

13 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee
ATTENTION : [] Assistant for Information
SUBJECT : FOIA Appeal - George McT. Kahin (74-120)

25X1

Acting for the O/DCI, the NIO/SSEAAF [] raises
no objection to the declassification and release of the W. W. Rostow
memo to McG. Bundy "Meeting Saturday Morning, January 28, in the
President's Office, on Vietnam," dated 1/30/61. Therefore, with
the concurrence of the DDO, the document may be declassified and
released to the requester in its entirety.

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[]
Administrative Officer, DCI

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Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M00165A003100020022-5

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
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

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29 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO
SUBJECT : FOIA Appeal - George McT. Kahin (74-120)
REFERENCE : Attachments

The attachments pertain to an appeal by George McT. Kahin of the sanitization and denial of information contained in one White House document (document #2 on the attached list). The DDO has no objection to release but recommends O/DCI review. Would you undertake to act for the O/DCI in this case?



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Administrative Officer, DCI

Atts: a/s

(Some background info. from ER is attached for your info.)

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GX-2 transfer to FU-1 Amber

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	[Redacted] 7-C-17 - Hqs. FU-1 Amber	12/29	✓
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p>As you can see from the attached material on the George McT Kahin appeal, the DDO has no objection to the release after the O/DCI has concurred. Would you please review and return to me with your opinion. Thanks.</p>			
[Redacted Signature Box]			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
AC/IPS 2-E-50 - Hqs. [Redacted]			12/23
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

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17 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Information Review Committee
ATTENTION: [REDACTED] Assistant for Information
SUBJECT: FOIA Appeal - George McT. Kahin (74-120)
REFERENCE: A. 10 October 1974 IPS Reply
B. Appeal Letter dated 12 November 1975

1. Summary of Recommendations: Pass document being appealed in toto subject to O/DCI concurrence.

2. Background: Subject is appealing the deletions made by CIA in only one of twenty-one documents referred for review; these documents were reviewed in reference to NARS Declassification Review NLK 74-3 on behalf of Subject. The document in question was reviewed by the responsible DDO component on 27 September 1974 and at that time had no objection to declassification and/or release pending review by the Office of the DCI. This document was passed to Subject in sanitized form.

3. Recommendation: This document has been re-reviewed in reference to this appeal. We still have no objection (see Tab B) to the declassification and/or release of the information previously denied to Subject. However, since the O/DCI was the initial denier of the information, I recommend that their concurrence be obtained (see Tab B).


4. [REDACTED] of OGC has been advised of this matter and concurs in our recommendation.

[REDACTED]
DDO Appeals Officer

Attachments:

TAB A - References
TAB B - Appealed documents

cc: OGC
[REDACTED]



Cornell University

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
McGRAW HALL
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850

74-120

LOG AS APPEAL
(50) 11652

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November 12, 1975

Information Review Committee
c/o Assistant to the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Gentlemen:

I write to request a review of your decision concerning my mandatory review case NLK-74-3, document No. 2. As I understand it, the CIA insists that this be sanitized before it is released.

I respectfully submit that inasmuch as both the Departments of Defense and State concluded that the entire document could be declassified and that this judgment has now been fully concurred in by the National Security Council there is no plausible basis for denying declassification by CIA. Deletion of this portion of the memo from W.W. Rostow to McGeorge Bundy that CIA has stipulated will effectively eviscerate the purport of this memo. This will mean an option laid before the President and seriously considered by him is being denied those seeking to reconstruct one of the most critical periods in the new Kennedy Administration's approach to the problem of Vietnam.

I do therefore respectfully request that your committee review this decision.

Sincerely,

George McT. Kahin
Professor of Government and
International Relations

Copy to: John F. Kennedy Library

NOV 19 4 07 PM '75

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10 OCT 1974

74-3

Reference: NLK-75-3

Mr. Richard A. Jacobs
Deputy Assistant Archivist for
Presidential Libraries
Office of Presidential Libraries
National Archives and Records Service
Seventh St. & Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20408

Dear Mr. Jacobs:

The CIA has completed its mandatory declassification review of the documents submitted in your request of 12 August on behalf of Mr. George McT. Kahin of Cornell University. There is no objection to declassification and release of the documents to Mr. Kahin except as indicated in Attachment A, subject per your letter to concurrence from the National Security Council, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

Attachment A also identifies those documents which, despite the need for continued classification, can be released in sanitized form, provided that the passages bracketed in Attachment B are deleted, and no objection is posed by the other reviewing agencies.

