

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence
Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010038-5
Washington, D.C. 20505

Chron
Executive Registry
78-6-95

DCI/IC-78-0051

4 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Security Agency
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, Intelligence and Research, State
Under Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Air Force
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking
Deputy to the DCI for National Foreign Assessment

SUBJECT: Trip on 18 and 19 August 1978

25X1

1. I am pleased that you all are coming to our brief retreat on the 18th and 19th. I look forward to the opportunity to share ideas on how we can mutually do our jobs better. It is my plan that our conversations be relaxed and informal. This will not be a decision-making event.

2. I would like to table the following topics for discussion. They are matters that are much on my mind with respect to where we are going in the longer run. I would be happy for your suggestions, either in advance or on the spot, for additional topics.

- a. What our activities should be producing for the country in terms of "outputs."
- b. How the outputs of intelligence are likely to change over the next decade.
- c. How we can better integrate the collection operations of the Community.
- d. How we can better integrate the production activities of the Community.
- e. How we can best ensure under our new organization that there is a good connection between the collectors and the producers.

25X1

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010038-5

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010038-5

25X1

SUBJECT: Trip [redacted] on 18 and 19 August 1978

3. I am attaching some papers with respect to output functions. The first is a list of outputs to which I have assigned my own priorities. I recognize we each view the Intelligence Community's product from a different perspective, therefore; for openers, it may be interesting for you to indicate the order of priority you would favor and whether these are the correct measures of output. Also attached are short point papers on each of the ten proposed outputs. They are very basic and are intended only to stimulate the conversation on how we all look on the value of our different outputs.

4. Look forward to seeing you on the 18th.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachments:
as stated

Distribution:

- 1 - Each Adsee., w/atts
- 1 - DCI, w/atts
- 1 - ER, w/atts
- 1 - D/DCI/RM Chrono, w/atts
- 1 - RM Registry, w/atts

25X1

DCI/STurner&D/DCI/RM/[redacted]
(3 August 1978)

SECRET

SECRET

ATTACHMENTS

KEY ISSUES
FOR DISCUSSION AT RETREAT
18 - 19 AUGUST 1978

SECRET

SECRET

Output functions of National Foreign Intelligence Program in order of priority.

1. Provision of Indications and Warning of Military Attack
2. Support in Managing Military or Political Crisis Situations
3. Support to National Policy Making with Political Data
4. Support to Military and Political Planning with Data on Strategic Military Forces
5. Treaty Monitoring
6. Support to National Policy Making with Economic Data
7. Support to Military and Political Planning with Data on Tactical Military Forces
8. Support to Military Commanders in Operational Matters
9. Support to National Planning with Non-Military Technical and Scientific Data
10. Provision of Counterintelligence Support

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

1. Key issues under, "Provision of Indications and Warning of Military Attack":

a. Our capability to provide warning of strategic attack on the United States is very much a joint product of DOD's Intelligence Related Activities and the NFIP. Our greatest weaknesses at this point lie in the ability to predict rapidly the intended impact of ICBM launches that are detected and to correlate sizeable numbers of such indicators in a brief span of time. How much additional effort may be warranted here is a function of the probability that we would launch on warning and/or take instant defensive measures for protection of leadership and population.

b. Warning of theatre level attack against U.S. forces can be divided into four principal cases:

— European theatre: NIE 4-1-78 provides a reasonably optimistic forecast of our ability to warn that the Warsaw Pact is moving into a posture from which attack is more probable. Clearly one should never be complacent about such warning. We should discuss whether you have mild, substantial or severe concern about warning in Europe. We can also look at what steps might increase our confidence in being able to provide adequate warning and at what cost.

— Korean theatre: Our warning capability here is less certain than in Europe and, perhaps, more critical to the tactical situation. Our planned redeployment of U.S. ground forces may make warning a more critical factor; though U.S. Air Force

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010038-5

forces will still remain. We appear to be at a costly point on the curve of improving capability.

- U.S. Naval Forces worldwide: Naval forces are distinct targets easily separable from territorial issues. They could be selected out for separate attack. Warning here is primarily dependent on IRA and tactical DOD assets.
- Smaller permanent or special deployments of U.S. forces: Such forces are always subject to possible isolated attack. Warning again is largely a responsibility of IRA and tactical capabilities.

