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Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/12 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002400150014-8

TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 20 August 1977
Approved For Release 2004/03/12

CIA-RDP80M00165A02400150014-8

TO: A/DCI/PA

ROOM NO.	BUILDING
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REMARKS:

FROM: DCI

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Executive Registry
77-5363/A

P. G. Young

August 16, 1977

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: (703) 351-7676

Mr. Richard C. Bjorklund
Executive Editor
Lerner Newspapers
7519 North Ashland
Chicago, Illinois 60626

Dear Mr. Bjorklund,

Admiral Turner has asked me to thank you for your letter of August 2nd. He will be in the Chicago area in mid-November, but the schedule is still somewhat uncertain. In any event, we will be happy to cooperate if at all possible. I will give you a call when our trip plans become firm to see if we can work out a mutually agreeable date and time.

In the meantime, I am enclosing a biography of Admiral Turner and some additional information on the CIA which I hope you will find useful. Please let me know if we can assist in any other way.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Assistant to the Director
(Public Affairs)

25X1

Enclosures
Biography of Admiral Turner
Central Intelligence Agency Information Kit

A/DCI/PAO:HEHetu/mee
Distribution
Orig - Addressee w/encls

STAT

[Redacted Box]

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FOR *Pub Affs*)

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip

PA

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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2	DDCI				
3	S/MC				
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Remarks:

(pls log out - fa)

Executive Secretary

12 Aug


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7519 North Ashland Chicago IL 60626 312 761-7200

Executive Registry
77-5363



August 2, 1977

Admiral Stanfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Admiral Turner:

Our publisher, Louis Lerner, met with you today and passed on to us the word that you are a Highland Parker and that you will be in Chicago later this year.

We are eager to have a hometown interview with you, one that would cover your residency in Highland Park, your military career and the challenges of your present position.

Please have your staff contact us about the dates of your upcoming visit to the Chicago area and we will arrange our schedule to the time you have available.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Bjorklund
Executive Editor

RCB:ek

cc: Lou Lerner

15 AUG 1977

LINCOLN/BELMONT BOOSTER
LINCOLN PARK/
LAKEVIEW BOOSTER
NORTHCENTER/
IRVING PARK BOOSTER
THE BOOSTER-MAIL EDITION
SKYLINE
THE SUNDAY BOOSTER

UPTOWN NEWS
RAVENSWOOD/LINCOLNITE
RAVENSWOOD NEWS
ALBANY PARK NEWS
NORTH TOWN NEWS
ROGERS PARK/
EDGEWATER NEWS
THE SUNDAY STAR

HIGHLAND PARK/HIGHWOOD/
FT. SHERIDAN LIFE
DEERFIELD/LINCOLNSHIRE LIFE
NORTHBROOK/
NORTHFIELD LIFE
WHEELING/
BUFFALO GROVE LIFE
GLENVIEW LIFE
LAKE FOREST/
LAKE COUNTY LIFE

HARLEM/IRVING TIMES
HARLEM/FOSTER TIMES
SCHILLER PARK TIMES
JEFFERSON/MAYFAIR TIMES
PORTAGE PARK TIMES
LOGAN SQUARE TIMES
NORTHLAKE TIMES
FRANKLIN PARK TIMES
PROVISO TIMES
RIVER GROVE TIMES
ELMWOOD PARK TIMES
NORTHWEST SUNDAY TIMES

THE SKOKIE LIFE
LINCOLNWOOD LIFE
MORTON GROVE LIFE
THE NILES LIFE
DES PLAINES/EAST MAIN LIFE
THE SUNDAY LIFE

VOICE OF ELK GROVE VILLAGE
VOICE OF BENSENVILLE/
WOOD DALE
VOICE OF ADDISON
VOICE OF ITASCA/ROSELLE
BLOOMINGDALE/MEDINAH
VOICE OF SCHAUMBURG
VOICE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES
VOICE OF HANOVER PARK
VOICE OF STREAMWOOD
BARTLETT

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 29 Aug 77
TO: ER		
ROOM NO. 7E12	BUILDING HQS	
REMARKS: For your files.		
FROM: O/D CI/B. Pindar		
ROOM NO. 347	BUILDING E00	
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55	REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.	

STAT



Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
(703) 351-7676

Herbert E. Hatu
Assistant for Public Affairs

8-15-77

MFR

Told Mr. Fulber -
DCI not available in
September - or for foreseeable
future due to very congested
schedule —

HEH

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

Public Affairs

STAT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

original of

Re attached invitation -- you have this to give to DCI. Mr. Fulker called me on 10 August to see if we knew whether DCI could do this; I said DCI was out of the city until 19 August. Fulker explained that they need to get letters out early to ensure a large crowd; he asked if there were any way to get an earlier decision. I said the only thing I could do for him is to ask Mr. Hetu to call him next week but that I was not sure Mr. Hetu would even be able to give him an answer. I have passed this message on to Mr. Hetu's office; suggest you call him to see what action he takes.

Barbara
12 Aug 77

Date

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

STAT

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AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Suite 227, National Press Building, Washington, D.C. 20045



National Capital Area Chapter

202/447-3247

Executive Registry
77-5382

August 8, 1977

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Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

The National Capital Area Chapter of ASPA would be delighted if you would accept our invitation to speak at the Chapter's September luncheon meeting. We are interested in hearing your views on the management of the U.S. intelligence community.

Previous speakers have included Alan Campbell, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission and a member of ASPA; William Coleman, then Secretary of Transportation; Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, also an ASPA member and Past President; and William Proxmire, Senator from Wisconsin.

To accommodate your busy schedule, we are suggesting three alternative dates for your consideration: Wednesday, September 7; Thursday, September 8; or Wednesday, September 21. Our preference is September 21.

The meeting will be held at Hogates Restaurant, 9th Street and Maine Avenue, S.W.

Luncheon will be served promptly at 12 noon, preceded by cocktails at 11:30 a.m. The meeting will begin at approximately 12:30, to allow sufficient time for your remarks and for a question and answer period. We like to adjourn between 1:30 and 1:45 p.m.

We are enclosing some ASPA materials for your information: the latest issue of Public Administration Review; a copy of the October 1976 monthly newsletter "News and Views," in which President Carter and then President Ford, as candidates, addressed the public administration community on "The Management of the American Governmental System;" an ASPA brochure which outlines ASPA's programs and activities; and an organization chart.

Public Affairs

Turner - page 2

The National Capital Area Chapter has 2200 members, many of whom are top-level career public servants who are key to implementing all new policies and programs.


Through our programs we try to provide a forum on timely new policies and programs. Through our newsletter your remarks will reach hundreds of additional officials in all government agencies.

We hope you will be able to speak to us in September. Given the time needed for publicity, we would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible. I will call your office on August 10 for a reply.

Should you need any further information, call me on 447-3247, or at home on 971-6354.

Thank you for your consideration of our invitation.

Sincerely,



Edmund N. Fulker
President

Enclosures

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news & views

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Volume 26, No. 10

OCTOBER 1976

In September, *P.A. News and Views* invited Presidential Candidates Carter, Ford, Maddox, and McCarthy to submit brief statements on the topic, "The Management of the American Governmental System." Candidates Carter and Ford submitted statements prepared specifically for *P.A. News and Views*. Candidate McCarthy submitted a press release and an excerpt from a previous speech dealing with the subject, and Candidate Maddox thanked *P.A. News and Views* for the opportunity, but said he did not have the time nor the staff to reply.

The following are the statements of three presidential candidates on:

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM



Jimmy Carter

On the campaign trail, a lot of promises are made by candidates for public office to improve economy and efficiency in government if they are elected. This pledge has a natural appeal to the financially overburdened taxpayer. But when winning candidates take office, they too often find that it's easier to talk about economy and efficiency in government than to accomplish it. I would like to share with you some of my ideas on how to carry out improved management of the federal government.

The basic difficulty facing the federal government today cuts across all other campaign issues. National problems and the government programs and agencies intended to deal with them have become incredibly complex. To begin with, the federal government is ill-equipped to deal with a

See CARTER, page 3




President Gerald Ford

I commend the members of the American Society for Public Administration for your excellent work in helping to improve public management. I especially note with satisfaction your educational programs and efforts to exchange useful management information and experience with federal, state, and local governments.

The term "management" was not in use at the time of the framing of the Constitution, yet it is clear that management is what the drafters had in mind when they vested the President with the general executive powers and charged him to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" (Art. II, Sec. 3). This "take care" clause conveys particularly well the fundamental responsibility of the President with respect to the management functions of planning, organizing, actuating, co-

See FORD, page 3



Eugene McCarthy

WASHINGTON, D.C., September 23, 1976 — Independent presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy today characterized the Carter energy program as misconceived and inadequate. Said McCarthy, "There should be no separate department of energy since energy supplies, needs and use must be a part of general resources policy, which neither Ford nor Carter have." McCarthy continued, "The need is for a Department of Resources which would include, along with energy, agricultural production (not marketing), forestry, mines and minerals."

The Resources Department would be according to a projected reorganization plan being prepared by the independent McCarthy. He would propose to reorganize the Executive Branch of the government into five basic departments. The other four would be:

See MCCARTHY, page 3



Were You There?

(Being an inquiry into the birth of ASPA and attendant matters)

One of the advantages of ASPA's new membership information system is the ability to determine, with the push of a computer button, the date that various Society members came into the organization.

ASPA must be doing something right these days, because so many people seem to want to associate themselves with our founding days. In fact, ASPA staffers often hear from members who claim that they participated in the Society's organizational meeting and are charter members. However, to quote one former ASPA president, if every person who claims to have been in on the founding meeting had actually been there, there wouldn't have been a room big enough in the hotel to hold them all!

Anyhow, at the request of Charter Member Albert R. Rathert of Walnut Creek, California, we asked the computer to come up with all current members who have starting membership dates of 1939 or 1940. The machine came up with 47 names of such original members, which are listed later in this article.

Historical Background

As a bit of historical background, the "founding session" of ASPA was described by Donald C. Stone, a former ASPA president and Society historian, in his article "Birth of ASPA — A Collective Effort in Institution Building" published in the January/February 1975 issue of the *Public Administration Review*.

According to the article, 700 invitations were sent out for an organizing conference which was held December 27 and 28, 1939, at the Wardman Park Hotel in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. It is interesting to note that the 1976 ASPA National Conference, attended by more than 2,500 persons, was held in the same hotel, now known as the Sheraton Park Hotel.

Approximately 250 persons participated in this first ASPA conference. To quote Dean Stone's article:

"An overflow turnout gathered at the opening luncheon, chaired by Louis Brownlow. Professor Leonard D. White of the University of Chicago described the British Institute of Public Administration with special reference to its applicability to the American scene. Luther Gulick, the major theoretician for the new society, outlined the case for it. Dean Mosher [Dean William E. Mosher of the Maxwell

School at Syracuse University] then reported on the steps already taken and 'indicated the desirability and advantages to those broadly interested in public administration of a permanent society.' He made sure that everyone had a copy of the proposed constitution and set the stage for formal action in the evening."

That evening, after an afternoon of panel sessions and a meeting of the Organization Committee where the membership dues were set at \$5 for full members, the constitution was adopted, a slate of officers elected, including Dean Mosher as the first president, and the new organization was born.

According to Dean Stone's article, about 150 persons applied for membership during the two-day conference.

Because ASPA membership records were kept by hand until recently, and it is possible that during the computer conversion some founding dates were dropped, the following list contains only the names of those for whom we have 1939 or 1940 joining dates and continuous membership since that time. Now here's your chance for ASPA immortality (although we'll probably be bringing rainclouds down on our own heads). If your name is not on the list and you can demonstrate you are a founding member *with continuous membership since 1939 or 1940*, please let us know so that we can make our records more complete.

Current ASPA Founding Members

Lyndon Abbott, G. Lyle Belsley, George C. Benson, Horatio Bond, John J. Corson, Edwin J. Crockin, J. Lyle Cunningham, Manlio F. DeAngelis, Marshall Dimock, G. Homer Durham, Rowland Egger, William O. Farber, James Fesler, Bernard L. Gladieux, Luther Gulick, Rolf N. Haugen.

Daniel Kurshan, John D. Larkin, George W. Lawson, Kendall I. Lingle, Elwin A. Mauck, William F. McCandless, Clifton McCleskey, Frederick C. Mosher, Lionel V. Murphy, Holtan P. Odegard, Emery E. Olson, Enar B. Olson, William W. Parsons, Don K. Price, C.H. Pritchett, Albert R. Rathert, Robert H. Rawson.

Emmette S. Redford, Leonard Reichle, Henry Reining, Jr., Harold Seidman, Irving E. Sheffel, Lloyd M. Short, Elmer B. Staats, O. Glenn Stahl, Donald C. Stone, Harold A. Stone, Stephen Sweeney, Carl W. Tiller, Paul P. Van Riper, and Robert A. Walker.

Volume 26, No. 10

ASPA News & Views

OCTOBER 1976

Published monthly. ©1976 by the American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036. 1976 subscription: \$12.00. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices.

Editor: Keith F. Mulrooney

Director of Communications: Barbara Byers Judd

P.A. News & Views Advisory Group: Raymond Bancroft, Leigh Grosenick, Edward Pazicky, and Wanda C. Woolcot.

PA NEWS & VIEWS, OCTOBER 1976

CARTER, from page 1

growing number of problems that transcend departmental jurisdictions. For example, foreign and domestic issues are becoming more interrelated; domestic prosperity and international relations are affected by our foreign agricultural policy, by raw materials and oil policies, and by our export policies, among others. *We must develop a policy-making and management machinery that transcends narrow perspectives and deals with complex problems on a comprehensive, systematic basis.*

In addition, the proliferation of programs and agencies, particularly in the past ten years, has inevitably created duplications, waste, and inefficiencies. There are over 83 federal housing programs, 302 federal health programs, and over 1,200 assorted commissions, councils, boards, committees, and the like. *We must undertake a thorough revision and reorganization of the federal bureaucracy, its budgeting system, and the procedures for analyzing the effectiveness of its services.*

The first step is to reshape the way we make federal spending decisions. *The federal government should be committed to requiring zero-base budgeting by all federal agencies.* Each program, other than income support programs such as social security, should be required to justify both its continued existence and its level of funding. We need to continue and expand programs that work and to discontinue those that do not. Without such a comprehensive review, it will be difficult to assess priorities and impossible to redirect expenditures away from areas showing relatively less success.

The heart of zero-base budgeting is decision packages, which are prepared by managers at each level of government, from the top to the bottom. These packages cover every existing or proposed function of activity of each agency. The packages include analysis of the cost, purpose, alternative courses of action, measures of performance, consequences of not performing the activity, and benefits.

See CARTER, page 4

FORD, from page 1

ordinating, and controlling, which are the necessary consequences of faithful and efficient execution of the nation's laws governing Executive Branch activities.

Over the course of almost 200 years, the role of the federal government has expanded and grown more complex. Each year new laws are passed by Congress which make the jobs of both the Congress and President more demanding. This is a direct reflection of what has happened in the country — the United States is a far larger, more complicated nation than that perceived by the founding fathers, and it demands a far more sophisticated federal government to administer national affairs.

Each President must cope with this complexity within the continuing constitutional framework of checks and balances. As President, I have pursued a broad range of initiatives in a constant effort to improve the quality of management in the federal government. My commitment to improved management of the governmental system is fully demonstrated in my legislative and budget programs. A few examples illustrate that commitment:

- I have proposed reform of the regulatory process to make regulatory agencies more effective and efficient in order to better serve the needs of the American people.

- I have placed increased emphasis on improving management in connection with the annual budget process. The yearly instructions to the agencies on developing their budget recommendations now require the agencies to do a better job in identifying program objectives, reducing paperwork, and assessing effects of inflation.

- I placed before the Congress in January legislative proposals to consolidate 58 categorical programs into four block grants. Together these 58 programs account for over \$18 billion in federal spending for health, education, social services, and child nutrition. The defects in these programs and the obvious need for reform have been well documented.

PA NEWS & VIEWS, OCTOBER 1976

McCARTHY, from page 1

—Commerce, which would include agricultural marketing, transportation, banking, regulatory agencies, postal services, housing, and labor.

—Justice, largely as now operating, with additional responsibility in the handling of tax cases.

—Foreign Affairs, which would include both State Department and military operations.

—Finance Department.

Finally, Eugene McCarthy would limit the number of independent executive offices which are self-contained and can be operated outside normal channels to those principally concerned with state, local, and federal government relationships.

* * * * *

The following are excerpts from an address given by Senator McCarthy to the 4th Annual AFL-CIO National Conference on Community Services in Chicago, Illinois, on June 1, 1959:

"We are guided by the fundamental rule of social philosophy, the principle of subsidiarity: that government should leave to individuals and private groups those functions which they can efficiently perform for themselves. But at the same time we must realize the right, the duty, of government to intervene when basic human welfare is at stake."

- I have directed a comprehensive review of energy organization to assure the most effective long-term structure for managing energy and energy-related functions. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 established the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Energy Administration Act established the Federal Energy Administration to deal with the oil embargo and the energy crisis. It is generally recognized, however, that these actions were interim measures and that a more comprehensive plan would be necessary to deal with the entire range of federal energy problems.

- I have placed increased emphasis on intergovernmental relations

See FORD, page 4

CARTER, from page 3

These packages are then ranked in order of importance against other current and new activities, as a basis for determining what functions and activities are to be recommended for funding in the new budget.

Besides placing priority on spending programs and revealing more information about actual governmental operations, zero-base budgeting achieves one more important action: it forces planning into levels of government where planning may never have existed. It forces all levels of government to find better ways of accomplishing their missions.

Second, we must commit ourselves to a greater reliance upon long-term planning budgets. I propose that we adopt a three-year rolling budget technique to facilitate careful, long-term planning and budgeting. Too many of our spending decisions are focused just beyond our noses on next year's appropriations. "Uncontrollable" spending is only uncontrollable in the short run; spending can be controlled if the planning system builds in more lead time. The three-year rolling budget technique will also permit businessmen and public officials at the state and local levels to do a much better job in laying out their own plans, relying less on the need for more elaborate proposals of comprehensive planning.

Third, reforming the budget and planning process will not be enough unless we are also committed to insuring that programs are carried out with efficiency. Improving government's performance will require action on at least two other levels. We must undertake the basic structural reforms necessary to streamline federal operations and to make the government efficient once again. And we need increased program evaluation. Many programs fail to define with any specificity what they intend to accomplish. In Georgia, we applied rigorous performance standards and performance auditing. Such standards, which are working in state capitols around the nation and in successful businesses, should be adapted for use in federal departments and agencies.

Fourth, we must take steps to help

insure that we have an open and honest government as well as an efficient and effective government. *An all-inclusive "Sunshine Law," similar to those passed in several states, should be implemented in Washington.* With narrowly defined exceptions, meetings of federal boards, commissions, and regulatory agencies should be opened to the public. *Broad public access, consonant with the right of personal privacy, should be provided to government files.*

The activities of lobbyists must be much more thoroughly revealed and controlled, both with respect to Congress and the Executive departments and agencies. Quarterly reports of expenditures by all lobbyists who spend more than \$250 in lobbying in any three-month period should be required. *The sweetheart arrangement between regulatory agencies and the regulated industries must be broken up, and the revolving door between them should be closed.* Federal legislation should restrict the employment of any member of a regulatory agency by the industry being regulated for a set period of time.

Thus our first priority must be to improve both the process and structure of government. We seek a government that is efficient and effective, open and honest, and compassionate in achieving justice and meeting our critical national needs. Reorganization is not a dry exercise of moving around boxes in an organizational chart. It is a creative venture toward the better direction of the energies and resources of our government.

The reform I am seeking is not a retreat; it is a marshalling of our resources to meet the challenges of the last quarter of this century. The problem is not that program goals are unworthy; it is not that our public servants are unfit. What is at fault is that the structure and process of our government have not kept up with the times and a changing society.

In our fast moving world, the relationships among societal factors are indeed difficult to understand. Increases in world population, food shortages, environmental deteriora-

See **CARTER**, page 5

FORD, from page 3

through improved policy guidance and strengthening the Federal Regional Councils. I look to the Federal Councils as a major force in our efforts to make government more efficient and responsive to the needs of the American people.

- I have proposed reform of the so-called Impact Aid Program. This initiative would ensure that school districts that are adversely affected by federal activities would receive offsetting support. At the same time, my proposal would not provide support where there are ancillary economic benefits provided through a federal presence or where there is no true burden resulting from federal activities.

- I have directed the establishment of a management orientation program for non-career executives who are new to the Executive Branch. The program has been established and is currently operational. This is a White House/OMB/Civil Service Commission enterprise which, through seminars and special reading materials, ensures that non-career executives, as they take office, are very well informed about how the Executive Branch and its central staff institutions work at the top level.

These are but a few of many, many examples where specific action has been proposed or taken to improve the governmental system. Perhaps the most important part of the total effort is our continuing work with the departments and agencies to "build in" effective management principles and practices in their major programs. Using the budget process, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars, and a variety of other techniques, we seek better program planning, clearer definition of program objectives, detailed, well-designed implementation plans and procedures, effective evaluation of programs, tighter financial controls, and improved management systems to support decision making.

The ongoing Presidential Management Initiatives effort, for which I have charged the Director of OMB to

See **FORD**, page 5

Federal Employment Application Forms Eliminate Questions on Organization Memberships

Applicants for positions with the federal government will no longer be required to answer questions pertaining to membership in organizations when they fill out Standard Form 171 and other applications for federal employment, the U.S. Civil Service Commission has announced.

The decision to discontinue using the questions followed extensive consultation with the Justice Department, the Commission noted. Although revised several times, the questions have been held by the courts to be overbroad in that routine use of the questions for all applicants encroaches on rights of association which are protected by the First Amendment.

Historically, questions regarding affiliation with organi-

zations were designed to elicit information regarding membership in the Communist Party or other totalitarian organizations. The Commission noted that the decision to drop the so-called loyalty questions from federal employment applications does not lessen the Commission's responsibility during the course of the required investigative process to inquire into, and resolve, any question of loyalty with respect to federal applicants and appointees.

The questions will be deleted from application forms when they are revised, the Commission announced. In the meantime, instructions have been sent to Commission examining offices to inform all applicants in writing not to answer those questions on existing forms.

CARTER, from page 4
tion, depletion of irreplaceable commodities, trade barriers and price disruptions, arms buildups, arguments over control of the seas, and many other similar problems are each one serious in itself, but each has a complicating effect on the others.

As I stated at the outset, we must develop a policy-making and management machinery that transcends narrow perspectives and deals with complex problems on a comprehensive, systematic basis. Whether the

issue is the cities, tax reform, energy, or transportation, *I am committed to forging a federal government which can successfully manage the modern complexities of America's third century.*

FORD, from page 4

provide leadership, is an illustration of this point. At my direction, nearly all departments and agencies are currently seeking ways to improve their decision-making processes and organizational structures, to obtain better evaluations

of their programs, to reduce the burdens imposed by federal reporting and regulations, to hold down overhead costs, to increase the use of the private sector in carrying out program functions, and to improve personnel management. These steps may appear unexciting to those who are constantly looking for dramatic new policy initiatives, but in the long run, the key to effective government is to make the programs we already have live up to their promise, by conducting them in an efficient and effective manner.

THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET: ISSUES AND QUESTIONS

BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, JR., a federal career executive with over 13 years' White House service, has written a provocative paper . . . one that will remain a landmark in the field for years to come.

Inside this remarkable work you will read:

- How should department heads be selected? What are the attributes a President looks for? What is their relative importance?
- Cabinet officers are torn in many directions by forces which demand attention and deference. What are they?
- The Presidential staff and cabinet members tend to have markedly different perspectives. What is the significance of this?
- Cabinet officers have to work together. What are the methods and which ones are most effective?
- President and Cabinet together. How did earlier Presidents regard their Cabinet meetings? What were the Eisenhower innovations? How did they work and in what four ways were they effective? What are the three basic modes of a President using his Cabinet?

Send \$4.00 (ASPA member price \$3.50) to Publications Business Manager, American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Please send _____ copy(s) of THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET.

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New HEW Guidelines Pending on Prohibiting Discrimination Because of Physical Handicaps

The Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has proposed new regulations, expected to become effective in early 1977, designed to fulfill its responsibility under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to insure that programs and activities funded by HEW are free of unfair discrimination on the basis of a handicap condition.

The section provides that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

Section 504 is similar to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. It differs, however, from both these civil rights statutes in that it applies to discrimination based on handicap. It differs from Title IX in that it applies to all programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance, and from Title VI in the extent to which it applies to employment practices.

There are a wide variety of recipients of HEW-administered federal financial assistance including approximately 16,000 elementary and secondary school districts, 2,700 higher education institutions, 7,000 hospitals, 4,000 skilled nursing facilities, and almost all state and local agencies dealing with health, education or welfare.

The Department's May 17, 1976, *Federal Register* notice resulted in over 300 written comments directed to a wide range of issues raised by the proposed regulations, ranging from the question of what constitutes "reasonable accommodation" actions to allow a handicapped person to perform, to the question of what steps funding recipients must take to make handicapped persons with impaired sensory or speaking skills aware of available social services.

Wide Variety of Opinion

While the comments received reflected little disagreement over the goals of the proposed regulations, as might be expected, there was a wide variety of opinion over the question of what measures should be employed to achieve the goals. For example, at least one federal agency, the U.S. Civil Service Commission, submitted comments indicating a belief that one proposed regulation would not only be impractical, if adopted, but also might actually serve to undermine the objective of eliminating employment criteria which may unfairly discriminate against the handicapped. Section 84.13 (a), which is almost identical to the parallel section of the Title IX regulation and to the EEOC regulations, provides that no test criterion for employment that has a disproportionate, adverse effect on the employment of handicapped persons or any class of handicapped persons may be used unless it has been validated as a predictor of performance in the position in question and

alternative tests that do not have such a disproportionate effect are unavailable. This standard is based upon the principle established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In its comments in response to HEW's May 17, 1976, notice, the Commission recommended against any proposal to pattern employment selection guidelines for handicapped persons along those established under Title VII by EEOC for minorities and women, strongly recommended against adoption of section 84.13 as presently drafted, and cited several problems with the proposed approach.

The Commission argued that without sufficient numbers of handicapped individuals in the work force and candidate population it is impossible statistically to determine whether there is an adverse effect. The problem of determining who among the candidate population and work force are handicapped was also cited as a drawback. Furthermore, the Commission argued, the problem is compounded by the different and sometimes multiple disabling conditions which are considered separately, since the extent and even existence of adverse affect for an examination depends largely on the nature of the handicap. The Commission feels that if this is indeed a proper interpretation of the proposed regulation, that reasonable criteria for making determinations will not be available.

Another problem cited by the Commission was the possibility that the necessity of defending the validity of selection methods, even when affirmative action is taking place, may result in the adoption by employers of a defensive posture rather than a positive, cooperative one. For example, employers may resist restructuring jobs so that handicapped persons can perform the duties that comprise the essential nature of the work. In the Commission's view, if the job substance is altered, the validation would have to be redone, and an average cost for a predictive validity study may be over \$40,000 per job.

The staffs of both the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health Education and Welfare and the Civil Service Commission planned to meet in late September to clarify further their positions and attempt to arrive at a workable, effective means of insuring equal employment opportunity for handicapped individuals.

Reasonable Accommodation

Many of the more than 300 comments received by HEW pertained to "reasonable accommodation," a concept which represents an attempt to draw the line between persons who, except for their inability to perform certain job-related tasks in the normal manner because of their handicap, would be fully qualified to perform the job in question, and persons who, despite reasonable accommodation, would be unable to perform an essential aspect of the job.

See HEW, page 18

Changing Direction of Public Employment Law

By Carl F. Goodman*

In a series of recent Supreme Court decisions — some reflecting bitter disagreement among the Justices, others such unanimity that only a summary order or *per curiam* opinion was called for — the high Court this past year dramatically affected the law of public personnel administration. Most of the cases related directly to state or local employee/employer relations; and, except for a mixed record in the equal employment opportunity area and one case in the field of political belief, the employer was successful in upholding its management prerogatives. This “track record” is not without significance in and of itself, but more specifically several perceptible trends appear in the Court’s decisions.



The Court exhibited a growing concern for the right of locally elected officials to deal with personnel questions. Thus, in one case, after accepting the proposition that under local law striking school teachers are entitled to a fair hearing before discharge, the Court stressed that such a hearing must be fair and must be presided over by an unbiased adjudicator. The Justices found, however, that the locally elected school board may be sufficiently impartial for this purpose, even though it was the breakdown in teacher/board negotiations which precipitated the strike. The school board had been elected to run school district affairs and was granted authority to dismiss teachers under state law — under such circumstances the presumption of honesty and integrity of public officials carrying out their duties overcame the presumed bias arising out of the board’s intimate involvement in the strike (*Hortonville Joint School District v. Hortonville Education Ass’n*).

This disposition to uphold the management prerogatives of state and local public employees was given further expression in a decision in which the Court found that the federal government lacks authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to legislate wages and hours for state and local employees. According to the Court, internal government operation is matter reserved to state sovereignty under the 10th Amendment (*National League of Cities v. Usery* — the *NLC* case). Yet, temporary federal measures designed to combat a national emergency, such as a temporary wage freeze to deal with nationwide inflation, may be permitted.

The ripple effect of the *National League of Cities* case is as yet unknown, although it would clearly appear applicable to any federal attempt to mandate local public

employee collective bargaining or to legislate concerning strikes by such employees. Moreover, while *NLC* dealt with only one part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the logic of the opinion should be applicable to other portions of the Act such as the extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment provisions — a matter of great significance since the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts’ mandatory retirement at age 50 for police officers (*Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia*). *NLC* does not, however, completely prohibit federal legislation affecting state employment — it affects legislation passed under the authority of the Commerce Clause; legislation to carry out the Equal Protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment may be supported by the grant of legislative authority found in that Amendment, since the Amendment was expressly aimed at state action (*Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer*).

Greater Discretion to Local Officials

The greater discretion being given to local officials in employment matters is also reflected in the Court’s separation of the public employee from the public-at-large when dealing with constitutional issues. While the state may not have the authority to legislate hair length regulations applicable to the general public, such regulation is valid when applied by Suffolk County to its police force (*Kelley v. Johnson, Quinn v. Muscare*).

To successfully attach the regulation the employee must demonstrate that it “is so irrational that it may be branded as arbitrary.” This is a very difficult burden for a plaintiff to meet. It is one, however, that, while variously stated, the Court has not been reluctant to place upon public employees or applicants for public employment. For example, it also forms the basis for the Court’s action in upholding Philadelphia’s requirement that firemen be residents of the city at the time of their appointment and remain residents thereafter (*McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission*). In *McCarthy*, while not deciding the issue, the Court uses language implying that the distinction between the public employee as citizen and the public employee *qua* employee could justify legislation wherein localities require local residence for a period of time prior to public employment.

As a corollary to greater public employer discretion, the Court limited the rights of employees to hearings when claiming that actions of their public employer have resulted in a constitutional deprivation. It has been well settled that a tenured public employee is entitled to a due process hearing when discharged. The Court did not abrogate this rule, but its decision in *Bishop v. Wood* shows that it is less likely to find the existence of tenure than it has in the past. Indeed, *Bishop* appears to say that if the state courts (or lower federal courts) interpret state law or city ordinance in such a way as not to grant tenure, the Supreme Court will not interfere. Thus, a city ordinance providing for a six-month “probationary” period after which the employee

*The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Carl F. Goodman is general counsel of the U.S. Civil Service Commission and adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. He has previously served with the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of State, and was associated with the Law Firm of Surrey, Karasik and Morse.

is classified as "permanent" did not provide tenure because the district judge had held that since the ordinance made no provision for hearing, the "permanent" employee could be discharged at will (a rationale rejected by the Supreme Court in *Arnett v. Kennedy*, decided shortly after the District Court's opinion in *Bishop*).

Bishop reemphasizes that if the local legislation does not unambiguously provide for tenure, the employee may have no constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment. The point is that while the Constitution is available to protect pre-existing property rights — for example, by mandating a due process hearing to protect the "property interest" that an employee has in his or her continued tenure — it does not itself create such rights. This is left to the legislature or to the employer/employee bargaining process. The message is that the Court will protect whatever "rights" the public employee may have to continued employment, but the employee will first have to obtain those "rights" from the legislature or in some other manner. According to the Court, it is not for it to decide what tenure arrangements a public employer wishes to make with its employees.

Right to Associate

On the other hand, where a specific "core" constitutional right is involved, such as the First Amendment's Freedom to Associate, the public employer must demonstrate that its interest in effective management, etc., outweighs the employee's right to freely associate — a substantially different test from that articulated in the hair length case of *Kelley v. Johnson*. Since the public employer could not meet this burden of justification in *Elrod v. Burns*, the Court, by a bare majority, held that patronage discharges of nonpolicy-making, nonconfidential employees

because of their political beliefs is unconstitutional. *Elrod* represents a major restriction on the patronage spoils system — nonconfidential, nonpolicy-making employees who perform satisfactorily may not be discharged because of political beliefs even if they obtained their positions as a consequence of patronage hiring (the Court specifically refused to address the issue of patronage hiring). *Elrod* leaves open the question as to whether "political activity" (i.e., campaigning such as is now permitted by state and local employees under the 1974 amendments to the Hatch Act) is to be distinguished from "political belief." It must be recalled, however, that as recently as 1973 the Court upheld the right of both the federal government and state and local governments to condition continued public employment on abstention from certain forms of partisan political activity.

As it had several years earlier in regard to state employment, the Court struck down across-the-board citizenship requirements for federal employment, but with a substantially different rationale and approach. The U.S. Civil Service Commission had promulgated regulations under which federal competitive service jobs were reserved for U.S. citizens. States lack authority to legislate regarding aliens, but the federal government is given that authority by the Constitution. The U.S. Civil Service Commission's regulation was stricken because it served no valid merit system function. There are indications in the opinion that such a prohibition adopted by executive order or through legislation could be upheld. In other words, and while the Court did not definitely speak to the issue, it may be that the problem was simply that the alien employment prohibitions were promulgated by the wrong federal entity. For, the Court did clearly recognize that the federal government — as distinguished from the U.S. Civil Service Commission — does have a valid interest in the area of alien employment (*Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong*).

Equal Employment Opportunity

In the equal employment opportunity area, the Court gave federal employees the same right to a full court trial in discrimination cases as employees in the private or state employment sector (*Chandler v. Roudebush*), although federal employees must follow the procedures of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and cannot rely on other authorities (*Brown v. GSA*). In so ruling, the Court appeared to concede that full Court review of such matters is somewhat at odds with Congress' purpose in providing for administrative treatment of discrimination claims. At the same time, however, it concluded that Congress had decreed it to be such, suggesting that any anomalies that resulted were for Congress to deal with.

Finally, in *Washington v. Davis* the Court questions a long line of Court of Appeals decisions involving employment (and other) discrimination occurring prior to 1972, the date of extension of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act to state and local government employment. The

See CHANGING DIRECTION, page 18

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EXAMINATION VALIDATION SPECIALIST. Salary \$17,035-20,529. San Jose, California. Large personnel dept. needs key person for validation unit. Requires equivalent to BA in Industrial Psych or personnel selection and two yrs prof. exp. in test development and validation. Apply: City of San Jose, Personnel Dept., 801 N. 1st St., Room 207, San Jose 95110 (408) 277-4204.

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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. Salary \$17,500. Moorhead, Minnesota. Degree in planning, civil engineering or Public Administration; minimum three years exp in metropolitan and transportation planning. Ability to manage staff of approx six personnel. Ability to communicate and coordinate work activities with elected officials and technical staffs. Send resume and references to G.H. Bromenschenkel, Chairman; Fargo-Moorhead Metropolitan Council of Governments; 44 Foss Lane; Moorhead 56550.

MUNICIPAL FINANCE SPECIALIST. Salary \$1,705-2,072 per month. San Diego, California. Comprehensive Planning Organization. Duties: prepares and presents (written and oral) analyses of public financing alternatives; fiscal impacts of specific capital projects; growth and development proposals; general plans. Knowledge of local government fiscal structures, budgetary processes and federal, state and local government financial analysis guidelines. Excellent writing and public speaking skills necessary. Preferred education: Masters in Business Administration, Public Administration,

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TOWN MANAGER. Salary \$20,000 plus fringes. North Branford, Connecticut. (Population 12,000.) Town Manager appointed by 9 member Council, elected at large on a partisan basis for 2 year term. Budget approx 6 million dollars. 55 employees. Previous managerial exp highly desirable. Exp in personnel and labor relationships, public works and sewer construction program. Should have good knowledge of grants, both state and federal. Budget preparation exp. necessary. Assistant exp acceptable. Send resume to Deputy Mayor Albert A. Doyle, 493 Village Street, North Branford 06472.

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ASSISTANT SANITATION PLANT SUPERINTENDENT. Salary \$1,030-1,380 per month. Simi Valley, California. Under general supervision, assists in the operation, maint., and supervision of the District's wastewater treatment plant; keeps reports; and supervises or performs various lab tests and analyses. Requires: grad. from high school or equiv. and 4 yrs. or increasingly resp. exp. in the operation & maint. of a wastewater treatment plant; possession of a wastewater treatment plant operator's Grade III Certificate issued by State Water Resource Control Board and a valid Cal. Driver's License. Grade IV Certificate is preferable. Apply: City of Simi

Valley, 3200 Cochran Street, Simi Valley, 93065 (805) 522-1333. Filing deadline: Friday, October 28, 1976 at 5:00 p.m.

ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER. Salary \$2550-3500 per month. Berkeley, California. The City of Berkeley is seeking qualified applicants for Assistant City Manager, who works under general direction of the City Manager, acts in his/her absence and assists the City Manager in the administration and supervision of City affairs. REQ: Degree in public/business adm., accounting, economics, or closely related field plus five (5) years progressively responsible full-time broad managerial and administrative exp. Apply to: City of Berkeley, Personnel Department, 2100 Grove Street, Berkeley 94704, 644-6460.

TOWN ADMINISTRATOR. Salary negotiable. Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina. Pop. Summer 30,000; Winter 500. Budget \$500,000. Departments: Finance, Streets, Sanitation, Water, Public Safety. Further information furnished upon request. Town Clerk, P.O. Box 719, Kill Devil Hills 27948.

SENIOR PROGRAM ANALYST. Salary \$10,946-15,402. Savannah, Georgia. In Community Development agency. Responsible for developing and instituting an evaluation system for municipal programs and services. Trains and supervises staff. Capable of analysis of impact as well as outputs of programs. Strong research methods, statistical and computer background required. Bachelors in social research or related field required. Masters preferred. Resume of training and exp should be sent to the City of Savannah Personnel Office, 10 E. Bay Street, Savannah 31401.

personnel and training

PERSONNEL DIRECTOR. Salary \$17,628. Wenatchee, Washington. A sharp, aggressive, self-starter who has successfully demonstrated superior management and personnel skills is needed to develop a complete personnel administration program. Job responsibilities: administering new classification and pay plans, EEO, affirmative action, recruitment and selection, labor relations, training and safety. Job rewards: opportunity, challenge, and quality living (hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, and skiing). 4 yrs. of progressively responsible exp in 3 or more specialized areas of

personnel or as a personnel generalist. Graduate study in personnel or public administration may be substituted for some exp. Send detailed resume by October 31, 1976 to: Mr. David Thrush, Finance Director, P.O. Box 519, Wenatchee 98801 (509) 663-0551.

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL. Salary open. Concord, New Hampshire. Providing professional personnel technical assistance, training and research services to local governments. Applicants should have degree and/or experience in public personnel/labor relations, recruiting and evaluation, pay and classification systems, and training. Reply by October 30, 1976 to NHMA, PO. Box 617, Concord 03301.

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planning and community development

ASSISTANT CITY PLANNER. Salary \$17,945-23,815. Peekskill, New York. Minimum qualifications - Master's degree in planning or related field with 5 years exp or equiv combination of training and exp. Some exp in urban design preferred. Position involves working with 701 Program, \$12 million CD Program, zoning and subdivision administration, Planning Commission and Zoning Board of Appeals. Apply to Director of Planning and Development, City of Peekskill, 901 Main Street, Peekskill 10566.

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special programs

TALENT BANK. New York University's Graduate School of Public Administration maintains a talent bank of junior and senior level administrators available for immediate employment. Preferred locations vary widely. Employers seeking confidential assistance with recruitment are invited to Contact: Dr. Marcia R. Fox, Director of Student Services, 4 Washington Sq. North, New York, New York 10003 (Telephone 212-598-3285).

teaching, research

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ASSISTANT PROFESSOR. Salary \$12,392 with fringe benefits. Baltimore, Maryland. Starting February 1977. PhD. required. Teach graduate and undergraduate courses in public administration. Competence primarily in research methods, budgeting, and personnel. Send resume to Dr. Joseph Harrelson, Political Science Department, University of Maryland, Charles at Mount Royal, Baltimore 21201.

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ASSISTANT PROFESSOR. Salary open. Athens, Georgia. To teach graduate and undergraduate public administration courses. Strong background in budgeting and finance is required. Preference will be given to those with some work exp. and some knowledge of program evaluation, information systems and the use of computers in financial management. PhD or DPA or equivalent degree. Send vita, credentials and recommendations to Prof. Felix Nigro, Department of Political Science, Baldwin Hall, University of Georgia, Athens 30602.

CHAIRPERSON HEALTH SCIENCE PROGRAM. Salary open. Miami, Florida. Florida International University. The Health Science Program is an interdisciplinary area in the School of Health and Social Services. It is presently comprised of a management, education and general track but has projected many more tracks and areas of development. We are seeking a person of a generalist background with a high level of creativity and leadership ability. Any interested parties should address their application to: Chairperson, Search and Screen Committee, Health Science Program, Florida International University, Tamiami Trail, Miami 33199. Application deadline: December 3, 1976.

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OR ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR: Salary negotiable. Miami, Florida. Public Administration Program of Florida International University, Miami, has two faculty openings for 1977. Candidates should have doctorate with teaching and research experience. Particularly welcome is Latin American experience with a knowledge of Spanish and/or Portuguese, as the Program is presently engaged in overseas activities. *First Position:* Teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in public finance, budgeting and quantitative methods. *Second Position:* Teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in re-

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ASSISTANT PROFESSOR. Salary negotiable. St. Louis, Missouri. One position in Administration of Justice. January 1, 1977. Ph.D. and teaching experience preferred. Applicants who have a terminal degree plus extensive experience in an agency of justice will also be considered. Teach two courses each semester. Additional responsibilities include a heavy involvement in continuing education-community service type programming in all components of justice. The ability to communicate-cooperate with operational personnel along the complete justice spectrum essential. Contact Professor Henry Burns, Jr., Chairperson, Department of Administration of Justice, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR. Salary open. Raleigh, N.C. N.C. State University. January/August, 1977 appointment. Teaching responsibilities in manpower, human resources development, and labor relations, primarily graduate

courses in an established MPA program, but expect interest in undergraduate political science program. PhD and graduate teaching exp required. Send reference to: Dr. Jackson M. McClain, Department of Politics, North Carolina State University, P.O. Box 5305, Raleigh 27607 (919) 737-2504. Closing date of December 1, 1976.

POLICY ANALYSIS/PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Salary open. Middletown, Pa. The Pennsylvania State University, Capitol Campus, announces opening to teach undergraduate and graduate courses in public policy analysis, administration of justice, state and local government and urban affairs effective January, 1977. Background in economics and quantitative analysis desirable. Opportunities to supervise interns in the Harrisburg area. Rank open. Send vita and supporting materials to Dr. Robert J. Bresler, The Pennsylvania State University, The Capitol Campus, Middletown 17057.

FACULTY. Salary open. Fullerton, California. California State University, Fullerton (CSUF) seeks applicants for a position in Public Administration to begin in September, 1977. A specialist in public finance and/or planning would be particularly desirable. Practical experience would also be an asset. We will prefer to make an appointment at the Assistant Professor rank, but the possibility of a higher rank is not excluded. CSUF is located in northern Orange County, California, in the general Los Angeles area. It is a growing university which will enroll over 15,000 full time-equivalent students in Fall, 1976. Public Administration is an integral part of a Department of Political Science which will include more than 25 faculty. In addition to the B.A. and M.A. in Political Science we offer a bachelor's level concentration in Public Administration, and two separate M.P.A. programs, one on-campus and another sited at Orange County's Civic Center, offered primarily for mid-career public servants. All personnel policies conform with the requirements of Executive Order 11246, Title IX of the Higher Education Amendment of 1972 and other federal regulations regarding nondiscrimination. Please return application materials to: Dr. Barbara S. Stone, Chair, Department of Political Science, California State University, Fullerton 92634.

EXTENSION PROFESSOR. Salary open. Hartford, Connecticut. Institute

of Public Service, University of Connecticut. Position to be based in Hartford, Ct. with extensive travel to Nigeria and other developing countries. Serve as trainer and consultant to the Nigerian Government and other developmental countries, assessing training needs of participants in the areas of project management and public policy analysis related to economic and social development. Prepare and revise training designs and materials, conduct classes and workshops, perform administrative coordination of training projects, program development, and contract negotiation with training sponsors. MA & 9 yrs exp, or PhD, DPA, or equivalent & 7 yrs exp in project analysis and management training consultancy required. Training exp to emphasize practical understanding and use of experiential methods such as the Cloverdale method, simulation and application workshops. Program development and grantsmanship ability required. Practical understanding of human relations training "andragogy" and instructional systems design is highly desirable. Working/living exp in Africa is important. Apply to John S. Tabor, 1380 Asylum Avenue, Hartford, 06105.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH ANALYST. Salary \$1,434-1,645 per month. Peoria, Illinois. Excellent fringe benefits. Researches operational problems in the Peoria Police Department and related agencies. Assists Chief of Police and other management personnel in understanding problem solving techniques; determines program effectiveness and makes appropriate recommendations; writes and publishes professional journal articles. Requires: Bachelors Degree specializing in organizational research, systems analysis, management science or other closely related subjects with some professional exp in the field of specialization, accompanied by thorough knowledge of and skills in use of required statistical research techniques. Apply: Send resume to Personnel Office, City Hall, 419 Fulton Street, Peoria, 61602.

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR. Salary open. Chicago, Illinois. Graduate (MPA) and undergraduate Public Administration Program at Roosevelt University. Position available January, 1977. Terminal degree and teaching and administrative experience required. Applicants should have some combination of interests in: Theory, Administrative Science, Fiscal, Personnel, and one or more substantive fields such as Health, Justice, or Muni-

cipal. Applications must be received by November 1. Send vita and four letters of reference to: Director, Public Administration Program, Roosevelt University, 430 South Michigan Avenue, Chicago 60605.

URBAN POLITICS. Salary open. Norman, Oklahoma. Seeking candidate with PhD to fill tenure track Assistant Professor position in urban politics beginning January, 1977. Courses to be taught are at undergraduate and graduate levels. Prefer candidates with interest in urban policy analysis and knowledge of quantitative techniques. Additional qualifications might include interest in urban management, state government and/or urban systems. Send resume, transcripts and three letters of reference to Chairperson, Professor Hugh G. MacNiven, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, Norman 73019.

DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES AND PROGRAM EVALUATION. Salary open. Springfield, Illinois. To assume leadership of and provide direction to applied research and service activities relating to policy and policy analysis concerns of state government agencies. A joint faculty appointment in public administration with teaching responsibilities. Doctorate, related experience, and demonstrated interest in policy studies desired. Application deadline January 1, 1977. Inquiries and credentials to: Geoffrey Cornog, Sangamon State Univ., Center for Policy Studies and Program Evaluation, Springfield 62708.

HEALTH PROJECT DIRECTOR. Salary open. Medford, Massachusetts. The Lincoln Filene Center for Citizen-

ship and Public Affairs at Tufts University is seeking an individual to develop new training programs for members of citizen consumer and professional groups involved in the design and implementation of Health Care Services. This individual must understand the major policy issues effecting health care delivery systems and be capable of designing related adult education programs. Ability to raise and administer funds from public and private sources to support such programs is necessary. A graduate or professional degree is required and qualified candidates will have the professional training relevant experience and self-starting temperament both to design interdisciplinary University training programs and to adapt such programs for a variety of community groups and settings. Please submit resume and requirements in confidence to L.J. Lerner, Personnel Manager, Tufts University, Medford 02155.

DIRECTOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE. Salary \$18,000-25,000. Columbia, Missouri. The Institute of Public Administration and interdisciplinary faculty in Public Administration seeks a Director for the Public Affairs Information Service. PAIS provides research and information to government agencies, industry, faculty students and others. The Director's duties include securing contracts, managing research and information services and directing a staff of 14 professional and technicians. Current PAIS activities include the administration of an economic planning project for the State of Missouri, operation and management of a census summary tape processing center, management of

the Missouri Occupational Training Information System and several other information service and research projects. Preference will be given to individuals who possess a doctorate. Applicants should have some combination of the following abilities, programming, econometrics, statistics, public data base management, design and administration of research. The closing date for applications is November 1, 1976. Applicants should forward a resume and letters of reference to: University of Missouri-Columbia Personnel Services, 309 Hitt Street, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia 65201.