Sincerely,

RSY

Robert S. Young
Archivist

Attachments: a/s
ISAS:CPB:BDrell:slh
(9 October 1974)

Distribution:

- Orig. - Addressee
- 1 - ISAS (Subject)
- 1 - ISG/DDO

UNCLASSIFIED - Not Approved
From Enclosure

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7 Oct 74

CIA Position on NARS Request NLK 74-3 for Mandatory

Declassification Review on Behalf of George McT. Kahin, Cornell University

Item	Date	Description	CIA Position
<u>CIA Documents:</u>			
1	3/25/61	A.W. Dulles memo to JFK: "Operations Against North Vietnam," S	Continue classification per E.O. 11652, 5(B)(2-3) ✓
<u>White House Documents:</u>			
1	1/27/61	McG. Bundy memo to McNamara, Rusk, & Dulles re meeting with JFK, S	No objection to declassification.
2	1/30/61	W.W. Rostow memo to McG. Bundy: "Meeting Saturday Morning, January 28, in the President's Office, on Vietnam," TS	Continue classification per EO 11652, 5(B)(1,3). No objection to sanitization provided passages bracketed in Attachment B are deleted. ✓
3	2/ 1/61	R.W. Komer memo to W.W. Rostow: "Forestalling a Crisis in South Vietnam," S	No objection to declassification.
4	3/14/61	C.V. Clifton memo to McG. Bundy re schedule for new Ambassador in Vietnam, C	No objection to declassification.
5/..	Unsigned agenda for Task Force Meeting March 20, S	No objection to declassification.
6	3/29/61	W.W. Rostow memo to JFK re Vietnam, C	No objection to declassification.
7	4/ 3/61	W.W. Rostow memo to JFK: "Vietnam," S	No objection to declassification.
8	4/12/61	W.W. Rostow memo to JFK re Vietnam, S	No objection to declassification.
9	4/15/61	W.W. Rostow memo to JFK: "Durbrow on Alsop on Diem on Vietnam," S	No objection to declassification.
9	4/28/61	R.W. Komer memo to W.W. Rostow: "Comments on Program of Action for Vietnam," TS	No objection to declassification.

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1	4/28/61	R.H. Johnson memo to W.W. Rostow: "Program of Action for Vietnam," TS	Continue classification per EO, 5(B)(3). No objection to sanitization provided passages bracketed in Attachment B are deleted.
12	5/ 3/61	R.W. Komer memo to W.W. Rostow, S	No objection to declassifica- tion.
13	5/ 4/61	R.W. Komer memo to W.W. Rostow, S	No objection to declassifica- tion.
14	5/ 5/61	Unsigned item: "U.S. Military Forces in South Vietnam," TS	Continue classification per EO, 5(B)(3). No objection to sanitization provided passages bracketed in Attachment B are deleted.
15	5/10/61	W.W. Rostow memo to JFK: "Viet- nam NSC Paper," S	No objection to declassifica- tion.
16	5/16/61	R.H. Johnson memo to W.W. Ros- taw: "Meeting of the Task Force on Vietnam, on Thursday, May 11, 1961," S	No objections to declassifica- tion.
17	5/17/61	R.H. Johnson memo to W.W. Rostow: "Meeting of the Vietnam Task Force on Monday, May 15, 1961," S	Continue classification per EO 5(B)(3). No objection to sanitization provided passages bracketed in Attachment B are deleted.
18	5/19/61	R.H. Johnson memo to Mc.G. Bundy: "South Vietnam Agency Comments on NSC Action Memorandum No. 52," TS	No objections to declassifica- tion.
19	5/24/61	R.H. Johnson memo to W.W. Rostow: "The Possibility of a Coup in South Vietnam," S	No objections to declassifica- tion.
20	5/26/61	W.W. Rostow memo to JFK on Vietnam, S	No objections to declassifica- tion.
21	5/26/61	R.H. Johnson memo to W.W. Rostow: "Economic Group for South Vietnam," C	No objections to declassifica- tion.

~~SECRET~~

9 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR : DDO/PIC

ATTENTION : Annette B. Swider

SUBJECT : Declassification Request No. 74-120

Requester: George Mct. Kahin
Documents Concerned:

Memorandum, W.W. Rostow to McGeorge Bundy,
28 Jan. 1961

EA Division has reviewed subject request and has determined:

- a. No objection to declassification and/or release.
- b. No objection to declassification and/or release after clearances have been obtained from the following: Office of the DCI
- c. Declassification of any part of the request is impossible at this time. Applicable exemptions under _____ apply.
- d. A sanitized version may be released after the bracketed material has been excised. Applicable exemptions under _____ apply.

e. Additional comments, if applicable:



Theodore G. Shackley
Chief, East Asia Division

Downgrade to _____
when detached

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CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

