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2 OCTOBER 1970

DRAFT DDCI SPEECH FOR
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
16 OCTOBER 1970

GENERAL McPHERSON, GENTLEMEN:

THE IDEAL SUMMARIZATION OF THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION WOULD BE THE STATEMENT THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS NO ROLE IN IT.

EVER SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN 1947, HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN ACCUSED SO LOUDLY, SO GLIBLY, AND SO PERSISTENTLY OF MAKING UNITED STATES POLICY--OR AT LEAST OF HAVING AN INDEPENDENT ONE OF OUR OWN--THAT THIS SIMPLE STATEMENT, HOWEVER TRUE, WILL NOT SUFFICE.

THE STATEMENT IS, ADMITTEDLY, A SIMPLIFICATION WHICH MUST BE QUALIFIED. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DOES HAVE A ROLE, BUT IT IS STRICTLY ONE OF SUPPORT. IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO FURNISH THE INFORMATION ON WHICH THE POLICY-MAKERS WILL BASE THEIR DECISIONS--NOT TO TAKE PART IN THE DEBATE.

THIS LIMITED SUPPORT ROLE IS IMPLICIT IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, WHICH IS THE CHARTER

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FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS IT EXISTS TODAY.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS AN ADVISER--NOT A MEMBER--OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH IS THE PRESIDENT'S TOP FORUM FOR POLICY DECISIONS. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDERTAKES SUCH ACTIVITIES AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS NOT REPRESENTED IN THE CABINET.

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ALL THIS RESTS

ON STATUTE OR PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE.

AS I INTEND TO SHOW YOU, FURTHERMORE, THE BASIC GROUND RULES UNDER WHICH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ABSTAINS FROM THE ADVOCACY OR FORMULATION OF POLICY ARE VITAL TO EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE WORK, EVEN IF THERE WERE NO SUCH RESTRICTIONS IN LEGISLATION AND IN REGULATIONS.

IN FEBRUARY, 1946--BEFORE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXISTED--THERE WAS A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WHICH TOOK OVER FROM THE WARTIME OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES. IN THE ABSENCE AT THAT TIME OF

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A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE C.I.G. TOOK ITS ORDERS FROM A "NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY" REPRESENTING THE ARMED SERVICES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

THE FIRST DRAFT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY DIRECTIVE--UNDER WHICH THE C.I.G. WAS TO OPERATE--STIPULATED THAT THE DIRECTOR OF THE C.I.G., ADMIRAL SOUERS, SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO "NECESSARY INFORMATION AS TO POLICIES, PLANS, ACTIONS, CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH REFERENCE TO FOREIGN NATIONS."

BEFORE THE DIRECTIVE WAS ISSUED, ADMIRAL SOUERS SUCCESSFULLY URGED THAT THOSE WORDS BE ELIMINATED. EVEN AT THAT EARLY DATE, IT WAS THE CONSENSUS OF THE INFANT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT THE WISEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS STAY AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE FROM ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE FORMULATION OF THE "POLICIES, PLANS...AND INTENTIONS" OF OUR OWN GOVERNMENT.

FOR 15 YEARS, IN FACT, WE MANAGED TO SHUN THIS FORBIDDEN FRUIT OF THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE, ON THE BASIS THAT WE HAD NO NEED-TO-KNOW, AND THAT IF WE DIDN'T EVEN KNOW ABOUT POLICY, WE COULD NOT BE ACCUSED OF MAKING POLICY.

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THIS WAS WISHFUL THINKING, OF COURSE, BECAUSE THERE IS APPARENTLY NOTHING THAT CAN STOP THE ACCUSATIONS BY OUR DETRACTORS; BEING THE SILENT SERVICE, WE HAVE BEEN HANDY WHIPPING BOYS.

THE PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, THAT WE DID NOT G-2 THE POLICIES AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS AND STILL IS ESSENTIAL, AND IT WAS MODIFIED DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN 1962, AS I SHALL DISCUSS LATER, ONLY BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT'S REQUIREMENTS IN REGARD TO REPORTING CHANGED OUR NEED-TO-KNOW.

IN THIS COURSE, YOU HAVE ALREADY DEVOTED ONE OF YOUR SYLLABUS TOPICS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS MACHINERY, AND YOU HAVE SIMILARLY COVERED THE WORKINGS OF THE CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I ASSUME, ACCORDINGLY, THAT I NEED NOT GO INTO THESE MATTERS IN DETAIL. IF I COVER SOME OF THE SAME GROUND, IT WILL BE ONLY TO RELATE THEM TO THIS QUESTION OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR POLICY FORMULATION.

CENTURIES AGO, THE ANCIENT GREEKS GOT THEIR ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE FROM THE DELPHIC ORACLE. SOME OF THESE ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN PRESERVED FOR US BY THE HISTORIANS AND PLAYWRIGHTS OF THAT ERA, AND THEY SHOW THAT THE DELPHIC ORACLE WAS AWARE OF ONE OF THE MOST

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ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES FOR ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE THAT WANTS TO STAY IN BUSINESS: CREDIBILITY. IT WAS TRUE THEN, AND IT IS TRUE NOW, THAT AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAS NO PURPOSE, NO VALUE, AND NO FUTURE IF IT IS NOT BELIEVED BY THOSE IT SERVES.

