

THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
Washington 25, D. C.

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C U R R I C U L U M

F O R

DEFENSE STRATEGY SEMINAR, 1960

**THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE**  
Washington 25, D. C.

18 May 1960

This syllabus is approved and promulgated hereby for the guidance of the Staff, Faculty and participants of the Defense Strategy Seminar for 1960.

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	<u>Page</u>
A. SCOPE OF THE COURSE . . . . .	1
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE . . . . .	3
C. DETAILED PROGRAM . . . . .	5

DEFENSE STRATEGY SEMINAR - 1960

A. SCOPE OF THE COURSE

1. Introduction.

This course is entitled, "Defense Strategy Seminar - 1960." It deals with the major issue facing the United States and its allies today: the conflict with World Communism. It considers the causes of this conflict, the objectives of the combatants, the techniques by which the conflict is sustained, and the measures which the Free World may take in order to maintain and increase its security, while preserving its traditional liberties for the individual.

2. Scope and Purpose.

a. To provide a specially selected group of personnel with a better understanding of the world conflict and of the organization, resources and methods used by the adversaries to accomplish their aims.

b. To enable this group to understand the requirements for successful US strategy, plans, and action in support of Free World security.

c. To present to this group ideas and programs for creating a resolute and informed US climate of opinion by which the above requirements can best be reinforced.

3. Subject Matter.

a. The initial part of the seminar is designed to outline our revolutionary environment at mid-twentieth century; the nature of the struggle in which we are engaged; the revolutionary forces which have transfigured the globe; and the objectives of the United States in a world in rapid transition.

b. Part II of the seminar deals with the nature of our opponent--his objectives, strategies, tactics, operating techniques and guiding philosophy. Particular emphasis is placed on those misconceptions which continue to cloud our understanding of the Communist threat.

c. Part III is an analysis of the spectrum of conflict. The theme underlying these presentations is that conflict is no longer an isolated phenomenon which flouts the "normal" peaceful process of history. Rather, the conflict of our time is total and encompasses the entire range of human activities, from such "non-violent" forms of conflict as economics and diplomacy to the weapons and delivery systems of total destruction.

d. Part IV considers some specific forward strategies which, in concert with her allies, the United States can adopt in order to close the gaps in her defenses and take the initiative in the global conflict.

e. The final part of the seminar is devoted to an exploration of courses of action open to the individual in a free society in the tasks of: (a) alerting his community to the dangers of communism; and (b) creating the necessary national climate of opinion in which a purposeful policy can be formulated and carried out.

**B. ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE**

<u>Daily Topic</u>	<u>Nr.</u>		<u>Page</u>	
<b><u>PART I. THE PRESENT WORLD ENVIRONMENT</u></b>				
Mon	11 Jul (A. M.)	1	The Nature of the Current Conflict	5
	(P. M.)	2	The Revolution in the Developing World	7
Tue	12 Jul (A. M.)	3	The Technological Revolution	10
	(P. M.)	4	Objectives and Vital Interests of the United States	12
<b><u>PART II. COMMUNISM: ITS STRATEGY AND TACTICS</u></b>				
	(P. M.)	5	Objectives and Strategies of World Communism	14
Wed	13 Jul (A. M.)	6	Communist Tactics and Operating Techniques	16
	(P. M.)	7	Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy	18
	(Evening)	8	Communist China's Foreign Policy	20
Thu	14 Jul (A. M.)	9	The Nature of Communism	23
<b><u>PART III. THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT</u></b>				
	(A. M.)	10	The Range of Conflict	25
	(P. M.)	11	The Psycho-Political Conflict	27
Fri	15 Jul (A. M.)	12	The Economic Conflict	29
	(P. M.)	13	The Technological Conflict	32
Sat	16 Jul		Reserved for Discussion and Con- sultation	35

Mon	18 Jul (A. M.)	14	The Military Conflict: "General War"	36
	(P. M.)	15	The Military Conflict: Limited and Guerrilla War	38
Tue	19 Jul (A. M.)	16	The Diplomatic Conflict	40

**PART IV. MEEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE**

	(A. M.)	17	Soviet Military Capabilities	42
	(P. M.)	18	US Military Capabilities	44
Wed	20 Jul (A. M.)	19	Exploiting the Vulnerabilities of the Communist World	46
	(P. M.)	20	Free World Alliances	49
	(Evening)	21	Economic and Technological Strategy	51
Thu	21 Jul (A. M.)	22	Foreign Assistance as an Instrument of American Foreign Policy	53
	(A. M.)	23	Religion in the Current Struggle	56

**PART V. YOUR ROLE IN THE COLD WAR**

	(P. M.)	24	The Role of the Military in Non-military Warfare	58
Fri	22 Jul (A. M.)	25	Your Action on the Community Level	60
	(P. M.)	26	The Private Citizen and the Dynamic American System	62

C. DETAILED PROGRAM

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FIRST DAY  
MONDAY, 11 JULY

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PART I. THE PRESENT WORLD ENVIRONMENT

Topic #1

THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT

1. Introduction.

a. In the revolutionary environment of the mid-twentieth century, two systems are locked in a conflict which is protracted in time, ubiquitous in space and embraces the forces currently dominant in politics, economics, culture, science and technology.

b. The salient characteristic of this struggle is its multi-dimensional nature. While armed power may prove to be its final arbiter, the conflict rages today on the shadowy battlefields of political, psychological, ideological and economic warfare, punctuated by intermittent "brushfire" encounters. Essentially it is a contest between two opposing systems: the Open and the Closed Societies.

c. The very strengths of the Open Society constitute, at the same time, its weaknesses. The tolerance of the Open Society for diversity tends to accord sanctuary to those very men whose purpose it is to destroy it. Accommodation is the guiding principle of the Open Society; yet its very penchant for compromise places it at a potentially fatal disadvantage in dealing with an enemy who will accept no compromise in his objective of world domination.

d. A main weakness of the Open Society in this conflict is that it reacts rather than acts, or responds rather than initiates. Divergent interests and opinions often tend to preclude agreement on the nature of the danger as well as programs for countering it. Historically--even as long as 2500 years ago when the Greek City States were threatened and later overcome by Philip of Macedon--the Open Society



has taken resolute action only when confronted with an immediate and clearly defined threat to its existence. Today, however, the West faces an enemy who has mastered the strategy of ambiguity.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To analyze the various manifestations and aspects of the current conflict and to evaluate the nature of the opposing world systems and their advantages and disadvantages in the protracted conflict.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

- a. Is time on the side of the West or of the Sino-Soviet Empire?
- b. What is the nature of the Cold War and the means with which it is being waged?
- c. How do the West's traditional concepts of "war" and "peace" contrast with the Communist view of conflict?
- d. What are the principal differences between an Open and a Closed Society, and how do these affect the conduct of the conflict?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "THE NATURE OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT."

