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ADDRESS  
BY  
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AT  
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EXPLOITING THE VULNERABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD

Any report dealing solely with the Soviet bloc weaknesses  
is one-sided and therefore must be taken with reserve.

True picture of any country's strength is a net balance  
between assets and liabilities; its relative world position is its power  
in contrast to that of its chief rivals or potential antagonists.

Today I speak of Soviet vulnerabilities and methods of exploiting  
them. But, at no point in any such presentation, should we forget that  
the Soviet is a very powerful nation, <sup>The</sup> second greatest military and  
industrial power in the world, striving over the next <sup>few</sup> decades to reach  
the first place, and possibly now first in certain areas of military  
capability.

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The Soviet Union and its communist allies, like any alliance has weaknesses which can be exploited. Some of them are inherent and cannot be corrected. Some of them may be short-term difficulties which are likely to be overcome. Others are important chiefly because they relate directly to the contest between the Communist world and alliances of Free States.

I shall deal chiefly with weaknesses of the Soviet Union but in the context of its position as the Bloc leader.

In this review I shall cover these features of national power:

- (a) geography; (b) the political and social system of the Soviet Union;
- (c) the international concerns of the Soviet Union; (d) the industrial, agricultural, and general economic situation in the Soviet Union;
- (e) its military <sup>factor</sup> ~~situation~~. Finally, I shall mention a few exploitable weaknesses that fall in no particular category.

(a) Geography.

When it comes to defense, or for offense against ~~some~~ neighboring European or Asiatic targets, the Soviet Union is in a position of great strength. (Napoleon-Kaiser-Hitler learned this). <sup>to their sorrow,</sup>

~~Furthermore,~~ <sup>I</sup> Its great land mass permits wide dispersion of vulnerable assets and a large measure of secrecy and security for those assets and for its striking force -- aircraft and missiles. (Evidence of ability to penetrate this security by U-2 -- hit Soviet at most sensitive point).

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On the other hand, in dealing with targets more distant from the USSR, such as the United States, Africa, and Latin America, the Soviet is at a ~~certain~~ disadvantage, though modern technology, missiles and air transport somewhat mitigate this.

The Soviet has no dependable military bases outside the Bloc. It does not even have thoroughly dependable centers of political strength, in which it can find a secure base for extending its influence in the neighborhood. (Trying to get them in Cuba -- Guinea -- Indonesia).

Our alliances and treaty relationships give us such bases of action nearer to the USSR. (Reason Soviet wants to get us out of our bases).

Also, for the time being at least, the great superiority in commercial shipping and numbers of commercial aircraft of the United States and its <sup>allies</sup>~~friends~~ gives us advantages in overseas trade; but Soviet air transport development is cutting down this advantage somewhat.

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(b), Social and Political

(1) Their internal political system.

Past history has taught us that dictatorships do not last indefinitely. Eventually they almost always degenerate, sometimes falling to a revolt of the people against them. Or they mellow and reform, and lose some of their initial aggressiveness.

It is true that modern weapons make the French

Revolution type of popular upheaval outmoded. Dictatorships

*may*  
have endured for a long time if supported by the army, or

an effective police system, although even these will not

*always*  
suffice nowadays if discontent is severe and disaffection

widespread.

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*Since Stalin has been*The Soviet dictatorship is ~~entering upon an~~*going through an*~~(evolutionary stage. This may give it a new kind of~~~~strength over the long run, but it might also lead in~~~~time to a loss of dynamic aggressiveness.~~Today the Soviet system is ~~becoming~~ somewhatmore responsive to popular pressures <sup>and</sup> The Soviet people~~today~~ have high expectation of better things to come.

Even Khrushchev cannot totally disregard popular

feelings or the pressure for evolution brought by education <sup>about</sup>

and increasing foreign contacts. The new generation of

*Soviet leaders*~~Russians~~ may well differ greatly from the Old Bolsheviks.

We have every interest in exploiting these

evolutionary trends.

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(2) The form of government of the Soviet is an inherent weakness.

*(old Robinson)*

The locus of power is of course in the Presidium.

With the personnel changes formally approved by the Supreme Soviet in early May, the presidium became the meeting ground of the three key power-wielding bodies, the Party Secretariat, the Cabinet of the Russian Soviet Republic, and the Soviet government itself. It is noteworthy that Khrushchev alone is the only presidium member to sit on all three bodies, and that the Central Committee is packed with Khrushchev supporters.

But packed organizations sometimes change in attitude. If Khrushchev should have a serious defeat in his foreign policy, in industry, or in agriculture, there might be trouble.

