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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

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*Collier*

Attached is an amplified and revised full-text draft for the National War College speech. I think it is approximately right in length, but should have at least a short section on Sino-Soviet relations and the prospects for Communist China. I am working on these.

*W.P.B.*

W. P. Bundy

27 Jan 56

(DATE)

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SECOND DRAFT  
DCI Lecture for  
National War College  
3 February 1956

26 January 1956

Assessment of Communist Successes,  
Problems and Prospects

After looking over the formidable array of previous lectures and discussions in this course, I have interpreted my own function as one of reflection and speculation primarily. I shall not attempt to repeat matters you have already considered, except insofar as they contribute to a broad assessment of where the Communist Bloc stands and where it is headed, both in its own eyes and in our judgment.

I start with the proposition that there has been no basic change whatever in Soviet objectives. The tactical variations we have witnessed over the last five years, and conspicuously within the past year, have never been beyond the bounds of the traditional Communist theory of alternate advances and retreats, initiated by Lenin and I am sure deeply grooved in the thinking of all the present leaders of the Kremlin.

Indeed, I think it is of crucial importance for us all to avoid any sharp swings in our view of Soviet activity. During the past year, speculation among the public has reached the point of wondering whether what we called the cold war was at an end. Since the second Geneva conference and the recent statements of Soviet leaders, there has been some tendency to swing to an opposite view -- that the cold war far from being abandoned will be intensified. The difficulty in preventing such swings in public opinion is a major concern of our policy makers. There should be no justification for them among groups such as yourselves.

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Let me then attempt to give a Soviet view of the world situation, which I should think would be broadly shared by all the top men in the Kremlin whatever their personal rivalries or other differences:

First, they must be quite well satisfied with their progress in the development and production of major military weapons. In the nuclear field, they have advanced to the point where, notwithstanding a continuing marked superiority in US striking power, particularly over the next two years, the world generally, and our major allies particularly, believe that a period of nuclear stalemate has already begun. Moreover, as a result of the first Geneva conference -- and notwithstanding the barren results of the second -- the Soviets must be more confident than before that the US will not deliberately precipitate a situation of major conflict in which nuclear weapons would be used. This does not mean that the Soviets are not still deterred by our own massive nuclear power from adventures of their own that would be likely to lead to major conflict. I am sure they are, and that they are convinced of our intention to act if certain lines are crossed or certain boundaries of action exceeded. But they are probably now confident that they will soon "have it too" -- that in the meantime they too have the benefits of deterrence, in part because they are credited, in the world at large, with greater capabilities than they have, and in part because their capabilities are in fact already a great threat to US allies in Eurasia.

As to the future, it is clear that the Soviets are going all out to achieve the next stages of military power ahead of us if they can. And in certain fields, notably in medium range guided missiles, we have had disturbing evidence within the past year that they may reach the level of

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operational capability before we do. I do not infer from this any great, or at least any immediate changes in their intentions with respect to a major conflict or general war. In intercontinental missiles, the race now looks about even. Whatever the relative dates of achievement of the intercontinental missile may be, the Soviets will in any case continue to be confronted by massive strategic air power from bases so dispersed that it is unlikely that they could expect to knock them out. We can never rule out the possibility of a truly decisive surprise attack capability by the Soviets -- and must obviously bend every effort to prevent that coming about -- but I should doubt whether the Soviets are now planning to any major degree on any assumption that this will happen.

Another major question is whether their growing nuclear capabilities will permit the use of pressure or "blackmail" tactics in support of local aggression and subversion. This is a more likely possibility than an achievement of a decisive surprise attack capability. If the United States and the free world fail to meet Communist expansionist moves effectively over the next five years, this could indeed become the method by which we would be "nibbled to death." In present Soviet calculations, however, I think it represents a hope rather than a firm expectation.

In summary, the Soviet view of the major weapons balance is probably two fold: (1) that there is a present balance or near-balance sufficient to reduce the risks of major conflict to a low point; (2) that there are hopes that the situation may develop in ways favorable to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, either by the pressure possibility or by the more remote chance of prior achievement of a surprise attack capability.

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This brings us to the second point, the present status of the cold war struggle.

