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UNITED STATES DELEGATION
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CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
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Draft Wind-Up Speech for April 28, 1960

The Task Assigned Us

As we conclude the first stage of our work and adjourn for the recess, it is with a feeling of sadness and disappointment that I have reviewed our proceedings of the past seven weeks in terms of the task assigned to us. I am sure that when this Conference started on March 15 we all shared the high hope that it might constitute a turning point in the postwar history of disarmament negotiation -- a history that has been, as we all know, replete with lost opportunities and successive failures.

The resolution which was unanimously approved by all members of the UN, expressed the hope "that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."

Even Prime Minister Khrushchev, in his opening day greetings to this Conference, emphasized that we "work out

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ACDA review(s) completed.

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within the shortest possible time practical ways" of putting into effect the recommendation of the General Assembly. He said "the Soviet Government has given instruction to its representative on the Ten Nation Committee" -- that is to Mr. Zorin -- "to contribute in every possible way to fruitful work by the Committee."

However, by rigidly insisting on general and complete disarmament of all nations in a specified and unrealistic time period, it seems to us that the Soviet position has neither sought "practical ways" to carry out the General Assembly recommendation nor has it, as instructed by Mr. Khrushchev, contributed "in every possible way to the fruitful work by the Committee."

The Present Soviet Approach to Disarmament

Let us look briefly at the Soviet approach to disarmament as set forth in the Soviet plan.

The Soviet plan recommends, and I quote Mr. Zorin's remarks at our second meeting, that "all armed forces must be disbanded, all armaments abolished, and all military production brought to an end within four years." The injunction from the United Nations General Assembly was that measures leading towards the disarmament goal be "agreed upon in the shortest possible time" -- not that the entire

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disarmament process be carried out in an impractically short and unrealistic period of time.

Mr. Zorin has said that such a program of complete and general disarmament "would of course create serious technical problems in as much as States nowadays possess powerful and large armed forces and armaments, the elimination of which would demand a certain amount of time." He also made another important admission. He said, "Similar difficulties would be experienced on the political plane for under the conditions of distrust still prevailing between States, no State obviously would agree to dispense immediately with all its armed forces and armaments."

Thus, even in Mr. Zorin's own words, doubt is raised in the mind of any reasonable person whether the Soviet Plan is in fact a practical plan. It would appear, rather, that the Soviet Union has asked the Ten-Nation Conference to underwrite an impossible undertaking.

The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Soviet plan for disarmament is simply a deceptive propaganda device to lead the mass of people to believe complete disarmament can be accomplished overnight.

The Soviet Fall-back Position

In as much as the Soviet plan itself does not provide

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a practical approach to achieving agreement on measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament, we must look elsewhere. We look to the fine print of what Mr. Khrushchev has said on a number of occasions and here he seems to offer a more realistic approach. He has said that if it is clear that complex complete disarmament cannot be solved immediately there is another solution: initial steps on which we might more easily agree leading to our disarmament goal. For such statements I refer you to his article written in last fall's issue of Foreign Affairs; to his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 19, 1959; and his speech to the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1959.

In his article in Foreign Affairs he said it had become clear to him that it was very difficult "to solve the complex disarmament problem immediately". He then went on to say, and I quote, "Let us concentrate our attention on those problems which lend themselves most easily to a solution. Let us undertake initial partial measures on matters concerning which the views of the different parties have been brought closer together."

While we have grave reservations about the particular measures Mr. Khrushchev went on to propose, the approach

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of beginning with initial measures leading toward general disarmament is one my delegation advocates. Let us immediately turn our attention to those initial measures on matters concerning which ~~the views of~~ the different parties have some hope of agreeing. This I believe is exactly what the UN meant when they asked us "to work out in detail and agree upon in the shortest possible time" -- "measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament."

In his speech of September 19, 1959, to the UN, when he presented the present Soviet Plan, Mr. Khrushchev added a significant after-thought, as though he understood well that the Soviet Plan was not realistic. I need not quote his exact words. We all recall his offer to move to a discussion of the Soviet version of partial measures if, as he put it, the Western powers are not prepared to embark upon general and complete disarmament.