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In the Soviet, as in China, there is no clearly defined or institutionalized way of dealing with basic disagreement between the dictator and any disagreeing associates. (Refer to 1957 when K. in minority and appealed to Presidium).

<sup>two</sup>  
This is a ~~major~~ weakness.

Will Khrushchev's successor be determined, as were the successors to both Lenin and Stalin, by a period of so-called collective leadership and the emergence of the dictator? Will the Army come to play a role?

These are two question marks. Tradition is too short for a procedure to have been settled.

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However, the Communist Party and its organs have strict discipline. Its relative restricted numbers -- some eight million out of over 140 million potential voters on a basis comparable to U.S.A., help to make it well-knit. The Party leaders realize importance of cohesive action to protect their control.

One cannot reasonably predict that the Party will fall to pieces, organizationally or otherwise, if Khrushchev disappears. On the contrary, the discipline of the eight million party members <sup>+ their control organs</sup> will constitute the main guarantee <sup>^</sup> of regime stability in the event of a new succession crisis.

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These institutional weaknesses are not readily open to direct exploitation. However as contact with the outside world increases, internal pressures in Soviet Union will also increase. <sup>The</sup> This is Soviet leader's fear and K's summit decision, refusal to receive President Eisenhower, actions toward Cuba and the Congo, <sup>W</sup> are all evidence <sup>that</sup> K. desired to slow up the trend of co-existence. It had become too dangerous.

(3) Soviet educational programs also present K. with a dilemma. To compete with the U.S.A. and the Free World, they have <sup>had to</sup> stressed the development of their technology, industry and the sciences. This has led to a <sup>massive</sup> ~~brood~~ educational program throughout the Soviet Union.

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While the emphasis has been on science and technology rather than on the liberal arts, and hence less dangerous from the ideological viewpoint, nevertheless education makes men and women think; it makes them seek for more, even in broader fields than their particular areas of specialization. It makes them more interested in developments in the outside world.

Over the years the Soviet has taught their people so much nonsense about the outside world in general, and the U.S.A. in particular, that the gradual coming of the truth to them is something of a shock, and Khrushchev realizes this.

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The sly perception with which the Russian people note all this is illustrated by the following joke that is being passed from mouth to mouth in Russia today:

"School teacher: Sascha, tell us about America.

"Sascha: America is a land of poverty, corruption and degeneracy.

"School teacher: Good; now, tell us about Russia.

"Sascha: Russia is trying to catch up with America."

Many years ago during the war when Wendell Wilkie visited Russia, he suggested that Stalin by educating his people, might be educating himself out of a job. Stalin laughed. Khrushchev is pondering.

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(4) With the disappearance of the old revolutionary

dialecticians of Communist theory, some of the vim and

~~vigor may be~~ <sup>has been</sup> lost to the ~~Communist movement.~~ <sup>ideological side of the</sup> ~~ideological~~

Revolutions such as Communism tend to lose their vigorous

drive after they reach their initial objectives, <sup>their</sup> ~~and~~ adherents

become more interested in their vested interests and in

keeping an acquired position -- political, social, military,

or material, rather than engaging in adventures.

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While Khrushchev makes a vast number of speeches, and his regime claims credit for a high degree of doctrinal creativeness, he is not personally distinguished as a dialectician. He is eminently a practical man. His most remarkable innovations have been in the organization of industry and agriculture. *(Also at 20-21st Party Congress - Crisis can be achieved without war.)*

Khrushchev's philosophy is simple: history will take care of the United States. As capitalism took care of feudalism so communism will take care of capitalism, and our grandchildren will all live in a communist society. He proposes to help along this process -- peacefully he proclaims.

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(c) Now to turn from the domestic to ~~the~~ Soviet international problems.

(1) The Warsaw Pact countries.

Communist control in these countries is an asset  
*to the Soviet*  
in that it moves the frontiers of the Soviet Union into the heart of Europe, thus protecting the Soviet homeland. The Kremlin knows, however, that these satellite allies are for the most part unreliable.

They have had the setback of Hungary and another situation of this kind would be serious for the USSR. Poland today is still a powder keg.

They haven't yet won over the people in the Satellites though they have made most progress in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

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They are not likely to really win them over to full and wholehearted cooperation at any time in the near future.

As I have said, many of the Satellite leaders are tough Stalinists; they fear the co-existence policy. They believe contact with the West will make people<sup>them</sup> even more restless. This is clearly shown by the refugee flood from Eastern Germany to the West which reached 20,000 in May and 18,000 in June. It points up their weakness in this area.

