

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-15
26 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive
Intelligence Material

1. As of 19 July 1974 all members of the USIB concurred in the Security Committee recommendations for "Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive Intelligence Material" with the exception of DIA.
2. DIA expressed concern with three of the ten recommendations. The first two objections relate to the contention that participation of the NIOs in the domestic and overseas dissemination process of NIEs (as recommended by the Security Committee and as currently exercised) is not warranted. NIOs now exercise a simple overview of the total number of NIEs requested. DIA's third objection is to the recommendation that NIEs no longer be disseminated to military or civilian training facilities.
3. The D/DCI/NIO reviewed DIA's expressions of concern and proposed changes. He agreed with DIA that NIOs should not be superimposed on the departmental determination of which overseas installations should receive copies. He recommended that you override DIA's other two objections.
4. I attempted to work out these problems informally with DIA and the D/DCI/NIO. While the D/DCI/NIO found my compromise proposals acceptable, [redacted] after extended review, advised on 11 November 1974 that he continues to hold to the objections presented by Adm. de Poix. DIA's proposed changes and my compromise proposals are located on facing pages at the Tabs. I have attached also Adm. de Poix's original memorandum containing his objections, George Carver's memorandum to you addressing them and a routing slip reflecting the D/DCI/NIO's acceptance of my proposed revisions.
5. Three alternatives are suggested:

Attached is Chairman, Security
Committee handout for USIB
(20 January 1975)

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(A) That the item be scheduled for discussion at a USIB meeting. George Carver and I believe this is the best alternative.

(B) That you override the DIA dissent and approve the Security Committee recommendations as modified by me and accepted by George Carver.

(C) That you approve the DIA suggested changes.

6. In the case of alternative (A), the USIB Secretariat could circulate Adm. de Poix's memorandum to the USIB with a note explaining subsequent actions of the Chairman, Security Committee, and stating that the subject will be scheduled for USIB consideration at a Board meeting. If you approve alternative (B), a memorandum from you to [redacted] explaining why you elect not to accept DIA's proposal would be advisable. If you elect alternative (C), a memorandum to USIB to inform the members of the changes would be required.

STAT

[Redacted Signature Box]

STAT

Chairman

Attachments

APPROVE:

Alternative (A) ✓

Alternative (B) _____

Alternative (C) _____

W. E. Colby
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence

7 DEC 1974

Date

EXCLUSIVE
174-6489/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby
Approved For Release 2004/04/01 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000100280001-4

Re attached memo from USIB Security Committee on Dissemination and Handling of Sensitive Intelligence Material, recommend you approve Alternative A -- Air opposing views at a meeting of USIB.

For whatever weight this may have I tend to go along with DIA on dissemination of selected NIE's to Senior Service Colleges -- My experience has been that they (the colleges) are much more careful and circumspect in handling sensitive documents than those of us who live with highly classified material every day.

3 Dec [Redacted Box]
(DATE)

D/DCI/IC

STAT

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 AUG 54

(47)

JAN 1975

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In connection with the disagreement noted by the Director, DIA, the Chairman, Security Committee, proposes that:

a. Recommendation No. 1, which originally read:

"That the dissemination of NIEs be considered on a case by case basis by the appropriate National Intelligence Officer acting in coordination with USIB Principals or their designees and that their considerations include the special needs of senior government officials and commanders below the NSC policy-making level as necessary to accomplish their missions and functions in support of NSC decisions. "

be changed to read:

"That departmental needs for NIEs be considered on a case by case basis by the USIB Principals or their designees in coordination with the appropriate National Intelligence Officer as to the total number of NIEs required by the departments and that their considerations include the special needs of senior government officials and commanders below the NSC policy-making level as necessary to accomplish their missions and functions in support of NSC decisions. "

SURE-STIK TABBING

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b. Recommendation No. 2, which originally read:

"That the appropriate National Intelligence Officer acting in coordination with USIB Principals evaluate requirements for dissemination of NIEs overseas to ensure that they are limited to those which are essential."

be changed to read:

"That the USIB Principals or their designees carefully evaluate requirements for dissemination of NIEs overseas to ensure that they are limited to those which are essential."

c. Recommendation No. 6, which originally read:

"That the practice of disseminating NIEs to military or civilian training facilities for reference use by students be discontinued."

be changed to read:

"That the practice of disseminating NIEs to military or civilian training facilities for reference use by students be discontinued. Any exception where use of NIEs is deemed essential for a special course or for continuing courses at a military or civilian training facility must be submitted to ^{DCI} ~~USIB~~ for approval."