FACULTY. Salary open. Albany, New York. The School of Criminal Justice at the University at Albany, seeks to fill a faculty opening for the Fall semester of 1977, subject to final budgetary authorization. Rank and salary will be dependent upon qualifications and budget approval. Candidates are being sought who possess a PhD or JD or equivalent degree. Since the School of Criminal Justice awards only the PhD and MA degrees, faculty must have a capacity for teaching in a graduate program and a demonstrated ability to conduct sophisticated research in criminal justice as evidenced by books or articles published in referred journals. Criminal justice is defined broadly and is meant to include a variety of perspectives in law, history, and the social, political, and behavioral sciences. The closing date for applications is February 1, 1977; however, resumes should be sent as soon as possible. Resumes should be forwarded to Vincent O'Leary, Dean, School of Criminal Justice, The University at Albany, 1400 Washington Avenue, Albany 12222.

STUDENT PLANS ANNOUNCED FOR ASPA CONFERENCE


The ASPA 1977 National Conference in Atlanta, Georgia, March 20 to April 2, will contain a large number of opportunities for student personal and professional development, according to Joan Geiszler and Henry Zimmer, coordinators for student participation.

In urging students of public affairs and public administration to start making plans to attend the Conference, the coordinators cited three major areas of student emphasis: (1) the Placement Center, which will offer opportunities to contact employers from all levels of public service; (2) a panel on conferencing, scheduled at the beginning of the Conference, to introduce first-time attendees to the ASPA National Conference and explain how to best take advantage of Conference opportunities; and (3) student

involvement in panels, both in presenting papers and discussing issues. All topic area leaders have been encouraged to seek as much student participation as possible. Panel topics cover a broad spectrum of interests in public administration.

Student Housing

Students will be housed in the American Hotel, directly across the street from the Peachtree Plaza, the Conference hotel. Rooms will cost approximately \$4 to \$5 per person, with four to a room. For further information on student activities, contact Henry Zimmer, 224 Robinhood Court, Athens, Georgia 30601, or Joan Geiszler, P.O. Box 1810, Wilmington, North Carolina 28401.



Basic Documents of Public Administration

A new publication, coming along appropriately in the bicentennial year, is *Basic Documents of American Public Administration, 1776-1950*, selected and edited by Frederick C. Mosher, a long-time ASPA member and former editor of the *Public Administration Review*.

The volume undertakes to present, in chronological order, the major official documents most relevant to the development of American public administration. It is divided into four parts. Part I contains some of the basic documents of the pre-Constitutional and organizing period of the new Republic. Part II covers what the author terms the "management movement," the half-century between 1880 and 1930. This is followed by a section on the documents issued or adopted during the second term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Part IV consists of selected documents between World War II and 1949.

Each of the four parts is introduced by an editorial statement discussing the period under consideration, its temporal boundaries, and its social and political context, followed by a few sentences on each of the documents that follow, relative to their origins, precedents, rationale, and impact.

Copies of *Basic Documents of American Public Administration, 1776-1950*, published by Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., New York, are available for \$14.00 hardcover and \$6.95 paperback.

NIMLO Publishes Book on Liability of Municipal Officials

The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has just published a 349-page volume on *Tort Liability and Immunity of Municipal Officials*, designed to provide a comprehensive, authoritative statement of the current status of the law regarding personal liability of municipal officials. The volume was authored by Charles S. Rhyne, executive director; William S. Rhyne, research director; and Stephen P. Elmendorf, research assistant — all of the NIMLO staff.

Included in a section on the liability of municipal employees are discussions on judicial officers of the municipality, executive and administrative officers, city legislators, and city policemen. Other portions of the book are devoted to an introduction to the tort liability of municipal officers, a functional approach to official immunity, recent developments, and administration of tort responsibility.

Copies of *Tort Liability and Immunity of Municipal Officials* are available for \$10.00 each from the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, 839 Seventeenth Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

Canadians Produce Case Program in Public Administration

The Institute of Public Administration of Canada has initiated a case program which will produce cases and simulations designed for use in university courses and for in-service training programs at all levels of government.

The Canadian Institute expects to produce 15 cases per year over a three-year period. Each case and simulation includes a "player's manual" containing all the documentation needed for participation and an "instructor's manual," containing notes to the instructor.

Cases produced to date include *The M.T.L. Simulation — Public Sector Collective Bargaining*, by Gene R. Swimmer and Claude P. Parent of the School of Public Administration, Carleton University; and *A Conflict of Loyalties*, by Kenneth Kernaghan of the School of Administrative Studies, Brock University.

For information on the Case Program in Canadian Public Administration, write The Director, Case Program in Canadian Public Administration, Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 897 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 1Z7, Canada.

Progress Reported in Environmental Protection

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has reported that a total of 6,702 formal enforcement actions in the air, pesticides, noise, and water pollution program areas were initiated by the Agency during the period from December 1, 1974, to December 31, 1975. This brings the total number of such actions taken in EPA's five years of operation to nearly 13,000.


Of the 6,702 formal enforcement actions, 36 per cent involved cases where compliance was obtained or underway without resorting to criminal or civil proceedings; 36 per cent related to cases in which administrative and formal court or agency proceedings were pending or results not yet reported; and 28 per cent were cases which required formal civil or criminal court proceedings or agency civil proceedings. The resulting penalties/fines amounted to \$1,382,608, bringing the total fines and penalties imposed by EPA-initiated actions during the five-year period to \$9,932,841.

In addition to directly initiated actions, EPA is also involved in supporting environmental enforcement activities by state and local governments.

The types of actions involved in the individual program areas, the names of the entities against whom EPA initiated enforcement actions, and other key information concerning each action are provided in *EPA Enforcement, A Progress Report, December 1974 to December 1975*, which may be obtained from the EPA Public Information Center, PM-215, Washington, D.C. 20460.

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ADMINISTRATION IN SOCIAL WORK

...the quarterly journal of human services management

EDITOR:
Simon Slavin, Ed.D., ACSW
 Dean, School of Social Administration
 Temple University

ADMINISTRATION IN SOCIAL WORK is the first journal devoted entirely to administration, supervision, and management in social work and human services. Articles aim to help social work administrators, sub-executives, and middle-managers improve their practice and methods of administration.

Topics cover case methods in administration; theoretical articles; applying management theory and practice to the social work setting; and the practical aspects of administering social work and social welfare agencies and departments.

Additional topics include:

- effective relations with agency boards
- strategies for organizational change
- introducing innovative methods of organization
- relating effectively to staff
- problems in fund-raising and fiscal management
- grantsmanship for the social work administrator
- recruiting board members and delegating board responsibilities
- dealing with host institutions

Articles in the journal will also be geared to the interests of social work educators and trainers (and their students) in schools of social work and other schools concerned with the development of careers in administration and management.

The Journal will also provide articles on social work administration in socially advanced countries (such as in Scandinavia). Because administration is so closely related to social planning and policy development, the Journal will also present articles that bear upon these interrelated areas.

Vol. I, No. 1 - Spring 1977
 Price: \$20 for individuals; \$32 for libraries & agencies

■ AUTHOR'S GUIDE TO JOURNALS IN PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY & SOCIAL WORK

Edited by Allan Markle, Ph.D. & Roger C. Rinn, Ph.D.

Here is the first comprehensive guide to more than 425 "core" journals in psychology, psychiatry, and social work.

Detailed information on each journal includes:

- publication lag time
- topics the editor prefers
- topics the editor usually rejects
- early publication options
- review period lag time

...and other important facts that an author *should* know before he or she submits a manuscript for consideration. Almost all of the information provided in this guidebook is not available in the journals themselves.

Price: \$12.95 (Fall 1976)

Periodicals of Related Interest

- **SOCIAL WORK IN HEALTH CARE**
 This journal is devoted to practice, research, administration, and theory of medical and psychiatric social work in hospitals, psychiatric clinics, and other health care settings. Also included are articles relating to the psychological and social aspects of physical disability and disease. Vol. I, No. 1 - Fall 1976
 Price: \$15 for individuals; \$30 for libraries & institutions
- **CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES**
 A new "current awareness" newsletter for all professionals working with children & youth in settings of all types. Provides rapid abstracts from the fields of psychiatry, child care, social work, psychology, nursing, law, and health--AND the authors' addresses for reprint requests. Vol. I, No. 1 - Jan 1977
 Price: \$14 for individuals; \$24 for libraries, institutions & agencies
- **OFFENDER REHABILITATION**
 A new professional journal devoted to all aspects of offender rehabilitation, including psychiatric, psychological, and social work services for prisoners and ex-offenders. Articles also deal with effectiveness of probation & parole, recidivism, diversion programs, and alternatives to incarceration. Vol. I, No. 1 - Fall 1976
 Price: \$16 for individuals; \$30 for libraries & institutions
- **COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW**
 This new type of "current-awareness" newsletter provides current abstracts of journal articles relating to community mental health, from the major journal literature of psychiatry, psychology, social work, rehabilitation, sociology, and health care. The authors' mailing addresses are included so that readers can request reprints of needed articles. Other features include a major review article in each issue, covering a critical area in community mental health, and tables of contents of new books. Vol. I, No. 1 - Jan 1976
 Price: \$14 for individuals; \$24 for libraries, institutions, and agencies

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Progress Is Being Made on Publications Committee Recommendations

Considerable progress has been made in recent months in implementing the recommendations of the ASPA Publications Committee, presented to the National Council last December. At that time, the Council voted to accept the report, adopt those recommendations which did not have financial implications, and refer the items with financial implications to the appropriate committees of the Society for consideration in the 1976-77 budget.

The following April, when the 1976-77 budget was under consideration, the Publications Committee requested a budget allocation of \$47,000 – \$25,000 to expand *P.A. News and Views* coverage by adding a full-time staff person; \$12,000 to expand *Public Administration Review* coverage by adding 96 pages per year or the equivalent of one additional issue; and \$10,000 for expanded publications activity. Of this total allocation, and due to budgetary limitations, the Finance and Administration Committee recommended and the National Council voted an expenditure of \$8,000 to increase the size of the *Review* by 64 pages.

Although additional funding for publications has been very limited, many of the Publications Committee's recommendations have been achieved. The recommendations fall into four distinct groups: (1) *P.A. News and Views*, (2) *Public Administration Review*, (3) Special Publications Services, and (4) Publications Advisory Group. Listed below is a brief rundown of the progress that has been made in each of these areas:

P.A. News and Views

Although no additional funding was made available to add a full-time staff member to *P.A. News and Views*, many of the recommendations of the Publications Committee are currently being implemented. Three new services were recommended to be added immediately to the newsletter. These services were determined as the result of a study of ASPA members conducted by Publications Committee Member Thomas Vocino to learn what features *P.A. News and Views* readers wanted to be added to their newsletter.

"1. *Government Update*. Quite brief reports of most significant federal, state, and local government developments, reports, and publications are needed." General items in this area have always been included in *P.A. News and Views*; however, in recent months a greater effort has been made to publish more items of current developments. The review of Supreme Court decisions in the personnel field in this issue, the articles by Alan Beals, Charles and William Rhyne, and Jerry Wurf on the Fair Labor Standards Act Decision, and the analysis of the Sharon Report on alleged merit system abuse within the U.S. Civil Service Commission during the Nixon Administration are examples of this new emphasis. And of course, a publication couldn't get much timelier during the national election campaign than by publishing articles by the presidential candidates. ASPA

members are encouraged to suggest subjects for future feature articles.

"2. *Administrators' Bookshelf*. Quite brief notes on current books (and possibly periodicals) are needed." In this issue, for the first time, we are bringing together brief reports on new books and reports of interest to administrators under the Practitioner's Bookshelf heading. This feature will be run in succeeding issues as a number of brief reports are available.

"3. Practitioners' Exchange. Short reports of current practices and developments of general practitioner interests in administration are needed." Some items in this area have been published; however, in the future greater efforts will be made to establish a network of practitioner writers or advisors to give greater input.

The Publications Committee also recommended a P.A. News and Views Advisory Group to consult with the executive director and the professional ASPA staff who produce the newsletter "with respect to improvements in format and style, general content, and such specifics as may be required by the professional staff." President Nesta Gallas has appointed the following advisory group: Raymond L. Bancroft, Public Information Office, Bureau of the Census, and former managing editor of *Nation's Cities Magazine*; Leigh Grosenick, director, Graduate Program in Public Administration, Virginia Commonwealth University; Edward P. Pazicky, staff personnel representative, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; and Wanda C. Woolcot, director, Public Affairs, the University of Alaska. A fifth member is still to be named to this group.

Public Administration Review

In addition to funding for the 64 new pages per year, other improvements to PAR are planned or under way. The Publications Committee agreed that "increasing quality must remain the hallmark of PAR as the principal journal of the discipline of public administration." It further noted that practitioner needs merit specific, continued attention, particularly with respect to writing styles and format. The committee recommended that existing PAR guidelines for writers and symposia editors be revised to stress PAR's interest in straightforward English and professional journal style. Work is now being done on the revision of the guidelines, and future issues of PAR will feature this emphasis on clarity in writing.

The committee also recommended the increase in publication capacity, with additional space allocated to practitioner-oriented materials which meet quality standards. A meeting was held in Washington at the end of September with PAR Editor-in-Chief Dwight Waldo, ASPA staff members, and several practitioners to start working out the details of a practitioner-oriented section of PAR which will be started early in 1977, utilizing some of the additional 64 pages voted in the 1976-77 ASPA budget.

Special Publications Services

The Publications Committee also recommended a series of special publications activities to be provided and/or considered as ASPA professional services, generally as cost-centered or revolving-fund activities.

In July the Executive Committee of the National Council approved a recommendation by the executive director to establish a cost center for publication services, promotion, and advertising and to employ a business manager for publications. The Executive Committee authorized a working fund loan of up to \$20,000 from ASPA reserves for three years repayable at the median interest rate of other ASPA investments at the time of repayment, but with first priority given to current income from expanded membership as a source of funds. In September Nicholas Gorski was hired as publications business manager.

One of the first actions of the new publications business manager was to launch a campaign to obtain increased advertising in the annual National Conference program and in the *Public Administration Review*. In addition, it was decided that effective immediately, *P.A. News and Views* would also carry advertising. This current issue is the first to carry such material. Also in the planning stage is a promotional campaign to increase the sale of ASPA publications and hopefully establish enough additional finances to produce special publications, such as a collection of previously published PAR articles on a given topic.

Also in the area of special publication services, the following recommendations of the Publications Committee have already been put into effect:

1. *Reprints of PAR articles should be made available.* Copies of single *Review* articles are now available for \$1.00 for one copy, 75 cents each for two to nine copies, and 50 cents each for 10 or more copies of the same article.

2. *A coordinated publications list should be published.* Such a list was published in June and is now being sent to each ASPA member with his or her renewal notice, as well as to others requesting publications information. In addition, a list of available ASPA publications was published in the last two issues of the *Public Administration Review* and in the July issue of *P.A. News and Views*. Anyone wishing additional copies of the publications price list may obtain them by writing to ASPA Headquarters.

3. *Periodical subscriptions options should be considered as a possible service.* Currently negotiations are in process with the Institute of Public Administration of Canada to enable ASPA members to subscribe to their journal, *Canadian Public Administration*, at a reduced rate.

Publications Advisory Group

As a final recommendation, the Publications Committee suggested that a Publications Advisory Group be created, consisting of those members of the PAR Editorial Board who are also National Council members; the member (or members) of the P.A. News and Views Advisory Group who is/are on the National Council; and two others to be

selected for their interests and knowledge in publications services.

The Publications Committee noted that the Publications Advisory Group is not to be a group which is superior to or which oversees the PAR editor and Editorial Board or the P.A. News and Views Advisory Group, but that rather it is to serve as a committee to consider (1) publications proposals or review requirements submitted to it by the National Council and (2) funding sources and opportunities for ASPA publications.

President Gallas has named the following to the advisory body: Robert C. Harrall, Fred A. Kahn, and A. Lee Fritschler, who are National Council members serving on the PAR Editorial Board; Edward P. Pazicky and Wanda C. Woolcot, National Council members serving on the P.A. News and Views Advisory Group; Walter Broadnax of the Federal Executive Institute, and Chester A. Newland of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, who was chairman of the 1975-76 ASPA Publications Committee. President Gallas has named Newland chairman of the Publications Advisory Group.

The advisory group held its first meeting in Washington, D.C., in August at which time it discussed the charge for the group, the new publications cost center, and the direction ASPA should be taking in the publications field, as well as the funding for additional publications.

A good deal of attention was devoted to the subject of special publications, including the issuance of special collections of PAR articles by functional areas such as MBO, PPBS, labor relations, OD, etc., to be used in the academic and training market. ASPA members with suggestions for topics for special collections and for editors should send their ideas to the Publications Advisory Group in care of ASPA, Suite 300, 1225 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Also under discussion were methods of funding special issues of PAR and other ASPA publications. The Advisory Group will continue its deliberations on December 3 at the Airport Marina Hotel, Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, so it can make recommendations to the ASPA National Council which meets in the same location the following day.

—Barbara Byers Judd, *ASPA Staff*

Want Additional Copies of This Issue?

As this issue of *P.A. News and Views* was going to press, we received an order from the Federal Executive Institute for 700 extra copies because of the articles by the presidential candidates.

We have run additional copies of this special presidential issue, which are available from ASPA Headquarters for \$1.00 each, with discount rates on larger quantities. Copies may be ordered by writing to the Publications Manager, American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. For single copies, please enclose payment with your order.

Commission Calls for FY 1977 IPA Grant Proposals

The U.S. Civil Service Commission has announced that \$12,408,000 is available in Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) formula grant funds for Fiscal Year 1977 and has called on state and local governments to submit grant applications to Commission regional offices.

According to the CSC announcement, state and local governments can use these funds to strengthen their management capacities and to train their professional, administrative, and technical officials and employees.

The Commission may approve grant support for up to 50 per cent of the cost of eligible projects. At least one-half of each state's allocation must be used to meet the needs of local governments. Under the IPA, the term "local government" also means the recognized governing body of an Indian tribe.

In announcing the funding allocations, the Commission encouraged state and local governments to place emphasis on projects which will have lasting impact or which can serve as demonstration models for other jurisdictions wishing to improve their management capacities.

In addition to grants, the IPA authorizes technical assistance in personnel management, temporary assignments of personnel between federal agencies and state and local governments or universities, attendance of state and local employees at federal training courses, and cooperative federal-state-local recruiting and examining programs. Further information on these assistance provisions is available from Commission regional offices.

HEW, from page 6

Under the proposed regulation, a recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of a handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. Where reasonable accommodation will not suffice to neutralize the effects of a person's handicap or will cause undue hardship, failure to employ or advance the handicapped person will not be considered discrimination, since the failure is due to objective and necessary criteria rather than to the fact that the applicant is handicapped. A recipient may not deny an employment opportunity to a person on the ground that reasonable accommodation will be necessary to enable that person to perform adequately on the job.

Under the concept of "reasonable accommodation," HEW funding recipients would be obligated to undertake such measures as job restructuring to shift duties and activities in a manner that will enable the handicapped person to perform the duties essential to the job or making facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons. Such actions might take the form of architectural modifications, the addition of elevators, and the location or relocation of particular offices or jobs so that they are in areas of the employer's facilities that are

CHANGING DIRECTION, from page 8

Davis opinion enunciates a different rule for cases involving alleged unconstitutional discrimination (the state must have an intent to discriminate and adverse racial effect is not sufficient to demonstrate this intent) than for cases under the EEO Act (disparate racial or sex impact raises a presumption of discrimination). Moreover, for the first time the validity of an employment test was upheld by the Supreme Court in the face of adverse racial impact.

The Court appears to recognize that any professionally accepted form of validity/study (e.g., criterion related, content or construct) will suffice, a standard which is different from that contained in the EEOC Guidelines (the Guidelines recognize a preference for criterion-related validity). Of signal significance is the importance which the Court attributes to Washington, D.C.'s successful affirmative action program. While proportional representation is not constitutionally called for, success in affirmative action not only blunts the claim of discrimination but also appears to impact on the quantum and quality of proof of validity which is acceptable.

In sum, the Supreme Court appears to have embarked on a course where, except for intrusions on specific "core" constitutional protections, public employers may set such standards for employees as desired, provided only that they are not so irrational as to be branded arbitrary. Greater discretion in employer/employee relations is assured for locally elected officials who are protected by *National League of Cities* against certain kinds of federal intrusion and by *Bishop* and *Kelley* from previously expanding judicial oversight. Public employees who have tenure are still entitled to a due process hearing after discharge, but the Supreme Court will not interfere with a state court's (or lower federal court's) narrow interpretation of tenure under state law.

Editor's Note: The Bureau of Intergovernmental Personnel Programs of the U.S. Civil Service Commission has just issued a revised edition of *Equal Employment Opportunity Court Cases*, a compendium of summaries of a cross section of civil rights court cases dealing with personnel administration. Copies are available from the Bureau of Intergovernmental Personnel Programs, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, D.C. 20415.

already accessible to and usable by handicapped persons. Such modifications need not be made if they would impose an "undue hardship" to the recipient. In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of a recipient's program, the department will consider such factors as the size and type of recipient's program and the nature and cost of the accommodation required.

Further information on the proposed regulations may be obtained by contacting the Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 330 Indiana Avenue S.W., Washington, D.C. 20201.

Tom Parker, *ASPA Staff*

MEETINGS OF INTEREST TO ASPA MEMBERS

Information has been received in ASPA Headquarters on several meetings which are of interest to various segments of the ASPA membership. Below are brief descriptions of these sessions.

Labor Law – Finance

The American Bar Association will be presenting national institutes on "Public Sector Labor Law" and "Municipal Finance" during the coming months. The institute on "Public Sector Labor Law" will be offered at the Ambassador West Hotel in Chicago November 18-19. Two institutes on "Municipal Finance" are scheduled, the first December 2-3 at the Shoreham Americana Hotel in Washington, D.C., and the second December 9-10 at the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. Information on all three institutes is available from John F. Foley, National Institutes Program, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637.

Police Intelligence

The Police Management and Operations Divisions of the International Association of Chiefs of Police is currently accepting applications for a workshop on "Police Intelligence Management," which will be held November 29 to December 3 in San Diego, and a workshop on "Police Intelligence Analysis," which will also be held in San Diego December 6-10. Further information about both of these workshops is available from Ray Garza, Police Management and Operations Divisions, IACP, Eleven Firstfield Road, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20760.

Regulatory Policy

The American Management Associations will hold the first National Forum on Business, Government and the Public Interest, bringing together leaders from the ranks of business, public interest groups, labor, and government December 1-3 at the Shoreham Americana Hotel in

Washington, D.C. The Forum will open with a session entitled "The Regulation of American Business – Government Regulatory Policy," featuring speeches by Senator Harrison Williams, chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor; Ralph Nader of the Center for Study of Responsive Law; and Jack Hanley, chairman, Monsanto Company. For further information, contact the Registration Department, American Management Associations, 135 West 50th Street, New York, N.Y. 10020.

Managing in a Tight Economy and Communications

The National Training and Development Service has announced a series of workshops on the topics of "Managing in a Tight Economy" and "Communications." Three-day workshops on managing are designed to provide public officials with new management tools to enhance their management skills and the productivity and effectiveness of their organizations. Workshop dates and locations are as follows: December 8-10, Seattle; December 15-17, Boston; January 12-14, 1977, San Francisco; February 2-4, Atlanta; and February 23-25, Dallas. For additional information on the Managing in a Tight Economy Workshop, contact Chip Morrison, National Training and Development Service, 5028 Wisconsin Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.

A series of two-day regional communications workshops will be conducted by NTDS, beginning in December. The workshops will focus on improving internal and external communications including the techniques and concepts for maintaining better communications with special interest groups, the news media, the organizational staff, other governmental agencies, and the general public. Workshop dates and locations are: December 16-17, Washington, D.C.; January 20-21, 1977, Atlanta; February 17-18, Memphis; March 3-4, Newport Beach, California; and March 17-18, Dallas. For further information, contact Scott B. Walker, Director of Communications, at the above NTDS address.

President Gallas Reports on 28th Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada

by President Nesta Gallas

At the invitation of C. Les Usher, National President of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, I participated in the 1976 Canadian Conference in Halifax, Nova Scotia, September 8-10.

A key topic introduced at the opening plenary and discussed at subsequent concurrent sessions was "Openness of Public Documents: The Policy Issues, and Implications for the Administrator." An American paper on the topic was presented by Harold C. Relyas, specialist in American government, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress. A second plenary session topic was "Oceans: The Role of Governments in Realizing the Potential of Economic and Coastal Zone Resources."

The similarity of interests between ASPA and its Canadian counterpart was evident in the subjects discussed

at the various sessions, including "Governing the Cities: Financial Issues," "Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: Criteria for Setting Wages and Salaries," "New Structures of Policy Administration," "Whither Canadian Federalism: The Challenge of Regional Diversity and Maturity," "The Administration and the Participating Public," and "Trans-Border Relations: Provinces and States."

During the Canadian Conference I met with various members of the Institute's Executive Committee and Executive Director J.M. Galimberti to discuss matters of mutual interest including the potential for cooperative efforts between the two professional societies. Other ASPA members participating in the Conference were Professors Frank X. Stegert from Rensselaer, Richard H. Leach from Duke, and Rolf Haugen from the University of Vermont.

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Presidential Candidates on "The Management of the American Governmental System," page 1. . . Were You There? - the birth of ASPA, page 2. . . New HEW Guidelines Pending on Prohibiting Job Discrimination Because of Physical Handicaps, page 6. . . Changing Direction of Public Employment Law, page 7. . . Student Plans for ASPA Conference, page 13. . . Practitioner's Bookshelf, page 14. . . Progress on Publications Committee Recommendations, page 16. . . Meetings of Interest to ASPA Members, page 19.

Four ASPA Regions Schedule October Meetings

Four ASPA regions have scheduled regional sessions during the month of October.

Region IV, which includes the states of Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia, will meet October 13-15 at The Carousel Center Hotel in Ocean City, Maryland, to discuss the theme "Public Administration: Today and Tomorrow." The program is divided into six tracks covering the following topic areas: Public Accountability, Personnel Administration, Public Policy, Problems of Intergovernmental Management in the 1970s and 1980s, Organizational Development, and Tools of the Professional Manager. In addition, there will be special panels on Women in Work and the Student Role in Region IV Activities.

Regions I and II, including the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont in Region I and New Jersey and New York in Region II, will meet October 14 and 15 at the Hilton Inn at Logan Airport in Boston. The two-day session will include panels on the following subjects: Intergovernmental Man-

agement, Professional Development, Judicial Administration, Growth Policy, Financial Administration, Collective Bargaining, Urban Management, Organizational Practices, Professional Standards and Ethics, Media, Smaller Governments, Evaluation, Productivity, Human Services, and a special session for the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA).

"Post Birthday Blues - Public Alternatives to Orwell's 1984" is the theme of the Southeast Regional Conference which will be held October 19-22 at the Deauville Hotel in Miami Beach, Florida. The Southeast Region, **Region V**, covers the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.

The three-day meeting will feature ten tracks covering the following topics: Big Government and Accountability, Collective Bargaining, Criminal Justice, Education and Public Administration, Environmental Interests, Human Resources Administration, Minority Affairs, Public Administration and the People, Public Administration and Public Policy, and Potpourri.

A Few More Important ASPA Dates

The September issue of *P.A. News and Views* ran a series of important ASPA dates from September through April. Here are two more dates to add to that list:

- October 21**, Professional Standards Committee, Washington, D.C.
- December 3**, Policy Issues Committee, Dallas, Texas

ASPA Membership Tops 16,000 Mark

ASPA membership has topped the 16,000 mark, according to Membership Department figures. Although the official computer verification isn't available yet, informal month-end figures show ASPA with a membership of 16,150, the highest in our history.


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WHAT IS ASPA?

The American Society for Public Administration is a national organization dedicated to the improvement of public service. This intent is achieved through a variety of programs for professional development at the chapter, regional, section and national levels.

With its inception in 1939, ASPA expounded the idea that public administration in any jurisdiction anywhere can be analyzed, evaluated, and improved and that a body of professional knowledge can be developed for both education/training and practitioner guidance.

Today, the goals and principles of ASPA are supported by a broad based membership which includes individuals from all categories of government—local, state, federal and foreign—as well as academicians, researchers, students, and interested members of the business community. All of these individuals are committed to advance the science, processes, and art of public administration. ASPA strongly supports equal opportunity for minorities and women.



STRUCTURE OF ASPA

ASPA is organized into over ninety chapters within a ten region structure. The governing board of the Society is its National Council, comprised of the President, President-Elect, and the three most recent Past-Presidents, nine members elected nationwide, three representatives elected from each of the ten regions and one representative from each of the organizations affiliated with the Society.

CHAPTERS

Chapters elect their own officers, and plan and organize their own programs based on the interests of their membership and on issues of local concern.

REGIONS

Regions plan and organize an annual Regional Conference which gives the Chapter members an opportunity to get together to discuss issues of mutual concern.

SECTIONS

Sections bring together public administrators interested in a specific area of administration without regard to geographic boundaries. Section membership is available for an annual dues of \$5.00, and Section officers are elected by their membership. ASPA's Sections include:

- Conference on Minority Public Administrators Section (COMPA)
- Section on Criminal Justice Administration (SCJA)
- Section on Human Resources Administration (SHRA)
- Section on International and Comparative Administration (SICA)
- Section on Management Sciences (SMS)
- Section on Natural Resources and Environmental Administration (SNREA)
- Section for Professional Development (SPD)
- Section on Science and Technology in Government (SSTIG)

COMMITTEES

Committees provide basic policy guidelines for the functional operation of the Society. Both Committee Chairpersons and members are appointed by the Society President. ASPA's Committees include:

- Committee on Higher Education/Government Relations
- Committee on Internships
- Committee on Professional Standards and Ethics
- Committee on Women in Public Administration
- Policy Issues Committee
- Relations with Business and Industry Advisory Committee
- Special Committee on Public Service Futures
- Committee on Military Public Administrators
- Committee on Budgeting and Policy Analysis
- Committee on Semi-Retired Public Administrators

NASPAA

The National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) is currently ASPA's only affiliate organization. A professional education association dedicated to the advancement of education and training in public affairs and public administration, NASPAA fosters goals and standards of educational excellence and represents the concerns and interests of member institutions in the formulation and support of national policies for education in public affairs/public administration.



MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS

• National Conference

The National Conference provides an opportunity for the membership to keep abreast of current trends and issues in public administration. Topics are chosen to meet the many faceted interests of the members, the Chapters, and the functional areas of Society Sections and Committees.

Future National Conferences will be held:

- April 9-12, 1978 — Phoenix, Arizona
- April 7-10, 1979 — Baltimore, Maryland
- April 13-16, 1980 — San Francisco, California
- April 12-15, 1981 — Detroit, Michigan

• Publications

ASPA's publications program is designed to inform the membership of professional developments and Society events. *The Public Administration Review* is a bi-monthly journal which is the leading source of information, opinion, and comment on public administration. The *Public Administration News and Views* is a monthly newsletter featuring news of the Society and highlighting current issues affecting the public service. ASPA periodically publishes special reports and publications on matters of immediate concern to the public administration community.

• Personnel Exchange

The Personnel Exchange and Recruiter Service gives university and public employers access to a public administration talent reservoir of more than 6,000 persons, which monthly refers some 500 resumes to potential employers. There is a five dollar annual charge for member participation in this program.

• Semi-Retired Program

The Semi-Retired Public Administrators Service, added in 1976, through a grant from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, emphasizes the identification of prospective employers willing to utilize the talents of semi-retired persons to provide needed public services.

• Group Insurance

Four Group Insurance Programs are currently available through ASPA and include the following: a) low-cost group term life coverage up to fifty thousand dollars (\$50,000), b) a hospital income plan providing cash payments up to seventy five dollars (\$75) a day directly to members, c) accidental death and dismemberment coverage providing coverage of up to two hundred thousand dollars (\$200,000), and d) a disability income insurance plan providing four hundred dollars (\$400) per month payment for up to two years, after thirty days of disability, which will be in effect in the fall of 1977.

• Voting Rights

Right to vote and hold office in Chapters, Sections and at the National level.

• Professional Study Tours

Group Professional Study Tours abroad are available to ASPA members. The 1976 program was a two week study tour to USSR. Plans for the current year include a study tour of the Peoples Republic of China and a seven day study tour of Cuba.

• Discount on Books


Members are offered discounts from time to time on professional books and publications of special interest to public administrators.

Administration Review • P.A. News & Views • Complimentary publications • Free listing in the monthly *Recruiter* • Complimentary registrations to the Annual ASPA Conference • Discount rates for quantity purchases of ASPA publications • Reduced rates for ASPA mailing list

for approved mailings. These benefits have a membership fee schedule based on agency or organization budget size. Contact the Director of Conferences, Membership & Chapter Development, ASPA headquarters, for information on Agency Affiliate Membership. 202/785-3255.

ASPA's Regional Structure

(Including Number of Chapters by State)



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CONTRIBUTING MEMBER: \$50—Includes \$10.00 Chapter rebate. Full membership services plus selected meeting reports • National recognition given.

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
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Public Administration Review is published bimonthly by the American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices.

The **Review** is indexed in Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Index, and Book Review Index. The contents are microfilmed by University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Subscription (libraries and institutions only): \$25 a year. Single copies: \$4.50. Annual membership (includes Review subscription): Regular \$30, Contributing \$50, Full-time students \$15. From membership fees, \$12.50 is allotted to Public Administration Review. © 1977 by American Society for Public Administration, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036. All Rights Reserved.

POSTMASTER: Send Form 3579 to Public Administration Review, 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

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INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

Editorial Orientation. The goal of *Public Administration Review* is that of the Society of which it is an organ: "to advance the science, processes, and art of public administration." To this purpose it seeks to increase communication and foster understanding among practitioners, teachers, researchers, and students.

The aim of the editors is to publish material pertinent to the interests of the broad spectrum of public administration. Opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the organizations in which they work, of ASPA, or of the editors.

Writing Style. All authors should give special attention to the problem of communicating across the broad spectrum of interests and specializations. Clarity is prized and relative brevity necessary. Plain English is preferred over professional jargon. Notes and references should be minimized. In general, the style of noting and referencing should be that of recent issues of the *Review*.

Manuscript Specifications. Manuscripts submitted for consideration should not exceed 4,000 words, and those ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 words are particularly welcome. All material should be double-spaced, on one side of the page only, and have margins of one and a half inches. Notes and references, if any, should also be double-spaced and should be placed at the end of the text. A title page should show the name(s) and position(s) of the author(s), but the first page of the text should show only the title of the manuscript.

Four copies of the manuscript should be submitted, routed as indicated below.

Routing and Handling. Three copies of the manuscript should be submitted to the managing editor, one copy to the editor-in-chief. (See inside front cover for addresses.)

An abstract of not more than 150 words and a brief biographical statement in the *Review* style should accompany manuscripts.

Normal procedure calls for review by at least two readers, usually but not always members of the Board of Editors.

Authors are requested to notify the editors if the manuscript is being submitted concurrently to any other journal.

If authors request the return of manuscripts this will be done if possible. Since loss or damage may occur, however, return cannot be guaranteed.

A Word of Advice. Prospective authors should spend some time with recent issues of the *Review*. This will help to orient the author with respect to the tone, style, and content of the *Review*. At minimum, authors should review recent issues to determine the relationship of their manuscript to previous material on the same or related subjects.

SEE INSIDE FRONT COVER FOR COMMUNICATION AND ROUTING

And in Conclusion

With this issue I conclude a 19-year editorial connection with the *Review*, eight years as a member of the Board of Editors and 11 years as editor-in-chief. So far as the evidence of mastheads signifies, this is the longest editorial connection in the history of the *Review*. It therefore seems proper to offer some observations and reflections on the enterprise. Indeed, I feel an obligation to do so.

I begin with a look at achievements, proceed by noting some failures, and then take another look at the central problem of the *Review*.

Changes in the Review

In my 11 years as editor-in-chief, the *Review* made the transition from a quarterly to a bimonthly publication. Additionally, the size of each issue increased; and an occasional extra issue has been made possible by outside assistance. Various changes in format and layout were made, aimed at increasing attractiveness and readability.

Several new features were introduced. One is the symposium which most issues carry. Those who have read my annual editorial statements know that I regard the symposia as posing a continuing question: undoubted "pluses" (intellectual and material) result from the symposia, but it is still not clear that this is the best use of limited pages.

From the Professional Stream: Currents and Soundings was introduced early in my tenure to solve a problem, namely, a place or medium for items of varied size, provenance, and subject that seemed proper for publication, but did not fit into any then existing feature or space: items such as speeches and short pieces not quite "essays."

Developments in Research was introduced as an attempt to solve the problem of presenting research findings with economy of space for the *Review* and economy of time and effort for the "consumers."

Book Notes and Notices was introduced to respond to requests that the *Review's* coverage of our literature be broadened and quickened. To respond to the requests seemed eminently desirable; but I resisted the suggestion that the "cluster reviews" or "review essays" be abandoned to do so. The review essay struck me as an excellent "genre," and almost the identifying feature of the *Review*. I now note with satisfaction that other journals are moving *toward* the review essay, not abandoning it.

The *Communications* feature was not so much introduced as encouraged. Some hold the view, I know, that this is a questionable use of space. I justify the use of the space with the rationale that communication is what the *Review* is *about*. (Additionally, I confess a personal interest in the responses and exchanges evoked; and confess further that for some journals to which I subscribe I seldom get *beyond* the communications.)

With this issue a new feature is introduced, *Public Management Forum*. It is introduced in an attempt to speak more directly to the interests of practicing administrators. It is inherently the most problematic of the features, for while the desire for more information, more "help," is strongly held, it is by no means clear how it is possible for the *Review* to respond to the desire. In recognition of the difficulties, this feature is being approached with special arrangements and in an experimental mode.

One feature was abandoned soon after its introduction – *Documentation*. The

intent was to make widely available to the public administration community documents bearing importantly on our enterprise, say an Executive Order dealing in a central or significant way with personnel, organization, or funding. But however useful this might be, it was judged not the best use of scarce space.

While the above-noted changes are hardly a matter of dispute, whether they represent, individually or collectively, "improvement" is of course a matter of opinion. It is worth noting that subscriptions (i.e., apart from memberships) have risen in the past decade from approximately 1,700 to nearly 4,000. Whatever some members may think, some non-members like us!

To the extent to which the above-noted changes elicit a favorable response, the credit must be widely distributed. Naturally, I am pleased to have played a part in the "accomplishment." But what has been done has been a collective effort. The Society is indebted to my editorial associates, the members of the Board of Editors, the officers and Council members, the contributors — to a large company that has given support in one way or another.

Some Failures

Various problems (as I judged them to be) I have failed to solve, though the solution to some of them would appear to have been within my power (in terms of resources and authority).

One of these is the expression of opinion in an "editorial" fashion. Though it had been the custom for the editor-in-chief to write an editorial for each issue, I quickly concluded that I did not have the energy (or wisdom) to write an editorial for each issue. I then experimented — boldly, I thought: I invited the members of the Board of Editors to contribute editorials. To my surprise, no response. I then invited the ASPA president, executive director, and Council members to submit editorials. I braced for a torrent. But I received not even a trickle. I then extended the invitation to the members of the National Academy of Public Administration (at that time still a part of the Society). Still no response. Eventually two editorials were received from members of the Board.

Perhaps I only *think* there is a problem. Anyhow, I am still of the opinion that editorials would be desirable, and hope a "solution" can be found.

Another problem I have not been able to solve is bringing humor into the *Review* in a regular and appropriate way. Some feel humor has no place in the *Review*, and indeed I received criticism for publishing some "light" pieces at the same time I was requesting funding for more pages. But I continue to believe that some humor would be a desirable addition to the professional "menu."

The problem, however, is a difficult one to solve. The risks are great, and the costs of failure great. An "elephant dance" would be an embarrassment; and one person's administrative humor is (I've discovered) another's crashing bore or bad taste.

Another problem I have failed to solve is getting "feedback" on any regular and reliable basis. Surprisingly (it surprised *me*), it is difficult for the editors to know whether the *Review* is communicating, to whom, and with what effect. Letters, or oral responses, praising this or damning that, are very rare. Repeatedly, I have "intended" to get a clearer picture of reader reactions and preferences; by questionnaire, tear-outs, or whatever. But didn't get to it.

A continuing failure and frustration has been the inability to get better and quicker reporting on developments in, or of import for, public administration. Developments of great importance may not be noted until a year has passed. Or indeed three years, depending on the interests and opportunities of contributors. However, as against those cases in which I feel I could have solved the problem

AND IN CONCLUSION

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myself with more energy and determination, I believe the solution is beyond the reach of the editor-in-chief. I believe that this problem can only be solved by having staff writers, available and competent, to follow developments and report and interpret them promptly. This means in turn that a solution may not be possible, unless and until the Society can hire the staff.

Still another failure: how to incorporate foreign and comparative materials into the *Review* in a timely, pertinent, economical way. Of course, I am aware that some members feel that I am creating a problem for a solution: the solution of simply ignoring foreign experience. After all, we have problems we can't handle immediately and pressingly before us; and foreigners ignorant of our situation are in no position to be helpful — and we have no interest in *their* problems. True, in some ways. But quite false, I think, in others. For what it is worth, I believe the *Review* would be improved by expanded foreign coverage.

The Central Problem and Some Options

For the first issue of the *Review* under my supervision I wrote an editorial in which I stated that I perceived the central problem to be addressed, that of bridging the interests of the Society's two main constituencies, the practitioners and the academics. Eleven years later my perception has not changed.

True, a number of developments have occurred that make the problem somewhat different than it was a decade or two ago. I believe it is the case that there now are more "pracademics," persons who move back and forth or have interests and positions that make them difficult to place on either side of a dividing line. But of the reality and importance of two centers of gravity, two communities of interest, I have no doubt.

What then follows, with respect to the *Review*? If we assume that the purpose and rationale of the Society is to frame and contain the whole spectrum of interests that "public administration" implies, then the strategy followed by the *Review* since its inception is a proper one. For the basic strategy from the beginning has been to try to communicate among all interests and constituencies.

To the extent it has succeeded this has been the *Review's* greatest success. To the extent it has failed this has been the *Review's* greatest failure. In any case, this has been the basic problem for the editors to try to solve. During my 11 years, approximately one-third of my professional time and energies have gone into the *Review*, and this problem has been given — directly — many hours indeed. I judge that I have been only moderately effective in the Cause: but I do claim earnest and arduous labor on its behalf.

To question the bridging strategy of the *Review* may seem equivalent to questioning the function and legitimacy of the Society. But I do not believe this is true. Permit me to suggest an alternative strategy, if only that, in rejecting it, the bridging strategy may be reaffirmed — with its benefits and costs, its rewards and pains, made clear and recognized as necessarily complementary.

I note first that the Society is not alone in its purpose and in its publication strategy. The American Association for the Advancement of Science seeks to unite all persons in the large and diverse area of "science"; and its weekly publication, *Science*, is a broad-spectrum publication with "something for everyone." It contains much "hard" and specialized science, but also less formidable essays, reporting in public affairs affecting (or affected by) science, and so forth. Presuming this is a successful effort — and certainly I so judge it — to what extent does it present a model that can be followed, an example that might even (in time) be improved upon?

Consider, however, the American Psychological Association. This is also a large

"house," with many more members than this Society, and with interests so varied there are more than 30 "sections." In this case the diversity of interests prevails, and there are many specialized publications. Again, for all I can observe, the strategy is successful. By recognizing varied interests the Association holds them together?

I draw no conclusion and point no moral. My point is simply that the Society in general and those responsible for its publications in particular need to reflect carefully on the options and to make decisions with as much deliberation as possible. And having made them, be prepared to move with both care and determination.

The above posing of widely different alternatives was meant only to be suggestive. There *is* a case for two (or more) types of journals. Some academics feel that I have failed because I have not made the *Review* "respectable" in scientific-scholarly terms. Some practitioners feel that I have failed because I have not made the *Review* comparable to media they consider more practical and readable. Certainly if there were two journals, the interest of both constituencies could be catered to more precisely. *Could* be, but this does not follow as an easy and necessary consequence, for many problems in financing and staffing would have to be solved. But assuming adequate funding and success in the planning and launching operations, would the Society be damaged, perhaps destroyed? Or possibly strengthened? Who can say with certainty?

But there are alternatives beyond one journal versus two journals each appealing to a main constituency. The recent increase in the size of *News and Views* and its obvious strengthening is relevant. Retain the *Review* much in its present mold, but supplement it with a lively *News and Views* performing functions unsuitable or even impossible for the *Review*? Adding if and when appropriate specialized media for whatever purpose? (In my opinion public administration has two needs that are now not adequately served: (a) as medium for reporting on theory-based research and (b) as a medium of information and discussion in the large and growing education-for-public-administration community.) One "house," broad-spectrum journal plus two or more "constituency" organs? All options should be kept in view as the Society evolves and needs change.

And a Note of Thanks

I thank the Society and its officers who have made this experience possible for me. There has been much labor and "pain" of one kind or another, but obviously I have felt challenged and rewarded or I would not have continued for so long. I thank all of the members of the Board of Editors — a "population" of about 100 — who have assisted with the enterprise during these 11 years. I extend a special thanks to the feature editors, who have given generously of their time and talent. And above all I thank the managing editor, Frank Marini, and the production editor, Barbara Byers Judd. These two able and agreeable colleagues have, over a decade, performed magnificently.

Plus a Caution

It should be understood by the readers that no abrupt change in the *Review* is possible. There are organizational and financial constraints, plus commitments to authors and editors (symposia are commissioned about two years in advance of publication). A new editor-in-chief will, of course, wish to make changes, perhaps major ones, but they will take time to effect.

Dwight Waldo

A Symposium

National Security

And Public Administration

Frank N. Trager, *Symposium Editor*

INTRODUCTION

The undersigned was invited to arrange for and edit the articles in this symposium on national security. The symposium grew out of discussions between the editor of this journal, Dwight Waldo, and some of the leaders of the International Studies Association, Section on Military Studies. The article by Major Chris L. Jefferies, U.S. Air Force Academy, indicates the minimal role this interdisciplinary subject matter has played in the pages of this *Review* during the past decade. The contributors and I are therefore indebted to Editor-in-Chief Dwight Waldo for his invitation to redress at least in part this imbalance.

We see no need to argue that national security as a field of teaching, research, and publication belongs as much to the discipline of public administration as it does to several other disciplines represented in the curriculum of the university. We hope that, however limited our effort, the symposium will prove to be a stimulus to our colleagues. Further information about teaching, research, and publication in national security affairs may be secured by writing to the undersigned. The authors of the articles in the symposium were deliberately chosen from among the younger generation in our midst.

The phrase "national security," as Arnold Wolfers observed some time ago, is an "ambiguous symbol."¹ Although Wolfers' remark specifically refers to governmental operations, it could, likewise, be applied with equal force to the growing, interdisciplinary field of national security studies.² The intellectual perimeters of this field

are yet to be definitively drawn. However, even casual inspection reveals that the study of national security in the United States includes a great many great issues flowing from the Constitutional requirement placed on the federal government to "provide for the common defense." The requisite powers to so provide were divided between the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief and the Congress as having the authority to "declare war," mobilize national resources, create armed forces.³

Debate on how best to provide for the "Common Defense" of the United States of America may be said to have been begun by the framers of the Constitution. It has continued year-in, year-out ever since and will continue to be debated by the federal establishment and the citizenry as long as America remains a democratic polity. The terms of the debate vary, but in recent decades, especially since World War II, there is wide agreement on the inclusion of such issues as: the theory and use of strategic and conventional force; the organization of the defense establishment; the formulation and execution of specific defense policies; civil-military relations; arms

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control and military alliances; the size, cost, and methods of recruitment of military manpower; research, development, and acquisition of weapons; the gathering and estimating of overt and covert intelligence, and others. Most, if not all, students of national security, whatever their disciplines, agree that national security is a rather complex and sometimes elusive area of study.

Although a consensus is obviously not yet to be found, the following definition may be considered both useful and helpful in one's analysis. National security is that "part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favorable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries."⁴ The ultimate purpose of national security policy is the protection and extension of certain national values which the state considers as "vital." Such values or fundamental principles upon which the very existence of the state are based may be derived from a variety of sources, e.g., law, custom, etc. These principles or values are considered "vital" if "their elimination or radical alteration would substantially change the character of the state or the political system within which it operates."⁵ The usefulness of such a "value-oriented" approach to national security studies has been demonstrably shown within the academic environment; its utilization — by, among others, the public administration sector — is the very "stuff" of what was referred to above as "the debate."

In the United States integrated machinery for developing national security policy has been formalized only in relatively recent years. In enacting the National Security Act of 1947, Congress stated that one of the purposes of the Act was "to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security." As amended, this Act has had extraordinary effects on the defense establishment of the U.S. — effects infrequently noticed and rarely studied by public administration professionals.

The Act (as amended), celebrating, if that is the right word, its 30th anniversary in 1977, brought about the following organizational innovations. It combined the two cabinet-level departments of War and Navy, created in our 18th century, as one Department of Defense (DOD) with a civilian cabinet secretary. The latter, corresponding to the Secretary of State, is the principal adviser to the

President on matters of defense. It provided that the three military services, Army, Navy, and (the then newly created, separate) Air Force, be each placed in a second DOD tier of sub-cabinet level departments, each presided over by a civilian secretary, subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. It created for the first time in our history a Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by a chairman and composed of the chairman and the three service chiefs (the Marine Commandant sits in with the joint chiefs when a subject pertinent to the Marines is on the agenda). The chairman and joint chiefs are the official senior military officers in peace time and war time. It also created for the first time the National Security Council as a statutory body advising the President at the President's discretion; and, again for the first time in our history, it created an institution known as the Central Intelligence Agency, whose director is also head of what is called the U.S. Intelligence Board, with members representing the various departments and agencies charged with an intelligence function — including the Department of State.

