3 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 3 March 1969

DD/I characterized Anatole Shub's article in the Sunday Washington Post on Soviet intentions regarding Berlin as rather dramatic and alarming and reported that he has asked [redacted] to prepare a critique of the article today. 25X1

*DD/I related that a draft brief for the Director's use in appearing before Congressman Pike's Pueblo subcommittee will be completed today. The Director asked the DD/I, Bross, Houston, and Maury to review the draft to determine whether it constitutes a sensible approach to the problem. The Director asked them to keep in mind the fact that all the subcommittee members with the exception of Congressman Bray are new to CIA.

Godfrey noted that the results of the Chilean congressional elections were somewhat surprising in that, while the Christian Democrats lost some ground, the radicals, Communists, and Socialists did not make substantial gains.

Godfrey reported they are puzzled that the ChiComs and Soviets are each publicizing their differences over the most recent ChiCom/Soviet border dispute. He noted that there have been some 3,000 such incidents in the past.

Godfrey reported that Berlin is essentially quiet, with traffic moving this morning.

Godfrey reported that they have received word from State Department Counselor Richard Pedersen that Agency support to the Secretary of State during the course of the President's trip was quite satisfactory.

In response to the Director's question, D/ONE noted that USIB will meet on Thursday to consider SNIE 97-69, Peru and the U. S. -- The Implications of the IPC Controversy, and SNIE 13-69, Communist China and Asia.

Carver reported that Saigon was hit by rockets again last night.

Carver noted the loss of [redacted] to the North Vietnamese and led a brief discussion on the technical and political implications. DD/I characterized Ambassador Sullivan's message as perhaps overstating the significance of the event. 25X1

Carver called attention to the Saigon station's follow-up message [redacted] to MACV's cable regarding the turnover of Phoenix.

Maury mentioned that today he will be receiving the text of Admiral Moorer's intended testimony before the Pike subcommittee.

Maury noted that Saturday's briefing of Senators Jackson and McClellan went well and observed that, according to Senator Jackson, Senator McClellan now seems predisposed to support our position on the Ervin bill. The Director passed a "Well done" to all concerned and observed that Senator McClellan will return for additional briefings in the future. The Director observed that this was apparently Senator Jackson's first visit to Headquarters.

Maury called attention to differences that exist between New York Times correspondent John Finney and Senator Jackson. The Director pointed to Finney's article in Sunday's New York Times regarding differences as perhaps contributing to Finney's uneasy conduct on the Meet the Press panel.

Bross noted that he saw Admiral Taylor during the course of his recent leave.

DD/S&T reported that they are doing a post-mortem analysis of Senator Jackson's remarks on Meet the Press, giving particular attention to the Senator's data on FOBS and on the ChiCom orientation of the projected ABM system. 25X1

[redacted]

The Director called attention to the Saigon message relating the value attached to station reporting on Communist intentions as expressed by General Phillip Davidson, MACV/J-2, and General Abrams.

*The Director asked that DD/I analysts study the Nasser/Sulzberger interview as reported in yesterday's New York Times.

*The Director called attention to the New York Times article of 2 March noting the appearance of a book by Marshal Zhukov on Stalin's posture at the Potsdam Conference. He asked the DD/I to obtain a copy and analyze it with respect to whether this might not be a Soviet effort to seek to document the state of their nuclear understanding. 25X1

The Director outlined Admiral Moorer's intended testimony before the Pike subcommittee and observed that Secretary Laird was recently aboard the Palm Beach to acquaint himself with Pueblo-type vessels.

The Director noted the President's scheduled visit to Headquarters on 7 March. The Executive Director is organizing the necessary arrangements. The Director emphasized that DD/P officers who do not wish to be photographed should stay away from the first floor area. He asked that Goodwin decide where photographs are to be taken. 25X1

Goodwin noted that he advised New York Times correspondent William Beecher that Agency order-of-battle methodology is too delicate to provide a basis for a requested briefing on this matter.

25X1

L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

Nixon's Job Offer to Humphrey Included Wide Patronage Power

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 1 — President Nixon was willing to grant former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey unusual patronage powers in the Republican Administration if the Democratic Presidential candidate had become United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

In offering the United Nations job to his opponent shortly after the election, Mr. Nixon suggested the Democratic leader would be free to pursue his own political ambitions, would have veto rights over appointment of Democrats to the Administration and would have the right to nominate a certain number of persons to Government jobs.

The offer was refused by Mr. Humphrey, largely because he felt he could pursue his own political interests and ambitions better outside the Administration. The proposal, without parallel in modern political history, underscores, however, how far Mr. Nixon was willing to go in his desire to establish an Administration of "national unity" with bipartisan participation at the Cabinet level.

Mr. Nixon, who during the campaign proclaimed his intention of bringing Democrats into his Administration, failed to find a prominent Democrat willing to serve in a Cabinet level job. But it has become apparent that in the immediate weeks following the election, Mr. Nixon was willing to go to considerable political lengths to find a Democrat for

Continued on Page 25, Column 3

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 2, 1969

Nixon Job Offer to Humphrey Clarified

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

his Cabinet.

When Mr. Humphrey declined the United Nations post, the President-elect unsuccessfully approached Sargent Shriver, an in-law of the Kennedy family, and then Senator Eugene J. McCarthy. Meanwhile, Mr. Nixon was pressing Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, to be Secretary of Defense.

After declining the Pentagon post, Senator Jackson learned that if he had been interested in joining the Nixon Administration he probably could have had the job of Secretary of State if he preferred that post to the Defense Department.

The Nixon offer to Mr. Humphrey, so politically generous that it momentarily interested the defeated Democratic candidate, was made during a meeting between the two at Opa-Locka, Fla., three days after the election, according to Humphrey associates.

Mr. Nixon's offer of the United Nations post to Mr. Humphrey has become known, although never officially confirmed by either party. What has not been disclosed are the unusual political concessions that went with the offer.

At the private, 30-minute meeting in an upstairs room in the Coast Guard operations office at the Opa-Locka Airport, the President-elect, after the customary political pleasantries, was reported to have made his offer and then gone on to add the following conditions:

As United Nations Ambassador, Mr. Humphrey would have Cabinet status and be consulted on all matters affecting foreign policy.

Mr. Humphrey would have a veto power over all Democratic appointments to the Government, such as to regulatory agencies, thus, in effect, giving him control over Democratic patronage.

Aside from this veto power, Mr. Humphrey would have the right to nominate an unspecified number of persons for Government jobs, with the implication that his nominations would be accepted by the Nixon Administration,

While serving in the Nixon Administration, Mr. Humphrey would be free to pursue his party activities, such as making speeches to help repay the campaign debt of the Democratic party.

The discussion then turned into a frank, intimate political talk between the two Presidential candidates as they considered the possibility that they might be running against each other again in 1972.

The talk was led by Mr. Nixon. Mr. Humphrey, on his way to a vacation in the Virgin Islands, was still depressed over his loss of the Presidency. Just the day before, on a stroll down a Washington street, he had confided to a friend "I was prepared to be President. I was prepared for the job. I knew what needs to be done."

Appreciates Party Loyalty

Despite their political differences, there is considerable personal respect between the two men. In a personal, confidential manner, therefore, Mr. Nixon said he appreciated that Mr. Humphrey still had personal political ambitions as well as obligations to help rebuild the Democratic party.