THE DELPHIC ORACLE, OF COURSE, WORDED ITS PREDICTIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT EACH ONE PERMITTED TWO DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE INTERPRETATIONS. WHATEVER HAPPENED, THE ORACLE COULD CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN RIGHT, IF PERHAPS MISUNDERSTOOD.

OUR MODERN CUSTOMERS CAN HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO TOLERATE THIS SAFETY MECHANISM, BUT CREDIBILITY MUST STILL BE OUR STOCK IN TRADE. AND THIS IS WHAT DICTATES THAT WE MUST ONLY SUPPORT--NEVER PARTICIPATE IN--THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS.

LET US SUPPOSE THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISERS FACE A CHOICE BETWEEN COURSE A AND COURSE B. THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS TO PROVIDE A COMPLETELY OBJECTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FACTS--AND THE WHOLE KNOWN RANGE OF FACTS--RELEVANT TO THE CHOICE. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL NOT RECOMMEND ONE COURSE OR THE OTHER.

THE MINUTE THAT WE ADVOCATE COURSE A, THE PROPONENTS OF COURSE B ARE GOING TO SUSPECT, IF NOT

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BELIEVE, THAT THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING HAS BEEN RIGGED AND THE ESTIMATIVE JUDGMENTS SLANTED TO SUPPORT THAT ADVOCACY. CREDIBILITY GOES OUT THE WINDOW.

WE MUST CONCEDE, OF COURSE, THAT THE FACTS THEMSELVES ARE NOT NECESSARILY IMPARTIAL. IN HISTORY'S FIRST RECORDED INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION, THE DOVE CAME BACK TO THE ARK WITHOUT SAYING A WORD, BUT THE OLIVE BRANCH WAS A CLEAR POLICY RECOMMENDATION TO NOAH TO PREPARE TO DISEMBARK.

THE DIVIDING LINE IS EVEN HAZIER WHEN THE ESTIMATORS ARE ASKED FOR CONTINGENCY PAPERS. THESE ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE POLICY-MAKERS ABOUT THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF, OR REACTIONS TO, SPECIFIC PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS IS INDEED THIN ICE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE RESPONSIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE SOMETIMES SO CLEAR-CUT AND SO DEFINITIVE THAT THEY ARE TANTAMOUNT TO TACIT POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. A WEATHER FORECAST OF RAIN IS OBJECTIVE, BUT IT IS ALSO IN EFFECT A TACIT RECOMMENDATION TO TAKE A RAINCOAT. THESE PAPERS ARE UNDERTAKEN, HOWEVER, AT THE SPECIFIC REQUEST OF THE POLICY-MAKER, AND THE CONCLUSIONS MUST BE BASED ON A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF

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ALL THE RELEVANT FACTS AVAILABLE. TO PRESERVE CREDIBILITY, RIVAL ADVOCATES AMONG THE POLICY-MAKERS CAN ALWAYS CHECK WITH THEIR OWN REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE QUESTION ACTUALLY HAS BEEN GIVEN A COMPREHENSIVE, OBJECTIVE, AND IMPARTIAL REVIEW IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS.

THIS BRINGS UP ANOTHER POINT--THE NEED FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTROLLED SCHIZOPHRENIA ON THE PART OF DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ARE POLICY-MAKING ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEIR OFFICERS RIGHTFULLY CAN BE AND OFTEN SHOULD BE ADVOCATES OF A PARTICULAR POLICY OR COURSE OF ACTION. SOME OF THESE OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE ALSO DESIGNATED BY THEIR DEPARTMENTS TO BE PARTICIPATING MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

WHAT WE MUST INSIST UPON IS THAT THESE PARTICULAR OFFICERS DEVELOP A SPLIT PERSONALITY. AT THEIR DESKS IN THE PENTAGON OR THE STATE DEPARTMENT BUILDING, THEY WILL OFTEN BE CALLED ON TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMULATION OF POLICY, AND THEY MAY WELL BECOME ARDENT ADVOCATES. WHEN THEY COME OUT TO LANGLEY,

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HOWEVER, AND FUNCTION ON THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD OR SOME OTHER INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP AS INTEGRAL MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, THEY MUST NEITHER MAKE NOR ADVOCATE POLICY.

IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO EXPECT OF MERE HUMANS, I SUPPOSE, THAT THE ADHERENTS OF COURSE A WOULD NOT SEE TO IT THAT THE ESTIMATE INCLUDES EVERY SINGLE FACT THAT SUPPORTS THEIR RECOMMENDATION, BUT WE CAN FIND COMFORT IN THE FACT THAT THE COURSE B BOYS ARE JUST AS BUSY ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE TABLE. AND THE ULTIMATE SAFETY DEVICE MUST CONSIST OF COORDINATION BY A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACTING AS REFEREE, WITH NO POLICY AXE TO GRIND AND A VESTED INTEREST IN PRESERVING A REPUTATION FOR CREDIBILITY.

