DDCI
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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#### THE WORLD SITUATION

I DO NOT WANT TO TAKE THE OVERSIMPLIFIED APPROACH THAT COMMUNISM IS AT THE ROOT OF ALL OF THE PROBLEMS THE UNITED STATES FACES IN THE WORLD TODAY. FOR ONE THING, THERE ARE TODAY A GROWING VARIETY OF COMMUNISMS WHICH MAKE SUCH A WHOLESALE, MEAT-AXE APPROACH MISLEADING IF NOT DANGEROUS. FOR ANOTHER, WE HAVE ENOUGH PROBLEMS SO THAT IN SOME OF THEM-NIGERIA, OR CYPRUS, OR PERU, TO CITE A FEW--COMMUNISM HAS PLAYED ONLY A MINOR PART, IF ANY AT ALL. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT WHEN YOU COME DOWN TO THE MAJOR CHALLENGE TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT SOVIET RUSSIA, AND COMMUNIST CHINA, THE MEN WHO RUN THESE COUNTRIES, THE OBJECTIVES THEY PURSUE, AND THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER THEY CAN BRING TO BEAR AGAINST US.

I PROPOSE, THEN, TO START WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE POSTURE AND POLICIES OF THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, AFTER WHICH I WILL TAKE UP THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET, THE CHINESE, AND THE CUBAN COMMUNISTS IN AFRICA AND IN LATIN AMERICA, THEN THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION, AND FINALLY THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

### THE SOVIET UNION

This past summer, the Soviet Union passed a BENCH-MARK IN THE MILITARY RIVALRY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, WHEN IT MATCHED THE UNITED STATES IN NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.

THIS WAS A GOAL THE SOVIET LEADERS HAD SET FOR THEMSELVES EARLY IN THIS DECADE OF THE SIXTIES. AT A TIME WHEN U.S. SUPERIORITY IN STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS LEFT THE SOVIET UNION AT A MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISADVANTAGE.

IT CAN, OF COURSE, BE ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS
STILL LAG IN STRATEGIC OFFENSE, BECAUSE THEIR MANNED
BOMBER FORCE IS FAR INFERIOR TO OURS, AND BECAUSE
IT WILL TAKE THEM ANOTHER THREE OR FOUR YEARS TO
MATCH OUR POLARIS PUNCH IN SUBMARINE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

NEVERTHELESS, AS THE SOVIETS FORGED AHEAD IN THE ICBM COUNT, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY FELT THAT THEY HAD ARRIVED AT THE STAGE KNOWN AS AN ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY—THAT THEORETICAL STATUS IN WHICH A NATION'S STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS CAN ABSORB AN INITIAL ATTACK, AND STILL RETALIATE WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE

PEOPLE, THE FORCES, AND THE RESOURCES OF THE ATTACKER. IF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION EACH HAVE THIS CAPABILITY, IN THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE IT BECOMES ACADEMIC TO ARGUE ABOUT THE FINER POINTS OF HOW MUCH STRATEGIC OFFENSE EACH SIDE HAS.

THE SOVIET LEADERS, THEN, HAVE BEEN PLAYING NU-MERICAL CATCH-UP IN THEIR MILITARY PLANNING THROUGH THE SIXTIES, BUT THEY FACE DIFFICULT AND SIGNIFI-CANT DECISIONS FOR THE NINETEEN SEVENTIES.

EVEN AS THE SOVIETS PULL AHEAD IN NUMBERS OF ICBMs, AND INVEST HEAVILY IN MISSILE SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEGUN THE MINUTEMAN THREE AND POSEIDON PROGRAMS, WHICH WILL MORE THAN DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE DEPLOYING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS THAT CAN OVERWHELM OR PENETRATE THE LIMITED CAPABILITIES OF THE ABM SYSTEM THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING AROUND MOSCOW. WE ARE BEGINNING TO ESTABLISH A FAR MORE MODERN ABM SYSTEM OF OUR OWN.

Thus the Soviets are confronted with the need for New Decisions on the future size and composition of their own strategic forces.

A CONTINUED INCREASE IN THE SHEER NUMBERS OF
THEIR PRESENT WEAPONS WOULD MAINTAIN A MEASURE OF
MUTUAL DETERRENCE, BUT IT WOULD OFFER LITTLE IMPROVEMENT BEYOND THEIR PRESENT LEVEL.

WE KNOW THAT THEY ARE WORKING HARD FOR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THEY ARE TESTING NEW ELEMENTS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. THEY ARE DEVELOPING MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES FOR THEIR ICBM WARHEADS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE AS YET SHOWN NO CAPABILITY FOR MULTIPLE WARHEADS WHICH CAN BE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED, LIKE OUR MINUTEMAN THREE AND POSEIDON.

THESE QUALITATIVE ADVANCES COME HARD, AND THE NEW ADVANCED WEAPONS ARE EXPENSIVE—PARTICULARLY FOR THE SOVIET UNION. ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS DRAW HEAVILY ON JUST THOSE HIGH-QUALITY RESOURCES IN MEN, MATERIAL, AND PLANT WHICH ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND ARE BADLY NEEDED TO SUSTAIN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF LIVING.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ALMOST CERTAINLY WERE AMONG THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THE SOVIET DECISION MORE THAN A YEAR AGO TO TAKE UP THE U.S. OFFER TO DISCUSS THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. WE KNOW THAT THIS DECISION CREATED FRICTION IN THE SOVIET

LEADERSHIP, BECAUSE THERE ARE STILL SIGNS OF UNHAPPINESS IN SOVIET MILITARY JOURNALS AND IN ARTICLES
BY MILITARY LEADERS. WHATEVER THE COURSE OF THE
ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, THIS ISSUE IS GOING TO CONTINUE TO CAUSE STRAINS IN THE MOSCOW POWER STRUCTURE.

IT WOULD BE WELL, THEN, TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE NATURE AND THE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP, AND THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN.

THE ELEVEN MEN WHO MAKE UP THE CURRENT POLIT-BURO--AND INCIDENTALLY, THEY ARE ALL CIVILIANS--ARE IN A SENSE A NEW BREED FOR SOVIET RUSSIA. THEY GREW UP UNDER THE HARD FIST OF STALIN; THEY SEIZED POWER FROM KHRUSHCHEV IN REACTION TO HIS MERCURIAL ADVENTURES; AND AS A RESULT THEY ARE PUBLICLY COMMITTED AGAINST A REVERSION TO ONE-MAN RULE IN RUSSIA.

THIS IS A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP, AND IT INTENDS TO REMAIN ONE. SOME OF ITS MEMBERS-BREZHNEV IN PARTICULAR--ARE "MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS," AS ORWELL PUT IT. IN OUR ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, ALL OF THEIR DECISIONS SINCE KHRUSHCHEV WAS DEPOSED FIVE YEARS AGO HAVE PROBABLY REFLECTED A CONSENSUS OF AT LEAST THE FOUR MEN WHO FORM THE INNER CIRCLE: THE PARTY BOSS, BREZHNEV; PREMIER KOSYGIN; PRESIDENT PODGORNY; AND THE PARTY IDEOLOGIST, SUSLOV.

ONE OF THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS FOR A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP, OF COURSE, IS HOW WELL IT CAN ARRIVE AT AN EFFECTIVE CONSENSUS. THE RECORD OF THE PRESENT KREMLIN COLLECTIVE TENDS TOWARD COMPROMISE, CAUTION, AND POSTPONEMENT OF THE HARD DECISIONS. THE ATMOSPHERE IS NOT ONE OF BOLD NEW PROGRAMS, BUT ONE OF "DON'T ROCK THE BOAT."

THESE LEADERS, AS I JUST NOTED, HAVE BEEN IN POWER FOR FIVE YEARS. IN ALL THAT TIME, THEY HAVE NOT PRODUCED A NEW CONSTITUTION, WHICH HAD BEEN PROMISED FOR NOVEMBER OF 1968. IT TOOK THEM SEVERAL YEARS TO AGREE ON A NEW COLLECTIVE FARM STATUTE. As for the allocation of critical resources, by AND LARGE THEY HAVE MADE NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE POLICIES THAT PREVAILED BEFORE THEY CAME TO POWER. THE MILI-TARY STILL HAS AN OVERRIDING PRIORITY. THE CONSUMER GOT A SOMEWHAT BETTER BREAK. BUT AGRICULTURE FOR THE PRECEDING THREE YEARS KEPT PACE WITH ITS PROB-LEMS ONLY THANKS TO EXCELLENT WEATHER, THE INDUS-TRIAL PLANT HAS BEEN SLIGHTED IN INVESTMENTS TO THE POINT WHERE A DAY OF RECKONING IS NOT FAR OFF IN TERMS OF BASIC ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, UNLESS THERE IS A NEW DEAL IN DIVIDING UP RESOURCES.