The President-elect emphasized that Mr. Humphrey would be free to pursue his political ambitions and to fulfill his obligations to his party. He then observed that it was possible that Mr. Humphrey would be his Presidential rival in 1972 and that the United Nations job might help him politically in keeping him in the public limelight.

"Tha is a risk I am prepared to take," the President-elect was reported to have confided to his defeated opponent.

Mr. Humphrey did not immediately reject the offer. His initial reservations were over the uncertainties of the Nixon Administration's foreign policy and over who would be Secretary of State, and thus his direct boss at the United Nations.

These initial reservations were then overtaken by political considerations. In finally rejecting the offer, Mr. Humphrey was said to have concluded that he could not remain as head of his party and leader of the loyal opposition, speaking out on issues, if he took a job with the Nixon Administration.

Zhukov, in Book Sold to British, Depicts Stalin at Potsdam Talks

By HENRY RAYMONT

Stalin, who reacted with apparent indifference when President Truman informed him at the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, that the United States possessed a new weapon of fearful power, was in fact attempting to conceal the Soviet Union's own atomic bomb program, according to a commander of Soviet armed forces in World War II.

The account of Stalin's response is contained in the unpublished memoirs of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, the commander, who accompanied Stalin to Potsdam two weeks before the first American nuclear weapon was dropped on Hiroshima.

Marshal Zhukov's version, which became available to The New York Times yesterday, suggests that Stalin was aware of the implications of Mr. Truman's report and ordered the Soviet nuclear research program to be accelerated.

A Soviet physicist who worked in the program, Dr. Igor N. Golovin, disclosed in a history of the project published in 1966 that it had been accelerated after the United States had exploded its first bomb on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, N.M.

Mr. Truman said in his memoirs that "the Russian Premier showed no special interest," and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill wrote, later, "I was sure he [Stalin] had no idea of the significance of what he was being told."

Marshal Zhukov indicates that the Soviet leader deliberately appeared indifferent in an effort to conceal the Soviet Union's own research on the atomic bomb.

Stalin Urges Speed-up

According to Marshal Zhukov, Stalin drew him and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, aside after the conversation with President Truman and declared: "They simply want to raise the price. We've got to work on Kurchatov and hurry things up."

This was a reference to Dr. Igor Kurchatov, a nuclear physicist who was in charge of atomic bomb development. The Soviet Union exploded its first bomb in September, 1949.

World book and magazine serialization rights to the 280,000-word memoirs of Marshal Zhukov were acquired in Moscow last month by James MacGibbon, managing director of the British publishing house Macdonald and Co., Ltd. Mr. MacGibbon said in London he bought the rights for "a six-figure dollar sum" in an unusual arrangement with Novosti Press Agency, the Soviet feature syndicate.

Novosti has agreed to let Macdonald publish the book in its Russian version in London to establish copyright and has said that the Soviet Union would issue the book in Russian only after the English translation is published next year.

Since the Soviet Union is not a member of the Berne Copyright Convention, its books normally pass into the public domain and are available to anyone to translate.

Under the agreement between Novosti and Macdonald, Marshal Zhukov, who is 72 years old, will add some passages for the English-language version, which is being translated by Prof. John Erickson, a military historian at Edinburgh University.

Macdonald has offered the American book rights to several United States publishing houses through its representative here, Mrs. Rhoda Weyr, a literary agent. It is reported to have stipulated a minimum price of $200,000.

Earlier efforts by Novosti to sell the book directly to publishers in the United States were unsuccessful. Publishing sources said the Soviet agency ha dasked $1.5-million to $2-million.

Reached at his home in Edinburgh yesterday, Professor Erickson said Marshal Zhukov's book begins with his childhood in Moscow, tracing his quick rise in the Red Army through the border encounters against Japan, the crucial battle of Leningrad, and the defense of Moscow.

The book ends with the postwar conferences and does not deal with the marshal's demotion by Stalin in 1949, his return after Stalin's death to become Defense Minister in 1955, his dismissal in 1957 by Nikita S. Khrushchev and his rehabilitation under the present leadership.

Professor Erickson said that the memoirs, except for a small part dealing with the defense of Moscow, have not appeared before and that an essay published by the marshal in 1965 to counter charges that he had unnecessarily delayed the capture of Berlin has been rewritten in a much more acerbic style" as part of the new book.

Nasser Foresees 4th War Unless Israelis Withdraw

In Interview, He Emphasizes There Can Be No Peace in Mideast Unless Problem of Million Arab Refugees Is Solved

By C. L. SULZBERGER
Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Feb. 26 — President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic is convinced that the conflict with Israel must some day see a fourth round of fighting unless the Jerusalem Government is persuaded to abandon every inch of soil occupied during the six-day war of June, 1967.

He also says Israel must take back into her territory those refugees who have left since the state was formed in 1948 and who wish to return.

Transcript of the interview is printed on Page 28.

"This is the main problem —the right of the Palestinians in their own land," President Nasser said. "They lived there for thousands of years and now they are expelled. Without fulfillment of such claims, this problem will continue for tens of years."

Mr. Nasser estimates that there are more than one million Palestinian Arab refugees—Moslem and Christian. He gives the impression that he does not expect Israel to accept a political solution on the terms he suggests and that, therefore, a solution must be found by other means. He adds:

"One could not accept occupation of his country by aggressive armed force. One has to fight."

The Egyptian President, widely regarded as the most charismatic of contemporary Arab leaders, spoke in fluent English, calmly and with no

Continued on Page 28, Column 1

Transcript of Interview With President Nasser of the United Arab Republic

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Feb. 26—Following is a transcript of an interview with President Gamal Abdel Nasser by C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times.

Q. Are you now ready to re-establish diplomatic relations with the U.S.? Will you take the initiative in this since, after all, it was Cairo which broke relations originally?

A. We are ready to resume relations with the United States, but if the situation and the circumstances facilitate this step—that is to say, as long as the United States supports the Israeli occupation of our territory and as long as the United States supplies Israel with planes while it is occupying our territory, there will be difficulties, because if we resume relations and Israel receives Phantoms, what will be the reaction? Receive Phantoms while occuping our territory? This means the United States encourages Israel to continue to occupy our territory.

Q. Do you expect more from the Nixon Administration than its predecessor? Did the Scranton visit seem to encourage a better atmosphere?

A. Of course, we hope so. Really, after the June war we faced a situation where the United States supported completely and 100 per cent the point of view of Israel. It was said by Governor Scranton that he thinks the United States must have a more even-handed policy in dealing with the situation. That is to say, we want from the United States not to take sides. Not to take our side, but not to support the occupation of our territory by Israel.

View of American Policy

Q. Why is United States policy always viewed so negatively? After all, in 1956 we strongly opposed Britain, France and Israel, and in 1967 we gave no active aid to Israel.

A. We have great admiration for President Eisenhower and for Nixon. When Nixon visited us in 1963, he was out of politics but we received him as Eisenhower's Vice President, although not as a President who will be elected. But of course people still look back today to the fact that there is Israeli occupation of our territories. Nobody could look at 1956 and forget what happened in 1967-68.

Q. Do you foresee a fourth round of war?

A. This is a very simple question. We are striving to end the occupation of Arab territory in Egypt, Jordan and Syria by a political solution — by peaceful means. If we don't achieve it by peaceful means, what result? We must strive by other means to achieve it. One could not accept occupation of his country by aggressive armed force. One has to fight.