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Holders
USIB-D-9.1/25
12 December 1974

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF USIB-D-9.1/25

SUBJECT : Dissemination of and Handling of
Sensitive Intelligence Materials

REFERENCE : USIB-D-9.1/25, 14 May 1974

1. As of 12 July 1974, all USIB agency members had concurred in the Security Committee recommendations for Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive Intelligence Material with the exception of DIA.

2. The attached memorandum from the Director, DIA, expresses concern with three of the ten recommendations. The first two objections relate to the contention that participation of the NIOs in the domestic and overseas dissemination process of NIEs (as recommended by the Security Committee and as currently exercised) is not warranted. DIA's third objection is to the recommendation that NIEs no longer be disseminated to military or civilian training facilities. These objections were reviewed by the Chairman, Security Committee, the D/DCI/NIO and Director, DIA. After further examination, [redacted] advises that he continues to hold to the objections presented by Admiral de Poix.

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3. It is planned to schedule the reference, along with the Director, DIA's memorandum, on a USIB agenda for discussion at an early date to consider the objections raised by DIA.

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[redacted]
Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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USIB-D-9.1/25
14 May 1974

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive Intelligence Materials

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-9.1/21, 7 September 1973
b. USIB-M-650, 20 September 1973, Item 4



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1. The enclosed report and reference c. above were prepared for Board consideration in response to a Chairman, USIB, request that the Security Committee survey the dissemination and handling of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and inputs to National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and examine current practices with respect to the handling of certain sensitive materials (references a. and b.).

2. Because of its security classification, the second report (reference c.) was prepared and circulated separately.

USIB ACTION REQUESTED

3. Board Members are requested to advise the Secretariat by close of business 24 May of their concurrence in or other views on the Security Committee recommendations that USIB:

a. Note the attached report and approve the Security Committee recommendations 1-10 and the Findings which are contained in pages 7 through 17 of the report.


b. Note reference c., which is circulated under separate cover, and approve its findings (paragraph D., page 6).



Executive Secretary

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Enclosure



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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Dissemination of and Handling of Sensitive Intelligence Materials

REFERENCE : Memorandum for the Chairman, United States Intelligence Board, Security Committee, 24 September 1973; Same Subject

1. In accordance with your request as outlined in reference, the Security Committee has prepared two separate reports of survey. The attached Report of Survey: The Dissemination and Handling of National Intelligence Inputs to National Security Study Memoranda has been approved by the Committee and responds to that portion of your request contained in paragraph 2a of referent memorandum. A second Report of Survey dealing with the dissemination and handling of materials within sensitive and narrowly-held sub-classifications of the major compartmented systems (IBSEC-T-2-73) is subject to special security controls and, therefore, is being forwarded under separate cover.

2. It is recommended that the U. S. Intelligence Board note the attached report and approve its findings and recommendations.


Acting Chairman
Security Committee, USIB

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

REPORT OF SURVEY:
THE DISSEMINATION AND HANDLING OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND INPUTS
TO NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM

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S E C R E T

INTRODUCTION

This report responds to a request by the Chairman, United States Intelligence Board, that the Security Committee survey the dissemination and handling of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and inputs to National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM). The report is divided into two Parts: Part I addresses the matter of NIEs, and Part II deals with the matter of inputs to NSSMs. Ten recommendations are included.

In the conduct of its survey, the Security Committee concentrated on the Departments of State and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, because these proportionately receive the greatest numbers of copies of such materials.

