

DRAFT/TR/ga/6/14

MEMORANDUM TO: FH FROM: TDR

SUBJECT: Study Plan - Covert Action

1. The Problem.

Should the U. S. Government have a capability for covert action overseas, i.e., clandestine political intervention in foreign countries? If so, under what circumstances, safeguards, and organizational responsibility should it be handled?

The subject of covert action is going to be extremely difficult to handle. Over the last 25 years, it has been an important tool of U. S. foreign policy, but one that is not officially acknowledged. It is a subject that stimulates passion but seldom objectivity; its repercussions have been great but difficult to measure. With a few exceptions (Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs, Laos), its efforts remain highly classified. The problem of covert action (CA) generally breaks down in the following way:

a. The Pros and Cons of Covert Action.

The case for and against CA should be stated as persuasively as possible, e.g.,

- (1) Advantages: historical effectiveness (?); protection against covert action of hostile countries; real-politik; a way to protect U.S. national interests when covert action would be inappropriate; maintaining a capability for some unforeseen eventuality; difficulty of dismantling the ongoing apparatus.

Dept of State review(s) completed.

(2) Disadvantages: Immorality (?); historical ineffectiveness (?); dangers of backlash through revelation; questionable justification in post Cold War era; self-fulfilling nature of the operations.

b. The Criteria Governing Covert Action.

If CA is to remain a tool of US foreign policy, what criteria ought to govern its use? Only in a situation whose outcome is important for the world power balance? Only in support of political forces that are self-sustaining? Only in a defensive situation (to protect against hostile CA)? What is the need for spreading propaganda clandestinely or countering disinformation? For using paramilitary/countersubversion forces? Should CA branch out from its traditional areas (political action, propaganda, and paramilitary activities) to new fields (e.g., suppression of narcotics or terrorism)? What limits in scope should be imposed, if any? What should be the US policy for admitting or declassifying CA programs?

This section can also be handled as a set of options, using different criteria.

c. Safeguards.

If covert action is maintained, what safeguards are necessary to insure careful study of each proposal at

the highest levels of the Government?

Current procedures: Do the procedures of the 40 Committee permit the members adequate time and staff support for reflection on the programs? Once ^{afforded} afforded, what are the mechanisms for reviewing on-going programs? What kinds of programs are discussed with the Armed Services Subcommittees of Congress? With Ambassadors overseas?

Alternatives: What are the various options for overseeing covert activities (e.g., more involvement of Congressional committees, creation of a new approval group in the Executive Branch, etc.)

d. Organizational Responsibility

If CA is retained,

What are the alternatives (e.g., a directing and planning staff in the NSC or the State Department)? Should the CIA keep the responsibility for conducting CA operations abroad?

In any examination of the foregoing issues, security problems will undoubtedly be troublesome. We will probably have to avoid discussing all real-life examples of covert action, except those programs already in the public record (Bay of Pigs, National Student Association, etc.) In addition, we will need a measure of cooperation from the DCI and perhaps Secretary Kissinger as well (in his capacity as chairman of the 40 committee).

^{Security}
Secretary clearances for all personnel and study group members will be required. Some documents will have to be stored or studied in specially secured quarters. The papers which are developed, if unclassified in any part, will probably require a classified annex. In short, the Commission will have to go to considerable lengths in order to accommodate the security problem.

2. The Study Mode

A study group composed of several Commission members and a number of experts knowledgeable about covert action -- drawn from several different quarters -- can prepare findings and recommendations for the Commission's review. The study group can base its work initially on preparatory material developed by a research consultant (or consultants) retained to analyze and set forth the key problems and the fundamental choices available. The study plan, therefore, falls into two stages:

Stage I - Preparation of a paper by a research consultant (or consultants), for the review of the Intelligence Study Group, covering each of the foregoing issues. The paper, drawn from research and interviews, will comprehensively review

- (a) The basic issues involved and the key problem areas,
- (b) The relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative organization and procedures.

Stage II - Intelligence Study Group to review the paper and to make recommendations on appropriate organization and procedures. Study Group may require five two-day meetings at two week intervals.