Q. Do you feel there is danger of a nuclear explosion in the Middle East?

A. As long as they don't sign the nonproliferation treaty, there is danger. We have signed it. But if they begin, there will be a race also. If they tried to build nuclear weapons, we would try to have our own. We have the capacity but what we need is the investment money required for production. I do not believe the Israelis have such weapons now.

Cairo's Terms for Peace

Q. Would you spell out (A) the short-range and (B) the long-range terms for peace.

A. When I speak of a settlement I don't mean short-term and long-term. If we solve the problem of the occupied territory and of the refugees from Palestine, this will result in a peaceful settlement in spite of what took place during the last 20 or more years. But if we solve only the problem of the occupied territory but neglect the other part, there will be no peace.

According to the U.N. 1948, 1949 and 1966 Assemblies, there were resolutions for the right of Palestinians to return back to their own land. But this was neglected completely by the Israelis and this is the main part of the problem. The Israelis have expelled more than one million Arabs — Christians and Moslems. They wanted a country based on Judaism. If they accept refugees and evacuate conquered areas, there will be lasting peace.

Q. What would be the basis for this Jewish-Arab state in Palestine?

A. After the war of 1948, there were resolutions in the United Nations according to Arab refugees expelled by Israeli terrorists the right to return to their own land. Now they are outside because Israel refuses and they want to return back to their own land. This is the reason for the fedayeen movement. They are mostly the children of those expelled in 1948 and who wish to return. The man who was killed by the Israelis in the recent Zurich attempt raid was born in Haifa and expelled.

This is the main problem —the right of the Palestinians in their own land. They lived there for thousands of years and now they are expelled. Sirhan was expelled from his home and village and went to the United States; and he has the desire to return to his own land. Without fulfillment of such claims, this problem will continue for tens of years.

'The Right to Return'

Q. How do you conceive of an Israel with the refugees returned: a larger state?

A. I don't mean that Israel should gain part of our Arab territory and then say in exchange it would accept Arabs. But certainly those expelled have the right to return back to their homeland.

Q. Would you want the 1967 U.N. resolution frontier? That is to say, the June 1, 1967 borders?

A. Nobody will accept the expansion of Israel because if this is permitted, it would merely be a step to achieve the dreams of some of the leaders of Israel to have Israeli territory expand between the Nile and the Euphrates. Yes, we would take the June 1, 1967, frontiers.

Q. What might be the influence of Eshkol's death? Could there be a succession contest of hawks versus doves in Israel?

A. I don't believe there are hawks and doves there. Some people like to speak diplomatic language like Abba Eban. They say he is a dove. Yet last week he was for continuation of the occupation of Arab territory. You say he is a dove? There are no real differences and I don't think there will be any change.

Q. What do you think of Eisenhower's formula for installing several large nuclear plants in the general area of Palestine in order to desalt water for irrigation and provide power for industry in new settlements which could be developed by Palestinian refugees?

A. I will tell you something. We gave great attention to these statements by General Eisenhower and those by President Johnson, and we tried to have contact between American officials and our Government and American enterprises and our Government to put these ideas into effect in our country. All were without any result. The last contact took place two months ago.

But what happened after the ideas of General Eisenhower were only statements. We need water for our deserts, but there is no attempt to put that into effect. We could not neglect the rest of our problem and deal with it from this point of view only. The idea of nationalism, the Palestine problem, the people who want to return to their homeland — this is our character and our inheritance, and we cannot separate it from other approaches.

Jews in the Arab States

Q. What is your view of the position of Jews now residing in Arab states? What is the status of the Jewish community in Egypt? Are the Jews now in Egypt free to leave if and when they wish?

A. First of all, I want to speak about the question of the Baghdad hangings. I am sorry to say that the press of all the Western countries tried to visualize the question as the hanging of Jews. It was not hanging of Jews; it was hanging of spies. Some were Moslems, some Arab, some Christian. It was not a hanging of Jews. After that, the second time, there was the hanging of Moslems only. But these were spies. It was the hanging not of Moslems, Christians, Jews, but of spies.

We have here about 5,000 Jews. We have about 100 under arrest because they are Zionists and are in contact with Israel and put under arrest after the war. Those who want to leave the country can leave, and many got permission to leave the country. The rest live as Egyptians and have all rights.

The Israelis are creating propaganda against that. Yesterday I was reading a report about the visit of the Red Cross in Gaza. Six hundred Arabs were in the prisons of Gaza. Of course, if we speak about the rest of the occupied territory, there will be thousands under arrest by the Israelis for reasons of security. We also arrest for the security of our country.

Q. Given the present situation, do you think that Jews in the Arab world ought not only to be permitted but perhaps even encouraged to emigrate?

A. The Jews are our cousins. Moses was born in Egypt. Don't stress this. I don't want it to be an Israeli claim. They say we are anti-Semitic, which is nonsense. We are Semites ourselves. We look upon Jews in our country as Egyptians. The Jews who live in the Arab countries feel it will be always more suitable for them to live in Arab countries rather than to go to other countries. Their fathers and grandfathers lived here for thousands of years without any discrimination.

Q. What is your attitude toward Al Fatah? I have heard this described as both favorable and unfavorable.

A. I admire them. As a man, I admire them because they are fighting for their rights. They waited for 20 years looking to the world to regain for them their deprived rights. Now they are fighting for these rights. I think everyone must agree with them because they have to fight. I admire them as we admired the resistance movements which took place, for example, in Europe and the Philippines during the Second World War.

Q. Don't you think there is a danger that Al Fatah may politically take over the Government of Jordan or other Arab states?

A. I am sure the Fatah movement has as one of its main principles not to interfere with the internal affairs of any of the Arab countries like Jordan or Syria. It concentrates on planning on the Palestine question and how Palestinians can end the occupation and achieve their rights in their homeland.

Q. Do you still feel there should ultimately be one single Arab state, a kind of federation of Pan-Arabism? It seems to me that comparable ideas, such as the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Slavic movements, never worked; do you think that present circumstances in the Arab world favor such a concept?

A. I think when the Arabs realize that unity and federation will be in their own interests and strength, this will help to achieve the object of Arab unity. It is not an easy question because of the contradictions politically and socially. These contradictions remain to be liquidated. People of all Arab countries want unity, but how to fulfill it is not an easy question. It can best be started by unity between two or three countries — by federation or confederation.

Ties With Syria Affirmed

Q. At one time Syria was a member of the U.A.R. but this did not work.

A. I accepted that union in spite of myself. I was not convinced that the time was ripe for union. I said to the Syrians that I don't know Syria. In order to have unity, politicians must know each other. I thought we needed five years, but they insisted. But we now have cooperation with Syria in all fields.

Q. What rights does the Soviet Navy have in Alexandria, Port Said and Port Suez?

A. We don't have any base in our country for any foreign country. Of course, the Soviets were visiting our ports before the aggression against our country and they visit our ports also now. However, no single ship is here right now. We don't have any ships now in Alexandria; but they visit us every now and then. We welcome visits because the Soviet Union helped us after the aggression, they helped us in the United Nations and they supplied us with arms after we lost our arms.