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UNCLASSIFIED

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M00165A003100020022-5

TSC No. _____
 Request No.: 74-120
 Part _____ of _____
 Document Identification
 (No., Title, Date, etc.):
W.W. Rostow to McG.
Bunday, 28 Jan 1961

Classification Programs Branch
 Information Systems Analysis Staff
 Room 2E-42, Headquarters Building

REVIEW WORKSHEET

(Do not detach from document)

Expendable Copy: Yes
 No

PART I. Findings and Recommendations

- a. No objection to declassification and/or release.
- b. No objection to declassification and/or release, but clearance(s) should be obtained from the following CIA components, US agencies, or foreign governments: Office of the DCI
- c. Document is unclassified or may be declassified, but it is privileged under exemption(s) _____ of the Freedom of Information Act and, as a matter of policy, should not be made available. The Office of General Counsel (has, has not) concurred in this determination. (Go to PART II.)
- d. Declassification is impossible at this time. Applicable exemption(s) under E. O. 11652 is _____. Document may be automatically declassified on _____. (Go to PART II.)

PART II. Sanitization

- a. Sanitization is impossible or inadvisable.
- b. Sanitized version may be released provided that certain information is excised. (If "Expendable Copy," bracket material to be deleted in red. If not an "Expendable Copy," indicate material to be deleted in the space below, citing page, paragraph, line etc. Use continuation sheet if needed.)

Downgraded to _____
 when detached

Reviewer _____
 Name or Employee No. _____
 Component DDO/EA _____
 Date of Review 9 Dec. 1975

TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M00165A003100020022-5

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Request No.: 74-120
Part 2 of 5
Document Identification
(No., Title, Date, etc.):
W. W. Rostow to McG. Bundy,
"Meeting Saturday Morning
January 28, 1961 in the
President's Office, on Vietnam,"
NLK-75-3, Item 2
Expendable Copy: x Yes
 No

to:


Classification Programs Branch
Information Systems Analysis Staff
Room 2E-423 Headquarters Building
SU

REVIEW WORKSHEET

(Do not detach from document)

PART I. Findings and Recommendations

- a. No objection to declassification and/or release.
- b. No objection to declassification and/or release, but clearance(s) should be obtained from the following CIA components, US agencies, or foreign governments:
Refer to O/DCI
- c. Document is unclassified or may be declassified, but it is privileged under exemption(s) _____ of the Freedom of Information Act and, as a matter of policy, should not be made available. The Office of General Counsel has concurred in this determination. (Go to PART II.)
- d. Declassification is impossible at the time _____ Applicable exemption(s) under E. O. 11652 is _____ Document may be automatically declassified _____ Indefinite. (Go to PART II.)



PART II. Sanitization

- a. Sanitization is impossible or inadvisable.
- b. Sanitized version may be released provided that certain information is excised. (If "Expendable Copy," bracket material to be deleted in red. If not an "Expendable Copy," indicate material to be deleted in the space below, citing page, paragraph, line etc. Use continuation sheet if needed.)

Downgraded to _____ when detached

Reviewer _____ Name or Employee No. _____

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Date of Review 27 Sept 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[TOP SECRET]

WLR-153

January 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bundy

FROM: W.W.R.

SUBJECT: Meeting Saturday Morning, January 28, in the President's Office, on Viet-Nam.

1. This memorandum is designed for Mr. Bundy only. It aims to give more detail than should go into a memorandum for the record.

2. The President thanked General Lansdale for his memorandum and stated it, for the first time, gave him a sense of the danger and urgency of the problem in Viet-Nam.

3. Mr. Parsons opened by describing the problems which had emerged out of joint work between Washington and the field for a plan to reverse the course of events in Viet-Nam. Its elements are these:

a. An increase in the force levels from 150,000 to 170,000, involving additional cost to the U.S. of \$28.4 million.

b. The proposal to improve, over two years, the quality of the civil guard, involving additional cost to the U.S. of \$12.7 million.

It is hoped that these two measures, along with the measures set out below, would permit Viet-Nam to move from the defense to the offense.

c. It is proposed that there be an improved integration of civil and military resources in the Viet-Nam government, from the top to the village level, including a reduction (from the present level of 43) in the number of people reporting personally to Diem and an improvement in the executive quality of those below Diem.

d. The creation of a national planning system for the economy.

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- e. Increased centralization of governmental institutions.
- f. An improved border and coastal patrol system.
- g. Improved domestic communications.

h. It is believed the local costs of this program, aside from those suggested above, for the armed forces and the civil guard can be met by the Viet-Nam government without inflation. There is a twenty-page foreword to this plan, and we might wish to get hold of it.

4. The President then asked whether this order of magnitude of increase in the armed forces of Viet-Nam would really permit a shift from the defense to the offense. He asked whether the situation was not basically one of politics and morale.