We can help to keep alive the hope and goal of freedom in this Eastern European area -- and we are doing so (RFE). We can continue to help Berlin and West Germany to be "show cases" of freedom and free enterprise.

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## (2) Communist China.

China still follows the hard Communist line --  
still in the days of Stalinism.

USSR faced with the choice of helping a Stalinist  
China become strong, and this they fear, or of dragging  
their feet as regards military, nuclear and industrial aid,  
and thus incurring the displeasure of the Chinese Communists.

*Meanwhile*

Mao is irritated at ~~this, and~~ his exclusion from  
Summit Meetings and had been muddying the Soviet copybook  
of co-existence by his *actions* ~~aggressions~~ in Tibet and on the Indian  
frontier.

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And Mao by his program of creating communes has irritated the Soviet leaders who propose to sell both domestically and abroad a much more restrained pattern of the ideal Communist state.

Mao has set himself up as a fountainhead of real Communist ideology. Khrushchev doesn't like this. In the last month or two the doctrinal controversy between Moscow and Peiping, as evidenced by Chinese writings and Soviet speeches, reached an unprecedented height. <sup>9</sup> *Small mis* ~~There is some~~ basic trouble ~~here~~, but it would be premature to predict a break. *h* Chicom aggressive and antagonistic attitude toward the U.S. makes it difficult today to exploit this weakness but it can be advertised, and we must work for opportunities to widen the breach.

## (3) Yugoslavia.

One of the most irritating experiences for the Soviet rulers is the demonstration that a country under Communist leadership can follow an independent of Moscow line and still survive. Yugoslavia is creating a dangerous heresy. It is more dangerous to Moscow than is a state that has always been an outright enemy of the USSR. Our policy toward Yugoslavia, ~~in my opinion~~, has helped to free Y.S. from dependence on the

Kremlin *and helped give them a measure of independence*

## (4) General balance of Soviet progress.

Soviet policy over the last ten years has won few new allies or Satellites (only change North Vietnam - vs East Austria).

This is in contrast to the previous decade. It represents a *serious* slowing down <sup>for Communism</sup> and any slow down is dangerous for a revolutionary state.

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Territorially the Soviet Bloc is no stronger than  
it was ten years ago.

The open threat in Greece and Azerbaijan and Korea  
was thwarted; the Berlin Blockade was ended. The Communist  
*menace*  
~~threat~~ in Italy and France, though still serious, is far less  
dramatic than it was twelve years ago.

Obviously still many weak points <sup>*in the Free World*</sup> but no immediate  
*Communist*  
threat of territorial takeover.

In the foreign policy area, Khrushchev's visits to  
India and Southeast Asia and Austria were not ~~really~~  
successful.

*However*

Today a new aggressiveness <sup>is</sup> evidenced in

Africa (Congo and Guinea), in the Caribbean (Cuba), and  
in SEA -- particularly Indonesia and a threat to Laos. In  
many of these areas a clear evidence of Soviet-Chicom  
coordination.

Some of these new held initiatives are far from  
their <sup>Soviet</sup> home base. This fact is a weakness we should be  
able to exploit with our greater ability to meet the problem  
of logistics. (In Congo they threaten -- we act). Both Congo

and Cuba show signs of backfiring. *Even Castro*  
*is becoming embarrassed by the embrace*  
*of the Bear.*

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## (d) The Military Sector.

I have suggested at the outset that the Soviet geographic position, strong though it be for resisting attack <sup>and</sup> for aggression against peripheral states, and as a base for long-range missile attack, still has inherent in it a measure of weakness as regards launching limited attack against distant targets overseas. "Volunteers" were easily useable in Korea, Northern Vietnam and even if they chose, in Greece, Iran and Turkey. In the Congo, Cuba ~~and~~ <sup>and other overseas areas</sup> Indonesia they must <sup>aid</sup> rely largely on economic ~~missions~~ and subversive action.

Despite the debate about our <sup>own</sup> readiness for so-called

"limited wars" it is unlikely that today the Soviet could do what we

<sup>have done</sup> ~~are~~ in countries as distant as Lebanon, Korea, or Taiwan.

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Hence, in many parts of the world, the Soviet has<sup>^</sup>  
*if they propose aggressive action*  
to choose between <sup>rusting</sup>~~open~~ war on the one hand, which I believe  
<sup>^</sup>  
they do not desire, or political subversion and economic  
penetration on the other, as instruments for changing controls  
in foreign countries in their favor.