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IBSEC-T-1-73

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PART I

National Intelligence Estimates

A. General

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are constructed to serve the requirements of those high policy-making individuals and groups that formulate national security policy: the President and members of the National Security Council, and various ad hoc interdepartmental task forces. Until recently, the Director of Central Intelligence was assisted in the preparation of NIEs by the CIA Office of National Estimates and a Board of National Estimates. During October 1973, the DCI appointed a Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO) and National Intelligence Officers to replace the ONE and the Board of National Estimates.

The process of constructing an NIE necessitates examining relevant intelligence information and arriving at the best judgment of the intelligence community. This requires considerable research at the departmental levels; the preparation and coordination of draft NIEs throughout the community; and the attempt to resolve divergent

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points of view. According to Mr. Sherman Kent, a former chairman of the Board of National Estimates, more than a thousand individuals have been involved in the preparation of a single NIE.

NIEs have been produced at the rate of approximately forty a year for CYs 1970-72 (32 at the SECRET level, two at the TOP SECRET level, and six subject to special codeword controls). Of the above six produced at the codeword level, four were sanitized for non-codeword dissemination. A number are produced on a regularly scheduled basis, and thus represent an updating of a prior NIE.

B. Individual Access to NIEs

It was found that regulatory procedures applicable to the protection of classified intelligence information and materials, including compartmented intelligence information and materials, are adequate to prevent access by individuals not possessing the appropriate security clearance and/or access approvals; or, in the event of inadvertent disclosure to unauthorized individuals, to take corrective action. Consequently, the Security Committee has no recommendations in this area.

C. The Construction of NIEs

The construction of NIEs necessarily involves considerable

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expression of divergent principles and positions which must be reconciled. It is these divergent viewpoints which the mass media find of great interest. An example was the 18 June 1969 article appearing in the New York Times titled: "U. S. Intelligence Doubts Soviet First-Strike Goal." The article reported an alleged difference of opinion between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense over Soviet "first-strike" capabilities. Although the article was suspected of having been based upon NIE 11-8-68, subject: Soviet Strategic Attack Forces, an analysis of the article's contents by an ONE official suggested that the article had been based upon a draft version.

The survey found that draft NIEs are controlled at the departmental level by officials serving as focal points for the NIE input and coordination processes. A sufficient number of copies are requested to achieve the necessary internal staffing, and the draft copies are disseminated on a case by case basis consistent with the need-to-know principle.

D. Dissemination of NIEs

The USIB previously expressed concern about the apparent broad dissemination of NIEs in October 1969 and again in May 1973.

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In response to the Chairman's expression of concern in 1969, CIA, NSA, and DIA significantly reduced their dissemination. Since that time, however, dissemination has again reached the pre-1969 levels.

In 1973 it was suggested that USIB Principals tailor the distribution of NIEs on a case by case basis, and DIA and State were specifically asked to reduce the number of NIE copies they normally request. DIA reports that it has reduced standard distribution from 212 SECRET and TOP SECRET NIEs to an average of 145 copies and that distribution of codeword NIEs is less than half that number. State advises that it has long considered dissemination of NIEs on a case by case basis; therefore, the number of copies it requests is not in excess of basic departmental needs.

As one basis for its examination of NIE dissemination practices, the Security Committee used two recent estimative reports: SNIE 11-4-73 (TOP SECRET codeword) and NIE 11/13/6-73 (classified SECRET). Beginning with dissemination lists provided by ONE, the Committee then proceeded to ascertain further dissemination of the reports made from the departmental levels of the Department of Defense, State, and CIA. The full dissemination of these NIEs is provided in two attachments to this report.

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Through the results of this exercise, combined with questioning of individuals involved in the NIE dissemination process, the Committee identified four conditions which influence the extent of NIE dissemination.

1. Intended to assist NSC-level policy-making officials, NIEs are also serving as an informational vehicle for officials in policy support activities below the NSC level.
2. Dissemination below the departmental level is a departmental decision.
3. Habit has led to considerable reliance upon standard dissemination list and a dissemination philosophy which tends to include rather than exclude in cases of doubt.
4. Internal departmental dissemination is influenced by internal pressure for broader dissemination.

