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Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000400190011-3

Committee 30

Cross Ref: Intel 15(a)
IC-75-2450
Conn. 8 & 10

28 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : USIB Committee Responsibilities for
Analysis of Foreign Weapon Systems

1. Your decision is needed as to how the USIB committee structure should deal with intelligence on foreign weapon systems. The problem arises primarily from four factors:

a. Dissatisfaction with the manner in which responsibilities for analysis of weapon systems-related information is now divided between the SIC and GMAIC.

b. The desire of the SIC to be relieved of responsibility for covering current weapons systems to permit a better focus on advanced technologies and new physical discoveries and their possible application to future weapons.

c. The proposal of the GMAIC chairman that his committee handle all weapon systems.

d. The counter-proposal of General Graham that a new USIB committee be formed, with a DIA representative as chairman, to deal with those weapon systems now under SIC jurisdiction.

2. Several decision options are suggested:

a. Continue the present division of weapon system responsibilities as between GMAIC and SIC. It was dissatisfaction with this arrangement which led to the present consideration of the problem.

b. Continue both GMAIC and SIC in weapon systems analysis, but change existing responsibilities. Dr. Proctor favors making a renamed GMAIC responsible for strategic delivery systems (ballistic missile submarines and inter-continental bombers as well as ballistic missiles and space systems) with SIC responsible for all other weapon systems.

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c. Leave GMAIC responsibilities as at present and form a new committee to analyze those weapon systems elements which are now the responsibility of SIC, some of which involve tactical systems. This would require no realignment of working groups since all of the SIC sub-elements would be moved to the new committee. This arrangement would take care of General Graham's problem, provided DIA chaired the new committee.

d. Set up a new committee and redivide responsibilities so that GMAIC would have strategic weapon systems and the new committee all tactical weapon systems. This would give each committee chairman a fairly small span of control as regards sub-committees. But there would be gray areas. Which committee, for instance, would study a missile system integrated into the strategic defenses inside the USSR when the same missile system also is an element of the tactical forces based outside the Soviet Union? Furthermore, in the early stages of a weapon system development, it is often difficult to determine whether it is intended to be of a strategic or tactical nature. Lastly, there would be considerable duplication between the committees, e.g., both committees would be studying submarines, aircraft, and cruise missiles, albeit of different types.

e. Form one committee to study all aspects of weapon and space systems. This is the proposal of the GMAIC chairman. The chairman's span of control would be considerable under this option. There is virtue in such control, but also problems in that the existing chairman's power is already subject to criticism from DIA and the military services. It would also be necessary to establish new working groups. A single committee would, however, facilitate the setting of priorities for study and provide better protection against gaps in analysis and unnecessary overlap. This solution is favored within GMAIC by CIA, State and ERDA, but opposed by DIA and the military services. A single committee is favored by Sayre Stevens, George Carver, Howard Stoertz and

3. If a single weapon and space systems committee is established, alternative sub-structures are as follows:

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a. Formation of two primary sub-elements: a strategic weapon systems sub-committee headed by a CIA officer and a tactical weapon systems sub-committee chaired by the Defense Department representative. This arrangement would have the same problem of gray areas cited in paragraph 2d above for a two-committee arrangement.

b. Establishment of a number of sub-committees or working groups to carry out detailed analysis by technical discipline rather than by operational (i.e., strategic or tactical) mission. All ballistic missiles, both strategic and tactical, would be handled by a single working group, all aircraft by a single working group, etc. Sub-committee and working group chairmen would be drawn from appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community as agreed between the chairman and vice-chairman of the committee.

c. Under either arrangement, the chairman of the new committee would be allowed to establish ad hoc working groups from time to time to handle any special matters which did not lend themselves to analysis by one of the extant working groups.

4. Of the various options, we recommend adoption of a single weapon and space systems committee (para. 2 e) with sub-committees and working groups organized by technical discipline (para. 3 b). Further, we recommend chairmanship of this new committee be as follows:

a. In order to provide an orderly transition from the present to the new working arrangements, the initial chairman should be the present chairman of GMAIC, who would serve a minimum of one year, with a nominee of the Director, DIA, serving as vice-chairman.

b. Thereafter, the chairman would normally serve a three-year term, with the chairman and vice-chairman positions rotating between CIA and DIA nominees.

c. Designation of chairman and vice-chairman of the committee would be as mutually agreed between the DCI and the Director of DIA.

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5. The recommended alternative in paragraph 4 recognizes that interagency relationships are an important element of any system for committee handling of weapon systems analysis. Any solution must involve elements of compromise. The arrangement which is set forth in paragraph 4 also would go far toward solving the substantive problems which have existed because of the split responsibilities between GMAIC and SIC. It would facilitate the setting of priorities for study and provide better assurance of overall coverage without unnecessary redundancy. This proposal may not be wholly acceptable to General Graham since it does not give DIA the control of a committee studying tactical weapon systems. Nevertheless, the proposal does give DIA a more direct and important role in the management of USIB committee matters dealing with the weapon systems which are of important concern to the Department of Defense. In my view, General Graham will live gracefully with such an arrangement.