Q. How many Soviet military training personnel and technicians are there today in the U.A.R.?

A. Really, I don't know the figure, but I am asking for more technicians.

Q. Is it a large figure? five thousand?

A. It is less than 5,000. You know, it is probably even less than 1,000. But I am asking for more.

Q. Does the U.A.R. have greater military, air and naval strength now than on June 1, 1967?

A. Of course, we are trying to rebuild our armed forces and, of course, we have new arms now instead of the older arms which were lost during 1967. Also we have acquired other material. But I could not say we have exceeded what there was in 1967.

That is why we are particularly worried about statements in Western countries that they want to ban arms entering this area. The meaning of an arms ban would be that Israel will have superiority in both army and air force, while we won't get the opportunity to replace what we lost. We are worried because this would leave the Israeli's Phantoms from the United States and tanks from the United Kingdom while we attempt to rebuild. This would put Israel in a superior position and encourage it to continue occupation of Arab territories.

Condition of the Economy

Q. What is the economic situation of the U.A.R. today and has the Aswan Dam had any effect on standards of living? When the dam was first started you told me the population was increasing so rapidly that at its optimum, it would only keep the standard of living at the level it then was. Is this the way things have worked out?

A. No. The standard of living rose because the increase in the economy's annual growth rate was about 6.5 per cent from 1960. The increase of population was 2.8 per cent. This makes a difference of about 3.7 per cent. Last year and this year we were not able to achieve this same level because of the conditions of occupation and the shifting of part of our budget to defense investment. But we think that we could increase the national economy every year by 7 per cent — not only by agriculture but by industry.

Q. What is your feeling about recent speculation that there is a power contest at the top in the U.S.S.R. today?

A. I will tell you something from my experience. At the top, there is always a power contest in every country. This is my experience. There are always differing points of view and ideas in the top everywhere. I think in every country there is a power contest. I don't know about the United States.

Really, I read press articles from the Western countries on Russia, but I don't think it is like that. Last July I met Brezhnev and Kosygin and Podgorny, and we discussed and were able to agree about many questions. Shelepin later came here and he spent about 10 days and told me he would return and give a report to Brezhnev. I think in Western countries they exaggerate these questions. There are always some differences in governments. Take Israel. Under Eshkol, there were Dayan and Eshkol. At the top, there is always some difference.

Matters of First Concern

Q. What is your feeling about the so-called Brezhnev doctrine — the right of Moscow to intervene in other socialist countries? Tito says he is very much opposed to this and I know you have a high regard for Tito.

A. I will tell you something. As long as the Israelis are occupying our country, we are not concerned with these questions. I am speaking to you frankly. Our main problem is the Israeli occupation of the Arab countries and how we can work to get rid of it either politically or by any other means.

Q. Do you intend to invite General de Gaulle to visit Cairo or do you have any intention of visiting Paris?

A. No, we have no plans for that. But I am sure that de Gaulle to our country at any time.

Q. I remember in your book, "Philosophy of the Revolution," you discussed the three linked circles of Arabism, Islam and Africa. Have you made any progress along this philosophical line?

A. I think it is progressing. We have better relations with the Arab countries. We are sending delegations to the Moslem countries. You know how the Moslems look to Jerusalem as a sacred city. We have contacts with all the African countries who supported us when Israel occupied our territory. I would add to that: not only African countries, but also Asian countries.

At the time the "Philosophy of the Revolution" was published, there were only three independent countries in Africa. Now there are more than 30. We have an African unity organization which has its center in Addis Ababa. There is a Moslem congress next month in Malaysia, and you know the Arab League is now stronger. After that there were many Arab meetings of the Kings and the Presidents.

The Nasser Ideology

Q. You have told me in the past that you have no ideology as such, that you are pragmatic rather than dogmatic. Have you by now developed an ideology and could you describe this to me a bit?

A. We met the last time in 1963. In 1962 there was a Charter and the principle of the ideas of development in our society and our culture was published in May, 1962. Our line for development after that was clearer than before.

Q. Could you describe this?

A. We don't describe it as socialist democracy, but as a "socialist community." People base their lives on socialism. Democracy, according to the charter, is freedom for the community and freedom of the individual, but it ends exploitation of the individual. The result was nationalization in 1961.

Q. Forgive me for saying this, but it seems to me that you have an unusual talent for turning defeat into victory and for climbing out of pits. What is the secret?

A. You know, I believe that I am a lucky man in spite of the catastrophe we face now. On the other hand, I don't plan it. It is natural. After the defeat, I was willing to leave. But you know when I said that I was selfish. I was trying to escape, but I was not able to.

Nobody was informed of my intention except three men. I was really intending to leave. I was very tired and sick. But now it is over. When I went to Khartoum, all the people came to the streets and I could not forget what was said in one of the magazines: "Hail the conquered." To be conquered is not a determined issue, but to surrender is. I am not going to surrender. I believe in God. I am a fatalistic man. I believe in His will. I don't plan for any of these crises.

Q. Who most influenced the shape of your life and philosophy — what person during your lifetime or what historical figure?

A. Of course, I was influenced by Mohammed and also by Jesus. I believe in both of them. Did you know that we believe in Christ also? I think many people in our country are influenced by him.

No Longer Plays Tennis

Q. Is there a more contemporary figure who had an influence on you?

A. I think the most effective man was Gen. Aziz el-Massri. I admired him when I was a young officer. He fought for independence, insisted on independence. I met him many times before the revolution and after the revolution until his death. He was appointed in the army as a general. He was in Turkey during the First World War and then he came to Egypt, and he was not in the army except for a period during the Second World War.

Q. What are your hobbies nowadays; do you still play tennis?

A. No. You know my leg was not well last year. I cannot play tennis. The recommendations of the doctor was not to have hard sports but to walk. Now I have returned to being normal, because last year I was not well. But I walk generally before lunch. During the winter it is better to do it before lunch.

Q. Do you watch movies a lot still?

A. Yes, but not as much as before. Only about once a week. When I see a film, I begin about 11 o'clock or midnight. I have so many meetings until then.

Q. Do you read?

A. Last year I was not able to read a lot, but now I am regaining my capacity to work as before, so I read more books. In the last few days I have been reading a book by Mao Tse-tung by a Canadian author. I can read some more now because we are starting a holiday.

Q. What is your dream that Egypt will be in 25 years' time — both in terms of its internal society and its external world position?

A. You know, during the last 17 years we were not able to fulfill all our dreams because of the continuous problems: the occupation, the aggression of 1956, and so on. My main dream is to develop this country. To have electricity in each village and have work for every man. We have work for every man in spite of many problems — the increase of the population by one million per year. We must have an increase in order to have jobs for one-half a million every year. This year we will have electricity in 300 villages. We have surplus electricity and water because now we have the water of the High Dam, which will help in land reform.

We don't have money for investment. We want also to use this electricity, and we have a committee of Soviet experts which handed us recommendations for using surplus electricity of the High Dam. We also want to develop the phosphate and fertilizer industry. We are going into heavy industry. We are building steel mills to give a production of one million tons of steel with a loan from the Soviet Union. The first phase will end by 1972.

We have to encourage investment in industry. This is, of course, my dream. I want to see this country without servants before my death. Now it is difficult for people to find servants. And this always-increasing problem about getting servants means an increasing standard of living.

'No Personal Life'

Q. You are still quite a young man (52); what is your dream for your own person in 25 years? Is there anything out of the realm of political life you would like to have achieved by that time—such as writing a book or painting a picture?