On this front, the Soviets must consider the prospects for gain to be considerable -- perhaps less than they were in early 1947, and with no major area as ripe for the plucking as North Vietnam stood in early 1953, but on an overall basis presenting great opportunities for the growth of Communist influence.

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In the past year, we have certainly seen a new Soviet line of policy in action. Essentially, this can be viewed as a third stage in the cold war. In the first stage, from 1947 to 1949, Communist control was extended over China, but elsewhere a series of Soviet thrusts were turned back, and NATO was set in motion. In the second phase, the Soviets turned to aggression by proxy, first in Korea and then in Indochina. Beginning in 1952, there were signs of a different line, and these signs expanded into the flood of actions taken in 1955, in two directions. The first of these was to promote a general reputation for peaceful intentions, through adjusting such local situations as Austria, failing to follow up on their promises of drastic action if West Germany became allied to the West, and accepting the Geneva Agreement on Indochina (of course in the expectation that Communist takeover of the South was only a matter of time in any case). The second prong of the new line of policy -- or you may call it tactics -- was the use of every possible device to extend Soviet influence and diminish US influence throughout the peripheral and uncommitted areas of the world.

In the last six months, Soviet intervention in the Middle East and South Asia has revealed a greater tactical flexibility than in the past, and

in particular the judicious employment of two Soviet assets, a plentiful supply of obsolescent arms and the ability of a controlled economy to absorb the critical surpluses of underdeveloped countries at a relatively small overall cost. In quantitative terms, we estimate that the aggregate cost of Communist military and economic assets sent to these areas is on the order of 400 million dollars, most of which is in the Egyptian arms deal. Objectively however, those surplus arms really had almost no marginal value at all, and in cold economic terms the cotton they are to receive in exchange may even be more valuable -- apart from its political importance in breaking Egypt's dependence on Western, particularly British, markets.

I have little doubt that the Soviets can continue to play the arms game; their reserves of such items as MIG-15's and T-34 tanks is enormous, and the now-surplus IL-28, a type of plane we and the British have never had in Soviet numbers, offers a special attraction to such countries as Egypt and India.

Moreover, the Soviets can clearly continue to absorb surpluses more readily than we can, and can offer, through state financing, more attractive financial terms than we can either as a government or through the World Bank.

When it comes to supplying really useful economic aid, Soviet capabilities are more limited, but still more than adequate for their present purposes. A million tons of steel to India, over a three year period, is only a tenth of the increase in Soviet steel capacity over that time. If the Soviets were to build the Aswan Dam, it would require only about 3% of their heavy electric equipment capacity. The equipment they are sending to Burma in exchange for surplus rice -- which is being diverted to North Vietnam to meet the pressing food problems there -- is substantial in Burmese terms but minute in Soviet

terms.

Perhaps most serious, the Soviets do have a substantial supply of technicians, whom they can readily train in the local language, and then send to the area where they can do the most good in the Soviet interest.

In all of this effort, the Soviets have their Satellites. While no sophisticated person is fooled by the Czech label on the arms sent to Egypt -- and we have every indication that the negotiations were quite firmly controlled from Moscow last August and September -- the fact remains that the Satellite identification obscures the extent of the total effort. The impression is even created that the Satellites are in honest competition with each other! Communist China's part is more minor, but appears to be at least partly coordinated with the USSR in such countries as Egypt and Indonesia.

One may ask why the Soviets appear to get such substantial results in good will from these efforts, which are in fact far less extensive or constructive than US and Western aid has been. In part, this is because Western aid is still tarred with the heritage of colonialism. The Soviets do all they can to stress this, and to conceal their own record in the Satellites and in their nationality areas. They have also, in these latest efforts, been fairly astute in managing to create a belief that the USSR's progress is a worthy model for these nations, that the USSR has faced and surmounted the same problems. The Soviets can, for example, point with pride to their accomplishments in developing marginal lands and educating backward peoples in the Republics of Central Asia.

The Soviets have also managed to avoid any impression of condescension, and to make it appear that their offers have no strings attached. Even the fact that some of the transactions have been hard bargains indeed, on a strict

quid pro quo basis -- like the steel to India -- has contributed to this impression.

