

Subject: Comments on US Visit by A. I. Mikoyan to Soviet Party Congress, 31 January 1959.

. . . . Comrades, one of the many questions I was asked at meetings and gatherings in the United States was why lately we have again attacked the antiparty faction. The people asking this question referred to the December (1958) plenary meeting of the central committee which concerned itself with agriculture and to the period following the plenum. Was this not because the opposition had grown stronger and constituted some sort of a menace, they wanted to know.

I replied that this was not at all the case. Our party is completely united and there is no struggle going on. The faction has not increased by a single person in this time. We thought it necessary to speak of the antiparty faction and we do so at this congress for the sole purpose of proving again with facts how wrong and detrimental the political position of this faction was and in order to underline again that the Leninist central committee was quite right in fighting the faction.

There has never before been such inner consolidation of all the forces of Soviet society or such organization and ideological unity in our party and such close contact with the masses as there is today. If anyone doubts this, I said

to my questioners, he should wait until the 21st congress which will be an unprecedented demonstration of the unity and solidarity of the Communist party and the Soviet nation.

Of course, the gentlemen who asked this question did not do so because they were sorry for us and were concerned lest we have difficulties in our party. Still I felt I should (warn) them so that they should not have wrong illusions and then be disappointed

Many questions were asked in the United States about relations between the Soviet Union and China. We may assume that the questions sprang from the revisionist anti-China propaganda of the Yugoslav press which lately has been doing some wishful thinking and insinuating that some sort of differences are cropping up between the USSR and China. In this case also, of course, it was not a desire that we should be close friends with China that prompted the question. No, it was a desire to ascertain whether there was not at least a small crack in our friendship and whether some sort of political plans could not be built on it.

I replied that apparently the gentlemen asking these questions had been dreaming happy dreams that, by some sort of magic, differences might arise in the socialist camp, say between the USSR and China. But I said it was only their dream, a dream that would never come true. . . .

The Soviet press has said a good deal about our trip to the United States and our meetings with Americans, with ordinary people and businessmen, and it has reported our talks with US statesmen. I should like to inform the congress of my main conclusions and impressions of that trip.

As for what impressed me most in the United States, I should say it was the fact that both ordinary Americans and the businessmen I talked with, looked upon me as an emissary of the Soviet Union, although I was there unofficially. Their attitude was very friendly. There seemed to be a great desire to learn what Soviet people want and what we are striving for.

Many questions were asked, some of them indicating prejudices and a wrong impression of our policy and our country. The explanations we gave met with profound understanding. We felt that the Americans wished to understand us correctly. They also made an effort to see that I understood them correctly. I for my part gave the proper attention to the questions they raised and listened attentively to what they said, without evading any questions, not even the most ticklish. It would have been wrong to evade the ticklish questions; I answered them as best I could.

I wish to note that the atmosphere at the close of the gatherings and meetings was always much better and more friendly than at the beginning, because the friendly exchange of opinions removed much that was superficial and accidental.

We explained the Soviet Union's position on the issues raised and as a result there was a greater feeling of friendship.

It should also be said that as our statements and the answers we gave to questions at the outset of our visit reached the US public, there was less and less that was superficial and accidental at our later meetings and there were fewer of what you might call unpleasant questions.

We had expected the Americans to be nice to us but, to tell the truth, we had not expected such a friendly reception and such great interest in our conversations on the part of public circles and the captains of industry and finance. We were pleased by their attitude toward us and their desire to understand the Soviet Union's position. We sensed the longing for peace of the American people and most businessmen. We could see that they are fed up with the cold war and want real peace on this earth and good peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Americans realize what a terrible thing a world war would be under present conditions with such deadly means as nuclear and rocket weapons. Business circles are already aware that, before business could be made out of war, under present conditions, US business and the people themselves may perish in the flames of war.

