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COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

FOLLOWING LECTURE

By

Honorable Allen W. Dulles

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The National War College
Washington, D. C.
4 May 1960

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QUESTION: (inaudible)

military dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's emphasis on disarmament. I believe some of those who went to Moscow got a few echoes of the fear of the Soviet military of what will happen to them in the future if this takes place. Do you have any evidence of any real apprehension in the Soviet military over Khrushchev's current emphasis?

ANSWER: You probably all heard the question. The question is whether the Soviet disarmament and reduction of forces has caused any dissatisfaction.

We have quite a lot of evidence on that. You can't reduce over as short a time as he has indicated by over a million men without affecting a great many people. We have some reason to believe that there was a good deal of dissension initially when this was considered in the Presidium and that there was not unanimity on it. Later, when it was promulgated as a policy -- and in the Intelligence Community we are rather inclined to feel that it will be carried out quite largely as exposed -- there has been a great deal of dissatisfaction.

It could happen in any country. If a lot of you were told that pretty soon you would be going into the factories and be on the assembly lines, I don't think you would be very happy. And that is

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about what has happened in the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: Will you comment, please, on those weaknesses which would seem to lend themselves most easily and effectively to exploitation by the United States? And, in this connection, perhaps comment on the nationalist aspirations in the satellite states and within the Soviet republics, for one, and, the other, the religious role there, the extent to which the religious groups outside the U.S.S.R. might exploit the religious hopes of those that still do have them within the Communist Bloc?

ANSWER: That is quite an order.

With regard to the situation in the satellites, a good many things are being done to try to exploit that situation. It is a tricky one to handle. Take, particularly, the Polish situation. As I indicated, that is now again coming up towards a boil.

It is not the policy, and I am convinced should not be the policy, to try to encourage these people or push these people in the satellites to a point of revolt, which would just lead to a second -- might lead to a second Hungary. One assumes a good deal of responsibility in doing a thing of that kind, unless one is in a position to act. And in that area it would be very difficult to act, because probably only military action would be effective, and then in effect you would have World War III.

So that the situation in the satellites has to be handled with a good deal of care and a good deal of discretion. What is being

done is to keep the hope of eventual liberation alive, to keep their faith strong and their ideals as a part of a free Europe, but not to push, either by propaganda or any other action, to the point of encouraging outright revolt.

Now, as to the whole gamut of exploiting these weaknesses, that would really be another speech. At the end I suggested one or two points. I feel we ought to develop the great advantage we have and the English-speaking world has in having a language which everybody in the world wants to learn. If we could teach them more, get more books out, get books out into Africa, get teachers out into Africa, as well as into Southeast Asia, we could make English, plus to some extent French, the great language of all Black Africa. If we could do that, we would have won the first leg of the victory to the holding of those countries, which are probably going into a measure of chaos over the next few years in any event, but it still would give us a great advantage.

From the point of view of effective aid, we have in the great financial structure of the Free World a great advantage that we can exploit over that of the Soviet Union.

I think in the military field, as I indicated, in the field of quick limited action in distant areas, we have advantages that can be developed and exploited.

I could go on, and, as I say, that is really another speech. Maybe, if I am back here for my tenth anniversary speech, I can give you a talk on how we should exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: You spoke of the differences over doctrinal matters between the Chinese and the Russian Communists. Are there any signs of competition as between pro-Russian and pro-Chinese elements in the Communist Parties abroad -- that is, in Africa, Asia, and other countries outside the bloc -- that are serious?

ANSWER: One has seen evidences of that to some extent in the satellites, as I briefly indicated. That is, Ulbricht in East Germany would probably prefer to see a Mao policy rather than a Khrushchev policy. Novotny in Czechoslovakia -- I can't remember the name of the great statesmen who lead Bulgaria and Albania today -- I probably should remember them both -- Hoxha, I think, is still in Albania -- there has been a change, I think, in Bulgaria recently -- but those two men would probably prefer a Mao policy.