The maneuver here is plain for anyone to see. The Soviet Union -- knowing its plan is unrealistic -- wishes to gain a quick and easy propaganda advantage by trying to persuade the world that because the West opposes the Soviet Plan it therefore does not support the UN Resolution.

The next maneuver is already apparent. If the West will not make this admission, which they won't -- the

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Soviet Union will say that it concludes that the West is not for general and complete disarmament. Then with all the Soviet propaganda trumpets heralding a great "concession" to the West, they will then move over to their version of partial measures, something which they have intended to do all along.

I repeat here and again that the Allied nations voted for the UN resolution, and support that Resolution and its three principal ideas: (1) that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today; (2) that governments should make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem; and (3) that measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. Again I say let us proceed with this task without delay and put aside the unrealistic, impractical, and obstructive plan of the Soviet Union.

The Western Plan and Soviet Response

I agree with Mr. Khrushchev when he says that we should concentrate our attention on those problems which lend themselves most easily to a solution; that we should undertake initial concrete steps on matters concerning which

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the views of the different parties have been brought closer together. Let us by all means do this.

Day before yesterday, Mr. Moch tabled on behalf of the Allied Delegations a statement of the general conditions to govern the fulfillment of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This paper reflects the basic considerations which nations must recognize and be willing to accept if the goals expressed in the United Nations Resolution are to be achieved and not merely paid homage to. The thoughts set forth in that paper can serve as a guide to all of us.

So that there may be no misunderstanding, I wish to make clear that the purpose of the U.S. Delegation in the elaboration of its understanding of the term "general and complete disarmament" under effective international control was solely to induce the Soviets to enter into discussion, negotiation and agreement on those initial measures which are essential to the attainment of that goal. It was made in response to the constant Soviet insistence that we advise them in more detail of the meaning which we attach to these words. We do not believe that any useful purpose is served by now entering into a discussion which would have as its purpose the reconciliation of our views in this

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regard. This would only divert us from our task of arriving at the earliest time at an agreement of those initial measures which are essential to the goal whether it be defined in Soviet terms or in our own. I speak of those early measures which would bring about a reduction of tension and as a result of which agreement could then be reached on those final measures which would result in the reduction of armed forces to the levels ^{needed for maintaining domestic and international} ~~and international~~ ^{tranquility,} ~~elimination~~ ^{and for} of those weapons of mass destruction which cause such concern to peoples everywhere.

Attention must be given to those concrete initial measures which lend themselves most easily to a solution. These are spelled out, with conditions and safeguards, in the Western plan of March 16, 1960.

1. Prohibition against placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, as an initial step towards insuring the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only. This proposal, if accepted, would have tremendous importance for the future of mankind in that it would have as its objective the denial to all nations of the use of outer space for war-making purposes. Today we all know it is possible to put satellites, which could carry nuclear weapons, into orbit

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around the world. It is not yet possible to use such vehicles as launching platforms for nuclear weapons which could be fired with accuracy at a predetermined point on earth.

However, we have had ample evidence of the speed of scientific research and we would be foolish to assume that the technical problems here will not be mastered sooner than we think. As I said in discussing this measure in some detail on April 1st (PV 14, p. 5): "The prospect that this danger can be averted before we have reached the point of no return is therefore of very great and compelling interest to all the peoples of the world."

What has been the Soviet response to this? Mr. Zorin has said the Soviet Union has always been opposed to the extension of the armaments race to outer space. This we agree with, but then he adds that this must be conditioned on the liquidation of foreign military bases. Apparently he does not understand the Western proposal, as he says that what we are proposing is the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But we do not include in our outer space measure the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Western outer space proposal is aimed solely at prohibiting the placing into orbit or stationing in outer space vehicles

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carrying weapons of mass destruction. It does not affect the Soviet earth based ICBM's at all -- and therefore it is unreasonable for the Soviet to link such a proposal to the elimination of foreign bases. If they have done this out of a misunderstanding of what the Western proposal encompasses, then there may be some hope for agreement in this area.