In addition to being receptive to the kind of military and economic contributions the USSR and the Satellites have to offer, the Middle East and South Asia offer a store of local issues on which the Soviets feel they can take sides to their advantage. Foremost of these is, of course, the Arab-Israel dispute, with Goa, Kashmir, and Pushtunistan (more moderately) as other conspicuous examples.

It goes without saying that the positions of the USSR toward these countries is entirely cynical. Contrast their present 100% espousal of the Arab cause with the fact that the USSR supported the creation of Israel completely, and in 1948 only the supply of Czech arms made it possible for Israel to establish its independence! Compare the advocacy of continued partition in Kashmir with the Soviet position on Indochina and, at least verbally, on Germany and Korea.

In many ways, what the Soviets -- and the Satellites in concert -- are doing in these areas is nothing more than 19th century realpolitik, conventional power politics designed to increase the influence of the USSR and to alienate these nations from the West by any tool that is handy.

As of now, I think the Soviets may feel that they have made considerable progress by these tactics, and that they have opened up a profitable new front on which they may be able to make still further progress. Certainly, there is very little reason to suppose that these are one-shot operations -- and just as little reason to suppose that "competitive coexistence," which should be called "antagonistic" or "hostile coexistence," has any other ultimate purpose than



the extension of Communist control in the fullest possible sense. //

Meanwhile, among our major allies, especially in NATO, the Soviets must believe that they have been fairly successful in reducing the "cement of fear" in NATO and that, whether or not Khrushchev and Bulganin revert to type in the hostile tone of their utterances, it will remain extremely difficult for our major allies to maintain the defense burdens of the 1949-54 period.

Moreover, the Soviets must be well pleased with the results of the French elections and by the talk of "openings to the left" in Italy. If it does nothing more, the renewal of popular front tactics seems sure to exert a continued disruptive effect on these countries. I do not think that popular fronts are imminent in either case, but they are surely a stronger possibility than at any time since 1948.

Finally, and in my judgment more immediately important than either Europe or the Middle East and South Asia, there are the two great sore spots of the current Far East picture, the offshore islands and Laos. These are not direct Soviet problems, but the Soviets must see clearly the advantages that may come to the Bloc from them -- and they are of course rendering all possible material support to the Communist Chinese and the Viet Minh.

There are a few indications that the Soviets exerted a restraining hand on the Communist Chinese during 1955 on the islands, and also on the situation in South Vietnam. Yet I have little doubt that, to the degree this was done, it was accompanied by an assurance to the Communist Chinese that the taking of the offshore islands would be done more easily, and to greater advantage to the overall cause, if the will of the major European nations could be

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further softened by the general "peace offensive" -- as has clearly taken place -- if the US could be isolated from its allies, and if the major "third-force" nations, notably India, could be subjected to increased Soviet influence -- as has also taken place.

In the case of Laos, the Communist moves are almost certainly designed largely as a balancing operation to offset the fact that South Vietnam has not developed, or rather deteriorated, as they anticipated when the Indochina agreements were made in 1954. But Laos is no mere token balancer; while its loss to the free world would be less serious than that of South Vietnam, the undermining effect in Thailand -- of which there are already indications -- might in a fairly short time virtually outflank even a greatly strengthened and pro-Western South Vietnam, while the situations in Malaya and Singapore, which have developed more adversely than we expected during the past year -- and with too little sign of effective British counteraction -- would be likely to go completely to pot. From the purely Soviet standpoint, it may be that any drastic action against the offshore islands or Laos would appear undesirable in that it would tend to interfere with the efforts to extend Soviet influence in the Middle East and South Asia, which are of course draped in the mantle of "peace." But if this is the Soviet view, it still might not prevail with the Communist Chinese and the Viet Minh. The major determinant, finally, is so largely the posture of the US and its allies that I can go no further as an intelligence officer. As the Soviets see it, there must appear to be lively possibilities of Communist gains in this, their area of maximum present expectations.

In sum, the Soviet leaders may well feel that they are doing at least as well as they may have expected in the cold war.

