULD TAKE OVER AFGHAN, BUT OVERT AGGRESSION WOULD ENTAIL AN TI-SOV REACTIONS ELSEWHERE IN AREA WHICH USSR WOULD AVOID.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7. AFGHAN WILL SEEK WESTERN ECONOMIC AID TO COUNTERBALANCE THAT RECEIVED FROM USSR. HOWEVER, UNLIKELY THAT AFGHANS WOULD JOIN WESTERN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT.
8. AFGHAN WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO ACCEPT SOV AID AND MAY MISJUDGE ITS ABILITY TO CURB ACCOMPANYING SOV SUBVERSIV E ACTIVITY. MAY ALSO OVERESTIMATE WESTERN ABILITY AND WILL TO ASSIST THEM IN EVENT OF MILITARY OR DIP CRISIS.
9. IMPROVEMENT IN PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS, DOMINATED BY AFGHAN--INSTIGATED PUSH--TUNISTAN CONTROVERSY, UNLIKELY.

~~SECRET~~