6. On receipt of your guidance, we will develop the necessary changes in the DCIDs for USIB consideration.

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

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Distribution:

Orig.--Addressee

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104-28 Jul 75

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
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25 July 1975

NOTE FOR: General Wilson

Sam:

This recommendation for GMAIC provides a further alternative for your consideration with the DCI and moves away from our earlier posture of supporting a two-committee concept. It tends to support the compromise solution we provided in our original draft (I pulled the one you sent to the Director back to give the boys one more chance) but at the same time is biased toward something of less than acceptable posture by DIA. If the proposal meets with your approval and in the light of Danny's own commitment to buy a compromise we might get away with the proposal in paragraph 4. However, I am still not certain that we want to specifically recommend paragraph 2. e. for adoption nor 3. b. either, but I am impressed that 3. b. is probably the best arrangement substantively that we could hope to achieve with a good possibility of Danny's agreement.

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Comm. (20)
Cross Ref: Intel 15 (L)
Comm. 8, 10
DCI/IC-75-0649

16 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : USIB Committee Responsibilities for Foreign Weapon Systems

1. Your decision is needed as to how the USIB committee structure should deal with intelligence on operational foreign weapon systems. The problem arises primarily from four factors:

a. Dissatisfaction with the manner in which responsibilities for analysis of weapon systems-related information is now divided.

b. The desire of SIC to be relieved of responsibility for operational weapon systems to enable a better focus on scientific and technical intelligence.

c. The proposal of the GMAIC chairman that his committee handle all weapon systems.

d. The counter-proposal of General Graham that a new USIB committee be formed, with a DIA representative as chairman, to deal with those weapon systems now under SIC jurisdiction.

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X 2. Five decision options are suggested:

a. Continue the present division of weapon system responsibilities as between GMAIC and SIC. It was dissatisfaction with this arrangement which led to the present consideration of the problem.

b. Continue both GMAIC and SIC in weapon systems analysis, but change existing responsibilities. Dr. Proctor favors making a renamed GMAIC responsible for strategic delivery systems (ballistic missile submarines and inter-continental bombers as well as ballistic missiles and space systems) with SIC responsible for all other weapon systems.

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c. Leave GMAIC responsibilities as at present and form a new committee to analyze those weapon systems elements which are now the responsibility of SIC, some of which involve tactical systems. This would require no realignment of working groups since all of the SIC sub-elements would be moved to the new committee. This arrangement would take care of General Graham's problem, providing DIA chaired the new committee. [There are political considerations which lend further credibility to DCI in selection of this alternative.]

d. Set up a new committee and redivide responsibilities so that GMAIC would have strategic weapon systems and the new committee all tactical weapon systems. This would give each committee chairman a fairly small span of control as regards sub-committees. But there would be gray areas. Which committee, for instance, would study a missile system integrated into the strategic defenses inside the USSR when the same missile system also is an element of the tactical forces based outside the Soviet Union?

e. Form one committee to study all aspects of weapon and space systems. This is the proposal of the GMAIC chairman. The chairman's span of control is considerable under this option, which could be a serious drawback. It would also be necessary to establish new working groups. A single committee would, however, facilitate the setting of priorities for study and provide better protection against gaps in analysis and unnecessary overlap. This solution is favored within GMAIC by CIA, State and ERDA, but opposed by DIA and the military services. A single committee is favored by Sayre Stevens, George Carver, Howard Stoertz and [redacted]

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3. We suggest you give serious weight to acceding to DIA chairmanship of a weapons committee. While there are some substantial drawbacks, we believe it is important to assure DIA involvement and commitment to the DCI and USIB in fields of their primary concerns in particular. The interplay between the committees forces an important relationship and provides for a more open coverage of the subject matter. We see no reason why NIOs could not be equally serviced by a DIA chairman--although this alternative, of course, expands the USIB committee structure further.

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4. As a compromise, Option e--a single USIB Foreign Weapon Systems Committee--with the following sub-elements goes a good distance toward meeting the DIA request:

a. The initial chairman will be a CIA officer, with a Department of Defense representative as vice chairman.

b. The chairman will serve a three-year term, with the chairman and vice chairman positions rotating between CIA and the Department of Defense. (There is a precedent for this since [redacted] of the Air Force was chairman of GMAIC in 1958-1961.)

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c. Designation of a Defense Department representative as chairman or vice chairman of the committee will be as mutually agreed between the DCI and the Director of DIA.

d. The Foreign Weapon Systems Committee will have two primary sub-elements: a strategic weapon systems sub-committee headed by a CIA officer and a tactical weapon systems sub-committee chaired by a Defense Department representative. Other sub-committees, panels and working groups may be formed as necessary. Appointment of the sub-committee chairmen will be subject to DCI approval.

5. The suggestions in both paragraphs 3 and 4 recognize that inter-agency relationships are an important element of any system for committee handling of weapon systems analysis. Any solution must involve elements of compromise.

6. On receipt of your guidance, we will develop the necessary changes in the DCID's for USIB consideration.

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[redacted]
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

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20d Executive Registry

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16 JUL 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: New USIB Committee on Foreign Weapons Systems?

I try hard to provide you with clean, unequivocal recommendations, but I'm falling short in the present instance.

My own tilt is apparent in paragraphs 3 and 4. Graham would prefer the former, will live gracefully with the latter.

Could you please place a check mark beside your preference. We will take it from there.



Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

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INFORMATION

Committee 30

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
USIB COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN WEAPON SYSTEMS

FROM: IC Staff
EXTENSION: []
NO. IC 75-2450
DATE 28 Jul 75

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)
DATE RECEIVED FORWARDED
OFFICER'S INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

TO:	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DCI	7/28	8/14	[Signature]	749/ 5885
2.				
3. D/IC				Tentatively agree - but I'd like to discuss it in USIB-
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5.				
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