

THE AIR WAR COLLEGE  
NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM

THE THREAT TO U.S.  
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

11 MAY 1970

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A FRIEND OF MINE IN THE UPPER MIDWEST HAS A YOUNG SON WHO HAS BEEN GETTING UP AT FIVE EVERY MORNING-- RAIN, SHINE, OR SNOW--TO DELIVER A NEWSPAPER ROUTE ON FOOT AND BUILD UP A SAVINGS ACCOUNT. MY FRIEND CAME HOME ONE EVENING TO FIND THAT HIS SON HAD WITHDRAWN 50 DOLLARS TO BUY A CONTRAPTION CONSISTING OF AN OLD TWO-CYCLE LAWN-MOWER ENGINE WELDED TO THE FRAME OF A BICYCLE, WITH A SYSTEM OF BELTS PROVIDING POWER TO THE BACK AXLE. THE BOY WAS PATIENTLY TRYING TO GET THE MOTOR GOING WITH ONE OF THOSE INFURIATING STARTER ROPES.

WHEN THE FATHER SUGGESTED THAT THE 50 DOLLARS HAD BEEN WASTED ON A PILE OF JUNK, THE BOY LOOKED THOUGHTFULLY FOR A MOMENT AT THE SNOW, THE BICYCLE, AND HIS FEET, AND THEN ANSWERED: "WELL, OBVIOUSLY I CAN'T AFFORD A CAR, AND THIS THING BEATS ANYTHING ELSE I'VE GOT."

I'M INCLINED TO THINK THAT SOMETIMES, WHEN WE ARE RACING AROUND THE WORLD LINING UP ALLIANCES, OFFERING MILITARY AID, AND SPREADING THE MESSAGE OF DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY, WE OUGHT TO STOP AND LISTEN TO THAT BOY.

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IT SHOULD BE OF VITAL CONCERN TO US THAT THERE ARE MASSES OF PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO ARE MORE THAN READY TO LISTEN TO ANY ONE WHO COMES ALONG SELLING A BILL OF GOODS WHICH PROMISES TO BEAT ANYTHING ELSE THEY'VE GOT.

WE CAN MONITOR CHINESE NUCLEAR TESTS, COUNT SOVIET MISSILE SILOS, AND KEEP AN EYE ON COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO SUBVERT THE LEADERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, BUT THAT DOESN'T COMPLETE THE COVERAGE OF PLACES WHERE TROUBLE MAY BE BREWING FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE FREE WORLD.

IT IS JUST AS IMPORTANT THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE PEASANT IN A VIETNAMESE RICE PADDY WHO HAS NEVER HAD A SENSE OF NATIONHOOD; THE INCA INDIAN IN THE PERUVIAN HIGHLANDS WHO HAS LOST EVERYTHING HIS ANCESTORS ONCE RULED; AND THE AFRICAN WHO THOUGHT INDEPENDENCE WAS GOING TO GIVE HIM THE STANDARD OF LIVING FORMERLY ENJOYED BY THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATORS.

THESE ARE THE PEOPLE--NUMBERING IN THE MILLIONS-- WHO ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN ONE REVOLUTION--THE REVOLUTION OF RISING EXPECTATIONS, THE SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTS CALL IT. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONVINCED THEM OF THE DESIRABILITY AND SUPERIORITY OF DEMOCRACY AS WE KNOW IT.

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IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HELP THEM TO BRING DEMOCRACY ABOUT--TO CHANNEL THEIR REVOLUTION, IF NEED BE, IN THAT DIRECTION. THE TROUBLE IS THAT IF--FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER--THEY ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT DEMOCRACY IS NOT ONLY THE BEST SYSTEM BUT IS ALSO WITHIN THEIR REACH, THEN THESE PEOPLE ARE GOING TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE SALES PITCH OF THOSE WHO OFFER THEM SOMETHING BETTER THAN WHAT THEY'VE GOT.

I HAVE BEEN ASKED TODAY TO DISCUSS "THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS." FOR A STARTER, I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE A BROAD LOOK AT POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS, RATHER THAN DWELL ON THE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC WEAPONRY WHICH YOU WILL BE HEARING ABOUT LATER.

THIS IS RELATIVELY EASY TO SUMMARIZE, IN A WAY--THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS ARE GOING TO BE VIRTUALLY ANY AND ALL COUNTRIES WHERE THERE IS TENSION, CONTROVERSY, POVERTY OR INEQUITY THAT THE COMMUNISTS CAN EXPLOIT. IT IS A QUESTION OF THE VULNERABILITIES IN THE SOCIAL FABRIC OF A NATION. IF THE PEOPLE ARE MISERABLE ENOUGH, THEY WILL SEEK CHANGE. IF THEY CANNOT BRING THOSE CHANGES ABOUT BY ORDERLY POLITICAL PROCESS, THEY CAN BE DRIVEN TO TRY IT BY CONSPIRACY, BY SUBVERSION, OR BY FORCE. THIS CREATES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO TAKE A LEADING ROLE.

IN MANY OF THESE CASES, THE PEOPLE OF THE FREE WORLD MAY VERY WELL SYMPATHIZE WITH THE ASPIRATIONS

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OF THE PEOPLE. CERTAINLY THE KUOMINTANG RULE OF MAINLAND CHINA IN THE 1930S AND 1940S FELL SHORT OF WHAT WE WOULD CONSIDER AN ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY. FULGENCIO BATISTA IN CUBA, THE TRUJILLOS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, KING FAROUK IN EGYPT, AND OTHER AUTOCRATIC RULERS AND REGIMES HAVE CREATED OR MAINTAINED CONDITIONS WHICH DENIED THEM THE SUPPORT OF THEIR PEOPLE, AND SET THE STAGE FOR THEIR OVERTHROW.

WE CAN ASSUME THAT IDEALLY, THESE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE WANTED TO MOVE TOWARD A DEMOCRACY LIKE OURS, BUT FIRST AND FOREMOST, THEY WERE BENT ON CHANGE. THEIR CONDITION AMOUNTED TO A VULNERABILITY TO COMMUNISM, AND EITHER BECAUSE THEY SAW NO CHANCE OF ACHIEVING A REAL DEMOCRACY, OR BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS EXPLOITED AND TOOK OVER THEIR REVOLUTION, IN SOME CASES--SPECIFICALLY CHINA AND CUBA-- THEY WOUND UP WITH A COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP.

LET US BE REALISTIC. IN CUBA, AT LEAST, THERE ARE A GREAT NUMBER OF PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY, WHO ARE BETTER OFF--IN EVERYTHING BUT FREEDOM--UNDER FIDEL CASTRO THAN THEY WERE UNDER THE BATISTA REGIME. THEY MAY BE AWARE OF THE EVILS AND INEQUITIES OF COMMUNISM, BUT THEY FIND IT BETTER THAN WHAT THEY HAD BEFORE, AND THESE--THE MILITARY--ARE THE PEOPLE WHO KEEP FIDEL CASTRO IN POWER.

TAKING THE LONG-RANGE VIEW OF POTENTIAL THREATS, THEN, LET US SAY THAT A THREAT TO OUR SECURITY EXISTS WHEREVER LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE ARE MISERABLE WITH THEIR PRESENT

-4-

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LOT, AND BELIEVE THAT IT CAN BE CHANGED ONLY BY REVOLUTION, NOT BY PEACEFUL EVOLUTION.

THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IS THE VULNERABILITY--THE NEED AND THE DESIRE FOR CHANGE. THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT NEED NOT BE DICTATORIAL OR EVEN AUTOCRATIC--THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO PROMISE SOMETHING BETTER WOULD BE JUST AS GREAT IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE SIMPLY TOO INEPT TO BE CAPABLE OF IMPROVING THE LOT OF THE PEOPLE. IN FACT, IT IS NOT EVEN ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE A STRONG COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN EXISTENCE IN THE COUNTRY; ALL THAT WAS NEEDED IN ZANZIBAR, FOR INSTANCE, WAS AN OPENING FOR LOCAL MAL-CONTENTS WHO HAD BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT COMMUNIST TRAINING, FUNDS, AND GUIDANCE. THE COMMUNISTS, IN FACT, MAY WELL SEE THEIR GREATEST OPPORTUNITY IN SITUATIONS WHERE THERE IS NO LEADERSHIP WHATSOEVER WORTHY OF THE NAME, BECAUSE THEN THEY CAN EITHER SUPPLY THE NEEDED LEADERSHIP, OR BUILD A STRONG MASS COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN THE CHAOS RESULTING FROM THE ABSENCE OF ANY.

