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*Read 5/3*

IC 75-1364

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community  
SUBJECT: National Situation Report Test Project

1. The attached two MFR's provide you with the "state of play" on the National Situation Report test project.
2. As you can see, progress is slow primarily because DIA sees its role in intelligence production endangered by the development of a national-level crisis product which is managed and edited at a location other than the Pentagon.
3. I am going to attempt to defuse Danny's concerns with regard to this matter. In the meantime, PRD's tack is to sidestep this major stumbling block and concentrate on working out the details of test procedures.
4. I will keep you informed.

[Redacted Signature]

Chief, Product Review Division  
Intelligence Community Staff

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Attachments - As Stated

Distribution:

- Orig - D/DCI/IC
- 1 - [Redacted]
- X - IC Registry
- 1 - PRD Chrn
- 1 - PRD Subject
- 1 - AREA Br. Subject
- 1 - PFCA Chrn
- 1 - [Redacted]

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IC 75-1360  
21 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting: National Crisis SITREP

1. On 18 February 1975, the National SITREP working group held its second meeting to discuss test procedures.\* A draft of these procedures, prepared by DIA, was used as the basis for these discussions.

2. With some minor adjustments all conferees accepted the National Situation Report's format prepared by DIA. INR expressed concern about its length, but was reassured once it was explained that the format was a checklist for the analyst rather than an outline that must be blindly followed regardless of the circumstances of the crisis. OCI's fears that the sequence of subjects in the proposed format could not be adjusted and that the "Outlook" section was too rigid in its methodology also were assuaged. It was agreed that the order of the presentation of subject matter would be determined by the situation itself, and that the "Outlook" section's assessment would represent the community's best estimate of what will happen without requiring adherence to a rigid format.

3. Conferees concentrated upon two principal issues: (a) which agency will draft the various sections of the national situation report; (b) who will be the final authority in determining what will appear in the National SITREP?

4. On the first issued OCI/CIA suggested that any agency should be permitted to prepare a draft on any subject. DIA, while not contesting CIA's point directly, believed that as a matter of practicality and for better management, one agency should be assigned drafting responsibility for a specific section, e.g. DIA would be responsible for the military situation, CIA for political and economic matters.

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5. With regard to the second question--who will have final authority for determining the contents of the national SITREP--DIA expressed its reservations about a crisis manager having final editorial authority over an agency's submission.

6. Full agreement was not achieved on either of these points. However, all conferees agreed that for purposes of this test:

a. Agencies will be assigned responsibility for the preparation of draft paragraphs of the National Situation Report. These assignments will be made, primarily on the basis of each agency's mission.

b. Assignment of this responsibility will not preclude other agencies from expressing dissenting views or drafting additional material, e.g. DIA might offer the crisis manager a draft paragraph on a political subject based upon a unique DIA-source which was received too late to be available to the principal drafting agency of the political paragraph of the National Situation Report.

c. The crisis manager/National SITREP editor will make every effort to minimize changes in the text of drafts submitted by agencies with principal drafting responsibility. However, final authority for the contents of the product must rest with the crisis manager/National SITREP editor.

7. The DIA representative noted that the Director, DIA desired to make changes in the USIB-approved testing procedures. The changes proposed that: (a) at least one test embody a military crisis format and that the task of putting together the SITREP for this test be conducted at the Pentagon (NMIC); (b) that an actual situation approaching crisis proportions be used for the test.

8. As these requests by Director, DIA require actions which exceed the authority of the Working Group, they have been forwarded to the Chief, PRD, IC Staff for further discussion with Director, DIA.

9. In the absence of the chairman of the National SITREP Working Group, PRD/IC agreed to prepare an MFR of the meeting, a revised draft of the test procedures based upon the original DIA draft as amended by the Working Group and to distribute these to the conferees.

10. Any proposed revisions to the test procedures should be provided to the Manager of the National SITREP test,

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(Room 6 G 11, CIA Hqs Bldg., Telephone ) not later than  
Thursday, 27 February 1975.