Though I had no particular plans, I thought I might have talks with members of the US Government, the more so since

Mr. Dulles, on his own initiative, stated before I left Moscow that he would be prepared to receive me on my arrival in the United States. Then it turned out that most of the members of the US Government found the time and felt it necessary to meet me. I had many long talks, in the course of which we discussed major international problems and Soviet-US relations. The talks were frank and very proper. There seemed to be a desire on both sides to understand each other. No ticklish questions were evaded, and each side listened patiently and attentively to the other. The President and other US officials emphasized that it was the duty of Soviet and US statesmen to try to find a course we could both follow that would lead to better relations between us. To this, I said that it fully coincided with the views of the Soviet Government.

US statesmen said that their government seeks to be conciliatory in the hope that the United States and the USSR may live in peace and each can work for higher living standards and greater prosperity in its own way. In these conversations we exchanged opinions about a large number of international problems and both sides found the exchange beneficial. We were, of course, pleased to hear President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, and Secretary of State Dulles say that they want world peace and good relations with the USSR, that they have no aggressive intentions with regard to our country, and that they

favor extensive cultural ties and contacts at all levels, as President Eisenhower said very graphically and at great length.

I assured the US leaders that the USSR wants peace and friendship with the United States as much as it always has and that we feel certain good relations between the USSR and the United States will promote universal peace and good peaceful relations between all nations.

When the conversations turned to concrete disputed aspects of international politics, questions on which the positions of our two countries are far apart, the US statesmen explained their position at great length and also, it seemed to me, showed a proper understanding of the position of the USSR and of the arguments which I used. The conversations on such topics usually ended with the more or less standard phrase of the US leaders that they had a common policy with their allies which they could not change and that it had the support of both the Democratic and the Republican parties.

This was said, for example, about the Berlin problem and about the question of a peace treaty with Germany. To this, I said that a policy that did not change when circumstances demanded a change was not necessarily a good policy. I emphasized that this was the way matters stood at present with US policy on Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany. The US leaders also said that their policy on Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany was bipartisan and that we should not expect it to change if the Democrats came to power, and they asked me to convey this fact to the Soviet Government and Comrade Khrushchev.

I may add here that Mr. Harriman too, who no longer occupies an official position, and apparently not only at his own initiative, remarked to me during a conversation at his home, in the presence of a small group of New York captains of finance and industry on whose behalf he was speaking, as he said, that all of them, and there were people from both parties there, fully supported the present position of the United States on Berlin and disarmament. I want to note that in our conversations, I no longer heard the US side talking of a policy of containment, roll-back, or liberation. On the contrary, both the President and the Secretary of State said that they do not consider it their aim, right, or duty to pronounce an anathema against Communism and that the United States does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Socialist countries.

We may conclude from these statements of the President and Secretary of State that now they are inclined to recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social and political systems. If that is the case, it is very significant for peace. But these statements must be followed by action to bear them out, and we have every right to expect such action.

I should like to call attention to still another important point: in contrast to earlier times, the US statesmen expressed a readiness to negotiate the disputed

issues. This was very important because we have always felt that all disputed international problems can be settled by negotiation. I endeavored to make this point clear in my conversations with US statesmen. I have already said that both sides found the exchange of opinion beneficial. It was natural to expect that after that the US Government would take advantage of the favorable atmosphere created during these meetings, and would also map out moves to bring the cold war to an end, knowing that the Soviet Union has always been opposed to the cold war, and is working to eliminate it.

I made this point at my news conference in Moscow on returning from the United States. But even before I left the United States, apparently when it became known to what extent the US public had reacted favorably to our statements, our desire for friendship, and for an end to the cold war, this frightened some in America.

After my departure, the American press began to call for a campaign that would in some way offset the positive effect this trip had exerted on American public opinion. The first shot was fired by former President Truman, who accused American businessmen of having shown me too warm a welcome. What particularly alarmed him, he wrote, was the desire of certain prominent US industrialists and financiers to surround the visiting deputy soviet premier with a degree of kind attention and worldly brilliance which would result in pressure on the White House. Truman said he feared that these American financiers and industrialists, swayed by the possibility of new deals, would be unable to weigh properly their interests against the national interests, and the security of the country as a whole.