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Thirdly, in looking at their own internal situation, the Kremlin leaders must find much to be hopeful about. Their overall economic growth has continued. 1955 was a good year for agricultural quantitative output. The burden of military expense has not yet operated seriously to reduce the large amounts spent for investment, and, although the flow of consumer goods has been held back, the real income of the Soviet citizen is still rising at a rate of about  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  per year.

Even more basically, Soviet scientific and technical training continues to produce ever increasing numbers of competent technicians, and secondary education is being expanded at a rate that will mean that well over 80% of Soviet children will receive such education by 1960. In the use of human raw material for narrow ends, there is no question that the Soviet system can produce results.

Moreover, despite the enormous dissatisfactions, particularly among nationality groups, overall morale in the USSR is almost certainly at a fairly high point. The aggregate evidence of travelers to the USSR in the last year is convincing that, whatever his view of the nature and personal consequences of the system, the Soviet citizen appears to be convinced that it works. This pride constitutes an enormous cohesive force for the present. Moreover, the visits of foreign leaders to the USSR, and the visits of Soviet leaders abroad as they have been reported to the Russian people, have undoubtedly contributed to a sense of international prestige and acceptance greater than at any time since the war.

Fourth, as they look at their relationship with the Satellites and Communist China, the Kremlin leaders can see, on the favorable side, continued stability in the Satellites, with little reduction in the prospects for effective

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Soviet control over the next five-ten years under present conditions. Communist China likewise continues a firm ally for the present, and Soviet economic aid to Communist China while substantial, and a serious future concern, is not in aggregate terms a very large burden on the Soviet economy at present.

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In summary, as the Soviet leaders look at today's balance sheet, as compared to a year or five years ago, they can see many favorable factors from their standpoint. In the aggregate, they might well conclude that the overall power position of the USSR and the Sino-Soviet Bloc is greater relative to the forces clearly arrayed against it than at any time.

Yet it may be that many of the assets in the balance sheet are not nearly so substantial as they appear, and that even those which may be taken at full value are outweighed by other situations or other aspects of the internal picture. So it is necessary to look closely at the debit side of the ledger -- the problems that the Soviets still confront externally and internally.

The first of these on the external front, is that in no major area of the world has popular support for the Communist form of government increased over the past year. The situation in East Germany, and to some extent in the rest of the Satellites, has compelled the Soviets to make brutally clear at the second Geneva conference that they have no thought of permitting free elections in East Germany, and that they know the outcome of such elections would be repudiation of Communism. While I do not look for another June 17, 1953, the Soviets have clearly found no way to keep East Germany below the simmering point. Just as one indicator, the number of refugees reaching West

Germany over the past year has been 260,000, 40% above the level of the preceding year and with about a quarter ~~existing~~ <sup>CONSISTING</sup> of military-age youths. Soviet and East German controls can reduce this flow, but only at the cost of more repression and more hostility in those forced to remain. Berlin remains a major sore spot to the Soviets and, despite all the harassments, the Soviets can hardly take drastic action against it without involving great risks of a major conflict. The key fact is that East Germany simply is not setting into any kind of satellite mold; on the contrary, to East and West Germans alike, its condition is a complete condemnation of the Communist system.

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Similarly, on the other side of the world, whereas it appeared probable a year ago that the Communists might win an all-Vietnam election even if considerable elements of a free election were present (though perhaps not if a prolonged period of impartial administration preceded the election), Viet Minh prestige and influence have been sharply reduced by the growing strength of the Diem government in the south, and by the failure to solve the basic food problem in the north. Thus, the prospect of a Communist victory in what the world might have considered a free election no longer appears substantial. If the Communists are to make substantial progress in South Vietnam, they will have to come above ground -- where they can probably be met and where they will in any case reveal their true aggressive nature to the unconvinced leaders of India and other key neutralist countries of the area.

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Elsewhere in the world, there now appears to be no area where the threat of Communist takeover is as acute as it was in Iran in 1953 or Guatemala in 1954, where the Communists met their match. The Indonesia situation is better than it seemed likely to be a year ago, although still precarious. Latin

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America has many unstable situations, but there have been encouraging signs that nations such as Brazil have passed through the inoculation phase with respect to the internal Communist threat, and are able to generate -- if we play our hand coolly -- their own corrective forces.