MY POINT IS THAT WHEN THERE IS CONTROVERSY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OVER WHAT THE U.S. POLICY OR COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE, THE OPPOSING ADVOCATES MUST HAVE AN IMPARTIAL SOURCE OF OBJECTIVE INFORMATION WHICH ALL CAN TRUST. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN FURNISH THAT OBJECTIVE FOUNDATION, AND COMMAND THE NECESSARY CREDIBILITY, ONLY IF IT NEVER ENGAGES IN ADVOCACY.

TO FOLLOW AN ACTUAL EXAMPLE, THE DECISION-MAKING

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PROCESS FOR U.S. POLICY UNDER CURRENT PROCEDURES STARTS WITH A NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM, OR NSSM.

THE NSSM ORIGINATES IN THE NSC STAFF UNDER DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WHO STATES THE PROBLEM AND OUTLINES WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BY WHOM, AND WHEN.

THE BASIC DOCUMENT IS DRAFTED, USUALLY BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, IN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP. ONE OF THESE, CALLED THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP, DEALS WITH PRIMARILY MILITARY MATTERS. THERE ARE FIVE OTHERS BROKEN DOWN BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, WHICH ARE IDENTICAL WITH WHAT WERE CALLED INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUPS IN THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION. THEY ARE CHAIRED BY THE APPROPRIATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE. THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE IS USUALLY THE APPROPRIATE DIVISION CHIEF FROM OUR OPERATING SIDE, THE DIRECTORATE OF PLANS, BUT HIS FUNCTION IS LIMITED TO INTELLIGENCE INPUT.

THE NSSM ITSELF STATES THE PROBLEM, LAYS OUT THE FACTS, AND THEN LISTS A SERIES OF OPTIONS, WITH PROS, CONS, AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES, BUT WITHOUT MAKING A FINAL RECOMMENDATION AMONG THE OPTIONS.

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WHEN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP IS SATISFIED WITH THE NSSM, IT IS FORWARDED FOR REVIEW AT A HIGHER LEVEL. IN THE CASE OF DEFENSE POLICY, IT GOES TO THE DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW GROUP, CHAIRED BY DR. KISSINGER AND COMPRISING THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS.

NSMMs WHICH ARE NOT PRIMARILY MILITARY GO TO THE NSC SENIOR REVIEW GROUP, ALSO CHAIRED BY DR. KISSINGER. I AM THE CIA REPRESENTATIVE, AND OTHER MEMBERS ARE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE, DEFENSE, AND JOINT CHIEFS, AND THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING. THE HEAD OF USIA USUALLY ATTENDS.

THE PAPER MAY SHUTTLE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP AND THE REVIEW GROUP SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE IT IS CONSIDERED READY FOR PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION. ULTIMATELY, IT COMES BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AS A DOCUMENT STATING A PROBLEM AND EVALUATING ALL THE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. IT IS A POLICY DOCUMENT WHICH

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STOPS SHORT OF MAKING A RECOMMENDATION; THE DECISION IS UP TO THE PRESIDENT.

WHEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS AROUND THE LONG OVAL TABLE IN THE CABINET ROOM, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS USUALLY SEATED ALL BY HIMSELF AT ONE END OF THE TABLE, MAY I REPEAT--AS AN ADVISER. HE GENERALLY OPENS THE MEETING WITH A SHORT, CONCISE BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.

NOW, THERE HAS BEEN, AS I SAID, AN INTELLIGENCE INPUT ALL THE WAY THROUGH, AT EVERY STAGE OF THE NSSM PROCESS. IT COMES NOT ONLY FROM THE CIA PEOPLE ON THE VARIOUS PANELS, BUT FROM THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS SUPPORTING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPERATING DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS DEFENSE AND STATE. IT CONTRIBUTES TO THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, AND TO THE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS OPTIONS.

THIS INTELLIGENCE INPUT, HOWEVER, IS ORIENTED TO POSSIBLE U.S. COURSES OF ACTION, AND IT IS SUBORDINATED TO A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES.

THE DIRECTOR'S BRIEFING TO THE NSC, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS ORIENTED TO THE PROBLEM--NOT TO THE ANSWERS--AND I THINK IT IS RELEVANT TO OUR EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN

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DETACHMENT FROM POLICY THAT, WHILE WE ARE REPRESENTED IN THE NSSM PROCESS BY OUR OPERATING AND COLLECTION PEOPLE, THE DIRECTOR NORMALLY CALLS ON THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION SIDE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, TO HELP IN THE PREPARATION OF HIS BRIEFING FOR THE NSC.