There are other innovative features brought about by the National Security Act of 1947 (Amended), for example, the special and regional combined commands of the military services that, together with the foregoing and the traditional aspects of the common defense (such as the annual presentation to and resolution by the Congress of the defense budget), help to define the field of national security.

In the intervening years since the enactment of the National Security Act, academicians and specialists alike have focused their attention on (a) the meaning of "national security," particularly the values, objectives, and interests which we attach to the concept; (b) the influence of such factors as stability/instability, threat perception, and the Cold War, and the consequential military, political, economic, and psychological ingredients of national security; (c) the interaction between the Executive and Legislative Branches of the government upon the formulation, funding, and execution of national security policy; (d) the theoretical considerations of "war," be it nuclear, conventional, limited, or guerrilla; (e) the various strategic defense policies pursued — unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral, nuclear or otherwise; (f) deterrence and the consequential problem of arms control (Salt I and II?); and (g) the economics of defense and the allocation of defense resources.

Although this listing is not in any rank order, nor is it comprehensive, it is clear that the consideration of some or all of the above have serious implications for national security and should be seriously considered by scholars whose disciplines, including public administration, are related to public policy in our conflict-ridden world.

The following four articles, each of which analyzes a specific aspect of the national security field, address themselves in part to the above need. While each article has its own focus, the respective authors also address the relationship of their subjects to the public administrative sector as a whole.

— Frank N. Trager

Notes

1. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXVII, No. 4 (December 1952), and *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 47.
2. Cf. Klaus Knorr, "National Security Studies: Scope and Structure of the Field," in Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg (eds.), *National Security and American Society* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973), pp. 5-16.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). Parts III, IV.
4. Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security," in Trager and Kronenberg, p. 36.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE MILITARY

Chris L. Jefferies, *Major, USAF, U.S. Air Force Academy*

A new student of public administration trying to relate his/her academic studies to the practical field of public administration soon finds that the practical focus is narrow; with few exceptions, it is traditionally concerned with the executive branches of national, state, and local governments and their efforts to carry out public policy. Indeed, one "standard" text specifically excludes the judicial and legislative agencies within government even though they are also clearly involved in the administration of public policy.¹

The student discovers that the focus narrows even further, however, as he/she becomes aware that within the Executive Branch, public administration concern lies with the administration and carrying out of domestic public policy; almost conspicuous by its exclusion from the "traditional" field is concern with the administration of public foreign or international policy. Hence, it is not surprising to the student that the field of public administration also excludes concern with military administration and its effects on public policy, since the military is an instrument of "foreign" policy.

Likewise, the student of military administration soon finds the military neither readily nor easily

■ This article addresses the problem of the lack of interaction between military administration and public administration. The author argues that the two fields are indeed compatible and that there is a definite need for more interchange between them.

The major causes for this lack of interaction lie with both the military and public administrators. The author describes three such causes: the military's adoption of business techniques for planning and efficiency and its reliance on private industry; the supposed uniqueness of the military profession; and lack of interest on the part of public administrators.

The mutuality of the two fields is demonstrated not only by the implicit allusions by public administration as a field to the relevance of the military to itself, but also by means of specific examples of mutual interest. The author concludes by advocating a more appropriate orientation of military administration than its present "business" orientation. "Is not military administration public administration?" he asks.

perceives of its administration as being "public." Indeed, administrative emphasis in the military appears almost exclusively to focus on the

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The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force or the Department of Defense.

"private" or "business" side of the tenuous public-private line, with administrative and management techniques and procedures typical of private business often appearing to be directly applied to military administration with little apparent regard to the "public" nature of the armed forces.

If the field of public administration does not consider military administration to be a legitimate area of its concern, and if military administration does not perceive of itself as "public" administration, why the lack of interchange? Clearly, the armed services are public agencies as well as departments of the Executive Branch of national government and thus fall within the milieu of public administration. Is the field of public administration incompatible with military administration, or are there other factors which have influenced the lack of a public-military administration interchange? More importantly, should there be more interchange and interaction between the two fields? This article attempts to address these issues by arguing that military administration is indeed public administration, and that the two fields are mutually relevant and important. It will attempt to do so first by examining indications that the two fields do not currently interrelate, together with an analysis of the apparent lack of interchange, and second by examining some current public administration "issues" in the military context to demonstrate mutuality and to suggest areas in which public administration scholars and analysts might direct their efforts.

Military Administrative Doctrine and Philosophy

Indications that the military does not relate to the field of public administration lie in the "private" or business orientation of military management and administration, which can be inferred from several sources. The first is the military operating manuals which state current administrative doctrine and philosophy. Hence, Air Force Manual (AFM) 50-20, *USAF Management Process*, provides useful examples.

On page A1-2 of AFM 50-20, the management philosophy of the Air Force is stated: "The Air Force will maintain the most effective force possible, incorporating maximum efficiency and economy in all operations consistent with planned objectives."² Of significance to our consideration are the terms "effective," "maximum efficiency," and "economy." In addition, the manual lists

services available to Air Force managers from the Air Force Management Engineering Service, organizations that conduct management studies and surveys, establish performance standards, recommend management improvement, document and install systems and procedures, and generally provide information and assistance to the management process. The unit considers the organization structure, work measurement, production controls, work simplification, forms and reports design, testing and rating systems, and shop and office layout.³

Of importance to our thesis is the fact that the terms employed, functions described, and approaches taken, as we have listed above, come directly from organization and methods manuals and texts long used by business schools, and, together with the military characteristics of specialization (Military Occupational Specialty and Specialty Codes), are highly suggestive and reminiscent of those formulated by Frederick W. Taylor, the founder of the "efficiency" movement known as scientific management which had an almost revolutionary impact upon the early development of both business and public administration.⁴

A problem inherent in such an approach, beyond the fact that it tends to overlook the importance of individuality, motivation, and human behavior, is the same reason why even business interests seldom employ Taylor's concepts in a strict manner; concern with efficiency, economy, and effectiveness quickly and easily becomes an end in itself, rather than remaining merely as a means. Indeed, the same problem is manifest even more significantly in public administration with its more broadly conceived public ends. The important point for our consideration is that these concepts used by the military were developed by Taylor in response to a perceived business need; the accomplishment of business ends.

A second example is found on page A1-2 of AFM 50-20, on which are listed several "essentials" of Air Force management. One essential is "... the process of organizing and using resources to accomplish predetermined objectives," a quotation taken almost verbatim from the writings and concepts of Peter F. Drucker, long an advisor to American business corporations on business policy and management.⁵

An important aspect of Drucker's approach is management by objectives, a technique widely

utilized in the business world. "Objectives are needed in every area where performance and the results directly and vitally affect the survival and prosperity of the business."⁶ (Note the emphasis on "survival" and "prosperity.") While his concepts and ideas have unquestioned utility in business and are also of some benefit in the public sector, "... the process of organizing and using resources to accomplish predetermined objectives" (his concepts translated into Air Force terms as quoted above), and the management by objectives technique it implies, also carries the risk of obscuring the broader public service ends of the military by emphasizing Air Force or organizational objectives at the expense of public interest objectives; the two are not necessarily the same. Indeed, one of the seven tenets of the Air Force management philosophy as stated in AFM 25-1, *USAF Management Process*, is that "... management policy must assure progressive achievement of Air Force objectives."⁷ Air Force objectives imply Air Force interests, an approach consistent with the business concept as developed by Drucker: "Objectives are needed in every area where performance and the results directly and vitally affect the survival and prosperity of the business."⁸

A major point here needs to be emphasized: The purpose of analyzing the business orientation of military administration is not to argue or imply that the techniques, philosophies, doctrines, and concepts incorporated into it are not valid, that they cannot be relevant to military needs and requirements, nor that with a stronger public administration orientation the same techniques would not be employed with the same resultant problems. Indeed, to a great extent, the fact that they are utilized by both the military and business illustrates the generic quality of much of administration and management, regardless of the milieu.

Nonetheless, one of the unique contributions public administration makes to management and administration in the public sector — of which the military is unquestionably a part — must be that governmental administration should serve public ends; not private or self-interest ends. The business techniques we have reviewed can be and are used in business with little fear of obscuring business ends (competitive advantage, adequate — if not maximum — profits, a secure financial position and market, and organizational viability) since they are designed to serve them. Their use in the

public sector (not just within the military) without an appropriate public orientation, however, may carry the risk of causing a too narrow interpretation or formulation of public ends; that is, organizational ends may predominate at the expense of public ends. Is it not in part because of this fact that public administration as a field has evolved beyond an early mechanistic, depersonalized technique approach to administration in government to a broader emphasis on, and concern with, the dynamic political-sociological-public policy aspects of administration? That the military may not have done so yet, as indicated by its administrative doctrine, suggests a consequence of the lack of military-public administration interchange and a useful contribution that public administration can make to the field. Indeed, might not the recent revelations of improper (if not illegal) interactions between the military and defense contractors be traced in part to too great a business orientation in military management?

Military Education Programs

Beyond the business orientation of military administrative doctrine and philosophy as an indication that the military does not relate to public administration lies a second and perhaps more important indication, one implied by military-sponsored administration and management education programs — an area most significantly reflecting current military attitudes and interests. Beginning with an assumption that the individuals most directly concerned with military administration and management are military officers, a review of two undergraduate-level precommissioning programs and their approach to administrative training is useful: Air Force ROTC and the Air Force Academy, the former important because it is the source of the greatest number of Air Force officers; the latter because it is the source of officers probably most likely to rise to high-level administrative positions.

Air Force ROTC management training is conducted during the last two years, or the advanced portion of the program. The text for that portion of training, used since the 1975-76 academic year, directly supports our point. Entitled *Managing; A Contemporary Introduction*, it is written by two professors of business administration at the University of Kentucky⁹ and is intended for use in an undergraduate business administration course. While it does address the

generic management issues, no attempt is made in the text to relate the issues to the public context. Thus, while the ROTC program provides officer candidates with limited exposure to administration and management, the orientation is clearly toward a business approach beyond the minor generic emphasis. Why does the program not use a public administration text?

The other significant source of commissioned officers is the Air Force Academy. Combining intensive military and academic training, the Academy offers baccalaureate degrees in 22 academic majors in areas ranging from engineering and basic sciences to humanities and social sciences. Of interest to our thesis is, first, a course in public administration taught by the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, and second, an academic major in management administered by the Department of Economics, Geography and Management.

The public administration course is, necessarily, a brief overview of the field.¹⁰ Its greatest limitation, beyond its abbreviated form, is the limited exposure cadets, many of whom will be future high-level military administrators, have to it. Offered during one semester, average course size is less than 40 cadets. Thus, out of an average graduating class of 780 cadets, only 40 at most (5 per cent) will have participated in the course and thus benefitted from even a limited exposure to the public orientation toward military administration and management.¹¹

The management academic major is not limited by such an abbreviated consideration, allowing an extensive in-depth study of management concepts and principles. Eight courses are required to complete the program. With few exceptions, the required subjects are overwhelmingly business oriented.¹²

With regard to the public context, then, the Air Force Academy approach to management and administration is limited either by depth of consideration and exposure (the public administration course), or by its clear and definite leaning toward conventional business or private administration (the management academic major). Indeed, considering that the Academy graduates will probably constitute the major future source of general officers, the business orientation will be significant in the future Air Force: out of a total of 6,257 graduates over the past eight years, 700 have majored in management (13 per cent of the total), a significant deviation from a uniform

distribution of cadets over the 22 academic majors.¹³ Compare this 13 per cent with an in-depth exposure to business methods with the 5 per cent who will have had marginal exposure to public administration. Again, the distinction between the public and business approach to administration in the military may mean the difference between public and private organizational interests in the military.

A review of Air Force-sponsored graduate-level degree programs confirms the implication of our thesis that there is little military-public administration interchange. Air Force Manual 50-5, *USAF Formal Schools Catalog*, lists 76 management-related course categorized as short or long, and ranging from three days (Pricing for Procurement Management) to two and a half years (a doctoral program in business administration).¹⁴ Of relevance to our thesis are the long courses conducted either at military facilities or in civilian universities.

These programs, leading to graduate degrees, are unquestionably business oriented: business administration, business statistics, economics, engineering management, facilities management, logistics management, and an MBA program in personnel management. Conspicuously absent from the list is any reference to public administration or a public-related management program.

An additional Air Force Manual, 300-4, *Data Elements and Codes: Personnel*,¹⁵ gives greater detail with regard to the specific academic graduate programs in which military personnel participate. It lists two major academic fields of interest to our thesis: business administration and public administration. While listing the field of public administration and its specialties implies that the military may, after all, recognize the relevance of a public administration approach to administration, an implied relevance falls far short of acceptance as is indicated by the number of degrees awarded to participants in the programs under Air Force sponsorship. During a five-year period there were 1,670 graduate degrees awarded in business administration, compared to only 34 awarded in public administration, a ratio of 49 to 1.¹⁶ While personal preference for an MBA program over an MPA program may have some significance, it is likely to have very little in these Air Force-sponsored programs, since the number of spaces allotted to each program is carefully Air Force controlled and reflects its perceived needs.

To be complete, brief mention should be made of two more Air Force-sponsored educational programs in administration and management. The first is the Minuteman Education Program which integrates full-time graduate study with the regular duty schedule of interested Missile-Launch Control Officers. Of the six programs, each affiliated with a nearby civilian university, five offer MBA degrees and one a degree in economics.¹⁷

The other program is centered in four high-level executive "special" short courses reserved for high-ranking military officers. Two, the Senior Executive Course and the Intermediate Executive Course, are one-week courses conducted by the Department of Defense. The other two, both of significantly longer duration — and thus providing greater in-depth study — are conducted by the Harvard and Boston MA Schools of Business and Management: the Harvard Advanced Management Executive Development Program (nine weeks) and the Program for Management Development (14 weeks).¹⁸

While few would question the value of senior military-executive training in administration and management, their conduct in business schools, with their private rather than public orientation, may raise questions, particularly when one considers that the U.S. Civil Service Commission conducts a course for senior executives that has an appropriate and relevant public orientation — the Federal Executive Institute. Founded in 1968, its goals are to heighten career executive responsiveness to national needs and goals; to increase career executive appreciation of the totality of the governmental system; and to improve career knowledge of the managerial process in a public context.¹⁹ Of an eight-week duration, the school's courses are specifically directed to the needs of the federal executive in the "very top career grades." Yet, considering that the course goals are eminently appropriate to military executives as well, that senior military officers qualify in every degree as senior public servants, and that the curriculum covers subjects and areas appropriate to the military services as well as to the Civil Service, it is most surprising that of 1,600 graduates of the school over a six-year period, only four have been military officers.²⁰

In summary, then, what does our survey of military administrative doctrine, philosophy, and educational programs indicate that is relevant to our thesis? It indicates the validity of the thesis implication that there has been little interchange

between military and public administration. Most important, however, may be a consequence, the tendency of the armed forces to obscure distinction between organizational, self-interest ends and public interest ends — the significant issue. Thus, greater interchange between the military and the field of public administration — particularly coming from the field of PA — might do for the military what it did for the traditional public service over the past several decades: provide a greater emphasis on the "public" nature of its functions.

On the Public Administration Side

Our examination thus far has focused on the military side of the issue of the lack of a military-public administration interchange. Moving the focus to the PA side suggests that we look to public administration to determine what cause for the lack of interchange may lie there. One implication is that the field of public administration has not demonstrated its relevance to or interest in military administration. Indeed, it is precisely this aspect of the issue that is of concern to a writer in the *Public Administration Review*, Robert Miewald, who argues that "...few students of public administration have been moved to heed the periodic cries that the military organization be considered an integral part of their field of study." Continuing, he laments, "... in the literature of public administration, there are neither sufficient theoretical foundations nor adequate empirical data available to enable us to comprehend the intricacies of operating this massive consumer of public energy and wealth!"²¹

That such indifference to the military has not been shared by academic fields other than public administration is illustrated by the disciplines of political science and sociology, both important contributors to the field of public administration. Since the early 1960s, for example, sociology has steadily increased its attention to the interest in the study of military organizations by social scientists and military personnel. The increased interest in military organization as a social system appears to be due to recognition that military and defense issues permeate the center of American political, economic, and social life.

The "parent" discipline of public administration — political science — has traditionally included consideration of the military role in foreign policy formulation and, more importantly,

in domestic policy in terms of such issues as the economic impact of the Defense budget. Examples of political scientists addressing military issues include Graham Allison in *Essence of Decision*, Bruce Russett in *What Price Vigilance?* and numerous political scientists in several readers including *American Defense Policy; Arms, Men and Military Budgets*; and *Modules in Security Studies*.²² Nevertheless, public administration as a field has been slow to follow suit. Surely these traditions of interest in the military, established by sociology and political science, are equally relevant and appropriate to the field of public administration. That Miewald's observation is accurate, and that the lack of a military-public administration interchange has been influenced at least in part by public administration indifference is important to consider in our study.

Public Administration Education and the Military

Conspicuously absent from the field of public administration appears to be an articulated interest in and concern with military administration. This assertion is most surprising as public administration is the field that most appropriately "should" have a continuing interest in and concern with the military, since it is within its realm of endeavor — administration of public enterprise.

Evidence of the assertion comes first from the area of public administration education. The landmark "Honey Report," for example, an oft-quoted extensive review of the adequacy of public administration education conducted by the *Public Administration Review*, had as its aim to address the role of public administration in government and its needs, together with the role of PA education in fulfilling those needs.²³ It included the following quotation: "Insofar as the professions are assuming places of dominance in many of our public agencies and increasing importance in the shaping of public policy, it behooves [public administration] to look at the process whereby such men are chosen, developed and educated, oriented and experienced."²⁴ Honey then concludes by listing the "professions" which he feels are important to study because they are "... assuming places of dominance ... and increasing importance in the shaping of public policy."

Notably absent from his extensive list is any reference to the military profession, which unquestionably plays a role in "shaping public

policy," both domestic and international.²⁵ Surely the implication is that Honey, and by extension, public administration education (indeed, there were no "letters to the editor" pointing out this omission), does not consider study of military education, training, and administration as relevant to the field. It is an implication that can be supported by a review of public administration school catalogs and course descriptions. The few which do address defense issues do so in terms of policy processes in the political rather than the military milieu.²⁶

The Public Administration Review and the Military

Evidence of the assertion that interest in and concern with military administration is absent from the field of public administration comes secondly from the *Public Administration Review*, a journal dedicated to "... advancing in distinctive ways the science, processes and art of public administration...."

The *Review* is the place where the larger dimensions and longer range developments of administrative theory and practice should be accurately described and critically examined. . . . It can assume the sharing of administrative thinking and experiences . . . across professions and disciplines, across the borders between public and private administration and those between politics, adjudication and administration.²⁷

With this ambitious goal of PAR in mind, this writer made a survey of the journal to determine the extent to which the military professions were included in the "professions and disciplines" across whose borders sharing in administrative thinking and experience was to be assured.

The same issue in which the above goals were published indicated an auspicious beginning. In symposium form, the issue of "Decision Making in Defense: The Role of Organization" was addressed in light of the President's plan to reorganize the Department in Defense in 1958. Most important for our consideration, the introduction to the symposium concluded by stating that "... the *Review* — accustomed to bringing outside views to administrators — in this article *provides instead public administration insights* on a question of importance to the general citizenry"²⁸ (emphasis added). Then followed four pieces by PA scholars and political scientists: Frederick C. Mosher, Paul Y. Hammond, Laurence I. Radway, and Max Kampleman. The symposium is an excellent example of the mutual relevance of military-public administration — the essence of our thesis.

The promise of relevance implied by the first article was not born out in subsequent issues, however. From the issue mentioned above, published in the summer of 1958, until the July/August issue of 1969, PAR's interest in military affairs was limited to an occasional review of books dealing with military-related subjects.²⁹ The year 1969, however, serves as an important milestone in our consideration. Not only were four books relating to defense and the military services reviewed, but a full article addressing the issue of defense was published, the first in 11 years.³⁰ In 1970, five more military-related books were reviewed, and, more importantly, a full article by Robert D. Miewald was included entitled "Weberian Bureaucracy and the Military Model."³¹ Ostensibly an attempt to present an organizational theory analysis of Weber and the German military, it appears that his real purpose is to illustrate that public administration is a useful and appropriate approach to the study of military administration: "By recognizing the military as being within its sphere of competence, and by making a serious attempt to appreciate its relevant conclusions, public administration could be doing itself and the society a valuable deed."³²

Miewald's plea appears to have had little impact. During the next two years, not even military-related books were reviewed. However, in 1971 an article by Frederick C. Thayer was published in which he addressed presidential use of the National Security Council which, by implication, concerned the military.³³ A symposium in 1972, "Productivity in Government," included one article entitled "Productivity Management in the Defense Supply Agency," by Melvin H. Baker.³⁴ However, even though both articles are related to defense issues, they only tenuously relate to the military; Thayer emphasizes the benefits of a more interactive process in presidential use of the NSC, but only mentions the military once, and the Defense Supply Agency is largely manned by civil service employees.

In 1973, an article by Stephen W. Harman was included, the first full article to extensively and directly address a public administration-military-related subject since 1958, or, in 15 years: the role of the military in the federal budgetary process ("Why is the Pentagon such a rugged competitor in the appropriations process?").³⁵ 1974 appears to be a banner year, with six military-related books reviewed (all by the same reviewer) and no less than two full articles included which directly

addressed military-public administration issues.³⁶ 1975, however, had only one article which could be even remotely related to the military: an article by Mazmanian and Lee about the Army Corps of Engineers, an organization of 300 military officers and 30,000 civilian employees involved in public works projects.³⁷ Through the July/August edition of 1976, no military-related articles were included.

With regard to our thesis, then, over a period of 18 years PAR reviewed only 20 books that were more or less military-related, published an initial four-author symposium, and printed seven full articles, only four of which were directly concerned with public administrative issues in a military context. Indeed, the 44 symposia published (1968 through July/August 1976) included only two articles (two of the four cited above) dealing with military-public administration-related subjects. The record hardly supports "... a sharing of administrative thinking and experience ... across professions and disciplines ..." between military and public administration. Together with a lack of interest by public administration education, then, PAR confirms the assertion that public administration has not considered military administration relevant to its field and has thus contributed significantly to the lack of interchange between the two fields.

The Lack of Interchange: An Analysis

Establishing the lack of interchange between military and public administration, however, does not explain why it has occurred, perhaps the most important part of our consideration. A major reason for the lack of mutual interest may first be functional; that is, public administration grew up as a subdiscipline of political science, concerned in its formative years with the reform and development of the domestic economy and agencies of the government. The study of international relations (which includes the military as an instrument of foreign policy), another subdiscipline of political science, grew up in a divergent direction with little, if any, interaction between it and its "fellow" subdiscipline. Indeed, the distinction between domestic and international affairs has been so extensive and pervasive that the editor of a study which addresses the relationship between national and international politics found it necessary as recently as 1966 to state that:

... the comparative of the interaction of domestic and foreign politics has quite often been a no-man's land -

neglected not because students of politics have thought the topic unimportant, but because *the divisions between the two fields have tended to foster this neglect*³⁸ (emphasis added).

Contemporary awareness of the close interaction between the domestic and foreign policy processes has succeeded in narrowing the distinction between public administration and the study of international affairs (examples: Allison, *Essence of Decision*, and Halperin and Kanter, *Readings in American Foreign Policy*, both addressing the issue of governmental organizational and bureaucratic processes as they affect foreign policy formulation, a key issue of PA; and Thayer, *An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition!* which addresses the issue of an expanded, interactive process of policy formulation in general, explicitly linking domestic and foreign policy processes).³⁹ However, little progress has been made in specifically linking public administration and the military, as this article is attempting to illustrate.

With regard to the apparent military lack of interest in the field of public administration, one reason might be, as Adam Yarmolinsky calls it, and as we have already explored, the business orientation and "civilianization of the military"; that is, "... its dependence upon advanced industrial technology and management systems . . . which cannot be bought off the shelf and which must be designed to meet special military needs."⁴⁰ Indeed, the days have long passed when military production was undertaken by government arsenals. In response to its dependence upon civilian industry to provide military goods, then, the military services necessarily developed "business," rather than "public," technical and managerial skills and abilities — both for communication and also to be certain that the development proceeded as specified. It is just in response to this need that the Air Force, for example, offers its programs of procurement and acquisition management, cost and price theory, and contract management theory — as well as extensive business management graduate programs — all justifiably and narrowly directed toward a business rather than a public approach.

A significant, if not major, influence might also be the preparation by military personnel for a second career to be entered upon separation or retirement, careers in business and industry being very popular. This fact undoubtedly accounts for much of the individual preference for training

related to — if not a direct counterpart of — skills and experience in demand in civilian industry and business. Thus, background in business administration rather than public administration appears to be an asset, with some applicability to a military career now as well as to a later civilian career, and probably accounts for the popularity of many off-duty or self-sponsored educational programs in business administration.

Looking beyond the pressures of "civilianization" and "industrialization" which may have influenced the private orientation of military administration lies the perhaps more important question of why the military, in spite of its public and governmental nature, has not identified more strongly with the public service — the civil service — and executive agency public activities, and hence with public administration.

At the heart of the issue is probably the perceived military need to maintain a separate and unique identity, one distinct from the civilian world. Hence, the military code of honor once required that the military man isolate himself from his former civilian life so that he would "... place the highest value on successful conformity with military reality."⁴¹ This perceived need no doubt had a functional origin since military disciplinary standards, training, and value systems, as Yarmolinsky suggests,

... clash with the democratic and egalitarian values of civilian society at many points. The military's group-oriented value system based on rank consciousness, unit loyalty, desire for combat, unquestioning patriotism, and instant response to commands runs counter to the egalitarian, individualistic, inquiring humanistic ideals of American civil society.⁴²

While the sharp distinction drawn by Yarmolinsky is less significant today than formerly, the point may still be valid: without a distinct identity, the military would find it difficult to inculcate the military attitudes and values necessary "to bear arms." Thus, the perceived need to maintain a distinction from the rest of society has probably extended to a hesitance to identify too strongly with a civilian or "civil service" orientation typical of the remainder of the Executive Branch of government.

A closely related influence may stem from the traditional definition of military honor which requires that the professional soldier be above politics in domestic affairs; the traditional "formulation" versus "execution" distinction. Indeed, Mills observes, it is drummed into every

military manager that he is to "back away" from anything resembling a political decision; that he is to stay "well on this side" of anything resembling a line dividing his responsibility and civilian authority.⁴³

While the pervasiveness of these phenomena is open to question today, particularly in light of the fact that the observations were made years ago, their role in influencing a distinction between military and the public service is probably not. The early dislike of politics by the military unquestionably extends to the civil service since it is controlled and directed by politicians, and is thus unorganized, parochial, and "political" in contrast to the military which is "professional."

Turning now to the field of public administration, yet remaining unaddressed is the issue of why there is a lack of interest from public administration in the military and its administration. An important factor must first be lack of opportunity. This issue, although in a broader context, was addressed by Fred Riggs during a conference on the theory and practice of public administration. Lamenting that fact, he views the field of public administration as being limited because it does not try to influence and teach "... future politicians who will become cabinet members... nor businessmen, engineers and lawyers who may become political appointees. *Nor do we teach cadets who become military officers ...*"⁴⁴ (emphasis added). The lack of opportunity, he feels, stems largely from the failure of public administration to think about government as a "total system."

Secondly, just as we isolated the military dislike or fear of becoming involved in politics and the need to maintain a separate identity as reasons influencing a trend in the military away from the public service and thus from public administration, we can probably isolate the same phenomenon influencing public administration attitudes toward the military. Certainly the same factors addressed by Yarmolinsky which create the need for a distinct identity in the military (those which "... clash with the democratic and egalitarian values of civilian society at many points") also operate to create a fear or apprehension among civilian administrators to identify too closely with the military, at least outside the Department of Defense. Thus, the fear of equating and combining the military and public politics — a fear probably stemming from the possibility that by so doing, civilian military control may suffer — together

with a distrust of the military "mind" and its technical and esoteric areas of concern and interest, has also worked to maintain a distinction between public and military administration. In other words, public administration has perhaps not considered military administration as properly appropriate to its area of concern; that is, it may not have accepted the idea that there is no purely military sphere in American society and policy.

In summary of the "why" of an apparent lack of military-public administration interchange, then, we can see three factors which may have had an influence: first, the "civilianization" of the military resulting in the adoption of "business" techniques for planning and efficiency, and reliance on the industrial sector (private) for procurement and development of systems; second, pressures within the military and American society which emphasize the uniqueness and distinction of the military profession; and third, a lack of opportunity and interest from the field of public administration itself.

Mutuality: PA Issues in the Military Context

Most important to our thesis is the demonstration of mutuality between military and public administration by illustrating specific issues and problems that public administration and civilian analysts should address — thus encouraging a more appropriate orientation to military administration than the present "business" orientation. Mutuality can be implied, paradoxically, first by the field of public administration. Dwight Waldo, also a participant in the above-mentioned conference on the theory and practice of public administration, states in "agenda of important and urgent matters" of concern to public administration two points relevant to our study. The first concerns external and internal security: since government originated in and evolved as an enterprise of collective security against aggression, "... how could public administration be ignorant of and indifferent to the main issues and activities of ... security? Public administration has responded only weakly and marginally to ... the effects of a large, permanent military-industrial complex."⁴⁵ The second concerns government by "osmosis and symbiosis," that is, the network of relationships between government and private enterprise through government contracts which blurs the line between public and private endeavor. Both points — external security and the use of government

contracts — are fundamentally part of both military and public administration.

Robert Miewald states that by not considering military organization as an integral part of public administration, "... there are neither sufficient theoretical foundations nor adequate empirical data available to enable us to comprehend [the military]."⁴⁶ Emmet V. Mittlebeeler argues that extensive defense-related research by public administration is needed, particularly with regard to the administration of defense agencies, their relations with civilian branches, their financing and spending, and their effects on civilian societies.⁴⁷ Finally, Paul Van Riper, in response to the Honey Report, argues that education in public administration should emphasize "some substantive understanding" of a broad field of public policy, including civil-military relations.⁴⁸

In summary, public administration as a field, implicitly and explicitly, alludes to the relevance of the military to itself. Yet as our review of education in public administration and the *Public Administration Review* indicates, action in that regard has been slow in coming, even though closely related disciplines such as sociology and political science have set the pattern by making the military an increasingly important object of study.

Mutuality can be illustrated, secondly, by isolating the relevance of military phenomena and issues in terms of public administration issues to which civilian analysts should direct their attention. The first example is the classic policy formulation-execution dichotomy exemplified by the political involvement of military officers. Samuel Huntington, a sociologist/political scientist, addresses the possibility of the phenomenon by pointing out that political involvement of military leadership takes two forms: (1) espousing and recommending policies derived from non-military sources, unrelated or contrary to the professional military viewpoint, in which case they assume a substantive political role; and (2) playing an active part in the public defense or merchandising of policies before Congress and the public. In these political roles, military officers have:

... pleaded for foreign aid appropriations, urged the ratification of treaties, defended the assignment of American troops (abroad), justified the dismissal of General MacArthur, defended the conduct of ... war, and explained the Administration's decisions on force levels and budgets ... Before both Congressional Committees and civic groups they acted as political advocates.⁴⁹

Indeed, as an agency in the Executive Branch, the procedural role of military officers is difficult to distinguish from that of any other public agency; political officials must necessarily turn to them for policy advice and recommendations with regard to the highly technical and esoteric matters of their specialty — in the case of the military, issues of defense.

To deal with Congress, for example, the military is well prepared and endowed in its offices of legislative liaison for which, in 1967, \$4 million was appropriated.⁵⁰ The liaison offices allow intensive and extensive interaction between the military and Congress in many matters, particularly in the areas of budget requests and military procurement. Yarmolinsky speaks of a "carrot and stick" approach the military takes with Congress: the biggest contract awards have tended over the years to go to districts of key members of the military committees, who, in turn, usually vote for the particular program.⁵¹ He quotes a high Nixon Administration official experienced in lobbying for the Pentagon as saying that most defense lobbying was done as joint Pentagon-industry ventures after the Pentagon had approved a weapons system and wanted to sell it to Congress. "The Pentagon had Congress organized like a Marine Corps landing, with generals, admirals, and top civilians always ready to run up to the Hill whenever a problem develops."⁵²

Is the observation that military officers have "political" roles valid, or are other explanations more appropriate? Surely such political activities are appropriate for consideration as an "issue" of public administration and worthy of civilian interest. If the military continues to perceive of itself as a policy neutral and thus impacts policy in a manner neither intended nor understood, then it is in the public interest to be sure they are aware of it. If military officers do not have political roles, then Yarmolinsky should be challenged. Indeed, such activities are by definition public administration, being part of the administration of public agencies in the political (public) environment. Yet few, if any, military or public administration sources directly address these aspects of the vital formulation-execution dichotomy with so many significant ethical, normative, political, and public interest issues at stake.

A second example illustrating mutuality, and to which civilian analysts might turn their attention, concerns the tenuous line dividing public and private endeavor as the activities, interest, and

responsibilities of both public and private organizations become increasingly similar with significant overlap — an issue almost universally alluded to by students and practitioners of public administration. An important link causing this interpenetration and overlap of public and private organizations and activities is found in the government contract, a means by which public functions are performed with private resources. One of the greatest users of this device in the federal government is the military. In fiscal year 1968, for example, public expenditures by contract amounted to \$71.5 billion, or 41 per cent of the federal budget of \$172.4 billion. Of this amount, military-related expenditures accounted for \$43.8 billion, or 61 per cent of the total contract expenditures.⁵³ The figures represented the direct employment by contract of three million individuals, effectively increasing defense “manpower” by 38 per cent.⁵⁴ While the figures may represent a somewhat skewed view since they represent the height of the Vietnam conflict, they nonetheless illustrate the point: the military is one of the greatest users of such contracts.

Although the practice of conducting public business using private resources raises many issues of concern to economists and political scientists, including the issues of the proper or desirable mix of public-private enterprise and the takeover of public functions by private interests, the issue relevant to our consideration concerns control and accountability; does government adequately develop and maintain policy direction and control over private organizations performing under contract, or do the private organizations unduly influence governmental policy? If private (hence, minority) interests do have a direct policy link with government through the contract, where does sovereignty lie — with the public through responsible and accountable public officials, or with private business/minority interests? Indeed, it is just this issue of control and accountability that has led to the suggestion that the military and industry, linked by government contract, may control and direct American foreign and defense policy.

The issue of control and accountability raised by the interpenetration of public (military) and private organizations is legitimately one of concern to public administration and civilian analysts. Thus, beyond the larger issue of the desirability of such extensive governmental use of this device to conduct the public business lies the fact that it is

through the administration of these contracts that is determined the extent and influence of the reciprocal public-private interpenetration if it exists; that is, the interface between the two — the “blurred line” — lies squarely in the realm of the military administrators as they administer the contract, and centers in the question of public versus private interest. As Yarmolinsky argues, “. . . this [interpenetration] does not guarantee either a more efficient or a more effective military establishment, but it is a process likely to continue and therefore it needs to be taken into account of in any effort to modify the [reciprocal] impact of the military establishment on the economy and the society.”⁵⁵ Indeed, in what field or discipline will the phenomenon “be taken account of” if not in public administration? The issue deserves analysis.

These two examples of public administration issues in the military context — the “political” roles of military officers interacting with Congress in such areas as military procurement, and the administration of military contracts — illustrate specifically the types of issues and problems which public administration scholars will find and to which they should address themselves in an effort to encourage greater interaction between the two fields. Indeed, analysts can expect to find the same problems inherent in administration of the military as in the other public agencies more traditionally associated with the field of public administration: “open” versus “closed” personnel systems; the “politics” of the defense budget formulation; the “new federalism” inherent in relationships between state-controlled national guard and federally controlled military budgets and command and control; the possibility and policy impact of military unions and collective bargaining; and the political-bureaucratic processes by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrive at a “corporate” decision among the services on matters of policy and budget. In the military context, these are issues over which the military has traditionally exercised almost complete autonomy, but which in the public context may have policy implications which extend beyond purely military concern. These are the types of issues civilian analysts are likely to find and, most importantly, the study of them will lead to a greater military-public administration interchange and thus greater awareness of the “public interest” implications — an awareness which may presently be lacking in the military due to an over-reliance

upon business or "private" administrative methods and techniques.

These issues also serve to illustrate the validity of the thesis that military administration is public administration; that it can and should be studied and evaluated in the public administration context; and that by so doing, "... public administration could be doing itself and the society a valuable deed."⁵⁶ To this must be added that studying military administration in the public administration context can also do the military a valuable service.

Conclusion

To concerned students of both public and military administration, it is evident that little or no interchange occurs between the two fields. Partly as a cause and as an effect of this fact, military administration and management is almost exclusively oriented toward a business or private enterprise approach rather than a public approach, a situation which raises issues of public versus private ends. Is it not more appropriate to view military administration as public administration? A wide range of issues suggest that it is (a few of which we have explored here), and that the two fields are, indeed, mutually relevant and important.

Notes

1. Herbert A. Simon et al., *Public Administration* (New York: Knopf, 1950), p. 7.
2. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 50-20, *Guide for Military and Civilian Supervisors* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force, March 1972), p. A1-2.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-116.
4. D.S. Pugh et al. (eds.), *Writers on Organization* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 97-101.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-116.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
7. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 25-1, *USAF Management Process* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force, August 1965), p.1.
8. Pugh, p. 114.
9. Joseph L. Massie and John Douglas, *Managing: A Contemporary Introduction* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
10. The course covers the following: PA as a field of study, administrative theory, organizations and the administrative process, organizations and the individual, the policy process, public management. Source: U.S. Air Force Academy, Department of Political Science and Philosophy, *Syllabus, Pol. Sci. 385, Public Administration* (Fall 1974).
11. Figures provided by the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, U.S. Air Force Academy, by telephone, November 14, 1974.
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THE BUDGET PROCESS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 1947-77: THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THREE SYSTEMS

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Budgeting and the budgetary process are critical in any organization because, to a great extent, "dollars are policy." If the funds for a particular activity cannot be acquired, planning becomes fruitless and execution impossible. In the Department of Defense (DOD) the budgetary process is especially important. This importance arises from three factors. First, DOD has a very thin legislative base. Nearly all of its programs must be acted on annually by the Executive and Legislative Branches in the budget process. Unlike other federal agencies, the Pentagon receives no long-term commitments from the Congress. This is different from most other federal agencies where the budget process consists mainly of costing out approved and continuing programs.

Second, approximately 65 per cent of the controllable expenditures in the entire federal government are in the area of national defense.¹ In FY 1976, \$63.8 billion in a DOD budget of \$92.8 billion was controllable. In contrast, only \$20 billion of HEW's total budget of \$127.7 billion was controllable. Therefore, defense appropriations are the easiest to manipulate in order to implement a particular fiscal policy. For example, during the fall of 1975, President Ford directed the Pentagon to make a \$7 billion reduction so that he could keep his FY 1977 Budget under \$400 billion.

Third, the decisions made in a particular budgetary evolution in DOD have profound long-term implications. For example, a surface ship funded in the FY 1976 defense budget will go to sea in 1983 and will remain operational until 2013.

Since the unification of DOD in 1947, three different budgeting procedures have been employed within the Pentagon. The first system extended from 1947 through 1961; the second prevailed during the 1961-68 period; while the third has been operative since 1969. In this article, we will outline the procedures and the conceptual underpinnings of each of these three systems and then the strengths and weaknesses of each system.

■ The article describes the procedures and conceptual underpinnings of the three basic budgeting processes used in the Department of Defense since its unification in 1947 and evaluates their strengths and weaknesses.

The first period was that of the Truman-Eisenhower years, and the system of fixed allocations to each service used pleased no one, its only advantage being the early imposition of a spending ceiling. The second, the McNamara Period, is best characterized by the complete control exercised by the Secretary of Defense and by the introduction of the planning programming and budgeting system (PPBS). The third system is that in use since 1968; its most important aspects are the decentralization of power and modified retention of PPBS. Despite the improvements in the system, there are still serious shortcomings in the budgeting process.

The author concludes that while much progress has been made in the budgetary process, there is still considerable room for improvement. Two primary constraints, however, will remain: its inherent political nature, and the near irrelevancy of planning.

The Truman-Eisenhower Period

The Process

From the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 through 1961, the budget format or process within the department was virtually unchanged.²

The budget process would begin about a year before the budget was to be submitted to the Congress. The first step would be the imposition of a ceiling on DOD by the Administration. Under President Truman, the Pentagon was allotted a fixed one-third of the total federal budget. Prior to the Korean War, the President refused to budge from the ceiling even when events in the

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international arena appeared to dictate an increase in defense spending. For FY 1950, the total DOD budget was \$13.3 billion, and in FY 1951 the Truman Administration asked Congress for only \$12.2 billion, a decrease of 8 per cent. The defense budget went down because federal revenues had dropped in the interim, and Truman was determined to keep the budget balanced. Yet, in the period between congressional approval of the FY 1950 defense budget and submission of the FY 1951 request, the Communists had taken over China and the Soviet Union had exploded an atomic bomb.³

President Eisenhower was also concerned with a balanced budget and decreed that no more than 10 per cent of the GNP would go to defense. Like his Democratic predecessor, the former general held steadfastly to his ceilings in spite of changes in the international environment. In January 1957 President Eisenhower requested \$35.5 billion for DOD during FY 1958. Within the next ten months the Soviet Union shocked the American public and the world by launching the first ICBM and orbiting the first Sputnik satellite. In light of these dramatic Soviet advances, the Congress and the public expected some spectacular new initiatives in the FY 1959 defense budget, but none were forthcoming. In January 1958 Eisenhower requested an increase of only 5.6 per cent in defense authority. Overall defense spending increased by only 12 per cent over the entire eight years of the Eisenhower era.⁴

After the imposition of the ceiling, the Secretary of Defense would allocate the amount among the three services. Each of the services would in turn prepare its basic budget submission by dividing its own ceiling among its own functions, units, and activities. Throughout this period, except for the Korean War, the services received virtually fixed shares of the total defense budget: The Air Force 47 per cent, the Navy 29 per cent, and the Army 24 per cent.⁵

In preparing their budgets, the services were supposed to be guided by two planning documents, the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) Document and the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP).⁶ The BNSP was issued annually by the National Security Council (NSC). Theoretically the BNSP was a comprehensive statement of American strategic policy which would provide guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the services in their planning for force and weapon levels. Although the NSC devoted a great deal of

time and energy to the drafting of the BNSP, the document was essentially useless for budgeting purposes. Rather than resolving the sharp differences of opinion over what the strategic policy of the United States should be, it glossed over them to make the document acceptable to all parties.⁷

After completion, the BNSP was sent to the JCS to serve as a guide for their Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). The JSOP is a document of two volumes that assesses the threat and then prescribes the military forces that the JCS believe are required to carry out our military strategy and national objectives. Because the BNSP could be interpreted in so many ways, each service Chief stressed that portion of the BNSP that enhanced the primary mission of his service. Consequently, the JSOP was really three separate plans added together and called a joint plan.⁸

There was in effect no definitive guidance on how to structure the armed forces. In building their budgets the individual services were free to emphasize those portions of their programs which contributed most to organizational health or organizational essence. Moreover, each service could legitimately claim that it alone had to provide for our security. Therefore, it would justify exceeding its budgetary ceiling. Thus, the budgets that were sent to the Secretary of Defense each October not only were unbalanced but exceeded the ceilings by some 15 per cent.

The first eight Secretaries of Defense used a variety of approaches to attempt to get the JCS to scale down these requests and thus share responsibility with them for the final budget. These approaches ranged from direct commands to pep talks about being team players, but the results were always the same. The Chiefs were unwilling to perform this function for the Secretary. They were so concerned with safeguarding the interests of their own services that they could not agree on where to make the reductions.

The task of reducing the requests thus fell to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Usually the Secretary of Defense or the comptroller made across-the-board cuts to bring the requests into line with the ceiling. For example, in December 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson ordered an across-the-board reduction of 10 per cent in military personnel to bring the FY 1955 budget requests of the military services down to the level imposed by the Administration.⁹ On at least one occasion, a Secretary of Defense was

unable to decide where to make a reduction and appealed to Congress for help. In 1959 Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy suggested that Congress "hold our feet to the fire" by choosing either the Army's Nike-Hercules or the Air Force's Bomarc as our continental air defense missile.¹⁰

Advantages and Disadvantages

Although this form of budgeting existed in DOD for 15 years, it really pleased no one. The only advantage of the system was the imposition of a ceiling early in the budget process. This gave the Secretary of Defense and the services the opportunity to face up to fiscal realities and to set priorities if they so desired. However, this advantage was more than offset by the many weaknesses which existed in the Pentagon in the pre-1961 period. These weaknesses may be placed into five categories.¹¹ First, there was no integrated planning done that was relevant to the budget process. There was some planning done by the military, but it was bifurcated and completely unrelated to fiscal reality. The forces necessary to implement the plans produced in the 1940s and 1950s would have tripled the funds available for defense.

Second, there was a great deal of duplication of effort by the services in certain areas. For example, each of the military departments was trying to stake out a role for itself in the prestigious strategic offensive area. Consequently, they all were working on their own ICBMs.

Third, many other areas of national defense were neglected and thus our defense posture was not very well balanced. The Air Force, which gave overriding priority to its bombers and missiles, neglected the tactical air units needed to support the Army's ground operations and the airlift units needed to move the ground troops. The Navy, which gave priority to the attack carrier, neglected its anti submarine warfare (ASW) and escort functions. The Army preserved its 14-division force even though this meant that all of the divisions lacked the necessary equipment and supplies.

Fourth, each service came to feel that it was entitled to a fixed share of the defense budget. This situation led each of the services to believe that it would receive its fixed share regardless of the effectiveness of its programs in meeting national needs. Moreover, if anyone in OSD favored a new program, that person would have to find funds for it. For example, in the late 1950s

the Navy refused to devote very much of its budget to Polaris. When it was confronted with arguments, based on urgent national need, for increasing the Polaris program, the Navy argued that Polaris was primarily a national program and should not be financed out of the Navy's 29 per cent share of the defense budget.

Fifth, the whole focus of those involved in the defense budget was on the upcoming fiscal year. This limited horizon resulted in decision makers placing an undue emphasis upon current costs and thus usually neglecting future costs and effectiveness. For example, in 1957 Secretary Wilson refused to approve pay increases in skill areas which were in short supply, even though the Cordiner Commission demonstrated that the present pay increases would more than pay for themselves because the higher retention rates would mean future reductions in training costs.

Sixth, the Secretary of Defense had no rational criteria for choosing among the competing programs put forth by the individual services. On some occasions his decisions were based upon intuition or experience rather than a standard by which he could judge which system or combination of systems would best produce a desired result. Other times, the Secretary sought merely to arbitrate or find a compromise which satisfied the services but did not necessarily serve the national interest.

The McNamara Period

When Robert McNamara agreed to become Secretary of Defense, he did it on condition that he could in fact make defense policy and manage the Department. As discussed above, in DOD the budget process is the key to the functioning of the Department. Therefore, in order for McNamara to gain control of DOD he had to gain control of the budget process. He already had the authority. What he needed were the management tools to allow him to view DOD at a level above the services. At the Rand Corporation, a planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) had been used to analyze defense issues at the program or OSD level since the mid-1950s. In staffing the Pentagon, McNamara recruited two of the Rand's most distinguished analysts, Charles Hitch and Alain Enthoven, and together with them introduced PPBS into the Pentagon.

The Cycle

PPBS divided the budgetary process into three

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clearly defined cycles which lasted nearly 20 months.¹² Thus, preparation of the FY 1966 budget, which was to become effective in July 1965, and was to be submitted to the Congress in January 1965, got underway in the spring of 1963. The foundation for PPBS in DOD from 1961 through 1968 was the Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP). This document was the master plan for the budget process and contained the programs approved by OSD with their estimated costs projected for five years. The initial FYDP was produced in 1961 and projected programs and costs through 1965. Each year the FYDP was updated by decisions made during the budget process.

The planning cycle was the first and longest of the cycles. It began in May and lasted until February, and was composed of three steps. The first step involved production of Volume I of the JSOP by the JCS. This volume was an assessment of the military threat facing the United States and of our national commitments projected for five years. Neither the NSC nor the Secretary of Defense provided any guidance to the JCS in developing JSOP I. Consequently, the military made their own assessments. Since these were so much more conservative or pessimistic than McNamara's, the JSOP had no impact in the budgetary cycle.

The second step of the planning cycle consisted of the submission of force level recommendations by the services and unified commands to the JCS. These recommendations were based upon the threat and commitments outlined in Volume I of the JSOP. The third and final step of the planning cycle involved the completion of two major documents. The JCS finished Volume II of the JSOP. This part recommended the optimum force levels that the military chiefs considered necessary to meet U.S. requirements.

While the JCS were completing the JSOP, OSD produced a Major Program Memorandum (MPM) for each of the ten mission areas and support activities of the defense budget.¹³ These memoranda summarized the OSD position on the major force levels, the rationale for choices among alternatives, and the recommended force levels and funding. Although the MPM were programming documents theoretically based upon the planning in the JSOP, their authors in fact ignored the JSOP, and the MPM became both a planning and programming document.

The programming cycle began with the

Secretary's receipt of the JSOP and MPM. This cycle lasted about six months, through the end of August. McNamara normally reviewed those documents for about 30 days and then provided guidance to the services for preparing Program Change Requests (PCR), suggested modifications to the FYDP. The primary factor shaping this guidance was the MPM.

