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Dupe

QUANTICO ADDRESS

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- (1) **Tough role of Intelligence. With a world bursting at seams -- from Lebanon - Indonesia. And trying at same time solve both terrestrial and outer space. (Trust can leave much of latter to scientists but we must still monitor USSR activities)**
- (2) **High recognition of Intelligence -- Have chance to sell our wares to President, NSC, etc. Never before such interest.**
- (3) **Intelligence mechanism -- From Mata Hari to machine age -- Radar - Electronic Intelligence Intercepts. Electronic computers can't prepare a national estimate or gauge our dangers. Sifting and appraisal process.**
- (4) **I. A. 'C. -- Watch Committee -- Indications Center. Increasing need of rapid communication Intelligence info. (Cooperation Military HQS abroad needed).**
- (5) **Intelligence team -- includes STATE, Military Services & JCS; C. I. A. with assist from AEC and FBI.**

(6) **Vital role of Mil. Services -- Service attaches and Int. officers in military commands abroad make great contribution.**

Mil. attaches -- (not merely for battle order or disorder and training) -- Opportunity to learn about foreign countries and personalities.

Burden of empire -- whether like it or not -- Need corps of pro-consuls (not to exercise authority of the old -- but to help guide inefficient, incompetent new gov'ts).

Mil. men will take over larger role in these new countries. They often represent element of stability in troubled areas.

Mil. attaches and chiefs of MAAG missions now working with military men of other countries who will be future leaders.

Must help build up leaders of free world --(lost two - Magsaysay and Castillo Armas).

(7) **Intelligence appraisal. Past year a difficult one.**

A. In the political field:--

Soviet regained much of ground lost in Hungary,
consolidated position in most of satellites and East
Germany by ruthless methods (smacking of Stalinism).
Slowly trying bring Poland back into Communist fold.
(But this remains a tinderbox as Poles may resist total
loss of liberties they gained).

In Europe: NATO allies divided by issues such as Cyprus,
Algeria.

Also public opinion problem re missile bases.

In Middle East -- Communists are backing nationalism
and Nasrism which has wide popular support even in
countries, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia where govts pro-West.
Lebanon -- undoubtedly backing Syria in its covert support
of the rebels in the fighting which partly a civil war and
partly covert external aggression.

In the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa the Soviet trade and subversive offensive is taking advantage of the weak and inefficient governments which with inadequate preparation, experience and skill are trying to make the democratic processes work.

In Indonesia -- the Communists are partly taking advantage of a civil war to strengthen their grasp on the Island of Java. But in some of these areas (and this is beginning in Indonesia) there is some realization that Communists more effective in wrecking an economy than in making it work.

(B) In the economic field, at home,

Soviet reorganizing and decentralizing its control of industry and maintaining a high rate of national growth -- rate almost double that of ours but on a lower base. But still their gross national product is less than one-half of our own.

(C) In the agricultural field; still suffering from the effects of collectivization and has low rate of efficiency in comparison with us.

(D) In the military field -- estimate that with a GNP only about 40% of ours they are nevertheless putting out an effort roughly equivalent in value to our own in terms of investment, manpower, materiel and research. (EXPLAIN)

Emphasis on heavy industry and military hardware means that although they have been able to increase somewhat their standard of living, their per capita consumption is only about one-fifth of our own; -- how long will the Russian people tolerate this situation? Effect of education and greater knowledge of outside world - Can they return to Stalinism - Y.S. situation.

E. Basic aim in military field is to create a deterrent as effective as the one we have possessed; to develop a military capacity which would inhibit the U.S. from using its military power.

Soviet leaders probably believe that after long period of inferiority this goal in sight:

(a) They possess adequate nuclear weapons capability but substantially less than our own.

Between now and mid-1960 they expect to have an initial ICBM capability -- a moderate number of heavy bombers supplemented by the large number, about 1,000, medium type bombers of the B-47 type; useability (on a one-way mission) against the USA.

Big question: will they try for super-sonic bomber.

- (b) Between 1960 and 1963 they will be shifting over to a greater emphasis on missiles. Indications are that they have drastically reduced (probably temporarily ceased) production of heavy bombers (BEAR and BISON-type).
- (c) In the submarine field with an existing fleet in the neighborhood of 500 submarines, one-half of which are modern, they have ceased production of this type and appear to be starting a new series, presumably some of which will be nuclear-powered and probably with built-in missile capability.
- (d) Retaining formidable capability in conventional arms; modernization and streamlining their ground forces. Some force reductions being carried as they prepare for nuclear warfare.

(8) Estimate:

- (1) That Sov does not desire to initiate gen. war vs US in near future, say for next five years, or to be drawn into one if they can avoid it.**

- (2) That Sov would not risk even limited war involving Soviet forces directly for fear it would not stay limited. But might through indirect means foster limited wars, particularly in ME or Asia, begun by others, if it suited their interests.**

- (3) That Sov will advance its policies which remain unchanged by political and economic penetrations, subversion and the like.**

This is on assumption that we maintain our military deterrent power; that no spectacular technical break through in military field; and finally that there is no serious miscalculation by Soviet of our intentions to honor our commitments or of our ability to do so.

If this estimate correct, we must look forward to a prolonged and intensive period of cold war.

(9) What weapons will the Soviet use:

- A. Communist Party organizations on a world-wide basis in the hard-core of the Communist apparatus. The popular front technique; -- refer to Mikoyan at the 20th Party Congress re Czechoslovakia.**

- B. Other front organizations: World Federation of Trade Unions and control of major labor unions, viz., France, Italy, Indonesia, Japan, women's organizations, student and youth fronts, and the like.**

- C. A judicious supply of military equipment to weak governments in Asia and Africa, particularly where prospects of upsetting governments are good. Subordination of leaders of weak countries. Use and abuse of the electoral process of the democratic machinery of government in those areas where democracy is young and vulnerable.**

(10) To combat these techniques we must:

- A. Develop adequate intelligence regarding their techniques and targets in key personnel of their subversive apparatus. Develop and indoctrinate real leaders wherever they can be found and begin building for the future by choosing the younger men who are likely to become leaders in next decade.**

B. Equipping ourselves to be ready to supply our friends and allies with the proper type of equipment in the military field; in the field of communications, as well as helping them to find and neutralize elements working for the Communists.

(11) Under existing authorities and high-level decisions, some progress has been made in these fields; however, much more remains to be done and it will require a coordinated effort on the part of the Departments of State, Defense, C. I. A., U. S. I. A., and other agencies to develop mechanisms adequate to meet the danger we face. As a result of experience gained, we are working on a program for consideration with many of you to see that the great potential assets we have are properly organized; properly located logistically; and properly manned, -- to meet the type of subversive warfare with which we are faced.