I DO NOT THINK WE HAVE ENOUGH TIME TODAY, THEN, TO SWING AROUND THE WORLD COUNTRY BY COUNTRY, ANALYZING WHERE THESE CONDITIONS EXIST, BECAUSE IN ESSENCE THEY EXIST IN ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES--WHETHER ONE CALLS THEM LESSER DEVELOPED NATIONS, OR NEWLY EMERGING STATES, OR THE THIRD WORLD.

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IN THE NEW COUNTRIES OF BLACK AFRICA, THERE ARE TWO SPECIAL FACTORS TO BE KEPT IN MIND. FIRST, MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE ANY INHERENT NATIONAL COHESION. INSOFAR AS THEIR BOUNDARIES ARE CONCERNED, THEY ARE ARTIFICIAL CREATIONS. THEIR AREA WAS DETERMINED, NOT BY THE DESIRE OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE TO FORM ONE NATION, BUT BY HOW FAR SOME EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY OR NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLONIZER EXTENDED HIS SWAY BEFORE HE EITHER CAME UP AGAINST A RIVAL COLONIZER, RAN OUT OF ATTRACTIVE TARGETS FOR ACQUISITION, OR HAD ALL HE COULD HANDLE. NIGERIA, FOR EXAMPLE, CONTAINS MORE THAN 250 DISTINCT TRIBES, AND IS DEEPLY DIVIDED BY RACE, LANGUAGE, AND RELIGION, FROM NORTHERN ARAB MUSLIMS TO NEGRO CHRISTIANS AND NEGRO ANIMISTS. THE RESULT IS THAT MANY OF THE NEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES START OUT WITH MORE FACTORS TENDING TO PULL THEM APART THAN TO HOLD THEM TOGETHER.

A SECOND FACTOR IN AFRICA IS THE EXCEPTIONALLY THIN VENEER OF QUALIFIED LEADERSHIP. THIS VARIES, OF COURSE, WITH THE DEGREE OF ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION WHICH PREPARED THEM FOR INDEPENDENCE. THERE ARE MORE TRAINED LEADERS IN NIGERIA, OR GHANA, OR KENYA, THAN THERE ARE IN THE FORMER BELGIAN CONGO, OR IN THE REMAINING PORTUGUESE COLONIES. THE STATES OF FORMER FRENCH AFRICA FALL SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN. EVEN IN THE BEST OF THEM, HOWEVER, WHAT YOU MIGHT CALL THE "BENCH STRENGTH" OF

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TRAINED LEADERS AND ADMINISTRATORS IS TOO THIN NOT TO SUFFER WHEN A MAN LIKE TOM MBOYA IS ASSASSINATED IN KENYA, OR WHEN AN ENTIRE GROUP IS EXCLUDED BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTES THE OPPOSITION, OR WAS ON THE WRONG SIDE IN A CIVIL WAR AS IN NIGERIA. THIS BRINGS ABOUT THE TYPE OF TALENT SHORTAGE FROM WHICH DEMAGOGUES, EXTREMISTS, AND THE COMMUNIST AGENTS CAN BENEFIT.

IN LATIN AMERICA, OTHER FACTORS COME INTO PLAY. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE LIES FAR BEHIND THESE COUNTRIES, BUT THE PROCESS AND THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC IN MOST CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES LEFT WEALTH AND POWER CONCENTRATED IN A VERY FEW HANDS--WHAT WE CALL THE ELITE OR THE OLIGARCHY IN EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES. PROSPEROUS JUAN VALDEZ, WEARING A GLEAMING WHITE SHIRT AS HE BRINGS HIS COFFEE TO MARKET ON A FAT AND HAPPY MULE, EXISTS ALL TOO OFTEN ONLY IN THE TELEVISION COMMERCIALS. THE PEASANTS IN THE FOOTHILLS AND THE INDIANS IN THE JUNGLE OR IN THE HIGHLANDS CREATE THEIR OWN VULNERABILITIES, AND SOMETIMES THEIR OWN REVOLUTIONS. A GOVERNMENT CAN WIN THEM BY REACHING OUT WITH ROADS, SCHOOLS, SANITATION, MARKETS, AND OTHER CIVIC ACTION. THE COMMUNISTS CAN ALSO REACH THEM WITH ORGANIZERS, PROPAGANDA AND GUNS IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OR WILL NOT MOVE FIRST.

IN COUNTRY AFTER COUNTRY, FURTHERMORE, THE SMALL FARMERS AND THE HINTERLAND INDIANS ARE GIVING UP BY THE THOUSANDS, AND MOVING TO THE CITIES WHERE THEY FILL MISERABLE, REBELLIOUS

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SLUMS. IN 1940, THERE WERE ONLY FIVE CITIES IN LATIN AMERICA WITH POPULATIONS OVER ONE MILLION. IN 1960, THERE WERE NINE; THIS YEAR, THERE WILL BE 18; AND WE ESTIMATE THAT BY 1980 THERE WILL BE 26 CITIES IN LATIN AMERICAN WITH POPULATIONS IN EXCESS OF ONE MILLION PEOPLE.

THE COUP, OR MORE PROPERLY THE "GOLPE," IS ENDEMIC TO LATIN AMERICA, BUT IN THE STRICT SENSE OF THE WORD, THESE ARE NOT TRUE REVOLUTIONS. THEY RARELY RESULT IN A RADICAL REORGANIZATION OF THE NATION, OR AN ABRUPT CHANGE OF ITS POLITICAL COURSE. THE COUP IS SIMPLY AN ALTERNATIVE TO ELECTIONS FOR TRANSFERRING POWER FROM ONE REGIME TO ANOTHER.

IN THIS CENTURY, THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY A HANDFUL OF TRUE REVOLUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: CERTAINLY THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION OF 1916, POSSIBLY THE BOLIVIAN UPHEAVAL IN 1952, AND CASTRO'S TAKEOVER IN CUBA. IF WE ARE TO LOOK--AS THE COMMUNIST AGENTS CERTAINLY DO--FOR THE PROSPECTS FOR REAL REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA, I SUGGEST WE LOOK AT THOSE 26 METROPOLITAN SLUMS OF 1980.

THESE ARE FAR MORE LIKELY SITES OF INFECTION AND TROUBLE THAN THE REMOTE MOUNTAIN RANGES WHERE FIDEL CASTRO HAS IN THE PAST ATTEMPTED TO INSTIGATE OR ASSIST RURAL GUERRILLA CAMPAIGNS. THESE CITIES HAVE THE DISCONTENTED, THE DEPRIVED, THE DESPERATE AND THE HOPELESS PEOPLE WHO CAN BE LED TO REVOLUTIONS.

-8-

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IN OUR ANALYSIS OF FUTURE DANGER SPOTS, WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE LEADERS OF THESE REVOLUTIONS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE YOUNG NATIONALISTS THAN ORTHODOX COMMUNISTS, OR EXTREMISTS OF THE CASTRO PERSUASION. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO COMMUNIST DIRECTION OR INFLUENCE, AND MOSCOW'S AGENTS AS WELL AS CASTRO'S WILL CERTAINLY BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR THEM, READY FOR ANY OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE IN ON AND TAKE OVER A POTENTIAL REVOLUTION.

IN 1959, WHEN CASTRO CAME TO POWER IN CUBA, THE SOVIET UNION HAD DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN ONLY THREE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES--MEXICO, URUGUAY, AND ARGENTINA. IN THE ENTIRE HEMISPHERE SOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE, THERE WERE ONLY 131 OFFICIAL SOVIET PERSONNEL. CASTRO IN HIS FIRST FEW YEARS OF POWER COULD CALL ON SEVERAL TIMES THAT MANY GUERRILLAS IN A DOZEN COUNTRIES, AND MANY TIMES THAT MANY AGENTS.

TODAY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN 11 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CUBA, AND GOOD PROSPECTS FOR ADDING MORE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. SOME OF THESE MISSIONS ARE NOT YET FULLY STAFFED,

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BUT BY THE END OF 1969 THEIR 131 PERSONNEL HAD INCREASED TO 271--AND IT IS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY ALMOST HALF OF THEM AS OFFICERS WITH A BACKGROUND IN INTELLIGENCE.