Secondly, although the Soviet-Satellite campaign in the Middle East and South Asia is off to a flying start, it will soon run into serious problems. To date, it has been largely a campaign of extending state influence, and its success has entailed some soft-peddling of internal Communist efforts and even, in the case of the Communist Party of India, almost a disavowal of that Party. Yet, without continuing or increasing the efforts of local Communist forces, Soviet aid may serve largely to strengthen governments that are ultimately non-Communist or anti-Communist.

I do not discount the possibility of growing economic or military dependence on the USSR, or that Nehru and Nasr will go somewhat further down the road of cooperation with the Soviets, or the seriousness of the threat posed by the presence of Soviet agents in these countries. It may be that the Soviets can conceal their hand and have the best of both approaches for the time being, particularly through the increased respectability of local Communist Parties. But they will be under continual temptation, and perhaps pressure from among the Soviet leaders themselves, to take a stronger line which would cause them to be recognized for the modern imperialists they are.

Similarly, the Soviets have the problem of fulfilling the expectations of the countries they have now undertaken to assist. Things are now in honeymoon period, which may not last long. I do not think we shall see such flagrant gaps between promise and performance as took place in the trade agreements with

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the Argentine and Uruguay, or in some Soviet dealings with the UK in 1953-54. If they mean business at all -- as we think they do -- they can avoid such fiascos. But there will still be strong possibility of disillusionment with Soviet actions that are bound to be partial and superficial in many cases.

In other areas where the Soviets have made apparent progress during the past year, they also confront dilemmas. Tito cannot be further wooed without the danger of increasing similar "national Communist" sentiments in the Satellites, and without creating even more serious dilemmas for the Communist party in Italy, which has been substantially weakened over the past year by this fact among others . . . In Germany, the Soviets can push the theme of direct negotiations between West Germany and East Germany to a point, with disruptive effects, but if the West Germans start to take the possibility of such negotiations seriously, they will almost certainly pierce the sham issue of "compulsory NATO membership" and come face to face with the ultimate Soviet position that a unified Germany should not have free elections and should not be free to determine its own foreign policy. Feeler unofficial negotiations between West and East Germany might well result in a very healthy clearing of the air in West Germany and in the strengthening of West Germany's ties to the West.

The fact is that in West Germany and in Japan -- still probably the major power centers subject to the cold war -- the Soviets have not made real headway. Despite some minor economic problems, and a slight decline in its phenomenal rate of economic growth, the fact is that West Germany continues extremely prosperous and is more and more tied to the West in what should be enduring economic relationships. If we can assist the strengthening of these

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*Clearly, it is an enormous asset to the USSR  
and the Bloc. It's*

Lastly, there is ~~the most difficult item~~ area of all to place in a global  
~~balance sheet~~ Communist China. On the ~~asset side~~ <sup>OH</sup> ~~the~~ great/military and material progress  
~~and the~~ mean a constantly increasing threat to Western positions in East Asia.

And, as I have said, the common interests of the USSR and Communist China should  
make them working allies over at least the next five years. Yet, from the Soviet  
standpoint, there must be concern about ~~the increasing~~ <sup>the increasing</sup> demands that Communist China is almost sure to levy on the  
USSR (unless, of course, Communist China is able not only to trade with, but to  
obtain credits from, the Free World). In particular, the prospect that Communist  
China will not be able to solve its food problem may mean that the USSR will be called  
on for agricultural exports ~~just as~~ <sup>while</sup> its own agricultural problem remains unsolved.  
Such problems as this are not likely to disrupt the relationship, but they are part of  
a picture in which the Soviets must realize that they will bear a considerable burden  
in supporting an increasingly independent ally.



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ties through NATO or through European integration moves, so much the better . . . And, of course, West German rearmament is underway, and her scientific and technological resources increasingly applied to the total NATO effort.

In Japan, too, the picture is far from dark. Not as much armament as we should like, and more trade with Communist China, but on the other hand greater stability than seemed likely a year ago, and substantial toughness in negotiating with the Soviets, without any substantial loss of popular support.