Now, when it comes to other parts of the earth outside the Bloc, there was at one time somewhat of a tendency between Moscow and Peiping to divide the world to some extent. Areas like Southeast Asia were to be exploited more by Peiping than by Moscow. I begin to see a slight change in that. I don't think that Moscow likes to leave that now too much to the Chinese. They don't like very much what the Chinese Communists did in Indonesia, for example -- very much muddled up Khrushchev's visit there because of the anti-Communist attitude of the government just at that time because of their struggle with Peiping.

There are certain evidences of what you suggest in various parts of the world. On the other hand, there are certain areas where we see them working together. They are working together to some

extent in Yemen. They are working together to some extent in Latin America. So it is hard to generalize.

QUESTION: One of the great debates here this year has been whether time is on our side or not. We have had varying answers. I wonder if you could give us your own personal opinion as to whether time is on our side or not.

ANSWER: I think the answer is a very short one and a very accurate one. Time is on the side of the people who use it.

I think there is quite a lot of time. That is, I don't think that anything is going to happen tomorrow that is going to vitally change the situation. I always believe in profiteering. We have a little time, but unless we do our planning effectively, unless we are ready to seize opportunities as they present themselves and the other fellow does seize those opportunities, then time is against us.

Take these underdeveloped areas of the world. Take Central Africa, for example, They have an advantage in that they are able to pinpoint and specialize. Because of our particular situation in the world we have to spread our butter fairly thin, although we put it on pretty thick in India; I guess we are today, aren't we?, a lot of butter.

But the whole world is looking to the United States and we are not in a position to do as they have done, as to pinpoint their efforts.

Take Africa. They have just taken the country of Guinea and they have moved in there. It is a small country. They have moved their experts in there, both the Russian and Chinese in that case, as well as the Czechs and others. They are going to try to make Guinea a show place of what the Soviets can do.

We have twenty countries in Africa where we have to do something, or we feel that it is necessary to do something. If you study, as you have done, and analyze their foreign aid, it has been pinpointing in a dozen countries, whereas we have over fifty where we have to be doing something. So in that way they have a certain advantage over us. The whole world is expecting the Soviets to do something for them, as they have that advantage over us, even though our resources are far greater and the total amount of our effort in the foreign aid field is far greater.

QUESTION: Mr. Dulles, you mentioned briefly the education and the problems they have with that. Would you develop this a little further for us? How are they handling their students? Is there a problem in that area?

ANSWER: With regard to the Soviet Union itself - the internal situation - they are, I believe, having a growing problem. The information we get from American students who have been to Russia and others who have been studying the Russian educational system indicates that they are becoming more and more inquisitive, they are becoming more and more open in student meetings in questioning things that

are being done by the government, questioning international policies. Under the present regime this is being tolerated as long as it keeps within bounds. I don't know of the open arrest of students who have asked impertinent questions (impertinent from the Soviet angle). I think that is a growing problem.

As I suggested in my remarks, they are putting a tremendous emphasis on the scientific and technical side as being less dangerous for them. The percentage of students in the sciences as compared to the liberal arts is tremendously higher in the Soviet Union than it is here.

There is one other facet to that that I neglected to mention here in my talk and I am glad you gave me an opportunity to bring it up, namely, the growing dissatisfaction about the educational handling of foreign students who go to the Soviet Union.

With a great deal of fanfare recently they had advertised that they were organizing a great separate academy in Moscow for foreign students. Well, the reason for that was not because they wanted to do that; it was because the foreign students and the Soviet students are not getting on well together and they want to segregate them. There has been great dissatisfaction by foreign students. The language problem is one of the reasons for it, but the reasons are much deeper than that. For example, the students that went to Moscow from Egypt are very largely being withdrawn. The Egyptian government has asked the United States, Britain and other countries (yes, even Britain and Germany) whether they could not take these

students. There were two reasons for that. One, they were being taught too much ideological Communism; and, second, the students themselves were dissatisfied with the education they were getting; and their relationship with the Russian students was not good. Further, there was a good deal of difficulty with regard to the Chinese students in the Soviet Union. They tell me that the Chinese work too damn hard and the Russians don't like it. I think there is some truth in that.

So that there is a sort of double-edged educational problem.