THE LEADERSHIP HAS FACED UP ONLY TO ONE HARD DECISION: THE INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE RECORD IN 1968 WAS ONE OF HESITANCY AND TEMPORIZING FROM THE BEGINNING OF DUBCEK'S REFORM PROGRAM IN JANUARY UNTIL THE ACTUAL INVASION IN AUGUST. WHILE WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY HOW THE POLITBURO WAS ALIGNED FOR AND AGAINST INTERVENTION, THE FRICTION WAS UNDUBTEDLY THERE, AND HAS BEEN REFLECTED—EVEN AFTER THE INVASION—IN THE CONTINUED PULLING AND HAULING ABOUT HOW TO GET THE CZECHS BACK ON THE MOSCOW PARTY LINE.

THESE SOVIET LEADERS ARE ORGANIZATION MEN, UN-COMFORTABLE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE UNFAMILIAR AND THE UNEXPECTED. THEY CONSORT TOGETHER AS MUCH FOR MUTUAL SAFETY AS FOR UNITY.

IN JULY 1968, FOR EXAMPLE, THE WORLD WAS TREATED TO THE SPECTACLE OF NINE OF THE 11 POLITBURO MEMBERS TROOPING OFF TOGETHER FOR THE TALKS WITH THE CZECHS AT CIERNA ON THE BORDER. PART OF THE APPEAL OF THIS TOGETHERNESS IS THAT NEITHER BREZHNEV NOR KOSYGIN APPEARS TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO RISK THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A SERIOUS MISTAKE, AND EVEN IF THESE TWO HAD A GREAT DEAL OF TRUST AND RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER—WHICH IS DOUBTFUL—THEY ALSO NEED TO KEEP AN EYE ON

OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COLLECTIVE. THERE ARE YOUNGER MEN IN THE POLITBURO--SHELEPIN (SHELL-YEP-PEEN) AND POLYANSKY, FOR INSTANCE--WHO ARE READY AND WILLING TO ASSUME LEADERSHIP.

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN TRIED IN RUSSIA BEFORE, AND THESE MEN ARE ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT IN THE END, IT HAS ALWAYS GIVEN WAY TO ONE-MAN RULE. HISTORY DOES NOT HAVE TO REPEAT ITSELF, BUT THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN TODAY WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME THEIR INCREASING TENSIONS AND THEIR UNSOLVED PROBLEMS TO AVOID IT.

I DON'T WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA IS IN THE HANDS OF BUMBLING SECOND-RATERS. THESE MEN GREW UP UNDER STALIN, AND THEY HAVE NO WISH TO RETURN TO HIS MANIC TYPE OF DESPOTISM, BUT THEY ALSO GREW UP UNDER COMMUNISM AND THE SO-CALLED "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT," AND THEY ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ITS PRINCIPLES AND GOALS. MOSCOW'S TACTICS MAY HAVE BECOME MORE CAUTIOUS, MORE GRADUAL, AND LESS BLATANTLY AGGRESSIVE, BUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE KREMLIN REMAIN UNCHANGED.

WHEN KHRUSHCHEV UNDERTOOK HIS CUBAN MISSILE ADVENTURE IN 1962, HE OVEREXTENDED HIMSELF, INTO A POSITION WHERE HE EITHER HAD TO RUN A GRAVE RISK OF

GLOBAL WAR, OR BACK DOWN. THIS, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER FACTOR, COST HIM HIS JOB, ALTHOUGH IT TOOK ANOTHER TWO YEARS FOR THE AXE TO FALL. THE MEN WHO TOOK HIS PLACE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PROJECTING THE POWER AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE USSR BEYOND THE SOVIET BORDERS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE DONE IT IN SMALLER, MORE GRADUAL PROBING STEPS.

TODAY A SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET NAVAL SQUADRON OF MODERN MISSILE SHIPS, AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT AND SUBMARINES PATROLS THE MEDITERRANEAN. OTHER SOVIET NAVAL CRAFT SHOW THE FLAG IN AFRICAN PORTS, IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. AND EVEN IN THE CARIBBEAN. SOVIET PATROL BOMBERS OPERATE FROM EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS. WHERE THERE WAS ONCE AN ALMOST PATHOLOGICAL SUSPICION OF RUSSIA IN THE NORTHERN TIER OF THE OLD BAGHDAD PACT, TURKEY HAS WELCOMED A SOVIET PREMIER ON A STATE VISIT, AND RESTRICTS U.S. ACCESS TO THE BLACK SEA, WHILE IRAN BUYS WEAPONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND HAS ACCEPTED SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AID. SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE MISSIONS ARE PROLIFERATING IN AFRICA, IN ASIA, AND IN LATIN AMERICA. SOVIET AIR LINES HAVE PUSHED FARTHER INTO AFRICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. EVEN THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS ARE RECEPTIVE TO CAUTIOUS CON-TACTS WITH THE SOVIETS.

IRONICALLY, THESE SOVIET ADVANCES ON A BROAD FRONT OUTSIDE THE COMMUNIST ORBIT HAVE BEEN ACCOM-PANIED BY SETBACKS INSIDE THE BLOC, WHERE MOSCOW'S MOST CASUAL WORD USED TO BE LAW. THE PRESENT KREM-LIN LEADERSHIP FINALLY SUCCEEDED THIS PAST SUMMER IN SUMMONING A WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, BUT THE COMMUNIST DELEGATES TO THESE MEETINGS NO LONGER JUST COME TO CHEER AND RUBBER-STAMP MOSCOW'S RESOLUTIONS. IN EASTERN EUROPE, YUGOSLAVIA HAS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ITS INDEPENDENCE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS BROUGHT BACK INTO LINE ONLY BY FORCE. THE RUMANIANS STILL ACT AS MAVERICKS IN THE WARSAW PACT AND IN THE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC COUNCIL, SHOWING JUST A BIT MORE DISCRETION TO AVOID THE CZECH FATE. THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT AP-PEARS TO BE IRRECONCILABLE, AS LONG AS THE PRESENT LEADERS REMAIN IN CONTROL IN PEKING.

AT HOME, THE KREMLIN HAS HAD TO CRACK DOWN ON A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF DISSENT. WHERE PREVIOUSLY ONLY A HANDFUL OF ARTISTS AND WRITERS HAD MAINTAINED AN INDEPENDENT ATTITUDE, THE HABIT OF CRITICAL THOUGHT NOW IS SPREADING IN SCIENTIFIC CIRCLES.

This dichotomy between Kremlin progress in the Free World and Kremlin problems at home may well be a reflection of a generation which has lived its

ENTIRE LIFE UNDER COMMUNISM, AND HAS LEARNED IN THE PROCESS THAT ANY CREED HAS TO HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOMMODATION TO SURVIVE AND PROSPER.

BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN & COMPANY ARE MORE PRAGMATIC THAN THEY ARE DOGMATIC. THEY ARE COMMUNISTS FIRST AND FOREMOST, DEDICATED TO THE CREED CREATED BY MARX AND LENIN. BUT THEY ARE ALSO SUFFICIENTLY REALISTIC TO RECOGNIZE THAT AS LONG AS THERE ARE STRONG UNBELIEVERS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD, THAT WORLD IS NOT ALWAYS GOING TO CONFORM TO THE DIALECTICAL BLUEPRINTS DRAWN UP 50 AND 100 YEARS AGO BY LENIN AND MARX. THEY ARE WILLING TO TEMPER THEIR BELIEFS TO ACCOMMODATE THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD, WHENEVER THIS CAN LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION. ON OCCASION, THEY HAVE SACRIFICED THE INTERESTS OF LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE PROCESS.

To summarize the status of the Soviet Union, then, Communist Russia will be our enemy--the split with Peking notwithstanding--as long as this country believes in Democracy and Freedom, and is prepared to help other countries which share our beliefs. Russia has major problems with an economy which is less than half the size of ours, but it has military

POWER WHICH CONSTITUTES A DETERRENT TO GLOBAL WAR,
AND WHICH INCREASINGLY CAN BACK UP A DYNAMIC SOVIET
POLICY IN VITAL WORLD AREAS OUTSIDE THE USSR. FINALLY, IT HAS A LEADERSHIP WHICH SUFFERS FROM SOME
BUILT-IN CONSTRAINTS OF HESITANCY, FRICTION, AND
IMMOBILISM, BUT WHICH MOVES EFFECTIVELY AND REALISTICALLY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF THE SOVIET STATE.
COMMUNIST CHINA

WHILE THE QUESTION IN RUSSIA IS WHETHER ONE-MAN RULE CAN BE AVOIDED, THE QUESTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA IS HOW LONG THE RULE OF ONE PARTICULAR MAN WILL CONTINUE.