A. I have no personal dreams. I have no personal life. I have nothing personal. Many people may not believe that, but this is the truth.

Q. What would you consider as your greatest success and greatest failure?

A. You know, as I told you, I velieve in God; I am a fatalistic man. I believe that life is a combination of success and failure. It could not be comprised of only success. Look at history. I have to accept failure. I have to do my best in order to change failure to success. I think the main success was the success of the revolution, the success of the 23d of July, 1952. I don't think that our defeat by Israel is a failure. I believe it will be followed by success.

My biggest mistake? Our life is full of mistakes. Always there are mistakes. There are many mistakes. I cannot really see something. Daily we have mistakes.

The New York Times

C. L. Sulzberger with President Gamal Abdel Nasser as the Arab leader commented on problems facing the Middle East

Nasser Foresees Fourth Round of War Unless Israelis Pull Back

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

historicins in an interview at his residence today on the eve of the Moslem holiday period of Bairam, in which Id el Adha, the Feast of the Mutton, is celebrated.

It was most informal. He wore slacks and a short-sleeve shirt with open collar. We sat around a table, sipping Turkish coffee, along with Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, Mr. Nasser's close friend and editor of Al Ahram, the Arab world's largest newspaper.

The President spoke easily and patiently for two hours, covering a wide range of topics. The meeting took place in a salon often used as a waiting room, outside his presidential office. On the mantle and atop tables were the many signed portraits, ranging from Nehru, Tito and Prince Sihanouk to a colored drawing of Lyndon B. Johnson, with an inscription exxpressing the hope for good relations.

Willing to Resume Ties

The conversation started on that subject. Mr. Nasser expressed readiness to resume diplomatic relations with the United States—which he severed in June, 1967, but made it clear that serious difficulties existed, since the United States was selling Phantom jets to Israel while her forces occupied conquered Egyptian territory.

"This means," Mr. Nasser continued, reading between the lines of a report to him, that the United States encourages Israel to continue to occupy our territory."

He thought that the Johnson Administration had "supported completely and 100 per cent the point of view of Israel" but hoped that the Nixon Administration would be, as he saw the situation, less partial.

"We want from the United States not to take sides," the Egyptian President said. "Not to take our side, but not to support the occupation of our territory by Israel."

As might be expected, a good part of the interview was taken up with the Arab world's most burning question — the persistent if intermittent Palestine war.

Mr. Nasser said he did not think that Israel had any atomic weapons. But he warned:

"As long as they [the Israelis] don't sign the nonproliferation treaty, there is danger. We have signed it. If they tried to build nuclear weapons, we would try to have our own. We have the capacity but what we need is the investment money required for production."

Fears Israel's Expansion

President Nasser professed to be convinced that Israel, if permitted to retain any of her 1967 conquests, would some day again seek to expand, aiming at a realization of "the dreams of some of the leaders of Israel to have Israeli territory expand between the Nile and the Euphrates."

Mr. Nasser did not think that the death this week of Premier Levi Eshkol would have any effect on the situation. He made it clear that he regarded all Israeli leaders—and therefore Mr. Eshkol's ultimate successor—as hawks.

The President showed restrained interest in the Eisenhower-Strauss plan to construct large nuclear plants in the palestinian area—both Israeli and Arab—to provide desalted sea water, power industry and jobs, hoping to absorb many of the Arab refugees. The plan was advanced in 1957 by President Eisenhower and his Secretary of Commerce, Lewis L. Strauss.

He said that Washington did not respond to his "contacts" on this — the last but two months ago; anyway he thought the program could not be considered practical while the frontier and refugee issues remained unresolved.

Says Jews May Leave

Mr. Nasser insisted that Jews in the United Arab Republic were treated as Egyptians with "all rights" and were free to emigrate if they wished—a statement that is contested by foreign observers.

He reckoned that there were about 5,000 Jews in Egypt, of whom about 100 were under arrest "because they are Zionists and are in contact with Israel." He insisted that in the Gaza Strip — a segment of former Egyptian-held territory — in Egypt—a figure far smaller

Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP80R01284A001800090124-2

Israel—600 Arabs were in prison for security reasons.

Mr. Nasser thought it silly to talk of anti-semitism in the Arab world because: "the Jews are our cousins. Moses was born in Egypt. Don't stress this. Don't want it to be an Israeli claim. They say we are anti-semitic, which is nonsense. We are Semites ourselves."

He criticezed Western reaction to the hanging of nine Jews in Iraq on Jan. 27.

"It was not hanging og of Jews," he said, "it was hanging of spies. Some were Moslems, some Arab, some Christian."

Admiration for Al Fatah

Asked about reports of dissension between Cairo and Al Fatah, the principal Palestinian guerrilla organization, Mr. Nasser said: "I admire them as we admired the resistance movements which took place, for example, in Europe and the Philippines during the second World War."

He expressed confidence that Al Fatah would not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country.

Mr. Nasser said that, although Soviet naval vessels often visit Egyptian ports, there were none here at the moment and that no military bases on his territory had been granted to any foreign country. He asserted that there wer probably fewer than 1,000 Russian technicians and training personnel in Egypt—a figure far smaller

Cairo diplomats—and added, "But I am asking for more."

The President also said that while Moscow had sent in large arms shipments to make up for losses in 1967, the United Arab Republic has not at this date exceeded its prewar weapons strength.

Worried About Arms Ban

"That is why we are particularly worried about statements in Western countries that they want to ban arms entering this area," Mr. Nasser said. "The meaning of an Arms ban would be that Israel will have superiority . . . in both army and air force, while we won't get the opportunity to replace what we lost . . . this would put Israel in a superior position and encourage it to continue occupation of Arab territories."

On other subjects, Mr. Nasser did not believe that there was any unusual power contest in the Kremlin now. "At the top," he said, "there is always a power contest in every country."

He thought that his revolution had evolved its own particular ideology, which he described as a "socialist community" and that it had made great strides in improving living standards. Moscow, he said, had given much aid by financing and helping to construct the Aswan High Dam and a steel complex that is scheduled to be

Bross reported that [redacted] recently received 25X
a detailed briefing on DIA's information handling system and noted the progress which DIA is making in this field.

DD/S&T reported that he will attend a Defense Science Board briefing on the Sentinel system next Tuesday.

Executive Director reported receipt of a telephone call last night from Hugh Sloan advising that the White House will abide by our wishes that no pictures be taken in the auditorium during the course of the President's visit tomorrow. The Director asked the Executive Director to walk him through the President's schedule today or tomorrow.

The Director briefed on his several observations growing out of attendance at the President's briefing of Congressional leaders on his recent European trip.

The Director briefed on yesterday's NSC meeting, noting that it was exclusively confined to the Sentinel problem, with Secretary Packard personally and ably presenting DOD material. The Director observed that following Secretary Packard's presentation BOB Director Mayo lucidly remarked on the cost of the program. The Director suggested that, given Mayo's perceptibility, we should be well prepared for hard questions from this quarter.

The Director thanked those who participated in preparing the text of his testimony yesterday and asked that similar careful attention be given to responding to additional questions growing out of the hearing. The Director summarized his response to the questions raised with respect to the role of the 303 Committee and Senator Symington's release of the Director's letter. The Director noted his reservations concerning the value of those testifying as to the "tremendous loss" in terms of damage done to the intelligence collection effort.

