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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 64

DATE 27 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR:

- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
- DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
- COMPTROLLER
- INSPECTOR GENERAL
- GENERAL COUNSEL
- ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Col. Grogan

LBK:dm

Distribution: TO ALL ADDRESSEES

1 - Col. Grogan

1 - ER via DCI, DDCI

NOTE: Copies to DD/I and Col. Grogan were fwd'd 26 Oct.

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MORI/CDF

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C2 7354

October 26, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

SUBJECT: Press Contacts in Connection with the Cuban Crisis

I note a growing amount of press comment indicating that the Cuban situation developed precipitously for one or two reasons: (a) information was withheld from the public, or (b) intelligence was faulty or inadequate.

Our line therefore should be about as follows:

The MRBM and IRBM areas were surveyed on August 29th and September 5th and there was no evidence of any construction activity or unusual movements of materiel, etc. Subsequent reconnaissance efforts in late September and early October were ineffective because of bad weather and the flights that were successful concentrated on developing essential information on known installations such as SAM sites, cruise missile sites, etc. Information was obtained in mid-September on the arrival of large crates suspected of containing fuselages of IL-28s but the planes themselves could not be detected as no crates were opened.

The first effective flight revealing significant information occurred on October 14th after several days' delay because of weather and this flight revealed the fuselage of one IL-28 which had been uncrated, the location of the remaining crates, and the evidence of some MRBM sites. The most advanced apparently had been under construction for a few days. Subsequent flights revealed progressive construction of the MRBM sites, additional MRBM sites being commenced and initial construction on the first of the IRBM sites, also a substantial number of MIG 21s (crates of which had been previously noted and reported) in being on the runway and one crate unloaded and the plane being placed in operational status.

One can only conclude that what we observed had been carefully planned for execution in a very minimum time in the interests of avoiding detection.

I am told there are a number of articles in preparation, some of which wish to deal with the role of intelligence in the findings and subsequent decision. Some writers have expressed a desire to do a profile on me personally. I would like both my personal role and the role of intelligence played down.

We might confine ourselves to the following:

On the evening of Monday, October 15th, analysis of photographs taken on Sunday, October 14th, revealed the probable evidence of medium range missiles in Cuba. This probability was reported to the White House Tuesday morning and McCone, who was on that day in Seattle to attend the funeral of his stepson who had been killed on the 14th in an accident, was advised and returned to Washington on the first available plane.

The Central Intelligence Agency and the entire Intelligence Community worked continuously on analyzing the photographic product and preparing the necessary appraisals and estimates needed for proper policy consideration and decisions. The United States Intelligence Board made up of senior intelligence officers from CIA, State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission met every day and sometimes more often to consider current intelligence and estimates as they evolved. Subcommittees of the Board were in continuous session. As a result the President and his policy advisors were currently supplied with a coordinated and considered judgment of the critical situation. McCone personally attended all meetings of the senior Government officials and with the National Security Council and with the President in considering the alternative courses of action and reaching final decision as to the course we have followed. McCone, as a principal intelligence officer of the Government, continues to meet daily as a member of the Presidential appointive Executive Committee of the N.S.C.

**John A. McCone
Director**

cc: General Carter

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