The services normally submitted about 300 PCRs annually to the Office of Systems Analysis, whose decisions were nearly always negative. The rejection of the PCRs was attributable to three factors: the services used poor analytical techniques, their requests did not convey a sense of priority in relation to the base program, and their cost.

Theoretically all the program decisions should have been made before budgeting began, but often this was not the case. Many of the program decisions were negotiated during and after the budgetary cycle. An OSD official reported that for FY 1968 and FY 1969, 90 per cent of the final program decision documents were not written until after December 28 — after the conclusion of the budgetary cycle.¹⁴

While Systems Analysis was reviewing the PCRs, the JCS were reviewing the MPM. The Chiefs' comments on the memoranda were sent to the Secretary in July. For the remainder of the summer, McNamara and the JCS met about 15 times to discuss the Chiefs' adverse comments. These meetings were primarily pro forma. McNamara was not interested in the JCS opinions. He had his own clearly defined views on strategy and he used these meetings to attempt to persuade the chiefs to accept his position or to divide the JCS.¹⁵

The budgetary cycle officially began in September when the services were asked to prepare their budgets in the traditional categories, i.e., each service separately rather than in program packages, for submission to OSD by October 1. In issuing his call for budget submissions, McNamara emphatically pointed out, year after year, that the services were not to feel bound by any budgetary ceiling, real or imaginary. They were to be guided only by decisions made in regard to the MPM and the PCRs. The Secretary repeatedly stated that this country could afford whatever was necessary for defense. Theoretically, the budgetary cycle was to consist only of costing out approved programs.

Despite McNamara's rhetoric, most of the key figures in DOD had a very good idea of what the

defense total would be. On most occasions, it was matter of simple arithmetic. It was more than a mere coincidence that what this country could afford for defense from FY 1963 through FY 1966, before the Vietnam buildup, came within one per cent of \$46 billion each year and that the Army, Navy, and Air Force shares of the budget were a fairly constant 27, 32, and 41 per cent respectively. A service Chief, who served under Eisenhower and McNamara, said that in regard to budget ceilings there was no real difference between either Administration.¹⁶ Another Chief remarked, "Weapons systems became more and more difficult to justify as we approached our portion of \$46 billion."¹⁷ During the last two years of the McNamara period the comptroller actually issued an informal memo which provided estimates of defense, service, and program totals.

However, in the absence of specific fiscal constraints, the services felt that they had to request much more than could be expected or even supported. To do any less would cause the service leaders to "lose face" with their subordinates. Consequently, during the McNamara period the requests sometimes exceeded the final budgets by as much as 30 per cent. During the last four years of the McNamara period, the requests of the services were an average of \$18.1 billion above the amount finally approved.¹⁸

From October through December, the Comptroller's Office reviewed these budgets. In order to reduce those budgets, the office normally had to initiate some 600 subject issues, i.e., area of potential savings. Although these issues were theoretically technical, e.g., the cost of a submarine or the cost of equipping an infantry battalion, the issues actually reflected intuitive feelings on the part of personnel in the Comptroller's Office about where they felt cuts ought to be made. McNamara reviewed the budgets personally and, with the subject issues as a guide, made about 700 budgetary decisions annually. Often his decisions concerned the smallest matters, such as the color of belt buckles.

The executive phase of the budgetary cycle concluded in late December when the President met with the Secretary and the JCS for about four hours. Despite vigorous opposition on the part of many members of the JCS during their "days in court," the President invariably sided with McNamara. The only major issue on which President Johnson ever overruled the Secretary was the ABM.¹⁹

The Chiefs were not the only ones who were unsuccessful in inducing the President to overrule McNamara. The Secretary's final budgets were not altered by a single penny by the Bureau of the Budget. For all other departments, the Budget Bureau could make any changes it wished. If the departments involved objected, they could appeal to the White House. But if the Bureau wanted to alter DOD's budget, it had to seek permission from the White House. Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, stated that during the McNamara years fiscal policy was forced to adapt to defense spending, rather than vice versa.²⁰

Merely looking at the steps in the PPBS cycle is not sufficient to understand the change that this system brought into the budgetary process in the Pentagon. In order to appreciate the total significance of PPBS in DOD, we must also consider its structural, analytical, and administrative—organization aspects.²¹

Structural Aspects

PPBS relies upon a structural program budget. The chief feature of this budget is its output orientation. The program budget allows the activities of several agencies to be assembled in terms of specific output packages, i.e., programs and sub-programs of various convenient levels of aggregation. For example, one of the goals of DOD is to achieve an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union — destroy 20-25 per cent of the Soviet population and 50 per cent of Soviet industry. To achieve this broad goal, which is one aspect of a strategy of deterrence, allocation decisions must be made. Assured destruction can be achieved through ICBMs, SLBMs, manned bombers, or some combination thereof. These three sub-programs compete with each other for defense funds in the strategic program. Each of these in turn is made up of alternative sub-programs, which compete with each other for resources, as inputs for achieving assured destruction.

Ultimately, the program budget identifies elements down to the input level of the basic building blocks of the various required resources: manpower, materials, equipment, buildings, land, etc. These blocks are known as program elements, and in the DOD budget there are approximately 1,700 of them. These elements are then combined into various packages that produce desired outputs (e.g., assured destruction). Breaking down and

combining data into useful building blocks allows decision makers to reconstruct the program budget at their particular levels of responsibility according to articulated objectives or goals.

PPBS also requires that the outputs be to some extent quantifiable so that the projected expenditure data, which appears in the budget, can be meaningfully related to projected performance. For example, in order to make a meaningful judgment about the Trident, we would want to know the amount of destruction that could be caused by a Trident Missile.

The final structural aspect of PPBS is its extended time horizon. The pre-1961 organization of budgetary data in DOD rarely offered a profile of future expenditures linked to or implied by current investment decisions. But to make rational choices, the decision maker must know something about the future expenditure implications of decisions made today. In DOD, the five-year defense plan (FYDP) provides this extended time horizon. It is a series of force tables giving an eight-year projection of forces and a five-year projection of costs and manpower, displayed in the mission-oriented programs.

Analytical Aspects

Analysis and evaluation are integral parts of the PPBS process; without them PPBS is really a shell. They include the study of objectives and of alternative ways of achieving them, of future environments, and of contingencies and how to respond to them. Since defense planning and budgeting need to be done over a number of years into the future, explicit recognition must be given to the uncertainties of the future. Budgetary analysis in DOD draws on the economic theory of choice over time or capital theory and benefit-cost analysis, referred to by some as cost-utility analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, or simply systems analysis.

Benefit-cost analysis is mainly concerned with resource allocation efficiency and attempts to relate total costs to benefits produced by a particular program. It permits the use of explicit criteria and systematic comparison of several alternative courses of action that might achieve a certain objective for some future time period.

Benefit-cost analysis requires information in addition to that likely to be presented in the program budget. It takes into account all costs, by whomever incurred, and all benefits, to whomever they accrue. The benefits are the value of the

added output, while the costs of a program are the resources sacrificed if that action is taken. If benefits and costs were exhaustive, certain, and commensurable, efficient resources allocation would result from a policy calculated to yield the greatest present value of net benefits. When financial constraints force the Secretary to choose from many desirable programs, he should select those with the highest net present value, until he reaches the point at which his budget is spent. However, in DOD benefits and costs are rarely exhaustive, certain, and commensurable; therefore, in virtually no case can a complete estimate of the present value of net benefits be obtained. But with care the analyst can obtain partial estimates of the benefits and costs of some systems and can furnish the decision maker with partial qualitative information on others. In practice then, the analyst, instead of maximizing one's present values, is usually satisfied with identifying preferred solutions; i.e., he/she suboptimizes.

Budgetary analysis also involves the careful, explicit treatment of uncertainties and their implications for planning and budgeting. These arise largely because of the extended time horizon required for rational decisions. Some of the tools for handling these uncertainties are sensitivity analysis, contingency analysis, and *a fortiori* analysis.²² Analysts also concern themselves with designing decision strategies and operations which offer preferred solutions under different types of uncertainty, e.g., sequential decision making, parallel activities, and investments in flexible multipurpose projects.

Administrative-Organizational Aspects

If PPBS is to be effective, it is not enough merely to establish programs and to use analytical tools. Someone outside of the agency must have jurisdiction over programs that transcend that particular agency or department, and the group of people who perform the analysis must be responsive to that individual. Prior to 1961, the Secretary of Defense had jurisdiction over DOD, but the men who occupied that position had neither the staff nor the inclination to exercise their authority. But Robert McNamara, who came to the Pentagon in 1961, was determined to be an active leader rather than simply a judge or referee, waiting for his subordinates to bring him problems for solution or alternatives for choice. To help him carry out this active leadership role, McNamara first established the Office of Systems Analysis in

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and then raised systems analysis to the Assistant Secretary level. He used this tool to transfer decision-making power from the services to his office. So complete was this transference of power that McNamara's tenure was referred to by some as the "McNamara Monarchy."²³

PPBS also brought about organizational changes in the three military departments. Initially the military services complained bitterly about the introduction of analysis into the Pentagon. They claimed that cost-benefit analysis denigrated military experience. Soon they realized that it was not analysis to which they objected but the style of the analysts. Eventually all of the services established their own analysis capabilities.

Advantages and Disadvantages of PPBS in DOD in the McNamara Era.

Even its harshest critics will concede that PPBS offers certain potential improvements in decision making in the budget process in DOD. The improvements or benefits can be classified within six broad headings.²⁴

First, PPBS allowed officials to make decisions in the budget process based more upon the explicit criteria of the national interest. Previously the Secretary of Defense sought to find a compromise among the various institutional, parochial, or other vested interests in DOD. But under PPBS there exists openly defensible national purposes that the program is meant to serve, alternative ways of achieving these purposes, and criteria by which to judge competing alternatives.

Second, PPBS considered military needs and costs together. Decisions on forces and budgets should be made together. When needs and costs are separated, there will inevitably be an imbalance between objectives and forces and ultimately an imbalance between planned forces and the actual budgets and programs provided to support them.

Third, PPBS provided for the explicit consideration of alternatives at the top decision level. Through the various programming documents, the Secretary of Defense was offered several balanced feasible solutions in which costs forces and strategies have been considered together.

Fourth, PPBS permitted the decision makers to judge the future implications of current decisions. The FYDP deals with forces and costs in a comprehensive manner, bringing together at one time and in one place all the relevant information.

Fifth, PPBS made use of open, explicit analysis.

Each analysis was made available to all interested parties so that they could examine the calculations, data, and assumptions and retrace the steps leading to the conclusion. All the calculations, data, and assumptions were described in such a way that they could be checked, tested, criticized, debated, discussed, and refuted by other agencies.

Sixth, under PPBS the base program competed equally with new programs. Previously, the budget process in DOD began by accepting the base and then examined only incremental departures from it. This caused the Pentagon to transfer the present into the future with a few small variations. New programs and radical initiatives had very little hope of being accepted. Since PPBS concentrated on objectives, the base program was sacred only as long as it conformed to the objectives.

The introduction of PPBS by McNamara into the Pentagon greatly improved the quality of budgetary process within DOD. However, PPBS as practiced by McNamara was by no means a perfect process. It too had several weaknesses. Those weaknesses may be placed into four categories.

First, the process was overcentralized. Too many decisions were left to the Secretary of Defense. By his own admission, McNamara made some 700 budget decisions annually. It is simply impossible for one man to make that many high-quality decisions. Moreover, the subunits of DOD and agencies outside of the Pentagon were virtually excluded from the process. The military services and the JCS could only comment on or attempt to change the initiatives of the Secretary. McNamara and his staff did the real planning and programming, and in their review of the service budget submissions they penetrated to the depths of the individual budgets. No item was too small to escape their scrutiny. Similarly, the agencies outside the Pentagon had almost no input into or impact upon the defense budget. The NSC offered no guidance for formulating the budget, the Bureau of the Budget could not set a ceiling on or change the defense budget, and there was no mechanism to review it for conformity with national policy. It was more than symbolic that the only comprehensive foreign policy statements made during the Kennedy-Johnson years were McNamara's annual statements on the defense budget.

Second, McNamara downgraded the value of experience. This was a mistake because systems analysis is more of an art than a science. There is a great deal of reliance upon judgment and intuition.

Oftentimes the objectives are either unknown or subject to change. For many of the crucial variables there was no mathematical function that could express the desired relationship. Finally, there may be no single criterion for judging results among conflicting objectives. Therefore, the military professionals by virtue of their experience could have brought many insights into the analytical process. The way in which McNamara constructed the budgetary process virtually made it impossible for them to make any meaningful contributions. Had he listened to this "voice of experience," McNamara may not have insisted on developing the ill-fated Joint Air Force-Navy Fighter, the TFX or F-111.

Third, facets of PPBS frequently collapsed under the stress of time constraints that are inherent in the budgetary cycle. Rarely, if ever, were all of the programming decisions completed before the budgetary cycle commenced. Indeed, on some occasions the program decisions were made after the budgets were finished. If the programs do not drive the budgets, much of the rationale for PPBS is gone.

Fourth, the failure to give specific fiscal guidance early in the process made it necessary to reduce the budget requests by very large amounts in a very short period of time. As noted above, from FY 1966 through FY 1970 the Comptroller's Office had to cut an average of \$18.1 billion in some two months. This process was so hectic that it often led to hasty and ill-conceived decisions.

Post-1968 Period

The Concept

Melvin Laird, who had observed McNamara's revolution from his seat on the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, felt that McNamara's methods had led to over-centralization in decision making. Accordingly, when he became the tenth Secretary of Defense, Laird instituted certain changes in the defense budget process to redress this situation. The essence of these changes was contained in a "treaty" signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the service Secretaries, and the Chairman of the JCS. This treaty, "negotiated" soon after Laird assumed the helm at the Pentagon, provided that the Secretary of Defense would look to the services and the JCS in the design of forces and that the Systems Analysis Office would limit itself


to evaluation and review and not put forward independent proposals of its own.²⁵ In return for this concession, the Secretary of Defense expected the services to work within the stringent budget ceilings which he would promulgate early in the cycle. These changes have been institutionalized by his successors, James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld.

In addition to the changes made by the Secretary of Defense, the budgetary process in DOD was also affected by changes made in the National Security Council system. Under the direction of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, the NCS issued 127 formal National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs) between 1969 and 1972. These documents spelled out in fairly specific terms what our policy was. For example, NSDM 3 directed the Pentagon to plan to fight no more than one major and one minor war simultaneously.²⁶ Similarly, Nixon and Kissinger created the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC), chaired by Kissinger. The committee was composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary of State, the Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisors and the JCS, and the Directors of OMB and Central Intelligence. The task of the DPRC was to assess the political, economic, and social consequences which would result from changes in the levels of defense spending, budgetary, and force levels.

The present budgetary process is outlined in Figure 1. As is indicated in that schematic, the length of the process is still 20 months and the foundation remains the FYDP. However, because of the innovations made within DOD and the NSC system, the emphasis within the process has changed. The JCS inaugurate the planning cycle by producing Volume I of the JSOP, i.e., the strategic assessment, and sending it to the Secretary of Defense. After his review of the JSOP, the Secretary issues a coordinated, complete, and current strategic guidance document for the entire defense community, the Strategic Guidance Memorandum (SGM). This document is issued in January — the SGM for FY 1972 was issued in January 1970. The JSOP and SGM are supposed to reflect the guidance contained in the various NSDMs.

In January the Secretary also issues a Tentative Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (TFGM) projecting dollar constraints for the next five years. While the elements of DOD are reviewing the TFGM, the

FIGURE 1
1972 PLANNING – PROGRAMMING – BUDGETING CYCLE



JCS completes the force structure portion of the JSOP, i.e., Volume II. This is prepared from a purely military perspective, without regard to the fiscal constraints of the TFGM. The Secretary reviews the comments on the TFGM and Volume II of the JSOP and then completes the planning cycle by issuing a Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (FGM) in February. The FGM sets definite ceilings on the total budget and on each service, and builds fences around the major program areas.²⁷ The SGM and FGM are often referred to as Planning and Programming Guidance (PPG).

The ceilings decided upon by the Secretary are primarily a reflection of the condition of the economy and the current economic game plan of the Administration. Since the late 1960s, defense expenditures have become the greatest part of the controllable outlays in the formal budget. In the early years of the Nixon Administration, the President and his fiscally conservative advisors slashed defense spending in an attempt to achieve a balanced budget and thus slow inflation. Ceilings on the defense budget have eased since 1972 as Presidents Nixon and Ford adopted the full employment budget philosophy.²⁸

The programming cycle begins in April when the JCS draw up a Joint Force Memorandum (JFM), which presents the Chiefs' recommenda-

tions on force levels and support programs that can be provided within the fiscal constraints of the FGM. The JFM also includes an assessment of the risks in these forces as measured against the strategy and objectives of JSOP, Volume 1, and a comparison of the costs of its recommendations with the FYDP. Finally, the JFM highlights the major force issues to be resolved during the year.

In May each service submits to the Secretary of Defense a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for each major mission area and support activity in its portion of the defense budget. These memoranda express total program requirements in terms of forces, manpower, and costs and must provide a rationale for deviations from the FYDP and the JFM. Analysts within OSD review the JFM and POM and prepare "issue papers" based upon the points raised in these documents. Both of these programming documents are part of the Laird innovations and represent the decentralization of power from OSD to the services. OSD no longer prepares its own programming documents. Its role is to respond to those prepared by the military.

The Secretary of Defense reviews these issue papers during July and by the end of the month usually issues a Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) for each issue area. Beginning in the first

part of August, the services, the JCS, and the defense agencies are given the opportunity to contest (Reclama) the PDMs. The Secretary concludes the programming cycle by holding major issue meetings with the Secretaries of the military departments and the JCS to resolve any disputes over the PDM.

The budgetary cycle commences on September 30 when each agency submits its budget to OSD. In the post-1969 period, the budgets of the military departments have never been more than five per cent above the established ceilings. During the remainder of the calendar year the budgets are reviewed jointly by the comptroller and representatives of OMB. Although these reviews are supposed to be merely technical, many of the questions raised in this review have programmatic implications.

Issues which cannot be worked out between OSD, OMB, and the services are sent to the Secretary or the White House for the decision. The budget is transmitted to the White House in late December or early January. The President generally meets with the JCS before making the budget final. In the post-McNamara period these meetings have been more than formalities and on occasion the chiefs have prevailed upon the chief executive to reverse the decisions of the Secretary of Defense or the Director of OMB.

Strengths and Weaknesses

The introduction of specific fiscal guidance early in the budgetary process and the decentralization of decision making cured some of the weaknesses of the McNamara period. Between FY 1970 and FY 1975 the budget requests of the services never went more than five per cent above the ceilings and oftentimes were within one or two per cent of the final budget.²⁹ This meant that during the hectic days between the submission of the budgets and their completion, the comptroller only had to make marginal changes, as opposed to the wholesale reductions of the McNamara period.

Decentralization forced upon the services the burden of making the tough choices about which areas to cut during the 37.2 per cent reduction in the real level of defense spending which occurred in the 1969-75 period. If OSD had taken on the task, they doubtless would have experienced a great deal of resistance and foot dragging from the services. As it turned out, the military services slashed their manpower and weapons inventory

about 40 per cent in the 1969-75 period with a bare minimum of bureaucratic resistance.³⁰

Although the innovations made in the post-1969 period have solved some of the weaknesses that existed in the McNamara era, they have by no means eliminated all of these problem areas. In addition, these innovations have created some new difficulties. The present budgetary process has six serious shortcomings.³¹

First, the present system extends over too long a period of time. From the time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff start work on JSOP I until the budget is submitted to Congress, nearly two years elapses. The inherent overlap in this 24-month cycle tends to confuse many participants about where they are in the cycle. For example, JSOP I, which contains the unconstrained JCS advice on broad objectives, military strategy, and defense planning scenarios, and the JFM, which contains the Chiefs' recommendations on the force structure which ought to be achieved within the prescribed fiscal constraints, are both issued in May. Each of these documents pertains to a different fiscal year.

Second, there is some disparity between the planning and programming guidance issues by the Secretary of Defense and the force planning guidance issued by the JCS. In a real sense, DOD has two parallel planning systems going on simultaneously, a military and a civilian system. Theoretically, JSOP I should be considered by the Secretary when he issues his strategic guidance. Similarly, JSOP II (JCS views on the forces the United States needs to implement defense strategy) should be influenced by the Secretary's strategic guidance. Finally, the fiscal guidance issued by the Secretary should take into account the prudent risks outlined by the Chiefs in JSOP II.

However, in reality there is very little connection between the documents of the JCS and OSD. The Secretary and his staff denigrate both volumes of the JSOP as "blue sky" recommendations and hence valueless to the programmer. Therefore, OSD does not even comment on them. Moreover, the strategic guidance of the Secretary is usually published too late to permit timely, detailed consideration by the JCS during development of the JSOP II. In some cases, the JCS and OSD give conflicting guidance on specific contingencies.

Third, program decisions are still not made until the budget itself is completed. This occurs

because there are too many opportunities for the services to request that the program decisions issued by OSD be reconsidered and because the comptroller has become increasingly involved in program issues. Theoretically, the programs should be set by the end of the summer, prior to submission of the budgets. But, because of the generous reclama cycles, program decisions are still open through the end of December. Theoretically, the Comptroller's Office should confine its budget review to technical areas, for example, the cost of an XM-1 or an F-18. However, in recent years the comptroller's review has reopened several program areas during the budgetary cycle. For example, the recommendation was made that F-14s be purchased rather than F-18s.

As a result of these deficiencies, there has been a great deal of confusion both at the headquarters and field level. The policy maker or operator who receives a JSOP I and JFM simultaneously cannot but wonder why these two JCS documents disagree. Similarly, the planner who compares the guidance issued by OSD with that put forth by the JCS is understandably confused about the premises on which plans should be based. Finally, the program managers within the services can never be certain about the status of their programs.

Fourth, although PPBS is an excellent device for making a budget, it offers little assistance in keeping control of the program elements after the budget is formulated. Decision makers can aggregate forces, manpower, and cost together in making the budget. But all of the elements in the program are not together when the budget is put into execution. Congress appropriates money, not by program, but by five separate accounts: military personnel; operations and maintenance (O&M); procurement; research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); and military construction. Moreover, within each of these five accounts there are numerous line items and sub-line items which control the allocation of funds. In the FY 1975 budget there were 750 line items in the DOD budget. The building blocks for a particular program element may be in all five of the accounts and in several different line or sub-line items within each account.

Fifth, the JCS do not actually make any independent or joint military recommendations concerning the forces which can be procured within the fiscal constraints. Their JFM is merely a compilation of the POMs of the individual services.

Thus, the Secretary has no independent military review of the programs of the separate services.

Sixth, the NSC initiatives were too short-lived. During the first three years of the Nixon era, approximately 130 NSDMs were issued. These documents laid out reasonably specific guidance on our national security policy. However, these have not been updated to reflect changes in our foreign policy which have occurred since 1972. For example, the NSDMs do not reflect our new relationship with China. Thus, the budgeters in the Pentagon are once again in the position of making their own foreign policy.

Similarly, the DPRC never worked as intended. In its first year of operation the Committee reviewed the defense budget after it had been completed by the Pentagon, but before it went to the President. This meant that DPRC has less than two weeks to deal with the budget, hardly enough time to fulfill its mandate. When the Committee tried to become involved earlier in the DOD budgetary process, it was rebuffed by Secretary Laird, who perceived this as an attempt by Kissinger to encroach upon his area of responsibility. Thus DPRC could not have any substantive impact on the defense budget. Eventually the committee atrophied as its chairman became personally involved in conducting several areas of U.S. foreign policy.³²

Conclusion

In the summer of 1977 the Department of Defense will mark the 30th anniversary of its unification. During the past three decades it has made considerable progress in the manner in which it produces its budgets. The manner in which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formulated his FY 1978 budget is light years ahead of the manner in which the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, grappled with the FY 1949 budget. This does not mean that the Pentagon has reached the "synthesis" of its budgetary evolutions. As this article has shown, there is still considerable room for improvement in the manner in which the Pentagon carries out this vital function. Thus, there will most probably be modifications as new Secretaries and Administration tackle the problem of deciding "How Much Is Enough." Whatever the future changes, the experience of the past 30 years has demonstrated that there are two primary constraints on the process which will be operative no matter what

form the defense budgetary evolution takes.

First, the budgetary process will be inherently political. The ceilings on the budget will always be affected by the political situation of the President. There never will be any formula to determine the size of the defense appropriation. Within a range of about plus or minus 10 per cent, a particular defense budget can support the same foreign policy objectives. The final figure will be decided by whether the President desires to have a balanced budget like Truman and Eisenhower, whether he chooses to use the defense budget to stimulate the economy as did Presidents Kennedy and Nixon, or whether, like Presidents Johnson and Ford, he wishes to keep the entire federal budget below a certain amount.³³

Similarly, the disposition of funds within the defense budget will always reflect the desires of the subunits of DOD to maintain their organizational essence. Regardless of how much analysis is done, it will be very difficult to dissuade the Army from trying to increase the number of its combat divisions, the Navy its aircraft carriers, or the Air Force its manned bombers.³⁴ The entire structure of each of those services is predicated around those entities. OSD can mute the desire for these

systems somewhat, but it will not find it very easy to eradicate them. Since DOD is too big to be run by any one individual, the Secretary must delegate some of the decision-making authority down to the services and must rely on their services for implementation of other decisions. The services will use this authority to enhance their organizational essence.

Second, planning will remain almost irrelevant for the budget process. Political leaders cannot be expected to give very definitive guidance to the military planners about how they will act in specific contingencies, because they themselves are not sure what they will do. By their very nature, political leaders develop skill in keeping their options open. Without this definitive guidance, military leaders cannot be expected to develop plans that are very relevant for budgetary process. Even if the military did receive guidance from the White House, the plans would not be of much value because of their extended time horizon. The JSOP I for FY 1978, which begins on October 1, 1977, was completed in May of 1975. At that time, the JCS could not know who our President would be, much less what our foreign policy would be.

Glossary of Terms

ABM	- Anti-Ballistic Missile
ASD	- Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASW	- Anti Submarine Warfare
CNO	- Chief of Naval Operations
DOD	- Department of Defense
DPRC	- Defense Program Review Committee
FGM	- Fiscal Guidance Memorandum
FY	- Fiscal Year
FYDP	- Five-Year Defense Plan
GNP	- Gross National Product
ICBM	- Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JCS	- Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFM	- Joint Forces Memorandum
JSOP	- Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
MPM	- Major Program Memorandum
NSC	- National Security Council
NSDM	- National Security Decision Memorandum
O&M	- Operations and Maintenance
OMB	- Office of Management and Budget
OSD	- Office of the Secretary of Defense
PCR	- Program Change Request
PDM	- Program Decision Memorandum
POM	- Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	- Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
RDT&E	- Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
SGM	- Strategic Guidance Memorandum
SLBM	- Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
TFX	- Tactical Fighter Experimental

Notes

1. *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1977*, p. 34. Controllable expenditures are those which can be increased or decreased without changing substantive law.
2. Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, 87th Congress, 1st Session (October 16, 1961), pp. 4-5. See also Charles Hitch, *Decision Making for Defense* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 3-20.
3. For an excellent analysis of the Truman budgeting procedures see Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner Schilling (ed.), *Strategy, Politics, Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 5-266.
4. The best sources on budgeting during the Eisenhower years are Glen Snyder, "The New Look of 1953," in Schilling; Edward Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1959); Matthew Ridgway, *Soldier* (New York: Harper, 1956); and Samuel Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
5. All budgetary figures are from the Budget of the United States Government for the appropriate year.
6. The JSOP was first developed in 1955.
7. Taylor, pp. 82-83.

8. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 92-93 and Hitch, p. 25.
9. Ridgway, p. 287.
10. Enthoven and Smith, p. 15.
11. The weaknesses of the budget process prior to 1961 are well summarized by Enthoven and Smith, pp. 11-30; Taylor, pp. 82-123; Hitch, pp. 23-26.
12. There are numerous sources on the budgeting procedures of the McNamara era. Among the best are: Enthoven and Smith; John Crecine, *Defense Budgeting: Organizational Adaptation to External Constraints* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, March 1960); William Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper, 1964); James Roherty, *The Decisions of Robert S. McNamara* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970); and Lawrence Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).
13. McNamara divided the Defense Budget into 10 programs. These same program categories are still used today.
14. Crecine, p. 41.
15. Interviews with four members of the JCS who served under McNamara.
16. Interview with General George Decker, USA, Chief of Staff, 1960-62.
17. Interview with Admiral David McDonald, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, 1963-67.
18. U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations Hearings for FY 1972*, statement of Secretary Laird, p. 1146.
19. Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 154-157.
20. Quoted in John Crecine, "Making Defense Budgets," in Appendix K, Volume IV, Report of the Commission on The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (June 1975), p. 83.
21. This breakdown of PPBS is adapted from Werner Hirsch, "Toward Federal Program Budgeting," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 26 (December 1966), pp. 260-262. See also Ralph Sanders, *The Politics of Defense Analysis* (New York: Dunellen, 1973), and Clark Murdock, *Defense Policy Formulation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974).
22. Sensitivity analysis is a technique which involves the repetition of an analysis with different values for cost or performance assumptions. Its purpose is to compare the effects of the substitution with the results of the basic analysis. If a small change in an assumption brings about a proportionately greater change in the outcome, then the results are considered to be "sensitive" to that assumption. Contingency analysis is a form of sensitivity analysis which alters the environment of a decision situation by varying the relevant factors which describe the environment. Its purpose is to determine the effects of a change in the environment on the results of the basic analysis. A *fortiori* analysis deliberately biases the variables in favor of the alternatives to a choice which has been previously judged as the best. If the best solution continues to receive a favorable comparison, in spite of the weighted analysis, its position is strengthened.
23. Hanson Baldwin, "The McNamara Monarchy," *Saturday Evening Post* (March 9, 1963), p. 8. See also Kaufmann, p. 90.
24. The advantages are summarized by Enthoven and Smith, pp. 33-47.
25. Enthoven and Smith, p. 334. See also House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1971*, Volume III, pp. 480-481.
26. Crecine, p. 88. See also John Leacacos, "The Nixon NSC: Kissinger's Apparatus," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1971), pp. 2-24.
27. This prevents the services from shifting funds away from a less glamorous area, e.g., Airlift.
28. George Mahon (D-Tex), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, forced Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to admit that there were funds in the FY 1975 budget which had as their primary purpose stimulating the economy. Press conference of the Secretary of Defense, May 22, 1974.
29. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
30. A good example of this was the 50 per cent reduction in the number of ships by the Navy. This program was initiated by the Chief of Naval Operations in order to transfer funds from maintenance into procurement. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), chap. 3.
31. The weaknesses were perceived by the author when he participated in the process as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the 1974-76 period.
32. In 1976, the DPRC was replaced by the Defense Review Council under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Defense. It confined its activities to long-range questions.
33. Secretary Schlesinger's failure to heed this fact led to his untimely firing. He refused to trim \$7 billion off of the proposed FY 1977 defense budget so that President Ford could keep his election year budget below \$400 billion.
34. It has taken the Air Force over a decade to overcome the opposition to a new manned bomber of several Secretaries of Defense, service secretaries, and analysts in OSD, and dozens of congressmen and senators. But it has prevailed!

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

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Presently the cost of research and development (R&D) for new weapons systems and equipment for national defense exceeds \$12 billion annually, exclusive of management and administrative costs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and costs of further development during the procurement phase following initial R&D. This is expected to grow to \$16 billion annually in the next few years and dwarfs in comparison the \$1 billion spent by General Motors in 1975, the largest R&D expenditure to date of any private corporation in the United States.

It was not always so. Prior to World War I, R&D costs within the military were negligible. In 1940, just prior to the build-up for World War II, they amounted to a scant \$30 million annually.

That there is a tremendous price tag on the development of today's weaponry is general knowledge. The evolution of the present system of management within DOD for R&D accompanying this tremendous cost growth is not so well-known, yet such knowledge is vital to an understanding of the full extent of today's national defense expenditures for R&D and of the present defense research and development management environment.

This evolution took many twists and turns. However, of the many changes within DOD in the organization and methodology of R&D management, there are eight that stand out above all the others as the chief determinants of the present DOD management system (see box). This article traces both the growth of R&D for national defense and the evolution of the present management environment in relation to these fundamental changes.

The Unique Nature and Background of the Defense Acquisition Process

The most important participant in the defense weapons and equipment acquisition process by far is the government as buyer and user. As the sole

■ This article traces both the growth of research and development for national defense and the evolution of its present management environment in relation to the fundamental changes brought about by such growth. The author details the unique nature and background of the defense acquisition process, one in which the most important participant, the government, has constant control over the R & D process of a product. However, such control is a relatively new procedure, and three general periods in its development are delineated.

Prior to World War II there was little R & D coordination between the Army and Navy Departments, and a heavy reliance on commercial "ready made" items for military use, as well as on foreign weaponry. In the second period – from WW II to the early 1960s – five fundamental changes are noted in the R & D management environment, including the centralized control of R & D and the separation of it from procurement. During the third period, beginning with the McNamara Secretaryship, three additional modifications come about. But, it is concluded, it is still too early to determine the effectiveness of these new procedures.

buyer of a unique commodity, it first decides what to buy and then implements this decision through the continuous control of the R&D process and the following procurement process. Although the first decision as to what to buy is critical, the implementation of this basic decision involves many successive decisions over the long and arduous process of development. The successful end-product of this is a prototype representing only an increased military potential, and results in the need for even more time and more money to

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**EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE R&D
MANAGEMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II**

- *Advent of extreme competition among the three services
- *Centralization of top-level control under DOD
- *Separation of R&D from procurement
- *Establishment of Special Program Offices
- *Introduction of the prime contractor approach
- *Implementation of PPBS
- *Issuance of DOD Directive 5000.1
- *Effects of increased congressional control of R&D funding

procure these systems in quantity before an increased military capability is achieved.

Prior to World War II, there was little formal coordination of research and development activities between the War and Navy Departments. Within these departments, management of R&D was largely a matter left to the various specialist branches and bureaus. There was no separate congressional appropriation for R&D, and funding was provided from the other military appropriations, mainly the procurement appropriation.

The level of R&D effort was extremely low. Most Navy R&D work was done in the Navy's laboratories and ordnance testing stations under the various Navy bureaus. These included the Bureau of Ordnance, organized in 1842; the Bureau of Aeronautics, organized in 1921; and the Bureau of Ships, formed in 1940 through the merger of the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Steam Engineering. The Army's R&D activities were conducted in arsenals, proving grounds, and special laboratories under the various technical services — the Ordnance Corps, Chemical Corps, Signal Corps, Corps of Engineers, and the new Army Air Corps Material Division at Wright Field.

There were other distinguishing characteristics of this pre-World War II era. One was the heavy reliance on commercial items for military use. Most military needs could be obtained directly in the civilian market with little or no modification. If modifications were required, manufacturers could provide prototypes for testing in military arsenals and proving grounds. Another distinguishing characteristic was a very heavy reliance on foreign weaponry. As a carry-over from World War I, most of the Army's artillery guns and

howitzers were modifications of British or French weapons. Many improvements of other types of weapons and equipment also had their origin in foreign military R&D.

Just prior to World War II, as a result of the new technology displayed in German armaments, there was a growing recognition of the increasing role which science and technology would play in U.S. weapons development. This recognition came not from within the military but from the civilian scientific and technological professions. As a result, in 1940 the National Defense Research Committee was formed and in 1941 it was expanded into the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) as a strictly civilian agency with its own separate budget and with authority to decide what military R&D efforts to initiate. As later stated by Irvin Stewart, the first deputy director of OSRD:

Modern science had progressed to the point where the military chieftains were not sufficiently acquainted with its possibilities to know for what they might ask with a reasonable expectation that it could be developed. . . what was needed was an organization which could make its own assessment of what the Armed Services needed and which could then, preferably with the assistance of the services but over their opposition if necessary, go about the business of getting the necessary weapons developed.¹

The OSRD achieved an outstanding record during World War II in connection with development of the atomic bomb, anti-aircraft gun directors, microwave radar, the proximity fuse, and many other new devices and systems. However, after the war, with the return to peacetime austerity, the OSRD was allowed to disband, and military research and development, with the exception of atomic energy, reverted almost exclusively to the various Army and Navy agencies and bureaus.

One issue that emerged with the military build-up on the eve of World War II was whether the coordination and top-level control of R&D and procurement activities within the War and Navy Departments should be the responsibility of civilian or military officials. The proponents of military control emphasized the close relationship between military operations and the provision of equipment and weapons for these operations. Alternatively, consolidation of top-level direction under civilian authority would give a broader perspective and would be more in keeping with the national policy of control of the military by civilian authority. Despite this controversy, up to

and including World War II, procurement and R&D within the Army and Navy generally remained a military function, leaving the question of top-level control to be settled in the post-World War II era.

Major Changes in R&D Management Following World War II

In the evolution of the present defense R&D management environment, the period between World War II and the early 1960s was one of tremendous growth and increasing importance. Five fundamental changes mark this period:

1. Increased competition among the services.
2. Centralization of top-level control under DOD.
3. Separation of R&D from procurement within the services.
4. Establishment of the special program office.
5. Introduction of the prime contractor approach.

If the period prior to World II can be characterized as a period during which there was little if any coordination and cooperation in R&D matters between the Army and Navy, the period immediately following World War II was one of intense rivalry among the three military services — rivalry over limited defense resources for R&D, over what to obtain with these resources, and over which of the three should take the lead in development of weapon systems of common interest. Immediately following the war there was the struggle between Air Force advocates of long-range strategic bombing and Navy advocates of the aircraft carrier. Later there was the conflict over the emphasis placed on preparation for massive retaliation at the expense of preparedness for a limited war threat. There was also competition for common-use physical resources. As an example, there was particularly heavy competition for use of the limited facilities at the Cape Canaveral Missile Test Range. Similarly, there was competition for the limited physical and human resources of specific defense-oriented industrial firms and for critical civilian expertise within DOD.

The most heated interservice rivalries, however, concerned competition for priority in developing and operating weapons which were quite similar if not identical in nature. Fundamental changes in weapons technology had made traditional roles and missions distinctions obsolete. For example,

the ballistic missile was considered by the Army as an extension to long-range artillery, by the Navy as an extension to the Navy's big guns and attack aircraft, and by the Air Force as a supplement to strategic manned bombers. This led to the Thor-Jupiter-Polaris competition. Likewise, there was much rivalry concerning whether the Army or Air Force was to develop surface-to-air guided missiles, as these missiles filled both the Army's antiaircraft artillery mission and the Air Force's manned interceptor mission. This resulted in the Nike Hercules-Bomarc conflict of 1958-59.

With the centralization of top-level control under DOD, and the advent of the planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS), these conflicts were generally resolved in favor of one of the services over the others. However, this solution did not always reduce bitterness nor the wasteful duplicate use of resources. In a further attempt to reduce interservice rivalry in weapons development, the concept of a "lead service" in development of specific systems was put into effect wherein the service deemed to be the primary user was given the role of leadership in coordinating and, to a degree, in controlling developmental effort. However, despite these efforts, rivalry among the services still persists today.

Centralization of Top-Level Control under DOD

In the first major reorganization action after World War II, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Air Force as an independent organizational entity under DOD and created the National Defense Establishment under the Secretary of Defense as a central coordinating agency for what was in effect a federation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.² Coordination in military procurement matters was implemented through the Munitions Board, and for military R&D through the Joint Research and Development Board. Consolidation of centralized power under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) came later in 1949 when the 81st Congress passed Public Law 216 which created the Department of Defense to replace the National Defense Establishment.³ In 1958 Congress passed Public Law 599, and centralized control by DOD was further strengthened.⁴

Centralization of R&D took place initially in 1950 when the Secretary of Defense appointed a director of guided missiles who assumed broad

responsibilities over guided missile development and production throughout DOD. In 1953 both the Munitions Board and the Joint Research and Development Board were abolished and their functions transferred to the new Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Supply and Logistics and for Research and Development. Centralized DOD control over R&D increased even further in 1958 with the establishment of a new and more powerful position directly under the Secretary of Defense — the director of defense research and engineering (DDR&E). In addition, Congress created the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) which involved the OSD directly in implementation of major systems R&D within the three services. Both the DDR&E and ARPA exist today as centralized R&D control and coordinating agencies of DOD.

At the same time that this centralization of top-level control was taking place, there was also an opposing trend from DOD for research and development in the two new semi-military fields of technology which originated during the war. These were the fields of nuclear energy and space technology. The Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1946 as an independent agency concerned not only with the development of atomic weapons but also with the application of atomic energy for commercial uses. Similarly, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency was established as an independent agency to conduct research and development in military as well as civilian uses of space and aeronautics. Both of these agencies received the major portion of their initial resources from within the military and both continued to perform the mission of developing military applications in their respective fields of technology. Yet from this time on, top-level control of these two important segments of military R&D passed from the military into the hands of independent agencies.

Segregation of R&D from Procurement Activities

Another significant milestone during the period immediately following WWII was the separation of R&D activities from their parent procurement agencies for R&D with independent budgets and programming. In 1946 the Office of Naval Research was organized within the Navy to monitor all basic and applied research, and in 1950 the Air Research and Development Command (the forerunner of the present Air Systems Command)

was established within the Air Force with a similar mission. Although development functions, as contrasted with basic and applied research, initially remained with the production and procurement organizations, there was a gradual separation of these functions also. All three services designated top-level civilian assistant secretaries and military deputy chiefs of staffs who were expressly responsible for both R&D program coordination and the formulation of R&D policy.

With the separation of R&D from other procurement activities, there was a concerted effort made to improve R&D budgeting and fiscal control. In the early 1950s the Army's R&D appropriation was narrowly defined, with large amounts of financial support provided from the Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA) appropriation. By 1958, however, both R&D and PEMA support for research and development were combined, and the single Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation was introduced for all three services. R&D thus became a separate entity, fulfilling the express requirement of developing for the military establishment equipment and weapons for which there was no commercial counterpart and responsible for its own programming and budgeting.

Establishment of the Special Program Office

In the evolution of the present environment of Defense R&D, no event has had a greater influence than the establishment of separate special program or project offices (SPOs) for major development programs. These SPOs integrate the many diverse functional and technical areas of a particular weapon system or equipment acquisition program under a single organizational and control structure. The concept of a separate program office did not originate within the military. Program offices had been widely used in industry when large complex development and marketing programs were undertaken with the matrix system of organization. This procedure has also been used effectively in Russia where an extreme form of "projectizing" is employed for weapons development.

As first introduced within DOD, the program office served both as a central authority for identifying and resolving interfunctional conflicts and as a communications center for ensuring that each of the interrelated parts of the program was coordinated with the others. Within the three

services, the SPO originally took on several forms, depending largely upon the amount of authority granted the program manager and the location of the program office within the organizational hierarchy. The most common form of SPO was a project group constituting a single weapons program within an agency like the Air Force Systems Command or the Army's Rocket and Guided Missile Agency. The following describes an Air Force office during this early period:

The typical special program office is set up for a single weapon system such as the F-105 fighter-bomber or the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile. Within the group are technical specialists on airframes, propulsion, guidance, control, flight testing, contracts, program phasing, production engineering, maintenance, and field support, all under the direction of a System Program Director. . . . These specialists are assigned full-time to the project office, working on behalf of the program director. . . . The project office Chief's job is best described as one of coordination. Generally, he has no *de jure* authority to resolve interfunctional disagreements by issuing orders to functional groups outside his office. He can persuade, but if a serious difference of opinion exists, the matter must be passed out of the project office and up the military chain of command for decision. . . . However, the project director may in practice have considerable *de facto* authority, depending upon his personal effectiveness in reconciling diverse view-points.⁵

Since difficult questions could not be settled within the SPOs as initially conceived, there was considerable agitation to increase the authority of program managers. Higher-ranking officers were assigned to these positions, program offices were placed higher in the command hierarchy, and other measures were taken to increase authority of the SPO. However, it was not until the 1970s under Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and his deputy, David Packard, that this problem was resolved.

Establishment of the Prime Contractor Approach

During this early period following WWII, one final development in R&D management of considerable importance today was the prime contractor approach, under which one principal contractor was selected to integrate the various subsystems comprising the entire system. The prime contractor in turn subcontracted specific segments of the developmental work to other contractors. Each subsystem supplier thus became a subcontractor to the system prime contractor. This procedure shifted responsibility for contract management of subsystem integration from the

SPO to the prime contractor. It also enhanced development within the defense-oriented firms of the special program office-type of organization for management of defense R&D contracts.

From the Implementation of PPBS to the Present

The evolution of the present system of management control of R&D of major defense systems from the early 1960s, when Robert McNamara took office as Secretary of Defense, to the present can be characterized by adoption of new policies for decision making with the DOD and the three services, by refinements in the system of selection and control of individual programs, and by increasing interest and control of defense R&D by Congress. Several principal events stand out in this period:

1. The implementation of the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) in the DOD.
2. The issuance of DOD Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems," by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard.
3. The limitations imposed by Congress in the FY 1972 Defense Authorization (bill and subsequent legislation).

The advent of PPBS has had by far the greatest impact on management control within the Department of Defense since the unification of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In describing the political and historical background of PPBS, Lawrence Korb stated:

. . . when Robert McNamara accepted Kennedy's offer to become the eighth Secretary of Defense, he persuaded the President-elect to postpone the subject of reorganization of DOD until he (McNamara) could assess the situation personally. Nevertheless, Kennedy gave McNamara two objectives: first, develop the military structure required for a firm foundation for our foreign policy without regard to budget ceilings; second, operate this force at the lowest possible price.

Armed only with these two directives and without benefit of any new legislation, McNamara made so many changes, both formal and informal, organizational and procedural, that he brought about not just a reorganization, but a revolution in DOD. Nowhere was this revolution more accurately felt than in the budget process where the Secretary of Defense introduced the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System. . . .⁶

The conceptual background for PPBS began earlier, however, in 1960 when two economists, Hitch and McKean, building on earlier studies by David Novick, published *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*.⁷ The thesis of this book was that DOD management is really a matter

of economic trade-offs to maximize benefits from limited resources, and that to derive the optimum from these resources, defense strategic planning must be linked with sound financial management.

During the years prior to PPBS, financial management and military planning were accomplished separately. Each had been treated as independent activities: management under the comptroller, and planning under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the planning organizations of the three services. Military planning was in terms of outputs: military forces and major weapons systems and equipment projected over periods of five, ten, or even 20 years. Alternatively, budgeting was in terms of inputs: organized financial categories acceptable to the Congress in an approved annual budget format. It was quite apparent that planning and budgeting were completely separate and independent activities. As stated by Alain C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense under McNamara:

It was to bridge the gap between these two functions [of military planning and financial budgeting] that we installed the "programming" system. By linking military planning and budgeting in a unified planning-programming-budgeting decision making process, we were able to produce a single departmentwide blueprint for the future known as the "Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program." This program projects not only the military forces needed to meet the requirements of our long-range military plans but also the personnel, equipment, supplies and installations required to support them. . . .⁸

In addition, prior to PPBS, there was no organized procedure by which tradeoffs among the various alternative programs could be made. The JCS and the service chiefs periodically made presentations of recommended programs to the Secretary of Defense. These would ultimately have to be accepted or rejected in the light of available funding. As stated by the former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis, before a Senate committee in May 1966:

Although Systems Analysis is a reasonable and straightforward concept, it was not an easy one to implement in the Department of Defense. In conducting a sound cost-effectiveness study you must be able to associate both the benefits and costs with the alternatives to be examined. The Defense management system as it existed five years ago did not permit this.⁹

Assistant Secretary Hitch, defense comptroller, describing the problems encountered by the Secretary of Defense resulting from the lack of an organized trade-off procedure among alternative

programs, stated as follows:

In 1961, the chief, in fact the Secretary's only systematic and comprehensive vehicle for the allocation of resources in the Defense Department, was the annual budget. For the task which it was being asked to perform, it was deficient in several respects. The budget focused on the financial problems of a single upcoming fiscal year, thereby discouraging adequate consideration of decisions whose near term dollar impact was slight but whose impact in later years was very large. . . .¹⁰

PPBS affected the defense research and development process in two principal areas. The first of these was in the establishment of what has been termed the "systems analysis approach" to individual program selection. PPBS in this sense could be viewed as a methodology and a conceptual scheme for optimizing the use of available resources in reaching a particular military objective or capability. Bernard H. Rudwick lists six key management questions that must be answered in formulating decisions concerning particular acquisition projects under PPBS:

1. What is the system objective?
2. When will the proposed system be operationally available?
3. How well does the proposed system meet the objective?
4. How much will it cost to implement the system?
5. Is this the best way of meeting the objective?
6. What are the risks and uncertainties involved in obtaining the stated system performance on schedule and at the estimated cost . . . ?¹¹

Under PPBS systems analysis gives the decision maker a visualization not only of program costs but also of the alternative methods of accomplishing the military objective. To the individual program manager this means that the program, to be selected, must prove itself to be the best alternative. The program must thereafter remain viable throughout the various stages of program development not only with respect to fulfilling its own particular objective but also in comparison with the other developmental programs in attaining various military capabilities requiring R&D effort.

Another major impact of PPBS on the defense systems acquisition process was in the integration of a particular systems development with its life cycle of operational use in terms of budgeting, scheduling, and operational performance. As a program element or sub-element in the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP), each system under development held a unique position in terms of

future defense operational capability. Integral planning elements included projected cumulative development costs, follow-on procurement and system operational costs, and the military operational capability of the system. At every milestone event in the R&D of a system, its progress was evaluated by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) in terms of overall contribution to the future defense posture.

