

23 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : [REDACTED]

25X1A

SUBJECT: White House/NSC Intelligence Requirements

Background

The mission statement of Monday, 19 March 1973 was to develop a definition of the consumer intelligence requirements. This is a large order and should be approached with measured steps and with attention to White House requirements before all others. The Andrew W. Marshall memorandum of 6 February to Bronson Tweedy outlines most of the problems and I will not reiterate.

Interviews

[REDACTED] and I interviewed Tom Latimer, Dick Kennedy, Chip Pickett, and Dave McManis. I spent another two hours with McManis on the mechanics of providing current intelligence to the President and Dr. Kissinger. In addition to the aforementioned interviews, I drew upon a year of experience as the DIA liaison to the White House and NSC Staff.

Findings

1. The White House is not satisfied with current intelligence support to the President and Dr. Kissinger.

a. The PDB consistently fails to meet the intelligence requirements/interests of the President.

b. The WHSR staff prepares an intelligence brief for the President by drawing upon "a few" of the articles carried in the PDB, CIB, INTSUM, and OPSINT but drawing upon message traffic for most material. An expanded version of this is prepared for Dr. Kissinger.

c. McManis has no confidence that the PDB will improve.

2. McManis identifies a White House requirement for coordinated intelligence community judgments on current events and states that they are nigh impossible to obtain in less than 2 to 3 days.

3. Summaries on intelligence products are unsatisfactory. They are usually too long and seldom convey the thrust of the paper. NOTE: This is raised by many sources and Andy Marshall is talking with a research firm on this problem.

4. Special groups such as DiBona on the energy problem and Schultz/Dam/Flanigan on CEP are probably not receiving the community support that is available.

5. Widespread complaints that the intelligence community fails to report on events of national interest, particularly in the economic field. NOTE: This is another symptom of the lack of "feedback" from WH/NSC to the community.

6. INR products are not valued highly. Frequent criticisms were "biased," "mushy judgments," and lacking intellectual discipline.

7. Apparent differences between CIA and DIA products on some subjects (Vietnam cited most often) are distracting and not differences of substance. The differences are highlighted by different methodologies or emphasis and the consumer wastes a lot of time doing his own analysis.

Notes: There are old complaints '65-'70 time of various problems.

Recommendations

1. This DCI Staff element should assume a liaison function to identify and coordinate the intelligence community support to:

- a. WH/NSC Staff
- b. Special groups/individuals such as DiBona on the energy problem, Schultz/Dam/Flanigan in CEP and CIEP, etc.
- c. Defense Department
- d. State Department
- e. Justice Department and the FBI
- f. Treasury Department and the BNDD

2. This DCI liaison function should:
 - a. Identify intelligence requirements.
 - b. Recommend DCI tasking of appropriate element of intelligence community to support requirement.
 - c. Stress use of established production elements and USIB structure.
 - d. Supervise intelligence support arrangements
3. This staff should become familiar with current intelligence production activities in INR, DIA, and CIA to include departmental intelligence as well as products for external/national use.
4. Watch the quality of the President's Daily Brief -- McManis is not confident that it will improve.
5. The DCI and staff must provide policy feedback to the intelligence community in order to provide focus to the production effort.
 - a. The DCI must deliberately provide production guidance based upon Presidential interest perceived in WSAG and 40 committee.
 - b. General Graham must provide formal or informal guidance/supervision to community research and production effort based upon NSCIC Working Group experience.
 - c. This staff will learn of national interests requiring intelligence support through liaison contacts and supervising intelligence support arrangements.
6. Longer range problems bearing on support of national intelligence requirements:
 - a. Improved IDHS and analyst communications among DIA, INR, and CIA will improve timely response to crisis situations and reduce expenses of competitive exercise to publish separately on special events.
 - b. Develop consumer polling techniques to facilitate quality control and consumer reaction to intelligence production elements.
 - c. Training courses in advanced analytical techniques must be developed and incorporated into existing intelligence schools.
 - e. Management policies for encouraging innovative approaches to collection, analysis, and production must be formulated.

SECRET

Excerpt from MOR, 12 March 1973, by [] Subj: Conversation with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff, on NSCIC Working Group matters and Related Concerns (filed NSCIC WG Projects - B)

25X1A

"3.....^(Andy)He feels none of the studies really addresses two problem areas which are of concern to policy levels of government.

a. First, he feels there is a lack of shared perception as to how policy makers view the world and particularly the role of force in that world.

b. Second, he considers the total exclusion of intelligence from participation in the planning process during crisis situations is a distinct handicap. He believes intelligence should have something to offer during the period when policy is being designed, in monitoring the on-going situation, and in providing a feed-back of the effectiveness of actions called for by policy decisions, but intelligence does not really contribute in these areas.

4. During the crisis periods which were studied (India-Pakistan, Arab-Israeli and Jorday-Fedayeen) the DCI had access to what was going on, in Andy's view, but there is no indication that he felt he could advise intelligence producers concerning what he learned while attending WSAG meetings and similar conferences.

8. Andy talked at some length about differences between the view which intelligence officers seem to have and that of policy level officials of the role of force and the deployment of military forces as levers to influence crisis situations. He felt this was clearly evident in the deployment of naval forces to the Bay of Bengal in the India-Pakistan war. The United States used these moves as a way of communicating U.S. intent and concern, but the intelligence community, particularly State and CIA, seemed to have the view that such moves were inherently ineffective or should not be done and, therefore, intelligence did not contribute as it should have in assessing the results. Andy said also that Dr. Kissinger's request for an estimate of the consequences of particular outcomes of the India-Pakistan crisis got a poor reply which did not deal with his concerns."

SECRET