5. References.

FIRST DAY  
MONDAY, 11 JULY

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Topic #2

THE REVOLUTION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

1. Introduction.

a. Succeeding periods of history have swept away the political, social and economic systems of the previous era in what may be termed a "systematic revolution." Thus, the Greek city-state gave way to the universalism of the Roman Empire, whose disintegration, in turn, created the base upon which the feudal system of the Middle Ages was built. The nation-state organization of the modern world emerged from the breakdown of the feudal structure of medieval society.

b. Today the world is engulfed in another systemic revolution, whose dimensions are comparable to the earlier upheavals. It is, in part, the product of powers unleashed by the natural sciences, the spread of industrialization, progress in communications and transportation, and the extension of Western ideas of liberalism and nationalism to the remote corners of the earth. One of the most important manifestations of this broad "systemic revolution" is the revolt of the underdeveloped areas of the world against the old order.

c. The rise of the "new nationalism," the demand for racial equality, and the "revolution of rising expectations" are some of the forces propelling this revolution in the underdeveloped world. These areas, historically, have been tied to the West; today many are in psychological, as well as political, rebellion against the West, thus creating conditions of instability and disorder which the revisionist force of international Communism seeks to exploit for its own purposes.

d. A factor common to most underdeveloped countries is a low standard of living with its accompanying social and economic ills. The growing realization in these countries that economic and social betterment can be achieved has made "progress" a vital political issue. Their governments, when unable to show concretely that they

are fostering this economic development, tend to be unstable and unpopular, and ripe for a Communist take-over through violence or the ballot-box. For economic reasons alone, the underdeveloped world will continue to be an unstable factor in the balance of power.

e. Economic instability in the underdeveloped world is matched by political instability. By and large, the initial enthusiasm and preference for Western representative institutions by the indigenes, Western-trained elites has waned because these Western political institutions have not been successfully transplanted into alien social and cultural climates. Hence, today there is a tendency to experiment with authoritarian forms of government, as nationalist leaders attempt to find more effective solutions to the growing problems of economic stagnation, social change, national disunity, corrupt bureaucracies and Communist subversion.

f. The general political, economic and military weakness of the underdeveloped areas may be expected to continue during the foreseeable future, offering numerous opportunities for Communist expansion.

## 2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To analyze the forces directing the revolutionary changes occurring in the underdeveloped world and the impact of this revolution on the struggle between the Communist Bloc and the Free World.

## 3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. How have the Soviets exacerbated tensions created by the systemic revolution in the underdeveloped areas?

b. What characteristics of underdeveloped areas hinder efforts of the United States to influence the course of the systemic revolution?

c. As new nations emerge from the initial revolutionary phase of their development into modern nation-states, are they likely to lose some of their anti-Western tendencies and become more aware of the threat posed by the new colonialism of international Communism?

d. Is economic progress and political stability possible in most underdeveloped areas under representative forms of government?

4. Lecture.

The title for the lecture this afternoon is "THE REVOLUTION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD."

5. References.

SECOND DAY  
TUESDAY, 12 JULY

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Topic #3

THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

1. Introduction.

a. The world is in a rapidly maturing crisis. The technology that is now developing and that will dominate the next decades seems to be increasingly in conflict with traditional geographical and political units and concepts.

b. Technological advances are having an increasing impact on political institutions and processes, economic development, the nature of warfare, and the struggle for the minds of men. Indeed, today technology cuts across the entire spectrum of national strategy and has become a proper and necessary subject around which secondary strategies should be shaped.

c. The exploitation of basic scientific research and technological empiricism has application in every phase of the world struggle; for instance, agricultural improvements are affected by advances in chemistry, farm tools, irrigation and fertilizers; manufacturing is tied to progress in machine tools, automatic data processing, transportation systems; military power is dependent upon metallurgy, electronics, vehicular mobility and meteorology.

d. A skillful technological and scientific strategy during the next decade or two is essential in order to provide the United States with effective tools to accomplish its international aims; to defeat the ambitions of international Communism and to meet the challenge of the revolution of rising expectations in the underdeveloped world.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To assess the extent to which technology has altered the configuration of the globe and to assess the impact of this force upon the formulation of strategy.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. To what extent can technological progress in the form of atomic energy, hydrology and agricultural improvements speed the process of economic development in the Afro-Asian-Latin American world?

b. What will be the impact in the next decade or two of the speed-up in dissemination of scientific knowledge and technological know-how to China, India and other areas in the underdeveloped world?

c. What are the military implications of this rapid technological progress?

d. Is the technological revolution likely to bring a trend toward political or at least economic integration in the underdeveloped world, as it has in Western Europe?

4. Lecture.

The title for the lecture this morning is "THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION."

5. References.

SECOND DAY  
TUESDAY, 12 JULY

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Topic #4

OBJECTIVES AND VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

1. Introduction.

a. Within the circle of those in the US government responsible for the formulation and execution of foreign policy there is general agreement on basic objectives. These include: the protection of the territorial domain of the United States and its dependencies from attack by unfriendly powers; the building of a strong alliance system as a defense against the world-wide threat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc; the maintenance of friendly relations with the underdeveloped countries and the promotion of their economic growth and political stability as a measure in our own enlightened self-interest; and the ultimate establishment of a world order based on law and justice.

b. The relative order of importance of these objectives and the means for securing them remain issues upon which opinion is deeply divided.

c. The success of the American experiment has led us to take a pragmatic approach toward the problems presented by revolutionary change in the twentieth century. Americans tend to regard their society as one of the elements in the process of change rather than as a potential master or moderator of the forces stimulating change.

d. A growing number of Americans recognize, however, that if our resources are to be applied successfully in the current international struggle, there must be a greater purposiveness than we have exhibited in the past. This sense of purpose, moreover, must inspire, not only the US, but the entire Free World, whom we are seeking to attract to our cause.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To examine United States objectives and the development of United States interests.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. What are the positive values which free peoples share in common?

b. How can the areas of shared interests be expanded while the areas of conflicting interests are prevented from spreading?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "OBJECTIVES AND VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES."