However, despite the many advantages to R&D management resulting from the initial implementation of PPBS, there were also several justifiable criticisms. These included the increased centralization of authority for decision making under the Secretary of Defense and his immediate staff within the DOD, the downgrading of professional experience and judgment of military experts within the three services, and the sheer impossibility of attempting to fit decisions on specific development programs into the time constraints of an annual review cycle. These disadvantages were to a large extent later eliminated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and his deputy, David Packard.

The Issuance of DOD Directive 5000.1

As one of the most recent major statements of R&D management policy, DOD Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems,"¹² has had a far-reaching effect on the conduct of the development of major defense systems. This directive, prepared under the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, established new and in some respects revolutionary management principles for defense R&D. Its main thrust was to provide more decision-making authority at the lower levels of management and to reduce the layers of authority above program managers. Packard emphasized that the successful development of weapons systems is primarily dependent on three ingredients: competent people, rational priorities, and fully defined responsibilities. As stated in the directive . . . "responsibility and authority for the acquisition of major Defense systems shall be decentralized to the maximum practical extent consistent with the urgency and importance of each program."¹³ New policies which corrected other serious defects in the acquisition process included the following requirements:

1. That each service designate a single individual responsible for each major program and that

he be given both the resources and authority necessary to carry out his mission;

2. To establish cost as a design parameter and give it an importance equal to that of technical performance and schedule performance;

3. To consider all system operational life cycle costs as design parameters;

4. That the system must be stated in operational terms and challenged throughout the acquisition process;

5. That technical uncertainty be continually assessed and that test and evaluation be started as early as possible and continued throughout the entire program development.

Under this directive, the three services were given the responsibility of identifying their needs for new systems and for the development and follow-on-production of these systems through their designated program managers. In turn, OSD was given responsibility for establishing the initial acquisition authority and for review of programs at the completion of specific stages of development and at other times where cost overruns, schedule slippage, or performance shortfalls had reached predetermined danger points.

Effects of Increasing Congressional Control

Thus far this article has been concerned primarily with the evolution of defense R&D management resulting principally from changes generated within the services and DOD. For most of the period following World War II, congressional interest and influence in the management of defense R&D was at a minimum. In the rare instance when Congress did exert its influence, it was done through the annual appropriation process. One authoritative assessment of congressional influence as late as 1962 is as follows:

Of course, Congress also plays a role in the weapons program process, although it is not nearly as active a role as is commonly supposed. For example, during the 1950's Congress appropriated all or nearly all of the military research and development funds requested by the Executive Branch, and the few congressional cuts which were made were much smaller than cuts made by the Secretary of Defense and the Budget Bureau in service requests.¹⁴

However, with the separation of R&D funding from the procurement appropriation and the increased costs of development of new weapons systems there was an increased interest by

Congress to assert its influence. Senator John Stennis, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, very pointedly voiced the congressional concern over the rising costs of new weapons when he stated in 1971:

If we can afford a permanent force structure of only one-fifth as many fighter aircraft or tanks as our potential adversaries — because our systems are about five times as expensive as theirs — then a future crisis may find us at a sharp numerical disadvantage.¹⁵

In the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the FY 1972 authorization of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, the warning was given that “the multiplying cost of weapons system development and procurement is reaching such prohibitive levels that the country may be unable to afford some of the most vital weapons systems.”¹⁶

Not only were the programmed costs of development of new systems far in excess of costs of previous systems; there was also a sizable cost growth experienced by these new systems during the development stages. Data contained in a 1973 General Accounting Office (GAO) report showed that the increased costs of development of the 45 most costly systems under development on June 30, 1972, amounted to \$31.5 billion, or 39 per cent of the original estimated costs of development of these systems.¹⁷

Concern was also mounting in Congress, as well as DOD, that notwithstanding these increased costs of development, some of the larger and more glamorous systems were not performing as well as expected. As stated in 1970 by Assistant Secretary of Defense David Packard in an address before the Armed Forces Management Association dinner concerning these new systems: “The Defense Department has been led down the garden path for years on sophisticated systems.”¹⁸ The initial problems with the F-111 in Vietnam is mute testimony to this statement. The C-5A is another example of an expensive, sophisticated system which has not performed as well as originally planned, particularly in its designated rough terrain capability.

Congress controls funding for defense R&D principally through the separate but interrelated functions of authorization, appropriation, and expenditure review. Historically, only a portion of the DOD budget requires annual authorization by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. Authorization for operations and maintenance and part of procurement requirements are made solely

on the basis of a continuing resolution. However, in 1959 budget review of the Armed Services Committees was increased to require prior authorization before appropriation for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. This law was amended in 1962 to require similar authorization for R&D of these three categories of procurement and in 1963 to require annual authorization for the entire RDT&E appropriation. As a result of the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974,¹⁹ additional review is now required by the Senate and House Budget Committees.

In the Fiscal Year 1972 Defense Authorization Bill,²⁰ the Senate imposed two restrictions on the funding for defense research and development (R&D) that were to have extremely important consequences:

1. Funds appropriated by the Congress must be obligated not later than the end of the fiscal year following the year for which appropriated.
2. Research and development work to be accomplished by the services under contract or in-house must be programmed on an annual basis, and budgets submitted to the Congress must be in work increments designed to be accomplished within a twelve-month period. This period was generally to coincide with the annual budget cycle.

The first of these restrictions reduced defense R&D funding from what was essentially a no-year cycle to a two-year cycle. It also required the immediate obligation of approximately \$1 billion in as yet unobligated funds appropriated in FY 1972 and preceding years. The second restriction required that DOD in the future ask Congress for only those funds necessary for utilization during the coming appropriation year. Through these restrictions Congress could better review past accomplishments on specific programs annually and provide for continued development of these programs through the following year. This would thus add impetus to the annual review cycle of defense research and development desired by Congress.

Although the above restrictions were not altogether inconsistent with previous congressional requirements for R&D, they did represent a quantum jump in increased congressional interest and control of defense spending.

There can be no doubt but that the basic intent of Congress at this time was to gain better control over the acquisition process of major defense systems. It was on the larger programs — those included under the Systems Acquisition Report

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(SAR) — that Congress had focused its interest. Specifically, the stated purpose was to reduce major systems development costs by enhancing the annual congressional review process on these systems and by requiring annual incremental budget submissions. Congress wanted to keep closer tabs on development progress and to cancel poorly achieved programs as early as possible in the development cycle. The providing of funds to DOD for these programs for use in future years and the build-up within DOD of appropriated yet unobligated funds precluded this control; hence, these practices had to be eliminated. Other purposes of apparent lesser importance were to reduce overall defense costs, to provide funds for the other, more politically popular, social programs, and to instill within DOD and particularly the major program offices better financial accountability and responsibility.

As to the long-term effects of these restrictions, there is no assurance that they will have in the future either a beneficial or a harmful effect within DOD in terms of planning for future research and development or in actual program development operations. It would appear from the opinions expressed during discussions that the flexibility of planning and operations might, in fact, over the long run be somewhat enhanced within the SPOs and the lower echelons of the hierarchy above the SPOs within the services. This would be especially true of the newer programs where funding was on a more current basis at the time of these restrictions. In the higher echelons of R&D management and control within the services and at the DOD level, flexibility of planning and operations over the long run will be somewhat lessened. This results primarily because the Congress by these restrictions has taken over a considerable amount of top-level managerial responsibility previously held at these higher levels. There is also the problem facing DOD of coordinating the annual program review cycle required by Congress and the program milestone accomplishment review required by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). These two reviews do not come at the same time nor cover the same aspects of program progress, yet continued program development depends on their close coordination.

Subsequent to the FY 72 restrictions, the Congress has continued to strengthen its control over the management of defense R&D, the most notable recent legislation being the Budget and

Impoundment Act of 1974.²¹ Whereas the former restrictions were directed specifically at the management of R&D programs within DOD, the latter provided sweeping changes across the board for all federal agencies.

Salient features of the 1974 Act with their impact to date on defense R&D are as follows:

1. Establishment of a starting date of October 1 for the new fiscal year with the stipulation that all appropriation bills would be enacted by this date, thus eliminating the requirement for continuing resolutions to bridge the gap between the start of a new fiscal year and appropriations for this year.

2. Establishment of the Congressional Budget Office and new Budget Committees for both the Senate and House. Although this should result in more coordinated annual funding for all federal agencies, it also requires hearings before these new committees on funding requests in addition to the Authorization and Appropriation Committees of the Senate and House.

3. Prohibition of impoundment of appropriated funds by the President except in certain specified instances agreed upon by Congress, and preclusion of the administrative withholding of funds within the hierarchy of the executive agencies.

4. Requirement that all requests for authorization of new programs be submitted 16½ months prior to appropriation of funds and that programs of more than one year's duration specify funding required for the first two years of the program. This, together with the additional time between the formulation of the executive budget and the new fiscal year, requires a considerable stretch-out of the PPBS and FYDP calendars of events for development programs for new systems.

5. Requirement that commencing in FY 1979, budget requests be structured by priority in terms of functions and subfunctions. This will require submission of funding in rank order for new and existing programs. It will probably also mean, at long last, Congress will accept budget requests in the PPSB format utilized within DOD.

The changeover to the new fiscal year has just been accomplished. As yet it is too early to determine the many problems that will be encountered over the years as a result of this new legislation or the advantages and disadvantages that will result to the management of defense R&D.

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National security policy, like all foreign policy, is a matter of reconciling necessary behaviors with resources that are available to support them. This article is about one kind of resource to support national security objectives: the policy organization of states, which defines what national objectives are necessary, distinguishes alternative uses of capabilities to attain them, decides among these alternatives, and then implements the actions decided upon.

Policy organization, as Klaus Knorr has pointed out, can be an element of a state's power in its own right, insofar as it makes more effective whatever levels of other human or nonhuman resource strengths that state possesses at the moment.¹ Like those other forms of capability, security objectives are enhanced for a given purpose when capabilities are increased, or, conversely, when limitations upon mobilizing putative capabilities are reduced. A well-developed structure of policy making can substitute in part, although not completely, for weaknesses in other forms of national security capability. At the same time, policy organization has its own sources of inevitable limitations, one being that the inevitable narrowing of choice in decision making may exclude some potentially useful courses of action. The major interest here is in how policy organization can be, and is, refined to widen the net of pertinent information and options for state behavior brought to the attention of national leaders for decision, and to enhance generally the preconditions of national achievement.

Special attention will be given in what follows to changes in the organization and forms of policy making as they have developed in the United States over the last 30 years, a focus that can have at least two important wider applications. First, recent American experience offers one of the best illustrations of how major emphasis can be given over a lengthy period of time to elaborating upon and improving the policy-making process in national security affairs. Second, the scope of these changes has been so large in relation to comparable developments in nonsecurity policy

■ This article is concerned with the ability of the U.S. policy organization to support national security objectives and how to improve that ability. Special attention is given to the development of this organization and to forms of policy making over the last 30 years.

The author outlines five major ways in which national security policy making affects American security interests and evaluates their effectiveness. The article then proceeds with a survey of policy making since World War II, focusing on the National Security Council and its development.

Organizational politics will always play a large role in national security decision making, the author concludes. Further, the five noted criteria have been unequally served. We must determine not only whether organizational elaboration is an effective response to national security problems, but also whether these national security policy-making organizations themselves fulfill the purposes for which they were created.

areas as to suggest the primacy of substantive concerns in national security over other major concerns of the American national government.

Uses of Policy Organization

We may distinguish at the outset at least five uses of policy organization (by which we refer to authoritative leaders, their immediate staffs, and the departments over which they have responsibility). First, it can enhance national authority and leadership, additionally in a democracy providing a central mechanism for public definition and popular understanding of issues. Second, it can supply continuity in the making of decisions by adapting decisions in advance to several different and plausible environments. Third, it can be a

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means of realizing consensus on policy matters by responsible officials who may often approach issues in different ways. Fourth, it can supply administrative guidance and direction to specific national efforts in the security field. And finally, it can encourage thorough debate about alternatives prior to the making of decisions. While these uses of policy-making structure can apply to any major set of policy undertakings, the following discusses each of them in a national security context.

The argument for strengthening the national government in security affairs, despite the American tradition of democracy and division of governmental powers, rests on the perceived need to be prepared for energetic, forceful action to cope with extraordinary needs.² Following the Second World War, the United States came to engage far more heavily than before in peacetime commitments abroad, particularly in Europe, and these commitments transformed the American security position by multiplying the number of situations that would bring American involvement in war. Adding to the transformation was the Soviet Union's development of an atomic weapons capability, which brought about for the first time the vulnerability to major attack of the continental territory of the United States. Understandably, the more ambitious the security objectives of a nation, and the more vulnerable the security position of that nation, the more important and central becomes the fundamental vitality of its government. Such vitality can enable it to avoid paralysis even in the face of threats that might appear paralyzing to many.

Continuity in the making of decisions becomes a security issue insofar as the conditions in which policy decisions take effect are constantly changing. Conditions change even where policy remains the same, and even small changes in these conditions may sharply lessen the usefulness of security behaviors. Since there are political and temporal limits to the frequency with which policy decisions can in practice be reopened (one political limit being the vested interests those entrusted with carrying out the policy have to continue that policy, even in the face of unanticipated obstacles), policy decisions need to be made adaptable in advance to important trends and shifts in the operational environment, instead of otherwise being rendered outmoded or obsolete by such changes. Moreover, many of the trends and shifts that matter for security policy will not be foreseen, so that it is prudent for states to allow

for surprise events as well in their planning.

Policy can and often is revised in time of crisis, but there are limits to what can be usefully accomplished through crisis responses. Crises often bring rapid decision making, improvised actions to perceived threats, and shortsighted objectives; in an age of nuclear weapons, it is prudent to see what can be done in a less-emotion-charged atmosphere to make policy relatively independent of crisis occurrence. However, it is usually only in crisis where there is widespread agreement that prevailing policy has serious shortcomings and needs to be reevaluated. Ways are needed to reopen policy decisions prior to the time that crises point the way to shortsighted shifts in behavior.

Divergent points of view of individuals and institutions in national security matters are, as elsewhere, the product of dissimilar preconceptions, perceptions, and judgments of individuals and their different institutional responsibilities and roles, but these divergences are often stronger and deeper for being the bases of disagreements over "core" value concerns (e.g., survival and status) which participating policy makers feel so strongly about. Each individual in policy process tends to take a self-interested view of the issues, setting forward his/her personal view in the name of the interest of the entire nation.³ Certainly at the highest authoritative levels of the American government, national defense matters in the nuclear age have not been viewed as routine matters; their alleged special importance has been an especially powerful motive in bringing individuals to get involved over them. Yet, as important as they may actually be, there is no provision in the policy process for imposing some solution over them from some source holding special formal powers. Instead, with effective power over decisions dispersed, and with disagreements persisting, the "strain toward agreement" in national security decision making has produced substantive decisions that, at worst, have been provisional, partial, superficial, and compromised.⁴ Easing this "strain toward agreement," especially at the most responsible levels of government, is a major need of policy organization in national security affairs, even as differences between participating individuals will persist.

A fourth way in which national security policy making affects American security interests is by supplying administrative guidance and direction to specific defense efforts. This function has been

particularly important for the United States in coping with long-term conflict with the Soviet Union, as well as in finding enough accommodation to avoid nuclear war; these two interests have rendered necessary unusually sensitive coordination of diplomatic initiatives designed to prevent war, military deployments designed to prepare for that same eventuality, and intelligence-gathering and evaluation operations. If anything, nuclear weapons have led to ever more delicate refinements in simultaneous diplomatic, military, and intelligence activity in recent years, because of the realization that there are many ways in which an undesired war might begin, and many ways in which a nation might be unprepared for a war that it might decide upon. In addition, for the first time, the scale of American defense preparations has not been commensurate with the scope of eventualities envisaged. Unlike the First and Second World Wars, when the United States fought an "all-out" or unlimited war with the aid of virtually unlimited resources, in the post-war period it has been necessary to prepare for such hostilities with much less than full mobilization of resources toward this objective. In the post-war period, therefore, there has been greater scope for administrative ingenuity and choice about acceptable levels of effort, and also greater uncertainty about the "best" security posture for long-term superpower competition.

Finally, policy organization can encourage thorough debate about alternative courses of action prior to the making of decisions. There is a tendency for those in the policy process struggling for attention to, and adoption of, particular behaviors to provide overly optimistic assessments of the usefulness of those behaviors they favor in order to enhance the chances of their recommendations being widely accepted. Since policy makers cannot be expected to discount the weight of their own prejudices in their policy recommendations (to do so might require them to abstract themselves from the very impulses that led them to make the policy recommendation in the first place), recommendations that are accepted uncritically and even on a superficial basis could help to bring about a policy consensus on ultimately indefensible grounds.⁵ To prevent such a consensus from forming, contrary points of view must be expressed in the decision-making process, and the process should require policy makers at authoritative levels to seek out and value the views of those critical of projected and already

implemented policy. Critical contributions of this kind would help deflate high policy expectations (which may be a product of feeling that policy somehow *needs* to succeed because of the high national security stakes resting upon it), reduce the rhetoric of policy recommendations, and, most importantly, serve as a self-correcting mechanism whereby policy options that do not survive sustained criticism do not become active choices.

These five criteria for the adequacy of policy organization are in no sense logically fully consistent with one another. But it will be helpful to measure the effects of changes in American decision-making organization for national security against the description above of how policy organization could have (and, some would say, *needed* to have) national security benefits.

Policy Organization in the Postwar Period

In examining American policy organization in the postwar period, it is striking how the institutional changes that were brought about, and the climate of opinion supporting them, were so much a legacy of American participation in the Second World War, even though that war posed very different challenges to the United States than did the postwar period. During the war with the Axis powers, it was generally agreed in the United States that the widely dispersed and diverse military operations of this country should be subject to central direction at the highest levels of government (cutting through political and economic bottlenecks holding back the war-making effort), unified direction (limiting needless sacrifice of life and inefficient production), and secret direction (preventing the Axis powers from anticipating and hampering American strategic operations). Each of these considerations justified leadership by a relatively few people over an enormous military machine geared to achieving total victory. With the onset of deepseated and widespread hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union shortly after the conclusion of the Second World War, informed Americans believed that some similar policy organization to that which had been so effective against the Axis should be employed to manage American security concerns in relation to the Soviet Union. The difference was that whereas the wartime organization was a product of presidential directive, the postwar policy structure was designed to endure longer than the tenure of particular Presidents.⁶

There was no partisan debate about these matters: indeed, the tradition of bipartisanship born during the Second World War persisted in the postwar period to support the institutionalization of extraordinary forms of organization, born in war, with which to wage the peace. Leaders of both major political parties agreed that party differences were not to intrude into the making of vital decisions as urgent as those dealing with national security, and the same kinds of unusual organization that kept political differences from impeding the earlier war effort were to be utilized to meet threats to the United States from the Soviet Union.

If anything, institutional developments following the war moved still farther in the direction set by wartime trends. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once having been created during the war, could act only by unanimous consent. In December 1945, President Truman proposed organizational changes entailing creation of a single department of national defense with "unified direction of the land, sea, and air forces at home as well as in all other parts of the world where our armed forces are serving," and envisioned defense "strategy, program and budget [as] all aspects of the same basic decisions." The National Security Act of 1947, a major landmark in postwar American legislation on policy organization, did not approve full unification of the services; rather, it provided for what has been called "a confederation of three military departments presided over by a Secretary of Defense with carefully enumerated powers." The creation of the Office of Secretary of Defense, however, represented a perceptible move in the direction of adding to the unification of the military services beyond World War II levels, and subsequent developments extended this trend still further. By 1961, after a number of intervening changes, it could be argued that the Department of Defense had in fact moved to the form desired by Truman in 1945.⁷ Growing unification of the services had been accomplished by enormous growth, first in the numbers and centrality of civilian specialists serving in the Department of Defense, and second in the authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense over the military services. (These trends were reversed somewhat by the early 1970s, but not enough to mitigate the importance of the above observations.)

The National Security Act was designed to provide for unification, for centralization, and for

secret deliberations in other ways. It created a National Security Council (NSC) with statutory members including the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to coordinate policy making on political and military affairs and to provide policy guidance from qualified, senior-level individuals in the policy process to the military establishment. The NSC was formed specifically to move away from the informal decision-making system utilized by President Franklin Roosevelt during the war to one in which specified people would participate on a consistent, regular basis from their institutional responsibilities in national security policy making.

To aid the NSC, the National Security Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an independent department of the government, empowered to recommend to the NSC coordination of intelligence activities of the other federal departments having interests and operations in national security.

The function of this new agency was also strongly affected by perceptions of events in the recent war. Policy makers wished to prevent the conditions that had permitted the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor to happen by providing a more unified intelligence establishment, one that was better able to discriminate between "signals" and "noise" and to communicate that refinement to the highest levels of government.⁸

Finally, the 1947 Act established the Air Force as a distinct military service, recognizing the strong role of air power in the previous war and allowing for the strengthening of long-range American air forces as a separate element of war preparation.

Underlying all these developments were two ideas: first, that the efficiency of military, political, and economic undertakings would be enhanced if duplication and competition for national security-related activities could be held to a minimum; and second, that unification at the highest levels of government was a prerequisite to unity of will on the part of the American people for what many expected to be a long siege of hostile relations with the Soviet Union.⁹ But these changes in decision-making organization produced neither appreciable reduction of duplication and competition, nor much stronger unity of will within the American governmental leadership. Each of these points will be discussed in turn.

Duplication, competition, and disunity came

about in part from the perceived urgencies of the security situation. It was to be expected that the greater the perceived threat to the nation's security from abroad, the more unified would be the nation's response to meet the threat.¹⁰ In the 1950s, the Soviet military threat to the United States was conceded by most informed Americans to be considerable and growing, especially in connection with Soviet successes in the development of fission and fusion weaponry, ballistic missiles, and space satellites, and with the outbreak of the Korean War. But what mattered most in meeting that threat was the perception of organizationally positioned individuals, and these individuals tended to factor the Soviet threat in ways calculated to meet the needs of their organization.

Each organization, in general, tended to take responsibilities for the new security situation on itself, looking to expand its plane of operations on the grounds of the same urgency it attributed to the nation's security more generally. Intense levels of Soviet-American conflict, instead of bringing general agreement on ways to manage that conflict, paradoxically stimulated organizational differences on how to act in what virtually everyone conceded were extraordinary times. For example, the CIA was plagued from the start with a running dispute with the military services over the collection of intelligence, the services insisting on excluding the CIA as much as possible from that activity, and CIA officials looking to intelligence production to strengthen their basic research, analysis, and coordination efforts.¹¹

There were perennial differences between the military services as to their respective warmaking responsibilities, and these differences were accentuated by the continuing emergence of new technologies that were difficult to categorize under previously settled demarcations.

These differences and others contributed in part to extensive duplication in national security affairs: for example, in 1951 there were as many as 24 different American government agencies and departments producing economic intelligence.¹² Again, duplication in weapons research and development among the military services was stimulated because allocated defense expenditures did not expand to keep pace with the rising political urgency, and authorization to deploy expensive new weapons was a major way to help subsidize other service activities that were starved for funds.³

There was also competition and rivalry within given agencies. Within the Navy and Air Force, those championing the cause of new ballistic missile technologies were in conflict with those favoring improvements of more traditional forms of weaponry, including airplanes and airplane carriers. Within the CIA, those producing and evaluating intelligence were almost completely cut off from those dealing in covert operations overseas, and the two branches emerged from completely different policy needs.¹⁴

These difficulties were no doubt due in part to the loose character of the federal administrative structure, described earlier. In this connection, Paul Hammond has suggested that the more pluralistic administrative politics are, the more resources will participants direct to gain accurate perceptions of the real world, even at the expense of internal consistency.¹⁵ But the newness of *many* of the organizational networks and the novelty of *most* of the important security problems faced by the United States were also factors. The fund of ideas on how to apply newly found American capabilities to policy problems did not grow as rapidly as did the institutions created to manage those problems.¹⁶ And with good reason: the same conditions of world politics which stimulated expansion of policy organizations also posed the most serious and bewildering requirements for the coordinating machinery.

The Soviet-American rivalry, though free from major superpower warfare, was one fraught with the danger of such warfare occurring; the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union lacked consistency insofar as it was not dominated by the use of any particular instrument or technique (as reflected, for example, in any earlier instance of warmaking), yet it obviously raised the values of the use of a combination of instruments and techniques. It was not clear — and it still is not — how the superpower rivalry would end, and what could be done to reliably and tolerably hasten its end. Understanding of the requirements of the nuclear age in the midst of these uncertainties came slowly.

The second idea, that more unified policy leadership would contribute to greater national unity of will, was compromised by the fact that unity at highest governmental levels was mainly in form, not in fact. Until 1960, the NSC was hampered by the expressions, within itself, of the same divisive institutional forces that had earlier

justified its creation in the minds of many. It did not change individual loyalties to parochial organizations or outlooks, but instead served as a field in which those loyalties were expressed.¹⁷ In addition, Presidents continued to value the special counsel of some NSC members and their immediate associates given outside the formal NSC process, and the strategy of getting direct access to the President to provide such counsel remained a prized one for those officials able to choose it.

This raises another paradox of American national security policy making: though the NSC system worked best when its members understood presidential purposes and interests, those members who had such an orientation were more likely than others to have special access to the President, which sometimes counted more for the making of policy than formal NSC deliberations. In the 1960s, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson relied increasingly on high-level officials known to be more loyal to their President than to the interests of their respective departments, and the role of the NSC declined. President Richard M. Nixon, on the other hand, allowed very few people outside the White House direct access to him, and the resurgence of the NSC during his administration (to be discussed later) was therefore especially important.

The Record of NSC Activity

Reviewing the public record of NSC activity, it is useful to focus, first of all, on the effects diplomatic emergencies involving the United States have had on NSC deliberations. For example, the NSC was stirred into one of its most useful activities — developing a comprehensive national security policy for the country, particularly in relation to the Soviet Union — more than a year after its inception and in the wake of diplomatic crisis. The earliest request to the NSC for such a policy statement came from Secretary of Defense James Forrestal shortly after the start of the Berlin Blockade, and President Truman accepted an NSC recommendation to prepare the statement after the initial Soviet testing of an atomic bomb. The initial statement of this kind, known as NSC-68, was approved by Truman after the start of the Korean War and served as the foundation of that part of the American military buildup during the war aimed at the Soviet Union. In this case as well as others, NSC plans prepared prior to crisis incidents came to condition American behaviors

when crises occurred.

The NSC was frequently put in a position of coping with diplomatic emergencies and with limited war situations, and this work was naturally of an overriding priority to any other NSC concern. But it was not usually well-equipped for speedy deliberations.¹⁸ It worked best when it worked slowly, between recurring international confrontations, to integrate wide-ranging considerations into unified national purposes. Without integrated planning of this kind, policy makers would have lacked agreed-upon standards to guide their responses in time of severe diplomatic tension, even as different sectors of the government struggled for approval of their preferred solutions. And policy makers would be especially tempted to take actions for short-term reasons in crisis, such as new force positioning or new political commitments, that could prove difficult or even impossible to reverse once the emergency ended.¹⁹

The NSC made another important contribution in between moments of crisis by leading its participants, and staffs, to focus on a longer time-range for policy than the usual one in which policy questions were most often addressed. It also examined the ways in which the intentions and capabilities of other countries, particularly the Soviet Union, would affect the security interests of the United States during this longer period,²⁰ and it developed contingency preparations whose triggering would depend on the perceived form which those intentions and capabilities took over time.

In addition, the NSC stimulated a great variety of interagency contacts and coordinating devices. Such "lateral coordination" has been a major development in postwar American national security policy organization,²¹ and a central method of reaching consensual policies, both at authoritative and at working levels, amidst divergent institutional approaches to policy problems. To prepare for such arrangements, departments have drafted positions on policy issues that increasingly have taken into account anticipated views of other departments whose clearance is required for authoritative policy decisions.

Other pertinent organizational needs have been given less attention in the NSC system, in part because the above functions have been so time-consuming, but also because the other priorities seemed to detract from those considered

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more important. For example, because of perceived security imperatives, national leaders believed that departments and agencies dealing with those imperatives should have the widest area of choice to pursue the mandate given them by the policy leadership. One of the most serious deficiencies of the work of the NSC was the lack of adequate policy guidance to national security organizations, including the military establishment and the intelligence agencies.²² Policy guidelines provided were very general, and major initiative for the work of those organizations was left dependent on the sense of urgency of those entrusted with them. Given prevailing organizational and political tendencies, this deficiency encouraged disunity and competition inside the organizational structures.

Another deficiency of the NSC was in the failure to encourage dissent to prevailing policy assumptions. Given the lack of policy guidance, the assumptions of policy might be widely shared even as operational behaviors following from those assumptions were not well-coordinated. But the policy assumptions were not investigated as frequently as they should have been. One persuasive study suggests a large number of crisis decisions of the NSC in which prevailing American strategic orientations were permitted to control the crisis response, without any significant opposition.²³ What this seems to show is that departments and agencies looking to take policy initiatives had a much stronger interest to show how these initiatives were consistent with policy already decided-upon — which rendered unnecessary high-level approval — than to argue for a change in policy as a way of gaining approval for them. Ironically, this orientation satisfied both the departments and the high-level decision makers, but seriously compromised the national security interests of the country. The policy makers assumed that the departments were acting consistently with national policy, especially as information to the contrary was not immediately available to them; and the departments permitted policy makers to believe that the policy they approved continued to be satisfactory, even though it often was not. The political conflict necessary to getting the policy revised by showing that it was no longer suitable was discouraged. Until relatively recently, departmental rivalry was not utilized — as it might have been — to encourage genuine debate about policy goals and instruments in the NSC.

This failure must not only be ascribed to the failings of the NSC: weak leadership in some departments was also a factor. The State Department, for example, frequently acted to seek autonomy in a limited area of national security behavior — the area of “political” relations between states, however defined — rather than act to gain a dominant role in wide policy matters. The Pentagon did not respect the division of responsibilities envisioned by State (especially with the effective work of the Pentagon’s “little State Department,” its International Security Affairs division).²⁴ Those departments which were vigorously assertive in seeking broad policy coordination in the NSC as elsewhere were, of course, the most influential over the substantive policies adopted, a point which helps to explain the growing prominence of the Pentagon in post-war American national security policy making,²⁵ but the more passive stance of other departments, including State, undoubtedly lessened the chances of using the NSC as a challenger of fashionable assumptions.

Still a third weakness of the NSC, particularly in its early years, was the tendency of its policy papers to refrain from discussing how policy objectives would be supported by material resources.²⁶ One reason for this is that many products of the NSC system were not designed to culminate in action programs; some, including the NSC-68 document already referred to, were put together for educational and polemical purposes.²⁷

NSC-68 set out a strong case for a major increase in American defense spending to ward off Soviet threats to the security of American Western European allies, but key elements of the analysis (including the definition of the Soviet threat to the United States, as well as the extent of the resources required for the arms buildup) were purposely left inexact in order to gain clearance from both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, who disagreed sharply on strategic matters.

The impetus for NSC-68 came from several individuals inside the Department of State who sought to challenge prevailing American attitudes on defense spending. But in asking the President to choose among alternatives without providing the costs of those choices, NSC-68 made choice more difficult and ultimately brought no choice at all (until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 changed popular American thinking and

made its recommendations acceptable). The case of NSC-68 is an example of how coordination within the NSC system can afford some satisfaction to participants and enhance consensus, yet fail to make the system an instrument of presidential leadership.²⁸

Product of Style

Policy organization is not, of course, merely an outcome of perceived urgencies in international conditions. It is also the product of style, temperament, and individual preference. Some Presidents have chosen to downplay the importance of the statutory authority behind the NSC and depend instead on informal policy-making methods to make national security decisions. They did so, despite having to deal with a series of foreign policy crises during their administrations, because they valued diverse channels of communication from advisors, independent sources of information, and maximum flexibility in policy making. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson seem to have viewed informal channels as a way of keeping large numbers of people dependent on presidential access, and therefore, as a way of enlarging presidential authority.²⁹

More recently, during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, there has been a return to vigorous use of the NSC system, though with a number of important refinements. First, there has been a major effort within the NSC to spell out an overall foreign policy strategy to serve as the context for particular national security decisions. One of the major purposes behind the definition of such a strategy has been to gain widespread agreement on major long-range objectives and needs, and on varying ways of meeting them and allocating priorities among these approaches. Such a blueprint, reached independently of the deadlines and sudden developments conditioning decisions on specific actions, would serve to ease the strain toward agreement on more immediate questions.³⁰ One difficulty has been that the head of the planning effort, Henry Kissinger, has also had extensive responsibilities for carrying out policy, and his operational activities have limited NSC strategic planning to a relatively small number of areas. Some issues that have only more recently emerged as national security matters on a continuing basis — for example, questions of international economic policy — were initially

dealt with outside the NSC framework.³¹

A second important contribution to national security decision making in recent years has been a comprehensive and systematic review of American policy on virtually all national security issues. Almost all of these have been undertaken under White House initiative, and directed in the form of National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) to appropriate departments and inter-agency groups. The objective behind the large number of reviews (126 in all between February 1969 and April 1971) has been to sharpen the focus on policy choices, and, particularly to have ventilated policy options that had previously not received attention at authoritative levels. A number of American national security policies have been changed in this way, by permitting middle-level officials to bring new options to NSC consideration, and to presidential decision, even though department heads to which those officials are responsible have not supported the options.³²

The NSSM procedure has been limited in three respects: first, by the large amount of time required to prepare departmental reviews; second, by the tendency of the NSC staff and a Kissinger-chaired NSC Review Group to rewrite the departmental reviews to suit their needs; and third, by the fact that the NSSM procedure has not extended to implementation of policy changes once they have been decided upon. But it has served as a means whereby the NSC and the President can make use of lower-level departmental disputes to reconsider policy that was allowed to persist by being insulated from challenge.

Conclusion

Perhaps the major theme in this evaluation of American national security decision making is that, regardless of the high stakes and urgencies of security matters, organizational politics will have an important place in determining how those stakes and urgencies are addressed. The struggle for political attention, the protection of organizational vested interests, and the competition for effective operating authority will continue to affect what the United States does in national security affairs; in addition, the perception of national security issues of "overriding" importance will stimulate these political effects, despite what appear to be moral imperatives for "unified" action. Any effort to adapt American policy

toward national security requirements — whether through the NSC or otherwise, and irrespective of what those requirements are — must take account of these political effects and allow for them, since they are a constant feature in highly consequential issues as well as in less important ones. They affect the level of political support for even the best policy; but, beyond that, they contribute political zeal that can vitiate the intended effects of policy despite providing the necessary political support for it.

Raising again the five criteria discussed earlier in this article for evaluating the effectiveness of policy organization in national security affairs, a survey of the record of American national security policy organization indicates that they certainly have not been equally served, and intentionally so. The largest priority has been given in successive administrations to enhancing presidential leadership in protecting national interests, and this irrespective of varying styles of policy making. A somewhat lower, but still very high priority has been given to identifying long-term directions and objects of policy, and this concern has been, and continues to be, a major defense of the formal NSC system. Another very significant priority has been given to easing disagreement among leading policy makers on substantive “core” concerns. Here again the formal NSC system made a major contribution, though easing the “strain toward agreement” at authoritative levels did not always require heavy reliance on the formal NSC system, as the record of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations shows.

The other two of the five criteria have not been as well provided for. Though opening channels for challengers of prevailing policy to make themselves heard can enhance the organizational and political strength of those dissenting from policy — and there are always dissenters around — the encouragement of dissent runs contrary to another widely accepted organizational and political rule of action, namely, that departmental staffs refrain from challenging policy views held by those to whom they report. Department heads, as I.M. Destler has pointed out, frequently see their staffs as their instruments for implementing their policy once it has been decided, not as lobbyists against it.³³ Despite a major effort in the Nixon and Ford Administrations to encourage what has been called “multiple-policy advocacy,” it is not yet clear whether an adequate number of advocates have yet come forward, or whether more can be done

to seek them out.

Finally, supplying comprehensive policy guidance to middle-level officials has been de-emphasized since the early 1960s because of a belief that, regardless of contrary effort at authoritative policy levels, departmental officials would resist institutionalization of the values of NSC participants, if those values were at odds with their own. In fact, one of the reasons for a growing centralization of authority in recent years in the NSC structure, both in decision-making and policy execution functions, has been to counter the ability of less-responsible officials with vested interests in current routines to block actions decided at higher levels.

A curious aspect to the present national security policy organization in the United States has been that, while reliance on policy advocates from within the bureaucratic structure to promote policy change has been one of the weaker, if still necessary, foundations of recent policy making, preventing middle-level officials from obstructing change has been regarded as a still more important objective, and leading officials like Mr. Kissinger have frequently tended to work around the bureaucracy, rather than through it. And, despite the formal “open door” to multiple policy advocacy, the most important stimulus for new policy has come from the top of the policy structure, rather than from within.

One concluding observation needs to be made about the political climate in national security affairs, which importantly helps define the kinds of national security questions that must be decided — and, indeed, that are open to choice. To an overwhelming extent in the past 30 years, issues in national security affairs, and the answers to those issues, have been defined by the President and his closest advisors. The prevailing climate of opinion has permitted this situation to persist and to grow.³⁴ This may easily be justified in the popular American need to have strong leadership to deal with dangerous and unpleasant contingencies, and some would argue that the trend has been unavoidable. But it is now necessary to take a closer examination of the political price Americans pay for this growth in executive authority, and to understand the national security policy organization for what it is, rather than what we would like it to be.

It can never be enough for the organizational structure and its capabilities to enhance the national and international position of the Presi-

dent, as important as that be. Nor, on the other hand, will it do to demand that the policy organization satisfy each and every one of the criteria for national security policy making defined above, for that does not seem feasible. Acceptable performance levels of the policy organization between these two extreme positions must be distinguished and, to permit this, the prevailing climate of opinion must be broadened so that it focuses not only on national security problems for which organizational elaboration is a response, but also on the adequacy of the organizations themselves for the purposes for which they were initially created.

Notes

1. Klaus Knorr, *The War Potential of Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), chaps. 6-8; also see Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), pp. 181-182, 184-185.
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3. On this point see Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy-making in Defense and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), chap. 1.
4. Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling et al. (eds.), *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 23-26, 218-222.
5. I am indebted to Alexander L. George, "The Case For Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), especially pp. 769-783, for all the ideas in this paragraph.
6. Walter Millis, (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1956), pp. 62-120; Paul Y. Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 54 (December 1960), pp. 899-902; and William T.R. Fox, "Diplomatists and Military People," in Stephen D. Kertesz and M.A. Fitzsimons (eds.), *Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 47.
7. For the matters discussed in this paragraph, see Charles J. Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 14-17. The text of the National Security Act of 1947 is included in C.W. Borklund, *The Department of Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 317-333.
8. "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," in Book IV of *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 7. Since this history, compiled from internal CIA histories, was written by Anne Karalekas, it will be cited henceforth as "Karalekas."
9. On the first point, see Schilling, pp. 108-114; on the second point, see Hammond, "The National Security Council," pp. 899-901, 908.
10. Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 13-14.
11. Karalekas, pp. 13-15.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
13. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 369-384.
14. Karalekas, pp. 46-47.
15. Paul Hammond, "A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara Administration," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52 (March 1968), p. 63.
16. See, for example, Schilling, p. 250.
17. I am indebted for the ideas in this paragraph to Paul Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 54 (1960), p. 905.
18. President Eisenhower occasionally went outside the NSC organization when he wanted decisions taken rapidly, as in the case of the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1958. Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere (eds.), *The President and the Management of National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 242. Under the Nixon Administration, however, a high-level crisis deliberation panel was established under the NSC system known as the Washington Special Actions Group, and it functioned frequently in such situations.
19. For example, the initial stationing of American B-29 bombers in England took place after the start of the Berlin Blockade, and American strike aircraft have been based there ever since.
20. Paul Nitze, in congressional testimony June 17, 1960. Included in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 879-880.
21. I.M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 14.
22. Hammond, "The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination," p. 902; Karalekas, pp. 32, 34.
23. George, *passim*.
24. Destler, pp. 160-162.
25. Adam Yarmolinsky, *The Military Establishment* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), is notable in part for stressing this trend.
26. Nitze, pp. 878-879.
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- ment," in Warner R. Schilling et al. (eds.), *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 372. The full text of NSC-68, recently declassified, may be found in *Naval War College Review* (May-June 1975), pp. 51-108.
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 30. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
 31. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150
 32. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-137.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
 34. This permissive climate of opinion was most notable in the provision of authority to the President from the Congress in the National Security Act.


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Local Government, Information Systems, and Technology Transfer: Evaluating Some Common Assertions About Computer Application Transfer

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Everywhere we go nowadays faith is expressed that some modern technology is waiting in the wings to make our lives better. This extends to local governments where large programs have been instituted to facilitate "technology transfer"¹—a concept that usually refers to the process of moving a piece of technology developed at a high cost in one place to another place at a lower cost than would be required to develop the technology locally.²

The appeal of technology transfer is considerable and stems from several notions:

1. Technologies are interchangeable from one site to another, having "plug-in" features in the sense that they are relatively self-contained, prepackaged, readily learnable, and their implementation can be buffered against the impact of the larger environment.
2. High value is potentially redeemable from R & D investments which create or "spinoff" technologies that can be transferred extensively.
3. Users who are able to transfer can obtain high

This article is part of a research project entitled "Evaluation of Information Technology in Local Government" (URBIS), supported by a grant from the RANN Division of the National Science Foundation (APR74-A01 & A02). The author gratefully acknowledges the intellectual stimulation and support provided by John King and Joseph Matthews, and the helpful comments on manuscript drafts by James Danziger, John Dever, Edward Hearle, Rob Kling, Robert Metzgar, Jim Maxwell, Alan Siegel, Myron Weiner, and Willis Ware.

■ The "faith in technology" attitude prevalent in the U.S. extends to local governments, where large programs have been instituted to facilitate technology transfer. This article examines the technology transfer of computer applications among and into city and county governments. It compares the benefit claims about application transfer, as expressed in seven key points most often found in literature about computerized information systems, with new data on local government transfer activity and the harsher realities of actual transfer experience. This article neither supports nor discredits claims about transfer of computer applications in local government. Rather, it attempts to fill part of the void in rational discussion about transfer by offering broad perspectives on why more transfers do not occur and, in some instances, why they shouldn't occur.

quality, sophisticated technologies without the need for making substantial development expenditures.

4. Certain technologies, such as management techniques, are instruments of political and admin-

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istrative reform, capable of "modernizing" public administration.³

Thus, the Federal Council on Science and Technology sees technology transfer as:

... critical to assuring that the results of an annual Federal investment of over \$15 billion in research and development are being applied to improve the services and quality of life of the Nation.

And, the importance given to technology transfer as:

... partly stimulated by the often quoted Presidential Message to Congress on Science and Technology in March 1972. Perhaps more important was the move toward "New Federalism" and revenue sharing, and the concern expressed by leaders at each level to actively spur the application of Federally sponsored research and development to state and local problems.⁴

Nowhere can the trend towards technology transfer be seen more clearly than in attempts to transfer computer applications between and among local governments. Computer application transfer in local government offers a classic case of technology transfer. General-purpose local governments appear similar in their functions and requirements. Computers are very alike in the functions they perform and are promoted for their interchangeability in handling different computer applications. Institutional support for application transfer exists in the form of policy support, financial aid, packaged programs, and technical assistance. Indeed, most of the current literature is highly enthusiastic about application transfer, highly optimistic about the ease and speed with which transfer can occur, and highly promotional about the dollar benefits to be derived.⁵

The image created about the transfer process is sometimes extreme.⁶ An urban technology transfer agent appears at city or county hall, carrying an arsenal of off-the-shelf, generalized, and pre-packaged computer programs ready to be plugged into the government's computer system. The technology agent has something for just about any operational or management problem ranging from utility billing to fire station location to collective bargaining negotiation. Without any difficulty, operating managers and data processing staff choose the application that fits their computer. Then the technology agent installs it, saving everyone the normal agony associated with developing computer applications in-house from scratch.

"Saving the day" is one of the images that makes application transfer appealing to local gov-

ernments. The touting of dollar savings makes software transfer irresistible. The following comments of a systems consultant typify the appeal:

As a concept, a design and an implemented system, GBIS [Geographic Base Information System] costs something on the order of a quarter of a million dollars. [Southern city A] will install this system for under \$40,000 plus a few man-months of data processing time.

[Southern city B] has saved something in excess of \$50,000 in choosing to accept PROVES [Property Value Estimation System] rather than designing their own system. Further, it is apparent that PROVES can be transferred to other cities at even more significant savings.

These facts speak for themselves: there is big money to be saved through the transfer of major systems. So for those of you who feel that yours may be better than mine, mine's cheaper than yours and it works, too!!

One would expect substantial software transfer to occur, based on these positive claims. Yet, the current level of applications transfer in the United States appears low in comparison to the amount of total development. In a survey we recently made of the transfer experience in cities over 50,000 and counties over 100,000 population in the United States,⁷ we found that only 22 per cent of the responding governments had transferred applications in the last two years.⁸ Twenty-three per cent of the responding cities and counties plan such transfers within the next two years (Table 1).⁹

Additionally, the average number of computer applications transferred per site over the past two years is not very great—1.4 applications in cities and 1.6 applications in counties (Table 2). The average number of applications planned for transfer over the next two years is similar, for both governments.¹⁰

Thus, in spite of the positive claims for transfer, relatively few local governments are transferring computer applications at all, and of those that are, few transfer more than one application. The major positive sign in the transfer patterns—one suggesting successful past experience—is that 60 per cent of the sites with transfer experience plan additional transfer during the next two years (Table 3).

Nevertheless, the low level of transfer casts doubt about the ease and benefit claims of application transfer. If the dollar savings are as great as transfer promoters say, why hasn't more transfer occurred? Why aren't more transfers planned? If transfer is so easy, why have most governments with transfer experience averaged only one application in the last two years? and, why are 40 per cent of the experienced governments planning no additional transfers during the

TABLE 1
SURVEY RESPONSE REGARDING TRANSFER
OF COMPUTER APPLICATIONS IN CITIES
AND COUNTIES

	Cities	Counties	Totals
Total number of local governments responding to URBIS survey	381	288	669
Per cent of governments responding to transfer experience portion of URBIS survey ^a	75%	59%	65%
Per cent of sites with transfer experience among responding local governments	18%	29%	22%
Per cent of governments responding to transfer plans portion of URBIS survey ^b	66%	52%	60%
Per cent of sites with transfer plans among responding local governments	22%	25%	23%

a. Number of respondents = 284 cities and 171 counties.

b. Number of respondents = 250 cities and 151 counties.

next two years (Table 3)?

The usual explanations for limited technological innovation offered in the literature focus on technical complexity, institutional constraints, and human frailties that create barriers to innovation.¹¹ These barriers undoubtedly operate with regard to transfer of computer applications as with other technologies. However, another explanation for the low level of application transfer may be more basic: "who" really benefits from transfer of computer applications simply is more unclear than with other technologies, and given this uncertainty, few potential transfer participants are willing to risk engaging in transfer without outside stimulus (e.g., a crisis, or external financial support).

Theoretically, application transfer should benefit all participants. Local government managers get modernization at a reduced price, within the constraints of their strapped budgets. Federal and state agencies, which assist local transfers or develop computer applications for transfer, get high leverage from a relatively low investment by demonstrating nationwide benefits from their R & D programs. The data processing professionals, who are providers of the technology, get status, recognition, and sometimes profit from their broker function. The department users in local governments get new tools for performing their jobs more efficiently and effectively. Ultimately, the taxpayer gets better service at a lower cost.

But, in reality, are the benefits of transfer,

TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF TRANSFER AND NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS TRANSFERRED
IN CITIES AND COUNTIES

	Cities	Counties	Totals
Have Transferred			
Governments with transfer experience	51	49	100
Total number of applications transferred	69	80	149
Average number of applications transferred	1.4	1.6	1.5
Plan To Transfer			
Governments that plan to transfer applications	54	37	91
Total number of applications planned for transfer	59	59	118
Average number of applications planned for transfer	1.1	1.6	1.3

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TABLE 3
OVERLAP OF CITY AND COUNTY
GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE TRANSFERRED
AND PLAN TO TRANSFER COMPUTER
APPLICATIONS^a

		Have Transferred		Total
		Yes	No	
Plan To Transfer	Yes	60	31	91
	No	40	305	345
Total		100	336	436

^aThe chi square statistic is greater than the predicted chi square with a significance level of .001 having one degree of freedom. Thus, the data indicates that a site which has transferred in the past is more likely to transfer in the future.

always this clear cut? Actual experience with application transfer suggests that transfer is more complex than the "plug-in" process usually portrayed. More importantly, experience suggests application transfers do not always serve everyone's best interests. Some participants may gain important benefits, while giving up others. Some participants may gain very little in relation to the investment required of them.¹²

Claims and Realities

Differences between the benefit claims and the harsh realities of actually performing transfer can be seen by examining some popular assertions found in the literature on information systems in local government:¹³

1. Transfer of computer applications prevents each government from having to reinvent the wheel.
2. Everyone benefits from application transfer.
3. Computer applications can be transferred and adapted for a small fraction of the time and money needed to develop them in-house from scratch.
4. Transfer makes badly needed computer applications available at low costs to all local governments.
5. Application transfer is a short cut for local governments seeking an advanced state of EDP (electronic data processing) development.
6. Technical factors, such as the lack of standardized computer hardware and programming languages, are major barriers to application trans-

fer among local governments.