[redacted] 25X

6X1 [redacted] The Director noted, however, that he did have an opportunity to converse with General Westmoreland, who made it clear that he had not requested the 206,000 troops as reported in today's New York Times.

[redacted] 25X

L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

NEW YORK TIMES
6 MAR 1968

The Vietnam Policy Reversal of 1968

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 5—On the cold and cheerless early morning of Feb. 28, 1968, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, landed at Andrews Air Force Base after an urgent mission to Saigon. Pausing only to change into a fresh uniform, he hurried through the rain to the White House to deliver a report and make a request.

The report was designed to encourage an anxious President and his beleaguered advisers, but it served only to shock them into extended debate.

The request — for more troops—was designed to bring military victory at last in the eight-year American military effort, but it led instead to a fateful series of decisions that stand in retrospect as one of the most remarkable turnabouts in United States foreign policy.

The month of March, 1968, became a watershed for a nation and a Government in turmoil. The Johnson Administration, by pulling back from the brink of deeper commitments and moving toward disengagement, set a course that affects the daily decisions of the Nixon Administration.

Many of the ingredients of decision then—troop strength and what to do about bombing North Vietnam—are still live issues, and many of the principal actors involved a year ago are participants in yet another crucial policy debate on Vietnam.

On that day at the end of February, President Johnson and his closest aides assembled for breakfast around the Chippendale table in the elegant family dining room on the second floor of the Executive Mansion. Before rising from the table, they had set in motion the most intensive policy review of the Johnson Presidency — and one of the most agonizing of any Presidency.

The wrenching debate began almost by accident and then gained a momentum all its own. One dramatic record of its progress appeared in the 12 versions of a Presidential speech that evolved during the month—the last draft pointing in the opposite direction from the first.

The entire episode also provided a remarkable demonstration of how foreign policy is battled out, inch by inch, by negotiation rather than decision. The turnabout emerged through sharp confrontations and subtle, even conspiratorial, maneuvering—with compromises struck for bureaucratic purposes and with opponents in agreement for contrary reasons.

At the time of that breakfast meeting, President Johnson had been thinking for about two months about not seeking re-election. His principal advisers had little inkling of his thoughts, and the President himself had no expectation that the tensions in the Government would shatter the consensus of his inner circle.

Clark M. Clifford, appointed but not yet sworn in as Secretary of Defense, was to play the pivotal role in the Vietnam reassessment, but it was not a one-man show.

Mr. Clifford had to be persuaded. He immediately came under pressure from a faction of civilian dissenters at the Pentagon who believed the war was deadlocked, questioned American objectives and felt that time to salvage American policy was fast running out.

When the debate was over, the President had set the Government on the path toward peace negotiations and disengagement from the war. He had imposed a limit on the military commitment to South Vietnam, ordered a reduction in the bombing of North Vietnam, and offered to negotiate with the Hanoi regime. And he had coupled the offer with the announcement of this withdrawal from the 1968 political campaign.

The replacement of the quest for military victory with the search for compromise might have been reversed by North Vietnam if it had not—to almost everyone's surprise — responded favorably to Mr. Johnson's offer. Furthermore, the hawkish faction in the White House inner circle sought to resist the new trend until the Johnson Administration left office in January.

The Tet Drive Assessed

The catalytic event in the policy reappraisal — and the centerpiece of General Wheeler's vivid report—was the enemy's Lunar New Year offensive, which began Jan. 30, 1968, and swelled into coordinated assaults on 36 South Vietnamese cities and included, in Saigon, a bold penetration of the United States Embassy compound.

Confident and secure one day, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then the American commander in Saigon, found himself on the next dealing with a vast battle the length of South Vietnam.

The psychological impact on Washington had outrun the event; The capital was stunned. But General Wheeler, with murals of the American Revolution behind him, offered a more reassuring picture to the White House breakfast on Feb. 28.

The Tet attacks had not caused a military defeat, he said. The enemy had been thrown back with heavy losses and had failed to spark a popular uprising against the South Vietnamese regime. Not only had the Government in Saigon and its army survived the hurricane, he continued, but the offensive had driven a dangerous wedge between the Vietcong and the people, cut out of non-Communists, and they were beginning to cooperate.

On the other hand, the general said that more — many more — American troops were needed because the allied forces were off balance and vulnerable to another offensive.

General Westmoreland felt, General Wheeler reported, that massive reinforcements would guard against a quick repetition of the Tet offensive and would allow the allies to regain the initiative, to exploit the enemy's losses and to "speed the course of the war to our objectives."

General Wheeler gave the Westmoreland request his personal endorsement. It added up to 206,000 more men.

'It Was Rough as a Cob!'

General Westmoreland, who did not actually use the figure, regarded the proposal as a planning paper. But President Johnson and other officials, knowing that, as a matter of administrative technique, no request became formal until the President had decided how many troops would be sent, treated the Westmoreland paper as a request. Even without a precise total they sensed how much was being sought. The "shopping list" outlined by General Wheeler called for three more combat divisions, with sizable air, naval and land support.

Once the plan was fed through the Pentagon computers the precise number emerged. It became so secret that to this day some officials will not utter it—a reminder of the President's wrath when it did leak to the press during the March debate.

The sheer size of the request—a 40 per cent increase in the 535,000-man force committed to Vietnam—stunned Mr. Johnson and the civilians around him, though the initial impulse was to see how the commander's needs might be filled.

"It was a hell of a serious breakfast," one participant recalled. "It was rough as a cob!"

Some of the participants believed that a substantial troop increase could well revive arguments for widening the war —for giving General Westmoreland permission to go after enemy sanctuaries on the ground in Cambodia and Laos, and perhaps even in North Vietnam.

The President was wary about a massive new commitment. Had he not gone to extraordinary lengths to send half a million men to Vietnam without calling up reserves or imposing economic controls? Every year the generals had come to him—sometimes more than once a year—with the plea for "a little bit more to get the job done." Now, with the nation sharply divided over the war, they were asking for mobilization.

They had confronted Mr. Johnson with a dilemma. The gist of the Wheeler-Westmoreland report, in the words of one breakfast guest, was blunt: "We've got to have a big infusion of troops or we can't achieve our objectives."

No one at that breakfast table that day advocated lowering objectives. It was a time, however, when many pressures for a change of course were con-

Continued

Spreading Doubts About War

The Tet offensive had punctured the heady optimism over the military progress reported to Congress by General Westmoreland and by Ellsworth Bunker, the Ambassador to South Vietnam, in November, 1967. Not only had the pool of disenchantment spread by late February to fence-sitters in Congress, to newspaper offices and to business organizations. It had also reached the upper echelons of the Government.

If tolerance of the war had worn thin, so had the nation's military resources—so thin, indeed, that there was almost nothing more to send to Vietnam without either mobilizing, enlarging draft calls, lengthening the 12-month combat tour or sending Vietnam veterans back for second tours of duty—all extremely unappealing.

Congress was in such ferment that the process of legislation was partly paralyzed. The dollar was being battered by the gold crisis in Europe and inflation at home.

More fundamentally, the nation was seriously divided. The fabric of public civility had begun to unravel as opinion on the war polarized.