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In sum, looking at the world picture as a whole, I think we must take the Soviet and Satellite moves of the last year extremely seriously, and intensify our actions to meet them. Yet, when you look at the whole of the balance, what the Soviets have mainly done has been, in most cases, to cash white chips without facing the difficult choices required for the red and blues. In the ebb and flow of the cold war, taken as a whole, the Soviets would hardly feel themselves compelled to correct, even if they could, the historic Communist doctrines of the growth of revolutionary situations, or Stalin's 1952 prophecies of softening and division in the free world -- but neither will they find any clear proof of the validity of these basic beliefs. As to the United States itself, and the alleged "internal contradictions of capitalism," we have had some recent indications that Communist theoreticians are coming to believe that, while capitalism will rot in time, it may take a pretty hefty dose of the acid of internal Communist disruption to bring on the process.

Turning now to their own internal picture, the Soviet leaders must realize

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that they have not solved two crucial domestic issues: organizing agriculture and increasing its productivity, and above all the problem of leadership itself.

I have said that 1955 was statistically a good year for Soviet agriculture, and I have little doubt that Khrushchev will be as zealous in claiming credit for the results of good weather in the Ukraine as he was last year in denouncing Malenkov for the results of bad weather there. The fact is, of course, that Khrushchev's corn and new lands programs had very little to do with this year's results. They are not wholly visionary; some useful techniques have been employed, and it was a substantial achievement to obtain even small yields from the new lands in so dry a year. Nonetheless, if another bad year in the new lands were not compensated by an unusually good year in the Ukraine, Khrushchev's bold experiment would be exposed as the risky thing it is. This would not mean that millions of Russians would starve or that the Soviet economy would be drastically slowed down, but it surely would mean serious damage to Khrushchev's political credit and standing.

This brings me to the problem of leadership, which of all the Soviet problems is the one that must hang over the minds of the Kremlin more than any other.

Predictions on the future holders of power in the Soviet Union are among the more perishable items on the intelligence shelf, particularly when made on the eve of a Party Congress. But I think we can be reasonably confident that power has come to reside over the past two years primarily in a small group of a half dozen at the top, but, as a close second, also in the considerably

larger Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It also seems clear that for the present neither the Army nor the secret police are in the control of any identifiable individual or group in the top leadership. Rather they are in substantial measure "institutionalized." The prestige of the military forces is unquestionably greater than under Stalin: they are capable of exerting policy pressure, as they probably did at the time of the decision for emphasis on heavy industry a year ago, and they are capable of negative pressure, as was almost certainly demonstrated against the secret police in the removal of Beria. But they do not stand as a separate and manipulatable element of power.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the present situation is that the Central Committee of the CPSU is almost certainly used as a forum, not only for organization and the disposition of personalities, but for the discussion of major policy questions. We know too little about what went on at its meetings last January and July, but the combination of almost total silence during these meetings, followed by an outburst of activity on many fronts, strongly suggests that if decisions were not actually made in these meetings, they were at least not valid until ratified therein.

*Khrushchev*

In this situation, it is of course crucial whether Khrushchev and his friends have obtained or can in the future obtain thoroughgoing control of the Central Committee. The pattern of personal appointments over the past year suggests that he has made considerable progress in this direction, but the odds still seem against his having the Central Committee elections sewed up by this Party Congress at least.

One is tempted to draw parallels to the rise of Stalin after Lenin's death, and to wonder if we may not be at, say, the 1927 stage of that process, which

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will proceed eventually to the conclusion of one-man power. It may be that this will be the case. Yet there appear to be striking differences between the present situation and the earlier succession problem. Above all, the decisions now taken -- apparently after being thrashed out in the Central Committee -- are vastly more complex and difficult, and the results come home to roost more quickly than in the 1920's. If Khrushchev, or any group of leaders, propose a given policy, either internal or external, that policy is tested promptly and its faults revealed. Moreover, on the internal front, whereas any gain in the 1920's could not be set against a norm, the very confidence the Soviets have gained in the capabilities of their economy, now means that decisions are judged harshly, by whether they in fact produce the results claimed for them at the time of decision. We are all familiar with the enormous political consequences in a democratic society of even the smallest economic shifts, which may have been in fact little, if at all, the fault, or the credit, of the incumbent government. Obviously, not even the Central Committee taken alone is in any sense comparable to a democracy, but its criticisms nonetheless may exert a continuing effect in preventing the successful rise of any single, supposedly omnipotent individual.