MAO TSE-TUNG IS 75 YEARS OLD, AND HE SUFFERS
FROM PROGRESSIVE CEREBRAL ARTERIOSCLEROSIS--HARDENING
OF THE ARTERIES IN THE BRAIN--WHICH IS USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY INCREASING MENTAL RIGIDITY. IN Mao'S CASE,
IT IS OBVIOUSLY ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY A DEEP-SEATED
SUSPICION OF ALL AROUND HIM.

COMMUNIST CHINA HAS GONE THROUGH THREE YEARS OF CHAOS CALLED THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, VIRTUALLY DESTROYING THE COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATUS WHICH HAD BEEN THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF POWER. MAO WAS INSPIRED TO LET LOOSE THIS UPHEAVAL, AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE,

BY HIS CONCLUSION THAT THE PARTY OFFICIALS WERE BECOMING STODGY AND SET IN THEIR WAYS--THAT THEY NO
LONGER HAD THE REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR OF THE FAMOUS
"LONG MARCH," AND COULD NOT BE COUNTED ON TO CONTINUE
HIS DOCTRINE OF PERMANENT REVOLUTION WHEN HE WAS GONE.

IN PART, HIS SUSPICIONS WENT BACK TO THE DAYS OF THE DISASTROUS ECONOMIC COLLAPSE AT THE CULMINATION OF THE "GREAT LEAP FORWARD" PROGRAM. AT THAT TIME THE OTHER CHINESE LEADERS, TRYING TO SALVAGE THE CHINESE ECONOMY, REVERSED SOME OF MAO'S PROGRAMS WHICH HAD LED TO THE COLLAPSE. MAO APPARENTLY DECIDED, THEN AND THERE, THAT MEN WHO OPPOSED AND REVERSED HIS POLICIES MUST BE HIS ENEMIES. WHEN HIS SUSPICIONS HAD REACHED A BOIL, HE UNLEASHED THE RIOTOUS RED GUARDS, THE UNCONTROLLED JUVENILE GANGS WHO WERE TO PURGE THE PARTY MACHINERY AND EITHER RE-MAKE OR REPLACE IT.

THE RESULT WAS A TURMOIL WHICH BROUGHT GOVERN-MENT ADMINISTRATION TO A HALT, WRECKED PUBLIC ORDER AND EDUCATION, AND EVENTUALLY DID SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMY. CHINA VERGED ON CIVIL WAR, UNTIL THE ARMY STEPPED IN TO RESTORE ORDER AND CONSTRAIN THE RED GUARDS.

Now, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAVE COMPLETED A PARTY CONGRESS WHICH PURPORTS TO HAVE RESTORED SOME

MEASURE OF STABILITY AND ORDER, ALTHOUGH THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS A MIXTURE OF ARMY MEN, CULTURAL REVOLUTION LEADERS, AND OLD GUARDS WHICH SO FAR RESISTS ANY FIRM ANALYSIS.

THE EXTENT OF THE PURGE IS SHOWN BY THE FACT
THAT TWO OUT OF EVERY THREE MEMBERS OF THE OLD CENTRAL
COMMITTEE WERE MISSING ON THE NEW LIST. BUT NONE OF
THE VARIOUS COMPETING FACTIONS HAS MANAGED TO ACHIEVE
DOMINANCE OF THE NEW EXPANDED BODY, AND THE EVIDENCE
WE HAVE STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL
OF CONTINUING DEBATE IN THE SECRET SESSIONS OF THE
CONGRESS.

ABOUT ALL THAT CAN BE SAID FOR SURE, IN FACT, IS THAT THE MORE MODERATE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS, EXCEPT PERHAPS PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, HAVE LOST INFLUENCE. CHOU HIMSELF HAS RETAINED HIS NUMBER THREE RATING. THE MILITARY ELEMENT REMAINS VERY STRONG, WITH MARSHAL LIN PIAO FIRMLY IN THE NUMBER TWO SPOT AS THE DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR TO MAO. MAO HIMSELF IS IN UNCONTESTED POSSESSION OF THE TOP SPOT, SURROUNDED BY LEADERS WHO PUSHED THE RADICAL GOALS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

SINCE THIS SUMMER, PEKING HAS BEEN TRYING TO RESTORE SOME SEMBLANCE OF NORMALITY TO THE COUNTRY.

THE FACTIONAL FIGHTING HAS TAPERED OFF IN ALL BUT A FEW ISOLATED AREAS. A NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN IS BEING WORKED OUT. EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO REBUILD THE SHATTERED PARTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY. THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE PARTY, HOWEVER, IS IN TROUBLE BECAUSE OF PEKING'S INSISTENCE THAT NEW LOCAL COMMITTEES HAVE TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES BOTH OF THE RED GUARDS, AND OF THE OLD PARTY OFFICIALS WHO WERE THE TARGETS OF THE RED GUARD RAMPAGES.

OVERSHADOWING THE ENTIRE PROCESS IS THE THREAT THAT MAO MIGHT DECIDE TO REVIVE THE TURMOIL. HE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WILL PROBABLY NEVER BE SATISFIED WITH STABILITY ACHIEVED AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS DESIRE FOR A PERMANENT STATE OF REVOLUTION. AS LONG AS MAO RETAINS CONTROL, THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD THAT THE INTERNAL CONFLICT WILL BE REVIVED, AND THE FORCES OPPOSING HIM WILL BE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO UNITE IN AN EFFORT TO STOP HIM.

# CHINESE ADVANCED WEAPONS

IF I MAY TURN NOW TO CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES, THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF PEKING'S HUGE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES IS THAT THEY CAN OVERRUN ANY OF THEIR SMALLER ASIAN NEIGHBORS, BUT ONLY IF THEY DO NOT ENCOUNTER OPPOSITION FROM A MAJOR

MILITARY POWER--MEANING THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION. THE LIMITATIONS IN THIS ASSESSMENT WILL HAVE TO BE RECONSIDERED, HOWEVER, AS COMMUNIST CHINA PROGRESSES WITH ITS ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS.

WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE DISRUPTIONS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, DESPITE EFFORTS TO SHIELD THE HIGH PRIORITY MILITARY PROGRAMS FROM THE TURMOIL, HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO DELAYS AND SETBACKS IN THE ADVANCED WEAPONS FIELD.

ACCORDING TO OUR ESTIMATES, PEKING COULD HAVE BEGUN DEPLOYMENT OF A 1,000-MILE BALLISTIC MISSILE TWO YEARS AGO, AND IT COULD HAVE STARTED PRODUCING ITS VERSIONS OF THE MIG-21 JET FIGHTER AND THE TU-16 MEDIUM JET BOMBER EARLY LAST YEAR. WE HAVE YET, HOWEVER, TO DETECT ANY MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, OR MIG-21 ASSEMBLY. PRODUCTION OF THE TU-16 FINALLY BEGAN THIS SUMMER. AS FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM, THE CHINESE HAVE DISPLAYED A THERMONUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE LOW MEGATON RANGE, BUT THERE ARE LONG GAPS BETWEEN SHOTS. THEIR FIRST TEN TESTS HAVE BEEN SPREAD OVER FIVE YEARS.

A LAUNCH PAD LARGE ENOUGH TO HANDLE AN ICBM WAS RUSHED TO COMPLETION AT SHUANG-CHENG-TZU, CHINA'S

REMOTE MISSILE TEST CENTER, EARLY IN 1967, BUT BE-FORE IT WAS USED, THE CHINESE BEGAN MAJOR MODIFICA-TIONS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SECOND LAUNCH PAD AT THE SAME COMPLEX.

WE KNOW THAT CHINA IS WORKING ON AN ICBM, BUT
THE EVENTS AT THE TEST RANGE LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT
THEY HAVE ENCOUNTERED PROBLEMS WHICH REQUIRED MAJOR
CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM. ONCE THEY BEGIN FLIGHT TESTS
OF ICBM COMPONENTS, THE EARLIEST CONCEIVABLE DATE
FOR AN INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY WOULD BE THREE
YEARS LATER. THAT DATE HAS NOW SLIPPED TO EARLY 1973
AT LEAST, AND THE PROCESS COULD TAKE TWO OR THREE
YEARS MORE IN THE LIGHT OF CHINA'S INEXPERIENCE, ITS
LIMITED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL BASE, AND THE CONTINUING POLITICAL DISRUPTIONS. ASSUMING THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE DATE IN 1973 FOR AN INITIAL CAPABILITY, IT
IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE CHINESE COULD ACHIEVE AN OPERATIONAL FORCE OF MORE THAN 10 TO 25 ICBMs WITH THERMONUCLEAR WARHEADS BY 1975.