IN THE BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWS, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PARTICIPATES ONLY WHEN HE IS ASKED FOR HIS OPINION OR FOR SOME ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE DETAIL. THERE IS, OF COURSE, NOTHING LIKE A FINAL VOTE, AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION NORMALLY IS MADE KNOWN AT SOME LATER POINT IN A NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM DIRECTING THE HEADS OF APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENTS OR AGENCIES TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS.

I HAVE DISCUSSED THE NSSM PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL BECAUSE IT AFFORDS A NICE CLEAN CASE HISTORY OF HOW THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FITS INTO A STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE OF PROBLEM, ANALYSIS, AND DECISION. THERE HAVE BEEN, HOWEVER, SOMETHING LESS THAN 90 NSSMS--MANY OF WHICH HAVE NOT REACHED THE NSC--IN SOME 633 DAYS OF THE CURRENT NSC MECHANISM--AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY MAKER IS A CONSTANT, DAILY BUSINESS.

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THE POLICY MAKER EXPECTS AND GETS FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ENCYCLOPEDIA BASIC INTELLIGENCE WHICH GIVES HIM ALL THE BACKGROUND, STATISTICAL, FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION HE MAY NEED ABOUT A FOREIGN COUNTRY; ESTIMATIVE INTELLIGENCE WHICH SEEKS TO PREDICT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN AN EXISTING PROBLEM AREA, OR FORECAST AN IMPENDING CRISIS BEFORE IT IS UPON US; AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WHICH KEEPS HIM UP TO DATE DAY-BY-DAY, OR EVEN HOUR-BY-HOUR IF NEED BE.

A GREAT DEAL OF THIS, OF COURSE, IS ON PAPER, SOME OF IT FILED AWAY, SCANNED BUT UNSTUDIED, AGAINST THE CONTINGENCY OF A CRISIS IN NEPAL, LIECHTENSTEIN, OR COSTA RICA. THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL TRADE, HOWEVER, IN "TWO-LEGGED MEMORANDA"; AT THE HEIGHT OF THE RECENT JORDANIAN CRISIS, FOR EXAMPLE, SPECIAL GROUPS WERE MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, AND AS OFTEN AS THREE TIMES A DAY, IN EACH CASE REQUIRING AN INTELLIGENCE INPUT.

BASIC INTELLIGENCE--WITH THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND THE BUDGET SQUEEZE OF RECENT YEARS--HAS BECOME A SPECIAL PROBLEM.

THERE ARE LIMITS TO THE VOLUME OF INFORMATION THAT THE POLICY MAKER CAN ABSORB, AND WITH GROWING

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RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHRINKING BUDGETS, THERE ARE CERTAINLY ALSO LIMITS TO THE AMOUNTS OF PROPERLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE THAT THE COMMUNITY CAN PRODUCE.

BUT WHAT ARE WE TO LEAVE OUT? THIS PROBLEM HAS FOR THE PAST COUPLE OF YEARS BECOME THE PROVINCE OF A GROUP CALLED THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES BOARD, WHICH I HAVE THE DUBIOUS PRIVILEGE OF CHAIRING. MY ASSOCIATES ARE DR. RAY CLINE, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, AND MR. ROBERT FROEHLKE, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ADMINISTRATION. WE HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY MR. HELMS TO MATCH INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSETS.

IT IS INEVITABLE THAT OUR ATTENTION SHOULD FOCUS ON SUCH BASIC INTELLIGENCE AS THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY, WHICH ALREADY AMOUNTS TO SOMETHING LIKE A DOZEN TIMES THE VOLUME OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA. THANKS TO ISLAND GROUPS, OCEAN BASINS, AND TERRITORIES, THERE ARE SOME 155 OF THESE SURVEYS AT LATEST COUNT--MORE SURVEYS THAN THERE ARE COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TODAY. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY ON THE SOVIET UNION AMOUNTS TO A TOTAL OF

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4,300 PAGES. THE DIRECTOR HAS BEEN KNOWN TO REFER TO SUCH INTELLIGENCE AS THE "PENGUIN CLASSICS." BECAUSE, IN THE WORDS OF AN EARLY ROBERT BENCHLEY BOOK REVIEW "THIS BOOK TELLS ME MORE ABOUT PENGUINS THAN I CARE TO KNOW."


IS THERE REALLY A NEED FOR AN N.I.S. OF 17 SECTIONS ON

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THE CIA OFFICE OF BASIC AND GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE PUTS AN UNCONSCIONABLE AMOUNT OF MAN-HOURS, FUNDS, HEAT AND SWEAT INTO PUBLISHING THESE SURVEYS, HARASSING THE COLLECTORS FOR INFORMATION, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AT LARGE FOR DRAFTING, EVEN THE FIELD FOR COORDINATION. THE RESULT IS OFTEN MORE THAN THE POLICY MAKER CARES TO KNOW, BUT IT IS A RISKY STATEMENT TO SAY THAT IT IS MORE THAN HE WILL NEED TO KNOW.