5. References.



SECOND DAY  
TUESDAY, 12 JULY

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PART II. COMMUNISM, ITS STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Topic #5

OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF WORLD COMMUNISM

1. Introduction.

a. The ultimate objective of Communism is world domination. Non-violent methods precede, accompany and follow military operations. Communists will forsake open military conflict if they can achieve their objective by non-violent methods. In that event, extermination of the opposition will follow rather than precede conquest.

b. The Communists do not restrict themselves in their choice of method. Their strategy is multidimensional. In a given situation, all approaches, direct or indirect, are used successively or simultaneously.

c. Communism thrives on the inevitable tensions of societies living in the grip of a revolutionary era. Communism is a method of highly organized conflict over a sustained period of time.

d. Communist strategy combines Russian conspiratorial and imperialistic traditions in a great variety of approaches. These include techniques of direct, indirect, overt, and covert opposition, military as well as nonmilitary attack against the opposing system, and subversion and infiltration.

e. Maintaining the strategic initiative, exaggerating strength, minimizing weaknesses, use of deception and distraction, neutralizing the opposition if it cannot be overcome--all these methods are characteristic of Communist protracted conflict strategy. If the Communists are to secure a stable base for their strategies, they must enforce strict internal security. They take advantage of all opportunities regardless of ideological considerations.

**2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.**

To examine the objectives and vital interests of World Communism and to develop an understanding of basic Communist strategy and techniques.

**3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.**

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

- a. What are the devices of Communist conflict management and in what circumstances have they been employed?
- b. What has been the role of military action in bringing about Communist successes in the past?
- c. Why do the Soviets have reason to believe that they may win the struggle without resort to open military conflict?
- d. Does the spectrum of Soviet strategy exclude a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States?
- e. What hinders the carrying out of a strategy of protracted conflict more vigorously by the Free World in general, and by the United States in particular?

**4. Lecture.**

The title of the lecture for this afternoon is entitled "OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF WORLD COMMUNISM."

**5. References.**

THIRD DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 13 JULY

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Topic #6

COMMUNIST TACTICS AND OPERATING TECHNIQUES

1. Introduction.

a. The Communists have the advantage of unrestricted operating techniques. They exploit many situations in different ways. Organizational procedures include highly centralized conflict operations, carried forward by the Communist parties of the world functioning as political armies or combat parties, a world-wide network for police control, espionage, propaganda, semantics and agitation to divide the opposition and destroy its will to resist.

b. Communists maintain special training centers for foreign agents and Communist cadres. A skeleton "government in exile" or cadres of exiles may be created to re-enter and infiltrate their countries of origin.

c. In Communist strategy, the indirect method for gaining power and control is of paramount importance. Indigenous groups opposed to their own governments, fronts, fellow travelers, and sympathizers are employed to deceive, divide, distract and demoralize the defenders of the established order. Principal targets of these tactics are elite groups, labor unions and ethnic as well as religious groups.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To develop an understanding of the means by which Communists translate their operational principles into everyday action.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. What are some of the methods by which Communists exploit the natural differences between various groups?

b. What types of differences between groups in the United States lend themselves particularly to Communist manipulation?

c. What role do fellow travelers and sympathizers abroad play in Communist strategy?

d. What are some themes of Communist propaganda which are current in the United States and which tend to weaken our will to resist?

e. What is the role of the Communist party, the police and the armed forces within a political system?

f. Compare the functioning of the Communist party of any nation with a conventional Western political party.

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "COMMUNIST TACTICS AND OPERATING TECHNIQUES."

5. References.

THIRD DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 13 JULY

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Topic #7

SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

1. Introduction.

a. The Soviet Union is the main power base and the guiding intelligence of the global Communist movement. The fundamental objectives, therefore, of the Soviet Union and world Communism are synonymous; these objectives are the progressive degradation of the non-Communist world, leading to the undisputed sway of Communism throughout the globe.

b. There have been times, however, when the Soviets found it expedient to sacrifice the fortunes of Communist parties abroad to the Russian national interest. Thus, Stalin concluded a pact with Hitler despite the latter's persecution of German Communists. Thus, also, Khrushchev continues to render support to certain leaders in the Middle East, despite their hostility toward local Communist parties. While these moves represent in part tactical accommodations, they reflect also the traditional thrusts of Soviet foreign policy; her drive for great power status and territorial expansion--particularly southward to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.

c. Before World War II, Soviet policy was overtly defensive. Its objective was to safeguard the Soviet Union against premature military encounters, while the experiment of "Socialism in one country" was being pressed, and while the USSR was gradually building a military establishment. World War II broke the "capitalist encirclement" and ushered in a new "flow period" of Soviet power.

d. A main short-term objective of the Soviets is the "legitimization" of Soviet conquests. This objective underlies Soviet efforts to induce the West to recognize the status quo in Europe, particularly the division of Germany. It is implicit, also, in the attempt to drive the Western powers from Berlin.

e. The Soviets seek to isolate the United States through the systematic dissolution of the Free World's defensive alliances. This explains their consistent policy of directing threats and blandishments at major allies of the United States, especially those that host the forward bases of US strategic power.

f. Parallel with the Soviets' divisive strategy is their endeavor to effect the disarmament of the United States. The Soviets seek to accomplish this objective through the "neutralization" of US nuclear capabilities, the physical "roll-back" of US strategic power overseas and a variegated campaign of disarmament.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To analyze Soviet foreign policy toward the Free World, with emphasis upon the United States.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. What do the Soviets mean by "peaceful coexistence"? How does this concept fit into traditional Communist conflict doctrine?

b. How have the policies of Khrushchev differed from those of Stalin?

c. What were the principal reasons behind the dissolution of the Comintern and, later, the Cominform?

d. Do the Soviets regard the Free World's military alliances as aggressive arrangements directed at the Soviet Union or as barriers to Soviet expansion?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY."