COMMUNIST CHINA HAS NO INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS,
AND WHILE THERE IS ONE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE—
A COPY OF THE SOVIET G-CLASS—THERE IS AS YET NO
MISSILE FOR IT, AND THE CHINESE NAVY HAS NO EXPERIENCE
WHATSOEVER IN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS BEYOND COASTAL
WATERS.

IF WE ARE SPEAKING, THEN, OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, IT COMES DOWN TO A POSSIBLE HANDFUL OF ICBMs in MID-1975, BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION AN ASSURED DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY, OR EVEN ENOUGH FOR A REALLY CRIPPLING BLOW IN A SNEAK ATTACK.

KHRUSHCHEV ONCE SAID THAT MAO TSE-TUNG WOULD WELCOME GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR BECAUSE CHINA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD THAT COULD ACCEPT 300 MILLION CASUALTIES AND STILL HAVE A NATION. THE SOURCE IS SUSPECT, AND THE THOUGHT APPEARS TO BE IRRATIONAL. PEKING HAS, AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALWAYS TALKED A TOUGH GAME, BUT WE CAN TAKE SOME COMFORT FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS RECORD OF EXTREME CAUTION IN SITUATIONS INVOLVING A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS MUCH IN MAO'S RECORD ON DOMESTIC MATTERS THAT PROVES HIM CAPABLE OF RASH AND ILLOGICAL DECISIONS. THAT IS WHY THE CHINESE THERMONUCLEAR ICBM PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE WATCHED VERY CLOSELY AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS.

AS FOR THE PRESENT STATUS OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHEN THE GREAT RIFT BECAME PUBLIC IN 1960 IT TOOK A LONG TIME FOR THE EXPERTS TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DISPUTE WAS REAL, DEEP-SEATED, AND DURABLE. IT

HAD LASTED FOR MORE THAN 10 YEARS, CULMINATING IN SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CLASHES ALONG THE BORDER, WHEN SUDDENLY PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN, FLYING HOME ACROSS SOUTH ASIA FROM HO CHI MINH'S FUNERAL, VEERED EASTWARD, CHANGED PLANES AT IRKUTSK, AND FLEW TO PEKING FOR A DRAMATIC MEETING WITH CHINESE PREMIER CHOUEN-LAI.

WHY? WELL, BOTH COUNTRIES FOUND THEMSELVES
BEING IMPELLED TOWARD A LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION WHICH
THEY DID NOT SEEK, WHICH THEY MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO
CONTROL, AND WHICH APPEARED DANGEROUS ENOUGH TO MAKE
ACCOMMODATION AN URGENT REQUIREMENT.

WE NOW KNOW THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN CONCERNED THAT THE FREE WORLD MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED BY A HOTTER SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE OVER A PREOCCUPIED RUSSIA. THE SOVIET LEADERS DID NOT WANT INTENSIFIED BORDER FIGHTING TO UNDERMINE THE SUPPORT WHICH THEY HAD SO PAINFULLY WON FROM THE OTHER WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES ON THE CHINA ISSUE, BY CASTING RUSSIA IN THE ROLE OF AN "AGGRESSOR" BULLYING A WEAKER NEIGHBOR. AND STRANGE AS IT MAY SOUND TO OUR EARS, THE KREMLIN ALSO APPEARS TO BE CONCERNED THAT CHINESE FEAR OF A SHOWDOWN WITH THE USSR MIGHT DRIVE PEKING TO SEEK SOME MEANS OF DETENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES!

THE CHINESE, FOR THEIR PART, ARE IN NO SHAPE TO UNDERTAKE MAJOR BATTLES WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE REMOTE BORDER REGIONS.

THE RUSSIANS, IRONICALLY, STARTED THE COOLING-OFF PROCESS BY HEATING THINGS UP. BY A NUMBER OF CAREFUL AND INTENTIONAL "INDISCRETIONS," THEY LET THE CHINESE KNOW THAT MOSCOW WAS DISCUSSING WITH A FEW COMRADELY GOVERNMENTS THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POSSIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST THE CHINESE ADVANCED WEAPONS FACILITIES.

THIS, TOGETHER WITH A CONTINUING RUSSIAN BUILD-UP WHICH HAS DOUBLED SOVIET FORCES IN THE FRONTIER AREA OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, WAS APPARENTLY ENOUGH TO CONVINCE THE CHINESE THAT THE SITUATION WAS INDEED DANGEROUS, AND THEY AGREED TO THE CHOU-KOSYGIN MEETING WHILE THE RUSSIAN PREMIER WAS ACTUALLY IN MID-AIR.

NEITHER MOSCOW NOR PEKING IS PREPARED UNDER
PRESENT LEADERSHIP TO GIVE GROUND ON ANY OF THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES WHICH ARE BASIC TO
THE SPLIT. THE TWO SIDES WILL EVEN BE HARD PRESSED
TO FIND THE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO RESOLVE THE LESS
FUNDAMENTAL BORDER DISPUTES. MOSCOW, JUDGING THAT
IT NOW HOLDS BOTH A MILITARY AND A POLITICAL ADVANTAGE

OVER THE CHINESE, WANTS SETTLEMENTS OF SPECIFIC TERRITORIAL ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD--IF REACHED--ELIMINATE
BORDER QUESTIONS FROM THE LIST OF SINO-SOVIET PROBLEMS.
THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, HAVE A MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVE.
THEY WANT TO PREVENT FURTHER BORDER CLASHES WHICH THEY
FEAR MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS PRETEXT FOR A MAJOR ATTACK. TO THIS END, THEY ARE INSISTING ON AGREEMENT-BEFORE ANY OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED-FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM THE IMMEDIATE
BORDER AREA. GIVEN THESE DIFFERENCES IN VIEWPOINTS
AND OBJECTIVES, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE BORDER
TALKS IN PEKING APPEAR TO BE STALEMATED.

THE CHINESE ARE COMPLAINING IN HONG KONG THAT
THE RUSSIANS ARE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH.
THE SOVIETS, IN TURN, ARE DROPPING HINTS THAT THE
CHINESE DO NOT APPEAR TO WANT TO NEGOTIATE ANYTHING.
SO THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE CONTINUES—ALTHOUGH SOME
OF THE HEAT MAY HAVE GONE OUT OF IT FOR THE TIME BEING.
COMMUNISTS IN AFRICA

I MENTIONED EARLIER THE PROLIFERATION OF BRANDS OF COMMUNISM--THE SOVIET, THE CHINESE, THE CUBAN, AND EVEN THE YUGOSLAV MODELS, ALL OF WHICH ARE PLAYING RIVAL ROLES IN THE COMMUNIST BID FOR INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD. THEY ARE COMPETING, AND IN MANY

INSTANCES IT IS A CUTTHROAT COMPETITION, BUT FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, THE EFFORTS DO NOT CANCEL EACH OTHER OUT.

RATHER, THEY ARE CUMULATIVE IN THEIR EFFECT AS FAR AS PROBLEMS FOR THE FREE WORLD ARE CONCERNED. THIS IS A NECESSARY PREFACE TO DISCUSSION OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA.

ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY HAS MADE FEW INROADS. THERE ARE, OF COURSE,
GROWING NUMBERS OF AFRICANS WHO HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO
COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION. MORE THAN 5,000 AFRICANS,
FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION,
AND SOME OF THEM ATTENDED PARTY SCHOOLS. THE NEW
AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS GIVE THEM IMPORTANT JOBS BECAUSE
THEY HAVE A DESPERATE NEED FOR ALL WHO HAVE RECEIVED
ANY FORM OF TRAINING. THESE GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR
PEOPLE, HOWEVER, ARE OVERWHELMINGLY NATIONALIST IN
THEIR ORIENTATION—MANY OF THEM TO THE EXTENT OF
A STRONG DISTRUST OR HOSTILITY TOWARD ALL FOREIGNERS.
THIS FACTOR WILL PREVENT COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY FROM
MAKING MUCH HEADWAY IN AFRICA FOR A LONG TIME.

Moscow and Peking Learned this the hard way.