Rusk Breaks a Precedent

President Johnson chose his long-time friend, Clark Clifford, to head a task force to advise him on the troop request. It quickly became a forum for debating the entire rationale for the war.

At 10:30 A.M. on Friday, March 1, in the East room of the White House, Mr. Clifford took the oath of office as the successor to Robert S. McNamara. Three hours later he gathered the task force around the oval oak table in the private Pentagon dining room of the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for the first time in his seven years in office, went to the Defense Department for a formal meeting.

The others present were all, like Mr. Rusk, veterans of arguments on Vietnam policy—Walt W. Rostow, the President's assistant for national security affairs, Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence; General Wheeler, General Maxwell D. Taylor, former Chairman of the oJint Chiefs of Staff, former Ambassador to Saigon and a Presidential adviser on Vietnam; Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach; Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Phil G. Goulding, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and, for financial advice, the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry H. Fowler.

None of the civilians present advocated a flat commitment of 206,000 more men, nor did they want to reject the request out of hand. Several insiders later suggested that a smaller request, for 30,000 to 50,000 men, would probably have been granted and the Administration crisis would have been avoided, or at least delayed.

Instead there was an early collision in the task force over war strategy and the possibilities of victory. There were, of course, shadings of viewpoint on most questions, but two broad coalitions emerged:

One favored continuation of General Westmoreland's strategy of wearing down the enemy by intense military pounding. The argument's assumption was that the Tet situation was less a setback than an opportunity. By boldly seizing the initiative, according to this view, the allies could decimate and demoralize the enemy and open the way to a favorable settlement.

The other group challenged the very premises of the old strategy. Its members urged a less aggressive ground war, called for new efforts to open neogtiations and, implicitly, laid the groundwork for political compromise.

Four Exponents of Continuity

The exponents of continuity were Mr. Rusk and Mr. Rostow and Generals Wheeler and Taylor. Mr. Rusk, by then the stanchest defender of the war in public, patiently bore the heat of criticism. Tall, unbending, composed, he was, in his own words, "the iceman."

Mr. Rostow and General Taylor, who had gone to Vietnam early in 1961 as President Kennedy's personal envoys and who came back advocating intervention, were even more opposed to "letting up the pressure." Mr. Rostow, athletic and ebullient, funneled the news from Saigon to the President.

The advocates of change were Messrs. Nitze, Warnke, and Katzenbach, and later — most powerfully — Mr. Clifford. Mr. Helms, thoughtful and angular, was neutral on policy questions. The weight of his C.I.A. analysis called into question military judgments, past strategy and the quest for victory implicit in so many earlier decisions.

Although Mr. Clifford was never alone, his eventual role was remarkable because it was wholly unexpected.

He came into government with a reputation as a hawk, as a trusted, loyal "back-room" counselor to Mr. Johnson who had steadfastly supported Administration policy. In December, 1965, he had opposed the 36-day bombing pause then advocated by his predecessor. One man acquainted with the circumstances of the Clifford appointment said later:

"I am sure the President felt, 'Here is a good, strong, sturdy supporter of the war, and that's what I need.' McNamara was wobbling — particularily on the bombing issue. I think the President felt Clifford was strong and sturdy."

But Mr. Clfford had begun to have doubts during a trip in August, 1967, to Vietnam and allied countries contributing troops to the war. On his return he confided to the President that he was deeply uneasy at having discovered that the American view of the war was not fully shared by Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines.

Disturbed he was, but he remained a supporter of Administration policy. He was enouraged by secret diplomatic efforts [illegible] ary, 1968, to get negotiations with Hanoi started on the basis of the so-called San Antonio formula.

That proposal, made public by President Johnson in a speech in the Texas city on September 30, 1967, offered to halt the bombing of North Vietnam provided it would lead promptly to productive talks and "assuming" that Hanoi would not take military advantage of the cessation.

At Mr. Clifford's Senate confirmation hearings on Jan. 25, 1968, he had added the important interpretation that this meant that the President would tolerate "normal" levels of infiltration from North to South Vietnam.

The president had not cleared Mr. Clifford's remarks in advance and, as a result, according to one informed source, "all hell broke loose at the White House and the State Department."

Secretary Rusk was said to have argued for two days with President Johnson against giving Administration endorsement to the interpretation. He was overruled. On Jan. 29 the State Department said Mr. Clifford's remarks represented United States policy.

He plunged into the minutiae of Vietnam like a lawyer taking a new case. He had private talks with Mr. McNamara, whose own misgivings had sharpened in his final months at the Pentagon.

As a newcomer with limited knowledge, Mr. Clifford had to rely on civilian subordinates more than had his brilliant and experienced predecessor. The large faction of dissenters from Administration policy was quick to seize the opportunity to press its views. The Tet offensive, recalled one dissenter, "gave us something we could hand our arguments on, something to contradict the beguiling upward curve on the progress charts" from Saigon.

With the lid off, the new Secretary discovered a nest of "hidden doves" at the Pentagon, including his deputy, Mr. Nitze; Assistant Secretaries Warnke, Alain C. Enthoven, Goulding and Alfred B. Fitt; the Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force—David E. McGiffert, Charles F. Baird and Townsend W. Hoopes; a few younger generals and colonels and a score of young civilians brought in by Mr. McNamara, principally Dr. Morton H. Halperin, Dr. Les Gelb and Richard C. Steadman.

The men who clearly had the greatest impact on the new Secretary's thinking were Messrs. Nitze, Warnke and Goulding—perhaps Mr. Warnke more than the others.

"Warnke was deeply upset about Vietnam and he was persuasive," a colleague said. "His style and Mr. Clifford's meshed." As a measure of their mutual confidence, Mr. Clifford chose Mr. Warnke as a law partner when both left the Government.

When the Clifford task force got under way, a number of officials took the troop request as evidence of panic on General Westmoreland's part. But ranking officers who were in Saigon headquarters during and after the Tet offensive assert that there was no thought of asking for many more troops until shortly before General Wheeler's visit late in February.

Continued

"The President asked General W[illegible]r to go out to Vietnam to find out what General Westmoreland thought he could use," a Pentagon official said. Civilian officials were irritated by this approach. "It was a mistake to ask a damned-fool question like that," a State Department official remarked.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had their own reasons for favoring a massive increase and a reserve call-up. For months they had been deeply concerned that the strategic reserve had been dangerously depleted and they had been looking for a chance to reconstitute it by persuading the President to mobilize National Guard units.

Another view was held by Ambassador Bunker, who never fully endorsed the troop request and who wanted first priority for re-equipping and expanding the South Vietnamese Army—a suggestion endorsed by Pentagon civilians.

The Wheeler-Westmoreland plan presented to the task force called for 206,000 men by June 30, 1969—roughly 100,000 within a few months and two later increments of about 50,000 men each. The first segment was to come from available active-duty units in the United States; the rest were to come from the reserves.

In the view of the Joint Chiefs, only the full number would assure victory. The implication was that with 206,000 more men, the war would "not be terribly long," as one Pentagon civilian put it—but there was no precise forecast.

At this point Mr. Warnke, in his nasal Massachusetts accent, read a C.I.A. paper that challenged the military thesis head on. Hanoi, he said, would match American reinforcements as it had in the past, and the result would simply be escalation and "a lot more killing" on both sides.

Besides, the task force was told, the financial costs would be immense. The proposed scale of reinforcements would add nearly $10-billion to a war already costing $30-billion a year.