5. References.

THIRD DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 19 JULY

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Topic #8

COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

1. Introduction.

a. The most persistent feature of Communist China's foreign policy is deliberate hostility toward the United States. The United States stands as the only major obstacle to the attainment of her major policy objectives: the seizure of Taiwan to ratify the success of the Communist revolution on the mainland; the establishment of Chinese Communist primacy in all of East Asia; and the eventual overthrow of the entire Free World, a goal shared by the Soviet Union.

b. These objectives of Peking are dictated by its Communist ideology and conflict doctrine and reinforced by Chinese history. Traditionally, Chinese expansionism has pushed to the south and west. Chinese aggressiveness is spurred also by such internal factors as the population explosion, communization and the continuing attempt to consolidate totalitarian control.

c. Chinese policies toward her southern neighbors have alternated between aggression and subversion on the one hand, to attraction and the diplomacy of "peaceful coexistence" on the other. The use of force or of threats is designed to instill fear into the leaders and peoples of weak and exposed neighboring states; the policies of attraction serve to lull the suspicions of neutralist leaders.

d. Alternating Chinese policies of attraction and pressure are likely to be continued through the decade of the 1960's, unless or until the Chinese Communists believe they are in a position to gain their ends by pursuing the one policy to the exclusion of the other. Overt aggression cannot be ruled out, should Peking conclude that the weakness of the area assures a swift Chinese victory.

e. Chinese and Soviet leaders believe they are riding the crest of history and the "future" in human affairs. Their alliance assures

each considerable military, strategic, economic and political advantages--advantages which are likely to outweigh various differences between them. Any rupture in Sino-Soviet relations would affect adversely the political prestige and power of both partners. Despite these important reasons for maintaining the unity of the alliance, there are possibilities for future conflict over ideology, timing and tactics, population pressures, bloc leadership, border issues and growing Chinese power.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To analyze Communist China's aggressive policies in Asia and Moscow-Peking relations.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. What are the various forms of limited and unconventional aggression employed by Communist China to overthrow both neutral and pro-Western governments in South and Southeast Asia?

b. How successful have US military and economic assistance programs been in improving the ability of these new nations to cope with Chinese aggression?

c. What impact would US recognition of Communist China have on the neutral and pro-Western nations in the area?

d. Given Peking's posture of hostility toward the US, is there any chance that US recognition of Peking would be reciprocated, short of complete US withdrawal from East Asia?

e. In what ways can Peking, together with Moscow, bring pressure to bear on Japan in order to weaken the US-Japanese partnership and force Japan into a neutralist position and eventual absorption into the Communist bloc?

f. Are Chinese and Soviet national objectives incompatible in the long run?

4. Lecture.



The title of the lecture for this evening is "COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY."

5. References.

FOURTH DAY  
THURSDAY, 14 JULY

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Topic #9

THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM

1. Introduction.

a. Fallacies regarding the nature of Communism are widely accepted as truth, and perpetuating these myths is a central Communist objective. Effective action against Communism is impossible unless its true nature is understood.

b. Communism is not humanitarianism; it is not devoted to improving the condition of the masses, nor is it "scientific" in its concept of man or history. Communism in practice is not a synonym for social egalitarianism, but, in many ways, its very antithesis. Communists are not sincere when they initiate and pose as protectors of national revolutions in colonial areas. The actions of the Communists belie their claims to being "peace-loving." Economic growth under a state monopoly is not necessarily greater than under a free enterprise system regulated by equitable government actions. The Communists profess an unyielding adherence to "scientific" dogma, but repeatedly ideology has been sacrificed to expediency. The USSR long ago abandoned Marxian economics.

c. Communism is not the "wave of the future." It is not the highest form of political evolution, nor is it inevitable. Nowhere has Communism been the product of spontaneous historical forces. In all countries where Communism has triumphed, it has been imposed and maintained by terror and force of arms.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To gain an understanding of Communism and to prevent and correct misconceptions regarding its nature.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

- a. How have the Communists managed to disguise the real nature of their system and philosophy?
- b. How have these myths arisen?
- c. Why are the uncommitted people of Asia and Africa so susceptible to these myths?
- d. What is the difference between Socialism and Communism?
- e. How does Soviet practice correspond to Communist theory?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM."

5. References.

FOURTH DAY  
THURSDAY, 14 JULY

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PART III. THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Topic #10

THE RANGE OF CONFLICT

1. Introduction.

a. All devices are employed by the Communists to advance their overall goal. Their master technique is to combine military with nonmilitary means of struggle. They seek first to achieve a qualitative and quantitative superiority of armaments relative to the Free World; secondly, to maximize the effectiveness of Communist military organization and coordination; thirdly, to integrate their military potential into the conduct of their permanent revolution against the West.

b. The Communists seek to achieve armaments superiority by their own accomplishments in the technological race, and by trying to reduce the armament of the Free World by disarmament propaganda and diplomacy. For the latter purpose they threaten the allies of the United States, especially those in whose territory the US has military bases and use nuclear blackmail to reinforce political pressure.

c. The Soviet combined arms doctrine extends to the whole spectrum of military conflict. The Communists use proxies to avoid direct responsibility for the initiation of hostilities and maintain a balanced military system capable of waging all types of warfare, from nuclear war to guerilla activities and individual terror. The spectrum includes all the methods of psycho-political and economic warfare.

d. The weakening of the Free World from within and the neutralization of strong elements of resistance are an integral part of Communist strategy.

e. The Communists are enjoined by their doctrine to withhold attack until a truly favorable opportunity arises, one in which the risks of the effort are minimal and the chances of victory optimal. Once the opportune moment has come, the Communists will strike or try to achieve world domination by forcing the Free World to surrender.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To develop an understanding of the nature of the Communist military challenge presented by an integrated system of military, paramilitary and military-political techniques.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. How do Communists mesh violent and non-violent methods of conflict in a given operation--for example, the penetration of the Middle East?

b. How do Communists exploit gaps or weaknesses in the Free World's weapons spectrum?

c. Are Communists likely to stress increasingly violent methods of conflict as their military capabilities grow?

d. Is there a relationship between the USSR's nuclear disarmament proposals and the actual composition and organization of its military forces?

e. By what techniques do Communists press for the disarmament of the Free World?

f. Under what circumstances is it likely that the USSR would resort to all-out war? Would the same estimate hold true for Communist China?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "THE RANGE OF CONFLICT."