QUESTION: Sometime ago we saw some discussion in papers on the difference between capabilities and intentions. They were pretty well muddled with politics and it was very hard for us to evaluate what exactly was happening. I believe this is related to your subject. Can you help us understand a little bit more about what is going on within our Government? Will you discuss it a bit for us, sir?

ANSWER: I would be very glad to.

The issue arose very largely over the latest estimate of the Intelligence Community with regard to the Soviet missile program; and the statement was made by a Defense Department spokesman, I believe, to the general effect that in this year's estimate we had shifted our basis from capabilities to intentions. That was actually a little fore shortening of what actually had taken place.

In our estimating in most fields one has to deal with the

capabilities and the intentions of a potential antagonist. Where one is dealing with the political field the issue is somewhat different than it is when you are dealing with any particular family of missiles that they may be developing.

One of the most interesting issues of capabilities and intentions was in connection with an estimate made just before I was down here at the time of the attack over the Yalu River in September, October, and November of 1950. At that time the Intelligence Community was quite accurate with regard to the capabilities of the Chinese Communists. We had their battle order the other side of the Yalu River quite accurately. The problem was: What were their intentions? On their intentions we were a little fuzzy, I am frank to admit. That is an illustration of the point that you raised.

But, getting into the particular issue with regard to missiles, we had this situation. Going back to 1957 (or late 1957 into 1958), we had been able to detect and analyze a sufficient number, although small in number, of tests of the Soviet long-range missile, to be able in our estimate to indicate that they had the capability of producing a missile with certain qualifications, or with certain attributes, rather, and that they had the industrial capability to produce certain numbers of these missiles.

At that point we did not feel, however, we could make out a very definite program -- that is, what was their intention with regard to this particular weapon.

Now, when it came to this year, we thought we had been

able to analyze a much larger testing program, to have further information with regard to their manufacturing capabilities and intentions in order to say that we believe their program will be so-and-so and so-and-so, not merely a capability. But we said that we believe they intend to produce so many missiles over a certain period. There were certain divergent views in the Community but we were fairly well together within the first year or so of this program.

That idea got a little fuzzed up. I think it was clarified somewhat at the end, but it wasn't entirely clear.

We had a very comparable problem with regard to the heavy bomber. There at first we had the estimate based on capability. We saw the BISON; they produced a good many of them at one of their May Day festivals. I have forgotten how long ago it was -- about five years ago -- more I guess -- '53, '54, along about then. We had a pretty good idea as to their production line and we started out with an estimate based on capabilities, and then we said we believe their program is going to be as follows, and we had a very good data on that program -- what they were actually producing and flying off from their test fields.

Then right in the middle their intentions changed and their capabilities remained. Their intentions about the production of the BISON changed and we began to see they were cutting down the actual number of bombers being produced; so we changed our estimate.

We have changed our intentions. We have changed our intentions about the B-57 and the B-70, and so forth, and so on. They

changed their intentions.

You have to be very alert to this. When you just see a program emerging, you start out and say we know they are capable of producing this kind of a weapon, and then as you get further along you say not only are they capable of producing it but we believe it is their intention to have a program of about these dimensions.

QUESTION: Mr. Dulles, we hear a good deal about Soviet concern with the possible emergence of Communist China as a member of the nuclear club. And, of course, it is a matter of concern to ourselves also. What can you tell us about the progress that Communist China has achieved thus far in the direction of attaining a nuclear weapons capability?

ANSWER: We have very little hard evidence on that. We know that they have capable nuclear scientists. We believe that over the next four or five years they could be perfectly capable of producing on their own steam a nuclear weapon, if they desire to put that amount of money and effort into it at this particular time. It requires a lot of money; it requires a lot of power which they might want to use for other purposes.

We do not believe that the Soviets have so far given the Chinese nuclear weapons. We believe that they have them in the Far East available to the Russians and they might give them, but there is no indication that they have given any so far. Now, at any time, if it was in the interest of the Soviets politically to do so, they

could turn over, of course, a nuclear bomb to the Chinese for the Chinese to detonate and make a great hoop-la about it. We would believe, though, that if over the next few months or even the next year or so there was a detonation of a nuclear bomb in Communist China it would be a bomb that had been loaned to them by the Russians rather than one which had been the result of native production, although, as I say, over a period of time they could produce a bomb, in our opinion, if they wanted to.