The Russians have been thrown out of The Congo twice for meddling in internal conflicts, and are now on their best behavior since their re-admission by

PRESIDENT MOBUTU. THE CHINESE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS WITH A RACIAL APPEAL THAT ALL COLORED PEOPLET-BLACK AND YELLOW--SHOULD WORK TOGETHER AGAINST THE WHITES, BUT THEY MADE THE MISTAKE OF OVERDOING THEIR EXPORT OF MAO'S THOUGHT AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND HAVE BEEN CALLED TO ACCOUNT FOR IT BY SEVERAL AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS.

Kenya, for example, was so incensed over the wholesale mailing of Mao Tse-tung badges and "Mao thought" leaflets that a law was passed in 1967 to prohibit the display of political badges. King Hassan of Morocco complained publicly about what he called "tons of subversive leaflets which enter Morocco under Chinese embassy cover." Earlier, when the Cultural Revolution appeared to be persecuting the Moslem minority in China, the Moroccan Ambassador was recalled from Peking, and a member of the Ceylon parliament tried to deliver a protest note to the Chinese Communist Embassy in Ceylon. The Chinese in Burundi were expelled for their excesses in supporting the rebels in the Congo.

Thus the main emphasis in the activities of both Moscow and Peking has been on open economic assistance, on military sales, on cultural contacts

AND ON TRAINING OFFERS. BOTH COUNTRIES IN RECENT YEARS HAVE BEEN EXPANDING THEIR DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITHOUT PAYING TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE POLITICAL LEANINGS OF THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

BOTH MOSCOW AND PEKING, OF COURSE, LOOK TO THEIR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID PROGRAMS TO BUILD CONTACTS AND INFLUENCE, PUTTING THEM IN A POSITION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT MAY COME ALONG TO ADVANCE COMMUNIST INTERESTS. THE MILITARY AID MOSCOW HAS BEEN GIVING THE NIGERIANS IS ONE EXAMPLE, AND BOTH RUSSIA AND CHINA GIVE MODERATE ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TRYING TO OVERTHROW THE REMAINING WHITE REGIMES IN AFRICA. UNTIL NKRUMAH WAS OVERTHROWN IN GHANA IN 1966, THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS RAN A MAJOR INTELLIGENCE AND SUBVERSION CENTER IN GHANA, WHILE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD A TRAINING CAMP UPCOUNTRY FOR REVOLUTIONARIES.

CUBAN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO THREE MAIN CATEGORIES; TRAINING AND ADVICE FOR SUB-VERSIVE GROUPS OPERATING AGAINST KINSHASA CONGO AND PORTUGUESE AFRICA; SUPPORT FOR THE BRAZZAVILLE CONGO GOVERNMENT; AND DEVELOPING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA. CASTRO BEGAN LIMITED GUERRILLA TRAINING FOR A FEW AFRICAN EXTREMIST GROUPS IN 1961. CHE

GUEVARA WAS INVOLVED IN THE CONGO REBELLION IN 1965 AND EARLY 1966, BUT SINCE THEN CUBAN INSTRUCTORS WHO HAD BEEN WITH THE CONGO REBELS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN.

In the past, early Communist aid efforts were good for a few laughs, like the Soviet tractors which turned up in Uganda with fully winterized Siberian-style cabs, or the mountains of Chinese cement that sat in the rain on the Burmese docks until they turned to concrete. The Communists have been in the aid business long enough now, however, to make it a professional operation. They have learned, for one thing, that the most a nation should expect for its aid is influence or at least access—that gratitude is a windfall, and control an outright miracle. They have also learned to resist the splashy, showy aid projects that don't pay for themselves in the long run, although they still seek projects with highly visible effects.

THERE IS ONE FUNDAMENTAL FACT TO BE KEPT IN MIND IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA; This is the extreme shortage of competent NATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE NEW AFRICAN NATIONS. ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ENTIRE BELGIAN CONGO WAS REPORTED TO HAVE LESS THAN 20 NATIVE UNIVERSITY GRADUATES.

WITH SUCH A THIN VENEER OF LEADERSHIP, AFRICA

CAN ILL AFFORD THE BITTER TRIBAL ANIMOSITIES AND

POLITICAL RIVALRIES WHICH DIVIDE THE NEW NATIONS

AND KEEP POTENTIAL TALENT SITTING ON THE BENCH.

THERE IS EVEN GREATER DANGER, HOWEVER, IN THE FOR
EIGN RIVALRIES WHICH MAKE ONE COUNTRY'S CANDIDATE

FOR OFFICE ANOTHER COUNTRY'S TARGET FOR DESTRUCTION.

THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM IN THE SHORT RUN. If THE SOVIETS CAN DESTROY A UGANDAN'S POLITICAL CAREER BY ACCUSING HIM OF SUBVERSION ON CHINA'S ACCOUNT, SCORE ONE FOR THE SOVIETS. IF AN ADMINISTRATOR IN TANZANIA CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN BY LABELING HIM A STOOGE OF THE COLONIAL POWERS, ALL OF THE COMMUNISTS BENEFIT. THE ONLY REAL LOSERS ARE THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND THE FREE WORLD. THE AFRICANS NEED EVERY CAPABLE LEADER THEY HAVE; THE FREE WORLD'S MAIN INTEREST IN AFRICA IS TO ESTABLISH ORDER AND TRANQUILITY; AND WHEN THE THIN LAYER OF AFRICAN LEADERS IS EXHAUSTED, THE RESULT IS CHAOS, FROM WHICH ONLY THE COMMUNISTS CAN GAIN.

# COMMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICA

THE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA IS DIFFERENT IN SEVERAL ASPECTS. IN MOST COUNTRIES, THERE ARE PLENTY OF CANDIDATES READY AND WILLING-WITH OR WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE PEOPLE--TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP. IN VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY SOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE, THERE ARE ALSO WELL-ESTABLISHED COMMUNIST PARTIES--ALTHOUGH MOST OF THEM ARE ILLEGAL.

SEVERAL COUNTRIES, IN FACT, HAVE NOT ONE, BUT THREE COMMUNIST FACTIONS, LOOKING RESPECTIVELY TO MOSCOW, TO PEKING, AND TO HAVANA FOR INSPIRATION, SUPPORT, AND DIRECTION. IN SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES, THERE ARE ONE OR MORE PARTIES OF THE EXTREME LEFT WHICH ARE SO MILITANT THAT THEY HAVE BEEN FAVORED BY CASTRO IN THE PAST OVER THE MORE ORTHODOX COMMUNISTS—FOR EXAMPLE, THE MIR, OR MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT, IN VENEZUELA.

THE SOVIET UNION PURSUES ITS GOALS IN LATIN

AMERICA AT PRESENT THROUGH A GRADUALIST POLICY EMPHASIZING STATE—TO—STATE RELATIONS. THE ORTHODOX LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY IS OPENLY URGED BY MOSCOW TO SEEK A PARLIAMENTARY ROAD TO POWER. SUBVERSION IS DEEPLY CLANDESTINE, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH—WHILE STILL A LONG—RANGE OBJECTIVE—WOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED ONLY IF MOSCOW WERE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN OF EARLY SUCCESS.

THE SOVIET UNION AT PRESENT HAS RELATIONS WHICH PLACE ITS MISSIONS IN NINE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

INCLUDING CUBA, AND PROSPECTS FOR ADDING MORE IN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. TEN YEARS AGO--WHEN ONLY MEXICO, URUGUAY, AND ARGENTINA HAD SOVIET MISSIONS--THERE WERE 131 SOVIETS ON OFFICIAL DUTIES IN ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. By the beginning of this year, those 131 HAD BECOME 254--AND WE CAN IDENTIFY MORE THAN HALF OF THEM AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THIS LATTER FACT SHOULD BE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE RESTRAINTS MOSCOW HAS IMPOSED ON THE ORTHODOX COMMUNIST PARTIES ARE NOT DICTATED BY ANY PERMANENT DEVOTION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA.

It could be that the Kremlin is in no hurry to acquire a batch of client states in the Western Hemisphere, all looking to Moscow to solve their economic problems. Cuba has been a burdensome liability and Fidel Castro an unmanageable headache ever since he joined the Communist camp. In any event, Latin America does not appear to rank high in Soviet world priorities.

THE PRO-PEKING COMMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICA ARE LONG ON GOALS AND SHORT ON ASSETS. IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, THERE IS EITHER A PRO-PEKING FACTION IN THE REGULAR COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION, OR A MINUSCULE SEPARATE PARTY FAVORING CHINA, BUT THESE

GROUPS ARE SMALL AND RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT. A PRO-CHINESE COMMUNIST FACTION TOOK PART IN THE DOMINICAN REVOLT, AND THERE IS ONE PRO-PEKING GUERRILLA GROUP-THE POPULAR LIBERATION FORCE IN COLOMBIA. PEKING FURNISHES A VERY SMALL AMOUNT OF TRAINING AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO GROUPS LIKE THESE, BUT IN MOST CASES THE LATINS HAVE ALIGNED THEMSELVES WITH PEKING NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE THEY PREFER MAO'S THOUGHT, BUT BECAUSE MOSCOW FOR THE MOMENT IS NOT ENCOURAGING VIOLENT ACTION, AND PEKING IS.