I believe that for the time being they will choose the  
latter and that it is in this arena that we must seek out their  
vulnerabilities and meet their challenges.

Meanwhile, however, we must not overlook the fact  
<sup>UN</sup>  
that we are now ~~entering~~ the nuclear-missile age. Here  
distance is no longer an obstacle. The Soviet will soon have  
the potential to attack any part of the world from their interior  
bases.

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But this means all out nuclear war. Today and tomorrow it is a weapon which can be used as a threat, as we have recently seen in the Cuban situation -- and four years ago during Suez. To carry out the threat changes the face of the world. It is not likely to be invoked to achieve limited objectives in any of the areas where the Communist world is today threatening us, and the more the missile threat is brandished, the less effective it becomes.

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(e) Soviet Economy

We see no immediately critical problems for the Soviet in the economic or industrial fields.

But like all of us they have certain problems. At the moment due to the war losses and the great inefficiency of their use of agricultural manpower, there is a shortage of manpower for industry.

Today they have on their farms about six times as many workers as we do. Despite this far smaller agricultural labor force, the United States produces about one-third more food than does the Soviet Union.

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26.

The manpower shortage is probably one of the reasons for their cutback in their military forces and for the fact that many students reaching the age of 15 are now being sent to the assembly lines and will continue their education on a part-time basis in the evening.

The availability of essential raw materials will probably not impede the successful execution of the Soviet Seven-Year Plan, 1959 - 1965. There are, however, some raw materials problems.

To support the planned expansion of the steel and aluminum industries for example, the USSR must exploit leaner and more costly ores. In the case of the steel industry, it must process ~~very~~ expensive coal for the necessary metallurgical coke.

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Only in the case of natural rubber and possibly copper is the USSR likely to be dependent on non-Bloc sources for the supply of an essential industrial raw material.

In this connection it is well to note that today they are using their raw materials sparingly insofar as consumer production and consumer goods are concerned and diverting them very largely to the national power segment of their economy.

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For example, they need/relatively modest amount of gasoline for the small number of automobiles they produce, and *of petroleum products* are even able to make substantial quantities available for export where political considerations dictate; viz., Cuba.

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28.

The task of extracting riches from the frozen Tundra of the Far North is not appealing.

While the Soviets are now paying serious attention to housing their much-publicized civilian construction plans will not be completed until well after 1965. Even then the available living space, on a per capita basis, will still be only a small fraction of that now being enjoyed in the U. S., and for that matter, in Western Europe. Furthermore, the quality of construction is inadequate by our standards and even in the newest apartment house, the chances are that the plumbing will not work.

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## (F) INDUSTRY

In industry, problems remain but they are centered around the need to increase efficiency and productivity rather than output alone. Khrushchev is still tinkering with his economic reorganization which went into effect in 1957 substituting a form of local control for vertical ministerial control of industry from the center in Moscow. The lack of <sup>any</sup> competition has resulted in lags in the introduction of new technology, in the continued use of high cost production facilities in many industries.

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30.

Khrushchev is aware of the need for reform. He has recently declared that plant managers in the Soviet Union will no longer receive substantial bonuses merely for the completion of the physical output called for in the various annual plans. Now these managers must show substantial improvement in the cost of production if they are to be rewarded by incentive bonuses.

We can expect to read a good deal about new experiments in organization and management over the next few years as the Kremlin leaders grope for solutions to these problems.

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31.

The Soviet Central Committee Plenum which adjourned last Friday, has been considering problems of industry and transportation. According to Soviet press reports, it found that serious difficulties still existed, including failure to make use of new gains in science and technology, to cut production costs and to improve the quality of the goods produced. The "Tass" summary of the final resolution failed to indicate what measures had been determined to overcome these deficiencies.

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## AGRICULTURE

Agriculture, as I have indicated, has been a perennial problem in the Soviet Union. The resistance of the peasants to collectivization and their resultant cruel measures of deportation and liquidation by Stalin are well known. While the Soviet concentrated on the development of industry in the years following W W II, agriculture was neglected; the inevitable result was that in the early 1950s that country ceased to be self-sufficient in food supply for the first time in history.

Khrushchev tried to meet this challenge by expansion of crop acreage into the so-called new lands area of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The growing of grain on the new lands is subject to great uncertainty. Frequently there is insufficient moisture to yield a satisfactory harvest, as happened in 1959.



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33.

The other major agricultural program was the introduction of corn. But remember that 80% of the Soviet Union lies north of the 50th parallel or Winnipeg, Manitoba. This means that much of the corn does not mature and must be cut in the green stage.