In the opinion of the Committee, condition (1) results from a valid requirement for senior government officials and commanders below the NSC level to have access to certain national intelligence in order to accomplish their missions and functions in support of NSC decisions. Despite the fact that the NIE, by definition, is not

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intended for this purpose, the Committee feels that in the dissemination of NIEs the special needs of such officials and commanders should continue to be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the Committee believes that the current dissemination of NIEs could be reduced considerably if the topical interests of the prospective recipients were taken more fully into consideration in each case.

In the further opinion of the Security Committee, the continuation of conditions (2), (3), and (4) above will perpetuate the erratic dissemination patterns of the past. It is considered desirable to establish a procedure for review of the dissemination requirements for NIEs. This procedure should be exercised by the USIB Principals or their designees and by an external officer associated with the material.

Recommendation No. 1:

That the dissemination of NIEs be considered on a case by case basis by the appropriate National Intelligence Officer acting in coordination with USIB Principals or their designees, and that their considerations include the special needs of senior government officials and commanders below the NSC policy-making level as necessary to accomplish their missions and functions in support of NSC decisions.

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The dissemination of NIEs to U. S. overseas installations constitutes a particular security risk because of the proximity of these installations to hostile foreign intelligence services. It was found that, except in cases of certain especially sensitive NIEs, there is dissemination of NIEs overseas--to U.S. Ambassadors, CIA Station Chiefs, and U.S. military commands headquartered abroad--whenever the subject matter appears to be in any manner germane to the officials' areas of responsibility. The decision to disseminate to particular U.S. overseas installations is, in practice, left to the departments concerned. In some cases, departmental dissemination procedures involve levels of review; however, such reviews frequently result in additions, rather than deletions, to the list. To some extent, such overseas dissemination appears to be prompted by considerations not immediately related to the NSC policy-making function, and as necessary to support NSC decisions.

Recommendation No. 2:

That the appropriate National Intelligence Officer, acting in coordination with USIB Principals, evaluate requirements for dissemination of NIEs overseas to ensure that they are limited to those which are essential.

Dissemination of NIEs to foreign governments is a matter considered by USIB on a case by case basis, and the Committee has no recommendation concerning this subject.

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E. Copying Practices

Other than as provided for in departmental interpretation of Executive Order governing the handling of classified information, there exists no explicit prohibition against reproduction of NIEs. No evidence was developed that final NIEs are being copied or reproduced. This may be because it is convenient to request additional copies. The Security Committee noted that there was no caveat appearing on the NIE prohibiting reproduction.

Recommendation No. 3:

That security instructions accompanying NIEs include the statement "NOT TO BE REPRODUCED."

F. Extracting Information from NIEs

At the 2 October 1969 meeting of the Board, the members concurred in the Chairman's request that the Executive Secretary be informed in advance of any proposal to quote or extract information from an NIE in any other document or message which is to be disseminated, particularly overseas, to an individual who would not otherwise have access to the basic NIE. The Executive Secretary was to record and coordinate each request as appropriate, checking particularly into the possibility of any sensitive problems which might be involved (USIB-D-2.1/21, dated 6 October 1969). The Chairman stated that the request was not intended to apply to the Secretary

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of State or the Secretary of Defense, if they felt the need was urgent. He concluded by noting that hard and fast rules were difficult to apply in this regard and that the rule of reason should prevail.

The Executive Secretary of USIB advises that only four requests have been received and considered pursuant to this request, the last being on 6 July 1973. Perhaps in partial explanation of this paucity, it is noted that DoD and State instructions implementing this request exempted information extracted from an NIE which was paraphrased, properly caveated, and not attributed to the NIE.

Recommendation No. 4:

That the United States Intelligence Board reaffirm the guidance in USIB-D-2.1/21 (attached as C) and that each USIB Principal review the implementing instructions of his department or agency to ensure that the sense of this guidance is being applied.