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010038-5

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP80M00772A000400010038-5

2. Key issues under, "Support in Managing Military or Political Crisis Situations":

a. This Administration has not had a severe and time-urgent crisis to manage. We have had considerable concern with a number of military crises in which we were not directly involved: Lebanon, Ogaden, Shaba I, Shaba II, Afghanistan, Egypt-Libya, Chad, Cambodia, and Western Sahara; and with a number of political crisis internal to some third countries: Pakistan, Bolivia, Mauritania, Kalahari and South Yemen.

There are two aspects to intelligence performance in such crisis:

- Advance warning: We provided advance warning in very few of these cases. In some situations it is most unlikely that we could ever expect to provide warning; in others, better analytic and collection efforts might do the trick. Are we doing an inadequate job if we do not provide advance warning?
- Information during a crisis: We attempt to provide data on events as they occur and predictions of what may ensue. In some of the crises noted above, our performance in providing an account of events was reasonably complete; e.g., Lebanon, Ogaden, Kalahari, Egypt-Libya--in others much less so. Success in these situations is dependent on bringing a variety of intelligence collection assets to bear, on good interpretational work, on prior development of collection and analytic capabilities in various areas, and on happenstance. Are there geographic areas of probable crisis incidence on which we should concentrate more effort?

SECRET

SECRET

3. Key issues under, "Support to National Policy Making with Political Data":

a. Some important consumers have complained that our reporting on political matters lacks depth and perspective and does not penetrate sufficiently into the intentions and plans of other nations. If we accept this criticism, in your view, where are our greatest shortcomings?

- In reporting on current developments to support day-by-day decision making?
- In analysis of longer-term trends that is designed to support broad policy making?
- In local or in regional analyses?
- In particular geographic areas?

b. Further, does your estimate of the value of the reporting from those few high-level penetrations which we have, make you believe that we should increase emphasis on these difficult and risky operations?

SECRET

SECRET

4. Key Issues under, "Support to Military and Political Planning with Data on Strategic Military Forces":

a. This is an area in which we pride ourselves on the technical ingenuity of our collection effort and the scientific skill of our interpretative work. There is always a thirst for more specificity and breadth of coverage and the qualitative arms race shows no sign of abatement. Yet this one output area, plus that for conventional forces, could virtually consume our total budget. The key issues are: Do we need to maintain this same level of effort? Should we increase it across the board, or can we increase it selectively; and, if so, how? For a discussion of force planning, which I propose to address here, rather than as part of treaty monitoring, I have the following questions:

- Do we give the consumers enough for them to understand adequately Soviet strategic doctrine and intentions?
- Do policy makers have sufficient data with which to plan our strategic forces?

b. If we agree that we can improve our intelligence, what can we do in the following areas:

- Soviet civil defense
- Better interpretation of the Backfire's capabilities
- Detection of indicators of an ABM development/deployment
- Evaluation of the long term prospect for anti-cruise missile defense
- Others

SECRET

SECRET

5. Key Issues under, "Treaty Monitoring":

a. Much of the data for treaty monitoring is subsumed under our efforts to support both strategic and conventional military policy. Many of the issues discussed under those output functions are applicable here. I suspect, however, that there are monitoring requirements which exceed military planning requirements, e.g.:

-- For a CTB there are two fundamental approaches to monitoring:

1) A recognition that limitations on the state-of-the-art are severe and that the marginal capabilities for seismic and radioactive monitoring of a CTB do not warrant large investments beyond our capabilities for a LTBT;

2) A conviction that we must do as much as possible to increase the cost, complexity and uncertainty of cheating by the Soviets. What are the implications of each?

-- For an ASAT treaty we must consider whether our priority of effort should be on monitoring a treaty so as to prevent the development and deployment of a capability against our satellites or on detecting and defending against attack if it occurs.

-- For SALT we are liable to agree on some conditions for which there is rather limited capability to detect cheating. Could the cheating indeed pose a threat of a first strike? -- of political blackmail? Which areas of potential cheating would be most troublesome?

-- More warheads?

-- More throw weight?

-- Cruise missiles?

-- ICBM reload capability?

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

6. Key issues under, "Support to National Policy Making with Economic Data":

a. Some of our present major efforts in the economic arena concern forecasts of energy supply and demand, prospective growth rates in the major industrial nations, insights into trade negotiations, and grain forecasting for the Soviet Union. Are our efforts adequate? In what other areas can we produce better economic data today?