5. References.

FOURTH DAY  
THURSDAY, 14 JULY

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Topic #11

THE PSYCHO-POLITICAL CONFLICT

1. Introduction.

a. On the psycho-political battlefield, the West has failed to match Soviet prowess--despite the West's overall superiority in material power. This paradox underscores the need of a thorough examination of the base of US psycho-political strategy.

b. Propaganda, no matter how cleverly conceived, is not by itself sufficient to determine the trend of international political attitudes. There is a widespread belief that propaganda constitutes a magic instrument for influencing the thinking of peoples according to a desired pattern, irrespective of basic military, political or economic factors. Actually, propaganda cannot be a substitute for power or, indeed, for policy.

c. Whereas the United States attempts to persuade, the Soviets seek to condition. We conduct information programs; they wage psychological warfare. We try to accomplish our political objective of influencing foreign peoples through formal arrangements made at the government-to-government level; they press their conditioning campaign through numerous non-governmental channels.

d. In waging psychological warfare the Soviets will continue to hold certain advantages which are inherent in the nature of "closed" societies pitted against the "open" societies of the free nations.

e. Psycho-political strategy, to be successful, must in the last analysis be based upon an adequate comprehension of the ideological forces and cultural factors operative in the contemporary international environment. During the last decade, the swelling ideological currents in the underdeveloped areas--nationalism, anti-colonialism, neutralism, antimilitarism, anti-imperialism and

anticapitalism--have been running against the West. By cleverly exploiting these forces, the Soviets have been able to win friends, stir up trouble for the West and reap handsome strategic profits at low cost.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Free and Communist Worlds in the psycho-political conflict.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. What are the inherent advantages held by Communists in the psycho-political conflict?

b. What are the moral and institutional restraints which inhibit a forceful Western psycho-political strategy, and how can these be overcome or modified?

c. What is the role of the Soviet disarmament campaign in the Communist psycho-political strategy?

d. How do the Iron and Bamboo Curtains shield the Communist bloc against outside influences and assist its leaders in their attempt to preserve unity of mind at home?

e. What is the role of nuclear blackmail in the Soviet campaign to undermine psychological defenses of the West?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "THE PSYCHO-POLITICAL CONFLICT."

5. References.

FIFTH DAY  
FRIDAY, 15 JULY

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Topic #12

THE ECONOMIC CONFLICT

1. Introduction.

a. Although the West has historically assumed that only one international economy exists, the Soviets are convinced that they are building a "parallel world market" which will gradually overtake and surpass the Free World market system.

b. The Soviet GNP is probably about 40 per cent of that of the US but the Soviet annual growth rate seems to be greater than ours. Moreover, the inherent nature of the Soviet system makes it possible for the USSR to depress consumption and allocate a greater portion of total expenditures to programs which promote national strategic power (military production, R & D, investment, foreign assistance and higher education).

c. Eastern Europe plays a more significant economic role than is generally realized within the West. The program of industrialization which has been carried out in Eastern Europe during the past decade has aided the economic development of China and enhanced the bloc's capacity for carrying out its foreign economic offensive.

d. The Soviet offensive is waged against the West, both directly (through dumping, gold exports and other disruptive tactics), and indirectly in the underdeveloped areas (through low-interest loans, barter deals, exchange manipulation and other devices of economic penetration). The dangers posed by the bloc in the area of trade consist, not so much in its actual volume, but rather in the flexibility and efficiency with which the Soviets can employ the resources of a state trading monopoly in dealing with individual free countries and business firms.

e. In any assessment of the long-term economic conflict, we should not lose sight of the great economic power of our Free World



industrial allies (United Kingdom, the countries of Western Europe, Japan and Canada), as well as the younger industrializing nations (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and others).

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To understand the realities of a divided economic world, the problem of comparing growth rates, and the various factors which bear upon economic strategic power in a period of prolonged international conflict.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. What are the assets and liabilities of the Soviet economic system? Are the Communists more conscious of "growth" as a strategic objective than we are? Are they able to put their productive resources to fuller use than we do?

b. Are the Communist bloc countries moving toward economic integration and cooperation more vigorously than the countries of the Free World?

c. Does China, on balance, represent a net gain or a net drain to the Communist world?

d. What difficulties are likely to confront the Soviet economic planners during the years ahead?

e. What advantages do the Soviets enjoy in approaching the underdeveloped countries with aid-trade offers?

f. What is the relation between military assistance and economic aid in our efforts to strengthen the defenses of the underdeveloped countries?

g. Is there any danger that we may begin to view other allied countries as posing a greater threat in the realm of economic competition than the Sino-Soviet bloc? What can be done to head off such a danger?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "THE ECONOMIC CONFLICT."

5. References.

FIFTH DAY  
FRIDAY, 15 JULY

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Topic #13

THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONFLICT

1. Introduction.

a. The Soviet Union during the postwar period has made rapid technological progress and radically increased its power-base relative to that of the United States. This surge has been reflected most vividly by the rapid Soviet attainment of a strong nuclear posture, its highly sophisticated conventional weapons, initial missile systems and achievements in the field of space technology.

b. There are several fundamental reasons for Soviet advancement. First, there is a continuous sense of awareness and decision, both by planners and those who carry out plans, as to the direction and relative priority of projects. Second, with these objectives in mind, the Soviet decision-making structure itself is more responsive and immediate in its reactions. Third, once decisions and priorities are established, efforts are devoted to a particular project in proportion to its priority.

c. Soviet leadtime for complex weapons systems development and other technical projects tends to be significantly shorter than our own. Moreover, the Soviets allocate funds according to strategic priorities, and do not determine priorities or strategies according to available funds.

d. In terms of comparative capabilities, the United States and the Free World undoubtedly possess the necessary physical and intellectual resources to meet the challenge of the Communist bloc. But mere possession of the tools is not enough. The technological advantage will go to that side which is most perceptive, dynamic and adept in exploiting them.

e. Technology is unique in the arena of strategic conflict in that the development of a technological arm of strategy is relatively within our own control. The interrelationships of the politico-diplomatic, military, economic or geographic aspects of an overall

strategy are complex and dependent on many factors. But technological aspects of US strategy enjoy the luxury of comparatively little interference from external pressure.

f. There are clear indications that the Soviets are in deadly earnest about outstripping us in this key field of endeavor. This is not merely a race for marginal advantages, but rather a ruthless competition for the wherewithal and know-how to win the protracted conflict.