3. Participation.

Study Group membership would include:

Commission Members

Others (e.g., Langhlin Campbell, Hugh Cunningham, Bob Kiley, Frank Lindsay, William Harris, Bill Trueheart, Roger Hilsman, Ray Cline)

4. Staff.

Temporary full time consultant (with assistants?) to be retained for the summer months to produce the papers in Stage I and to participate in Stage II matters. Core staff (FH and TR) to monitor and oversee.

5. Budget.

6. Follow-up. Meshing of Covert Action Study Group report with other Commission work.

7. Timing.


Stage I - July, August, September

Stage II - September, October, November

8. Next Step.

Get Commission approval.

REVISION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY



COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

The objective set forth in the first section of the legislation authorizing the Commission is simple and straightforward: "to submit findings and recommendations to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy." The statute goes on to specify the kinds of recommendations sought. It directs that they address "the reorganization of the departments, agencies ... and instrumentalities of the Executive Branch participating in foreign policy matters; ... improved procedures among those departments and agencies; the abolition of unnecessary activities and functions; and such other measures as may serve "to promote peace, economy, efficiency and improved administration of foreign policy." In addition to these issues, all concerned with the functioning of the executive branch, the Commission is directed to recommend "more effective arrangements between the executive branch and Congress, which will better enable each to carry out its constitutional responsibilities."

The mandate of the Commission, in short, is not to concern itself directly with the substance of foreign policy, but to propose improvements in the means by which, in both the executive and legislative branches, foreign policy is made and implemented.

In order to focus and direct its inquiries and the work of its staff, the Commission finds it useful to amplify that statement of objectives with further comments of two kinds. Some concern the characteristics the Commission believes "a more effective system" of foreign-policy-making should possess. Others address the problems of making the work of the Commission itself effective.

Elements of Governmental Effectiveness

Any effective system for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy will possess certain characteristics. Those to which this Commission expects to give highest priority

Subj: Statement of Objectives

Page Two

are the following:

That in the FORMULATION of policy, decisions should be based upon --

- (a) a continuing analysis of major trends and developments in the changing world environment;
- (b) a coherent conception of both the immediate and longer-range objectives of this country;
- (c) the best obtainable information from a wide range of sources;
- (d) rigorous and objective analysis of implications flowing from available information;
- (e) a careful balancing of the full range of relevant considerations -- specifically including domestic political and economic factors;
- (f) the consideration of a full range of realistic alternative courses from which to choose;
- (g) adequate coordination and consultation with those who should participate in the policy process;
- (h) procedures which keep to the minimum the decisions which must be made at the top.

That in the IMPLEMENTATION of policy, decisions should be --

- (a) communicated to those responsible or affected by them in a clear and timely fashion;
- (b) monitored to insure that those decisions promptly become policy in fact as well as in word;
- (c) reviewed and evaluated in their effects through a continuing process of reassessment.

Subj: Statement of Objectives

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That in both FORMULATION and IMPLEMENTATION --

- (a) the commitment of resources -- personnel and budgetary -- be appropriate in scale and skill to the task;
- (b) the several processes operate in as open and public a manner as their nature makes possible, and
- (c) all actions taken be broadly consistent with the public's sense of the nature of U.S. interests and the means legitimate to advance those interests.

The role of the Congress is critical in both the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The organization of the Congress for these purposes, however, can only be determined by the Congress itself. Nevertheless, the Commission will explore various arrangements concerning the organization, jurisdiction, and staffing of the Congress, and the information and analytic support which might be helpful to it in the conduct of foreign policy.

The Commission will also examine the organizational and procedural arrangements important to the relationship between the legislative and executive branches in the conduct of foreign policy. In particular, the Commission will examine the flow of information and consultation between the two branches.