- The economic vulnerability of Rhodesia? South Africa?
- The investment actions of Saudi Arabia?
- The viability of Iran's combined military and industrialization program?
- The economic impact on the EEC of Greek and Portuguese accession?
- German and Japanese economic intentions and performance versus professions?

b. Looking toward the future, which directions are most likely to need accent? There has been very little change in the quantity of intelligence effort in economic matters in the past two decades. Should there be more in the future?

- Do we need to be able to model the economies of 50 countries as we now do ten-to-twelve?
- Are particular areas of growing import?: e.g., non-fuel mineral resources, food; population?

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

7. Key Issues under, "Support to Military and Political Planning

with Data on Tactical Military Forces":

a. There are two distinct concerns here: conventional forces that may oppose our own forces; forces that may oppose each other. We have addressed already crisis management of situations involving our conventional forces support to consumers for force planning is an additional area that does consume considerable effort and could consume much more. The key issue is what force planning decision might the U.S. make today or tomorrow if policy makers knew more about the forces of potential opponents?

-- Are there data missing or insufficiently explicit that would be likely to lead to quantitative changes in our force levels? If so, in which areas?

-- Are there data missing or insufficiently explicit that would lead the U.S. to structure the mix or the characteristics of individual forces differently? If so, are these most likely to be in:

- Tactical aircraft and weapons characteristics?
- Electronic warfare equipment and techniques?
- Anti-submarine warfare?
- Chemical/Biological warfare capabilities/intentions?
- Cruise missile characteristics and doctrine?
- Soviet tactical planning in the European theatre?
- North Korean tactical planning?

b. With respect to analyzing non-U.S. forces that might oppose each other, we pay particular attention to the Middle East, but rather little elsewhere. Where else would detailed balance assessments be useful?

SECRET

SECRET

8. Key Issues under, "Support to Military Commanders in Operational Matters":

a. A number of our national intelligence capabilities have potential for support commanders engaged in military operations. Real-time photo and ELINT satellites stand out in this category. The costs of transmission systems are substantial. Transmitting intelligence from a satellite is not all that is required, however. New intelligence data must be processed, often involving computerized sorting and sifting techniques; and it must be interpreted, at times involving computerized comparisons with stored data bases. Every military commander understandably wants direct access to, and even control of, his intelligence data collection. He wants, and needs, to ensure that interpretation is tailored to his requirements. In fast moving situations this is best achieved on his own territory.

b. Yet because the requirements for processing, collation and interpretation are so substantial, they are not likely to be performed in a commander's immediate command post. I have to decide if it is worth the expense to transmit the data and duplicate the processing and interpretation centers simply to shorten the ultimate transmission distance and to subordinate the interpretations process to the military commander. Beyond this, is it worth a major expense to transmit the data only to the CinC level? Do we know the levels to which photos must descent in order to gain maximum usefulness, for instance?

SECRET

SECRET

c. A separate issue is how much effort should be made to advance real-time availability of ELINT data and to develop geolocation capability with that data, regardless of whether it is transmitted to CONUS or to the field. Clearly it is desirable, but at what expense? Should we aim for:

- Command posts?
- Airfield activity?
- Armored force movements?
- Submarine transmissions?
- Major surface ship movements?
- In-flight aircraft movement?

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

9. Key Issues under, "Support to National Planning with Non-Military Technical and Scientific Data":

a. There is a modest amount and wide variety of intelligence produced in this area today. A good bit relates to issues of technology transfer, and this has military implications. Other relates to commercial technology and has implications for economic competition. A major issue to be decided is how far should we go toward utilizing our intelligence capabilities to keep American industry abreast of technological developments and demands in the markets in which they compete.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

10. Key Issues under, "Provision of Counterintelligence Support":

a. Counterintelligence has both human and technical dimensions.

Should we have a more sharply defined national program to counter penetration of the U.S. by technical intelligence systems?

b. On the human side, do we need to expand our counter efforts in the U.S. in light of increasing numbers of Warsaw Pact, PRC and other foreign intelligence operatives believed to be here? Also should we increase our counterintelligence efforts overseas in light of:

- Recent activities between ourselves and the Soviets which will likely lead to greater efforts against our HUMINT programs.
- The increasing emphasis on collecting intelligence in friendly or semi-friendly foreign countries where the embarrassment of disclosure is greater than in non-friendly areas?

SECRET