CASTRO, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS CUT BACK SHARPLY IN HIS SUPPORT OF INSURGENCY, PARTLY BECAUSE OF SOVIET URGING, PARTLY IN DISILLUSION OVER THE DISMAL FAILURE OF CHE GUEVARA'S BOLIVIAN ADVENTURE. HE IS MORE SELECTIVE, AND OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL "EXPORT OF REVOLUTION" WILL REQUIRE URBAN AS WELL AS RURAL GUERRILLAS. HAVANA RECENTLY PUBLISHED A SO-CALLED "MINI-MANUAL FOR URBAN TERRORISM."

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THE CONCLUSION IS FAIRLY OBVIOUS THAT THE KREMLIN FEELS IT IS TO COMMUNIST ADVANTAGE IN THE LONG RUN TO SIT BACK AND WAIT FOR THOSE VULNERABILITIES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL FABRIC TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES, THAN IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE THE ISSUE BY INSTIGATING GUERRILLA WARFARE FROM OUTSIDE.

IN ASIA, OF COURSE, THE ASIAN COMMUNISTS LONG AGO CHANGED THE ISSUE OF SUBVERSION AND CONSPIRACY INTO AN OUTRIGHT TRIAL OF MILITARY STRENGTH, BUT IT IS STILL INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT IN KOREA, THE COMMUNISTS ARE HELD IN CHECK IN LARGE PART BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANY VULNERABILITIES IN SOUTH KOREA WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE PEOPLE TO SEEK OR TO ACCEPT COMMUNIST HELP. IN VIETNAM, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE MIGHT WELL HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE WOODS MILITARILY LONG AGO IF THE PEOPLE HAD ANY REAL SENSE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH AND SUPPORT FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THEY NECESSARILY IDENTIFY WITH HANOI, OR WITH THE VIET CONG; IT IS THE ABSENCE OF ANY SENSE OF NATIONHOOD, OF ANY FEELING THAT ANY GOVERNMENT IS WORKING IN THEIR BEHALF, THAT CREATES THE VULNERABILITY.

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IF THE WEALTH OF OPPORTUNITIES MAKES IT NECESSARY TO BE SOMEWHAT VAGUE ABOUT WHERE THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT CHOOSE TO CAUSE TROUBLE OVER THE NEXT 15 YEARS, PERHAPS WE CAN BE MORE SPECIFIC IN EXAMINING THE RECORD OF WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN DOING OVER THE PAST 15.

I USE THAT TIME PERIOD BECAUSE THE MODERN COMMUNIST DRIVE FOR WORLD INFLUENCE BEGAN WITH THE END OF THE STALIN ERA.

STALIN WAS CERTAINLY AN OPPORTUNIST WHEN THE SITUATION AS HE SAW IT CALLED FOR SUCH TACTICS, BUT HE WAS FIRST, LAST, AND ALWAYS DOCTRINAIRE. HE EVIDENTLY FELT THAT NON-COMMUNIST FORCES--NO MATTER HOW ANTI-COLONIAL THEY MIGHT BE--WERE SIMPLY NOT PROPER REVOLUTIONARY COMPANIONS, AND PROBABLY NOT EFFECTIVE TOOLS FOR FORWARDING COMMUNIST INTERESTS. AND ORTHODOX COMMUNIST ASSETS IN THE THIRD WORLD IN STALIN'S DAY, IN CONSEQUENCE, COULD NOT CONSTITUTE BY THEMSELVES THE THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS THAT STALIN'S SUCCESSORS ARE ABLE TO POSE TODAY.

STALIN'S HEIRS OBVIOUSLY WERE OF A DIFFERENT OPINION. THE NEW SOVIET APPROACH TO THE THIRD WORLD WHICH WAS GRADUALLY UNVEILED, HOWEVER, WAS MADE POSSIBLE IN PART BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH CLEARLY DID NOT OBTAIN UNTIL THE LAST FEW YEARS OF STALIN'S LIFE. BY THE MID-50'S,

-11-

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MOSCOW HAD MANAGED TO CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE--AN AREA WHICH HAD REQUIRED PRIORITY SOVIET ATTENTION BEFORE. AS A RESULT OF ITS OWN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD AT ITS DISPOSAL FOR THE FIRST TIME THE KINDS OF RESOURCES THAT ALLOWED FOR LIMITED INVOLVEMENT ABROAD. THE ACQUISITION OF NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY THINKING AT THIS TIME RESULTED IN VAST QUANTITIES OF SURPLUS ARMS THAT MET THE NEEDS OF POTENTIAL CLIENTS BUT WERE OBSOLESCENT BY SOVIET STANDARDS. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET LEADERS HAD PROBABLY GAINED A CERTAIN CONFIDENCE FROM THEIR COUNTRY'S NEWLY ACHIEVED INTERNATIONAL POSITION WHICH ENCOURAGED THEM TO WANT TO STRIKE OUT MORE BOLDLY IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. BEYOND THAT, LOCAL COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD WERE SIMPLY NOT FARING WELL, AND WERE CERTAINLY NOT UP TO THE TASK IN MOST INSTANCES OF DOING MOSCOW'S BIDDING. THUS, THE SOVIET LEADERS INITIATED A POLICY OF LENDING SUPPORT OF VARIOUS KINDS ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON PLATFORM OF "ANTI-IMPERIALISM." IN THIS RESPECT, OF COURSE, SOVIET ENTRY INTO VARIOUS AREAS OF THE THIRD WORLD HAS COME ABOUT AS MUCH BY INVITATION AS BY SOVIET INITIATIVE.

IT HAS NEVER BEEN CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIET POLICY HAS DEVELOPED ALONG ANY PREORDAINED LINES.

-12-

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THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH DREW THE SOVIETS INTO THE THIRD WORLD IN THE FIRST PLACE--AND WHICH HAVE PREOCCUPIED THEM EVER SINCE--WERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THUS COULD BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS. AT THE TIME, THE SOVIETS WERE EVIDENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION THE US WAS ESTABLISHING ON THE USSR'S PERIPHERY, AND THEIR MOVES IN THAT REGION OVER THE YEARS HAVE SURELY BEEN DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE AMERICAN PRESENCE, PARTICULARLY THE MILITARY FORCES THE US MAINTAINS IN AND AROUND THE MEDITERRANEAN. OTHER REGIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD, NAMELY AFRICA AND ASIA, HAVE DRAWN A GOOD MEASURE OF SOVIET ATTENTION, BUT NONETHELESS REMAIN LOW PRIORITY AREAS. THE RELATIVE REMOTENESS OF THESE AREAS FROM THE USSR PROBABLY ACCOUNTS IN PART FOR MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE. BEYOND THAT, OPPORTUNITIES HAVE SIMPLY NOT PRESENTED THEMSELVES IN THE WAY THEY HAVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR UNWILLING TO GET TOO DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE VAGARIES OF POLITICS IN AFRICA AND UNABLE TO COMPETE TOO HEAVILY WITH THE US COMMITMENT IN LATIN AMERICA.

INSOFAR AS SOVIET POLICY HAS REFLECTED ANY BROAD STRATEGIC CONCEPT, THAT WOULD BE MOSCOW'S BELIEF THAT SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS CAN BE FORMED BETWEEN

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THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" AND THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NATIONALIST FORCES OPERATING IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE PRIMARY AIM OF THIS BROAD FRONT OF "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" FORCES IS TO REDUCE AND CONSTRICT WESTERN INFLUENCE AND TO DENY THE WEST INTERESTS OF EVERY SORT--ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY. THE SOVIETS HAVE ASSUMED, OF COURSE, THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE COMMUNIST STATES, THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES WOULD SOONER OR LATER TAKE ON A MORE RADICAL CHARACTER. AT THAT POINT, THEY WOULD EMBARK ON THE "SOCIALIST PATH," THEIR CONFLICT WITH THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD INTENSIFY, AND THIS IN TURN WOULD LEAD TO A DENIAL TO THE WEST OF CRITICALLY STRATEGIC AREAS AND RESOURCES. ULTIMATELY, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HOPED THAT COMMUNIST REGIMES MIGHT EMERGE ON TOP IN SOME OF THESE STATES.