## 2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To develop an understanding of the technological conflict, with particular emphasis on the implications of the rapid Soviet technological advances on the security of the Free World.

## 3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. Where does the United States stand, technologically speaking, in the international power struggle?

b. Is the notion of a technological stalemate an illusion? Is a decisive technological breakthrough on either side possible or probable?

c. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Soviets and ourselves with regard to advanced planning methods and leadtimes in the selection and production of weapons?

d. What will be the relationship between outer space developments and Free World security in the next decade?

e. How can the will to devote a higher proportion of the national wealth and energy to critical defense research and production be instilled in the American people?

## 4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONFLICT."

5. References.

SIXTH DAY  
SATURDAY, 16 JULY

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RESERVED FOR DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION

SEVENTH DAY  
MONDAY, 18 JULY

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Topic #14

THE MILITARY CONFLICT: "GENERAL WAR"

1. Introduction.

a. Nuclear weapons exist in many forms, and their yield and variety are suited to various modes of application. Since we are still in the "model T" stage of nuclear weapons development, effective types can be evolved only by continued research, experimentation and development.

b. It is necessary to understand the impact of nuclear weapons and powerful new delivery systems on the developing forms of military operations and forms of combat in general, and upon Soviet military doctrine in particular. The trend appears to be toward the development of ever greater firepower of nuclear weapons.

c. So far the Soviets have rejected exclusive reliance on an ultimate weapon or on a particular weapons system, realizing that it is necessary to possess a capacity to deal with a variety of strategic and tactical objectives. Apparently they are shifting to a concept of nuclear surprise attack and of nuclear blackmail based upon technological superiority. While in the past the combined operation by balanced forces, tailored to the strategic role or tactical mission and not to a specific weapons concept or system, has been the Soviet answer to warfare, it is gradually changing.

d. Like ourselves the Soviets are confronted by the problem of how to fight an all-out nuclear war without committing suicide. Winning the technological race and winning the political battle are the two cornerstones of a nuclear survival strategy.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To assess the problems of general war and the impact of new weapons systems upon military strategy.

**3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.**

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

- a. What has been the impact of nuclear weapons technology on traditional Soviet military doctrine?
- b. Are their dangers in the so-called "missile gap"?
- c. Is the "balance of terror" a stable one?
- d. What are the objectives of the Soviet campaign for a nuclear test ban? How would such a ban affect the capabilities of both sides?
- e. How can a more constructive US public opinion be developed regarding the relation of nuclear weapons to national security?

**4. Lecture.**

The title of the lecture for this morning is "GENERAL WAR."

**5. References.**



SEVENTH DAY  
MONDAY, 18 JULY

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Topic #15

THE MILITARY CONFLICT: LIMITED AND GUERRILLA WAR

1. Introduction.

a. The definition of limited war is an elusive one. Wars may be limited in terms of their intensity, geographic sweep and the objectives pursued by the combatants.

b. The USSR's growing nuclear capability is likely to open to the Communist leadership an increasingly wide range of political and military option. The Soviets may well come to conclude that limited and guerrilla wars, especially those initiated by satellites under ambiguous circumstances, may be "safe wars"--wars that will not trigger all-out nuclear conflict. The various instruments of indirect aggression, such as "volunteers" and proxies, which have proven so successful in the past, may be used more frequently.

c. The Communist bloc's capability for limited war--with or without resort to tactical nuclear weapons--may not have to be exercised in actual combat. The implied threat of its use may be sufficient to gain such limited objectives as Berlin.

d. Strategic nuclear capabilities are of overriding importance in deterring a direct nuclear attack against the United States. But they may not deter challenges overseas that fall below the "threshold" of an obvious issue of US survival. The Soviets may seek to raise this "threshold" through an incessant campaign of nuclear blackmail.

e. A major danger inherent in limited war--especially one fought with tactical nuclear weapons--is its possible "spiralling" into general thermonuclear conflict. The contestants' willingness and ability to keep a given conflict limited will depend on their respective objectives and their tacit acceptance of certain "ground rules" concerning firepower and geographic limitations.

f. Guerrilla warfare is gaining importance both as a "safe" means of waging conflict under the nuclear umbrella and as a potential instrument for winning the "broken back" phase of a nuclear conflict. With few exceptions--notably the british anti-guerrilla campaign in Malaya--the West has proven itself inept against this unconventional and surreptitious form of attack.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To develop an understanding of the nature of limited and guerrilla war and their role in the spectrum of conflict.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. Is it feasible or desirable for the West to maintain a "dual capability"--i. e., a capability to fight limited wars either with nuclear or conventional means?

b. Do announced Soviet forces reductions signify that the Soviets have abandoned the idea of limited war?

c. How do limited war and guerrilla warfare conform to traditional Communist conflict doctrine?

d. In the light of the unfolding strategic equation, is limited war in Western Europe possible?

e. Are the requirements of a general and a local deterrent power compatible or mutually antagonistic?

f. How can the democratic nations increase their capabilities to wage both guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "LIMITED AND GUERRILLA WAR."