We all remember that it was during Truman's presidency that Soviet-American relations began to deteriorate and the cold war started. But now he has gone to entirely ridiculous extremes since when, indeed, and in what way, can rapprochement between our countries or the hospitality shown to a Soviet representative by the businessmen of the United States threaten that country's national security? As for the mood of the American people, it is apparent that the cold war has already thawed considerably. But the (prongs) of the old war strategists are still so strong that we must not yet commit ourselves to any far-reaching conclusion concerning retreat on the part of the American circles interested in fanning the cold war. For example, hints are already appearing in the American press that the businessmen who extended us their hospitality may even be called to account for it.

Matters have reached a pass where very prominent US Government spokesmen and specialists in that field have now joined this campaign to fan up the cold war. Two of Secretary of State Dulles' able assistants, Dillon and Murphy, went on countrywide tours, taking in the cities I visited, and addressed the same audiences before whom I spoke, filling their speeches with the spirit of the cold war and throwing cold water on the heads of the business circles that began to feel a softer breeze warming up our relations. But that, evidently, did not yield the desired results, for Dulles has since drawn his heavy artillery into the field.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that in the telegram he sent to us on our departure from the United States on 20 January, which reached me in the plane, Dulles said that the President was hopeful that a stable atmosphere of peace and friendship, essential to the welfare of the peoples themselves, would continue in the interests of both our nations. This telegram, which actually sums up the results of our meetings, expresses the hope that an atmosphere of peace and friendship will develop in our relations. That would seem to place a considerable responsibility on the American side to strive for rapprochement between our countries.

We replied to the telegram in the same spirit from the US military base at Argentia, when the plane we were returning on made a forced landing. The statement we made at the press conference in Moscow was also made in the same spirit. Then to our general surprise, on 27 January, the day our congress opened, Dulles made a statement at the press conference to the effect that he saw no signs of a sincere desire on the part of the Soviet Union to end the cold war and that the Soviet Union allegedly intended to continue the cold war and seek victory in that war. Dulles put it as though he was the one who wanted the cold war to end while the Soviet Union wanted it to go on.

In that statement he also distorted the Soviet Union's peaceful proposals, Citing our proposal for the development of normal trade in peaceful commodities, he charged the Soviet people with making that proposal to give itself and International Communism an advantage in the cold war and win a victory in that war. He did not say that to me. There was nothing to that effect in his

telegram. Dulles puts everything upside down. We did not start the cold war and we do not want it to continue. We want to end it immediately and without striving for any victory.

What is Dulles after? He claimed that the Soviet Union does not want the cold war to end. This unfounded claim, in whose support no arguments are offered, can only be interpreted as emanating from the sole desire to turn back the progress in American public opinion which has been calling more and more vigorously for rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the termination of the cold war.

Nor can we help feeling surprised at another of Dulles' statements at the press conference in which he expressed the hope that Mr. Mikoyan's trip would not serve as a basis for mistaken calculations on the part of the Soviet Government in appraising the mood in the United States. In one breath, Dulles says, and correctly, that the impression I have gathered concerning the attitudes which prevail in the United States was a true one, and, in the next, he expresses diffidence concerning the same question, and throws the shadow of suspicion over the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

All the Soviet proposals on international problems are directed toward peace and the easing of international tension. Surely it must be clear to Dulles that our proposal concerning a peace treaty for Germany, for instance, is aimed at doing away with the remnants of war in Europe. Then why has Dulles come out against the peace treaty with Germany? Can he not see that absence of a peace treaty with Germany does not consolidate the peace, but, on the contrary, creates an atmosphere of war? Is

not he himself beginning to get worried about the activity of the excessively belligerent West German militarists?

I can say more: in talking to Dulles, we touched on the question of the threat of another war. When I asked him whether he really believed that we want to wage war, whether he believed there was a threat of war from the Soviet Union, he told me outright that he did not believe this was the case.