QUESTION: Mr. Dulles, recently we have been hearing a great deal about Communist guerrilla activities in Laos and Vietnam. Would you care to give us an appraisal of their capabilities to defend the area and how they (inaudible) ?

ANSWER: Starting with Laos, Laos has a common border with Communist China and a very long border, of course, with North Vietnam. Both of those countries have the potential nearby -- either a few guerrillas, volunteers, or otherwise -- to do a lot of harm and make a lot of mischief in Laos. We do not believe that at the present time they want to move in a way which would openly show their hand as intervening and that they will restrict themselves -- both the northern Vietnamese - Communist Vietnamese - and the Communist Chinese -- to infiltration and other moves not clearly identifiable.

One of the reasons for trying to bring the U. N. into that picture was to have the presence of the U. N. there, to be able to advertise quickly any moves that were made. Laos is a very exposed

country. They have had an election recently. They probably overdid a little bit in the elections. The present government that will be formed following the elections will be a pro-Western government in all respects, I believe. It would have been even if there hadn't been a little packing of the ballot boxes here and there; the pro-Westerners would have won it. They didn't need to do some of the things they did, I am afraid. I am very much against all the vice that they did with it.

You have to keep an eye on that situation. It is not one that you can say: Well, that is all very nice; that is all in order; we can put that in the box and forget it. It is a permanently fragile situation. With a long exposed frontier in a country where the population on both sides look so much alike that you can't tell when they come over the frontier whether they belong in the country or whether they have come there -- a very small population in a very large area. So Laos is going to be perpetually a potentially weak and dangerous spot.

As to Vietnam, the activity of the pro-Communists is spear-headed very largely from northern Vietnam through the infiltration of the volunteers through Laos and around through Cambodia into southern Vietnam, directly and by sea and by other ways. They have built up in very difficult fighting areas - swampy areas - in southern Vietnam an area of resistance based upon the insurgents that have remained there in some numbers ever since Diem pacified the country.

Attention had been alerted to this sometime back. Steps

are being taken -- I think very effective steps are being taken to control that situation. But it is still a bit tricky situation in southern Vietnam.

QUESTION: The Soviet people, sir, have the capability of

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(inaudible)

This could be good for us or bad for us, correct or incorrect. The main point is

(inaudible)
or turn it around as they see fit. Since we have relative difficulty in getting to the Soviet population books and various programs, do you think this is more of a weakness than a strength? If so, in what way would be the more exploitable than it is at the present time?

ANSWER: You are quite right; it is not easy to get the voice of the Free World, Voice of America, and other mentalities into Russia. There has been some cessation of jamming of the Voice of America. I understand that they have threatened recently that if the Voice of America doesn't behave they won't stop the jamming; they will probably start the jamming again. But so far they are not jamming the Voice of America, to any great degree anyway, in the Soviet Union, and that is quite an advantage.

I don't know that I agree with the first premise that you suggested. Others who have been to the Soviet Union -- some of you who are sitting here would know maybe better than I, although I see a great many reports -- I haven't been given a visa yet to go. I applied for one in 1936 and I haven't had an answer yet. I haven't

asked for one in recent years, however. I imagine they might give me one if I asked for it, but I haven't asked for it.

I think there is a very basic fundamental friendship between the Russian people and the American people. I don't think that the propaganda and the vituperative, vile stuff they have poured out at times have basically changed that. They are not doing that so much now. I may be wrong but that seems to be the testimony of American travelers, and I have talked to hundreds of them, who have been around Russia and have talked with the Russian people. I have seen practically no evidence of hostility, of unfriendliness in those contacts. So I have great hope that there is this residue and a very great residue of basic good will between the two peoples. Am I right on that?

AMBASSADOR LACY: I think so.

MR. DULLES: Ambassador Lacy would know that better than anybody.