No Latin American country except Cuba maintains diplomatic relations with Peking. The only other Communist Chinese presence in Latin American consists of a small trade mission in Chile, and bureaus of the New China News Agency, manned by native correspondents, in Chile and Uruguay. Trade between Communist China and Latin America is negligible.

FIDEL CASTRO HAS MODERATED CUBAN EFFORTS TO EXPORT REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE THE DEATH OF CHE GUEVARA IN BOLIVIA IN LATE 1967. THE LEVEL OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARIES IS PROBABLY LOWER TODAY THAN IT HAS BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1960. CUBAN PROPAGANDA HAS BEEN TONED DOWN AND REDUCED.

FRONT GROUPS LIKE THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY OR-GANIZATION ARE VIRTUALLY DORMANT, AND THE THEME OF REVOLUTION HAS DISAPPEARED FROM CASTRO'S SPEECHES.

This change appears to be in part a result of Soviet urgings, but principally it is an outgrowth of Castro's reappraisal of the prospects for revolution in the Hemisphere, and of Cuban ability to influence it.

In the case of Guevara's brief career in Bolivia, U.S. Special Forces instructors had given counterin-surgency training to the Bolivian troops which finally

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SURGENCE TRAINING TO THE DULLYTAN TROOPS WHICH FINALLY	
ELIMINATED THE GUERRILLAS,	_

What had happened was that Che and sixteen other Cuban guerrilla experts came swaggering into Bolivia and announced that they--the Cubans--were

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GOING TO RUN THE REVOLUTION FOR THE BOLIVIANS. THEY OFFENDED THE BOLIVIAN COMMUNISTS, AND GUEVARA WOUND UP WITH JUST A RELATIVE HANDFUL OF BOLIVIANS ON HIS SIDE--A FEW PRO-CASTRO TYPES, AND NONE WHO WERE CAPABLE OF WINNING THE SYMPATHIES OF THE PEASANTS.

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TELLS US THAT CASTRO, AFTER
STUDYING GUEVARA'S DIARY, HAS REACHED AT LEAST ONE
DECISION: NEXT TIME--IF AND WHEN THERE IS A NEXT
TIME--THE CUBANS WHO JOIN GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS ELSEWHERE WILL JOIN AS COMMON SOLDIERS, AND NOT AS LEADERS UNLESS THEY CAN EARN THE LEADERSHIP IN THE EYES
OF THE LOCAL GUERRILLAS.

CASTRO HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS HOPE FOR VIOLENT REVOLUTION IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BUT FOR THE TIME BEING, HE WILL NOT COMMIT CUBAN MONEY OR PERSONNEL UNLESS HE CAN DETECT FAR BETTER CHANCES FOR SUCCESS.

LIKE AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA ALSO HAS BASIC LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS OTHER THAN COMMUNIST ACTIVITY WHICH ARE CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FABRIC OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IS SHOT THROUGH WITH VULNERABILITIES WHICH GIVE RISE TO VIOLENCE, WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE COMMUNISTS THERE

TO EXPLOIT THEM. BANDITRY HAS BEEN A WAY OF LIFE ON THE COLOMBIAN MOUNTAINSIDES SINCE THE DAYS OF THE CONQUISTADORES. THE DESCAMISADOS--THE "SHIRT-LESS" POOR--WHO BROUGHT PERON TO POWER IN ARGENTINA ALMOST 25 YEARS AGO, STILL HAVE MANY OF THE SAME GRIEVANCES. THE DESCENDANTS OF THE INCAS WHO ONCE RULED PERU LIVE IN ABJECT POVERTY AND DEPRESSION. THE SMALL FARMERS AND THE HINTERLAND INDIANS IN COUNTRY AFTER COUNTRY ARE GIVING UP AND MOVING TO THE CITIES, WHERE THEY FILL MISERABLE, REBELLIOUS SLUMS. IN 1940, THERE WERE ONLY FIVE CITIES IN LATIN AMERICA WITH POPULATIONS OVER ONE MILLION. IN 1960, THERE WERE NINE; NEXT YEAR THERE WILL BE 18; AND WE ESTIMATE THAT IN 1980 THERE WILL BE 26 CITIES IN LATIN AMERICA WITH MORE THAN A MILLION PEOPLE.

THIS IS AN EXPLOSIVE SITUATION. IN OUR ESTIMATION, IT AFFORDS THE POSSIBILITY OF REAL REVOLUTION
IN LATIN AMERICA—AND BY THAT I MEAN A MAJOR UP—
HEAVAL TO CHANGE THE SOCIAL ORDER, NOT JUST A COUP
OR AN OCCASIONAL GUERRILLA OUTBREAK. THE LEADERS
OF THIS REVOLUTION WILL PROBABLY BE YOUNG MEN FROM
THESE URBAN SLUMS. THEY WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE
COMMUNISTS, OR PRO-CASTRO. BUT THE SITUATION IS ONE

WHICH THE COMMUNISTS ARE ALREADY EXPLOITING, AS WE HAVE SEEN IN THE RECENT WAVE OF RIOTS IN MANY LATIN AMERICAN CITIES.

## THE MIDDLE EAST

SEVERAL YEARS AGO, COMEDIAN STEVE ALLEN INVENTED A QUIZ GAME IN REVERSE, SUPPLYING THE ANSWERS AND ASKING CONTESTANTS FOR THE QUESTIONS. IF
THE ANSWER WAS "GEORGE WASHINGTON SLEPT HERE," THE
QUESTION OBVIOUSLY HAD TO BE "WHAT ARE THOSE CHERRY
PITS DOING IN MY BED?"

This is appealing to the Intelligence agencies, if only because congenitally we have so many more questions than we have answers. But seriously, I think this reverse process definitely has something to offer on the subject of Communist activity in the world today.

START WITH THE ANSWER THAT OVER THE PAST DOZEN YEARS OR SO, THE COMMUNIST NATIONS HAVE COMMITTED MORE THAN 11 BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AID, AND SOME SIX BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS <u>OUTSIDE</u> THE COMMUNIST BLOC. THE BEST QUESTION I CAN POSE FOR THIS ANSWER IS: "WHAT ARE THE COMMUNISTS <u>REALLY</u> UP TO?"

Take a closer look at the detailed figures for this aid, and you will find that 68 percent of the economic aid and almost 95 percent of the military aid has gone to the Arabs, South Asia, and Indonesia.

THE EMPHASIS IS NOT ON BLACK AFRICA, NOR ON LATIN AMERICA. INSTEAD, THE THRUST OF MOTHER RUSSIA IS TOWARD THE WARM WATERS TO HER SOUTH. JUST AS THE CZARS OFFERED TO PROTECT THE MUSLIMS AND THE HINDUS AGAINST THE BRITISH RAJ, THEIR COMMUNIST SUCCESSORS BELIEVE THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE GIVES THEM A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME THE PROTECTORS OF ALL THE ARABS.

IT MAY NOT BE AN OVERSIMPLIFICATION TO SAY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE <u>BARGAINING</u> IN HELSINKI AND PEKING SO THAT THEY WILL BE FREE TO <u>ACT</u> IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE MIDDLE EASTERN CRISIS BEGAN SOME 3,300 YEARS AGO WHEN THE HEBREWS--CULMINATING A MIGRATION WHICH HAD BEGUN IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA--FOUGHT THEIR WAY INTO PALESTINE. THE LOCAL INHABITANTS, SUBJECTS OF THE EGYPTIANS, APPEALED TO THE PHARAOH FOR HELP, BUT NONE CAME, AND THE HEBREWS TOOK OVER.

ABOUT 600 YEARS LATER THE ARABS, ALSO ORIGINATING IN THE ARABIAN DESERT, PUSHED INTO BABYLONIA--PRESENT-DAY IRAQ. Thus THE HEBREWS AND THE ARABS ARE CLOSELY

RELATED BY ORIGIN, BY RACE, AND BY LANGUAGE--AND THEY HAVE BEEN NEIGHBORS FOR 27 CENTURIES--BUT THERE IS NO RECORD THAT THEY HAVE EVER GOTTEN ALONG TOGETHER.