(2) Cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production to non-weapons uses, in order to halt the further increase and to begin the reduction of present stocks of nuclear weapons as an initial measure toward the final elimination of these weapons. This proposal by the West which I outlined at some length on April 8th and 14th is intended as I said on April 8th "to reverse the nuclear arms race by stopping the growth of stockpiles and by reducing them" until scientists find the means of inspection that would enable us to achieve the final elimination of nuclear weapons. These are disarmament measures which the West is ready to undertake immediately.

What has been the Soviet response to this concrete disarmament measure? Mr. Zorin has said that such a reversal

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of the growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles and the reduction of those stockpiles by international agreement is "devoid of practical content as a measure of disarmament."

Instead he and the Soviet plan advance the unrealistic and uncontrolled measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons and for the ban on the use of nuclear weapons. Both of these are admitted by the Soviet to be incapable of effective control. The Soviet May 10, 1955, plan specifically stated this as did Mr. Khrushchev himself more recently in June of 1957. Mr. Zorin on April 14 has called the ban on use a moral and political obligation -- requiring "self-control". But given the low state of mutual confidence which both Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Zorin admit exists in the world, what nations would rely on "self-control" as a means of enforcing a measure on which might depend the very life or death of that nation?

(3) Prior notification of proposed launching of missiles as an immediate step to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. The primary purpose of such notification is to reduce the danger that missile firings conducted for experimental or training purposes might be interpreted as a sign of hostile action and thus trigger a nuclear war. Such a measure would go far to help reduce

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the fear of military preparation carried on in secret which is one of the prime causes of international tension.

But what is the Soviet reaction to such a proposal? As Mr. Khrushchev said on January 14th it wishes to do everything possible "to develop rocket armaments and to take the leading position in this field". And Mr. Zorin, after rejecting it as not being a disarmament measure, complained on April 21 that we now propose to prohibit only intercontinental ballistic missiles and thus strive to achieve a unilateral military advantage. There is nothing in the first two parts of our plan which calls for the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles. All we ask is that a beginning be made to control this means of delivery of nuclear weapons -- knowing full well that the Soviet Union jealously guards this modern means of destruction and will not countenance any further practical step.

(4) Establishment of initial force level ceilings of 2.5 million for the US and the USSR, and of force level ceilings for all militarily significant nations to go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of further force level ceilings of 2.1 million for the US and the USSR, as an initial step toward the reduction of national armed forces to levels required for internal security and the fulfillment of United Nations Charter obligations.

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(5) Deposit of agreed quantities and types of modern armaments in internationally-supervised storage depots, as an initial step toward the final reduction of armaments to the level required for internal security and the fulfillment of United Nations Charter obligations.

What is the Soviet response to these concrete disarmament measures? Mr. Zorin on April 20th rejected them as not being "very significant" and not being "a real disarmament measure". Instead he called them a pretext for setting up very wide controls over armaments and armed forces. The Soviets, instead of accepting the Western proposal of agreed controlled reductions, make much of unilateral uncontrolled Soviet reductions of armed forces as disarmament measures.

However, in justifying such a reduction to his own people on January 14, Mr. Khrushchev's true purpose became more evident. On that occasion he frankly stated -- and I quote -- "In our time the defense potential of the country is not determined by the number of our soldiers under arms or by the number of persons in naval uniforms -- the defense potential of the country to a decisive extent depends on the total firepower and the means of delivery available to the given side . . . The Soviet Army now has combat means and firepower never before possessed by any army."

Therefore, rather than a disarmament measure, the Soviet

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unilateral reductions turn out to be in the total picture just the reverse. Mr. Khrushchev makes this crystal clear when he said again on January 14th, "I emphasize once more that we already have so many nuclear weapons -- both atomic and hydrogen, and the necessary rockets for delivering these weapons to the territory of a potential aggressor that should any madman launch an attack on our state or other socialist states we would be able literally to wipe the country or countries which attack us off the face of the earth."

Mr. Zorin makes even more ridiculous the deceptive Soviet attempt to put forward unilateral Soviet reductions as real disarmament measures when he on April 20th described in detail the breaking up of one cruiser in the Soviet fleet. However, Mr. Khrushchev himself had already stated in his January 14 Supreme Soviet speech: "The military air force and navy have lost their previous importance in view of the modern development of military equipment. This type of armament is not being reduced but replaced." In Mr. Khrushchev's own words, what Mr. Zorin hails as a reduction is not a reduction.