G. Library or Reading Room Access

DIA reports that dissemination to and access at library and/or reading room facilities of NIEs is severely restricted. When disseminated to such facilities, they are not displayed or provided voluntarily for research. State Department advises that there was no indication that NIEs are available in any library or reading room type of operation. ONE reports that copies of "sensitive" estimates

are not sent to the Agency's library service, but others are, and that "need-to-know" is generally presumed based upon a requestor's interest in seeing the report, provided he possesses the appropriate security clearance(s) controlling the particular estimate.

Recommendation No. 5:

That controls be established at library and/or reading rooms where NIEs are maintained to ensure a need-to-know determination is made by senior officials prior to providing individual access.

H. Access at Military Training Facilities and Similar Civilian Institutions

DIA policy provides for the use of NIEs as reference material for student theses at the military joint colleges. This policy states that joint colleges are provided copies of NIEs for background use and information. When the faculty of the college determines that a U.S. student has the requisite clearances and need-to-know, he may be given access to an NIE for background study in the preparation of a thesis or other study projects. Information may be extracted, in paraphrased form and without attribution to an NIE, when permitted by the classification and caveats of the NIE. In this connection, the policy states that all NIEs shall be treated as NOFORN DISSEM

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and CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION, which would prohibit the dissemination of any theses containing material derived from an NIE to any non-governmental activity. State Department official staff representatives at joint colleges also receive one copy of NIEs for their information. As demonstrated by the attached dissemination list, other military training facilities also receive NIEs.

CIA's Office of Training also receives SECRET and TOP SECRET NIEs routinely, and by special request, codeword NIEs. In most instances, these are used only for faculty reference purposes and to demonstrate a national intelligence product for the benefit of students. In at least one course, however, the students are assigned study projects which require working with an NIE and other national intelligence publications.

The Committee believes that the practice of allowing student access to NIEs at military training facilities and similar civilian institutions greatly increases the problem of limiting access. While sympathetic to the needs of such institutions, it is believed that other substitute materials should be found.

Recommendation No. 6:

That the practice of disseminating NIEs to military or civilian training facilities for reference use by students be discontinued.

PART II

National Security Study Memoranda

A. General

The National Security Study Memoranda process is a systematized procedure by which the President directs the attention of the Executive Branch of Government to national security issues.

Topics addressed by NSSMs range from broad ("U. S. Policy Toward X Country") to narrowly focused studies ("Chilean Debt Renegotiations"). There were 85 NSSMs issued in 1969; 26 in 1970; 32 in 1971; 23 in 1972; and 23 issued to November 1973. NSSMs issued over the signature of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs are sent to members of the Senior Review Group (Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) and to other entities when the subject matter is appropriate. For example, NSSM 149, "U. S. - PRC Trade," was also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Commerce.

NSSMs are prepared upon direction of the National Security Council. Action is assigned to either a National Security Council Interdepartmental Group or to an Ad Hoc Committee. The response is submitted to the National Security Council Staff for review and is

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then forwarded to the National Security Council Secretariat for consideration by the Senior Review Group. The Senior Review Group examines the paper and determines further disposition of the NSSM response. This disposition may be a request for additional input; the forwarding of the NSSM response to the NSC; issuance of a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) by the President; or referral to the Under Secretaries Committee for follow-up action.

The Director of Central Intelligence serves as the intelligence advisor to the National Security Council. In this connection, his primary role is to provide the National Security Council, its members and its supporting mechanisms, with the information and judgments about foreign developments which they need to formulate and implement national security policy. The DCI is a member of most of the committees within the NSC structure: the Senior Review Group, Under Secretaries Committee, 40 Committee, Intelligence Committee, Defense Programs Review Committee, and the Verification Panels on SALT and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction.

The DCI uses the expertise of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide intelligence inputs to any of the National Security Council Groups. Because NSSM tasking papers are addressed by the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs to the Secretaries of

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State and Defense in addition to the DCI, the task representatives from State/INR and DIA are designated by their respective departmental heads. Unlike the NIE process, the intelligence inputs to NSSMs involve only a limited number of individuals, all working in the Washington, D. C., area.