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THERE ARE STILL SOME BRITISH SKIPPERS WHO WILL CONFIRM PROFANELY THAT OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR THE BOTCHED BRITISH LANDINGS IN NORWAY IN 1940 WAS BASED IN PART ON WOODCUTS OF NORWEGIAN SCENIC ATTRACTIONS IN THE 19TH CENTURY, AND A GOOD SHARE OF THE U.S. MARINES WHO DIED ON TARAHA IN 1943 WERE LOST BECAUSE WE DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH ACCURATE INFORMATION ON THE REEFS, SANDBARS, AND BEACHES TO KNOW WHAT KINDS OF LANDING CRAFT COULD BEST GET THEM ASHORE WITH THE MINIMUM DANGER OF GROUNDING.

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NIRB, I MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO CUT BACK SHARPLY ON THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS TO MEET THE BUDGET AND MANPOWER SQUEEZE, AND IN FACT WE HAVE HAD TO APPLY SOME LIMITATIONS: OF THE 154 SHELF-FEET OF BASIC INTELLIGENCE WHICH HAVE BEEN FILLED SINCE THE NIS PROGRAM BEGAN, WE ARE NOW KEEPING ONLY ABOUT 80 FEET CURRENT. THIS STILL MEANS, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE KEEPING THE PROGRAM UP TO DATE ON A TOTAL OF 90 COUNTRIES, AND AS A MARINE, I'M NOT ABOUT TO DEEP-SIX AN INTELLIGENCE

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PRODUCTION PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDES A CHAPTER ON "COASTS AND LANDING BEACHES" FOR PRACTICALLY EVERY SPOT IN THE WORLD THAT CAN BE REACHED BY BOAT.

THERE ARE, OF COURSE, COUNTLESS ENCYCLOPEDIAS, GUIDE BOOKS, ATLASES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OFFERING A GREAT DEAL OF BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN COUNTRIES, BUT WHEN THERE IS A CRISIS, THE U.S. POLICY MAKER NEEDS INSTANT INTELLIGENCE, NOT MERELY INFORMATION. TRAVEL BOOK WRITERS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ACCURATE; THEY WILL NOT, AS A RULE, PROBE FOR INFORMATION WHICH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS SECRET; AND THEY ARE WRITING FOR TOURISTS WHO ARE NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN POTENTIAL LANDING BEACHES AND DROP ZONES. BASIC INTELLIGENCE IS TAILORED FOR THE GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE FACING A MAJOR CRISIS, AND CONTAINS THE CONSENSUS OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BASED ON EVERY AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE SOURCE, COVERT OR OVERT.

I DON'T THINK I NEED TO GO INTO SUCH DEPTH ON THE ESTIMATES AND THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE THE POLICY MAKER NEEDS FROM THE COMMUNITY. I AM SURE THAT THE PANEL YOU HAD HERE YESTERDAY DESCRIBED THEM IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. I WOULD LIKE, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS

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BRIEFLY SOME OTHER DESCRIPTIVE TERMS FOR THE FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT.

IT IS, OF COURSE, COMPREHENSIVE OR "ALL-SOURCE," INCLUDING INPUT RANGING FROM THE MOST SENSITIVE METHODS AND SOURCES TO THE OVERT, AMPLIFIED BY BACKGROUND AND EXPERT ANALYSIS. IT IS IMMEDIATE, BECAUSE THE COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OPERATE ON A 24-HOUR BASIS, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, WITH AN INTERLOCKING NETWORK OF OPERATIONS CENTERS AND WATCH OFFICES. IT IS AS NEAR "REAL TIME" AS WE CAN GET IT, BECAUSE IT HAS TO BE IN AN ERA WHEN A NUCLEAR WARHEAD CAN REACH AN INTERCONTINENTAL TARGET IN HALF AN HOUR. ALL OF THESE ATTRIBUTES FALL WITHIN THE STOCK DEFINITION FOR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.

BUT THE SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY GIVES THE POLICY MAKER IS ALSO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, AND NET INTELLIGENCE.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS DEFINED WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AS "ALL INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WHICH CONCERNS MORE THAN ONE DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY, AND WHICH TRANSCENDS THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF A SINGLE DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY." IN OTHER WORDS, IT REPRESENTS THE

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AGREED, COORDINATED VIEW OF THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD IN LATE 1957--THEN KNOWN AS THE KILLIAN COMMITTEE--RECOMMENDED THAT TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE ALL INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED TO THE POLICY MAKERS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE DAILY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, SHOULD BE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

THERE IS AN INEVITABLE CLASH BETWEEN CURRENCY AND COORDINATION. THE FORMAL COORDINATION OF A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY, FOR INSTANCE, FROM THE TIME IT IS DRAFTED UNTIL EVERYBODY IN WASHINGTON AND IN THE FIELD HAS AGREED TO EACH WORD AND PUNCTUATION MARK, MAY TAKE SIX MONTHS. YET HARDLY A NIGHT PASSES WITHOUT AN ITEM THAT HAS TO GO INTO THE BULLETIN, OR A SITUATION REPORT FROM A TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED TO KEEP TABS ON A CRISIS, WHICH MUST BE HANDLED IN A GREAT DEAL LESS THAN SIX HOURS--NOT SIX MONTHS.