THE MAIN INSTRUMENTS OF COMMUNIST POLICY

SINCE THOSE EARLY YEARS OF SOVIET EFFORT, MOSCOW AND THE COMMUNIST REGIMES OF CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE HAVE CONSIDERABLY ELABORATED THEIR TIES WITH THE AFRO-ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN STATES. IN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE ON THE ROLE OF THE PREFERRED GREAT POWER SUPPORTER, THE SOVIETS HAVE USED A VARIETY OF METHODS TO MAKE THEIR INFLUENCE FELT. ALL THE TACTICAL INSTRUMENTS FROM LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY TO "NATIONAL LIBERATION" WARFARE HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY THEM, AND



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UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO. THEIR MAIN RELIANCE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN ON THE CONVENTIONAL INSTRUMENTS-- TRADE AND ECONOMIC AID, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT, VARIOUS KINDS OF EXCHANGES, HIGH-LEVEL CEREMONIAL VISITS, PORT CALLS, AND OTHER SORTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS AND SUBVERSIVE METHODS ARE, OF COURSE, EVERYWHERE A PART OF SOVIET POLICY, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN USED IN RECENT YEARS MORE TO ADVANCE MOSCOW'S POSITION WITH ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS THAN TO WIN POWER FOR LOCAL COMMUNIST FORCES.

AS A RESULT OF SUCH INTENSIVE EFFORTS, IT HAS BECOME MORE OR LESS A FACT OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE TODAY THAT THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, BUT PRIMARILY THE SOVIETS, HAVE MANAGED TO WIN FOR THEMSELVES IMPORTANT POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE IN SOME AREAS OF THE THIRD WORLD AND TO SUPPLANT THE WEST IN OTHERS. IF SUCH SUCCESS AS THEY HAVE HAD CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY ONE TANGIBLE THING, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TO THE SPECIAL AID RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED OVER THE YEARS WITH MANY OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. MOSCOW HAS BECOME A MAJOR SOURCE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, A LARGE MARKET FOR TRADE COMMODITIES (PARTICULARLY RAW MATERIALS), AND, MOST IMPORTANT, A SUPPLIER OF A WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. THE COMMUNIST REGIMES OF CHINA AND EASTERN

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EUROPE ARE ALSO INVOLVED IN THESE ENDEAVORS, BUT ON A MUCH LESS AMBITIOUS SCALE.

ECONOMIC AID

OVER THE YEARS, THE COMMUNIST REGIMES TOGETHER HAVE PROMISED TO POUR <sup>ABOUT</sup> MORE THAN \$11 BILLION IN ECONOMIC AID INTO 48 NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD. ONLY ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THIS AMOUNT, HOWEVER, HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DELIVERED. OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE EXTENDED TO DATE, THE VAST BULK OF IT, SOME <sup>6.9</sup> \$6.7 BILLION, OR ABOUT <sup>65</sup> 62 PERCENT, HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY MOSCOW. OF THE REMAINDER, THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS HAVE EXTENDED SOME ~~\$2.9~~ <sup>\$3</sup> BILLION AND THE CHINESE ABOUT \$1.1 BILLION. AS FAR AS THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THIS ASSISTANCE IS CONCERNED, ABOUT 70 PERCENT OF THE AID EXTENDED HAS GONE TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA, 15 PERCENT TO AFRICA, 10 PERCENT TO THE FAR EAST, AND 5 PERCENT TO LATIN AMERICA. THE OVERALL AID EFFORT IS QUITE IMPRESSIVE--PARTICULARLY WHEN VIEWED BY THE TOTAL NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS--BUT THE OVERWHELMING PORTION OF THIS COMMUNIST ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HAS GONE TO A RELATIVE HANDFUL OF STATES ALONG THE USSR'S SOUTHERN PERIPHERY AND A BIT FARTHER AFIELD IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE MAJOR RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN INDIA, THE UAR, IRAN, INDONESIA,

-16-

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AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND PAKISTAN, WHICH TOGETHER HAVE BEEN PROMISED ABOUT 68 PERCENT OF ALL ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED TO DATE.

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT BENEFITS OF SUCH ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION WITH MOSCOW HAS BEEN THE RATHER LIBERAL ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WHICH ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN OFFERED. IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN UNUSUALLY SELECTIVE IN DETERMINING HOW MUCH AND WHAT KIND OF ECONOMIC AID THEY HANDED OUT. IN ADDITION, THE TERMS THEY OFFERED WERE ~~EXTRAORDINARILY~~ <sup>RELATIVELY</sup> GENEROUS-- LONG-TERM LOANS, LOW INTEREST RATES, AND FLEXIBLE REPAYMENT PRIVILEGES. FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SIGNS THAT SOVIET AID POLICY IS HARDENING. THIS HAS PROBABLY BEEN BROUGHT ON AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ~~SOVIET~~ <sup>SOVIET</sup> DEALINGS WITH COUNTRIES LIKE INDONESIA WHERE, UNDER SUKARNO, UNSUITABLE PROJECTS WERE TAKEN ON AND WHERE A PRIMITIVE ECONOMY SIMPLY COULD NOT ABSORB WITH ANY EFFICIENCY THE VAST QUANTITIES OF CAPITAL AID THAT WERE DELIVERED.

NOW, BEFORE NEW SOVIET COMMITMENTS ARE MADE, QUALIFIED SPECIALISTS GENERALLY UNDERTAKE FEASIBILITY SURVEYS. MOREOVER, MOSCOW PRESENTLY EXTENDS RELATIVELY FEW COMPREHENSIVE LINES OF CREDIT FOR MULTIPLE UNDESIGNATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, PREFERRING INSTEAD TO ALLOCATE AID FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES. AS A RESULT, MOSCOW

-17-

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TENDS TO COMMIT ITSELF TO FEWER OF THE SO-CALLED "GLAMOR PROJECTS," AND CREDITS HAVE ACCORDINGLY TENDED TO SHRINK. FOR INSTANCE, OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NEW CREDITS EXTENDED OVER THE PAST 4 YEARS, ALMOST 70 PERCENT HAVE BEEN FOR LESS THAN \$25 MILLION. BY CONTRAST, DURING THE PREVIOUS 4-YEAR PERIOD, MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF SUCH CREDITS EXCEEDED THAT AMOUNT.

TRADE RELATIONS

COMMUNIST TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD HAVE DEVELOPED IN A LESS ONE-SIDED FASHION. THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BECOME IMPORTANT MARKETS FOR GOODS AND RAW MATERIALS FROM A LARGE NUMBER OF UNDERDEVELOPED STATES, AND THEY IN TURN HAVE SUPPLIED EQUALLY LARGE AMOUNTS OF FINISHED COMMODITIES AND EQUIPMENT. THE TRADE BALANCE THAT HAS BEEN MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE THIRD WORLD STATES ON THE OTHER, HAS GENERALLY BEEN AN EVEN ONE. THIS OF COURSE HAS HAD A FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, WHICH NOT TOO LONG AGO ALMOST TOTALLY DOMINATED THESE MARKETS. IN 1968, FOR INSTANCE, THE COMMUNIST<sup>0</sup> REGIMES TOGETHER SUPPLIED ROUGHLY 6 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL IMPORTS AND TOOK SLIGHTLY LESS THAN THAT SHARE OF THE TOTAL EXPORTS ✓

-18-

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## SECRET

FROM THE WORLD'S 120 LESS DEVELOPED NATIONS. THE GENERAL TRADING PATTERN THAT HAS EVOLVED, HOWEVER, FOLLOWS PRETTY MUCH ALONG THE SAME GEOGRAPHIC LINES AS THE COMMUNIST AID PROGRAMS; NAMELY, MOSCOW'S HEAVIEST TRADING IS WITH THE RADICAL ARAB STATES AND THOSE COUNTRIES ALONG ITS SOUTHERN BORDERS. IN 1968, FOR EXAMPLE, THESE STATES ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT 55% OF THE COMMUNISTS' IMPORTS AND ABOUT 63% OF THEIR EXPORTS.