QUESTION: Mr. Dulles, we all know there are many programs and actions that are taking place in this field of lessened tensions between the U. S. and Russia, such as lifting travel restrictions, cultural exchanges, and so on. On the other hand, there are some programs taking place that cause one to wonder, such as helping the Russian agricultural segment of the economy by giving them hybrid corn, all sorts of advice, experts traveling there, and so on. I was wondering whether you feel this type of program should go on,

especially from the standpoint of how do you assess the advantages to be gained in our better relations between the two countries versus the disadvantages by ameliorating some of Russia's difficulties in the very ticklish agricultural problem they have and freeing some of their resources to be used perhaps in building up some more of their power capabilities against us.

ANSWER: Well, there may be difference of views on this. I am inclined to think, taking the agricultural field, that most of the information which they get through these exchanges they could get anyway, maybe not quite as accurately but they could get it by other methods.

This is an open country. All our agricultural journals and all our publications are telling all about this. It is not something that we could keep secret, even if we wanted to. I think, by having these exchanges, we may be forcing on, pushing on this evolutionary movement which I think is the only hope for peace in the world. It is a risk. Obviously, we take certain risks. Maybe we are helping them to get strong faster than they would otherwise. But to deny this to them would, I think, turn back what may be the greatest hope of the future, that is that there will be this evolution, this mellowing, and so forth. I don't say you can trust them today. I wouldn't trust Khrushchev very far. But I think he is being carried, as I indicated, somewhat on a wave that he would find it very hard to resist -- like trying to turn back the tides. He might try to do it; I don't think he would succeed in doing that.

I think these exchanges help along that movement which hopefully might lead to some reforms and changes in the Soviet system and in its aggressive policy of trying to take over the world.

Khrushchev made his position very clear when he said, regarding his comment "we will bury you", that he didn't mean he was going out with a pick and shovel and put us in a grave. He said, as I indicated in my remarks, that the wave of the future was with him and that Communism was going to succeed capitalism just as capitalism succeeded feudalism. Well, we have to show him that he is wrong. It is not that capitalism is going to change but that it is Communism that is going to change. That is the only hope, as I see it, we have of maintaining the peace over the distant future.

QUESTION: Sir, would you discuss the potential dangers and recent developments in Cuba?

ANSWER: It is never nice to see a neighbor and a great friend fall by the wayside and get led into evil paths. There is always a question of how you are going to turn some one from their evil paths. It is not always by our preaching to them. Sometimes you have to let them see where their evil paths are taking them and, after they are in the gutter, then maybe one can help them to rise.

It is a tragic situation in Cuba. I think there have been, of course, mistakes made in the past. They have had dictatorships. They have had corrupt governments in Cuba. That happens. Now, we see Cuba taken over by a regime whose stock and trade is to attack

the United States, try to turn the people of Cuba away from the United States, try to misrepresent and malign everything we have done and tried to do for Cuba over the years is a tragic situation. I don't think it is a permanent situation.

The change in Cuba over the last six months, the recession of the Castro wave -- I don't say that it has stopped. Castro still has the support of a great many people but he has the support of far fewer people than he had six months ago.

The great patience that the United States has shown -- we are big enough to be patient, we are big enough to let the Cubans learn their own lessons without trying to teach them by intervention or anything of that kind. I am hopeful of the result. I don't expect anything from Castro. It looks as though he were getting a little frightened now and maybe trying to make up to us just a little bit. But I think Castro is essentially hostile. I think he feels that that is his real stock and trade. His ambitions go beyond Cuba. He would like to take over the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and he would like to be the dictator of the Caribbean and eventually of Latin America. He has very broad ambitions. I don't think he has the ability to carry them out. I think he will come a cropper.

I look optimistically toward the future, but a good deal of crockery is going to be broken in the meantime, and it is a tragic thing to see it happen. It is hard to be patient. It is hard to restrain one's self, but I think we are big enough to do it.

GENERAL CRABB: Mr. Dulles, we appreciate this most interesting, informative, and invigorating presentation. I think one of the reasons we have enjoyed it so much is because we sort of feel that you know what you are talking about.

On behalf of the students and the faculty, thank you.

MR. DULLES: Thank you.

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