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OUTLINE OF REMARKS

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June 20, 1958

I. Introduction

1. For purposes of this conference, most useful thing I can do is to discuss:

a. What kind of a world military situation the USSR is trying to create.

b. In what ways they intend to exploit this military situation.

c. What dangers and problems will be created for us.

II. The World Military Situation They Are Trying to Create

2. What they are trying to do is to create a deterrent which will be as effective as the one we have possessed.

a. They have had for some time capability to damage the US with nuclear weapons.

b. But US superiority was so great and their own capability to inflict critical damage on the US so dubious that they were effectively restrained.

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c. Their aim now is to develop enough capacity in long-range aircraft or ICBM's to inhibit the US from using or threatening to use its own capability.

3. The Soviet leaders probably now believe that their goal is in sight.

a. They possess adequate nuclear weapons capability.

b. Between now and mid-1960 they will have an initial ICBM capability, 100 to 200 heavy bombers, and a large number of medium bombers.

c. Between 1960-63 they will be shifting over to greater reliance on missiles.

d. By mid-1963 they will probably be placing major reliance upon ICBM's for delivering nuclear weapons, but will probably also possess about 200 to 300 heavy bombers.

4. Meanwhile, they will probably develop submarine-based missiles and short and medium-range missiles, and they will retain a substantial ground and air capability of more conventional types.

III. Under the Cover of a Condition of Mutual Deterrence, they will wage a prolonged and intensive cold war

5. They will probably avoid courses of action which would clearly lead to serious risk of general war. But -- since they think we will

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be inhibited from using our own power -- they probably believe they can pursue somewhat bolder policies than in the past without a corresponding increase in risk.

6. One major facet of this cold war will be effort to gain influence in underdeveloped areas.

a. Economic aid program, in support of neutralists and even in some countries allied with us, i.e., Turkey.

b. Soviets avoiding openly trying to recruit neutralists into their camp.

7. Underdeveloped areas -- Southeast and South Asia, Middle East, Africa, Latin America -- are politically unstable and economically weak. Good area for Soviet meddling. All undergoing social and economic revolutions.

8. Neutralism in Asia and Africa is a course which has great appeal. People here not concerned with Communism, but think largely in terms of a US-Soviet power struggle. Neutralism regarded as safe and profitable.

9. Soviets taking advantage of this and are penetrating neutralist states. Coming struggle in many will be between neutralism and pro-Communism. Cases of Syria and Indonesia. Pro-Western forces in Asia and Africa under attack from neutralists and communists. Cases of Lebanon, Tunisia, Laos.

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10. Soviets also carrying on campaign to weaken US alliances -- through alternate use of carrot and stick.

a. They are sometimes bellicose and talk of the dangers of nuclear destruction to some of our allies. This has some success, especially with those who are small and weak. There is some real fear in some of these allied countries that the US would not come to their aid, because the US fears its own destruction, and that -- even if the US did come to their aid -- it would not be worth it. Thus, a form of neutralism -- pacifism is developing as a way out.

b. Soviets are also offering the carrot. Their propaganda for a summit conference, for nuclear-free zones, bans on nuclear weapons and foreign bases, etc., are designed to show our friends and allies that there is a way out through negotiation. They hope our allies will weaken their ties with the US and reduce their own military establishments. This line of effort by Soviets also has its appeal, though at the moment this appeal has been somewhat weakened by the Soviet performance regarding Nagy and the Moscow ambassadorial talks.

c. These efforts against our allies are having an effect. They have and they will slow down our efforts to establish overseas missile bases, and create increasing difficulties for us in retaining overseas bases on terms assuring their availability and

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effectiveness in case of need. Especially in Asia and the Middle East trends toward neutralism among our friends and allies will be troublesome.

IV. Problems and Dangers Created

11. As a result of Soviet cold war activities, there will be constant movement and jockeying for position as countries or areas move in or out of neutralism or in or out of Soviet or US influence. This will create very difficult problems in calculating the risks involved in actions -- or inactions. It is not easy for us to decide whether we would be better off or worse off by intervening in Lebanon. It is not easy for us to decide whether we should extend large-scale economic aid to Indonesia. But it is not easy for the Soviets or the Chinese Communists to decide to what to do about Taiwan, massive economic aid to India, or the sealing off of Berlin.

12. There will be from time to time numerous points at which we will resist by one means or another Soviet and Chinese Communist efforts to gain influence or control, and points at which they will resist our efforts. Periods of tension will arise.

13. These periods of tension will contain the danger of local war, and even of general war. Local wars are not necessarily kept limited because it is sensible not to allow them to expand. You gentlemen are aware of the rapidity with which events occur, the pressures upon chiefs of government and commanders to look to the

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security of their countries and of their military forces. You are aware of the importance of time and of surprise attacks. Actions taken under pressure or as a protection against contingencies could confuse and distort the intentions of the governments involved.

#### V. Conclusion

14. The years ahead are not going to be pleasant and easy. There will be nervousness on both sides. We may suffer some losses, and the Communists may make some gains. The Sino-Soviet bloc will be an increasingly formidable opponent, but its leaders also must cope with problems.

15. There has been a significant change in the USSR and in relations between the USSR and the other bloc countries toward somewhat more liberalism. These changes can not be easily undone. With fits and starts, more changes will probably occur. The USSR and the Soviet bloc now seem politically strong, but major changes in the Soviet leadership and in the satellites could again disrupt what may be a strong but nevertheless remains a somewhat fragile political system.

16. We cannot count upon an evolution in the Soviet system to ease our problem. We must use our own political, economic, and military resources to the best advantage in the prolonged and intensive cold war which lies ahead.

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