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
Colonel, USMC

Attachment

Procedures for Initial Test  
National Situation Report (NSR)

Distribution:

- Original -
- 1 - PRD Chrn
- 1 - PRD Subject
- 1 - Area Br. Subject
- 1 - PFCA Chrn



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21 February 1975

PROCEDURES FOR INITIAL TEST  
NATIONAL SITUATION REPORT (NSR)

1. GENERAL.

a. The initial feasibility test for the National SITREP (NSR) is scheduled during the hours 0700-1300, 12 March 1975, and will use in the main, the real-world situation in Indo-China and Thailand.

b. For the purposes of this test, OCI/CIA will have primary editorial responsibility, assemble, and publish the final draft of the National SITREP. DIA, State/INR, and NSA will participate, to the degree possible, by establishing task force-type organizations during the test period and by designating an approving authority for coordination.

2. DRAFTING PROCEDURES.

a. For the purposes of this test, DIA will be primarily responsible for Section II "Military Situation," CIA for Section III, "Political/Economic Situation;" and State/INR will, in the main, respond to Section IV, "U.S. and Friendly Actions..." Normally, Sections I ("Summary") and V ("Outlook") will be the responsibility of the National Situation Report editors, but they may exercise this responsibility by requesting draft support from specific intelligence agencies depending upon the subject matter of the crisis.

b. Nothing in the above paragraph should be construed to preclude independent submissions of original material by any agency on any subject.

3. COORDINATION PROCEDURES.

a. Coordination, as used herein, means the right to dissent/disagree with another agency's submission by written comment appended to the NSR.

b. During the initial test, the NSR editor will exercise final judgment over that which appears in the National SITREP. To facilitate coordination and meet publication deadlines, submissions normally will be submitted to the editor not later than one hour before publication. The editor will then compile all inputs and send draft SITREPs out for coordination.

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c. At the discretion of the editor, late breaking intelligence may be added to the SITREP and labelled as uncoordinated intelligence.

d. In any case, each National SITREP will contain a clear reference explaining the currency of its information, i.e., an "as of time" expressed in terms of EST/EDT.

e. To the degree possible various agencies' analysts should exchange information and views prior to submitting copy to the NSR editors in order to facilitate the final coordination process.

f. Crisp judgments should not be sacrificed to bridge real analytical differences. If agreement cannot be quickly reached, analysts should then move to dissent.

g. Agency dissents should be terse and concentrate on new evidence or insights which would place a new dimension on the primary submission, i.e., dissent should not merely refute the original position.

h. The NSR editor may not exclude a dissent if the original view which triggered the dissent is included in the SITREP.

#### 4. COMMUNICATIONS.

a. The WASHFAX net (LDX) will be the primary means used to pass textual and graphic material.

b. The NSA "Meet-me-Bridge" will be used as the secure conferencing system between agencies.

c. IC Staff will publish necessary changes to the "Crisis Management Communications Card."

d. Analysts will use their normal communications links to coordinate intelligence on a desk-to-desk basis.

#### 5. CONTROL PROCEDURES.

a. The IC Staff will act as control and will station observers with each agency's task force to observe operations during the test.

b. The IC Staff will act as national consumers to task the National SITREP system as appropriate.

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21 February 1975

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PROPOSED FORMAT FOR THE NATIONAL SITREP

(This format is intended as a checklist for analysts and supervisors. It is not an exact outline that must be rigidly followed, i.e. paragraph order can be changed according to the importance of the subject matter at the moment and paragraphs may be deleted or abbreviated according to circumstances.)

- I. Summary - Short resume of significant developments since last SITREP. First SITREP provides all essential background and pre-crisis history.
  