In turn, Dulles asked me whether I believed there was such a threat from the United States. I said that in my opinion the United States did not want war at the present time, but that we entertained serious suspicions in connection with the existence of US military bases around the Soviet Union, with America's efforts to conclude military pacts with our southern neighbors, and with the policy of resurrecting German militarism, and so forth. Dulles tried to dispel these suspicions.

I should also like to touch on the recent speech of Vice President Nixon, made at Fordham College after my departure from the United States. In this speech, he goes at length into the substance of my talks with him, which entitles me to say a few words on the question, too. Speaking to me, Nixon said that he thought it important that the statements made on both sides at government level should be distinguished by moderation and objectivity; that it was necessary to refrain from careless words, let alone careless actions. Going over to various concrete matters, Nixon supported the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states.

It is to be regretted that Nixon considered it possible in his speech to interfere most unceremoniously in the domestic

affairs of the European countries of people's democracies, although it must be noted that when speaking to me, Nixon and other statesmen declared that they did not want to interfere in these countries' domestic affairs.

In my conversation with Nixon, I fully concurred with his view on the undesirability of both careless actions and careless words and with his view that the statements on both sides should be distinguished by moderation and objectivity. For Nixon, a wise and experienced man, who is quick at repartee in argument, forgot his own correct words about the behavior of statesmen.

It is surprising that such a man does not see how he places himself in an embarrassing position. I should like to hope that this was just a relapse to an old habit, that this statement of Nixon slipped off his tongue in the heat of oratory, and that in the future he will succeed in keeping to the reasonable rules of behavior of which he spoke so eloquently in his conversation with me.

In speaking to me, both Nixon and Dulles asked many questions about international Communism. Replies were given to all these questions. For instance, in my conversation with Nixon, the complete insolvency and baselessness of statements to the effect that the Soviet Union wants to make use of the Communist movement in other countries to expand the area of its influence and undermine the governments of these countries was made clear to him. It was stated that we, as Communists, sympathize with the Communists of other countries, but our socialist state in no case intends to interfere in any form in the affairs of other states

or in the affairs of their political parties, including the Communist party.

This question was also explained with exhaustive clarity to Dulles in our conversations. It appeared at the time that both Nixon and Dulles understood our position, but now they are again taking their stands on this issue as though no explanation had been given. It follows that Dulles fears Communism, but fearing Communism means fearing the American people, for there is no one other than the American people to establish a Communist system in the United States. It is the American people, and no one else, who will decide when and how this is to be done.

I said in my conversations in the United States that, as a Communist, I regret that there are so few Communists in America, but there is no way in which I could help them. The ideals of Communism originated in the world prior to Soviet power, and not in Russia. They will live and advance in keeping with historical laws of development, no matter who takes action against them and no matter what action is taken against them. This question should not be confused with the foreign policy of the socialist countries. If this is understood and viewed as the starting point, it will be possible to find a common tongue on this basis, and to secure peaceful coexistence. I formed the impression that the American statesmen understood this.

My conversations with statemen in the United States brought to light differences on trade issues. I had only one meeting with Dillon, deputy under secretary of state for economic affairs, before my departure from the United States, since at the

beginning of my tour Dillon was in Canada. My conversation with Dillon is interesting. I must say that I formed a good impression of him. He is young, experienced, and knows his job. I will not conceal the fact that at times the conversation became quite heated. These were not negotiations, of course, but we exchanged views on trade matters frankly for the purpose of ascertaining each other's views in order to pave the way for agreement in the future. After my departure from the United States, Dillon made a speech in the cold-war spirit. In this speech, he raised many questions of Soviet foreign trade policy, distorting several aspects.