B. Findings

The Security Committee found that NSC procedures governing the tasking and intelligence responses to NSSMs are well documented and generally adhered to. A major problem, however, exists in the area of the production of inputs to the NSSM process.

Departmental and agency procedural statements and regulations governing the production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs are in need of revision, because they have been outdated by reorganizations and reassignment of functions. Consequently, the production of intelligence inputs to NSSM has come to be handled more and more on an ad hoc basis.

This lack of a systematized approach to the production of NSSM intelligence inputs creates administrative and procedural problems which spill over into the matter of security. Individuals are frequently given tasks for which they do not possess appropriate Security Access Approval to handle; individuals are given tasks

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without stated authority to task other elements for inputs, thus resulting in the involvement of a greater number of individuals to justify the requirements than would be necessary under a more regularized, streamlined management approach; and ad hoc procedures of questionable security practice are frequently resorted to, i. e., the use of unsecure telephones and the excessive and uncontrolled reproduction of draft reports to achieve coordination.

C. Recommendations

Recommendation No. 7:

That USIB Principals effect a revision and updating of departmental and agency instructions and regulations related to the production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs, and that such revisions provide for central authorities responsible for coordinating NSSM intelligence inputs, vested with authority to task other such departmental and agency elements as may be required.

Recommendation No. 8:

That each department and agency participating in the production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs establish registries responsible for controlling all draft copies, with sole authority to duplicate and control reproduction.

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Recommendation No. 9:

That each department and agency participating in the production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs maintain a roster of individuals assigned to the response task or otherwise made privy to the activity.

Recommendation No. 10:

That telephone discussions related to the production of intelligence inputs to NSSMs be restricted to secure voice communications systems or secure long-distance zerography, and that working groups be provided secure working environments for their activities.

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ATTACHMENT A

DISSEMINATION LIST

NIE 11/13/6-73

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE SINO-
SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

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S E C R E T
OVERALL
EXCLUDING CIA

Copy

- 1 The President
- 2 Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to President, National Security Affairs
- 3 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Attn: Mr. Wheaton B. Byers
- 4 Secretary of State
- 5 Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs Room
- 6 Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian & Pacific Affairs
- 7 Secretary of the Treasury
Attn: Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
- 8-12 Department of the Treasury
Attn: Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
- 13-17 Secretary of Defense
- 18-24 National Security Council
 - 1 - Mr. Andrew Marshall
 - 1 - Mr. Robert R. Ratliff
 - 5 - Information Liaison
- 25 Office of Management and Budget
Attn: Mr. Arnold Donahue

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26 Department of State
Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research

27-131 Bureau of Intelligence & Research

132-196 DIA ATTN: DS-4C

197-203 Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI)

204-223 Department of the Navy
Naval Intelligence Command (NIC)

224-230 Department of the Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (AF/INA)

231-235 National Security Agency
Director, NSA (CREF/CDE)

236-237 Atomic Energy Commission
Division of International Affairs

238 Federal Bureau of Investigation
Assistant to the Director

239-240 Director, National Indications Center

241-248 Department of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security)

249-250 Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis

251-252 Director of Defense Research & Engineering

253-272 Joint Chiefs of Staff

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INTERNAL CIA

Copy

273	DCI
274	DDCI
275	O/PPB
276-278	D/DCI/IC
274-280	Special Asst for SAL
281	USIB/S
282-286	DD/I
287	DDI/Special Research Staff
288	DD/O
289	DD/M&S
290	DD/S&T
291	Inspector General
292-315	Office of National Estimates

316

317



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318-320

[Redacted]

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321-323

Office of Basic & Geographic Intelligence (OBGI)

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324-356

[Redacted]

2 USIA (awaiting USIB approval)
9 stockpiled

357-359

OCI/OPSCEN Attn: Mr. V. Heyman

360-366

OER

367-371

OSR

372-373

DDI/IRS

374-375

NPIC/Ref

376-397

[Redacted]