5. References.

EIGHTH DAY  
TUESDAY, 19 JULY

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Topic #16

THE DIPLOMATIC CONFLICT

1. Introduction.

a. The Communists have recognized more perceptively than the nations of the Free World the interrelationship between diplomacy, military power and psycho-political strategy. Diplomacy can maximize and consummate gains in the relative power position. It can enhance the psycho-political impact of these gains. But diplomacy cannot be substantially stronger than the power on which it is based.

b. A totalitarian regime possesses inherent advantages in the diplomatic struggle--highly centralized direction, greater secrecy and fewer intelligence requirements. A democracy cannot hope to overcome these advantages completely but can, within the framework of its institutions, take certain steps to modify its handicaps.

c. One of the Communists' inherent advantages is their ability to enter into specific negotiations with the West with maximum demands. By contrast, the bargaining position of democratic coalitions, because they must achieve a consensus both within their own constituencies and among themselves, is invariably a minimum one. Any compromise, therefore, represents a net gain for the opponent. This is one of the main techniques used in the Communist diplomatic offensive today.

d. Diplomacy, conducted as it is today on the floodlighted international stage, is a key theater of the psycho-political conflict. The Communists are past masters at meshing diplomatic thrusts with their over-all psycho-political operations. This is the significance of the current Soviet disarmament campaign.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Free and Communist Worlds in the diplomatic conflict.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. How is Lenin's maxim of "two steps forward, one step backward" applied to the Communist diplomatic offensive?

b. How do the Communists "manufacture" bargaining positions through such devices as the "crisis strategy" and the open or implied threat? Are similar devices available to the Free World?

c. What is the role of "summitry" in the diplomatic conflict?

d. What is the impact of public opinion and debate upon the conduct of diplomatic negotiations?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "THE DIPLOMATIC CONFLICT."

5. References.

EIGHTH DAY  
TUESDAY, 19 JULY

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PART IV. MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

Topic #17

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

1. Introduction.

a. Military considerations have always loomed large in all phases of Soviet life. Since the Soviet economy is state-controlled, it can be readily mobilized for any specific task its rulers might dictate. The priority which the USSR gives to military power is demonstrated by the proportion of the nation's economic effort devoted to it. The USSR, with a gross national product less than half of ours spends roughly as much as we do for military purposes.

b. Efforts to maximize military power and potential have been as marked since the Second World War as before. Despite reconstruction demands, only a partial military demobilization was effected after hostilities ended. Throughout the postwar period budgetary allotments for military purposes have remained high to permit a broad program of weapons development and general modernization and re-equipment. Repeatedly the Kremlin has asserted that world conditions and other factors indefinitely preclude any diversion of effort from expanding as rapidly as possible the basic industrial and military might of the country. The result has been the creation of what is generally considered, both quantitatively and qualitatively, a formidable military machine, and one that appears likely to continue its forward progress.

c. In 1956 Khrushchev officially shaded the traditional communist doctrine regarding the inevitability of conflict between communists and capitalists. He declared that the ultimate collision between the two systems, as foreseen by Lenin, was no longer inevitable, largely because of the growth of Soviet power. This adjustment of communist theory to the realities of the thermonuclear age has been

accompanied by a re-examination of long-standing concepts by Soviet professional military writers, intent upon developing a strategy that takes into account the new weapons. Since this military assessment affects, in turn, total Soviet policy, it is clearly essential to examine the concepts underlying contemporary Soviet military doctrine.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To assess current Soviet military strategy, the qualitative and quantitative strengths and weaknesses of the existing Soviet military establishment and its future potential.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

These questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

- a. Soviet propagandists make much of the fact that the US defense allotment represents a higher percentage of the total national budget than does the reported Soviet figure. What are the flaws in their contention?
- b. What is known of the quality of Soviet military equipment as compared with that of the US?
- c. What are the major assets and the major deficits of the Soviet armed forces?
- d. Have the Soviet rulers or military leaders indicated any change in their thinking and practices as a result of nuclear weapons?
- e. What is the effect on US national security policy of the Soviet possession of an ICBM?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES."

5. References.

EIGHTH DAY  
TUESDAY, 19 JULY

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Topic #18

US MILITARY CAPABILITIES

1. Introduction.

a. The military power of a nation has in the past been measured largely in terms of the total potential of a nation to mobilize its resources for war. Although this is still to some degree a measure of military power, recent technological advances in weapons and weapons systems have placed a far greater premium on instant readiness as a true measure of military strength. In this age of thermo-nuclear weapons and missiles the advantages accruing to the aggressor assume new and sinister meaning. In view of the announced policy of the United States to use its military strength only to resist aggression we stand to lose a quantity of our military resources to an enemy's surprise blow.

b. Within the above framework, the principal requirement for the United States is for strategic delivery forces capable of surviving a surprise attack and still dealing a crushing blow. This means "ready" diversified delivery systems, both land-based and sea-based with emphasis upon dispersal, mobility and invulnerability. Logically, the capacity to retaliate massively embraces both the ability to inflict great damage on the enemy and to minimize it at home. It is obvious that an extensive and well-planned civil defense program would constitute a most meaningful and positive step toward indicating to the USSR our readiness to meet the threat of surprise nuclear attack.

c. In addition to the above, the United States must be prepared to meet limited aggression wherever and whenever it may occur. This means adequate numbers of highly trained mobile forces armed with the best weapons modern science and technology can provide. This also means that adequate air and sea lift must be available at all times.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To assess current US military strategy, the qualitative and quantitative strengths and weaknesses of the existing US military establishment and its future potential.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

These questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. Is the present overall military strength of the United States adequate vis-a-vis that of the Sino-Soviet bloc?

b. What is the impact of lead time problems upon the level of our preparedness?

c. What is the meaning of the so-called "missile gap?"

d. Are our manned bomber forces becoming obsolete in the missile age?

e. Why is the United States, in terms of population and industrial concentration, more vulnerable to nuclear attack than the Soviet Union? How could this vulnerability be reduced?

f. Are present US and NATO forces adequate in number and armament to contain limited probes by the Communists?

g. Does the US have adequate strategic reserve forces and the capability to deploy them rapidly?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "US MILITARY CAPABILITIES."