Making the Commission Itself Effective

The Commission anticipates two principal problems in making its own work effective. The first is that organizational arrangements must in some degree depend on both the personal preferences and the policy predilections of top-level officials. Clearly, therefore, no single best organizational framework for the future can now be authoritatively established. The Commission, therefore, expects to propose single preferred arrangements for those kinds of foreign policy issues which can be resolved at levels of government below the very top, and which consequently need not reflect so directly the decision-making style of particular individuals. As to the kinds of issues which inevitably receive the attention of heads of departments, chairmen of Congressional committees and presidents, the Commission expects to propose alternative methods of organization, any of which might be serviceable and one

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of which would be preferable, depending on the working styles of the senior officials. In addition, the Commission will undertake to specify the criteria which it believes any organization framework, at all levels, should meet.

The second and larger problem is posed by the fact that many of the issues which this Commission will examine have been addressed by prior commissions, study groups and task forces and that the practical results of many of these studies have been meager. We believe there may have been two principal reasons for this fact. The first is that for every proposed organizational change substantial costs or disadvantages as well as benefits can be discerned. They are proposals therefore on which, if the experience and judgment of individuals are the only basis for decision, reasonable men may reasonably disagree. And few prior studies were able to offer their readers any other basis of decision; they did not present a body of evidence to show that the advantages of their recommendations would clearly outweigh the costs or disadvantages. The second reason appears to be that in many cases prior commissions were unable to enlist in the development and review of their recommendations the full participation of the several agencies, departments and indeed branches of government which would be affected by them.

This Commission recognizes an obligation, therefore, to present not merely a set of recommendations and their rationale, but a body of evidence which suggests that such recommendations, if implemented, can reasonably be expected to produce beneficial results. It recognizes also an obligation to offer the many parties inevitably affected by such recommendations the opportunity to comment critically on them and to offer alternative suggestions.

The Commission also recognizes that there may be circumstances under which it can advance the cause of improved organization for foreign policy prior to the issuance of its final report. As its views on appropriate organizational changes develop, therefore, it expects to consult with the officials now responsible for the conduct of foreign policy to determine whether organizational changes which they may be contemplating deserve the Commission's support.

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Means to Those Ends

Accordingly, the Commission expects its own work and that of its staff to involve, among others, the following activities.

1. A thorough review of the findings and recommendations of previous relevant studies and reports.
2. A solicitation of the views of a larger number of public and private persons with experience in the analysis or operation of foreign policymaking.
3. A detailed canvassing of the attitudes and desires of members of Congress with respect to the appropriate role for Congress in the making of foreign policy and the means necessary to the effective performance of that role.
4. An intensive study program designed both to canvass existing materials and to develop fresh sources of information on the potential benefits and probable effects of alternative organizational arrangements.

Prospectives on the Commission's Assignment

We undertake this effort and believe it to be important not alone to deal with any inadequacies in our government's current organization for the conduct of foreign policy but for two other reasons as well.

The first has to do with complexity. The world is now not bi-polar but multi-polar. We can no longer neatly divide the nations of the world into antagonists, allies, and neutrals. The pace of technological change increases. The interdependencies of nations become more numerous and more sensitive. Even more pertinent, many of the most important problems are no longer clearly "domestic" or "foreign"; they cannot therefore be adequately dealt with in existing organizational frameworks. In this setting the tasks of foreign policy grow more numerous, more subtle, and more direct in their impact on our daily lives. Some changes in the organization of our government to perform those tasks may therefore prove highly beneficial.

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The second reason has to do with power. From the end of World War II until very recently the power and influence of the United States were sufficient to insure that its principal objectives would be attained even where those objectives were only simply perceived and crudely pursued. Those days have gone, and they are not likely to return. Our margin of error is considerably reduced. If the United States is to attain its ends in the future, it must formulate and implement its policies with far greater foresight, precision and control. Here again, organizational changes may prove useful.

It is with the expectation of making substantial contributions to these ends that the Commission pursues its work.