THAT IS PROBABLY WHY THE CODIFIERS IN THE COMMUNITY HAVE YET TO COME UP WITH A DEFINITION FOR NATIONAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. IT WOULD BE AN INHERENT PARADOX. AND YET, THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WE HAVE TO

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ACHIEVE IN OUR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS.

COORDINATION SOMETIMES PERFORCE BOILS DOWN TO CONSULTATION, AND IN THE ULTIMATE RESORT, THERE WILL BE TIMES--USUALLY FOUR OR FIVE A.M.--WHEN THE ANALYST WHO HAS BEEN ROUSTED OUT OF BED TO MEET A SHORT DEADLINE IS GOING TO HAVE TO RESORT TO TELEPATHY. IN THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, HE IS ENJOINED TO WRITE AS THOUGH HIS OPPOSITE NUMBERS IN DIA AND STATE WERE LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDER, AND EXERCISE THEIR PROXIES FOR THEM. THIS ALL COMES BACK AGAIN TO THE VITAL PRINCIPLE OF CREDIBILITY. IF WEDNESDAY MORNING'S CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN HAS TO CARRY A NOTE FROM DEFENSE OR STATE TAKING SHARP ISSUE WITH AN ITEM IN TUESDAY MORNING'S BULLETIN PREPARED UNILATERALLY BY CIA, IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE THE BULLETIN WILL NO LONGER SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE AS FAR AS THE POLICY-MAKER IS CONCERNED.

IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED THAT FOR SEVERAL YEARS NOW CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDA AND OTHER CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORTS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE POLICY-MAKERS HAVE BEEN CARRYING A FOOTNOTE ON THE FIRST PAGE STATING PRECISELY WHAT COORDINATION HAS BEEN INVOLVED.

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AS FOR "NET" INTELLIGENCE, THIS IS A LABEL WE HAVE BORROWED FROM THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES. THE STANDARD NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY DEAL WITH SOVIET CAPABILITIES. IF THESE ARE BALANCED AGAINST U.S. CAPABILITIES, IT IS CALLED A "NET ESTIMATE," AND BY EXTENSION, WE USE "NET INTELLIGENCE" TO DESCRIBE REPORTS WHICH GO BEYOND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ON SOME PROBLEM OR CRISIS TO CRANK IN RELEVANT INFORMATION ON U.S. POLICIES, PLANS, CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS, OR OBJECTIVES.

HARKING BACK TO WHAT I SAID AT THE OUTSET ABOUT OUR "AGE OF INNOCENCE" IN THE EARLY YEARS OF CIA, WHEN WE DID OUR UTMOST AS A MATTER OF POLICY TO KEEP INTELLIGENCE REPORTING FREE OF ANYTHING THAT EVEN TOUCHED ON THE UNITED STATES, THIS POLICY ENDED ABRUPTLY AND "NET INTELLIGENCE" CAME INTO BEING DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN 1962. PRESIDENT KENNEDY MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE FOUND IT INCONVENIENT-- TO PUT IT MILDLY--TO HAVE TO READ ONE PIECE OF PAPER FROM THE CIA ON WHAT THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS WERE UP TO, A SECOND FROM STATE ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED TO DO, AND A THIRD FROM DEFENSE ON WHAT WAS AVAILABLE TO DO IT WITH.

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ADMITTEDLY, THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO MOST FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. THERE ARE AMPLE REGULATIONS, RESTRICTIONS, CAVEATS AND CLASSIFICATIONS THAT REQUIRE THE REGULAR PUBLICATIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OPERATIONAL REPORTING AND POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. THERE IS STILL THE REQUIREMENT FOR CAUTION TO KEEP OBJECTIVE REPORTING FREE OF POLICY ADVOCACY, AND AN EVEN MORE STRINGENT REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THE MEN WHO ARE INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS--BE THEY INTELLIGENCE OR MILITARY--FROM UNNECESSARY DISCLOSURE.

BUT SINCE 1962, THERE HAVE BEEN A VERY FEW, TIGHTLY-HELD "PIECES OF PAPER"--AS OPPOSED TO THE "PUBLICATIONS" HEMMED IN BY THE NORMAL RESTRICTIONS--DESIGNED TO GIVE THE VERY HIGHEST LEVEL OF POLICY MAKERS WHAT THEY WANT--THE COMPREHENSIVE, AGREED, ACROSS-THE-BOARD NATIONAL AND NET INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION. PRIMARILY, THERE IS THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF, IN WHICH THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT AND THREE OR FOUR OF HIS TOP COLLEAGUES.