Owing to a shortage of time, it is impossible for me to answer all these questions now. I expect that our minister of foreign trade, Comrade Patolichev, will give a detailed reply in the press to Dillon's speech. If you listen to Dillon, and to Dulles, who also raised this question a few days ago in his speech, you might think that the United States places no barriers in the way of developing Soviet-American trade, and that the solution of this problem depends entirely on the position of the USSR. This is a typical case of an attempt to lay the blame at the wrong door. Last summer, in a reply to Khrushchev's letter seeking to break the deadlock in Soviet-American trade, President Eisenhower gave a favorable reply on the whole, and said that he was instructing the State Department to examine our concrete proposals and to reply to them.

Since practically eight months have gone by and no reply has been forthcoming from the State Department, it was naturally interesting to me to hear from Dillon what was being done to fulfill the President's instructions. Dillon tried to justify their delay by referring to political events in various parts of the world; he mentioned the events in the Far East in addition to the Berlin question. This explanation of Dillon's alone shows that in questions of trade the American Government is not guided by business considerations but ties these questions to the different controversial political problems that spring up in the international situation. Prompted by the same motives, the US Government undertook a number of measures to hinder trade between our countries as soon as the cold war was started: everyone remembers the unilateral US abrogation in 1951, on purely political motives, of the Soviet-American trade agreement concluded in 1937 during President Roosevelt's term of office. This was a good agreement, forming the juridical basis for normal trade exchange between our countries.

By abrogating this agreement, the US Government discriminated against the Soviet Union. By way of illustration, I can say that in this connection US import duties on certain commodities of ours became much higher than on similar items imported from other countries. The duty imposed on our manganese ore was boosted four times, on ferrochrome and ferromanganese three times, on certain items of sawmill output four times, on birch plywood three times, tobacco two times, alcoholic beverages--including vodka--four times, and canned salmon nearly two times the duty charged on the same items imported from other countries.

By the way, I expressed my surprise to Dillon at the fact that they place our vodka, which enjoys a brisk demand in the United States, in a discriminative position, while they produce their own vodka at home under the name of Russian vodka. I jokingly added that the Americans did not ask our permission for licenses for its production. Dillon replied that Soviet vodka, to his regret, was much better than the vodka made in the United States. I noted in reply that by expressing his regrets he was in this particular case thinking in the spirit of the cold war.

Of course, vodka is not the decisive item of our exports, although we are, of course, ready to sell it abroad in any quantity, the more so since the consumption of vodka here in this country has fallen sharply. But Soviet furs, which have won world-wide renown, are an important item of export. However, in 1951 the United States banned the import of certain types of our fur. At the same time, the Americans banned the import of our canned crabmeat claiming it was made with the aid of the labor of Japanese prisoners of war and Soviet prisoners. The ridiculousness of these claims are obvious to all.

In order to create normal conditions for our trade with the United States it is necessary for the United States to remove the discriminatory duties on Soviet goods which are traditional items of US import. It is necessary to restore order so that the same duty would apply to our goods in the United States as to the goods of other countries. This would enable us to increase the sales of goods in the United States, and to use the dollars earned to place more orders with US firms. Dillon did

not agree with this proposal, with restoring the trade agreement.

Dillon stated in his speech that it could not be expected that the United States would supply the USSR with means of warfare. The same was said by Dulles in his speech. He, for instance, claims that we want to buy strategic goods in the United States and what is more, make our own choice. It is surprising how statesmen can say such things after the meetings and conversations that took place. They well realize that we do not need their arms and did not intend to purchase arms or any other strategic goods, that we have enough of our own and of a higher quality than they have. We speak of trade in peacetime commodities in our proposals for an expansion of Soviet-US trade.

Dulles and Dillon object to giving the USSR most-favored-nation treatment. Our proposals to restore normal conditions for Soviet-US trade, that is, the conditions that existed before the cold war, envisage nothing exceptional or different from the conditions which exist in our trade with other capitalist countries, with Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, and others. As is known, these countries, together with many others, have most-favored-nation agreements with the USSR. It is also known that our trade with these countries is steadily expanding. In 1958, the trade turnover of the USSR with the capitalist countries of Europe and the United States nearly trebled compared with 1950.