February 20, 1974

4/16/74

COG/FP D3a

Summary

RESEARCH PROGRAM

Phase I Studies

- A. The Utility and Limits of an Organizational Approach: Given that organizational patterns necessarily vary with differing key personalities and differing policy concerns, what kinds and degrees of organizational change can the Commission propose in the absence of knowledge about either future U.S. political leadership or of the dominant policy concerns of the near future?
- B. The Problems Commonly Cited: What are the major criticisms commonly made about the conduct of foreign policy, in particular substantive areas (e.g., economic, cultural); functions (planning, implementation, etc.); resources (budgets, personnel); and other categories?
- C. The Future Environment: What are the major alternative future environments which current developments may foreshadow, in which U.S. foreign policy will operate over the next decade; what policy problems may prove paramount, and what functions, resources, and organizational arrangements may be most severely taxed in such circumstances?
- D. Lessons of Prior Studies: What have been the issues addressed, the recommendations made, and the factors which have determined the impact and degree of success of each of the major studies of foreign affairs organization since 1945?
- E. Characteristics of an Effective Foreign Policy System: What characteristics should any effective system for the conduct of the nation's foreign policy possess?
- F. Alternative Models of Organization: What alternative patterns of both Executive and Legislative Branch organization for the conduct of foreign policy seem plausible, and what are the likely relationships between various combinations of Executive and Congressional models?
- G. Comparable Patterns of Other Governments: What aspects of organization for the conduct of foreign policy in other nations can provide lessons applicable to U.S. conditions? (This study will be selective in the features of the practice of other countries which it examines.)

4/16/74

RESEARCH PROGRAM

Phase II Studies

- A. The Effectiveness of Organizational Change: What makes organizational change effective in meeting intended purposes, as suggested by examination of a number of prior attempts at such change in the foreign affairs area of the U.S. Government?
- B. Adequacy of Current Organization: How effective has current organization for policymaking been in recent administrations as suggested by a review of a large number of recent decisions and actions in each of the following areas:
1. The Interaction of U.S. and Foreign Economies: How well does the U.S. Government succeed in conducting policy which reflects both domestic necessities and the realities of the international economic system?
 2. National Security Issues: How well do we balance foreign policy implications, economic and budgetary impact, and national security requirements, in decisionmaking on defense-related topics?
 3. Coordination in Complex Settings: How adequate are current U.S. Government organizational forms to insure coordination where many activities of high importance are conducted simultaneously? (South Asia has been tentatively selected as the geographic focus for this study.)
 4. Multilateral and Global Issues: How well organized is the U.S. Government to develop and conduct policy dealing with that group of increasingly prominent issues which tend to be global in nature, contain both domestic and international implications, cross traditional jurisdictional lines, and involve important technical components (e.g., multinational corporations, seabed policy, environment, population, food)?
- C. Toward Greater Rationality: What organizational steps can be taken to minimize vulnerability of officials to political, bureaucratic, organizational, physiological, and psychological pressures in both crisis and routine situations?

- D. Conduct of Routine Relations: How adequate are current organizational arrangements to manage continuing and reasonably routine relations, which nevertheless can substantially shape U.S. foreign relations? (Latin America has been tentatively selected as a geographic focus for this study.)
- E. Resources for Foreign Affairs: How well is the government organized for identifying and providing the resources needed to carry out the nation's foreign policy effectively?
1. Personnel: What types of personnel are needed for the effective conduct of foreign affairs, and what organizational and procedural steps should be taken to improve foreign affairs personnel systems?
 2. Budgets and Resource Management: What organizational and procedural steps should be taken to improve the budget processes related to foreign affairs, and to mesh policymaking and resource utilization more effectively?

OTHER STUDIES/PROBLEMS

- A. Confidentiality and Security Classification: What organizational and procedural steps can be taken to limit classification of information relating to the conduct of foreign policy to the minimum clearly required by the needs of national security?
- B. Public Opinion and Public Information: What are the responsibilities of the Executive Branch to inform the American people about the conduct of foreign affairs, and to assure -- other than through the Congress -- that actions taken are broadly consistent with the public sense of the nature of U.S. interests and the means legitimate to advance those interests; and what organizational steps are necessary to fulfill these responsibilities?
- C. Intelligence: What organizational and procedural steps should be taken to improve intelligence support for the conduct of foreign affairs, and what level of effort is required to provide adequate support?