I DON'T WANT TO GET THIS OUT OF PERSPECTIVE. IT IS THE EXCEPTION, RATHER THAN THE RULE, FOR THE

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PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF, FOR EXAMPLE, TO REPORT ON STATE OR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES, BUT THERE HAS TO BE A CHANNEL OF SOME KIND FOR DOING THIS ON THE RARE OCCASIONS WHEN IT IS RELEVANT AND NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO REPORT MEANINGFULLY ON SOVIET SHIPS APPROACHING THE QUARANTINE LINE WITHOUT SAYING WHERE THAT QUARANTINE LINE WAS. THERE WAS NO CORRESPONDING NEED, HOWEVER, TO REPORT ON THE ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS IN FLORIDA, THE DETAILED DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES, OR THE VARIOUS DEMARCHES BEING MADE BY U.S. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES--EXCEPT INsofar AS THE ANSWERS THE DIPLOMATS RECEIVED MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE.

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELEVANT NET INTELLIGENCE HAS ENLARGED THE DIRECTOR'S NEED-TO-KNOW BACK TO THE LEVEL THAT ADMIRAL SOUERS DECLINED 24 YEARS AGO, BUT IT BOILS DOWN TO ONE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT COVERS BOTH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND NET INTELLIGENCE.

IN A TIME OF CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO BE RECEIVING CONFLICTING ADVICE FROM A WIDE VARIETY OF SOURCES. TO CHOOSE AMONG THEM, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT HE BE ENABLED TO START OUT WITH A

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FOUNDATION OF ONE SET OF AGREED FACTS.

FINALLY, THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORTING THE POLICY-MAKER FROM TIME TO TIME TAKE ONE HIGHLY SPECIALIZED FORM OF REPORTING ON U.S. CAPABILITIES--THE ASSESSMENT OF OUR OWN CAPABILITIES IN THE FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE.

WHEN WE WARN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF A POTENTIAL DANGER, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE COMMUNITY SHOULD ALSO STATE WHAT THE CHANCES ARE THAT WE WILL HAVE ADVANCE WARNING OF THE ACTUAL EVENT. THIS IS ABOUT THE ONLY WAY WE CAN CLOSE SOME OF THE GAP BETWEEN ASSESSING THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, AND PREDICTING HIS INTENTIONS.

WE CAN ASSESS IN CONSIDERABLE AND AUTHORITATIVE DETAIL THE RECIPROCAL CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE CONFRONTING EACH OTHER ACROSS THEIR LONG BORDER FROM THE PACIFIC OCEAN TO THE PAMIR MOUNTAINS. IT IS CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT--AND OF CORRESPONDINGLY GREATER USEFULNESS TO THE POLICY-MAKER--TO GIVE HIM AN ESTIMATE OF OUR PROSPECTS FOR TIMELY FORE-KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INTENTIONS.

SIMILARLY, THERE ARE EXTENSIVE AREAS OF THE WORLD WHERE COUPS ARE ENDEMIC, AND COUP RUMORS ARE

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A DIME-A-DOZEN. WE SERVE THE POLICY-MAKER BEST WHEN WE CONCENTRATE ON HOW RIPE CONDITIONS ARE FOR A COUP IN A GIVEN COUNTRY, AND REMIND HIM AT THE SAME TIME OF THE LIMITED PROSPECTS THAT WE CAN CALL THE SHOT PRECISELY IN ADVANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP. THE CONSPIRATOR WHO EXERCISES ENOUGH SECURITY TO CATCH HIS GOVERNMENT NAPPING IS ALSO LIKELY TO KEEP US FROM PINPOINTING THE TIME AND PLACE. AT BEST, WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE WARNED THAT THERE IS ENOUGH UNREST, THE PLOTTERS ARE STRONG ENOUGH, AND THE GOVERNMENT IS WEAK ENOUGH FOR A COUP TO SUCCEED AT ANY TIME.

FOR ONE LAST CURRENT AND SPECIFIC EXAMPLE, I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SUPPORT OF NATIONAL POLICY FORMULATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.

THIS SUPPORT BEGAN, OF COURSE, LONG BEFORE THE INITIAL MEETINGS AT HELSINKI.

FUNDAMENTALLY, IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SUGGEST SUCH TALKS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT A GOOD SOLID DECADE OF HARD INTELLIGENCE ON THE MAGNITUDE AND PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. IT WOULD BE A RASH POKER PLAYER

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INDEED WHO WOULD BET AT HIGH STAKES WITH ALL HIS OWN CARDS EXPOSED, WHEN HE KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT THE OP-
PONENT'S HAND. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CAN
DICKER EFFECTIVELY ON THE LIMITATION OR REDUCTION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS ONLY
IF IT KNOWS WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY JUST HOW MANY
OF THESE WEAPONS THE SOVIETS HAVE, AND HOW EFFECTIVE
THEY ARE.

SECONDLY, STARTING BEFORE ANY FORMAL PROPOSAL
FOR SALT TALKS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAD TO
INFORM THE POLICY MAKERS, AND KEEP THEM INFORMED ON
A CONTINUING BASIS, ABOUT THE FORCES AT WORK IN THE
USSR--POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC--FOR AND
AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY APPRECIABLE SOVIET
INTEREST IN SUBSTANTIAL ARMS LIMITATION.