- II. Military Situation
  - A. Enemy actions and plans
  - B. Friendly actions and plans
  - C. Third party actions and plans

OR

  - A. Belligerent actions and plans
  - B. Actions and plans of countries friendly to U.S.
  - C. Third party actions and plans
  
- III. Political and Economic Situation
  - A. Political/economic developments affecting the military situation
    1. Belligerents Enemy
    2. Friendly to U.S. Friendly
    3. Third party OR Third Party
    4. International organizations
  
  - B. Political/Economic Developments affecting the general situation
    1. Belligerents Enemy
    2. Friendly to U.S. Friendly
    3. Third party OR Third Party
    4. International organizations

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- IV. U.S. and Friendly Actions Bearing on Enemy/Belligerent Third Party/International Organization Actions (Deals only with those actions which explain a later action or counteraction by any country, organization, or group.)
- V. Assessments - Emphasis should be placed on assessing the meaning of events and what they portend. A short-term outlook will be published at least daily during a crisis. The outlook assessment may include: (a) the objectives and intentions of the parties involved, (b) their relative capabilities; (c) their points of confrontation and (d) their probable course(s) of action. The main purpose of this section will be to give the community's best estimate of the future course of events.

NOTE: All times cited in the text will be Eastern Standard Time and each SITREP will contain a footnote indicating the difference in hours between EST and that standard time which obtains in the crisis area.

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14 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Working Group Meeting: National Crisis SITREP

1. On 6 February 1975, [redacted] OCI/CIA, chaired a meeting with representatives from CIA, DIA, State/INR, and IC/PRD to discuss the USIB directed feasibility test for the National Crisis Situation Report.\* It was decided, tentatively, that the first test would be held on 12 March and that the working group would meet again on 18 February to lay out test procedures.

2. Specifically, the group will address three issues: (1) the SITREP format, (2) drafting responsibilities, and (3) coordination procedures. DIA will draft, and distribute before Tuesday's meeting, a straw-man format and will indicate those subjects for which DIA would assume primary drafting responsibilities.

3. Much of the discussion centered on the general issue of coordination. All agreed that communications would pose serious difficulties since the LDX system, to be used during the first test, is often burdened by other, higher priority traffic (e.g. NID or NIB items). Thus, the group decided to schedule the test, at least the first test, during hours of low LDX usage.

4. Another issue under the rubric of coordination involved the question, what is a SITREP? More precisely, what kind of intelligence should a SITREP contain? State/INR seemed to believe that a crisis situation report merely listed facts and events to inform the reader of the latest

\* [redacted]

events and thus, coordination of this type of information would not pose major obstacles. IC/PRD pointed out that, in fact, SITREPs during previous crises--the October War and Cyprus--did much more than that. Fairly consistently they attempted to explain the meaning of events and on occasion to estimate the future course of the crisis. Our point was that coordination would likely be a good deal less simple than INR assumed, because it would be made over judgments and interpretations of facts and not just over the facts themselves. There seemed to be general agreement on this point from others but the question, what is a SITREP, was not settled.

5. Another coordination question concerned "check-writing" capabilities. OCI/CIA was concerned that coordination procedures might affect timeliness if crisis task force representatives, rather than higher supervisors, did not have the authority to pass on items. DIA commented that the level at which items could be coordinated would depend largely on the implications of the item. If it were a judgment with serious implications for US interests, for example, (e.g., that the Soviets were probably going to intervene militarily in the Middle East), then higher authority in DIA would likely have to approve coordination. For the most part, however, DIA task force representatives could write that agency's checks.

6. Finally, the meaning of coordination was discussed. While a precise definition was not rendered, all seemed to support the IC/PRD position that coordination is not just agreement, it is also dissent, which as general rule should be included in the published item.

7. Two other topics, not immediately germane to the test but relevant to any future efforts to establish a National SITREP, were discussed. One concerned where the report would be produced, and the other whether the advent of a National SITREP was really a first step in a larger effort to centralize direction and control of community intelligence assets. The latter was voiced by DIA and is related to its concerns that a National SITREP has major implications for DIA's roles and missions. It was noted that the testing presently being considered had no such long term goals in mind, and PRD made clear that the IC Staff was not entering this test with "a position" or any pre-conceived notions.



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Distribution:

Original - [redacted]

1 - PRD Chrono

① - PRD Subject

1 - Area Branch Subject

1 - PFCA Chrono

1 - [redacted]

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IC/PRD/AB: [redacted] (14Feb75)

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
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SPAM

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- Not much point in disseminating this today. Let's combine it with an account of today's mtg & then send it out.

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INFORMATION