7. More application transfer would occur if there were a National Clearinghouse and Resource Center that would make information and computer applications available to local governments.

1. *Transfer of computer applications prevents each government from having to reinvent the wheel.*

An underlying assumption behind application transfer is that having each government develop its own applications is inefficient, if not wasteful. Therefore, application development projects should be done centrally and transferred to local governments in order to prevent costly duplication of effort. This prescription may be true, but it overlooks the important learning benefits derived from reinventing the wheel.

The process of developing computer applications offers individuals and the local government an exceptional opportunity to develop computing capability, within the constraints of local skill, time, and money availability. Computing staff professionals engaged in in-house development learn about various government functions. Department users learn about computing. And, both develop working relationships that support future operation, maintenance, and expanded use of computing. By contrast, application transfer may actually prevent learning. This is particularly true when transfer is performed by outside agents and the application exceeds local capabilities, as the computing staff and users are frequently under great time pressure and easily overwhelmed by the outside experts. In this situation, staff/user learning usually occurs later when the application is in operation and the staff has time to discover what the application really does and what assumptions underlie its models of reality. They, of course, also may discover that the application is ill-suited to local operations. Since computer applications, unlike a car, carry no warranty, there is no recourse with application "lemons."

Given that computing is still in its infancy in most local governments, learning opportunities that build in-house capability are especially valuable. Ironically, it is these governments with relatively undeveloped computing that are most often targeted for software transfer by the transfer agents on the deceptively rational grounds that transfer is most beneficial where local capability is weakest.

Contrary to this popular belief, the best candidates to undertake transfer may be the governments with highly developed EDP. Being sophisticated, these governments can better assess the potential of applications *before* they are implemented by outside experts. In addition, they are capable of undertaking the complexities of their own independent search, evaluation, and transfer.

Considerable evidence supports this view. The survey of U.S. cities and counties cited indicates that the greatest amount of transfer tends to occur in the larger governments and particularly in governments with an advanced state of EDP development. Table 4 shows that a greater proportion of larger cities and counties have transfer experience than smaller governments. Table 5 shows that the transfer governments tend to have higher EDP expenditures, spend proportionately more of their operating budget for EDP, have larger computer core capacity, have more applications operational, have more applications on-line, and have more applications documented than the average city or county in the survey, all of which indicates a relatively advanced state of development.

That the majority of these governments originally developed their own applications might be one important reason why they have become relatively sophisticated users of computing. In addition, transfer probably involves fewer risks for the larger more experienced governments because, unlike smaller inexperienced governments, they have sufficient skill to overcome adaptation problems and sufficient size to absorb unanticipated costs.

2. *Everyone benefits from application transfer.*

If application transfer yields all the beneficial things claimed for it, who could possibly resist transfer efforts? Depending on the situation, both the EDP and user departments might object.

Consider first the data processing professionals and users. In addition to the learning benefits, computing professionals and users stand to gain the personal and professional satisfaction that comes from their own design embellishments of the wheel. Since design is the *sine qua non* of the computer profession, the design-development phases of automating provide the most challenging

TABLE 4
PER CENT OF TOTAL URBIS CITIES AND COUNTIES TRANSFERRING COMPUTER APPLICATIONS, BY POPULATION*

Transfer Experience Categories	Cities		Counties	
	URBIS Respondents (A)	Have Transferred in Last Two Years (% of A)	URBIS Respondents (B)	Have Transferred in Last Two Years (% of B)
Totals	284	18%	171	29%
Population Groups				
500,000 and over	19	42	38	34
250,000-499,999	27	22	46	28
100,000-249,999	74	15	87	26
50,000- 99,999	164	16	—	—
Transfer Plans Categories	Cities		Counties	
	URBIS Respondents (A)	Plan To Transfer in Next Two Years (% of A)	URBIS Respondents (B)	Plan To Transfer in Next Two Years (% of B)
Totals	250	22	151	25
Population Groups				
500,000 and over	15	27	32	25
250,000-499,999	23	30	41	22
100,000-249,999	66	23	78	26
50,000- 99,999	146	19	—	—

*119 cities and 139 counties failed to answer this question

TABLE 5
COMPARATIVE STATE OF EDP DEVELOPMENT AMONG CITIES AND COUNTIES
THAT HAVE TRANSFERRED-IN APPLICATIONS

Indicators of EDP Development Status	Cities		Counties	
	Transfer Sites	All URBIS Cities	Transfer Sites ^a	All URBIS Counties
Average EDP expenditures	\$891,031	\$554,444	\$1,345,933	\$965,155
Average EDP expenditures as a percent of total operating budget	1.4%	1.0%	1.8%	1.7%
Average total core capacity in bytes	596K	346K	598K	450K
Average total operational applications	44	31	39	32
Average total operational applications on-line	11	6	7	6
Average total operational applications with documentation	25	15	24	18

^aThis includes only places that have transferred-in. As might be expected, places that have transferred-out have somewhat higher values.

and creatively fulfilling jobs for many programmers and analysts. By contrast, the transfer adoption process is generally viewed as unstimulating, even drudgery.¹⁴

"Professional practice" is to department users what design is to the computer staff. User department people develop small differences in local practice as a means of maintaining and building recognition and professional superiority over their counterparts in other governments. Users frequently assert that "we are different from City A," "our department does not function like County B," "our procedures are better than theirs." Thus, many user departments are preconditioned to reject a system developed for another local government with a "different" situation. Their position frequently is reinforced by the patchwork of state and local statutes governing local governments' operations and the already differing pattern of standard operating procedures.¹⁵

Data processing professionals and users are not the only ones who might resist transfer. Bureaucratic incentive and resource politics enter into considerations about transfer, particularly for the managers in the EDP and user departments. When development is done in-house, or when transfer is done by in-house staff, the monies essentially go to increase staff in the EDP department, the user

department, or both. When software is transferred in by an outside agent, a large portion of the money that could otherwise be used for development goes outside to the transfer agent. While the local staff is strained with the transfer burden, it generally receives no additional budgetary support. The net effect is that the EDP and the user department managers lose a substantial basis for future budgetary increases and must use the "slack resources" under their control to assist in the transfer effort.

These erosions of operating funds might be all right with the managers if they were rewarded for efficient resource use. But generally they aren't. There is no more professional prestige for managers than the staff from transfer-in; and, there aren't additional resources either. In fact, the budgeting-from-past-history practices of local government means that managers generally will be rewarded with increased budgets only for accumulating staff in-house rather than for using outside resources, and for using their current staff inefficiently rather than efficiently.¹⁶

Thus, both managers and staff in the EDP and user departments, accustomed to traditional bureaucratic incentives and practices, are preconditioned to find shortcomings with the transfer process and have built-in technical and professional arguments to support local development

rather than transfer. The combination of such technological and professional arguments usually has a significant impact on other decision makers, such as chief executives who might otherwise strongly favor transfer from another government.¹⁷

3. *Computer applications can be transferred and adapted for a small fraction of the time and money needed to develop them in-house from scratch.*

This benefit holds the strongest attraction for software transfer and provides the dominant basis for promotional claims. Undoubtedly, substantial cost savings can occur from transfer because most of the front-end development costs have been borne by others. The transferee bears only the costs required to adopt the application locally. In reality, however, such savings only occur under the best of conditions: when the automated task is truly general, when the application has been well documented and designed for transfer, when the computer programs fit the transferee's current computing capability, and when the application is relatively self-contained. Unfortunately, it is common for any or all of the following technical problems to occur:

The automated task is poorly suited to the local situation. Some computer applications have low transfer potential across state or regional lines because of differences in state and local information requirements and operating procedures. This is particularly true with regard to sophisticated applications such as real property appraisal models and complex operational applications such as integrated utility billing and on-line customer inquiry. Simpler models, such as Fire Station Locator, and report generators, such as Uniform Fire Incident Reporting System (UFIRS), are easier to transfer.¹⁸

The application is poorly documented. Poor programming documentation can be worse than no documentation because it can mislead transferees about the net benefits of transferring the application and may lead them far along the wrong paths in converting and debugging the programs for the local situation.

The application is poorly designed. One city that transferred-in an accounting package discovered that the programming audit trails were woefully inadequate. The city had to redevelop the program at considerable expense, in addition to bearing the cost of the initial transfer failure.

The application is not designed for transfer. Some otherwise well-designed applications simply have not been designed with their potential transfer in mind. Therefore, the cost of their modification for transfer exceeds the potential development savings.

The application is part of an integrated system, and thus contains features not required for stand-alone use, or delivers its benefits only in an integrated EDP environment. The first of these conditions is pointed out by an observer of the Charlotte USAC Project:

Remember that in taking an IMIS [Integrated Municipal Information System] product you are taking a part of a system, but the system doesn't exist [in your situation]. So there may well be programming niceties, data handling, and so forth that are unnecessary and turn out to be costs rather than benefits.¹⁹

The second situation occurs in applications such as Detective Investigative Support where the real benefits of the application come from integrating the data in many normally separate police operational files. Here the transferee can obtain the applications benefits only by building an integrated system, at least for those aspects of the police function that provide the operational data.

4. *Transfer makes badly needed computer applications available at a low cost to all local governments.*

Even if there are no problems in transfer and development savings do occur, the savings are meaningful only if the transfer-in application meets a real need in the government and is economical to implement, operate, and maintain. Thus, application transfer should be viewed in terms of priority needs rather than simple availability, and in terms of full life cycle costs, rather than the mere saving of development costs.

Assessing the need for transfer-in applications is a universal problem. Thinking that they are "getting something for nothing," many local officials are lured into application transfer when in fact they may be getting something they don't need, or which meets local needs only marginally. This problem occurs because some applications promoted for transfer to local governments are designed primarily to serve non-local needs, such as state and federal needs for criminal data and national statistics, and thus have only secondary local value, if any, to the local government. Transfer in local government sometimes is induced by promotional literature extolling the benefits of

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the applications, and by offers of technical assistance and financial support for the transfer-adaptation phase. Once implemented, local officials may discover that the application doesn't live up to the benefits claimed for it, yet it requires a continuing financial commitment for maintenance as part of the federal-local agreement.²⁰ This general situation has led one observer to quip that USAC's Integrated Municipal Information System (IMIS) project is "another example warning the cities to beware of Greeks [in this case, the feds] bearing gifts."²¹

Another consideration for application transfer is its net benefit over its full life cycle.²² Development savings from transfer may pale in the face of costs for operation and maintenance. Some applications simply are expensive to operate because they were not designed with operation and maintenance costs in mind. Others are expensive because the originators issue frequent changes or enhancements that have to be implemented. Other applications are expensive because they require new data collection and updating procedures not previously performed by the local government. This is particularly true of federal-agency proffered applications that establish a new reporting system or get the local government to accept responsibility for an activity not previously performed locally.²³

Thus, local officials who make the transfer decision on the basis of development savings alone may discover that unforeseen costs exceed these savings when they encounter technical problems, low benefits, or life cycle costs connected with the automated task.

5. Application transfer is a short cut for local governments seeking an advanced state of EDP development.

This notion of "a quick technological fix is sometimes used to promote application transfer and, although appealing, it simply doesn't square with reality. As mentioned already, transfer is not occurring at a rapid pace, and most governments with transfer experience transferred only one application in the past two years (Table 2).

These findings should not be surprising for several reasons. First, the search for transferable applications requires extensive professional contacts, at least within the same state, because the small number of applications available and acceptable are difficult to find even with the aid of various computer software catalogs.²⁴ A rich

network of professional relationships is likely to be developed only in larger, experienced installations that have overcome pressures to show immediate payoffs and adapt to vendor equipment changes.

Second, the assessment of somebody else's software is complex and requires that the transferee government have personnel with experience and sophistication comparable to the source's EDP staff and user department personnel.

Even if the application bears the "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" from a national public interest group, the transferee still requires adequate staff skill locally for implementation. Should the application be installed by an urban technology transfer specialist, the transferee still will need a local staff skillful enough to maintain the application after the transfer-adaptation phase ends.

Thus, successful application transfer requires technical sophistication by the host government that is similar to that needed to develop the application. It is not a quick, easy way to get such sophistication.

6. Technical factors, such as the lack of standardized computer hardware and programming languages, are the major barriers to application transfer among local governments.

The considerable variety in computer mainframes, operating systems, and peripheral devices used among local governments creates compatibility problems in adapting applications from one computing environment to another.²⁵ Most of these compatibility problems now have known solutions and do not present the same transfer barriers as in times past.²⁶ In addition, diversity of programming languages represents a lessened barrier to transfer today, since most local governments have adopted COBOL as their common programming language for administrative applications and FORTRAN for scientific-engineering applications.

While transfer barriers due to hardware and languages are lessening, "design for transfer" looms large as a barrier primarily because of institutional and behavioral factors. Local agencies tend to design computer applications only to fit local conditions rather than to be generalized because frequently there are no special incentives to design for transfer. Generalized approaches take more time and money to develop, involve commitment to greater hardware and software expendi-

tures for operation, and inevitably result in compromises for local users. Without special incentives, therefore, local agencies are unwise to bear these costs. However, sometimes this position is taken even by system designers working on federally supported projects where special monetary incentives are provided to develop generalized applications for use by other governments.²⁷ This human tendency to design suboptimally for local conditions may result from lack of knowledge about how to design for transfer, or from lack of personal/professional incentives, or both.

A related tendency of some computer professionals is to design for "leading edge" technology rather than within the mainstream of existing technology. "Leading edge" design offers many incentives for the designer. It actually enhances the designer's job because the more advanced technology automatically provides many functions the programmer previously had to design as part of each application, and it permits sophisticated niceties to be built into the application.²⁸ The designers sometimes are aided by enthusiastic users who can think up frills that the designers may have overlooked.²⁹ These features, which make the application unique and bring professional distinction to EDP staff and department users alike, can also render the application difficult to transfer to less advanced EDP installations.

Thus, the lack of institutional incentives for local agencies to design for transfer and the behavioral tendencies to design suboptimally for local conditions and for leading edge technology—frailties which affect the EDP and user staffs alike—probably constitute greater current barriers to transfer than the lack of technical standardization.

7. More application transfer would occur if there were a National Clearinghouse and Resource Center that would make information and computer applications available to local government.

Some proponents of application transfer correctly argue that the greatest benefits of transfer will occur when a particular computer application is installed nationwide among many local governments. To effect this, they would establish a National Clearinghouse and Resource Center for application software. The clearinghouse would keep current information on each local government's computing system, application availability, and future needs and thereby "broker" exchanges of applications among local governments with

comparable application-technology mixes. Among other things, the resource center would collect and maintain well-designed and documented "application packages" that it would transfer or make available to interested governments under membership or contract arrangements.³⁰

Although the idea for some kind of national center might be a good one, and indeed is supported by local government officials,³¹ there are several problems with the above conceptions. A clearinghouse capable of storing and updating information on each government's applications and host computing system would be costly to build. Updating the information might be a problem since frequent changes in local computing technology could require keeping information on each "version" of an application. Therefore, the costs of maintaining the clearinghouse information could swamp the start-up costs.

Moreover, local motivation to contribute information about applications to the clearinghouse could lessen as each government's costs become clear. Periodically, each participating government would need to update its information profile in the clearinghouse and each would need to bear the cost of documenting its applications, something few governments now do. Those governments with a "popular" application would need to control the "versions" of the application every time it underwent technology changes or design enhancements. And each government would have to bear the cost associated with handling inquiries and visits from other governments exploring the possibility of transfer.

Assuming exchanges result, governments with few applications to offer but much to gain from exchanges would have the greatest incentive for participation, while governments with extensive applications might be deluged with requests for information and assistance with little to gain in exchange. When the costs became too great, these governments might withdraw from the clearinghouse causing an end to the operational feasibility so dependent on the participation of the more advanced (but not necessarily the most sophisticated) governments.

Participation might be maintained and the clearinghouse might have value commensurate with its costs if focused on facilitating the search phase of application exchanges, thereby limiting the scope of data collection, maintenance, and exchange. Most initial searches involve looking for a particular application of interest available on a

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comparable computing system. Once preliminary information indicates a fit, there is need for follow-up search and inquiry that requires more detailed information than need be kept in a central information bank, along with direct personal communication with potential application sources. Thus, the feasibility and value of a clearinghouse to information transfer about computer applications appears reasonable if its operation is limited to facilitating the initial search for applications, and local follow-up.

While a limited clearinghouse function is potentially useful to information transfer, the resource center would be of low utility to physical transfer of computer applications. The assumption underlying the resource center—that most applications can be transferred nationwide from a single center—is problematic given the current pattern of transfers. Table 6 shows that the dominant pattern of current application transfer involves transfers from one local government to another (“local to local”) rather than transfers from “centers” such as federal or state agencies, or urban technology transfer agencies. Table 6 also shows that, overall, more transfers occur within the SMSA or state (47 per cent) rather than cross-country (37 per cent).

However, the pattern varies considerably between cities and counties. Forty-eight per cent of the cities transferred applications from “outside the state” and 28 per cent transferred from “inside the state” or “inside the SMSA.” This difference between cities and counties may be related to the pattern of federal funding support for transfer which has favored cities until recently.

There are several practical reasons for the overall pattern of “local” transfers despite these differences between cities and counties. One reason is that state-to-state differences in administrative procedures reduce the likelihood that suitable applications, particularly operations-oriented applications, will be found in another state if they can’t be found locally. Another reason for the dominance of intra-state transfer is that local governments restrict out-of-state travel more than local travel. Also, the need for communication (user-to-user and analyst-to-analyst) throughout the transfer-adoption process is extensive and is greatly facilitated by geographic proximity which reduces travel time and costs. Lastly, computer professionals rely heavily upon personal knowledge of the skill and programming practices of other computing installations in making software transfer decisions, and this knowledge is gained by frequent, extensive peer contacts which also tend to be circumscribed by state or regional boundaries.

It is also significant to note that the primary kind of application packages currently available from federal agencies and other urban technology transfer agencies tend to be stand-alone, management-oriented applications such as reporting systems, resource allocation models, and facility location models. These are relatively easy to “standardize” and to transport from one place to another. Yet, these kinds of applications have relatively low priority locally as shown in Tables 7 and 8.

Most local governments place first priority on

TABLE 6
SOURCE AND LOCUS OF TRANSFERRED APPLICATIONS

Transferred From:	Cities		Counties		Totals	
Source of Application						
Local to local ^a	78%	(54)	95%	(76)	87%	(130)
Federal state to local ^b	22	(15)	5	(4)	13	(19)
Totals	100	(69)	100	(80)	100	(149)
Locus of Transfer						
Inside SMSA ^c	14%	(10)	16%	(13)	15%	(23)
Inside state	14	(10)	48	(38)	32	(48)
Outside state	48	(33)	16	(13)	31	(46)
Unknown ^d	24	(16)	20	(16)	22	(32)
Totals	100	(69)	100	(80)	100	(149)

a. From either a city or county to another city or county.

b. From a federal or state agency or an urban technology transfer agency.

c. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

d. Source of transferred application not indicated in response.

TABLE 7
KIND OF APPLICATIONS TRANSFERRED

Kind of Application	Cities	Counties	Total
Management-oriented	25	18	43
Operations-oriented	44	62	106
Total	69	80	149

automating the "bread and butter," operations-oriented tasks of government (Table 8). Increasingly they also place priority on making these

applications "on-line" and "integrated" (data not shown). However, even simply operations-oriented applications tend to have low transferability because of differences in local administrative procedures. When these applications are additionally on-line and integrated, it is nearly impossible to transfer them without replicating the original EDP system and application in the new host environment.³² While transfer makes these systems cheaper, they are still very expensive and complex; thus, there are likely to be few of such transfers.

The nonstandardness, complexity, and cost of

TABLE 8
APPLICATIONS TRANSFERRED BY GOVERNMENT FUNCTION

Function	Number of Applications Transferred			Function	Number of Applications Transferred		
	Cities	Counties	Total		Cities	Counties	Total
Police/Sheriff				Budget preparation/ accounting	2	4	6
Law enforcement statistics/crime reporting ^a	3	1	4	Purchasing	1	2	3
Law enforcement "package"	3	—	3	Personnel	3	—	3
Other law enforce- ment	5	3	8	Geoprocessing	5	1	6
Fire				Data Processing	2	1	3
Fire incident reporting	4	—	4	Public Information	—	—	—
Fire station locator	3	—	3	Clerk/Recorder	1	2	3
Courts				Public Buildings	1	—	1
Jury selection	—	7	7	Central Garage/Equip- ment Management	3	2	5
Other court appli- cations	3	9	12	Planning and Zoning	—	1	1
Emergency Preparedness	—	—	—	Housing and Urban Renewal	1	—	1
Accounting				Transportation	4	1	5
General accounting/ financial manage- ment	5	6	11	Utilities			
Payroll preparation and accounting	5	7	12	Water/electric billing	—	3	3
Treasury/Collection/ Assessment				Public Health	1	3	4
Personal property records	—	2	2	Public Welfare			
Real property tax records/billing	—	4	4	Assistance records/ food stamps/dis- abled/general	2	6	8
Other tax records	5	3	8	Information and referral	1	2	3
Budgeting and Management				Other	—	1	1
Budget monitoring	—	2	2	Libraries			
				Catalogue/circulation	3	—	3
				Vital Statistics	—	—	—
				Voter Registration			
				Registration records	1	2	3
				Vote counting	—	3	3
				Miscellaneous	2	2	4
				Totals	69	80	149

many operations-oriented applications means that they probably cannot be handled as a "product" by the resource center. Therefore, the applications with greatest local demand and priority probably would not be handled by the resource center. Rather, the center would be limited to handling applications that many local officials might regard as "management frills" and might therefore ignore until they have completed more basic automation locally. Thus, the value of the resource center may be questionable.

One area in which the resource center could be of great value is the professional evaluation of application software, particularly standard packages promoted by federal agencies or private vendors. But, because it is too controversial, the center is unlikely to perform this function. In order to obtain continuing financial support from various federal agencies, the center could become a promoter for government-produced applications. Consequently, it could exacerbate, rather than help solve the evaluation problem for local governments.

Summary and Conclusion

Application transfer is a logical idea and has substantial benefit, providing everything works right. But, the experiences of cities and counties show that frequently something goes wrong. Therefore, local officials who must decide whether to transfer a computer application from outside or to develop it in-house must soberly assess the complexity of the transfer-adaptation process and the technical and behavioral factors that constrain it. Much of the literature on transfer will not be of much help to them because of its strong promotional bias. Some of the government and private agencies aren't very helpful either, since these agencies have a potential conflict between their interest to promote their own or others' application software to local communities and their purported interest in assisting local governments.

This article has tried to fill part of the void in rational discussion about application transfer by critical examination of some popular beliefs. Not surprisingly, the assessment brings neither acclamation nor disproof of the basic merits of application transfers. Rather, it has offered broad perspectives on why more transfers don't, and in some instances shouldn't occur. One perspective focused on the necessary conditions for any real cost savings to occur from transfer. Another focused on real and imagined technical barriers to application transfer.

Still another perspective pointed to behavioral factors in transfer, which are the heart of technical and cost problems, but which are important barriers to effective transfer in their own right.

The issues raised here about application transfer may be applicable to urban technology transfer generally. They point to the need for more critical examination of basic tenets in the field. They also point to the need for systematic research into the transfer process and into the relative costs and benefits of transfer for different local government activities and functions. Lastly, they suggest that further critical examination of proposals for a National Clearinghouse and Resource Center for information technology may be warranted.

Notes

1. An excellent overview of the major programs is contained in Robert Crawford, "The Application of Science and Technology in Local Governments in the United States," *Studies in Comparative Local Government*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1973), pp. 1-19; and Federal Council on Science and Technology, *Directory of Federal Technology Transfer* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
2. The idea of transfer is expressed differently by different organizations, Defense and space programs describe technology transfer as the process of employing a technology for purposes other than that for which it was developed. For example, see National Aeronautics and Space Administration, *Spinoff 1976: A Bicentennial Report* (Washington, D.C.: NASA, Technology Utilization Office, 1976), p. 3. The Federal Council for Science and Technology defines technology transfer more broadly as "the process by which existing research knowledge is transferred operationally into useful processes, products, or programs that fulfill actual or potential public or private needs." Federal Council for Science and Technology, p.v.
3. In the latter sense, technology transfer has been part of the experience of American public administration at least since the '50s. See William J. Siffin, "Two Decades of Public Administration in Developing Countries," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January/February 1976), pp. 61-71; and "Policy Management Assistance - A Developing Dialogue," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 35, Special Issue (December 1975).
4. Federal Council for Science and Technology.
5. For example, see: The Urban Institute, *The Struggle to Bring Technology to Cities* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1971); "Managing Data for Decisions," *Public Management*, Vol. 53, No. 10 (October 1971); "Innovations in Local Government," *Public Management*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (April 1975); Robert Wilson, "An Planned Program," *Urban and Regional Information Systems: Information Research for an Urban Society*, Vol. II, Papers from the Tenth Annual Conference of URISA (Urban and Regional

- Information Systems Association) (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1973), pp. 95-98; James R. Paul and John L. McCarty, "FAMIS - A Study of System Transferability," *ibid.*, pp. 99-115; and Joseph E. Staszak, "Financial Management Systems: Transfer for Results," *Urban and Regional Information Systems: Perspectives on Information Systems*, Vol. II, Papers from the Twelfth Annual Conference of URISA (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1974), pp. 21-26.
6. This has always been a problem with the images conveyed by equipment vendors and software firms who market computer applications, and has led to their claims being treated skeptically by knowledgeable buyers. Some of the more surprising offenders in recent years are federal agencies and federally sponsored urban technology transfers groups. Since their claims might be taken more seriously, this development bears watching.
 7. The survey is part of a research project called URBIS, for *Urban Information Systems*. The project objective is to evaluate information technology in local government. Two questionnaires - one dealing with the computing installation's environment and another with computing applications - were sent to the data processing managers, and one questionnaire was sent to chief executives dealing with their perceptions of computing. An overview of the project is provided in Kenneth L. Kraemer and John Leslie King, "The URBIS Project: A Policy-Oriented Study of Computing in Local Government," *Computers, Local Government and Productivity*, Vol. I, Papers from the Thirteenth Annual Conference of URISA (Chicago, Ill.: URISA, 1976), pp. 406-429.
 8. The questions asked about *transfers from another local government* (i.e., city, county, school district, special district, or regional agency). The survey did not specifically request information about transfers from federal or state agencies, computer manufacturers, software vendors, or organizations which specialize in urban technology transfer (e.g., Public Technology, Inc.). These data were collected indirectly through a checklist of computer applications which included major "transfer packages," particularly those available from federal agencies. In addition, some of the respondents listed computer applications from these non-local-government sources in their replies about transfers from other local governments. These non-local sources are included in the data presented here and treated separately wherever possible. However, since the survey did not specifically ask about these non-local-government sources, the data about these sources should be considered only suggestive.
 9. By contrast, we estimate that 65 per cent of the responding cities developed one or more applications in-house during the last two years and 67 per cent of the responding counties developed applications in-house. These percentages are conservative estimates. In addition, 87 per cent of the cities and 83 per cent of the counties plan to develop applications in-house or to transfer-in applications over the next two years.
 10. By contrast, we estimate that the average number of computer applications developed in-house per site over the past two years is 6.3 in cities and 5.4 in counties. These averages are conservative estimates. In addition, the average number of applications planned for development and transfer over the next two years is 28.6 in cities and 24.2 in counties.
 11. The literature on innovation is vast, but the following studies specifically focus on "barriers" to innovation: Arthur D. Little, Inc., and Industrial Research Institute, Inc., *Barriers to Innovation in Industry: Opportunities for Public Policy Changes* (Washington, D.C., 1973); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The Conditions for Success in Technological Innovation* (Paris: OECD, 1971); *Project SAPPHO, A Study of Success and Failure in Innovation* (Brighton, England: Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, 1971).
 12. Anthony Downs was the first to suggest that computerized information systems would have political impacts in addition to technical ones in "A Realistic Look at the Final Payoffs from Urban Data Systems," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1967), pp. 204-210. Downs focused on political impacts from the "information" contained in automated systems rather than from the systems themselves. For discussion of this distinction and political impacts from automated systems per se, see: Kenneth L. Kraemer and John Leslie King, *Computers, Power and Urban Management: What Every Local Executive Should Know* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976); and Rob Kling, "Automated Information Systems in Public Policy-making," Working Paper No. 76-16 (Irvine, Calif.: University of California, Public Policy Research Organization, 1976).
 13. This evaluation, though conducted without an evaluation research design, is nevertheless systematic and empirically based, using data from the URBIS survey, reported experiences from the USAC projects, exploratory case investigations in several local governments, and case descriptions in published literature. The URBIS survey is described in Note 7 above. The USAC (Urban Information Systems Inter-Agency Committee) projects were sponsored by a consortium of ten federal agencies, conducted in six municipalities, and involved research and development of information systems for municipal governments with transferability as a major objective. Sources of information on the USAC experiences include the publications of individuals associated with the projects, official project reports, and the author's personal involvement and visits to the project sites over a period of five years. Some observations from the case work are reported in James N. Danziger, "Computing, Local Governments, and the Litany to EDP," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January/February 1977).
 14. Danziger, p. 28. For example, talks at the annual conferences of the Urban and Regional Information Systems Association (URISA) tend to focus on new applications, new approaches or plans for transfer rather than on "successful transfer experiences." One reason may be that the realities of transfer involve difficulties and uncertainties that few people are eager to talk about. The difficulty and uncertainty surrounding transfer is cautiously conveyed in the

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following "abstract" from a URISA conference paper by a participant in the City of Fresno's experience with transfer of a complex financial information system from the City of Dayton: "An increasing number and variety of requests for financial information indicated that the City of Fresno was outgrowing its existing system for providing information. Through a long and difficult process spanning more than two years the City has developed and 'translated' a new Financial Information System based on the City of Dayton model. The investment in the system has been high but with the continuing involvement and support of management it is anticipated that this tool will mature to the point that the monitoring, increased control, and flexibility it provides will be worth the effort," (p. 245). See Don Nolan, "The Fresno City Experience in Transfer or 'Translation' of a Financial Information System Using USAC Technology," *Computers, Local Government and Productivity*, Vol. II, Papers presented at the Thirteenth Annual Conference of URISA (Chicago: URISA, 1976), pp. 245-252. The complexity of this transfer effort was mainly due to its size, involving many batch programs and integrated data files, and covering the areas of payroll/personnel, accounting/disbursing, treasury management, purchasing, and a program/project activity recording structure for accounting and budgeting.

15. Danziger.
16. These tendencies are documented in John P. Crecine, "A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Budgeting," *Management Science*, No. 13 (July 1967), pp. 786-815, and *Governmental Problem Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969).
17. In the URBIS survey, we asked chief executives whether it was better to develop an application in-house, transfer it from another local government or transfer it from a private vendor. Over half (52%) of the chief executives favored transferring the applications from another government. Yet, only 22 per cent of the cities and counties have transfer experience. The chief executive's preference seems to make a difference in the transfer sites. The number of chief executives who preferred to transfer an application from another local government was higher in the transfer sites than in the URBIS population (66% versus 52%).

The chief executive's preference also seems to be understood by the data processing managers in the transfer sites. The number of data processing managers who felt that the availability of low cost transferable applications was "important" or "very important" also was higher in the transfer sites than in the URBIS population (47% versus 37%). Additional information on the transfer issue and the preferences of chief executives is contained in William H. Dutton, "Major Policy Concerns Facing Local Executives," *Nation's Cities*, Vol. 13, No. 10 (1975), pp. 33-36.

18. Both of these programs are relatively small, independent of other programs, and operate in the batch mode. The Fire Station Locator, distributed by Public Technology, Inc., is a computer program for

comparing and evaluating alternative fire station site proposals using "response time" as the location criterion. UFIRS, *Uniform Fire Incident Reporting System*, is a computer program for generating management reports and analyses from fire incident records. It was developed jointly by the National Fire Protection Association and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and is distributed by HUD.

19. George C. Hemmens, "Implementing the Integrated Municipal Information Systems Concept: The Charlotte, North Carolina Case," paper presented at the 57th Annual Conference of the American Institute of Planners, San Antonio, Texas, 1975, p. 19.
20. The GBF/DIME system promoted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census illustrates the problem. The system, which is a method of coding data to geographic locations, was originally designed to assist the Bureau in its mail-out-mail-back procedure for census taking. The system requires verification and periodic updating locally because urban geography changes. The Bureau secures local assistance through "agreements" wherein the local governments receive matching financial support and technical assistance to implement and maintain GBF/DIME and access to various Bureau programs that will turn the system into a "tool for local decision making."

The system serves local policy makers and managers directly mainly through its utility to various kinds of planners for community analysis, location studies, and service boundary studies. However, the system is inadequate to meet day-to-day operational needs for geographic data such as in police and fire dispatch; therefore, the local cost of maintaining the system is considered by some local governments to exceed the benefits for planning alone. The geoprocessing studies of the USAC cities discuss this issue and alternatives to GBF/DIME. See, for example: Public Safety Subsystem Project, *Geographic Indexing Support System Conceptualization and System Requirements* (Long Beach, Calif., 1973).

21. Hemmens, p. 14.
22. Life cycle costing refers to the calculation of costs and benefits over the expected useful life of a system. Costs and benefits are calculated for three major phases: investment (comparable to design-development phase), implementation (comparable to transfer-adaptation phase), and operation and maintenance. For a system, or a computer application, to be cost-beneficial, there must be a net benefit when all three phases are considered together. Savings in one phase such as design-development may be outweighed by expenditures with no corresponding benefits for implementation, operation, and maintenance phases.
23. The Census Bureau's GBF/DIME system is perhaps the best example. Local agencies that adopted the system in connection with the 1970 census are now being asked to assist with updating it for the 1980 census. See Note 20.
24. Software catalogs might become an important aid to application transfer among local governments, but currently they aren't. Catalogues specifically dealing with local government computer applications are

- nonexistent. The catalogues currently available rarely cover local government applications. For example, neither the Spring 1975 issue of *Skinny* (abbreviated version of *ICP Software Directory*) nor the 1974 NTIS *Directory of Computerized Data Files and Related Software* contains many "systems or utilities" software that is potentially useful to the operation of local government data processing installations; about half of the directory consists of such software. International Computer Programs, Inc., *Skinny* (Carmel, Ind.: International Computer Programs, Inc., 1975); and National Technical Information Services, *Directory of Computerized Data Files and Related Software Available from Federal Agencies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974).
25. The great variety in mainframes and operating systems is not only due to the variety of makes and models available at any time, but also due to the many changes that occur over time to the mainframe and operating systems. In addition, the applications themselves evolve through enhancements. Thus, for a particular computer application to be transferable, it must exist in multiple versions, and "version control" becomes a major problem in itself. One consultant's experience with these technical problems in relation to a financial management system is reported in James R. Paul and John L. McCarty's "FAMIS - A Study in System Transferability."
 26. Equipment compatibility also may be a lesser problem today because a few computer vendors dominate the local government market. The URBIS survey shows that 60 per cent of the cities and 70 per cent of the counties over 10,000 population use at least one IBM computer mainframe. The number of IBM mainframe users increases with government size. For example, about 40 per cent of the cities between 10,000-25,000 use IBM mainframes and 75 per cent of those between 250,000-500,000 use IBM mainframes. After IBM, the smaller governments (between 10,000-25,000) use NCR and Burroughs computer mainframes about equally (25%). See Kenneth L. Kraemer, William H. Dutton, and Joseph R. Matthews, "Municipal Computers: Growth, Use and Management," *Urban Data Service*, Vol. 7, No. 11 (Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association, 1975); and Joseph R. Matthews, William H. Dutton, and Kenneth L. Kraemer, "County Computers: Growth, Use and Management," *Urban Data Service*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1976).

The survey also shows that transfer is more likely to occur among local governments with the same information manufacturer. Fifty-nine per cent of the cities with the transfer experience had similar mainframe manufacturers and 71 per cent of the counties had similar vendors. Thus, the dominance of local government computing by a few vendors probably facilitates transfer among major groups of governments.
 27. Fossum and Gottlieb question whether the result of design for transfer is worth the price either for the development city or another transfer city. See Bernard Fossum and Steven Gottlieb, "The Wichita Falls USAC Project Viewed in Perspective," *Urban and Regional Information Systems: Information Research for an Urban Society*, Vol. I, Papers from the Tenth Annual Conference of URISA (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1973), pp. 280-285.
 28. Data base management systems are a good example of an advanced technology that facilitates the designer's job but reduces the possibility of widespread transfer of applications developed on them. For example, Donald Luria, the former technical director of the Charlotte, North Carolina, USAC project, points out the following barriers to application transfer from these systems: "Computer programs that run under a particular data management system rarely, if ever, can be transferred to run under another data management system.

... The structure of an integrated data base is a more subtle barrier to program transfer. In a job or application-oriented (non-integrated) system the files are structured to meet the processing requirements of a single or relatively small number of programs. In an integrated data base the files should be structured to optimize the service to a multitude of users. It follows then that computer programs that work efficiently against one file structure may be far from efficient against another file structure. Since the structure is a function of the nature and variety of applications and these will vary from city-to-city, another barrier to the transfer of programs is set in place" (p. 290). Donald D. Luria, "Success Depends on Transferability," *Urban Regional Information Systems: Information Research for an Urban Society*, Vol. I, Papers from the Tenth Annual Conference of URISA (Claremont, Calif.: URISA, 1973), pp. 286-293.
 29. Even without frills, user-oriented design reduces the likelihood of transfer. For example, Luria (p. 286) says: "... there is an inverse relationship between the degree to which the system is operations based and integrated and the degree to which the systems programs are transferable. First, the more operationally based a system is, the more interactive it is. The more interactive it is, the more the programs become tailored to specific user-oriented procedures."
 30. The characterization of the National Clearinghouse and Resource Center is simplified here for analytical purposes and is based upon participation in meetings and discussions with the USAC Support Panel, Assembly of Engineering, National Research Council, *Local Government Information Systems - A Study of USAC and Future Applications of Computer Technology* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1976).
 31. Ninety-four per cent of the city and county chief executives responding to the URBIS survey felt "There should be some central place (independent of computer manufacturers) where local governments can go for technical advice and training in computing and data processing." (N=563)
 32. This is one of the central conclusions of two observers from the Charlotte, North Carolina, IMIS project. See Hemmens and Luria, particularly the quotations in notes 28 and 29.

What Is and What Should Be In University Policy Studies?

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As its title indicates, this article is designed to serve two purposes. The first purpose in the order presented is to describe what is happening in university policy studies activities within political science departments and within interdisciplinary programs. The second purpose is to analyze a set of prescriptions for improving policy studies activities which have been recommended by academics and by government practitioners. By policy studies activities in this context we mean research, teaching, and related activities that deal with the applications of political and social science to the study of the causes and especially the effects of alternative governmental policies. Causes include among other things the role of public administrators in making policies or prospective decisions, and effects include the varied implementation of governmental policies.

In order to determine what is and what should be happening according to knowledgeable persons, we conducted a survey in 1976 of chairpersons of political science departments and directors of interdisciplinary programs. We also conducted a related survey in 1975 of members of the American Political Science Association who were holding positions in federal, state, or local governments. This article emphasizes the results of the university survey. A previous article emphasized the results of the practitioners survey,¹ but comparisons will be made throughout this article between the responses of the academics and the practitioners.

The schools surveyed include all universities or colleges that offer either a PhD degree or MA degree in political science as indicated on the chairperson mailing lists of the American Political Science Association. The schools surveyed also include the interdisciplinary policy studies programs that are included on the membership list of the National Association of Schools of Public

Affairs and Administration which have a political science component, but that are not exclusively political science, public administration, or business administration programs. Of the 298 schools surveyed, 42 per cent at least partly responded, and information was obtained for 10 per cent of the others from a similar survey made in 1973.

The exact wording of the questionnaire, the verbatim responses of the respondents, and various tabular presentations are all available elsewhere and need not be repeated here.² Instead, this article will emphasize the highlights of the results of the survey with regard to such policy studies activities as (1) special degrees, (2) research, (3) teaching, (4) interdisciplinary activities, (5) funding, (6) journal publications, and (7) hiring and placement. It will also emphasize the recommendations for improving those activities especially with regard to research, training, and communication among academics and government practitioners. Part of the analysis will include a comparison with an earlier survey of academics in 1973 so as to bring out trends in policy studies activities. The quantitative presentation is supplemented with example quotations and a synthesizing analysis of the controversial issues raised by the respondents.

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I. The Questionnaire Responses

Present Policy Studies Activities

Of the 103 respondents to the item asking about *special degrees* related to policy studies (other than the MA and PhD degree in political science), 74 per cent answered yes. They were generally referring to an MAPA which variously stands for a master's degree in public administration, public affairs, or policy analysis. Special degrees also included doctorates in public administration or policy analysis, and masters degrees in public systems engineering, planning, public service, criminal justice, and science policy. The most special degrees seem to be offered by the University of Michigan's Institute for Public Policy Studies, which offers (in addition to the MA and PhD in political science) a master of public policy, master of public administration, master of science in public systems engineering, and a doctorate in public policy. Many departments responded like North Texas State University by saying, "We do not have a separate field for teaching and research in policy studies, nor a separate degree. However, we have been increasing our course offerings in the area and expect this trend may continue."

Fifty-two per cent of those responding indicated they had organized policy studies *research* programs other than just relevant individual faculty research. These specialized programs emphasize research in such policy fields as health (e.g., NYU), environmental protection (Davis), science policy (Purdue), communications (Michigan), energy (MIT), transportation (Tufts), foreign policy (Johns Hopkins), urban policy (Northwestern), housing (Minnesota), policy theory (Indiana), poverty (Wisconsin), education (Columbia), criminal justice (Albany), population (North Carolina), teaching policy studies (Syracuse), and agriculture (Iowa State).

Many schools mentioned not having a specialized research program but extensive research activities, such as the response from Ohio State University which said,

We do not have a single policy studies research program in our department. However, several projects have developed to the point that they have served as a source of employment for graduate students, have provided a focus for course offering, and have provided a basis for M.A. theses and Ph.D. dissertations. These projects focus on policy-making in the executive branch, foreign policy decision-making, the implementation of employment

legislation, and the implementation of compensatory education programs.

Research integrated into the teaching curricula seems especially strong at the LBJ School at the University of Texas, where its respondent said, "Students in their second year pursue an independent research project which generally includes analysis of a public policy issue for a public sector client, agency, or legislative committee."

Sixty-nine per cent of the respondents indicated they have a special *teaching* curriculum or field within political science called something like policy studies. At the graduate level, the University of California at Riverside said,

Public policy is, and for four or five years has been, one of the six fields a student may elect in our Ph.D. program. The public policy field, as we define it, includes both substantive areas of policy (such as government and business, government and science, intergovernmental relations, educational policy and politics, etc.) and the major policy making institutions (courts, Congress, Presidency).

At the undergraduate level, MIT said, "MIT has a number of programs in policy studies . . . in addition, we are planning an undergraduate concentration in public policy." Other schools often indicated public policy is treated as a sub-field within American government (e.g., Georgetown) or as an interdisciplinary outside field (e.g., Duke).

Sixty-four per cent of the respondents indicated their schools have an organized *interdisciplinary* policy studies program. For example, Idaho State said,

Research generated through the Government Research Institute has involved some fifty students over the past three years in projects that are interdisciplinary and have conceptual relevance to policy studies and their analysis in the classroom. These programs have been organized and supervised by a team of faculty members representing Political Science and Sociology disciplines, with an occasional input from the Department of Economics.

Minnesota also said,

Students are urged to include courses from outside the department. In addition, a weekly colloquium offers students and faculty the opportunity to hear speakers on varied aspects of public policy. Joint degrees are in effect with the Law School, Program in Hospital and Health Care Administration, and School of Social Work.

The interdisciplinary policy studies programs like those at Harvard, Michigan, Washington, and elsewhere by definition include people and

perspectives from a variety of social science disciplines and sometimes also natural science, humanities, and the professional schools like law, social work, education, and business.

Fifty-one per cent of the respondents indicated their departments or schools were recipients of special *funding* concerning policy studies activities. The sources particularly included the National Science Foundation, Ford, LEAA, DOT, HEW, HUD, NIMH, DOD, Sloan, Carnegie, NASA, and the Office of Education. The Ford Foundation has been especially helpful to about a dozen interdisciplinary policy studies programs like those at Duke, Yale, Princeton, and Stanford. Money, however, seemed to be a problem partly as indicated by the relatively low percentage of schools indicating a willingness to take over the operation of the journal of the Policy Studies Organization given the financial burden that might mean. The University of Massachusetts said, "Sorry, we're broke," and the University of California at Davis said, "Possibly, if suitable budgetary arrangements could be made," although Georgia State said, "We would be glad to discuss the possibility."

Although the political science marketplace in general is rather tight because of budgetary problems, 40 per cent of 95 respondents indicated they were *hiring* in the policy studies field. Unlike other political science fields, the number of schools hiring exceeds the number of schools seeking to place public policy graduates, since a lower 24 per cent of 71 respondents indicated they had people available to place. The market for hiring and placing in the policy studies field seems to be especially active at the junior level for lack of funds to hire senior people, and possibly because junior people may be more likely to have relevant policy analysis training. The University of Washington at Seattle said, "The Graduate School of Public Affairs plans to make two or three appointments for the fall of 1976." A typical response illustrating that hiring is greater than placing in the public policy field (as contrasted to other fields) came from Cornell which said,

One of the currently vacant positions is in American Government/Public Policy, but no other openings are likely as Cornell has generally frozen hiring. Our program is only beginning to have Ph.D.'s with a program in Public Policy, so we do not have any placement experience yet.

The analysis of policy studies activities could have been broken down into the PhD departments, the MA departments, and the interdisciplinary

programs. Doing so would indicate that the interdisciplinary policy studies programs are the most active in the sense of having special degrees, organized research, special teaching, interdisciplinary activities, special funding, a willingness to participate in the PSO journal, and hiring and placement. The PhD departments are the next most active, and the MA departments third, although there are many MA departments that are more active than some PhD departments.

Among the PhD departments, the degree of activity correlates positively with the ranking of the department by the American Council of Education. This indicates that policy studies has acquired a greater respectability among the higher ranked departments than was the case with the 1973 academic survey (which resulted in the first *Policy Studies Directory*³), where that correlation was negative. It may also indicate that the higher-ranked departments are now less likely to leave policy studies exclusively to the interdisciplinary programs at those schools. The correlation analysis also shows that if a department responds favorably on one item, it is also likely to respond favorably on each other item given that policy studies tends to relate simultaneously to many aspects of the operations of political science departments.

Changes in Policy Studies Activities

A subgroup of the respondents reported an increase, a decrease, or no change in each of the seven items. That subgroup consisted of those 36 who responded to both the present 1976 questionnaire and the previous 1973 one, thereby holding constant those respondents across both surveys. We cannot meaningfully compare the total percent saying yes in the new 1976 questionnaire with the per cent saying yes in the old 1973 questionnaire, since the first one only included PhD departments and not MA departments or interdisciplinary programs, and since the same PhD departments did not respond to both questionnaires.

A department shows an increase on an item by having said no in 1973 and sort of or yes in 1976, or by saying sort of in 1973 and yes in 1976. A department shows a decrease by having said yes in 1973 and something less than yes in 1976. The no change category generally involves saying yes to both questionnaires on an item, although sometimes saying no to both, or sort of to both. With regard to the first item involving special degrees,

50 per cent of the 36 departments who responded to that item in both '73 and '76 showed an increase, 50 per cent no change, and 0 per cent a decrease. A net increase on each item was calculated by subtracting the per cent decrease from the per cent increase and ignoring the no change category. Thus, the net increase on the special degrees item was 50 per cent (or 50 per cent—0 per cent).

There was a substantial net increase in departments reporting special policy studies degrees, extension training of government personnel, organized research, special teaching, and organized interdisciplinary activities. More moderate net increases occurred in newsletters, special funding, and miscellaneous policy studies activities. Net decreases, however, occurred in hiring and placement activities given the increased tightness of the academic and governmental job markets. Hiring and placement, however, is still quite active in the policy studies field as indicated by the fact that 40 per cent of all the respondents said they were hiring, and 24 per cent said they were placing. A net decrease was also reported in willingness to take over some of the publication activities of the Policy Studies Organization, possibly due to a feeling that the costs would be too great in view of the expanded nature of those activities and the contracted nature of departmental budgets.

Recommendations for Improved Research, Communication, and Training

The second part of the questionnaire was designed to provide recommendations and other ideas for improving the policy relevance of political science research, communication, and training. Those were three key topics discussed in the recent *Political Science Utilization Directory* (Policy Studies Organization, 1975) by present or former government practitioners in federal, state, or local government who were members of the American Political Science Association. In offering *recommendations for research*, the responding political science departments and interdisciplinary programs emphasized the need for research on methods of decision making and policy evaluation. The practitioners from the earlier survey, on the other hand, placed less emphasis on research methodology and policy formation, and more emphasis on substantive policy and public administration.

Both groups emphasized the need for more

evaluation and impact studies, as is illustrated by the practitioner respondent from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration who commented,

We need prescriptive rather than descriptive research. Simply to tell a political decision-maker that a policy will be endorsed by one constituency rather than another probably only repeats something he already knows.