As an alternative, Mr. Warnke urged a turn toward deescalation—a pullback from General Westmoreland's aggressive search-and-destroy tactics and the abandonment of isolated outposts like the besieged Marine garrison at Khesanh. He said that American forces should be used as a mobile shield in and around population centers and that more should be demanded from the South Vietnamese Army.

The sheer complexity of the troop issue began to raise doubts in Mr. Clifford's mind.

Questions Others Avoided

"Part of it was Clark's intelligent questioning and part of it was his naiveté," a colleague recalled. "He asked about things that others more familiar with the details would not have asked.

"He just couldn't get the figures straight on troops. He drove Bus Wheeler mad. He would say, 'Now I understand you wanted 22,000 men for such and such,' and Wheeler would point out this didn't include the support elements, and if you added them, it would be 35,000 in all."

"This happened again and again every time Clark wanted to get the numbers down as low as possible, and it had a psychological impact on him," the source added.

The first weekend in March was consumed by a study of the papers drafted for the task force and by questions. "It was meet all day, sandwiches in for lunch, sandwiches in for dinner," a participant recalled.

Word was passed to President Johnson that the review "wasn't going well" and had hit a "discordant note." But Mr. Clifford's doubts had not hardened into convictions by the time he handed the President his first report on March 5.

A short, unsigned, four-or-five-page memorandum, it recommended giving General Westmoreland 50,000 more troops in the next three months and set out a schedule for readying the rest of the 206,000 men for dispatch over the next 15 months.

From Divergent Points of View

Characteristically, the President's advisers disagreed on the recommendation's significance. The Pentagon saw it as a move "to get the pipeline going"—general approval of the troop request; State Department officials viewed it as part of a process of "whittling down" the 206,000 figure.

Although Mr. Clifford had passed along the report, he was uneasy about it. He was worried that if the President approved the first batch of troops, that action would move him irrevocably toward the whole 206,000. But the Secretary did not challenge the report directly; he tried to stall, suggesting that the task force check General Westmoreland's reaction to be sure the "mix" of forces was right.

General Wheeler wanted to move ahead, but others, including Mr. Rusk and Mr. Rostow, were willing to have the issue studied further, so the task force carried on for several more days.

This seemed to suit Mr. Johnson's mood, too. His instinct, a White House aide explained later, was to delay implementing the plan. "He kept putting off making an initial decision," the aide said.

For the President had heard the grumbles in Congress over the danger to the dollar from the gold drain and from the rising costs of the war. Politicians were alarmed by the size of the troop request.

Old, trusted friends like Senator Richard B. Russell, the Georgia Democrat who headed the Armed Services Committee, were complaining tartly about General Westmoreland. Influential men like Senator John Stennis, the Mississippi Democrat, were privately warning the President to go slow on mobilizing reserves.

As the task force persisted, Secretary Clifford himself was putting more pointed questions. "What is our military plan for victory?" he asked. "How will we end the war?" He was not satisfied.

Then the bombing campaign came under his scrutiny. Mr. Hoopes wrote him a memorandum urging a halt, arguing that the bombing was not having significant results and that, because of Soviet and Chinese Communist aid, North Vietnam had become "on balance a stronger military power today than before the bombing began."

Mr. Hoopes contended that it was "a military fiction" that American combat casualties would rise if the bombing were halted. American losses, he said, were primarily a result of the aggressive ground strategy in the South.

Under the impact of such arguments, Mr. Clifford's doubts became convictions. He supported the President's previous restrictions on the war—no invasion of North Vietnam, no expansion of the ground war into Laos or Cambodia, no mining of the Haiphong harbor—and he became convinced that within those restrictions there was no military answer. He began the search for a path to disengagement.

The debate, by now in the White House, seesawed through the middle of March. At this time Mr. Clifford began to state his case for a fundamental change in American policy: It was time to emphasize peace, not a larger war.

He now challenged the task-force recommendation for more troops. "This isn't the way to go at all," he told the President. "This is all wrong."

His Words Carried Weight

With the nation bitterly divided over the war and in desperate need at home, he maintained, it would be immoral to consider enormous added investment in Vietnam—a "military sinkhole."

His outspoken challenge was deeply disturbing to President Johnson, who always preferred a consensus among his close advisers. Although he never turned his celebrated temper on Mr. Clifford, the argument chilled their personal relations and left the Defense Secretary, a friend for 30 years, feeling oddly frozen out of the White House at times.

Secretary Rusk apparently did not disagree with Mr. Clifford so sharply on troop numbers, but he was opposed to the long-run implications of Mr. Clifford's arguments—that in the end, the United States would have to settle for less. Mr. Rostow felt that the new Defense Secretary had fallen under the influence of "the professional pessimists" in the Defense Department.

At the Pentagon morale was rising among civilian advocates of a new policy. "We used to ask," a former Pentagon civilian said of the Secretary, "is he one of us? Well, there was 'one of us' at the White House." He was Harry McPherson, the President's speech drafter, who, unknown to the Pentagon or the State Department, was already at work on a major Vietnam speech. The final version was Mr. Johnson's address to the nation on Sunday, March 31.

First a Plea for a Stiffer Stand

The speech was originally conceived late in February on the basis of Mr. Rostow's analysis that the Tet offensive had not been a real setback and that the allies should pull up their socks and hang on until the enemy came to his senses. While the discussions of troop strength were proceeding, Mr. McPherson was developing his draft.

Initially, it included an opened-ended commitment to the war—a willingness to carry on at whatever the cost. But as the internal debate over troop figures raged on and the numbers dwindled down to 50,000 and the tone softened, the President would not commit himself to any figure.

Continued

Then came a series of signal events: Senator Eugene J. McCarthy scored a stunning upset in the New Hampshire Democratic primary on March 1. American dead and wounded in Vietnam reached 139,801 — exceeding over-all Korean-war losses. American and Western European bankers held an emergency meeting in Washington to stem the run of gold as the price soared. Senator Robert F. Kennedy announced on March 16 that he would seek the Democratic Presidential nomination.

All this formed the backdrop for the most delicate argument of all — that about the bombing.

On March 15, Arthur J. Goldberg, the American representative at the United Nations, sent an eight-page memo to the President urging him to halt the bombing to get negotiations started.

Others in the Administration favored such a step—Mr. Katzenbach and Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, among them—but it was Ambassador Goldberg, increasingly frustrated by his sense of powerlessness on the Vietnam issue, who dared brook the President's anger by raising the issue directly.

Few officials knew he had done so. He drafted the memo himself and sent it labeled "For the President's Eyes Only." Copies were given to Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, and Mr. Rostow, as the President's aide, saw it in due course, but Mr. Goldberg discussed it with none of them.

Still others, including Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, favored waiting for several weeks on the ground that another enemy offensive might be near.

A day after the Goldberg memo arrived, the subject came up in Mr. Johnson's inner circle. The President, his patience sorely tested, sat up in his chair and said:

"Let's get one thing clear! I'm telling you now I am not going to stop the bombing. Now I don't want to hear any more about it. Goldberg has written me about the whole thing, and I've heard every argument. I'm not going to stop it. Now is there anybody here who doesn't understand that?"

There was dead silence.

The bombing issue was dropped at that meeting, but it was not dead. Mr. Clifford, the lawyer, had noticed a loophole.