There is no counterpart in the Soviet Union to our own highly productive corn belt. The uncertainty of agricultural production even in the traditional growing areas of European USSR showed up again this year. Winterkill and dust storms caused severe damage to crops in the North Caucasus and the Southern Ukraine. The present harvest outlook is at best uncertain.

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34.

Factors of geography and climate will always make agricultural production in the Soviet Union much more risky and uncertain than either in the U. S. or Western Europe.

(g) MISCELLANEOUS WEAKNESSES.

1. No convertible currency. This restricts their trade dealings to barter type of operations. (But speed in effecting barter deals with underdeveloped nations, as contrasted with our red-tape type deals, has created impact, though at times some of the goods delivered in barter have proved second rate.)

2. Limited use of Russian as a language of general communication as contrasted to English; the great lingua franca of the world. Here is an asset of our to exploit.

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35.

3. Shortage of adequately trained operatives for many parts of world - (The testimony of Kaznacheyev as contrasted with the book, "Ugly American".) Many Soviet experts do not know foreign languages.

4. Soviet rulers lack of trust in their people.

This slowly changing but still exists.

5. Paucity of production in the field of the arts with the exception of music. Lack in literature and poetry, painting, sculpture. Their ballet is great but it is still old-fashioned and probably not as good as in the time of the old regime.

6. Existence of boredom and inadequate means of using their leisure.

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7. Russia is an atheistic country and history has shown that no country whose people lack a deep moral and religious purpose has ever survived long as great.

### CONCLUSION

Russia is a country of great contradictions; great technical skills; massive scientific and military achievements combined with great areas of backwardness; housing shortages and road shortages, transportation problems except for air transport. With great cities like Moscow and Leningrad and yet thousands of small villages which show little change over the past decade; great in industry, backward in agriculture; outstanding in music, sterile in the other arts; Russia is great in many things and shriveled in many others. It remains a state isolated from freedom.

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In approaching the problem of exploiting the vulnerabilities of the aggressive Communist movement which boasts that it will take us over in time, there are certain general considerations which I feel are quite fundamental.

First: there is no trick solution. We cannot solve the matter by creating some sort of Cold War Executive to master-mind a program. We cannot solve it by massive propaganda.

Second: The Communist Bloc has largely closed and sealed itself off from the normal methods for the exchange of thoughts and ideas. There is both an Iron Curtain and a jamming barrier. There are, of course, leakages into the Communist orbit which can be exploited by radio, by exchanges and by the very fact of a considerable flow of people back and forth.

Third: There is no subtle propaganda thesis which even if it could be got over to the Soviet people would have much effect upon them. They think they are doing reasonably well; better than in the past. They have a pride in their country's accomplishments. While there are the elements of unrest and uneasiness, of desire for more contact with the outside world, these are slowly moving forces. Evolution and not revolution should be our objective in exploiting vulnerabilities. Educational advances may be a solvent in this process as we come to deal with a new generation of Russians.

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Fourth: Communist vulnerabilities are most open to direct and effective countermeasures where we meet them outside of the Communist Bloc, in the uncommitted and rapidly changing areas of the world -- in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Also we must meet the threat, even in countries of the NATO Alliance. In Italy, for example, a strong Communist Party, tied to Moscow, is still endeavoring to undermine Italy's freedom.

Fifth: I do not believe that the Soviet now intend to try to achieve their objectives by direct military actions. As long as we maintain our own military strength, they will rattle their atomic to time missiles from time/for blackmailing purposes but probably will not use them. Hence our attack should be against their economic and subversive thrust into the free and uncommitted world.

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This should include publicizing the activities of Communist parties in the Free World, and their controlled, subversive front organizations. We should meet their economic thrust both directly or collaterally by quicker action on our own part; sending better goods and giving better services; by <sup>a</sup> better understanding of the needs and aspirations of the new nations of the world. And don't let us try to make them little replicas of the United States, governmentally or economically, as we cannot do it. ~~But let us~~ ~~try to get rid of Congressionally imposed red tape on many features~~ ~~of our over-subsidized~~.

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Where we are "cheek by jowl" with the Communist world,  
let us help to build show cases of freedom, as in Berlin, in West  
Germany, in Austria.

Finally, in the contest for survival which is joined between  
the Free World and the world of aggressive Communism, we must  
be prepared to meet their elements of military strength with equal  
or superior strength; we must maintain our economic and industrial  
superiority and continue to exploit peacefully but effectively the  
vulnerabilities of the Communist <sup>World</sup> ~~drive~~.