DESPITE THIS FAIRLY HIGH LEVEL OF TRADE ACTIVITY, MOSCOW IS EVIDENTLY CONCERNED THAT THE STATE OF ITS TRADE RELATIONS IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE. IN FACT, THE VALUE OF THE SOVIET TRADE TURNOVER WITH THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAS INCREASED ONLY VERY SLOWLY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO FIND MODEST NEW MARKETS FOR THEIR GOODS, THERE IS APPARENTLY A MEASURE OF ALARM IN THE KREMLIN THAT IF THINGS KEEP GOING THE WAY THEY HAVE BEEN, THE USSR WILL EVENTUALLY BE TAKING IN CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN IT IS SENDING OUT. WHAT THIS MEANS IN ECONOMIC TERMS, OF COURSE, IS THAT AN UNFAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE WILL HAVE DEVELOPED. IN AN EFFORT TO FEND OFF THIS PROSPECT, THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE A COUPLE OF THINGS: THEY HAVE ISSUED PUBLIC WARNINGS THAT CONTINUED PURCHASES FROM THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE CONTINGENT ON THE LATTERS' PURCHASES FROM MOSCOW; AND

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THEY HAVE STARTED TO MAKE INCREASED OFFERS OF TRADE CREDITS, WHICH ESSENTIALLY ALLOW CUSTOMERS TO BUY SOVIET GOODS ON TIME.

### MILITARY AID

PROBABLY NO OTHER SINGLE INSTRUMENT OF COMMUNIST POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS BROUGHT MORE POLITICAL DIVIDENDS FOR THE COMMUNISTS, YET CREATED MORE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THEM, THAN THE SUPPLY OF MILITARY ARMS. UNLIKE OTHER FORMS OF AID, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME; THEY HAVE A SPECIAL APPEAL FOR AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WHOSE STABILITY LARGELY DEPENDS ON MILITARY FORCES; AND THEY GENERALLY ENCOURAGE A KIND OF CLOSE CONTACT AND RAPPORT WITH RECIPIENTS THAT IS OTHERWISE DIFFICULT TO GAIN. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE LEARNED THAT MILITARY AID RELATIONSHIPS HAVE NOT PROVIDED THEM WITH STRONG OR DEPENDABLE CONTROL OVER CLIENTS, AND ONLY RARELY HAVE THEY LED TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE FORTUNES OF LOCAL COMMUNISTS. BEYOND THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR IN 1967, THEY HAVE LEARNED THAT SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH MILITARY AID RECIPIENTS CAN LEAD TO RISKS OF UNWANTED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, AND POSSIBLY EVEN TO DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE US. THIS IS TO SAY NOTHING, OF COURSE, ABOUT THE PRESTIGE LOSSES AND THE

-20-  
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COSTS OF REPLACING LOST EQUIPMENT AND OF RESTORING DAMAGED RELATIONSHIPS WITH DEFEATED CLIENTS.

EVEN SO, THE COMMUNISTS PROBABLY REGARD MILITARY AID AS ONE OF THE MOST SUITABLE MEANS AT PRESENT FOR GAINING THE KIND OF INFLUENCE THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IN THE THIRD WORLD. OVER THE YEARS, THE SOVIETS, COMMUNIST CHINA, AND SEVERAL OF THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST STATES HAVE EXTENDED SOME \$6 BILLION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO 23 COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND AFRICA. THE OVERWHELMING PORTION OF THIS, ABOUT 90 PERCENT, HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY MOSCOW. THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES HAVE EXTENDED SOME \$700 MILLION IN ARMS AID (NEARLY THREE QUARTERS OF WHICH WAS PROVIDED BEFORE 1958); AND THE CHINESE HAVE EXTENDED ABOUT \$100 MILLION IN ARMS ASSISTANCE, MUCH OF WHICH HAS BEEN IN THE FORM OF OUTRIGHT GRANTS. IN ADDITION, SINCE THE START OF THEIR PROGRAM, THE SOVIETS HAVE TRAINED MORE THAN 22,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AND IN RECENT YEARS, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY PERSONNEL SERVING IN THE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES HAS AVERAGED ~~SOME 3,500 ANNUALLY~~ <sup>IN EXCESS OF 4,000 MEN.</sup>

ABOUT HALF OF ALL SOVIET ARMS AID HAS GONE TO TWO COUNTRIES, THE UAR AND INDONESIA. FIVE OTHERS-- IRAQ, INDIA, SYRIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND ALGERIA--HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT 45 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, WITH THE

-21-

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REMAINDER GOING IN SMALL CHUNKS TO A NUMBER OF STATES, PRIMARILY IN AFRICA. THE PRIMARY RECIPIENTS OF EAST EUROPEAN ARMS AID HAVE BEEN MOSCOW'S MAJOR CLIENTS, THE ARAB STATES AND INDONESIA, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN. THIS SHOWS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES HAVE GENERALLY ACTED AS ADJUNCTS TO SOVIET POLICY.

THE CHINESE HAVE PROVIDED SIZABLE AMOUNTS OF ARMS TO ONLY 5 NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: ALGERIA (BEFORE INDEPENDENCE), CAMBODIA, INDONESIA, PAKISTAN, AND TANZANIA. IN ADDITION, PEKING HAS EXTENDED TOKEN ASSISTANCE--PRIMARILY SMALL ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND TRAINING--TO A FEW AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND TO DISSIDENT POLITICAL GROUPS IN AFRICA AND ASIA. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CHINESE AID PROGRAM ARE BROAD--TO BUILD POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF BOTH THE WEST AND THE USSR--BUT THE MEANS THAT PEKING HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL ARE QUITE LIMITED, AND THE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY HAVE NARROWED OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS.

THE FACT THAT SOVIETS ARMS OFFERS HAVE BEEN MADE IN WIDELY DISPERSED AREAS SUGGESTS THAT THE KREMLIN'S MILITARY AID PROGRAM IS NOT DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT A RIGID PLAN, BUT TO RESPOND TO OPPORTUNITIES WHEREVER THEY ARISE AND TO ESTABLISH A SOVIET PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE. THE OPPORTUNISTIC NATURE OF



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SOVIET MILITARY AID POLICY IS HIGHLIGHTED MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE BY THE FACT THAT MOSCOW HAS NOT TURNED DOWN, AS FAR AS ANYONE KNOWS, A SINGLE PROSPECTIVE CLIENT SEEKING ITS ASSISTANCE. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO RISK ALIENATING ONE CLIENT-- AND EVEN INVOLVING THEMSELVES IN REGIONAL CONFLICT-- BY OFFERING AND SUPPLYING ARMS TO AN ANTAGONIST. A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THIS IS MOSCOW'S RECENT EXTENSION OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN, WHICH HAS PERIODICALLY BEEN IN DISPUTE WITH TWO OTHER SOVIET ARMS CLIENTS, AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA. BUT INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IN MOST OF THESE CASES, THE NEW CLIENTS THEMSELVES ORIGINALLY PREFERRED OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY, AND TURNED TO THE SOVIETS ONLY AFTER FAILING TO GET WHAT THEY WANTED ELSEWHERE.

THE SOVIETS ARE NOT, HOWEVER, AS INDISCRIMINATE IN SETTING TERMS AND IN DETERMINING THE KINDS AND QUANTITIES OF ARMS THEY WILL SELL. FOR INSTANCE, OVER THE PAST YEAR THE SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN INTENSIFYING THEIR CONTROL OVER THE REQUIREMENTS AND USE OF THE ARMS THEY ARE PROVIDING THE ARABS. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO REPLACE THE ARMS LOST BY THEIR ARAB CLIENTS, THEY HAVE DONE SO WITH INCREASING CONCERN FOR ARAB CAPABILITIES TO ABSORB AND USE SUCH EQUIPMENT EFFECTIVELY. NEW AGREEMENTS

-23-

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WITH THE UAR AND SYRIA DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1968, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE UNDERTAKEN WITH MUCH GREATER DELIBERATION THAN THE ONES CONCLUDED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE JUNE WAR. AND THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BOTH COUNTRIES GOT CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THEY WANTED AND THOUGHT THEY NEEDED. NOT LONG AGO, SOUTH YEMEN WAS ALSO DENIED A CONSIDERABLE PART OF ITS ARMS REQUEST, APPARENTLY REFLECTING SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES IN THAT COUNTRY AS WELL AS MOSCOW'S EXPERIENCE IN NEARBY YEMEN, WHERE INTERNAL MILITARY CONFLICT HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF MOSCOW DESPITE SIZEABLE DOSES OF SOVIET ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.