5. It was explained that a very high proportion of total Viet-Nam forces was now penned on the front facing a Viet Minh force of 300,000.

(16/1/63) [6. The President asked whether guerrilla forces could be mounted in the Viet Minh area. It was explained that Diem had shown thus far little taste for such operations. Mr. Dulles said that four teams of eight men each had been organized for harassment; that the CIA had other notions about offensive operations; but thus far these teams had been allocated to working on a series of guerrilla pockets in the south of the country, which had moved in over the Laos border. General Lansdale said that he was familiar with the plan, as was Diem. He said that any plan that could work would require that the Vietnamese themselves become fully engaged. Diem's view was that some parts of the American plan made sense, others would be very difficult. For example, he has been able to find only three men who could bear serious executive responsibility beneath him; only three men who could make tough decisions and not simply buck them upward to himself. He also said that he believed an increment of 20,000 men to the armed forces could significantly affect the margin in the field available for counter-guerrilla operations. The Communists had just begun serious political work in the field. Their objective was to organize some kind of political front capable of bringing Diem down, which they could dominate.]

7. The President asked what his estimate of the prospects was. Lansdale replied that the Communists regard 1961 as their big year. He believed that a maximum American effort could frustrate a definitive effort in 1961 and move over into the offensive in 1962. The essentials were three: first, the Americans in Viet-Nam must themselves be infused with high morale and a will to win, and they must get close to the Vietnamese;

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secondly, the Vietnamese must, in this setting, be moved to act with vigor and confidence; third, Diem must be persuaded to let the opposition coalesce in some legitimate form rather than concentrate on the task of killing him. [It was Diem's view that there are Americans in the Foreign Service who are very close to those who tried to kill him on November 11. Lansdale found it impossible to dissuade him that this was a fact. Diem felt confidence in the Americans in the CIA and the MAAG. He had tried to persuade Diem to appoint his brother to an executive position out in the open; but Diem apparently needed the confidence of his brother's advice, given at night and in the early morning; Diem did not believe his brother had executive competence; and the loss of his brother -- perhaps in an ambassadorship -- would be a traumatic experience for Diem.]

8. Lansdale said that if Laos goes to the Communists, we might not have time to organize the turn-around required in American and Viet-Nam morale and action.

9. Mr. Dulles described the recent increase in the number of transmission stations used by the Communists to instruct the guerrillas in Viet-Nam, an increase from 11 to 29. He advocated a quick beefup of counter-guerrilla forces before the 20,000 increment was organized. He advocated a review within our government of training of foreign guerrillas, a program for which there was no clearcut line of authority. He said the MAAG organization was excellent but had no adequate provision for para-military forces. There was no clear authority in Washington; the funding problem was not clear; and the CIA was properly confined to the training of the FBI-type men to seek out and identify dangerous Communists.

10. The President again stated he wants guerrillas to operate in the north and asked what the situation there was. Mr. Dulles replied the people were unhappy and that the government was strong. The military forces consisted of over a quarter of a million men. Moscow had its men in the government bureaus; but the Chinese Communists were more widely spread about in Viet Minh territory.]

11. Mr. Rusk explained that the diplomats in Viet-Nam face an extremely frustrating task. They were caught between pressing Diem to do things he did not wish to do and the need to convey to him American support. It was a difficult balance to strike; and Diem was extremely sensitive to criticism.

[TOP SECRET]

12. The President asked whether he should write to Diem. Mr. Rusk said this would be a good idea, as a new approach by the new Ambassador. It was agreed there would be an early Presidential statement backing the effort in Viet-Nam. The President asked how do we change morale; how do we get operations in the north; how do we get moving? It was replied that the funding problem would be difficult. The emergency fund was low. We already had \$41,000,000 committed to Viet-Nam and \$30,000,000 committed to Laos. The President expressed in the meeting, as he expressed to me personally, his desire to be fully informed with respect to the emergency fund. He wishes a Viet-Nam task force set up like the Cuba task force. The question of whether General Lansdale or Mr. Kenneth Young should go to Viet-Nam as the new ambassador, was considered.

13. The President said that he wanted Mr. Bundy to make sure to get prompt action on the question of personal responsibility in Washington for the four crises areas: Viet-Nam; Congo; Laos; and Cuba. The President said we must change our course in these areas and we must be better off in three months than we are now.

14. In a conversation after the meeting with Mr. McNamara, Mr. Rusk and myself, Mr. Rusk expressed some anxiety that the development of these task forces might obtrude on the normal workings of the government. Mr. McNamara said he understood this; but for crisis situations such measures would have to be accepted.

[TOP SECRET]