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398-399

DDM&S/Off. of Joint Computer Support

400

Office of Logistics/PS

401

Office of Medical Services

Attn: [Redacted]

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development	1
Chief of Research and Development	1
US Army Material Command	1
JFK Center - Military Assistance	1
US Army Foreign Science & Technology Center	1
US Army Forces Command	1
Continental Army Command Tactical Intell Center	1
US Army Air Defense Command	1
US Army Alaska	1
US Army Pacific	2
US Army Europe (Heidelberg, Germany)	2
US Army Southern Command (Quarry Hts., Panama CZ)	1
Army War College	1

*Direct dissemination by CIA.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Missile Intelligence Agency	1
SAFEGUARD System Manager	1
Commander in Chief US Navy Europe (London, England)	1
Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet	1
Commander Second Fleet (Afloat)	1
Commander Seventh Fleet (Afloat)	1
Commanding General Fleet Marine Forces Pacific	1
Atlantic Intelligence Center	1
Fleet Intelligence Center Europe	1
Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific	1
Naval War College	1
Marine Corps Development & Education Command, Quantico	1
Air Force Systems Command	1
Pacific Air Force	1
US Air Force Europe (Ramstein AFB, Germany)	1
Air Force Security Service	1
Foreign Technology Division	1
Air University	1
Commander in Chief Alaska	1
Commander in Chief US European Command (Heidelberg, Germany)	2
Commander in Chief Continental Air Defense Command	1
Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command	2
Defense Nuclear Agency	1
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff	1
Armed Forces Staff College	1
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	1
National War College	1
DIA (Deputy Director for Collection & Surveillance)	1
DIA (Secretary, External Affairs Division, USIB & CIA Office)	3
DIA (Deputy Director for Intelligence)	5
DIA (Deputy Director for Estimates)	4
	5 (STOCK)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISSEMINATION

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Secretary of State	4
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs	5
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs	6
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research	26
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Intelligence Analysts)	27 to 41
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Department Duty Officer, Operations Center	45
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs	46 to 47
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	48 to 49
Bureau of European Affairs	50 to 54
Soviet Affairs	
NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs	
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs	55 to 57
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ATTACHMENT B

DISSEMINATION LIST

SNIE 11-4-73



25X1

SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS PROGRAMS
AND DETENTE: WHAT ARE THEY UP
TO?

S E C R E T

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OVERALL
EXCLUDING CIA

Copy

1 The President
 VIA: Dr. Kissinger

2 Special Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs (Dr. Kissinger)

3 The Vice President
 VIA: Brig. Gen. J. M. Dunn

4-16 The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
 Board VIA: Mr. Wheaton B. Byers

17 Office of Management and Budget

18 Mr. Andrew Marshall
 National Security Council

154 L. G. Robertson
 National Security Council

19 The Secretary of the Treasury

20 The Secretary of State (INR/RCI)

21-25 The Department of State
 The Director of Intelligence and Research (INR/RCI)

26-27 United States Arms Control and Disarmament
 The Director (INR/RCI)

172 State, for Ambassador Johnson

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28-39 The Secretary of Defense
30-31 The Joint Chief of Staff
32-81 Defense Intelligence Agency
181-190
83-84 National Security Agency
85 Atomic Energy Commission
86 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Assistant Director (via DDI)

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INTERNAL CIA

Copy

82 Chairman, GMAIC
87 Director, National Indications Center
25X1 88 Pentagon
89-90 Director, DDI/IAS
91-92 NPIC
149 Chairman, COMIREX
93 COMIREX Staff
94-96 DDO
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99 DCI
100 DDCI
101 Inspector General
102-103 D/DCI/IC
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104-105 DDS&T
106 ODE/DDS&T
107-110 O/WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE

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S E C R E T

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145-146	DDI/IRS
147	DDI/SRS
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150	Scientific Intelligence Committee
156	Chairman, JAEIC
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199	Pres. Library
200	Archives