THIRD, ONCE THE SALT TALKS BECAME A REASONABLE
POSSIBILITY, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH LOOKED TO THE IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR OUR KNOWLEDGE AND OUR JUDG-
MENTS ON THE PROBABLE SOVIET PROPOSALS, BARGAINING
POSITIONS, AND OBJECTIVES. THAT MUCH IS STANDARD
INTELLIGENCE, FAIRLY DISTINCT FROM U.S. POLICY IN-
VOLVEMENT, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE EXPECTED TO
ASSESS THE PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSALS.

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AND FOR THIS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAD TO KNOW IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL WHAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO PROPOSE.

THERE IS ALSO A REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUING COMMUNITY ANALYSIS AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION DURING THE TALKS IN HELSINKI AND VIENNA, COVERING EVERYTHING RELEVANT TO THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT CAN HARDLY COME AS A SURPRISE THAT THERE ARE INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS ATTACHED TO THE DELEGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TABLE.

AND FINALLY, THERE IS THE SPECIALIZED SUPPORT I JUST TOUCHED ON, CONSISTING OF THE ASSESSMENT OF PERTINENT U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES.

JUST AS IT WOULD BE RISKY TO NEGOTIATE ARMS LIMITATION WITHOUT KNOWING THE ENEMY'S EXISTING STRENGTH, IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY--GIVEN THE LIMITED SOVIET REGARD FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE PAST--TO CONCLUDE A TREATY WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF OUR ABILITY TO MONITOR RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS REACHED.

A YEAR AGO, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMPLETED FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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A BASIC STUDY OF OUR ABILITY TO DETECT BY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS--MEANING, IN THIS CASE, UNILATERALLY--POSSIBLE SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS PREPARED, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF DR. KISSINGER'S NSC STAFF, BY REPRESENTATIVES OF CIA, DIA, THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY.

THIS SO-CALLED VERIFICATION PANEL HAS BEEN KEPT BUSY EVER SINCE, REVIEWING, REVISING, AND AMPLIFYING THE BASIC STUDY TO CONCENTRATE ON SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS, AND TO RELATE TO THE VARIOUS OPTIONS THE UNITED STATES WILL PROPOSE AND THE COUNTER-PROPOSALS FROM THE SOVIETS.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THE WORD "SPECIFIC." THIS IS NO SIMPLE MATTER OF SAYING THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF ICBM DEPLOYMENT IS GENERALLY STRONG, OR THAT THERE ARE GAPS IN TIMELY INTELLIGENCE ON SOVIET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. IF WE ARE TO SERVE THE MEN WHO ARE MAKING THE DECISIONS AND CARRYING ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE MUST TELL THEM WITH THE GREATEST PRECISION POSSIBLE JUST HOW RELIABLY WE CAN COUNT LAUNCHERS AND MONITOR NEW ICBM TESTS, WHAT OUR CHANCES ARE OF

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DETECTING THE RETROFITTING OF INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES IN INTERMEDIATE SILOS, AND HOW MUCH WARNING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COULD GIVE OF A PROGRAM TO UPGRADE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES INTO AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM.

THIS, IN FACT, CARRIES US INTO AN AREA THE PURIST MIGHT CALL POLICY RECOMMENDATION, AS LONG AS HE WILL CONCEDE THAT IT IS, AFTER ALL, INTELLIGENCE POLICY. WE WOULD BE REMISS IN OUR SUPPORT OF THE POLICY MAKER IF WE DID NOT POINT OUT CERTAIN SUPPLEMENTARY VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIETS TO SUPPORT THE MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE. AN OBVIOUS EXAMPLE-- BEYOND WHICH THE SUBJECT MATTER GETS TOO SENSITIVE, SPECULATIVE, AND OPERATIONAL TO DISCUSS IN DEPTH-- WOULD BE PROVISION FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.

TO SUMMARIZE, THE ROLE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN NATIONAL POLICY FORMULATION CONSISTS OF--AND IS LIMITED TO--SUPPORT OF THE DECISION-MAKERS IN THE FORM OF COMPREHENSIVE, COORDINATED, RELEVANT FACTS AND AGREED, ANALYTICAL, ESTIMATIVE JUDGMENTS.

IT WOULD BE IDLE TO DENY THAT THE SUM TOTAL THRUST OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CONTINGENCY ESTIMATES

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THE POLICY MAKERS REQUEST, IN SOME CASES, TEND TO WEIGH IN HEAVILY ON ONE SIDE OF A POLICY DEBATE, BUT IT MUST BE THE FACTS WHICH TAKE SIDES--NOT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

BY CHARTER, BY DIRECTIVE, AND BY SELF-INTEREST, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS FORBIDDEN ANY PARTISAN ADVOCACY WHATSOEVER IN THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, AND WITHOUT THIS PROHIBITION, IT WILL HAVE NO CREDIBILITY, NO USEFULNESS, AND NO FUTURE.

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