- D. Covert Political Action: Should the U.S. have a capability for covert political action overseas and if so, under what safeguards and organizational responsibility?
- E. Overseas Establishments: How can U.S. representatives abroad and to multilateral organizations be most effectively organized and controlled?
- F. Cultural Affairs Programs: What should be done with respect to reanalysis of basic concepts, organizational modification, classification of jurisdictions and coordination mechanisms, and improvement of procedures to make cultural affairs programs more effective?
- G. Foreign Information Programs: What should be done with respect to reanalysis of basic concepts, organizational modification, clarification of jurisdictions and coordination mechanisms, and improvement of procedures to make foreign information programs more effective?
- H. Foreign Assistance Programs (Development and Security): What steps are necessary with respect to basic concepts, organization, jurisdictions, coordination mechanisms and procedures to make both developmental and security assistance programs more effective?

DCI/IC 74-1029

Exec.Reg. 74-1651/A

The Honorable Robert Murphy
Chairman of the Board
Cerning International Corporation
717 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Ambassador Murphy:

I have received a letter from Kent Crane, the Administrative Assistant to Congressman Frelinghuysen, telling me of his appointment with the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. In his letter he suggested meeting with me to discuss the proposed outline for the Commission's study on intelligence.

As you know, I believe the work of the Commission is very important, and I am anxious to be cooperative with you in your work. Accordingly, I think it might be useful if you and I could meet with Mr. Crane to discuss the Commission's plans and further focus on intelligence and his role. I'd also like to have General Graham and Dr. Clarke of my Intelligence Community Staff present so that they can follow up as desired. If this seems a good idea, please let me know, and we will set up a mutually agreeable time to get together.

Sincerely,

W. E. Colby

Enclosure
Copy of Mr. Crane's
letter mentioned above

DCI/IC/CS/S/ [] (S) (STATINTL)
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PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN
5TH DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEE:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

KENT B. CRANE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000060014-7


Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

May 20, 1974

DISTRICT OFFICES:

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W

The Honorable William Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:


You are already aware of the existence and purpose of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. The Commission is approaching its task in two phases. First, it is taking testimony from practitioners in the foreign affairs field, such as yourself. Second, it is conducting in depth studies of specific foreign policy issues of major importance.

The Commission Chairman, Ambassador Robert Murphy, and Congressman Frelinghuysen are both personally very interested in the Commission's study of the intelligence community. As the enclosed letter indicates, Ambassador Murphy recently named me to head the Commission's study group on intelligence.

It is my intention, for rather obvious reasons, to keep our study group small and select. Further, it is my hope that we can draw as necessary upon the expertise available within the intelligence agencies, the USIB and the PFIAB.

As a first step, may I ask your assistance on three specific matters:

(a) Would it be possible to call upon you during the week of June 17th when I am scheduled to return from a study trip to Southeast Asia? At that time I would like to review our proposed study outline (a tentative list of topics which would seem to be of legitimate interest to the Commission is enclosed) and discuss the type of information and possibly staff assistance which we might reasonably expect to obtain from you. I will be prepared to spend as much time as you think useful with you, your staff or members of the USIB staff.




(b) Could you arrange, either directly or with DOD, to reinstitute the more esoteric clearances which I shall need to carry out the Commission's mandate successfully? I believe I had most of the necessary clearances when I left USIA a few months ago. In the interim, DOD has recently granted me another TS clearance, so upgrading my clearances should be a relatively simple matter.

(c) May I have access to previous studies of the intelligence community done in the past couple of years by various people and presumably available to you as Director of Central Intelligence? I am well aware that much thought and not an insignificant number of reports have been devoted to the organization and total resource structure of the intelligence community. The Commission has no desire to laboriously retrace the steps of others over well-trodden ground.

It is my sincere hope that you and others in the intelligence community will accept our study group's creation and charter as readily as we accept the challenge of the task ahead.

Kind personal regards.