PALESTINE IN TURN HAS BEEN RULED BY THE HEBREWS, ASSYRIANS, BABYLONIANS, GREEKS, ROMANS, PERSIANS, ARABS, CRUSADERS, TURKS, AND FINALLY BY THE BRITISH. IT WAS THE BRITISH, SEEKING HELP IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR, WHO PROMISED BOTH THE JEWS AND KING HUSAYN OF HEJAZ--THE GREAT-GRANDFATHER OF THE PRESENT KING HUSAYN-BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THE HOMELAND. THE TROUBLE IS THAT BOTH THE ARABS AND THE JEWS TOOK THE WORD "HOMELAND" TO MEAN PALESTINE.

IN ANY EVENT, THE NATION OF ISRAEL WAS CREATED BY THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE IN 1948. THE ISRAELIS HAD TO ESTABLISH THEIR NEW STATE BY FORCE OF ARMS. THEY SUSTAINED IT IN 1956, AND THEY ENLARGED IT IN 1967 WITH OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES ABOUT THREE TIMES THE SIZE OF ISRAEL ITSELF.

IT IS OUR ESTIMATE THAT THE ISRAELIS TODAY ARE STILL MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO ANY FORCE THE COMBINED ARAB STATES CAN BRING AGAINST THEM, DESPITE SOVIET RE-ARMAMENT AND TRAINING OF THE DEFEATED ARABS.

THE ARABS--HOWEVER--AND PARTICULARLY THE MILITANT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS--CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND TALK UNREAL-ISTICALLY OF PUSHING THE ISRAELIS BACK INTO THE SEA.

Tension has become endemic all along the Arab-Israeli front. The Arab leaders are undoubtedly aware that a renewal of general hostilities would be suicidal under present circumstances, but public opinion requires them to maintain a credible level of defiance. The terrorists, with no territory or economic resources to lose, don't care what happens as long as there is no settlement until Israel is destroyed. So the Egyptians keep shelling and probing across the Suez Canal; the fedayeen, supported by Syria and Iraq, keep up a steady rate of raids, sabotage, shelling, and outright terrorism; and the Israelis—having found no other deterrent—continue to intensify the scale of their reprisal operations.

THE ISRAELIS, WHO WANT PEACE AND RECOGNITION
BY THE ARAB STATES, SAY THEY ARE PREPARED TO BE
REASONABLE--BY THEIR STANDARDS--IN REACHING A SETTLEMENT. THE LONGER THEY HAVE TO WAIT, HOWEVER, THE
MORE HARDNOSED THEY ARE BECOMING ABOUT TERMS. IT
IS ALREADY APPARENT THAT THEY INTEND TO KEEP ALL OF

JERUSALEM, THE GOLAN HEIGHTS THEY TOOK FROM SYRIA,
A POPULATED AND FORTIFIED DEFENSIVE BELT ALONG THE
WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER, AND PROBABLY A LINE
OF COMMUNICATION DOWN THE EAST COAST OF SINAI TO THE
STRAIT OF TIRAN, WHICH CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE PORT
OF EILAT.

THE ISRAELI CASE IS THAT THEY ARE OUTNUMBERED 20 TO ONE, THEIR COUNTRY IS BARELY 10 MILES WIDE AT SOME POINTS, AND THEY DO NOT PROPOSE TO LIVE FOREVER IN AN ARMED CAMP. WITH EACH WAR, AS THE ARABS GET MORE FOREIGN SUPPORT AND THE ISRAELIS GET LESS, THE ISRAELI MARGIN OF VICTORY GETS SLIMMER.

They do <u>Not</u>, however, want an imposed or mediated U.N. or Four-Power settlement, set forth in two copies so that the Arabs will not have to put their signatures on the same piece of paper with the Israelis.

ISRAEL INSISTS THAT THIS TIME, THE ARABS MUST FINALLY END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE AND BARGAIN FACE TO FACE.

Israel will settle for nothing less. The Arabs, however, insist that the Israelis must first agree to withdraw from all of the Arab territory occupied

IN 1967, AND THEN SOME WAY WILL BE FOUND TO WORK OUT A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THE ÅRABS MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT ACCEPT A FORMULA INVOLVING RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. THE ÅRABS BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN COUNT ON SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THIS STAND; THEY FIGURE FRANCE IS IN THEIR CORNER; AND THEY HOPE THAT THE NEED FOR MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND A RE-OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL WILL ULTIMATELY INDUCE THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN TO BRING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. I MIGHT ADD THAT AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR STIFFENING THE ÅRABS IS THE WELL-JUSTIFIED DOUBT OF SOME ÅRAB REGIMES THAT THEY CAN REMAIN IN POWER AGAINST THE GROWING APPEAL OF THE FEDAYEEN IN THE EVENT OF ANY SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

THERE SEEMS TO BE ALMOST NO PROSPECT FOR A RATIONAL SETTLEMENT IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

THERE REMAINS THE QUESTION OF RUSSIA'S OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. A LONG LINE OF RUSSIAN CZARS SOUGHT A WARM-WATER OUTLET FOR RUSSIA; THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IT. THE SOVIET NAVY SAILS THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE RED SEA, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND MAKES FRIENDLY PORT CALLS AT THE HEAD OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE NORTHERN TIER BELOW THE BLACK SEA AND THE CASPIAN HAS BEEN PENETRATED, AND THE

Soviets are building a presence in the Middle East which is displacing American and British influence. It suits Soviet purposes to keep the Middle East in a state of turmoil and unrest.

AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW RECOGNIZES THAT THERE ARE DANGERS. ANOTHER WAR AND ANOTHER ARAB DEFEAT COULD DESTROY REGIMES ON WHICH MOSCOW HAS LAVISHED A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY, MATERIAL, AND EFFORT. AND THERE IS ALWAYS THE DANGER THAT ANOTHER WAR, WITH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES BACKING OPPOSING SIDES, COULD LEAD TOWARD DIRECT INVOLVEMENT AND CONFRONTATION OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS—AN EVENTUALITY WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED TO AVOID.

Moscow, then, will try to keep the tension below the boiling point, but it will do little to advance any settlement which does not conform largely to Arab terms—and on that basis, there can be no settlement. There are reports that the Soviets are doing what they can to restrain their Arab clients from acts which could touch off renewed general hostilities—but this involves a very delicate balance between a simmering tension and full-scale war. In May, 1967, the Soviets fed the Arabs information about alleged Israeli military preparations. The Soviet aim may have been to make the

ARABS MORE DEPENDENT ON RUSSIA, OR MORE ATTENTIVE. BUT THE RUSSIANS GROSSLY MISCALCULATED BOTH THE ARAB REACTION, AND THE ULTIMATE ISRAELI RESPONSE. MOSCOW CERTAINLY DIDN'T WANT A WAR AT THAT POINT, BUT NASIR ORDERED THE UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCES AWAY FROM THE BORDER, MOVED HIS TROOPS FORWARD INTO THE SINAL, AND CLOSED THE STRAIT OF TIRAN. EVEN BEFORE THE FIGHTING STARTED, IT SEEMED INCONCEIVABLE TO US THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT KNOW THAT CLOSING THE STRAIT WOULD BE TAKEN AS AN ACT OF WAR BY THE ISRAELIS. AND THAT TEL AVIV BELIEVES ITS CHANCES TO BEAT THE ARABS DEPEND ON STRIKING THE FIRST BLOW IF THERE IS TO BE WAR. THE RUSSIANS ARE BEING SOMEWHAT MORE CAREFUL NOW IN HANDLING THE ARAB ARMIES, BUT THERE IS STILL NO GUARANTEE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING ANY MORE ADEQUATE ALLOWANCES FOR 2,700 YEARS OF FANATICAL HATRED.

#### VIETNAM

FINALLY, THE SUBJECT OF VIETNAM.

I WANT TO CONCENTRATE THIS MORNING ON WHAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE TRYING TO DO IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DO IN PARIS.

These are two facets of a single policy. The Communists, as they did in Indochina in 1954, and

AS THEY HAD DONE IN KOREA BEFORE THAT, ARE TRYING TO OBTAIN-BY GRIM, BLOODY STAYING POWER, AND BY THEIR "FIGHT-TALK-FIGHT" STRATEGY--THE OBJECTIVES WHICH THEY NOW KNOW THEY CANNOT WIN BY SHEER MILITARY MEANS.