(6) Establishment of appropriate measures to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack, as an initial step toward the achievement of an

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open world in which all nations are safeguarded against surprise attack.

As Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Zorin well know, President Eisenhower is keenly interested in the developments of safeguards against surprise attack as a means of reducing tensions and making the world a more secure place in which to live. His famous "open skies" proposal at the Summit in 1955 was an offer to open the entire United States to internationally supervised aerial inspection if only the Soviet Union would do the same. But the Soviet Union -- apparently fearful of such openness -- never accepted this offer which, I might add, still stands.

These then are the key concrete disarmament measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament which the West offers to the Soviet Union as a basis for consideration in carrying out our task. The Soviet ~~response~~ ^{response} to them has been cold and negative. Under such conditions I regret to say it is impossible for me to see how we are going to make progress in fulfilling the task given to us by governments -- namely, to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament by working out in detail and in the shortest possible time measures leading toward that goal.

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The Future Prospect

Having said that the Soviet have thus far been cold and negative in their response to the positive, constructive Western disarmament proposals, it remains to be said that the future prospect for our negotiations after the Summit still holds promise of moving forward on the task assigned us.

While it is true that the Soviet have adopted as their first tactic in the Ten Nation talks an attempt to gain what has turned out to be an unsuccessful propaganda advantage, it is likewise true that Mr. Khrushchev -- and perhaps Mr. Zorin -- have left the door open to moving to a realistic consideration of those concrete measures which lead towards our mutual disarmament goal. This fact itself is an augury of promise and of progress.

While it is true that the partial measures referred to in Mr. Khrushchev's September 18th U.N. speech almost all center around one geographic location -- Europe -- it is likewise true that Mr. Khrushchev in that same speech has stated that he considers that the May 10, 1955 proposals constitute a sound basis for agreement at this time.

While we cannot agree with this, Mr. Khrushchev indicates that - and I quote:

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"The Soviet Government is prepared to come to an agreement with regard to appropriate, partial measures on disarmament and to strengthening security."

This may offer real reason for hope, although what Mr. Khrushchev would envisage as partial measures we would look on as initial measures moving down toward the road to the attainment of our goal.

The primary question now is -- after a review of the proceedings to date and of other Soviet pronouncements in the field -- which are the concrete disarmament measures which may hold most hope for agreement? (1) prevention of surprise attack; (2) reduction of forces and arms; (3) control of outer space; and (4) cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and thereafter the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. It goes without saying that if there is hope for agreement on any of these disarmament measures it is because there is hope that the International Disarmament Organization and the control measures affecting these disarmament measures are possible of acceptance by both sides. There would be no hope at all if it were a proven fact that the Soviet would not accept the corresponding verification required.

I recognize that Mr. Zorin on April 7th rejected the Western plan as not meeting Soviet requirements for a program

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of general and complete disarmament -- just as we had earlier rejected the Soviet plan.

But I also recognize -- as I have taken some pains to point out -- that the Soviet Union will almost certainly turn soon to their alternative approach -- that is, a consideration of what they call partial measures. We ^{would} ~~will~~ welcome ^{the more provided the measures concern the} ~~these, not as partial measures, but as~~ initial measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. When this happens -- some of the measures in the Western plan and some of the measures in the various Soviet plans may be found not to be too far apart.

If we but follow this course here after the Summit meetings our work will have hope of success. We will then have begun the execution of the task assigned us by the UNGA Resolution -- the working out in detail and agreement upon the measures leading toward our goal. We will then have begun to realize the high hopes with which this Disarmament Conference started -- ^{dedicated as it is to} ~~dedicated as it is to~~ achieving the aspirations of all mankind, will mark a turning point in the long post-war history of lost opportunities and successive failures.

As President Eisenhower said in his message to me at the beginning of this Conference: "We must not be pessimistic

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because of the lack of success in past disarmament negotiations. Nor should we necessarily expect immediate, dramatic, and far-reaching strides, although we would certainly welcome such progress. Rather it should be our objective in these negotiations to contribute by carefully balanced, phased and safeguarded arms control agreements to the ultimate objective of a secure, free, and peaceful world in which international disputes will be settled in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

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