IN SUM, SOVIET MILITARY AID HAS BECOME ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF MOSCOW'S POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD. IT HELPS TO INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE AND TO REDUCE THAT OF THE WEST. IT IS USED AS A MEANS FOR GAINING ENTRY INTO STATES WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE BE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOVIET APPROACHES. IT SOMETIMES HELPS TO MAINTAIN IN POWER REGIMES FAVORABLE TO THE USSR. IT OCCASIONALLY HELPS TO ALIGN THE SO-CALLED "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD WITH MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY. (GOOD EXAMPLES OF THIS POINT ARE THE POSITIONS MOST OF MOSCOW'S ARMS CLIENTS HAVE TAKEN ON THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE

-24-

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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. A LARGE PROPORTION OF THESE STATES HAVE GIVEN OFFICIAL SUPPORT TO HANOI, AND MOST HAVE EITHER ENDORSED OR BEEN RELUCTANT TO CRITICIZE MOSCOW'S MOVE AGAINST THE CZECHS.) AND IN RECENT YEARS, IT HAS ALSO BEEN USED TO PURSUE THE ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVE OF ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT THE CHINESE FROM EXTENDING THEIR INFLUENCE.

#### THE IMPACT OF COMMUNIST AID POLICY

HOW MUCH DURABLE LEVERAGE THE SOVIETS HAVE GAINED FROM ALL THIS ACTIVITY, HOWEVER, IS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE. STILL MORE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE IS HOW MUCH ANY SUCH GAINS THEY HAVE MADE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEIR AID PROGRAMS, AND HOW MUCH TO LARGER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. INDONESIA UNDER SUKARNO, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS A MAJOR BENEFICIARY OF SOVIET LARGESSE. IN TURN, HE WAS FAIRLY COOPERATIVE WITH MOSCOW ON SOME INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, BUT WENT ON TO PURSUE POLICIES MUCH MORE IN LINE WITH PEKING. INDIA TOO HAS REPEATEDLY DEFERRED TO THE SOVIETS ON FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, BUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT COUNTS ON SOVIET SUPPORT AGAINST CHINA. THE RADICAL ARAB STATES HAVE, OF COURSE, BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH THE SOVIETS. BUT EVEN THOUGH

-25-

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THEY ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON SOVIET SUPPORT AND AID, THEY HAVE FROM TIME TO TIME CRITICIZED MOSCOW FOR ITS FOREIGN POLICIES AND FOR MEDDLING IN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS.

EVEN SO, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY CALCULATE THAT THEIR AID PROGRAMS, PARTICULARLY THEIR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, COULD OVER TIME HAVE A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE RECIPIENT, ITS POLICIES, AND PERHAPS EVEN THE CHOICE OF A SUCCESSOR REGIME. SOVIET SUCCESSES TO DATE, HOWEVER, HAVE NOT BEEN COMMENSURATE WITH THESE EXPECTATIONS. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS HAVE MET WITH SOME OUTRIGHT FAILURES IN SEVERAL INSTANCES. IN GHANA, FOR EXAMPLE, SOME OF THE MILITARY WERE FAIRLY COOPERATIVE WITH MOSCOW FOR A TIME, BUT EVENTUALLY TURNED OUT BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THEIR MINION, NKRUMAH. IN INDONESIA, THE MILITARY WAS NEVER VERY RESPONSIVE TO THE SOVIETS DESPITE ALMOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON THEM FOR ARMS. AND IN THE UAR, MOSCOW CONTINUES TO SUPPLY ARMS TO A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FOR WHOSE POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND PROFESSIONAL QUALITY IT DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY HIGH REGARD.

-26-

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NONETHELESS, BY THEIR OWN STANDARDS AT LEAST, THE SOVIETS MUST SURELY REGARD THE INROADS THEY HAVE MADE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS MORE SIGNIFICANT AND PROMISING THAN ELSEWHERE IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE SOVIET PRESENCE THERE IS NOWADAYS ACCEPTED PRACTICALLY EVERYWHERE AS A SIMPLE FACT OF LIFE; SO IS THE ALMOST TOTAL DEPENDENCE OF SOME ARAB STATES ON SOVIET AID AND SUPPORT. IN FACT, WE LANDED TROOPS IN LEBANON IN 1958 TO FORESTALL PRECISELY THE KIND OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WHICH WE NOW RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT. AND SINCE THAT TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE MANAGED TO CREATE CONDITIONS ALL OVER THE AREA WHICH MAKE A US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN MOST SITUATIONS TODAY A FAR LESS FEASIBLE POLICY ALTERNATIVE FOR US. IN ANY EVENT, IT DOES NOT TAKE SUCH CLOSE SCRUTINY ANYMORE TO DETERMINE THAT THERE IS A PROFUSION OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA.

TO MOSCOW, ALL THIS IS PROBABLY REGARDED AS ONLY RIGHT, GIVEN ITS HEAVY EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS AND ENERGY AND THE AREA'S PROXIMITY TO THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS REALIZE THAT THIS HAS NOT COME ABOUT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE DISCOMFORT AND RISK. MOSCOW NO DOUBT HAD

-27-

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SOME BAD MOMENTS DURING THE JUNE WAR. THE SOVIETS MISCALCULATED BY EGGING NASIR ON BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN, WITHOUT EVIDENTLY EVER CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT THEY COULD ACTUALLY RESTRAIN THE HOT-HEADED ARAB LEADER. AND ONCE HOSTILITIES STARTED, THEY FOUND THEMSELVES BACKING A CLIENT THEY COULD NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORT WITHOUT THE RISK OF HAVING TO TAKE ON THE US AT THE SAME TIME.

AT PRESENT, THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY UNDERSTAND THAT ESSENTIALLY UNCONTROLLABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE CLIENTS COULD CAUSE GRAVE PERIL FOR THEIR POSITIONS AGAIN. THIS IS PROBABLY ONE REASON WHY MOSCOW HAS THUS FAR HEDGED ON LENDING THE POPULAR ARAB COMMANDO GROUPS ALL-OUT SUPPORT. NONETHELESS, CONFLICTING SOVIET UTTERANCES ON THIS ISSUE SUGGEST THAT SOME PEOPLE IN THE KREMLIN ARE FEELING INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO CHARGES--MAINLY FROM THE CHINESE--THAT MOSCOW IS NOT DOING ENOUGH TO PROMOTE REVOLUTION. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, ONE OF THE MAJOR CONCERNS OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS TODAY IS NOT ONLY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GAINED INFLUENCE WITH THE ARABS, BUT THAT THIS INFLUENCE MIGHT BE INSUFFICIENT TO DETER THE ARABS FROM SOME PRECIPITATE ACTION.

-28-

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THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES MUST AT TIMES QUESTION WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THEIR ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE RADICAL ARABS WILL BE. THEY REALIZE THAT THEIR POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS LARGELY BASED ON SUPPORT OF RADICAL ARAB HOSTILITY TOWARDS ISRAEL. AND YET, A FULL SCALE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING AT PRESENT COULD BRING ON KIND OF CHAIN REACTION OF EVENTS, RANGING FROM THE POSSIBLE DEFEAT AND WHOLESALE TURNOVER OF THE ARAB REGIMES, TO THE COMPLETE LOSS OF THE SOVIET INVESTMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND A MAJOR SHAKEUP OF THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP BACK IN MOSCOW. BUT THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT TRYING TO ATTAIN A STABLE SETTLEMENT COULD ALSO JEOPARDIZE THEIR POSITION, SINCE AS THINGS NOW STAND IT WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO BRING GREAT PRESSURES TO BEAR ON THEIR CLIENTS, AND RISK ALIENATING THEM. FOR THE SOVIETS, THEN, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THEIR MAJOR OBJECTIVE IS TO LOWER THE CURRENT LEVEL OF TENSIONS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WITHOUT, HOWEVER, FORCING THEIR CLIENTS INTO MAJOR CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL. THIS, OF COURSE, REQUIRES A GREAT DEAL OF AGILE MANEUVERING ON MOSCOW'S PART, AND THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH

-29-

SECRET

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THE ARAB STATES THEMSELVES CANNOT CONTROL, WILL NOT IN THE MEANTIME DO SOMETHING TO TOPPLE THE KREMLIN BALANCING ACT.