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DISSEMINATION

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CINCEUR - Europe	61
CINCREDCOM - Florida	62
CINCLANT - Norfolk	63
CINCALCOM - Alaska	64
CINCPAC - Hawaii	65
CINCONAD - Colorado Springs, Colo	66
CINCSAC - Offut AFB, Neb	67

Services

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Navy	69-76, 60, 28
USAF	184-189

Others

CINCUSNAVEUR - London	68
Foreign Technology Division - Ohio	77
Foreign Science & Technology Center - Charlottesville, Va.	81
Missile Intelligence Agency - Alabama	80
USAFE - Germany	78
USAREUR, - Germany	79
AFSC - Andrews AFB	190
SALT - Geneva	55

DoD and DIA (Internal)

(All other copies)
(29 thru 54)

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
ASD/Intell
ASD/AE
DDR&E
DDPA&E
CJCS
DJS
J-3
J-5
OSD
DIA

S E C R E T

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISSEMINATION

- 20 The Deputy Secretary of State
- 21 The Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Under Secretary for Security Assistance
- 22 The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
- 23 Director Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Deputy Director Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Director Planning and Coordination Staff
Deputy Director Planning and Coordination Staff
- 24 Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Three Deputy Directors Bureau of Intelligence Research
- 25 Various Intelligence Analysts in the Office of Current
Intelligence
- 26 & 27 Sent to U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
for retention
- 172 Ambassador at Large Johnson

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USIB-D-2. 1/21
6 October 1969

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Dissemination of National Intelligence Estimates

REFERENCE : USIB-D-2. 1/20, 29 August 1969
(Memorandum for USIB Principals)

1. In opening the discussion on this subject during the executive session at the 2 October Board meeting the Chairman noted that in August (see reference) he had requested each USIB Principal to review two questions regarding this subject:

a. The large number of copies of estimates being disseminated.

b. The practice of quoting or extracting information from national intelligence estimates in other documents or messages, particularly those going overseas.

2. In regard to question a. above, the CIA, NSA and DIA Members reported that they would be able to reduce significantly the number of copies distributed within or by their respective departments or agencies. Mr. Helms commented that these reports were most encouraging and thanked the Board Members for their cooperation. In order to hold down the distribution of NIEs he requested that each USIB Principal continue to give attention to this problem, and that the Board review the situation periodically.*

*Subsequent to the meeting Mr. Abbot Smith asked the USIB Secretariat to transmit his request that each USIB Principal furnish the Secretariat within a few days their requirements for normal distribution for the following: (1) SECRET NIEs, (2) SECRET SNIEs, (3) TOP SECRET NIEs, (4) TOP SECRET SNIEs, (5) ALL SOURCE NIEs and (6) NIPP's. Mr. Smith noted that special restricted dissemination will continue to be determined on an ad hoc basis.

SECRET

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Attachment C

USIB-D-9.1/25


USIB-D-2.1/21
6 October 1969

3. Regarding question 1. b. above the Chairman indicated that he wished to achieve better coordination and control over this practice, but that he did not intend that it be prohibited. Specifically, he requested that each USIB Member department or agency check with the Office of the DCI in advance, even by telephone if necessary, regarding any quotations or extracts from NIEs which they proposed to use in documents or messages to individuals who would not otherwise have access to these estimates. Mr. Helms explained that this procedure would be helpful in making it possible to:

- a. Know what was being done.
- b. Raise the flag if there were any particularly sensitive problems involved.

He stated that this request was not intended to apply to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense if they felt the need were urgent. Mr. Helms concluded his remarks by noting that hard and fast rules were difficult to apply in this regard and that the rule of reason should prevail.

4. The Board then concurred in the Chairman's request that the Executive Secretary of USIB should be informed in advance of any proposal to quote or extract information from a National Intelligence Estimate in any other document or message which is to be disseminated, particularly overseas, to an individual who would not otherwise have access to the basic NIE. The Executive Secretary will record and coordinate each request as appropriate, checking particularly into the possibility of any sensitive problems which might be involved.


JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

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SECRET