A small but substantial subgroup from both the academics and the practitioners also emphasized economic analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and related research. Respondents from the interdisciplinary programs especially emphasize the need for interdisciplinary research, such as the respondent from the Maxwell School who said, "Political scientists should be employed in evaluative studies of the impact of existing programs, along with other social scientists."

In offering recommendations regarding how political scientists might better *communicate* their research to people in government and receive feedback in return, the respondents emphasized the need for exchanges of research summaries, conferences, and workshops with practitioners. The practitioners also advocated similar devices, as indicated by the respondent from the National Institutes of Health who said,

Academic political scientists should spend some time in government as advisors, consultants, interns, residents, special assistants to Cabinet members and Congressional committees, etc. Government employees should spend a semester or two at a university every five years. There is a great need for such continual interchange.

Given the agreement on both sides, all that is perhaps needed are some facilitating personnel and funds in various governmental line agencies and research agencies designed to encourage relevant research utilization. The academics and practitioners also agreed on the need for journal articles with less jargon. The main disagreement relates to the fact that the academics may be more optimistic regarding what academic research has to offer than the practitioners are. The interdisciplinary policy programs at Berkeley, Harvard, and Yale participate in publishing the useful policy journals: *Policy Analysis*, *Public Policy*, and *Policy Sciences*, respectively, although the respondent from the Princeton Woodrow Wilson School mentioned that we need "the preparation of far better reviews of the state-of-the-art than have been issued either by government or the research community."

Recommendations were also offered for how political science *training* can better prepare people

for working in government, or doing work outside of government that is relevant to government decision making. Here as in research, the academics emphasized methodology, especially quantitative techniques, whereas the practitioners emphasized substantive knowledge about how government actually functions, and expertise in specific policy areas. Both groups strongly endorse internships in government and field experience, and they both endorse the increased emphasis on public policy studies.

The methodological emphasis of the academics is illustrated by West Virginia University, which responded by saying, "Presently, many institutions turn out people who may be well-trained in the substantive aspects of American politics and government or applied policy science, but do not have a solid grounding in the science of political science," or the response from Cornell which said, "A first requirement is that political scientists have a solid training in economics . . . because the discipline is most relevant to the framing of questions of choice and because so many choices are framed in economic terms." A representative practitioner involved in planning at the statewide level said,

The best training we have found is the actual experience in doing policy analysis for elected decisionmakers. Some kind of actual training which required taking an issue, looking at it, and preparing recommendations for particular action is the most effective preparation for people in our kind of an agency.

Optimism as to the meaningfulness of the new interdisciplinary training programs is expressed by the respondent for the Berkeley Graduate School of Public Policy who said, "A profession is now developing in which people are trained to examine alternative approaches to public policy programs, to evaluate the effects of policies, and to facilitate the implementation of programs."

Although the PhD departments may have more policy studies activities, the respondents from the MA departments tended to be more articulate with regard to offering recommendations for research needed, improved communication, and improved training. Perhaps becoming more involved in trying to operate a policy studies program makes one more cautious about making recommendations after seeing more of the complexities involved. On the other hand, some of the PhD departments may be overly cautious not only with regard to making recommendations, but also with regard to getting involved in the application of political science to

important policy problems. Perhaps an error of holding back when one could make a significant theoretical and practical contribution may be much more costly in terms of the opportunity costs than an error of moving forward with recommendations and programs before they are fully tested.

II. Issues Involved in Having a Balanced Policy Studies Program

1. To what extent should the program be an undergraduate rather than a graduate program and a PhD rather than an MA program?

For political science departments that only have undergraduate courses, this is not an issue, although they could be thinking about maintaining a balance between the policy studies training of undergraduates who are not likely to do graduate work and those who are. The departments in the 1976 questionnaire all offer at least a master's degree, and for them the undergraduate-graduate distinction is relevant. A program that involves undergraduate MA and possibly PhD policy studies work provides diversity of faculty experiences and student interaction, an increased quantity of students to generate the critical mass that might be needed for a more effective program and a recruitment source for the more advanced aspects of the program. Teaching policy studies to undergraduates can be especially helpful with regard to learning how to simplify the presentation of materials that might otherwise be unduly quantitative or theoretical, and such simplification can also be helpful with regard to improved communication with government practitioners. Establishing a three-level program can be made easier by including a number of advanced undergraduate courses that can be taken for either graduate or undergraduate credit. Further discussion of the undergraduate aspects of a policy analysis program is included in David Smith, "Policy Analysis for Undergraduates" (Ford Foundation Public Policy Committee, 1975).

2. To what extent should the program train people for government work as contrasted to teaching work?

This issue is related to the first issue in that PhD programs tend to emphasize teaching, and undergraduate or MA programs tend to emphasize government work, but not necessarily. There is an increasing demand for PhDs to do government policy evaluation work as indicated in the

responses to the *Political Science Utilization Directory* (Policy Studies Organization, 1975). Likewise, the undergraduate and MA programs could have a component which encourages going on for a PhD teaching degree. It is desirable to have interaction between students who are oriented toward becoming policy evaluation practitioners and students who are oriented toward becoming teachers and research authors, since both groups have perspectives and ideas that may provide insights to the other group as well as to the faculty.

3. To what extent should the program be a political science program as contrasted to an interdisciplinary program?

Since we are mainly talking about policy studies programs within political science departments, it follows that these programs will basically be political science programs although with interdisciplinary elements. Of all the social sciences, political science is the most relevant to discussing the institutional aspects of policy formation and policy implementation with regard to the roles of federal, state, and local legislators, chief executives, administrators, and judges. Political science also provides relevant knowledge and theories with regard to the roles of parties, interest groups, public opinion, and political philosophy in policy formation and implementation. Those concerns are enough to make political science a meaningful focus for a policy studies program, although a more nearly comprehensive program would require substantial supplementing from other disciplines like economics, sociology, law, psychology, and philosophy, as is discussed in *Policy Studies and the Social Sciences* (Nagel (ed.), Lexington, 1975). The supplementing can take the form of required outside courses, a required minor, political science courses that emphasize the substance and method of other disciplines, and also recommended electives.

4. What about the balance between substance and method?

Both substantive and methodological knowledge are needed for policy studies. If students are just well-versed in policy evaluation methodology, but they have had no depth in any substantive policy problem area, then their work is likely to be overly abstract and possibly impractical for lack of that concrete knowledge. On the other hand, individuals who are well-versed in a specific policy problem area (like poverty, environmental protection, foreign policy, economic regulation, etc.)

could not consider themselves to be policy studies or policy analysis persons if they do not have some generalized methodological skills for analyzing policy alternatives across policy problem areas. Relevant substantive problems of special interest to political scientists are those included in *Policy Studies in America and Elsewhere* (Nagel (ed.), Lexington, 1975), such as civil liberties, electoral policy, and foreign policy. Relevant methodologies include those dealt with in books like Sciolo and Cook, *Methodologies for Analyzing Public Policies* (Lexington, 1975), and Delbeare, *Public Policy Evaluation* (Sage, 1975), such as case studies, inductive statistics, and deductive modeling.

5. To what extent should policy studies be a separate field within political science rather than a pervasive approach in all fields of political science?

Policy studies can be both a separate field and a pervasive approach. As a separate field, policy studies is distinguished from other political science fields partly by its methodology which emphasizes (1) causal analysis in explaining policy variations over time, across places, and across subject matters, as well as a methodology of (2) means-ends analysis for evaluating alternative public policies especially, but not exclusively, in terms of their impacts on the political system. It is also distinguished by its substance which emphasizes a concern for poverty, environmental protection, foreign policy, economic regulation, and other policy problem areas. As a pervasive approach, a policy studies perspective can be included within every field of political science including international policy, comparative policy, policy theory, administering policy, judicial policy, state and local policy, legislative policy, and policy dynamics. The relevance of all fields of political science to a given policy problem is illustrated by *Environmental Politics* (Nagel (ed.), Praeger, 1974).

6. To what extent should the program balance classroom and field experience?

It is highly desirable to give policy studies students some experience in government work, especially policy evaluation work, to supplement their classroom learning. The difficult problem is how to provide that experience. One method at least for PhD and MA students is through internships, especially in state government. The need for providing more experience to more students can also be partly satisfied by having the students work with faculty members who are involved in real world consulting projects. Playing

simulated roles in policy gaming situations such as those that relate to urban planning, environmental protection, foreign policy, criminal justice, and other problem areas can also provide many useful insights. Inviting practitioners to teach and speak within the policy studies program can provide some vicarious experience to supplement the more abstract classroom and textbook experience. For further information on policy studies internships, see the publications of the Washington-based National Center for Public Service Internship Programs, such as *Public Service Internships: Opportunities for the Graduate, Post Graduate and Mid-Career Professional* (1975).

7. To what extent will the program be balanced with hard money from university budget lines as contrasted to soft money from grants and possibly contracts that relate to policy evaluation?

The hard money is needed to give the program security and also respectability. The soft money is needed to give the program some extra funds and also to provide the kind of research projects that may be especially useful as learning experiences and for developing some PhD dissertations, MA theses, and seminar papers. Obtaining some soft money grants and contracts may also stimulate the university to appropriate regular budget money for the program on a seed money basis or a continuing basis. On the other hand, obtaining hard money to establish the program can facilitate getting research grants and training grants from foundations and government agencies. Outside grant money may be especially facilitated if the political science policy studies program can link up with an academic research institute which already has a good track record for policy evaluation research, as do some institutes of government research at public and private universities. Policy studies grant-getting is the subject of the forthcoming *Policy Studies Grants Directory* (Policy Studies Organization, 1977).

8. To what extent should the program be exclusively a teaching and training program as contrasted to being exclusively a policy studies research institute with no substantial teaching component?

A meaningful training program would have to have a research component because part of the training logically involves training to do research regardless whether the program is training (1) academics who teach and research or (2) government practitioners who administer or produce research, or at least consume research. To

acquire research skills, one needs to be involved in research projects. Thus, the policy studies program should encourage research on the part of its faculty and its graduate students. That research will increase the visibility of the program, aid its recruitment, aid its placement, and aid in getting grants and contract money. On the other hand, a pure research program would be hurt by the absence of graduate students and possibly undergraduates who would be part of the training component. Those students help generate questions, comments, and ideas which improve the research. They also provide people who can participate as research assistants and research collaborators. A pure research program might have difficulty attracting sufficiently creative personnel who welcome faculty-student stimuli and who consider being exclusively in a research institute too much like a 9 to 5 job lacking the independence that is associated with a two course per semester teaching schedule in which one may work well into the night, but on self-motivated research.

9. To what extent should the program emphasize the causes of variation in public policy rather than emphasize the evaluation of alternative public policies?

Increasing emphasis is now being placed in political science on quantitatively evaluating alternative public policies. That emphasis is in response to (1) new methodological tools and data banks, (2) job opportunities and grants, (3) the stimuli of intense public concern over governmental policy in the late '60s and early '70s, (4) reaching a possible saturation point with regard to the application of duplicative quantitative research to relatively unimportant political matters, and (5) the momentum of policy-relevant research, teaching, and institutions in political science in the mid-1970s. That evaluative emphasis is especially relevant to the mainstream of political science if it deals with evaluating alternative public policies that relate to how chief executives, public administrators, legislators, or judges ought to operate, or if it relates to subject matters that are especially within political science like international relations, civil liberties, or electoral policy.

That evaluative emphasis may also be quite relevant to political science regardless of the type of public policies being evaluated so long as the concern is with the authoritative allocating of things of value rather than with natural science, humanities, or other non-political science topics.

On the other hand, one cannot meaningfully evaluate alternative public policies without taking into consideration what causes some policies to be adopted and others to be rejected by policy makers, policy appliers, or policy recipients. To ignore that kind of causal analysis is to ignore the important evaluative criterion of political feasibility. Causal analysis is also quite relevant to evaluation or optimizing work in the sense that one cannot evaluate alternative public policies unless one knows something about the causal relations between those policies and whatever goal-criteria are being used. That kind of means-ends causal analysis is different from what causes a type of policy or decision to be adopted, but the same kind of methodology applied to either kind of causal analysis.

III. Some Conclusions

The main conclusion to be drawn from the questionnaire responses is that policy studies are alive and well in political science departments and interdisciplinary programs across the country, and still growing rapidly although possibly at a less rapid rate than in the early 1970s. Additional quantitative support for that conclusion is given in the recent 1975-76 APSA Survey of Political Science Departments which again shows that the public policy field is the fastest growing political science field as measured by course enrollment trends. Of the 49 PhD departments with 21 or more faculty, 53 per cent reported a gain in the public policy field, and only 9 per cent reported a loss, for a difference of 42 percentage points, which is higher than any other field. There was a similar difference of 45 percentage points in 1974-75, and 52 percentage points in 1973-74, indicating some plateauing of the trend. It is difficult, however, every year to have almost 50 per cent of those political science departments report another gain in the public policy field, as they have been since the APSA survey began. The related field of public administration has been maintaining a close second with regard to the per cent of departments reporting a gain rather than a loss in course enrollments.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the discussion of issues in Part II of this article and the recommendations included in Part I is that there are a variety of policy studies perspectives regarding the relative importance of such matters

as (1) method versus substance and (2) policy formation versus policy evaluation. Those two issues particularly divided academics and practitioners, although they agreed on the need for (1) more policy studies within political sciences, (2) more academic-practitioner interaction, and (3) more field experience for policy students. There were also some differences of emphasis (1) between PhD departments and MA departments, as for example, on method versus substance, and (2) between political science departments and interdisciplinary policy studies programs, as for example, on policy formation versus policy evaluation and interdisciplinary emphasis. There does, however, seem to be general consensus that those perspectives are not incompatible, but rather are simultaneously needed to provide balanced policy studies programs either within political science departments or in interdisciplinary programs.

Thus, we can conclude that a lot is happening with regard to university policy studies, but that more probably should be happening, especially with regard to simultaneously having (1) PhD, MA, and undergraduate emphasis, (2) training for government and teaching, (3) political science and interdisciplinary emphasis, (4) substantive and methodological training, (5) policy as a separate subfield and a pervasive perspective, (6) more field experience to supplement the classroom, (7) support money from diverse sources, (8) teaching and research activities, and simultaneously having (9) causal and evaluative emphasis in the policy studies programs. Adoption of these considerations should help to bring closer together and make more effective the fields of policy studies, political science, and public administration.

Notes

1. Nagel and Neef, "The Use of Political Science: The Practitioner's Perspective," *PS*, Vol. 8 (1975), pp. 376-380; and Nagel and Neef (eds.), *Political Science Utilization Directory* (Policy Studies Organization, 1975).
2. Nagel and Neef (eds.), *Policy Studies Directory* (Policy Studies Organization, 1976). Copies of this 152-page directory can be obtained for \$1.00 to cover administrative and mailing costs from the Policy Studies Organization, 361 Lincoln Hall, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois 61801. The Directory was published with the aid of the NSF Office of Intergovernmental Programs.
3. *Ibid.*

From the Professional Stream

CURRENTS and SOUNDINGS

STAFFING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

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After having been largely ignored for many years, personnel issues have begun to again receive attention at the United Nations.¹ Since approximately 70 per cent of the UN's budget is devoted to personnel costs, such attention is long overdue. However, one very important recent development seems to have passed almost unnoticed. This is the creation of the International Civil Service Commission. In this article we will briefly discuss the establishment of the Commission. Its functions will be described and its initial activities analyzed. We will conclude with some thoughts on the major challenges facing the Commission in the future.

The International Civil Service Commission

As long ago as 1945 the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations recommended the creation of an international civil service commission and the General Assembly adopted that recommendation at its first session in 1946.² This initiative was, however, never pursued, and instead the International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB) was set up in 1948 to advise the United Nations system of organizations on personnel practices.

The International Civil Service Advisory Board was instrumental in shaping the evolution of the United Nations "common system" of personnel policies and practices. Beginning in 1946, specialized agencies such as the ILO and other organiza-

tions affiliated with the UN entered into certain agreements with the United Nations thus creating the common system. The common system consists of common salaries and allowances, a common grading system, participation in a common pension fund, and a common administrative tribunal.³ The common system now includes all of the specialized agencies (with the exception of those located in Washington, D.C.⁴) and other organizations in the UN system such as UNICEF and UNDP. Despite these arrangements, there has never been a unified international civil service. Differences and discrepancies in personnel practices and policies exist. Such a situation is perhaps inevitable when a large number of organizations, each of which must report to different legislative bodies, is involved.

By the 1970s the international civil service had greatly increased in size. The secretariats of the organizations comprising the United Nations common system now employ approximately 40,000 individuals, and it became clear that more effective coordination of personnel practices of the different organizations was needed in order to maintain and strengthen the common system. In addition there was continuing uncertainty over what salary scale was appropriate for the United Nations system. In 1970 the General Assembly created a special committee to review the salary system. But its massive report, issued in 1972, was inconclusive.⁵ Finally, there was a good deal of dissatisfac-

The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of various United Nations staff members in preparing this article. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

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tion, particularly among Member-States, over what were perceived as inadequacies in personnel policies and practices.⁶ In brief, it can then be said that the desire to maintain the common system with an appropriate salary scale and eventually to create a unified international civil service plus considerable dissatisfaction with existing policies and practices are the main factors which explained the General Assembly's decision to create the International Civil Service Commission.

The General Assembly decided to establish the Commission in 1972.⁷ It was later decided that the statute of the Commission should be referred to governments for comment. It was therefore not until the 29th session of the General Assembly in 1974 that the statute was approved and the Commission formally came into being.⁸ The Commission consists of 15 members of whom only two, the chairman and vice-chairman, serve full-time. Raul Quijano of Argentina was named chairman. The vice-chairman is A.L. Adu of Ghana.⁹ According to its statute, members of the Commission shall serve "in their personal capacity as individuals of recognized competence who have substantial experience of executive responsibility in public administration or related fields, particularly in personnel management." Members are also to be chosen "with due regard for equitable geographical distribution." Of the first 15 members of the Commission, five are from the Western, developed world, two are from Socialist bloc countries, and eight come from developing countries. No two members may be from the same country.

In exercising its functions, the Commission should aim "at the development of a single unified international civil service through the application of common personnel standards, methods and arrangements." According to the statute, the following matters fall within the Commission's mandate: (1) broad principles for the determination of the conditions of service of the staff; (2) scales of salaries and post adjustments for staff; (3) allowances and benefits of staff; (4) staff assessment; (5) methods by which the principles for determining conditions of service should be applied; (6) classification of duty stations for the purpose of applying post adjustments; (7) job classification standards; (8) standards of recruitment of international civil servants; (9) development of recruitment sources, including the establishment of central rosters of qualified candidates; (10) organization of competitive examinations or alternative selection procedures; (11) career devel-

opment, staff training, and staff evaluation programs; and (12) the development of common staff regulations.

Although the Commission will exercise certain powers itself, on most matters it will make recommendations. The Commission will carry out its functions "in respect of the United Nations and of those specialized agencies and other international organizations which participate in the United Nations common system and which accept the present statute." To date, ten organizations, in addition to the UN itself, have accepted the statute.¹⁰ It is anticipated that all organizations, except the four in Washington, D.C., which have traditionally had separate personnel procedures, will accept it in the future.

The full Commission meets twice a year. Thus far the Commission has had four sessions. The first was devoted almost entirely to organizational matters. The General Assembly, in establishing the Commission, asked that it review the United Nations salary system "as a matter of priority." The Commission dealt with the salary review at its second, third, and fourth sessions. A report on salaries for the international civil service has now been completed and submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration.¹¹

In addition to conducting the salary review, the Commission has assumed responsibility for such technical tasks as the monthly revisions of the schedules of daily subsistence allowances (for UN staff members travelling in all parts of the world) and of post adjustment classifications. It also now has responsibility for carrying out cost-of-living surveys required for the calculation of various rates and salaries. In the 1976-77 budget period the Commission's total staff will number approximately 38 and its annual budget will be approximately \$1.5 million.¹²

The Commission and the Future of the International Civil Service

Given the interdependence of the world community and the resulting increase in the activities to be conducted by international organizations, it seems likely that the size of the international civil service will increase in the future. This assumption, however, is valid only if the international civil service proves itself capable of discharging these increased responsibilities with a certain degree of competence. Otherwise, governments will seek different avenues for dealing with global problems.

The evolution of the international civil service then is a matter of considerable importance. The International Civil Service Commission will undoubtedly play a large role in this evolution. The general environment in which the Commission must operate is not an auspicious one. The day has long since passed when there was an accepted model of the international civil service. The model that emerged from the League of Nations experience, and the one that was adopted without serious question by the founders of the United Nations, is the traditional model of the international civil service. The traditional model is based on the principles of merit, independence, and impartiality. In 1945, it was expected that the United Nations would conform to this model in its staffing arrangements. This expectation is quite clear in Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter which states:

The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

It was clearly the founders' intention that merit take precedence over geographical representation and it was on this basis that a career international civil service was established. But the traditional model never received unqualified support from Member-States. The Soviet Union questioned the concept from the beginning, and the United States also played a part in weakening it.¹³ Despite these challenges and the natural inclination of Member-States to put forward their own nationals for vacant posts, the essential elements of the concept of an international civil service remained intact until the early 1960s. Until that time debates on personnel questions were rather tepid.¹⁴

This period of relative tranquility came to an end in the 1960s. The Socialist bloc countries, gravely concerned over the tendency of the Secretary-General and the secretariat to act independently, expressed strong reservations on the concept of an international civil service. Also in the 1960s, a large number of African states gained independence and became members of the United Nations. According to Professor Leland Goodrich:

The new members were still in the mood of revolt against colonialism, all too often identified with Western influence, and were impatient in their demands for recognition. They were anxious, on grounds of state equality and national prestige, to obtain quick and full acceptance

of their claims to equal participation in the work of the organization, not only in the political organs but in the Secretariat as well.¹⁵

In the 1960s, questions regarding the international civil service became much more contentious and the subject of intense debate in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly. This trend has continued in the 1970s. As the Third World nations became increasingly militant on international political and economic questions, they also sought to increase their influence within the secretariats of the UN system of organizations, many of which were perceived to be dominated by Westerners.¹⁶ Personnel questions have hence become highly politicized and support for the traditional model of the international civil service has undergone considerable erosion. It should also be noted that another important factor contributing to the erosion of the traditional model is the change in the nature of functions of the organizations in the UN system. As the organizations have become deeply involved with questions of development, it has inevitably been found necessary to recruit more staff with technical skills and specialized types of knowledge. For a variety of reasons, it is more feasible to employ such individuals on a fixed-term rather than a permanent basis and this has brought into question the concept of career secretariats.

This erosion of support for the traditional model has alarmed Western observers, and the conventional wisdom has been to link the decline in support of the traditional model to what are said to be declining morale and standards of competence of the staffs of international organizations.

Indeed a number of reports and analyses have come to the conclusion that the quality and competence of the staff were not what they should be. For example, a 1972 symposium on personnel problems of the UN Secretariat came to the conclusion that "a major effort is needed to improve the quality of the Secretariat."¹⁷ A Joint Inspection Unit report issued earlier stated: "General dissatisfaction and real problems which are not properly solved but grow worse from year to year: these seem to me to be the essential features of the present situation with regard to personnel questions in the United Nations."¹⁸ A more recent analysis also came to the conclusion that the morale and quality of staff are deteriorating.¹⁹

But it must be recognized that the evaluations which have taken place are largely impressionistic and indeed it is difficult to say what criteria

should be utilized to evaluate performance in international organizations. Other observers deny that standards are declining and assert that emphasis on geographical representation has strengthened the system, since only staffs which represent the cultural, racial, ideological, and linguistic diversity in the world can hope to function effectively in today's international environment.

Although at first glance it might appear as if most of the Commission's functions are of a technical, non-political nature, political questions cannot be avoided. For example, questions relating to career development fall within the Commission's mandate. One of the major issues in career development is whether staff should be recruited on a career or short-term basis, which is an issue of great controversy among Member-States. Indeed personnel practices are related to general personnel policies which are ultimately derived, whether implicitly or explicitly, from some model of the international civil service. The Commission then cannot avoid indicating what model of the international civil service it deems most appropriate. This will be difficult at a time when no consensus exists as to what model is to be preferred and when almost all issues relating to the international civil service tend to be contentious.

The environment in which the Commission must operate is also a difficult one for other reasons. In a time of economic difficulty, Member-States are closely scrutinizing the budgets of the United Nations and related organizations. The largest items in these budgets are personnel costs, and the Commission is expected to suggest reforms that will maximize the return on resources devoted to personnel. At the same time the Commission must deal with the increased militancy of staff associations which are pressing for increases in salaries and benefits, which some Member-States already regard as being excessive. This militancy has already resulted in a strike by general service staff at the United Nations office in Geneva and several threatened strikes in New York.²⁰

Since the Commission has been in existence for a relatively short time and has yet to assume some of the functions assigned to it, it is perhaps premature to evaluate its performance. Yet conclusions can be made on how well the Commission's composition and powers prepare it for discharging its functions in the present environment.

The geographical spread of the Commission's membership is about what would be expected, given the prevailing political environment at the

United Nations. All permanent members of the Security Council, with the exception of China,²¹ are represented, and Third World nations have a majority. The statute of the Commission, as previously noted, states that members of the Commission should be "individuals of recognized competence who have had substantial experience of executive responsibility in public administration or related fields, particularly in personnel management." A review of the backgrounds of the 15 Commission members however reveals that other criteria were apparently considered of more importance. Only five of the members seem to have backgrounds in personnel management, and only slightly more than half the members have had "substantial experience of executive responsibility in public administration."

The backgrounds of the members rather clearly reveal that they have been drawn primarily from what one might term the "foreign affairs establishment." Seven of the members are former ambassadors, one is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and several others have had careers in their countries' foreign service. A substantial majority of the Commission have had lengthy experience dealing with the UN either as an ambassador or delegate, a senior staff member, or member of various commissions and bodies. The first chairman of the Commission characterized the membership as "a happy mixture of administrative expertise and political representation."²² The political side seems to be more heavily weighted, which is not surprising. Undoubtedly, it is indispensable to have on the Commission individuals who are knowledgeable about UN operations and procedures and who have a political sense of what is feasible in the UN environment.

However, it might be asked if the Commission is perhaps too dominated by what might be termed "old UN hands." Only one Commission member is under 50 years of age and the mean age is 61. One would also hope that the Commission might be a source of fresh, innovative ideas, which is somewhat unlikely given the present composition. Members of the Commission, although formally proposed by the Secretary-General and appointed by the General Assembly, are in the first instance suggested by governments. The fact that most governments have put forward individuals with political and diplomatic backgrounds, rather than administrative ones, indicates that they are fully aware of the political implications of the Commission's work.

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The composition of the Commission of course cannot be considered in isolation from the Commission's role and functions. Although the Commission, in inspiration at least, might be seen as an equivalent of national civil service commissions, in reality its role is somewhat different. At least in the Anglo-American tradition, the role of civil service commissions is to insulate the civil service from undue political pressure. Thus in the United States and the United Kingdom most appointments to the civil service are made by supposedly impartial civil or public service commissions which also perform a variety of other executive functions such as recruitment and job classification.

The International Civil Service Commission has a somewhat different role. It does not have responsibility for personnel administration, including recruitment, training, salary determination, classification, etc. Appointments to the secretariats will continue to be made by the executive heads of the various organizations who are also responsible for most aspects of personnel administration. The Commission is given the responsibility for discharging a few functions by itself, but on most matters of importance it can only make recommendations, either to the General Assembly or to the organizations which have accepted its statute.

The success of the Commission will then depend largely on its ability to persuade various affected groups to accept its recommendations. With this in mind, the dominance of "old UN hands" on the Commission takes on a different perspective. Such individuals should have the proper "connections" to convince the various interested parties to accept the Commission's recommendations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, what can be said of the Commission's prospects? Can it indeed meet its objectives of creating a unified international civil service that will effectively and efficiently serve the organizations of the UN system? At this point one can only speculate, but it can safely be said that the challenge before the Commission is a great one. At a time when personnel issues are becoming increasingly politicized, it must attempt to reach agreement on a variety of controversial issues. Once agreement is reached, it must then persuade elements with often conflicting interests — Member-States, staff organizations, management of organizations — to accept its conclusions. One can

envision this scenario working, but the possibility of the Commission not having much of an impact must also be considered.

Notes

1. The United States government, for example, recently accused Secretary-General Waldheim of not resisting political pressures in making appointments to the UN Secretariat. See Kathleen Teltsch, "U.S. Says Waldheim Is Yielding to Pressure on Jobs," *New York Times*, October 12, 1976.
2. See General Assembly Resolution 13 (I).
3. Not all organizations that are part of the common system participate in all these arrangements.
4. These are the four organizations in the World Bank Group: the IBRD, the IMF, the IDA, and the IFC.
5. *Report of the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System* (A/8728), 3 Volumes (New York: United Nations, 1972).
6. For background see Richard F. Janssen, "UN Bureaucracy Begins to Feel Uneasy," *International Herald Tribune* August 16, 1976.
7. See General Assembly Resolution 3042 (XXVII).
8. The Statute is attached to General Assembly Resolution 3357 (XXIX).
9. Other members of the Commission are Pascal Frochoux (Switzerland), Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia), Doudou Thiam (Senegal), Toru Hagiwara (Japan), Robert E. Hampton (United States), A.H.M. Hillis (United Kingdom), Antonio Fonseca Pimentel (Brazil), Jean-Louis Plihom (France), Amjad Ali (Pakistan), Michael O. Ani (Nigeria), A.S. Chistayakov (U.S.S.R.), P.N. Haksar (India), and Halima Warzazi (Morocco).
10. These organizations are ILO, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, IMCO, ITU, UPU, WIPO, ICAO, and WMO.
11. See *Report of the International Civil Service Commission* (A/31/30) (New York: United Nations, 1976). The report on salaries, "Report of the International Civil Service Commission on the Review of the United Nations Salary System," is part two of this document.
12. See *Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 1976-1977 Report of the International Civil Service Commission* (A/C.5/1700) (New York: United Nations, 1975).
13. When it was revealed that a small number of Americans working for the United Nations had refused to answer certain questions before a grand jury, the United States government demanded that they be dismissed and they eventually were. For background, see Howard Wriggins and Edwin A. Bock, "The Status of the United Nations Secretariat" (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954). See also Shirley Hazzard, *Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destruction of the United Nations* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1973).
14. See Richard N. Swift, "Personnel Problems and the United Nations Secretariat," *International Organization*, Vol. XI (Spring 1957).

15. Leland Goodrich, "Geographical Distribution of the Staff of the U.N. Secretariat," *International Organization*, Vol. XVI (Summer 1962), p. 470.
16. See, for example, General Assembly Resolution 3417 (XXX) adopted by the 30th General Assembly which noted that "64.5 percent of the staff members who occupy senior posts in the Secretariat are nationals of the developed countries," while "developing countries constitute 73 percent of the membership of the United Nations." The resolution went on to request the Secretary-General to take appropriate steps to "increase the number of staff members recruited from among nationals of developing countries for senior posts in the Secretariat."
17. Richard Gardner (ed.), *The Future of the United Nations Secretariat* (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the Institute on Man and Science, 1972), p. 26.
18. *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on Personnel Problems in the United Nations* (Bertrand Report) (A/8454) (New York: United Nations, 1971), p. 16.
19. Seymour Max Finger and John Mugno, "The Politics of Staffing the United Nations Secretariat," *Orbis*, Vol. XIX (Spring 1975).
20. For background on the strike in Geneva, see Joint Inspection Unit, *Report on Some Aspects of the Strike at the United Nations Office at Geneva from 25 February to 3 March 1976* (JIU/REP/76/6) (Geneva: United Nations, 1976). The staff of the specialized agencies in Geneva did not participate in the strike.
21. China declined to recommend a candidate for a seat on the Commission.
22. See *Fifth Committee Provisional Summary Records* (A/C.5/SR.1744), p. 5.

THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Milton Pikarsky, *Regional Transportation Authority of Northwestern Illinois*

The following material was adapted from an address by Milton Pikarsky to the Chicago Chapter of ASPA on February 8, 1977.

I have been asked to speak on the challenge to the public official who is often found in the midst of confrontations of one sort or another. This is a situation with which I am sure many of you are reasonably familiar, if less publicly than myself.

Our situation is related to the observation that during the past few years there have been important changes in the way things happen within our government. These changes greatly affect what an administrator does, but the changes are not all that apparent to the public, nor always to the news media either.

One reason why the public, the constituents we serve, and the media are not aware of these changes is that things are happening so fast. Newspaper and magazine articles tell us that the taboos about things which could not be presented just a few years ago on TV and motion picture screens would seem ridiculous today. In fact, it has become popular for TV shows to humorously present clips from shows only a few years before; people are amused and astonished at how quickly

tastes and values have changed. Recently a local newspaper carried a story of how an actress had received an academy award for a part in a movie about *avant garde* life of the late 1960s which today seems very dated. So the lack of awareness of rapid social change has itself become a topic of our times.

Another reason why the public does not always sense the changes in government practices is that they were never much aware of how government really worked in the first place. I recall that when I first became commissioner of public works, trained as a civil engineer, it came as quite an education to learn how decisions and choices were really made. In college for example, we were taught what the choices in bridge design were, and how to make the best determination of design based on need, physical properties, and to a great extent, economics. Mainly our considerations had to do with computing stress loads, material available, projected use, and safety considerations. But

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in the practical world many other factors enter. The choices as to which priorities will receive consideration and what funding decisions will be made depend on many socioeconomic considerations that the engineer would not have taken into account. For example, a church in the right of way of a large expressway may not be given much notice by the planning engineer, who is looking to optimize safety and minimize construction costs. But this same church will receive a great deal of attention from the political representative of those people who value the church itself and who for religious reasons would not want to see the church moved or altered in any way. So the administrator working in public service must learn to work comfortably in such an environment, an environment in which the technical facts may receive less recognition than social implications or perceptions and the administrator must learn ways to resolve differences. That professional planners have found this situation frustrating is apparent from the well-known saying: "The planner proposes, the politician disposes."

These factors are especially evident when any new regional government is formed, and the RTA (Regional Transportation Authority of Northeastern Illinois, a six-county regional government including the City of Chicago) is no exception. Let us take a moment to consider the RTA situation. The major role of the RTA is to develop a workable transportation system for the six-county area. We have a highly pragmatic orientation at the RTA — given that much of our work is doing what must be done to keep existing systems operating, while at the same time forging ahead on new development. Our responsibility is to approach what comes, head on, to get this job done.

It is imperative that we solve daily operational problems which confront us as they occur — be it the bankruptcy of a rail line, insufficient equipment, or a major disaster. We have to deal effectively with the situation whether we had anything to do with the difficulties or not. At the same time, we must implement sound operational policies, both in terms of meeting present needs and in setting precedents for the future. Especially we must work with the labyrinthine complexities of the federal government: the red tape, the bureaucracy, both good and bad, and all the agencies which provide the federal funds essential to getting our job done.

Very little of this is understood by the general public or even the media. In fact, part of what

happens sometimes defies understanding. The media seize on items they consider newsworthy, but must report in their limited space a highly complicated issue in the briefest, simplistic terms. It becomes then, a most challenging task to communicate the facts of these issues to the public. We diligently address ourselves to this cause, and there is evidence that we are beginning to succeed.

Consensus Building

We have assembled competent, qualified people who are skilled in their fields and know what they are doing. We frequently find ourselves involved in situations where the operating alternatives are very limited . . . situations where there are strong, practical constraints on what can and cannot be done. In this environment, we find ourselves in the area of consensus building: in negotiating and arbitrating various interests and balancing various trade-offs to work out a step-by-step operating policy.

These tasks become highly challenging in the public administration area because of the close association with the political forces of the community, especially in view of the basic distinctions between those trained for the political world and those in a professional discipline, such as engineering, planning, or administration.

What happens then, in a general way, is that the professional trained in a given discipline tries to give as exact a description of the material world as possible. Much of a professional person's life is spent in determining fact from non-fact, and in being as clear and accurate as possible in defining a given situation. The person usually does not appreciate the social consequences of his or her recommendations.

By contrast, politicians, who live in a world of people — all types, shapes, and sizes of people — do not as a rule deal in facts alone and may be uncomfortable when too careful or precise a description of any issue is drawn. For most trained professionals, the basic facts do not vary from day to day. But in the political world we attempt to react to the needs and desires of our present constituencies and do not adequately address the needs of future generations.

Those in the political world are known to favor a less distinct shaping of issues, because any subject not now in debate may suddenly be up for negotiations. It is wise to keep as many options and alternatives open as possible to enhance bargaining power.

Thus it is not so much a question of basic personal conflicts as to what is right or wrong, but a question of emphasis and priority.

The practice of circumlocution to obscure the endorsing of an idea is another method of practice common to the political world but foreign to most managers and professionals. In transportation especially, many of the principal participants, skilled in negotiation, may well be more interested in developing compromising language than in the technical facts that transportation planners and engineers may feel of paramount importance. Again, the facts of the situation do not carry the same weight as other considerations.

For example, the first documented use of the term "operating assistance" rather than the more descriptive "operating subsidy" was in 1965 by Hollman D. Pettibone, chairman of the Mayor's Central Area Committee. Pettibone had a talent for finding terms on which conflicting interests could agree. He managed to draft a statement that all members of the committee found acceptable, including Wayne A. Johnson, president of the Illinois Central Railroad, who had emphatically opposed subsidies for the Chicago Transit Authority, saying, "I don't get one. Why should they?" But Johnson was willing to agree to a compromise using the words operating assistance, in place of subsidy.

This same problem is with us today. In a recent bill before the Congress, we had hoped to get an increase in the federal share of the operating assistance which we now receive to help cover our operating losses in transportation. The staff of the Senate Banking Committee, which prepared the bill, have stated they feel there would be substantial resistance to gaining passage of anything larger than the 50-50 sharing we now have. However, they realize something must be done to get more funds to the transit-dependent cities for operating losses, so they have used a tactic of forming a large reserve fund which can be used as a discretionary fund by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. They feel this Senate Bill 208, presented by Senator Williams, has a good chance for passage. It is therefore not so much a case of the facts of the funding but rather the perception of the principles involved.

Although there are some public administrators who are not directly involved with the activities of the federal government, most of us do find ourselves heavily involved in legislation, guidelines, regulations, and all that goes with obtaining

federal funds. Because of the way the tax system works in this country, the federal government is the only source of the massive funds needed for most public programs, and this is especially true for public works and transportation. Success in this endeavor is essential to the performance of any public official. It means both working with the legislature to get the funding authorized and working with the bureaucracy to get the funds delivered for the needed projects.

Streamlining Bureaucracy

The workings of the bureaucracy have become so cumbersome that streamlining their activities has become a major goal of the new Administration. These projected activities portend well for us in public administration. However, there are reasons for concern that things will not improve as fast as we might like. First, there is the basic objection to change which any bureaucracy exhibits. If you have been following Senator Adlai E. Stevenson's recent work in reform of the Senate's Committee System, you know he was chairman of the Committee on Reform and his plan was approved by a vote of 80 to 1, but not before extensive surgery was worked on the plan.

Originally he proposed cutting in half the present 31 Senate committees. In the end, only ten were eliminated. Those of us in transportation noticed that Senator Edmond Muskie managed to keep authority for highways and mass transit in the Public Works Committee on which he serves, instead of the planned transfer to the Commerce Committee on which he does not serve. The single vote against the plan was from a senator who was chairman of one of the committees which was eliminated. Senator S. I. Hayakawa, a former university professor and now a freshman senator who has long battled with rigid institutions which resist change, observed, "I am startled to find some of my liberal colleagues standing in the way of change." Many of us in public administration will perhaps not be quite so startled at the lack of change in the proposed streamlining of bureaucratic functions, much as we would like to see such change. But any improvement is of course welcome.

The fact is that most people probably do not comprehend the workings of the bureaucratic world. And to those who do take time to try and understand the bureaucratic decision-making process, it may not seem at all rational. In some sense,

it is not rational. Certainly it would seem reasonable that since the government bureaucracy, especially the large agencies created to carry out the wishes of the Legislative and Executive Branches of government, presumably seeks the same goals as the rest of the nation, the decisions ought to reflect this shared concern. It would follow that actions might then be presumed to flow directly and unambiguously from these decisions. But the reality of the situation is much more complicated, as any public administrator knows.

The decisions of the bureaucracy, especially regarding priorities as to what is handled and what is laid aside, has in part to do with how these decisions affect the careers of the people involved, the goals and missions of their organizations, and the prestige which these organizations have within the government hierarchy. Government organizations often do things which seem strange on the local level but are completely understandable from the national level, however detrimental to local interests they may be. Some organizations will, for example, reject new functions which tend to lead to joint control operations with another organization, since this type of activity is seen as diluting their strength . . . even if the new function may be needed by local interests. An agency may also accept a function initially to keep others from having it, only to later deprive funds and key personnel from that function if it is viewed as peripheral to the agency's self-interest. The same function of course may not be at all peripheral to the interests of local governments.

Any successful agency, and we think the RTA is proving to be a good example of this, must deal effectively with these problems. We have to face the question, given all these complexities, how can we get something done? What are the tactics and strategies which a public administrator can use to get things accomplished that need to be accomplished and in a time frame that will be acceptable to the public that is served?

The ad hoc task force is one mechanism which lends itself to this needed activity very well. Long known for effectiveness where special skills or access are required or in situations where intermediaries are needed, the ad hoc task force offers a way for getting things done when traditional methods fail, and has become a valuable tool for many public administrators.

The truly effective task force is private in nature, and therefore is usually without recognition as an entity in itself. In most cases, only the

accomplishment is publicized. An interesting example of such a task force occurred in the fall of 1974. At that time, most transit properties throughout the nation were in dire economic straits for operating assistance funds, then prohibited by Congress. Efforts to interest the Department of Transportation had proven fruitless. Consequently, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, unable to get a hearing with the Secretary of Transportation, formed a consortium of city mayors, transit experts, an automobile manufacturer, and other authorities in transportation, and gained a meeting with President Ford. At this meeting, economists pointed out that unless operating assistance were provided, the transit industry would have no recourse but to raise fares substantially. It was estimated that about \$350 million would be taken out of the economy through fare increases to meet operating deficits. However, the effect of this economic drain on the consumer price index would be such that procurement offices of the U.S. government would find it necessary to spend an additional \$500 million for the same goods planned for purchase. Since it was actually cheaper for the federal government to give the operating subsidy rather than pay the inflated price increases, the President called together the necessary congressional leaders to bring about, within a few weeks time, the legislation that for the first time provided federal operating subsidies. The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974, a milestone in transit legislation, was the direct result of this task force effort.

This is just one example of how public administrators and others work to overcome apparent obstacles and a strategy in which many of you have been involved. It is probably fair to say that most share the same goals and objectives and are motivated toward the same hopes and accomplishments for our communities. The individual decisions made by various individuals along the line do not always reflect these shared concerns. The decisions tend instead to reflect the backgrounds and perceptions of the various participants. And the issues themselves are as complex as the time . . . reflecting the puzzles and contradictions of our rapidly changing life style.

Public administrators thus find themselves in a lively environment. We must use our competence in every way to achieve the greatest possible good for the lasting betterment of those we serve. It can be both challenging and rewarding if we are willing to do our best.

Public Management Forum

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CARL W. STENBERG, *Editor*

What We Are Trying To Do

The purpose of Public Management Forum is simple to state but difficult to define. This feature focuses on the practitioner, and the challenges and opportunities associated with managing public sector organizations at all levels of government. Since the areas of greatest interest to administrators and the most desirable and feasible ways to deal with them are not readily identifiable, in subsequent issues our approach will be experimental – substantively as well as stylistically.

“Forum,” of course, is not the only place in PAR where practitioner-oriented material will appear. But, as the name implies, this space will be devoted to sharing experiences, raising issues, discussing solutions, and looking ahead. We intend to do so in as informative, insightful, provocative, and straight-forward a manner as possible. While our concern is with public management, our hope is that this feature will appeal to the broad spectrum of ASPA’s membership, and that practitioners, academicians, students, and others will contribute to its development.

All of this will take time and patience. Bear with us – and let us hear from you.
Carl W. Stenberg

Zero Base; Federal Style

Donald F. Haider, *Northwestern University*

During the 1976 presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter repeatedly stressed that “The greatest need facing the United States today is for a well-managed structure of government.” Focusing upon the federal budgeting process specifically, Mr. Carter characterized it as being “inefficient, chaotic, and virtually uncontrollable by either the President or the Congress.” He pledged that if elected, he would initiate a complete overhaul of the federal bureaucracy and budgeting system.

Following the November election, any doubts federal officialdom may have had about the President-elect’s commitment to ZBB were soon dispelled when he announced that an executive order would be issued “immediately after my inauguration requiring zero base budgeting for all Federal departments, bureaus, and boards.”

There immediately sprang up throughout

Washington a zero-base training industry. The U.S. General Accounting Office, Department of Agriculture Graduate School, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Association of Government Accountants, local universities, and management consulting houses began ZBB training programs.

Peter Pyhrr’s book could be found in the window of nearly every bookstore within a mile radius of the White House. Management and budget subgroups formed within federal agencies to begin training personnel, developing and applying ZBB. As one high-ranking Office of Management

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There immediately sprang up throughout Washington a zero-base training industry.

and Budget careerist observed, "Never has any management fad so completely taken over this town."

Ordering first that a zero-base review be applied to the White House and its operations, President Carter next issued instructions to heads of departments and agencies on February 14, 1977, "to develop a zero base system within your agency in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Office of Management and Budget."

OMB Director Bert Lance and Deputy Director James T. McIntyre, Jr., met with the new Cabinet officials that same day to explain zero-base budgeting and to lay out a timetable for its implementation for the FY 1979 budget. President Carter and Director Lance reiterated the Administration's commitment to implementing ZBB at successive Cabinet meetings. The President emphasized his expectation that individual department heads should become familiar with and fully utilize zero-base budgeting in the months ahead.

The more immediate challenge for Lance and McIntyre involved selling their own agency, which, by March, had to develop general ZBB guidelines for agency review and comment, issue final instructions by mid-April, and revise its Circular No. A-11 giving specific instructions to agencies on preparation and submission of budget estimates for FY 1979 by June.

"Introducing ZBB in a state with five million people, 79,000 state employees, a \$5 billion budget with 14 budget analysts is one thing," remarked a veteran OMB division chief. "However, designing and implementing a ZBB system for a nation of 203 million people, five million federal civilian and military personnel, a \$460 billion budget, and doing this with 180 budget examiners — all in six months — is quite another."

OMB veterans bore the institutional memories of prior efforts to introduce program-planning-budgeting (PPB), management by objectives (MBO), presidential management initiatives (PMI), and a host of circulars aimed at implementing new management techniques across government. These past OMB efforts to mandate detailed operations in the federal agencies had

nearly always ended in a controversy, not to mention a failure. ZBB was to be different.

Institutional skepticism notwithstanding, responsibility for designing the ZBB system and preparing OMB instructions was left to the Budget Review Division in cooperation with the budget examining divisions. Led by Dale McOmber, Assistant OMB Director for Budget Review, the chief of the Resources Systems Branch, George Strauss, and his key aide, David Levthold, OMB developed a framework for applying ZBB.

A general OMB philosophy governing its implementation also emerged, namely that far greater wisdom on how to implement the new procedures and also to determine operating instructions geared to individual program structure and accounting systems resided with the agencies rather than OMB. "We'll set the framework, principles, and general rules, but you tell us how to apply ZBB," became OMB's operating philosophy. OMB staff recognized that the size and diversity of federal operations precluded the application of a single set of detailed operating instructions to direct all federal agencies.

McIntyre, in turn, set the charge to budget examiners and their division chiefs. "The success of ZBB is in your hands," he exhorted them, "the President is committed, the Cabinet Secretaries are committed, and your task is to get the Under Secretaries and chief fiscal officers of your departments and agencies committed."

McIntyre had served under Governor Carter as the director of the Georgia Office of Planning and Budgeting. Not only was he totally familiar with zero-base budgeting, but he also had a keen sense of what President Carter expected from OMB. During the spring, budget examiners attended special in-house seminars with instruction provided by those who had worked with ZBB in Georgia.

The President received periodic briefings from McIntyre and Lance on ZBB's progress, as did key congressional officials and staffs — the Appropriations Committee, Budget Committees, the Congressional Budget Office, and the U.S. General Accounting Office. All were afforded the opportunity to offer suggestions and advice which fed back into OMB's design of ZBB instructions. By late February OMB had completed a working draft of its zero-base guidelines which it shared with the chief fiscal officers of federal agencies for review and comment. OMB's message was direct: "Help us design a system that recognizes your problems

and recognizes our goal of implementing the system this year."

On April 9, 1977, OMB issued Bulletin 77-9, containing instructions to heads of departments and agencies on zero-base budgeting. This document concluded, "Should additional discussion be necessary, agencies should contact their OMB budget examiner." One week later the President instructed agency heads that "implementation can be effected better by the diligent efforts of OMB and agency career staff familiar with the Federal budget process and procedures than by consultants from outside sources." To further such linkages between OMB budget staff and the agencies, each department and agency designated two senior members of their budget staff to serve as liaison to OMB on ZBB. On May 23, the President met personally with several hundred agency ZBB liaison people to assure them of his commitment, followed by OMB providing the agencies with an advance copy of that portion of OMB Circular No. A-11 ("Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates") pertaining to zero-base budgeting.

The President has participated at all stages — exhorting and selling the Cabinet, meeting with agency careerists assigned to ZBB implementation, and commenting upon ZBB progress reports.

