

"THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
IN NATIONAL SECURITY"

remarks by

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before

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- (1) Work of Military Intelligence - Attaches - (Middle East Crisis)
- (2) Division of work - coordination
- (3) C.I.A. - Not a competitor - to serve - a great common task.
(Briefing of NSC)
- (4) Change in Intelligence - technical and scientific - guided missile -
heavy bomber - nuclear
- (5) Problem of judging - capabilities and intent. (Yalu River)
- (6) Problem of separating wheat from chaff - likely today to be
swamped by volume
- (7) Problem of making policy makers "intelligence" minded.
(Preparation of NIE and how to make palatable).

(8) Great catastrophies of history due to failure to heed or use available intelligence;

(a) World War One - Germany didn't believe Great Britain would intervene for "a scrap of paper." (Same in World War Two - "little mice")

(b) Pearl Harbor

(c) North African invasion, etc.

(9) Principal reasons for failures:

(a) Preconception and prejudice

(b) Warping intelligence to support existing policy

(c) Failure to pay attention to details

(Review of Yalu River)

(d) Failure to recognize inevitability of change - (Hungary)

(10) Conclusion

A fascinating profession more of a challenge today than ever.