The only exception was the United States, but they are to blame for this, not we. In the light of these facts, there is absolutely no ground to Dillon's claim of a certain unreliability in trade relations with us or to his claims that at times we stop, then resume, trade with capitalist countries.

Why are these entirely unfounded allegations necessary? The USSR has long-term agreements on mutual trade deliveries covering three to five years with a large number of capitalist countries. These agreements are being fulfilled satisfactorily. They cover a broad list of goods for delivery on both sides. We are prepared to sit down at one table with the Americans and come to terms in a businesslike manner on a concrete program for mutual deliveries for 3, 5, and even 7 years on normal trade terms if, of course, the US Government consents.

The USSR stands for an international division of labor, not only between the countries of the world socialist system but also between the socialist and all the other countries, including the Western countries. Dillon claimed afterwards that we only want to trade on our own terms. Yet all the statements made by Dillon indicate that he considers trade between our countries to be possible only on terms restricting this trade, terms which have been established unilaterally by the Americans. During my conversation with Dillon, I told him that there are two axioms which comprise the immutable truth: the first is, bad political relations do not promote a development of trade, and the second is that good trade promotes good political relations. Dillon agreed.

So you see, we did not only argue. If the United States did not connect trade problems with current international political problems such as the Far East or Berlin--after all, you cannot buy or sell Berlin or the Far East-- Both sides could study the views we exchanged during my meeting with Dillon and make that meeting the starting point for a mutually acceptable basis for US-Soviet trade.

This Congress will take decisions on the seven-year plan for the development of the national economy and culture of the USSR. But now no one, not even in the capitalist countries, doubts whether the Soviet economic plans are realistic. That is a great achievement. However, there are some who try to frighten businessmen with our plan. Such people inspire misgivings about whether the USSR will buy anything from anyone. They say that trade with the USSR has no prospects and that all this follows from the autocracy they ascribe to us, but this is absolutely wrong.

It is refuted by our policy and by the history of our foreign trade. Suffice it to say that the seven-year plan provides for the possibility of doubling our trade with the capitalist countries. Besides, experience throughout history indicates that the more highly developed a country is industrially the greater are its needs and opportunities for extensive foreign trade. The scare is also raised that the USSR will advance its economy to such a degree that it will begin to flood world markets with low-priced goods in order to undermine capitalist economy.

This is just as much nonsense as the other assertions. We never engaged in dumping and always opposed it in principle as an unhealthy practice. These fabrications come from the same sources that engage themselves in such impermissible methods. Our foreign trade organizations try to make as much as possible on the articles they sell. By the way, they are given bonuses when they get good prices. After all, why should our country

sell goods cheaply when we can get full value for them and use the proceeds for the benefit of our people?

Unfortunately, such prejudices and erroneous arguments are widespread in the capitalist countries. I explained this in the United States, and it seemed to me that to a certain degree I cleared up these misunderstandings. We wish to trade, and we trade according to the generally accepted rules of international commerce, according to which the capitalists themselves trade.

They also say that when the USSR is still stronger economically it will be able to expand its cooperation with the economically underdeveloped countries, claiming that this will be a threat to the Western powers. We do not see any threat in that. If you like, it will be a sort of competition in cooperation with the economically underdeveloped countries in advancing their economy. This will compel the capitalist countries and their monopolies to grant credit and trade with those countries on the same fair conditions we apply and which are advantageous to the underdeveloped countries. There is nothing unfair in that, though the capitalists would sustain certain losses.

But, as I stated in America, they have grabbed so much in those countries that by God's justice, which they refer to so often, it would be no sin to return part of it. When you go beyond the frontiers of our country, you feel especially strong about the grandeur and might of the USSR. Our people can be proud of the dynamic, high-principled, consistent, and flexible foreign policy of the Soviet Government and the Communist party

which fights stubbornly, step by step, to dispel international tension, to eliminate the cold war, and to ensure peace and friendship among all nations. Now it is not only our people, but also the socialist countries and our friends in the West who appreciate our policy and wholly approve of it