THE THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS

IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM THE SCALE AND CHARACTER OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD IN RECENT YEARS THAT MOSCOW HAS COME TO POSSESS MORE THAN A POTENTIAL CAPABILITY FOR MAKING TROUBLE FOR THE WESTERN POWERS IN CERTAIN OF THESE AREAS. MOREOVER, IN SOME REGIONS LIKE THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIET PRESENCE--PARTICULARLY ITS MILITARY PRESENCE--HAS GROWN TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS ALREADY CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE A MAJOR MENACE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR REMAINING POSITIONS THERE. ALTHOUGH MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY FIGURED IN THE SOVIET DESIRE TO CONTEST THE WESTERN PRESENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD, IT HAS NEVER BEEN CLEAR WHETHER THE NEEDS OF SOVIET POLICY MIGHT PROMPT MOSCOW TO SEEK MAJOR MILITARY ASSETS FOR THEMSELVES IN THE REGION SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, OR MIGHT CAUSE THEM TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN LIMITED MILITARY CONFLICTS IN BEHALF OF THEIR CLIENTS.

-30-

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NATURALLY, THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE UNEASINESS IN WESTERN QUARTERS OVER THESE MATTERS. A GREAT DEAL OF THIS CONCERN HAS BEEN BROUGHT ON BY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. SINCE THAT TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED A LARGE AND CONTINUOUS NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. IT AVERAGES ABOUT 35 SHIPS, SOME 20 OF WHICH ARE CLASSIFIED AS MAJOR COMBATANTS, AND HAS AT TIMES EXCEEDED 60 SHIPS OF ALL KINDS. ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET SQUADRON HAVE ENGAGED IN TACTICAL EXERCISES, INCLUDING AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED A PERMANENT NAVAL PRESENCE AT ALEXANDRIA AND PORT SAID; THEY HAVE ACQUIRED FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES AT PORT SAID, AND MANAGERIAL CONTROL OVER SHIP CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR FACILITIES AT ALEXANDRIA. SOVIET SHIPS HAVE ALSO PAID LONG AND FREQUENT CALLS TO OTHER ARAB PORTS, AND ARE NOW MAKING REGULAR CALLS AT PORTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND RED SEA AND ARE GENERALLY MORE VISIBLE IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

BESIDE THESE MANIFESTATIONS, THERE HAVE BEEN REPEATED INSTANCES OF SOVIET SURVEILLANCE OF SIXTH FLEET CARRIER OPERATIONS BY SOVIET COMBATANT SHIPS

-31-

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AND BY TU-16 AIRCRAFT BEARING EGYPTIAN MARKINGS. FOR A SHORT TIME FOLLOWING THE JUNE WAR, SOVIET PILOTS TOOK PART IN COMBAT OPERATIONS IN YEMEN IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLICAN FORCES THERE. AT PRESENT, LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY PERSONNEL ARE OPERATING IN HIGHER AS WELL AS LOWER ECHELONS OF THE UAR AND SYRIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS, AND THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SOVIET CASUALTIES AS A RESULT. NOW, THE SOVIETS ARE APPARENTLY GOING TO MAN NEW AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN EGYPT AND SOVIET PILOTS MAY HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR FIGHTER PROTECTION OF SOME PARTS OF EGYPT. THUS, STEP BY STEP, THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE SHOOTING WAR. ELSEWHERE IN THE THIRD WORLD, THE SOVIET NAVY IS SHOWING THE FLAG IN BOLDER WAYS THAN BEFORE. A SOVIET TASK FORCE HAS VISITED HAVANA AND EXERCISED IN THE CARIBBEAN, AND JUST LAST MONTH THE BULK OF THE SOVIET FLEET ENGAGED IN UNPRECEDENTED EXERCISES IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS SIMULTANEOUSLY.

THIS HEIGHTENED ACTIVITY HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO ACCOMMODATE A VARIETY OF AIMS, SOME OF WHICH ARE

-32-

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ALTOGETHER APPARENT, SOME OF WHICH ARE NOT. NONETHE-  
LESS, THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF MOST OF THIS ACTIVITY  
HAS PROBABLY BEEN MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY. THE  
INCREASED SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN GENERAL HAS UN-  
DOUBTEDLY BEEN INTENDED TO IMPRESS US AND THE WORLD  
AT LARGE WITH THE STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY OF SOVIET  
NAVAL FORCES. IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WHERE IT HAS  
BEEN MOST INTENSE, IT HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO LEND A  
SHOW OF SUPPORT TO THE ARAB CAUSE, AND TO WARN THE  
US THAT THE MEDITERRANEAN IS NO LONGER AS HOSPITABLE  
TO AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES AS IT ONCE WAS. EVEN  
THOUGH THE LEVEL OF SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS TO THE  
MEDITERRANEAN HAS GREATLY INCREASED OVER THE PAST  
TWO YEARS, THE FORCES THE SOVIETS KEEP THERE AND ARE  
LIKELY TO MAINTAIN THERE FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS  
COULD NOT LONG OPERATE IN A GENERAL CONFLICT SITUA-  
TION AGAINST THE GREATLY SUPERIOR FORCES WITH WHICH  
THEY SHARE THAT BODY OF WATER. ONE OF THE MAIN  
REASONS FOR THIS, OF COURSE, IS THAT THE SOVIET  
FLEET IS DEPENDENT ON VULNERABLE MOBILE LOGISTIC  
SUPPORT AND IS LACKING ADEQUATE AIR DEFENSE.

-33-

SECRET

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INVOLVEMENT IN LIMITED CONFLICTS

IN RECENT YEARS THE USSR HAS BEGUN TO SHOW INTEREST IN THE CONTINGENCY OF APPLYING ITS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY POWER IN AREAS BEYOND ITS PERIPHERY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITIES APPROPRIATE TO THIS. FOR SOME TIME NOW, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MAKING EFFORTS TO PROVIDE THEIR ARMED FORCES WITH MORE FLEXIBLE CAPABILITIES. OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED THEIR AIRBORNE AND AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FORCES. NEW HEAVY AIR TRANSPORTS AND NAVAL LANDING SHIPS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ADDED TO MOSCOW'S MILITARY INVENTORIES. THESE FORCES WILL BE PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MORE MUSCLE ON THE USSR'S PERIPHERY, BUT THEY WILL ALSO GIVE THE SOVIETS GREATER CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THEIR ARAB CLIENTS.

SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY SINCE THE JUNE WAR IS, IN FACT, INDICATIVE OF MOSCOW'S GROWING INCLINATION TO CONSIDER THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES IN THIS WAY. THE ALMOST CONSTANT PRESENCE OF SOVIET SHIPS IN EGYPTIAN PORTS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN RESPONSIVE TO CAIRO'S DESIRE TO DETER POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACK. ISRAELI RELUCTANCE TO UNDERTAKE REPRISAL RAIDS AGAINST, OR TOO CLOSE, TO THESE FACILITIES IS PROBABLY VIEWED IN MOSCOW AS VISIBLE

-34-

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PROOF THAT A GREAT POWER LIKE THE USSR CAN ACT IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS WITH A MEASURE OF IMPUNITY, PARTICULARLY IF IT HAS THE WILL AND DETERMINATION TO DO SO. IF THIS IS THE SOVIET CONCLUSION, IT IS LIKELY TO UNDERGO A TEST BY FIRE IN THE NEAR FUTURE, OVER THE ROLE OF THE SA-3 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE BATTERIES NOW BEING INSTALLED IN EGYPT. THE ISRAELIS HAVE VIRTUALLY TOLD THE RUSSIANS IN SO MANY WORDS THAT IF THE SOVIETS WANT TO EMLACE THESE WEAPONS AROUND ALEXANDRIA, CAIRO ITSELF, AND THE ASWAN DAM, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE WILLING TO FORGO ATTACKS WHICH COULD INVOLVE SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL DIRECTLY IN THE FIGHTING. THE QUID PRO QUO FOR SUCH A TACIT UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, WOULD BE THAT ISRAEL INSISTS ON MAINTAINING AIR SUPERIORITY OVER THAT PART OF EGYPT IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE SUEZ CANAL, AND THAT SA-3 SITES IN THIS AREA WILL BE ATTACKED AND DESTROYED REGARDLESS OF THE NATIONALITY OF THEIR CREWS.

THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY FEEL OBLIGED, FOR THEIR OWN PRESTIGE, TO FURNISH NASIR SOME RELIEF AGAINST THE PERSISTENT ISRAELI AIR RAIDS, AND IN THEIR FRUSTRATION OVER EGYPTIAN INEPTNESS, THEY HAVE APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT SOME OF THE NECESSARY DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS CAN BE EFFECTIVELY MANNED ONLY BY SOVIET PERSONNEL. IDEALLY, THEY WOULD HOPE THAT THE MILITARY RISK THEY

-35-

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ASSUME WILL BE AS LOW AS THE POLITICAL RISK OF NO ACTION WOULD BE HIGH.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO POINT TO A POTENTIAL CONFLICT SITUATION, HOWEVER, WHERE THE RISKS OF DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE LOW ENOUGH TO BE DISREGARDED BY THE KREMLIN. THIS IS PROBABLY ONE REASON WHY MOSCOW UNTIL NOW HAS SO CAREFULLY AVOIDED MAKING MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO SOME OF ITS ARAB CLIENTS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS SURELY REALIZE THAT THERE IS SIMPLY NO GUARANTEE THAT LIMITED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WOULD ACCOMPLISH THEIR PURPOSES. IN FACT, IT COULD EVEN LEAD TO MILITARY EMBARRASSMENT FOR THEM, AND POSSIBLY EVEN TO CONFRONTATION WITH OUR OWN FORCES. FOR THE TIME BEING THEN, THE SOVIETS HOPE THAT THE MAIN FUNCTION OF THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE WILL BE TO MAKE A DISPLAY, TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF A SOVIET INTEREST, AND TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT SUCH AN INTEREST WITHOUT ACTUALLY HAVING TO UNDERTAKE A MAJOR SHARE IN THE SHOOTING.

#### PROSPECTS

VIEWED FROM MOSCOW TODAY, THE THIRD WORLD MUST SEEM A VERITABLE KALEIDOSCOPE OF POTENTIAL RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES. THE SOVIETS HAVE, OF COURSE, MADE SOME IMPORTANT INROADS INTO THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD ALREADY, BUT THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN PERIODICALLY BURNED IN

-36-  
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THE PROCESS. THE LATTER MUST SURELY CAUSE THEM FROM TIME TO TIME TO PONDER ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE BITTEN OFF MORE THAN THEY CAN CHEW. SUCH BITTER AND SOMETIMES COSTLY EXPERIENCES AS THEY HAVE HAD, HOWEVER, WILL MOST LIKELY NOT LEAD MOSCOW TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS OVEREXTENDED AND MUST RETRENCH. THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISENGAGE IN THE PAST, BUT THEY HAVE SHOWN LITTLE INCLINATION TO DO SO. INSTEAD, MOSCOW IS LIKELY TO PROCEED AT A CAUTIOUS PACE, TAKING OPPORTUNITIES AS THEY OCCUR, BUT KEEPING A SHARP EYE OUT FOR DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO SITUATIONS OF UNCONTROLLED RISKS.

EVEN WITHIN PRESENT LIMITATIONS, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO FIND NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THE CHRONIC TENSIONS AND INSTABILITY WHICH ARE LIKELY TO PERSIST IN MANY OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS WILL CREATE FERTILE CONDITIONS FOR SOVIET PROBES. NOT ALL THE VARIOUS CONFLICT SITUATIONS WILL BE EXPLOITABLE BY MOSCOW. SOME, HOWEVER, WILL BE. THERE ARE SEVERAL CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT THAT WILL DRAW SOVIET ATTENTIONS--IN PARTICULAR: (1) THE CLASH OF TRADITIONAL AND RADICAL FORCES WITHIN INDIVIDUAL STATES; (2) INTRA-REGIONAL STRIFE ARISING FROM ETHNIC AND TERRITORIAL ISSUES; (3) DECOLONIZATION PROBLEMS; AND (4) CONFLICTS OF

SECRET

INTEREST BETWEEN WESTERN POWERS AND VARIOUS DEVELOPING STATES.

ANY NUMBER OF THESE CONFLICT SITUATIONS ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN ALMOST EVERY AREA OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THEM WITH VARYING DEGREES OF BOLDNESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT OPEN WARFARE WITHIN OR AMONG THESE STATES. SOME OF THESE SITUATIONS COULD LEAD TO CONFRONTATION WITH US, OR FORCE THE SOVIETS INTO MAKING UNWANTED CHOICES BETWEEN ANTAGONISTS. USUALLY, MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY SEE ITS INTERESTS BETTER SERVED BY HOLDING CONFLICTS BELOW THE BOILING POINT; THIS ALLOWS IT TO PLAY BOTH SIDES OF A DISPUTE TO ITS OWN ADVANTAGE. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IS, OF COURSE, AN EXCEPTION TO THE LAST POINT. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE SOVIETS CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE OF THE WAY THINGS HAVE DEVELOPED, THE ARABS REPRESENT THEIR BEST LONG-TERM BET FOR ADVANCING SOVIET INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE REGION.

WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF ITS THIRD WORLD POLICY, HOWEVER, MOSCOW IS LIKELY TO DEVOTE A GROWING SHARE OF ITS RESOURCES AND ENERGY TO CULTIVATING THAT GROUP OF STATES EXTENDING FROM THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO SOUTH ASIA. THE BULK OF THE SOVIET AID EFFORT HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN THIS GENERAL AREA FOR

-38-

SECRET



## SECRET

A NUMBER OF YEARS ANYWAY. THIS AREA'S GENERAL PROXIMITY TO THE SOVIET HOMELAND, ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST, AND THE TIES TO WESTERN MILITARY ALLIANCES MAINTAINED BY SEVERAL OF THE STATES OF THIS REGION MAKE THIS GENERAL AREA A PRIMARY TARGET FOR SOVIET EFFORTS.

ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS GEOPOLITICAL EMPHASIS IS THE ASSIGNMENT OF OTHER AREAS TO LESSER PRIORITY IN SOVIET POLICY. AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA SEEM TO BE REGARDED AS SUCH BY THE SOVIETS AT PRESENT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT OPPORTUNITIES WILL NOT BE TAKEN OR THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE INACTIVE IN THESE AREAS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ARMS SUPPORT PROVIDED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA AND THE MORE RECENT OVERTURES TO THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN PERU, PROVIDE AMPLE PROOF THAT MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WHERE IT CAN, USING FAMILIAR TECHNIQUES. BUT MOSCOW'S EFFORTS AND EXPECTATIONS SEEM CLEARLY REDUCED FROM WHAT THEY WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS DECADE. EVIDENTLY, THE SOVIETS' TROUBLED RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA AND DISAPPOINTMENTS IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES OF AFRICA AND ASIA HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS CHANGING VIEW. IN ANY EVENT, MOSCOW APPEARS TO HAVE OPTED FOR A CAUTIOUS, LONG-RANGE POLICY OF IMAGE BUILDING IN THESE AREAS, WHICH IT

-39-  
SECRET

SECRET

EVIDENTLY FEELS WILL BE ABLE TO SURVIVE THE CONSTANTLY CHANGING ALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES.

WHATEVER MOSCOW'S EVENTUAL HOPES FOR THESE TWO AREAS MAY BE, IT DOES NOT AT THE MOMENT SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL REQUIRE MAJOR NEW COMMITMENTS OF SOVIET PRESTIGE AND RESOURCES. PERHAPS, THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT THEIR PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED INFLUENCE WILL BE REASONABLY GOOD OVER THE LONG RUN, EVEN IF THEY DO VERY LITTLE. IN ANY EVENT, THERE IS CERTAINLY NOTHING UNRELENTING ABOUT THE MARCH OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THESE AREAS OF THE THIRD WORLD, OR FOR THAT MATTER IN ANY OTHER, CONTESTED AS IT NOW IS BY THE UNITED STATES, BY THE CHINESE, AND BY A GROWING NUMBER OF NATIONALIST FORCES. WHILE MEMORIES OF MISTAKES MAY INHIBIT THE SOVIETS FROM UNDERTAKING AMBITIOUS NEW COMMITMENTS, AND THE SUSPICIONS OF NATIVE NATIONALISTS MAY NARROW OR BLOCK MOSCOW'S OPPORTUNITIES, OUR COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIETS WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE, AND THE THIRD WORLD IS DESTINED TO REMAIN A MAIN ARENA FOR THAT STRUGGLE.