IN SOUTH VIETNAM LAST YEAR, THE COMMUNISTS LOST ALMOST A QUARTER OF A MILLION MEN KILLED IN ACTION, DEAD OF WOUNDS, OR PERMANENTLY DISABLED. THE BLOOD-IEST LOSSES WERE IN THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE AND THE SUBSEQUENT CAMPAIGN IN MAY. THESE WERE DESIGNED TO BE KNOCK-OUT PUNCHES, BUT COMMUNIST LOSSES WERE SO SEVERE THAT CAPTURED INDOCTRINATION DOCUMENTS AND PRISONERS OF WAR WERE SPEAKING IN TERMS OF "ONE LAST TRY" OR "ONE FINAL EFFORT."

IN THE 14 MONTHS FROM THE TIME THE BUILD-UP FOR THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE BEGAN, THROUGH THE END OF 1968, THE ENEMY STARTED MORE THAN 300,000 MEN DOWN THE LONG INFILTRATION PIPELINE RUNNING FROM NORTH VIETNAM TO THE BATTLEFIELDS IN THE SOUTH. THIS WAS ENOUGH TO REPLACE COMBAT LOSSES, BUT IT IS A FEARFUL DRAIN ON A COUNTRY WITH A POPULATION OF LESS THAN 20 MILLION. IT REFLECTS A CASUALTY RATE WHICH CANNOT BE SUSTAINED IN THE LONG HAUL, AND WHICH EVEN IN THE

SHORT TERM HAS LOWERED BOTH THE FIGHTING EFFECTIVE-NESS AND THE MORALE OF THE FORCES IN THE FIELD.

THE "FIGHT-TALK-FIGHT" STRATEGY, HOWEVER, REQUIRES THAT THE ENEMY MAINTAIN STRONG MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. HANOI'S BELIEF THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE WON BY WAITING FOR AMERICA TO GROW SICK OF WAR AND GIVE UP SIMILARLY DICTATES THAT THE COMMUNISTS MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN A HIGH RATE OF AMERICAN CASUALTIES.

THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ACCORDINGLY DEVELOPED NEW "ECONOMY OF FORCES" TACTICS, DESIGNED TO LIMIT THEIR OWN LOSSES WHILE THEY CONTINUE TO INFLICT CASUALTIES ON OUR TROOPS.

THIS INVOLVES KEEPING THE MAIN ENEMY BATTLE

FORCES UNCOMMITTED IN BASE AND SANCTUARY AREAS TO A

SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE, SO THAT THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE

TO SCATTER AND SEEK THEM OUT, WHILE EXPERIENCED

SAPPER UNITS AND ARTILLERY, MORTAR, AND ROCKET FORCES

CARRY OUT SHARP HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS ON ALLIED MIL
ITARY INSTALLATIONS AND SELECTED TOWNS.

THE COMMUNISTS FIRST TRIED THESE TACTICS IN THEIR FINAL 1968 CAMPAIGN OF AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. BY AND LARGE, IT WAS A BUNGLED ATTEMPT. THE ENEMY

TOOK HEAVY CASUALTIES, AND ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE ON THE BATTLEFIELD, IN PARIS, OR IN WASHINGTON.

THIS YEAR'S TET OFFENSIVE, FROM LATE FEBRUARY
THROUGH MARCH, WAS MORE PROFESSIONALLY EXECUTED.
THERE WAS HEAVY RELIANCE ON ROCKETS AND MORTARS,
ALTHOUGH A FEW LOCAL ENEMY COMMANDERS TRIED TO OVERRUN SOME OF OUR MOST EXPOSED POSITIONS, WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS FOR THE COMMUNISTS.

SINCE THEN, THERE HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT PATTERN OF SPORADIC AND LARGELY LOCALIZED "HIGH POINTS," AS THE ENEMY CALLS THEM--MAINLY STAND-OFF ARTILLERY AND ROCKET ATTACKS DESIGNED TO INFLICT CASUALTIES. SOMETIMES THERE ARE ACCOMPANYING SAPPER INFILTRATIONS, AND AN OCCASIONAL ATTEMPT AT GROUND ATTACK.

ONE OBJECTIVE IS CERTAINLY TO SUSTAIN ALLIED CASUALTY RATES FOR THEIR EFFECT ON DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION, BUT RECENTLY THERE IS SOME PATTERN OF A CHALLENGE TO THE CONCEPT OF VIETNAMIZATION. ONE EXAMPLE IS THE CURRENT SUSTAINED PRESSURE ON THE CAMPS NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER ALONG THE TWO CORPS—THREE CORPS BOUNDARY, WHICH ARE MANNED LARGELY BY CIDG VIETNAMESE, BUT DIRECTED BY SPECIAL FORCES AND SUPPORTED BY U.S. ARTILLERY UNITS.

There has been no real effort to storm any of these camps, and there may not be. Our intelligence indicates that the North Vietnamese intend to maintain this type of stand-off pressure through December, at which point the main force units are to be withdrawn for reinforcement and refitting, before returning to their old Kontum-Pleiku operating area for a spring offensive--probably of the same type.

The pressure on the CIDG camps has caused some increase in South Vietnamese casualty figures—and to a lesser extent in U.S. casualty figures—but at a considerable cost to the enemy as well. The North Vietnamese have had more than 1,000 killed in the area in a period in which allied fatalities have amounted to less than 200.

IN THE FACE OF THIS CONTINUING DRAIN ON ENEMY MANPOWER, IT IS INTERESTING THAT INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM WAS VIRTUALLY SUSPENDED FROM MAY THROUGH OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR. IT IS ALMOST AS THOUGH HANOI HAD TOLD ITS FIELD COMMANDERS: "You WILL HAVE TO MAKE THE ECONOMY-OF-FORCES TACTICS WORK, BECAUSE THERE WILL BE NO REPLACEMENTS."

IN CONTRAST TO THE QUARTER OF A MILLION MEN INFILTRATED IN 1968, ONLY ABOUT 102,000 HAVE BEEN

SENT IN DURING THE FIRST 11 MONTHS THIS YEAR--MAINLY IN THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS. THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS IN NOVEMBER--AS THE ROADS IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE DRIED OUT--THAT THE INFILTRATION RATE MIGHT BE RISING AGAIN, AS IT DID LAST DECEMBER WHEN 28,000 MEN WERE SENT IN DURING THAT MONTH ALONE. WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM ANY SUCH SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE, HOWEVER, AND THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN HAS BEEN THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE START MOVING THEIR REPLACEMENTS SOME TWO TO THREE MONTHS BEFORE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN IN WHICH THEY EXPECT TO INCUR HEAVY CASUALTIES.

FOR ALL THAT, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MAIN FORCE UNITS REMAIN LARGELY INTACT IN BORDER AREAS AND OTHER SANCTUARIES. THEY CAN LAUNCH WIDESPREAD HEAVY ATTACKS WITH LITTLE ADVANCE NOTICE, AND IF THE INFILTRATION PIPELINE IS FILLED AGAIN IN DECEMBER, A MAJOR OFFENSIVE COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS EARLY AS MID- OR LATE FEBRUARY IF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN HANOI SO DIRECTS.

What the Communists are trying to do, in effect, is to rock the conference table in Paris from the Battlefields in South Vietnam.

As for the Negotiations, hours can be devoted to discussion of the Six Points of President Thieu, the Ten Points of the National Liberation Front, and the Eight Points set forth by President Nixon.

I BELIEVE IT IS LESS CONFUSING AND MORE INSTRUCTIVE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE TWO POINTS WHICH WE BELIEVE CONSTITUTE THE ROCK-BOTTOM OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNISTS, BOTH ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE LONG RUN, HANOI WILL TRY TO INSIST ON AGREEMENT ON THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN FORCES WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIME PERIOD. IT WILL TAKE MUCH MORE HARD BARGAINING TO ARRIVE AT ANY UNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO A RECIPROCAL WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, BECAUSE HANOI WILL MAINTAIN THAT NO VIETNAMESE ANYWHERE IN VIETNAM, NORTH OR SOUTH, CAN BE CONSIDERED FOREIGN TROOPS.

AND SECONDLY, HANOI WILL INSIST ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT GUARANTEEING THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM SOME KIND OF STATUS WHICH DOES NOT PRECLUDE AN EVENTUAL BID TO TAKE POWER AND COMPLETE HANOI'S FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE—THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM UNDER A SINGLE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP.

They believe that they were promised this in Geneva in 1954, and were then somehow tricked out

OF WHAT THEY HAD WON. THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO SETTLE FOR LESS THIS TIME.

THE ANSWER, OBVIOUSLY, MUST BE TO HAVE A SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH IS STRONG ENOUGH--POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND MILITARILY--SO THAT WHILE THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE ASSURED OF THE RIGHT TO BID FOR POWER AND CONTROL, THAT BID WILL FAIL.