In short, there is a good case for supposing that the Soviet system may lack for some time the strong one-person control under which the system was created. This does not mean that the system will collapse in the short or even medium-term. Nor does it mean any conspicuous decline in the skill with which the Soviets conduct at least limited maneuvers in the field of external policy: on the contrary, at several times during the past year there has been every indication that Soviet footwork was faster than in the Stalin period. What the continued collective leadership does mean, however, is that world

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Communism will lack a single ideological voice capable of adjusting basic doctrine to changing demands as Stalin so conspicuously did. And there is at least a substantial chance that it will mean over time the development of major differences among the leadership which will tend to diminish the effectiveness of Soviet policy, both externally and internally.

Moreover, in the less likely event that Khrushchev or some other individual should attempt a drastic seizure of power, the countervailing forces are now such as to produce a serious internal conflict.

Meanwhile, the broad structure of Soviet society itself is being drastically changed by the very forces that have contributed to the growth of Soviet material strength and economic power. I do not suggest that industrialization, in itself, is in any way fundamentally at odds with the continuing of a highly centralized and totalitarian form of government -- Nazi Germany is the obvious example of just such a case. Nor is it necessarily true that a more highly educated populace will resist totalitarianism in any short or medium-term period.

Yet, when a people find their living standards substantially increasing at the present Soviet rate, and when that same people is undergoing an enormous educational revolution at a rate more rapid than that of any nation in history, these trends must create vast imponderables in the calculations of Soviet leaders.

We have had some evidence that the improvement in the sciences has been obtained in part by diminished emphasis on ideology, particularly in the physical sciences and even recently in the once-strait jacketed field of biology. Such trends may well be hard to prevent from expanding to other fields of study, including history. In simpler terms, it cannot be so easy for a regime to spread wholly false views among a generation 80% of which has received a secondary

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education.

This is not a new problem in Russian history. Writing of Peter the Great, a pre-revolutionary Russian historian once said:

"His beneficent actions were accomplished with repelling violence . . . . He hoped, through the threat of his authority, to evoke initiative in an enslaved society, and through a slave-owning nobility to introduce into Russia European science and popular education . . . . He desired that the slave, remaining a slave, should act consciously and freely. The interaction of despotism and freedom, of education and slavery -- this is the political squaring of the circle, the riddle which we have been solving for two centuries, from the time of Peter, and which is still unsolved."

I do not say the present Soviet rulers cannot solve this problem of combining discipline with education. Indeed, as you can see, I cannot offer firm predictions on any of these trends. Certainly they cannot develop in a manner that would tend to make the Soviet Union an acceptable member of international society unless Soviet expansion, whether by aggression or subversion or even the growth of marked influence, can be held in firm check. Plainly, that is not now the case. But if Soviet confidence in the exportability of their system can be reduced, it stands to reason that Soviet energies will find increasing outlet -- and adequate psychological reward -- in the internal development of their society.

If, then, we ask ourselves what are the prospects for the USSR over the next ten-twenty years, we can be most confident that, barring a major conflict, the USSR will have attained great economic and educational advances. Those

advances may conceivably be harnessed to the wishes of a still highly centralized and totalitarian government and that government may, through subversion, techniques of influence, or atomic blackmail, succeed in greatly expanding the territories it controls, perhaps even to the point of making our own situation desperate.

On the other hand, Soviet techniques of influence, such as have emerged in the past year, may prove as transitory as some of the efforts of the Czars. If this can be done, while at the same time the threat of Soviet and Chinese Communist aggression is reduced, the Soviet internal system could evolve into forms for which I see no real historic parallel but which offer at least the possibility of a Soviet state that will not be at rest or without any aggressive designs, but that can be handled by a continuously vigilant policy on the part of the rest of the world.

*Study for  
Super  
Satellite*