5. References.



NINTH DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 20 JULY

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Topic #19

EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES  
OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

1. Introduction.

a. - The Communists are increasingly hard-put to reconcile Marxist-Leninist dogma with the realities of the Communist system and strategy.

b. The existence of a massive and in part secret police system casts doubt upon the popularity of Communism in the Sino-Soviet bloc. "People's Democracy" is government neither for nor by the people. The inhabitants of the "workers' paradise" escape, satellites rebel, and individuals concentrate on improving their own lot, not the good of the state. Revolts in East Europe and Tibet, and sporadic reports of unrest among Soviet Russia's own national minorities, prove that Communism has not conquered the forces of traditional nationalism.

c. The Sino-Soviet bloc directs its economic activities toward increasing its power-base for world domination, not toward improving the living standards of its people. Contradictions within the system include the disparity of income levels in the "classless" society, the rise of a technological managerial elite intent on maximizing its own welfare, the shortage of labor and the relatively poor performance of Soviet agriculture.

d. Communism is based inherently on fear and violence. Terrorism, the purge, liquidation and the slave labor camp are its refinements of the instruments of organizational control. Fear, however, not only forces compliance, but spurs defection. The power struggle is the only mechanism for leadership. Leadership succession is invariably accompanied by a simulated break with the unpopular past and the persecution of those associated with past policies.

e. The above is not to suggest that the Sino-Soviet bloc is ready to collapse. But we should make a careful study of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Communist system as an aid in our own policy-making process. We should avoid policies which help the Communist leadership to get "off the hook" by relieving them of some of their difficulties. We should actively criticize the shortcomings and failures of the system in our propaganda, ridicule the leadership and compound the internal problems confronting it. Above all, we should endeavor to shift the psycho-political conflict onto the Communist-dominated areas.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To assess the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Communist system and to discuss ways of exploiting them.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups.

a. Does criticism of the Soviet regime in our radio broadcasts beamed to the USSR serve any useful purpose?

b. Is it possible to make any effective appeal to the non-Russian nationalities inside the USSR?

c. Is there any danger that in criticizing the Soviet way of life we may alienate the Soviet people? To what kinds of criticism are they likely to prove sensitive? To what kinds most receptive?

d. What can the United States and its allies do to exacerbate the strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance? In this context, is it better to maintain a US posture of strength around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc or to consider detente, disengagement and accommodation?

e. How can our cultural exchange programs be geared more effectively to pointing up the differences between our way of life and the Soviet way, to our advantage?

f. In World War II, the Ukrainians and other Soviet people welcomed the Germans as liberators. Are we doing enough to take

advantage of a possible inner front of anti-Russian and anti-Communist forces in the Soviet Union?

g. What should we do the next time trouble flares in Eastern Europe?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this morning is "EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD."

5. References.

NINTH DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 20 JULY

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Topic #20

FREE WORLD ALLIANCES

1. Introduction.

a. The United States, as the most powerful nation of the Free World, plays the leading role in a number of regional organizations of varying strength, composition and purpose. These include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the Organization of American States (OAS); the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); the security treaty of the United States with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS); and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

b. The basic strength of the Free World alliance system derives from its voluntary character. The nations which have joined with the United States in NATO and the other regional security organizations have done so of their own free will. The Communist bloc is bound together by the common interests of its power elites. In the event of conflict, the Free World alliance may be expected to hold together, while the Communist system will suffer strains which could breach its bonds.

c. Conversely, the weakness of a flexible alliance system in a cold war situation is the lack of cohesion in the efforts of individual members to meet the wide range of conflict challenges. The Soviet system is designed precisely for the exploitation of tensions and conflict arising in a revolutionary period.

d. The lack of centralized direction of the Free World alliance system imposes handicaps which are not easily overcome. In the first place there are wide differences among the various alliance members on the nature of the threat of Communism. Lacking agreement on this fundamental, there is even less agreement on the means to deal with the threat.

e. The United States must take an active role in consolidating and energizing the Free World resources. Coercion will not work

and is not appropriate in a voluntary system. US leadership must convince our allies that it is in the combined self-interest of all free peoples to pool resources in a common effort.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To explore the strength and weaknesses of Free World alliances and to seek ways and means to strengthen the Free World organization.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

- a. How can NATO be organized more effectively to deal with the nonmilitary threat of Communism?
- b. Can the Council of NATO Ministers become a mechanism for considering broad political and economic questions on which the NATO countries must present a united front?
- c. How can other regional security organizations be strengthened to deal with the nonmilitary threat?
- d. What should be the interrelationship of NATO and the other regional associations?
- e. What is the prospect of regional federation or confederation in the various areas of the Free World and particularly within the Atlantic Community?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this afternoon is "FREE WORLD ALLIANCES."

5. References.

NINTH DAY  
WEDNESDAY, 20 JULY

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Topic #21

ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY

1. Introduction.

a. The United States needs to increase its annual rate of economic growth and channel a greater share of its national resources and efforts from consumer goods and services into those areas vital to our survival as a nation. The US must meet the challenge of the Soviet Union in military and space technology, promote fuller economic cooperation among the nations of the Free World. A concerted attack on mass poverty in the underdeveloped areas is indicated. An economic-technological strategy is an integral part of an overall strategy designed to protect US national interests and achieve US foreign policy objectives.

b. The technological strategist must study the full sweep of immediate and long-range problems facing the country, e. g., the Soviet Union's increase in nuclear-missile capacity. He then must survey the broad spectrum of technologies, both those immediately at hand and those on the horizon. His next task is to decide what technologies to apply to what problems. The technological strategist must look at every level of the current struggle. His planning must be as long-term as the protracted conflict in which we are engaged.

2. Scope and Purpose of the Topic.

To seek ways and means of improving the position of the United States and the Free World in the economic and technological conflict with the Communist Empire.

3. Suggested Topics for Consideration.

The following questions are posed, not as a guide for the formal lecture, but to stimulate individual study and analysis and for possible use in discussion groups:

a. What is the relationship between technology and economic growth?

b. Can the voluntary actions of private business and individuals raise the level of national effort and output sufficiently to meet the economic-technological challenge of the present age, or must the government operate as the catalyst for and organizer of such action?

c. Do US defense, mutual security and space programs take priority in our national effort over assistance to the underdeveloped areas?

d. Can we devise a technological-economic strategy for the underdeveloped areas which will utilize the skills and resources of the Free World more efficiently so as to provide these areas with a better opportunity for rapid development than is offered by the Soviet Bloc?

e. What are or should be our national objectives in the development of outer space technology?

f. Can the United States organize an effective economic-technological strategy without endangering our private enterprise economic system?

g. Should the United States maintain her embargoes on the Sino-Soviet bloc or are we more likely to hasten the "liberalization" of the Communist system through trade?

4. Lecture.

The title of the lecture for this evening is "ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY."

5. References.