Sincerely,



Kent B. Crane
Administrative Assistant

cc: Ambassador Robert Murphy
Honorable Francis O. Wilcox

CORNING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

CORNING

717 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

Arw
Filed 5/10/74

ROBERT D. MURPHY
Honorary Chairman of the Board

A wholly owned subsidiary of
Corning Glass Works
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May 3, 1974

The Honorable
Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MAY 10 1974

Dear Peter:

Thank you so much for your helpful letter of May 1, 1974, on the work of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

I find myself in full agreement with what you say in the first paragraph, as well as your useful remarks at the Commission's recent meeting. We are giving study to the manner in which public support can best be generated as well as to the matter of timing.

I am glad you mention the role of intelligence in which I am personally very much interested. It is lucky to have Kent Crane aboard and to be able to draw on his experience and judgment. Fran Wilcox, too, agrees that Mr. Crane is best equipped to head the study group.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

RM

Robert Murphy

RM:lb

cc: Hon. F.O. Wilcox

INTELLIGENCE TOPICS FOR REVIEW

By COG/FP Study Group

I. Intelligence Collection

- A. Requirements--how and by whom should requirements be generated?
- B. Sources--are both human and technical sources currently adequate and what is their future potential?
- C. How debilitating are various operational restraints (inadequate cover, opposition CI efforts, etc.)?
- D. What cost-effectiveness studies have, or can be, made of various elements of the intelligence effort?
- E. What are the specific collection missions of individual agencies and what degree of coordination exists among them?

II. Intelligence Reports and Estimates

- A. Is current reporting adequate--in terms of type (basic/strategic, current and estimative) and topic (political, economic, military and scientific)?
- B. Is the style and schedule for the production of reports well-conceived--are policy maker concerns and needs paramount; is threat assessment effective and timely; etc. ?
- C. How should raw data be collated--who should produce finished intelligence; who should brief senior officials; how many collating elements are necessary and economical; etc. ?
- D. How should reports be distributed--who should get which reports in the Executive and Legislative Branches of government?
- E. How should reports be evaluated--by whom, how often, in what format, etc. ?

III. Oversight Responsibility

How can intelligence activities best be coordinated and subjected to accountability and review in the Executive Branch and in Congress?

IV. Covert Political Action

Does the U.S. Government require a continuing capability for covert action abroad (i. e., clandestine political or propaganda operations in foreign countries)? If so, under what circumstances, safeguards and organizational authority should it be managed?

DCI/IC 74-0977

12 March 1974

Mr. Fisher Howe
Deputy Executive Director
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
2025 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Fisher:

As we agreed in our telephone conversation today, Mr. Colby's letter to Ambassador Murphy is forwarded without the "enclosure." In this case "enclosure" means that after 1 April I will meet Tom Reekford at the PFIAB offices, where you store your documents, to highlight the classified portions of the Director's testimony. Of course, you may have access to our marked master transcript at any time in the interim.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

STATINTL

Enclosure
As stated

DCI/IC/CS/[Redacted] (3/12/74)

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STATINTL

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

9 March 1974

The Honorable Robert D. Murphy, Chairman
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
2025 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Murphy:

At the request of the Commission, my representatives have reviewed the transcript of my testimony before the Commission with the objective of identifying all matters which are classified. Statements which we wish you to hold in the highest confidentiality are underlined in red in your copy. I ask that you make certain that these matters do not appear in the public record. All other portions of the transcript can be considered open to your use for any purpose.

I would like to call to your attention that occasionally throughout the transcript we have underlined the remarks of some of the Commissioners, indicating that we consider those statements to include classified material. This has been done for two reasons. First, because the member's question or statement alludes quite specifically to a part of my own testimony which is classified. Second, and mainly with respect to your remarks and some of Senator Mansfield's, prior knowledge of intelligence matters by members of the Commission revealed substance which would have been treated as classified had I made the remarks myself. In the latter cases, I am sure that we were all sharing information and past experiences quite openly because we respected the confidentiality of the session.

I want to thank you for the courtesy which you have displayed throughout the hearings and in prior and subsequent staff contact. It has been a most interesting experience for me.

Sincerely,


W. E. Colby