OMB and the federal agencies collaborated extensively on developing guidelines and concepts within which each agency would develop procedures to meet its requirements and in preparing the A-11 instructions for fall budget submissions. On the budget examiner and division level, OMB worked with individual agencies in "reaching agreement" on specific issues related to decision package preparation: consolidation and rankings, relationships between the budget account structure and the decisions identified in the agency justification materials, coding of decision packages, and on other technical issues.

The President, in turn, has participated at all stages — exhorting and selling the Cabinet, meeting with agency careerists assigned to ZBB implementation, and commenting upon ZBB progress reports. From late May through June, the President scheduled some 25 hours for the Spring Budget Review at which agency and department heads participated in the tentative planning for the President's FY 1979 Budget. One purpose of these

unprecedented joint reviews is to reach decisions on which agency programs should be highlighted for presidential attention in ZBB fall reviews and on budget guidelines. The introductory stages of zero-base budgeting have been relatively smooth, far better than ZBB critics anticipated. Step-by-step progress has been achieved through a strong working relationship between OMB careerists and their agency counterparts.


ZBB Applied

Probably no two users of zero-base budgeting apply this management tool in exactly the same way. Zero-base budgeting, federal style, is to be a management process that provides for systematic consideration of all agency programs and activities in conjunction with the formulation of FY 1979 budget requests. It will be central to the federal budget process and will provide the basis for agency justification of budget requests. OMB's overriding concern has been one of simplifying the zero-base process by developing broad, flexible guidelines within an overall framework. A mutual concern which links OMB to federal agencies is avoiding a paperwork explosion both within the agency and in what is eventually sent to OMB. The essential concept OMB has tried selling and, indeed, the key to ZBB's full utilization, is that this management tool requires the active participation of managers at all levels in the planning, budgeting, and evaluation processes.

As can be seen in the accompanying figure, zero-base begins with the identification of decision units and program or unit objectives. Generally, decision units are the lowest organizational or program level at which the manager makes major decisions on the amount of spending and the scope, direction, or quality of work to be performed. Interaction between top-level and lower-level managers is necessary for identifying program and organization objectives in terms of output measurements and in aiding each successive managerial level in ranking budget requests. Unit objectives, namely what one is trying to measure, can affect the choice of decision units. So can current federal budgeting practices affect choice to the extent that it is desirable to fit a decision unit within a single budget account, one budget subfunction, and an existing organization structure. Since agencies are still required to submit budget requests to Congress in terms of appropriation accounts, ZBB, in some cases, will require the agency to develop two related budget justifications

DECISION PACKAGE RANKING AND CONSOLIDATION PROCESS ILLUSTRATED

Managers A, B, and C each rank packages for their units and send to Manager X
 Manager X receives packages and evaluates and ranks them within each unit
 Manager X ranks packages for units A, B, and C against each other, and sends to Manager R
 Manager R evaluates packages from Managers X and Y, and then ranks them against each other
 Manager R prepares some consolidated decision packages before submitting budget request to next higher level



1. Higher level manager reorders the proposed priorities of the subordinate decision unit managers. The packages may be revised by either the initial decision unit manager or the higher level manager.
2. Higher level manager accepts proposed priorities of the subordinate manager.
3. Higher level manager accepts proposed priorities of the subordinate manager, but chooses not to propose funding of lowest priority package.

Source: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Bulletin No. 77-9, "Zero-Base Budgeting," April 19, 1977.

simultaneously.

Identification of decision units becomes one step, if not the most important, in applying zero-base budgeting. There exists a range of alternatives in selection. So as to simplify, OMB has requested that higher and lower management levels agree on an internally consistent system compatible with existing budgetary classifications, program and organizational structures, and their own accounting support systems.

In most cases OMB has worked with the agencies in identifying decision units since, for large agencies, to select small units too low in their structure would likely result in excessive paperwork, innumerable consolidations of decision packages, and excessive reviews. On the other hand, to select too large-scale or aggregated units may neglect important considerations, prevent full

review of the work being performed, and result in superficial information.

Following the identification of decision units, the manager specifies ways in which the program or activity can be carried out. These alternatives may be new ideas or initiatives not yet fully developed. While it is likely, especially in the first year, that managers will recommend performing future work in the same manner as current operations, this process can be an important way to stimulate change from deep within an agency.

The decision unit manager next prepares a series of decision packages that cumulatively represents the total budget request for that unit. Each package of the set focuses on a different program or funding level and contains information such as identification (agency, appropriation or fund account title, etc.), activity description (work or

services performed, evaluations, cost/benefit results, etc.), resource requirements (funds and personnel), short-term objectives, and the impact on major objectives. To minimize paper work but maximize essential information required for rankings, consolidated decision packages will be restricted to two pages.

One of the chief limitations to developing incremental levels is the fact that so much of the federal budget is considered "relatively uncontrollable." Over \$200 billion of new budget authority of permanent appropriations is in the form of entitlement programs, interest on the debt, and the like, requiring statutory changes in order to alter resource allocations.

The ultimate purpose in arraying incremental levels is to provide information on where cost reductions can be attained and to identify the consequences or benefits accrued from additional or alternative spending plans. Determining how alternatives are displayed and the effects of different spending plans presented can be a monumental task. Once again, agencies are required to provide guidance to lower-level managers for preparing these alternatives.

In most cases there will be four decision packages, but, where appropriate, there may be as few as one, and in some cases, more than four. The minimum level should be less than current operations. Below this level, the manager should be able to argue that the program ought to be discontinued or, as one observer put it, the point below which the person in charge of the program would quit. The next level may be between the minimum and current operating levels. The third level should correspond roughly to the existing level (in budget terminology, the current services level), unless the total requested for the decision unit is below the existing level. The last alternative should be any additional increments desired above the current level. The design of decision packages should be flexible and need not correspond to any set percentage level above and below current levels, although such may be the case.

The decision unit manager then ranks his packages in order of priority. Once this is complete, higher management levels review rankings and begin forming them into consolidated rankings with packages from other decision units. The rankings of all decision packages are shown on a sheet that each review level prepares for the next higher one. The ranking sheet cumulatively builds the agency budget in terms of budget authority

and outlays.

Agencies can use whatever detailed review and ranking techniques are appropriate to their needs. However, the principles of ZBB still remain intact. That is, the minimum level for a decision unit is always ranked higher than any increment for the same unit. This does not mean, however, that a minimum-level package for a given decision unit must necessarily be ranked higher than an incremental level of some other decision unit. On the contrary, one of the primary purposes of ZBB is to sharpen overall objectives and set priorities. This means that as a consequence of ranking minimum levels for a decision unit so low a priority in comparison to incremental levels of other decision units, the entire minimum-level package (program, activities, organization entity) may drop out of the final budget request. This would represent a loss of funding for that decision unit.

Consolidated decision packages are prepared at higher management levels to summarize and supplement information contained in decision packages received from lower-level units. Besides minimizing paperwork and the burden of review, decision package consolidation permits top management to reformulate initial decision packages into a lesser number according to natural groupings of subordinate decision units to meet their decision-making needs. For larger departments, consolidation is absolutely essential, even though it may still lead to several hundred (more than 1,000 in HEW) packages.

Agencies may develop their own review system at successive management tiers, but predetermined review format and guidelines are important to lighten review workload at the middle or even higher agency levels. The latter review may focus on a number of highly ranked levels, perhaps with in-depth coverage given only to certain programs and lower-ranked packages. This leaves higher-ranked packages to be reviewed from the perspective of consistency, establishment of more uniform ranking criteria, and overall agency priorities.

The OMB requirements for agency budget justifications will include goals, objectives, accomplishments, evaluations, and other budget justification materials traditionally required with agency budget submissions, but geared to the ZBB format. The ZBB process is thus structured in such a manner that there is little chance the agency will be able to avoid defining objectives for each of their basic programs and analyzing whether the

programs are the best means of reaching these objectives.

Repetition of the Past?

Reformers of federal management and budgetary practices have mistaken OMB's leverage through the budget process as being an unlimited opportunity to introduce change throughout the federal establishment. It is perhaps true that budget leverage, legislative clearance, and ongoing relationships with federal agencies place OMB in a unique position relative to any other institutional actor in government. However, past history strongly suggests that OMB's efforts to go government-wide with major budgetary-managerial innovations have not succeeded. Management tools tended to be oversold in their introduction into federal budgeting. Prospective benefits were exaggerated and utilization was often portrayed as being a panacea for institutional and program-centered problems. Whether implementation of ZBB has thus far fully avoided such pitfalls may be questioned. However, ZBB does represent a basic philosophical departure from the past insofar as it depends ultimately on bottom-up implementation in contrast to the top-down, mechanical imposition of prior management innovations.

The ZBB process permeates throughout an agency, drawing in program managers and allowing a much broader spectrum of agency employees to become involved in budget decisions. Not only do objectives tend to be sharpened at lower levels, but managers often become much more sensitive to resource allocation issues and how their operation fits into an agency's overall mission and goal. The process can be kept informal, but at the same time be systematic and comprehensive. The process provides considerable latitude for proposing new ideas, alternatives, and better use of resources; at the same time, the focal point of the decision process can still be concentrated upon issues and programs.

Essential to the successful introduction of any managerial change as sweeping as zero-base budgeting is strong presidential support. Presidential interest in PPB and MBO proved to be ephemeral, and waxed and waned within a single budgetary cycle.

The federal bureaucracy takes its signals from its chief executive seriously, and ZBB is a case in point. President Carter has personally involved himself at each major stage of zero-base budgeting

— design, review, implementation, monitoring progress, and personal utilization in the spring budgeting planning. The President not only has demonstrated his commitment, but he also has set the ground rules for the FY 1979 budget appeals by Cabinet officials in terms of their decision package rankings. For agency heads wishing to defend against executive-imposed budget cuts, they will have to understand their agency's zero-base budgeting process and be involved in the overall ranking of decision packages.

. ZBB does represent a basic philosophical departure from the past insofar as it depends ultimately on bottom-up implementation in contrast to the top-down, mechanical imposition of prior management innovations.

Much of OMB's initial disinterest in Senator Muskie's proposed zero-base budgeting bill stemmed from some well-founded fears that adoption governmentwide would result in paperwork which would be mind-boggling even by Washington standards. As concerned as OMB has been in meeting ZBB timetables, it has been far more concerned about simplifying the process and reducing associated paperwork at each step. Nonetheless, expectations are that this fall's start-up will result in OMB receiving a sizeable increase of agency-submitted budget materials. Examiners will have to cope with two budgeting systems — ZBB and appropriation accounts — with crosswalks between them. There will be confusion, errors, and difficult times, but with the longer-term prospect in mind that eventual computerization of much ZBB material and further simplification will result in a sizeable reduction in paperwork in succeeding years.

Beyond the First 100 Days

Zero-base budgeting, federal style, will be implemented throughout the Executive Branch this year. It will take far longer than a single budget cycle to assess the effectiveness of this new management tool. In the meantime, it is possible to offer some limited insights into possible changes and problems which may result from the ZBB process.

No President has stressed management as a campaign issue to the extent Jimmy Carter did. His personal stake in making ZBB work is con-

siderable. The President is also committed to balancing the federal budget by 1981 and, putting aside the issue of whether a balanced budget is feasible or even desirable, ZBB is viewed as being instrumental in attaining this goal. To the extent the President utilizes zero-base budgeting as a constraint on executive spending, one can expect systematic consequences including sharper, more protracted budgetary conflict between the President and the Congress.

For heads of departments and agencies, zero-base budgeting could well turn out to be a dual-edged sword. Benefits may accrue immediately. The ZBB ranking process may assist agency heads in focusing agency missions, establishing program priorities, and in getting on top of the very organizations the President expects them to manage. On the other hand, ZBB may produce other outcomes which could seriously impair executive-legislative relations. Agency heads may have to defend their decision package rankings before congressional committees and agency clientele groups, and may thus find themselves to be political victims of their own priorities. The net result would be agency heads torn even more between loyalites to the President and survival needs of courting the good will of congressional overseers.

Assuming the President, through OMB, employs the ZBB ranking process to establish bottom-line expenditure ceilings (characteristically below the agency budget request), how long will it take agency heads to respond by adjusting their rankings to reflect congressionally assured increments? It may be argued that agencies already do this, as does OMB in its budget review markups, but such "sandbagging" activities may become more apparent once the first-year results of ZBB are fully internalized within the agency.

It is also unclear how involved congressional committees will become in the zero-base process. Reportedly those appropriation subcommittees which have experimented with zero-based justifications are less than enamored with the results. Congressional pressures have built up over the years for agency submission of budget requests to the President through OMB to be transmitted directly to Congress as well. Thus, the rankings of decision packages both by the agencies and OMB should sharpen attention on those programs which may rank high in congressional popularity but otherwise rank low in the estimation of the agencies and OMB.

Furthermore, assuming Congress enacts some

version of "sunset" legislation, it may well set in process legislative procedures and timetables which compete with zero-base budgeting for agency attention and documentation. ZBB and "sunset" can be complementary to one another, but they also can be competitive insofar as both aim at altering resource allocation. Much of the current budget process facilitates consensus building by reducing conflict and providing stability and continuity in government. Both zero-base and "sunset" are potentially threatening to the existing process and could foreseeably be manipulable by defenders of the status quo to check one another.

OMB's stakes in zero-base budgeting are considerable as well. Repetition of paper blitz efforts would be devastating internally. Credibility with agency counterparts rides on making the process manageable. ZBB could alleviate the budget examiner's workload, which has at least doubled in the past decade. Highly ranked programs and activities may receive far less attention than marginal decision packages ranked just above and below the budget cutoff line, with subsequent budget appeals limited largely to decision packages specifying increments and decrements around the suggested budget ceiling. ZBB may also enable examiners for certain agencies to get at activities and functions which have long escaped thorough review due to current structuring of accounts and subaccounts.

. . . . ZBB may well draw state and local government officials even more deeply into the budgetary thicket.

Zero-base budgeting may prove instrumental to the OMB-led reorganization effort. A coding system developed around decision packages may facilitate groupings of programs and functions across agencies and departments and more fully reveal program duplication and overlap. ZBB also will provide OMB with substantial information on agency base evaluation capabilities and systems. Such information as workload measurement, unit costs, productivity, cost/benefit and other evaluative or measurement devices that contribute to justifying funding or activity levels will be accessible for a thorough review.

Indeed, institutionalization of ZBB will require a vast improvement in agency evaluation systems to facilitate program comparisons and rankings. Determination of program impact at various expenditure levels is complex, often requiring

lengthy study where design and measurement techniques are still being developed. Even in cases where evaluations have been conducted they may not be appropriate to decision makers' needs, or may be largely ignored in the decision-making process. Accordingly, zero-base application is likely to reveal the difficulty government has in measuring accurately program impact levels in terms of service output.

Finally, ZBB may well draw state and local government officials even more deeply into the budgetary thicket. Much of the \$81 billion in FY 1978 outlays for federal aid to subnational governments falls within the more controllable aspects of the budget and is particularly susceptible to zero-

base review. Zero-base application to hundreds of federal grants programs may be the source of considerable intergovernmental friction as well.

Zero-base budgeting is revolutionary by most any standards of efforts aimed at systematic changes in the ways government conducts its business. Even though it has overcome rather formidable obstacles during the first 100 days, far greater challenges lie ahead.

Whether zero-base budgeting will succeed or not remains an open question. The one thing that can be stated with some assuredness is that President Carter will spend at least four years in seeking to institutionalize the process. This is only the beginning.

Stress and the Public Administrator

David E. Morrison, M.D., *Topeka, Kansas*

Stress is a legitimate concern of public administrators. It effects all the human aspects of their work. For example, heart disease is out of control in our civilization (not so in many other cultures). Despite massive preventive efforts since the 1940s, the incidence actually continues to increase. Heart disease, high blood pressure, alcoholism, marital discord, child abuse, and poor citizenship are strongly related to psychological, interpersonal, and cultural factors. Since workers spend approximately one-third of their adult life on the job, it is not surprising that researchers can document clear relationships between the ways people are treated at work (including management philosophy)¹ and personal, family, and social distress.

As a public administrator, you are forced to deal with stress, because it affects citizens (your customers and bosses), your staff, and yourself. For, despite what television doctor shows tell us, people who are distressed (sick, adapting poorly, malfunctioning, etc.) are not pretty, civic-minded persons with great philosophical insight. Generally, distress makes people ugly, mean, and stupid. If you must become involved with them, they are inefficient, unpredictable, infuriating, and bewildering. Fortunately, that describes all of us at one time or another. I say "fortunately," for we then have the opportunity to empathize with

another when he/she is distressed. All of us have experienced mental as well as physical illness. We may have misunderstood it, or called it "the flu," but we had it. Then we were not good workers or pleasant.

On the other hand, people who are mentally healthy are good workers, players, and lovers. A good manager is concerned that his people stay on the healthy end of the "Health-Illness" continuum. Good health is good business—not just for the medical profession.

There are also more personal reasons why administrators concern themselves with the topic of stress. From an individual's point of view, these may be the most important. Personal impetus has come from:

- Seeing colleagues succumb to pressures which are supposed to be "part of the job" (but which others doubt they handled very well);

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- Becoming aware of chronic anger in the face of a spouse;
- Realizing that a 15-year-old daughter grew up and he/she missed the opportunity to participate in the miracle;
- Recognizing symptoms in subordinates or in oneself. Managers then ask, "How do you begin the work of supporting the human dimensions in organizations?"

There are many possible approaches. They are all interconnected and all eventually lead to one another. Managers may:

1. Develop understanding of human motivation and behavior.
2. Examine the issue of psychological contracts and the effect such contracts have on work and health.
3. Study the methods that groups use to select a member to become sick.
4. Study the reasons a group "goes crazy."
5. Examine the effects of "crazy groups" on their leaders.
6. Explore the principles of managing conflicts.
7. Share information for understanding and managing stress.

Since leaders so much affect those under them, a distressed supervisor can do more damage than a distressed subordinate.² This article is directed toward the relationship between the public administrator as a leader and stress.

We must acknowledge one technical problem of such an undertaking. It's perfectly legitimate for a reader to ask, "What should I do—specifically?" Unfortunately, one can't make recommendations to a stranger on such personal issues as managing stress, except in very general terms. Once the individual does the hard work of defining the problem, recommendations are simple or obvious. No one can tell others what to do in the human dimension of their lives and work. With a group, suggestions have to be even more general and impersonal. So, the objectives for this writing are modest:

1. *Share Useful, Even Though General and Incomplete Information.* The author sincerely believes he can tell no one how to run his or her life or do his or her work. The only exceptions are individuals with severe psychological limitations.
2. *Give Some Examples in Which You May Find Something Useful to You.* Perhaps none will be applicable for you. The examples are intended to function as nuclei for you to start a conceptual structure—in much the same way that a lattice

work of a crystal forms around a seed.

3. *Attempt To Establish a Partnership for Searching.* In this area, we all grope together. No one has the single correct answer.

What Is Stress?


Stress is an engineering term and can be applied to engineering problems in a living organism such as stress on a muscle or bone. Dr. Hans Selye, a physician and physiologist, did the pioneering work of exploring what we now mean by *stress on the whole person*. Unlike the lay definitions, which usually connote something unpleasant (pain, anxiety, fear, fatigue, frustration), the scientific definition does not depend on discomfort. Stress is "the non-specific response of the body to any demand made upon it."³ For centuries physicians knew the body had specific responses to specific demands (e.g., constriction of the pupil in response to light), but Selye discovered that at the same time there is a "Non-Specific Response." Thus, stress is the total organism's response to change. It makes no difference if the change feels good or bad. It makes no difference if we feel joy, quiet satisfaction, or anxiety in response to the change. The physiological response to the change is the stress response.

That non-specific response is the physiological "fight/flight" reaction. As part of that reaction, these elements increase: adrenalin, nonadrenalin (these first two are the most sensitive indicators), plasma triglycerides, free fatty acids, cholesterol, thyroid hormone, fibroanalysis, blood sugar, secretion of gastric acids, and blood pressure. Only a few of those events are unknown to laymen, for the relationship of most to some infamous illnesses is well-publicized.

To move from basic physiology to an organized way of conceptualizing the demands on a leader, I have developed Figure 1. While necessarily incomplete, the pressures are those which stand out in my work with responsible leaders of business and government. Demands can be organized into non-personal, inter-personal and very personal pressures.

The Non-Personal Sphere is best known to most administrators. That is why many call it "the real world." It is the world of *external* and *impersonal* dangers. The human organism is equipped to respond to those dangers. The fight/flight response prepares our body to attack or run. Unfortunately,

Figure 1



today the required action is rarely associated with physical activity, let alone fighting or fleeing.

Far fewer managers are knowledgeable about the *Inter-Personal Arena*. The dangers here are *external* and *personal*. Although it is the area in which most of their *real* work awaits them, it is rare for a manager to have been trained to work here. Highly trained for an area where they no longer work, working in an arena for which they've received little training, it is understandable that administrators inappropriately try to apply their technological knowledge to "people problems." To do so they must make people into machines—and with very dire consequences.⁴

While the non-personal arena is governed by Aristotelian, or mathematical logic, this arena is governed by different rules for reason. Viewed from the standpoint of technology, this other logic seems irrational. It is not. It is simply different. The non-personal arena is directed or restrained by legal contracts which tell you what you can and cannot *do*. The inter-personal field is influenced by psychological contracts which tell you what you can and cannot *be*.

In the Personal Arena executives are surprisingly ignorant. Of course, all of us are mostly ignorant here. Our heroes don't manage this area well and appear uninterested in understanding it better. For inter-personal work, however, this is the resource upon which leaders depend most. The dangers are *internal* and *personal*. Commonly, a manager responds to trouble in this area as if it were in the outside world. He/she really believes there is danger outside—either in the technological or in the inter-personal sphere. That's under-

standable, since we've been educated that way—to see external and not internal dangers. Ours is not an introspective society. The disciplines that produce most of our leaders (business, technology, the sciences, law) are not introspective professions.

And yet, even while most of us are ignorant of the personal pressures, we are not uneducable. I've received much personal pleasure after my executive and leadership seminars from feedback about "doors for new knowledge," which were opened to further exploration and experiences. Administrators have bought volumes of Shakespeare and read them. They have listened to teenage children and found it could be fun. They have begun tending to their own needs. Further, along with their supervisors, they were surprised to find that such personal expansion did not detract from, but contributed to, work in the outside world. Those administrators did not become slothful and self-indulgent, but more task oriented and sensitive to others' needs.

Hidden Problems

Obvious demands can be tough. Yet most people can adequately manage their own, or support others wrestling with even greater pressures—when they are clear and preferably caused by factors outside the individual. When hidden and therefore the suffering is questionably legitimate, people may not be able to manage their own or support others. Again, we will approach the pressures in the categories of the three arenas. Only a few of the relevant demands can be examined.

Less than Obvious Nonpersonal Pressures

The pressures of "technology" are associated with the knowledge explosion. All of us have heard, read about, and experienced this phenomenon. Who doesn't receive more journals and books than he/she can adequately master? We all know the problem: the more you learn, the more you realize there is to learn. Each new discovery does not decrease, but increases, the required new information. A computer is brought in to control information and manage the data. Once it is installed, administrators ask for a great deal more information than they even privately desired before the computer was purchased. Instead of decreasing complexity and the number of jobs to do, these are increased. This challenge of the knowledge explosion is associated on a psychological level with "input overload."⁵ People suf-

fering from input overload complain about unrealistic deadlines, working to someone else's standards, having needs greater than resources, and "too many balls in the air."

There are two types of input overload: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative input overload is a result of simple demands, but too many for the time allotted. For example, too many phone calls, memos to read, and meetings to run in the time allowed. Increases in blood pressure, pulse rate, and cholesterol are associated with quantitative input overload.

Qualitative input overload results from complexity and limited time. There are not as many jobs, but the time allotted to do the large job is less than needed to do it up to standard. The end product will be less than one's ideal. Too much disparity between one's ideal and the real results in depression. Depression which lasts a matter of hours or days is simply a part of human existence. But depression initiates complicated physiological processes, which, if sustained over a long period of time, diminish one's capacity to adapt. That diminished adaptive capacity may show itself in decreased resistance to infectious disease, social clumsiness, or slow thinking.

There are two types of input overload: quantitative and qualitative.

Surprisingly, changes which cause stress can be grossly quantified. Doctors Holmes and Rahe are particularly well-known for their work in relating Life Change Units (figured from their own charts) to illness. There is still much to learn, but as gross and imprecise as the measurements are, they have surprisingly predictive capacities. Further, the scale exemplifies the relationship of stress to change, whether the change is desirable or not.⁷ Thus, while separation from a spouse gives 48 points, reconciliation gives 46. New home improvements gives 26, vacation 11, and Christmas 13. For reasons of space, the chart won't be reproduced here, but it must be acknowledged as a useful tool for individuals to seriously examine the relationship of change to stress, and follow their own "stress units" from year to year to check percentage increases.

Research⁸ has documented what many knew from experience: unpredictable change causes more distress than predictable change. This is related to many of the complaints I receive from public administrators. State officials, for example,

describe increased anxiety and discomfort when the state legislature is in session. Then they may be called at any moment to testify, be informed that they have either received new or lost old responsibilities, or read surprising news about their programs in the newspapers.

Less than Obvious Interpersonal Pressures

In this arena there is much to discuss. Perhaps two of the areas will raise enough broad issues. First, most administrators work with groups, and they need to understand the capacity of groups to make people malfunction. If one doubts this, all he/she need do is serve on a voluntary board; there one can easily see how groups take highly intelligent, task-oriented, shrewd individuals and distress them. Of the many events which can occur in groups, fits between the individuals' coping devices can be the most entertaining. For example, some of the more common fits are between the exhibitionist and the voyeur, the sadist and the masochist, the paranoid and the depressive. While such fits may be entertaining to the other group members, the work isn't done. So people become vulnerable to input overload, surprises, and other stresses.

The group as a whole also has its coping devices, which can interfere with work and pull malfunctioning behavior out of people. For example, a group in a dependent mode is the group which goes dumb. Trying to seduce someone to take the omnipotent leadership role, group members act extremely dependent and childish. Professionals call them "de-skilled." Anyone who steps into the omnipotent role will step into a cauldron of stress, unless he/she understands the underlying irrational forces at work in such groups.

The family too has its hidden pressures. The family is there to give support, but it also needs support. If a man or woman believes their family is a quiet, restful lair where they can go and take without giving, they are in for some surprises. The concept of an "assigned patient" was developed from family therapy. There mental health professionals discovered a malfunctioning family could get one member to live the illness—in essence, as the sacrificial lamb. Later we came to appreciate the same phenomenon in work groups. The family is not a cozy, comfortable lair, but an extremely complex organization, full of intrigue and exciting power plays.

Pressures from Oneself

First, there are the rather personal pressures from our own physiology. Unseen and usually unfelt, we see only the consequences of the stress response. Without discomfort as a guide, if we are to adequately cope, we need to be informed and thoughtful instead of emotional. For example, that physiological response will be provoked in adversarial relationships. Morale problems lead to increases in adversarial relationships. An adversarial setting feels good to certain personalities. The dilemma for such individuals (and those who must live or work with them) is that for them to change means they will feel uncomfortable, even though the change is in a more healthy direction.

A person's own needs make demands. Basically, the public administrator's human needs are the same as everyone else's. Each of us has the need to be aggressive. For many this is hard to admit. We would rather sterilize it by saying we are "assertive." Aggression feels good, and the appropriate expression of aggression doesn't damage others, but contributes to creative problem solving. We also have a need to love. This is more difficult for many men to admit. Part of our cultural prejudice is that the only legitimate fun for men is aggressive. Such men will be just as distressed by their own needs as women who deny they need to be aggressive.

Our values make demands on us. Some may have a value which demands the individual have no real human needs. I have seen executives whose values demand they have no feelings. They, of course, not only distress themselves and those people next to them, but their work is inefficient and wasteful, since they are out of touch with reality.

Our coping devices exert pressures on us. When there is conflict, the part of our coping devices I have called "alarm systems" makes itself known. For example, when there is a conflict between our body's physical integrity and assaults from the outside world, the alarm called "pain" goes off. When there is a conflict between our own standards and external reality, the alarm called "depression" goes off. When there is conflict between our own needs and our own values, the alarm called "anxiety" may go off. Many people don't know how to use their alarms, and either fear or idealize them, instead of understanding they are simply signals calling attention to some process.

Personal coping devices help, but also make

their own demands. In addition to the physiological fight/flight, we have psychological fight/flight coping devices. Instead of describing those in detail, I will discuss what I consider a mal-adaptive variant, i.e., the individual who has learned only how to fight, and not how to flee, withdraw, or give in. In essence, it seems to me that the so-called "Type A Personality" is just such a costly coping device. The "Type A Personality" was described by two cardiologists, Doctors Rosenman and Friedman.⁹ From their clinical and research work that has spanned two decades, they see this personality style as *the cause* of heart attack (with very rare exceptions) in people below the age of 65 (see Figure 2). They believe 60 per cent of the population in this country are Type A personalities. While those factors cited by Rosenman and Friedman serve statistical needs, for the individual they can be further broken down and integrated with the rest of the literature and experience working with executives. In my view, the factors cluster around four general points which increase a person's vulnerability (see Figure 3).

When there is a conflict between our own needs and our own values, the alarm called "anxiety" may go off.

Many of those qualities are the very ones which help individuals master challenges in the technological world (for example, working against time). All the qualities have helped the individual at one time or another, and perhaps have contributed to business or professional success. Unfortunately, many people forget how to turn them off. The techniques become one's personality. The person becomes a machine. It is then exceedingly difficult to get them to change, unless they have a heart attack. What has happened to most of our population is that their strength has become their weakness. That, of course, is a danger in all areas of psychological work. The techniques become the master. The person got what he/she went after, and found that it had a price. Is it too late to change?

Fortunately, life styles change, too. Internal (Very Personal) changes are part of normal adult life. Thus, all of the stresses do not come from the outside world. Values, needs, styles, and alarms change if the individual is really growing and adapting. A 25-year-old is different from a 55-year-old—not just physically, but psychologically different. This, of course, raises the whole

FIGURE 2
"TYPE A" CHARACTERISTICS

Myer Friedman, M.D.
Ray Rosenman, M.D.

1. Physical signs of personal conflict:
tics, clinched fist, jaw, teeth
2. Personal commitment to having not being
3. Unaware of greater environment
ignore elements not associated with immediate task
4. Excessive need to make subjects your special interest
uninvolved if not

5. Compelled to challenge another Type A instead of understanding him/her

6. Characteristic speech:
explosive accentuation (hostility)
acceleration of last few words in sentence (impatience)
7. Chronic sense of time urgency
schedule more and more into less and less
8. Polyphasic thought or performance
9. Impatient with speed of events:
finish other's sentences
irritated with lines
10. Do all things rapidly
11. Always some guilt when relaxing

12. Increasingly committed to evaluating activities in terms of numbers
13. Believe "Type A" style is what made them successful

issue of the growth and development of adults: "mid-life crises," "transitions of adults," etc.^{10,11,12} Whatever one calls it, it is well worth an administrator's time to gather more information in order to understand him or herself, members of the family, and those with whom he/she works. To make it even more complicated, external changes will mean different things to people at different ages. A change in the number of arguments, or even the death of a spouse, will have different personal impact to adults at different stages of their own growth and development.

Some Suggestions for Dealing with Stress

Learn about all three arenas: There is no evidence that any one arena is more important

than another. There is much evidence that a healthy person needs to strike a balance in the various areas.¹³ Further, there is overwhelming evidence that most administrators need to gain more knowledge about the interpersonal and personal areas. That knowledge needs to be as specific as it can be for the individual. Thus, once the general seminars, reading, and group discussions are completed, the individual has his/her own responsibility to begin the hard work of specific application. He/she may get outside consultation, but the responsibility is his/hers.

To gain understanding means you must move into the required new areas of knowledge. Really move in—not just repeating cliches of Grandmother, Papa, or an old coach. This will almost assuredly be unpleasant, for new knowledge causes pain. Old systems of understanding and interacting will be proven inadequate. Before knowledge makes one free, it limits one. The college student has to study in order to gain more freedom later. The same is true of learning about stress. Ultimately, the knowledge will be helpful, but initially it will provoke anxiety and limit certain old

FIGURE 3
QUALITIES UNDERLYING TYPE A CHARACTERISTICS

1. *A Constant State of Being "On Guard":* This shows itself in "free-floating hostility"; almost constant anxiety (when not hostile); inability to relax; inability to depend on anyone else; and a fear of really new experiences (for example, vacations, ballet, children, etc.).
2. *Hypermasculinity* (masculine as defined in western technological societies): This shows itself in an inability to admit vulnerability, hating all feminine qualities in oneself, fear of tender emotions, fear of personal closeness, an unnaturally low voice pitch, and preoccupation with "masculine" competition.
3. *Constantly Working Against Time:* This shows itself in never being able to wait in line, finishing other people's sentences, polyphasic thinking, scheduling problems, doing all things rapidly, need to be in control, etc.
4. *Ignorance of One's Own Psychological Needs:* This shows itself in an avoidance of psychological information (unless it is in terms of numbers), poor management of aggressive drives, egotistical behavior, impatience, and ignorance of the practical shortcomings in one's own value systems.

options.

New knowledge in the personal and interpersonal areas means you will come to know other people in new ways. This can cause discomfort as far as one's own self-esteem is concerned. Many managers enjoyed saying things like "I've known him 15 years and know he can handle the new responsibilities," when they really didn't know the person or the human requirements of the job at all. They only knew some of the superficial technical qualities and requirements. More knowledgeable, but less pompous, they must later say, "I didn't know him at all." A human manager at that point will feel some despair and shame, which will be more intense if that other person is someone with whom he/she has been closely related. Perhaps that's why so many people resist gaining really new information about spouses and children. But, on the other side, it is also very exciting to realize we still have so much to learn about ourselves and others.

Develop the skills to read the signs of distress, anger, and depression in yourself and others: Such signs include:

1. Irrational behavior: For example, irrational complaints, refusal to delegate properly, and using old ways when they are no longer appropriate (as when an economist uses techniques of finance on problems of personnel).
2. Defensiveness against feelings—primarily angry feelings. At work this can show itself in excessive paperwork, which covers the individual from supposed assaults.
3. Frenetic activity and/or withdrawal into excessive sleep, missed meetings, or a detached, aloof attitude.
4. The traditional organizational signs of distress: Alcoholism, Absenteeism, and Accidents.

Try to keep your work force on the healthy end of the continuum: Sick people don't work well. The task for distressed people is rarely the work task. Distressed people stress their leaders. To help in this area, use your in-house consultants. I have been impressed with how many skillful, knowledgeable professionals in personnel are not used by their organizations. They have information and skills, yet their talents tend to be wasted.

Sometimes you may need to use outside consultants. Use them properly. Proper use starts with defining your own criteria of success. Then determine how much your criteria are dependent on the "pleasure principle." Feeling good is easy to accomplish in a training program, consultation, or

seminar. As a leader, you must decide how important pleasant feelings are, for yourself and your people. Sometimes you may want the groups to leave feeling not so good. For example, a group that has been blaming others for its problems can be turned around to see how it causes its own problems. If the program ends at that point, the group can then work on the problems, but the mood will be lower than it was to start. It is not legitimate for the consultant to set the goals for the client. It is legitimate for the consultation to involve helping you define your goals.

Develop skills to listen: Most managers who are concerned about "doing or solving something" forget how powerful and helpful just "being" a listener is.

Tend to the people issues associated with changes: Remember—change is the cause of stress. So there needs to be more than just preparation for the change. There must also be aftercare. Aftercare concerns such things as listening and understanding the process that unfolds in individuals and groups after significant change. To help with that you may want to use a simple checklist (see Figure 4). Remember, the guiding principle in supporting people at work is: whatever you do is done to support the task.

Build supportive structures: Supportive structures at work are basically those associated with good management principles. It means being logical instead of emotional. One must remember that ignoring emotions in oneself or others is an emotional action, not a logical action.

Build supportive structures in one's home, which will include sacred times, family rituals, and protected settings for recuperation. Build supportive structures within oneself, which is associated with one's own attitude toward discomfort, work personnel needs, and the like.

Put the issues into words: Words are structures themselves. Sometimes they need to be written down, particularly when working to build supportive structures for oneself or one's family. Problems that are terribly difficult to manage, and which hang over one's head for weeks, maybe even years, may surprisingly dissolve once the work of putting them into words is accomplished. Verbalizing and writing can help you see the bigger picture, and in that way understand your legitimate limitations. I have found this to be one important meaning to the frequent answer "experience." When seasoned managers say "He'll be able to manage that with experience," they mean that with experience the

FIGURE 4
CHECKLIST FOR UNDERSTANDING
THE HUMAN RESPONSES TO CHANGE

1. Is the support or resistance to this change motivated by the pleasure or reality principle?
 - From individuals?
 - From the group?
 - Do people feel they are being active or acted upon?
 - From me?
 - What about the coping devices?
2. What supportive structures will be disrupted by this change?
 - How will they be replaced?
 - Should they be replaced?
3. Are the unexpected, individual, or group responses associated with underlying human themes?
 - Role conflicts.
 - Timing in the process of the change.
 - Personal involvement/vulnerability.
 - Growth phase of the person.
4. What does this change do to the psychological contract?
 - Unspoken expectations.
 - Interdependence.
 - Psychological distance.
5. From where does the stress come?
 - Impersonal.
 - Interpersonal.
 - Very personal.
 - Is the solution from the appropriate area?
 - What are the predominant conflicts?
 - Values vs. needs.
 - Values vs. values.
 - Inside vs. outside.
6. Do you appreciate what you've done?
 - Change means some loss.
 - Change causes stress.

individual will develop a longer-range view and not take things so personally. The "ante" isn't as high. To help gain that longer view, put your personal goals into words. Personal goals are necessary so you can understand why you should put up with the discomfort. They are the reasons for the costs. Sometimes it helps to write your own views of alternative futures for the next 30 years. Define the problems and the possibilities for those futures. Then you can record your own goals, the skills you will need to reach those goals, the people you will need to develop your skills and

reach your goals.

Be gentle with yourself: While not backing away from the challenges and opportunities of life, don't be harsh on yourself for not anticipating problems that social and medical scientists are only now beginning to uncover. No one is going to get out of this thing alive anyway. Stress is part of the aging process, and therefore related to how we die. The question then is "How do you choose to die?" Of course, that's the same question as "How do you choose to live?" Do you stress yourself in a way that is wasteful and more distressing than it needs to be? Do you stress yourself in a way that causes excessive stress and distress to those people who depend upon you, and whom you need? Do you stress yourself on issues that are truly important to you? To answer the last question, you must do the hard work of defining what is truly important to you.

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Why Not *Qualitative* Analysis?

Eileen Siedman, *U.S. Commission on Civil Rights*

Qualitative analysis is coming out of the closet. Thanks to inflation, congressional budget ceilings, Administration austerity measures, and public disenchantment with government, "why?" may soon carry as much weight as "how much?"

With the rise in literacy and the phenomenal growth of communication, the printed word mystique was replaced by a numbers mystique. Our search for scientific rationality and factual evidence led to an irrational reverence for an authority of numbers which was seldom challenged. Quantification became fashionable because counting was comfortable and predictability was "scientific." Numbers seemed to be so tangible, so undeniable. It was inevitable, then, that "how much?" or "how many?" replaced "why?" as the key question for analysts.

We have been encouraged to believe that quantification is impersonal and objective and, therefore, more reliable than qualitative methodology which takes into consideration such relatively intangible factors as values. But while qualitative analysis has been dismissed as too difficult, too intangible, and too subjective, few have questioned the inherent subjectivity of quantification which requires "selection" of parameters and base line data, the interpretation of findings, and the selection of facts and evidence. There is much to be gained by destroying the myth of objectivity since subjectivity is already integrally involved — but disavowed.

When quantification is used in conjunction with qualitative analysis, it provides important support for conclusions and recommendations. But the numbers have no magic of their own and their "objectivity" is an illusion. They are the product of people who subjectively collected them, sorted them, interpreted them, and used them to make a point.

The canard that "objective" is good and "subjective" is bad denies the fundamental worthiness of human endeavor — of creativity, imagination, ingenuity, and spontaneity. Qualitative analysis restores the legitimacy of subjectivity, and — even more important — gives it visibility and weight so that decisions and actions can be more accurately assessed. We need to remember that a fact is not a fact until someone labels it a fact — a subjective

action on its face.

One of the most revered platitudes of American government has, itself, served as a stumbling block to the use of qualitative analysis: ours is a government of laws, not of people. While the fundamental premise implies the absence of an absolute ruler with unbridled power, it also tends to promote and encourage the erroneous assumption that institutions are impersonal. This myth of a mindless system which operates independently of people is the genesis of our misguided faith in numbers — nearly religious in its intensity — and in an objectivity which pretends to select out values while it denies or denigrates human behavior.

Program analysis, then, is an art, not a science. It is an art form which uses qualitative as well as

Thanks to inflation, congressional budget ceilings, Administration austerity measures, and public disenchantment with government, "Why?" may soon carry as much weight as "How much?"

quantitative measures to select and weigh information for public policy as well as for operational decisions. For despite our tunnel vision about the "scientific" nature of quantitative data and our futile attempts to deny the influence of omnipresent human factors, we analysts, bureaucrats, researchers, and politicians are just people who identify problems and issues, make judgments about them, and take some kind of action. What we seldom do, however, is try to assess reality — the effects of our decisions and efforts. Instead, we tend to focus on operational fragments, because structure, process, and money seem to be easier to count and measure than is the achievement of legislative intent or organizational goals.

Given the current emphasis on zero-base budgeting and "sunset" legislation, the overriding criterion for defining program success should be the achievement of legislative intent measured

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by results from the viewpoint of the clientele or beneficiaries. In order to make such basic decisions as whether to decrease, increase, modify, or abolish a program, legislators, planners, and managers must have accurate, sufficient, and timely information about the factors which facilitated or inhibited the achievement of expected results. And that means a more intensive examination of the impact of program planning and management as well as the validity of the legislation itself.

When special purpose programs become law but fail to solve the problems for which they were designed, organizational chess games and statistical studies provide a facade of activity which hides an inability to achieve organizational goals. "Not enough money" is the standard apology for program failures, while few dare define "enough" in the absence of hard data on "what" was purchased for the dollars spent.

Nevertheless, "what went wrong?" can't be answered unless we know what we expected — unless our assumptions are explicitly articulated. It is nothing less than insanity to continue to run public programs with no clear agreement on expected outcomes. For without such agreement we cannot justify continued expenditures, no matter how efficiently or economically they are managed.

And that brings us to the legislative process as an expression of expectations. If we view the judicial process as an attempt to remedy the consequences of attempts to realize legislative expectations, we also recognize that it is management which takes the legislation, interprets it, and creates the policy and machinery to give it existence as law. Yet, "how to do it" is expected to just happen as a multiplicity of specialized professions view program management (or public administration) much as the blind men viewed the elephant.

Compared with legislative action and the judicial process, management lacks drama and glamor. But it is the life breathed into a law — the human action or the "system" — that lawmakers dream and lawyers try to fix up.

Time and again, legislators suffer frustration when legislation doesn't seem to produce the benefits anticipated. "What went wrong?" goes unanswered while managers reorganize ad infinitum hoping to change results by changing the system's appearance. Sometimes adjudication follows, with a patchwork of remedies through

case results which often are not enforced.

In the endless tinkering with institutional arrangements for delivering public services and goods, villains are found everywhere. "Red tape," "bureaucracy," and "the system" are blamed for what happens to legislation between its enactment and the search for answers to "what happened?" And while public administration research tends to concentrate on theories of organizational structure and process, institutions and their programs continue to reshuffle tasks and resources as problems fester, multiply, or explode. Too often, reorgani-

Too often, reorganization doesn't solve problems, it just rearranges them while postponing their resolution.

zation doesn't solve problems, it just rearranges them while postponing their resolution.

At the same time, an overloaded judicial system struggles to remedy systemic defects. But even when such remedial action appears to be successful in terms of clarifying legislative intent or constitutionality, the problem of enforcement remains. The court can only decide who is right or wrong, but cannot do anything about it except issue orders or punish culprits.

Perhaps public administration, as a profession, has been remiss in its willingness to settle for counting dollars and heads — because results and consequences are what really matter, not intentions or good faith efforts. When a poorly constructed building collapses, we hold the architects and contractors responsible. When the law is poorly enforced, we should hold its architects and managers accountable. The use of qualitative analysis is important in achieving that kind of accountability. Economic analysis does not tell us about the human factors which contributed to the collapse of the building. And economic analysis cannot tell us whether a program has effectively achieved legislative intent, because numbers are not enough.

A case in point is the U.S. Postal Service. After several years of so-called businesslike methods, this public communications system's policies have resulted in slower, more erratic mail deliveries, higher costs and subsidies, and a sadly predictable loss or destruction of package mail. Uncertainty about deliveries and rising costs have driven users to other forms of communication. Yet, the Postmaster General recently offered statistical averages to show that "certain percentages of mail are delivered within certain time frames"¹ as a

refutation of criticisms and complaints. This is a classical example of the substitution of numerical rhetoric for reality, and an infuriating insult to the client whose mail is late or lost.

Another example is the article by Robert Quinn in a recent issue of the *Public Administration Review*, which describes the impact of a computerized information system on the integration of human services.² Although Quinn characterizes this seven-year evaluative research project as a "qualitative study," and includes the achievement of client-benefit goals as one of several objectives, the overall goal was to develop and use computerized information systems to "integrate services." The study did not probe whether the services were necessary, appropriate, relevant, or valid from the client's point of view — a qualitative approach. Rather, the work was predicated on the assumption that the services were satisfactory and needed only to be integrated to save time, effort, and money by clarifying goals, sharing information, keeping better records, and improving reports. The development and implementation of this technological system avoided the key element of qualitative analysis: *Why* provide the services in the first place? Who will be better off, to what extent, and with what consequences?

Despite their evaluation components, most federally funded programs do not systematically collect, store, select, or provide information that describes and evaluates "how well" or to what extent program goals were or were not accomplished. "What happened?" is usually a collection of unverified and unrelated assumptions. Additionally, by limiting analysis to auditing or tracking only federal expenditures, evaluators and monitors select out relevant state, local, and private cost data and their relationship to program effectiveness. At the same time, the impact of administrative implementation (e.g., rule making, leadership, information systems, decision-making processes, fiscal management, personnel management, contractual enforcement, records, reports) is generally overlooked or underestimated as a prime factor in such areas as policy development or programmatic consequences.

Most public program effectiveness evaluation today still evades assessment of the achievement of legislative intent on the grounds that "no one really knows" what was intended, a rather appalling admission or a cop-out. Nevertheless, each plea for more legislative specificity on the one hand is inevitably balanced with a plea for less

legislative specificity on the other!

Notwithstanding, these important questions generally go unanswered:

1. Did legislators and program administrators agree on legislative intent? If not, which view prevailed?
2. Are the original program goals and objectives still valid, necessary, relevant, and appropriate in the light of implementation experience?
3. To what extent — and why — are program recipients better off, worse off, or unchanged as a result of the program activity?
4. Did management of the program impede or facilitate the achievement of legislative intent? How?
5. What were the actual costs (obvious and hidden) of the program and its ripple effects on state and local governments, the relevant private sector, and the taxpayers?
6. What were some of the unanticipated consequences of the program on the private sector, the public, other programs, and pending legislation?
7. How can existing resources be used to achieve public policy goals without new legislation or judicial remedy?

In the final analysis, achievement of program goals must be measured by whether program recipients are in fact better off, worse off, or unchanged as a result of the program. Without such information, cost factors have little meaning. Counting hospital beds or the frequency of their use tells nothing about the effects of that institution's services on patient clientele, since quantitative analysis assumes that resources are available, are appropriately used, and are uniformly beneficial. It is the validation of all such assumptions that is the essence of qualitative analysis.

In our attempt to transform the art of implementation into a science of management, we seized on numbers and permitted them to become ends rather than means. Perhaps the time has come to return those numbers to their proper role as useful tools in the hands of human beings, and to expand our analytical perspective to include the assessment of results through qualitative as well as quantitative analysis.

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BOOK REVIEWS and NOTES

THAD L. BEYLE, *Editor*

URBAN POLITICS, URBAN POLICY, CASE STUDIES, AND POLITICAL THEORY

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The Politics of Progress, Raymond E. Wolfinger.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974.

Power in the City: Decision Making in San Francisco, Frederick M. Wirt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

In a celebrated article published more than a decade ago, Theodore Lowi used the occasion of a review of Bauer, Poole, and Dexter's case study of American trade policy¹ to outline an immensely fruitful typology for analyzing the politics of the policy process in American national government.² The recent appearance of two new case studies of urban politics and policy, one by Raymond Wolfinger and the other by Frederick Wirt, suggests that something similar is needed in the field of urban government.

Like *American Business and Public Policy*, *The Politics of Progress* by Wolfinger and *Power in the City* by Wirt are both excellent books, rich in detail, and lively with theoretical insights and implications. But like it also, they are so rich and lively that they easily overwhelm the meager theoretical constructs available to organize material in their field. While informing readers usefully about their respective cities, therefore, the main impact of these two books is to demonstrate the paucity of existing theory in urban research and to illustrate the great need for new conceptual equipment, new theory, to capture the reality of America's changing urban political scene and make sense of it.

Wolfinger's book, for example, takes us back to the glory days of Mayor Richard Lee's early tenure in New Haven. The central theme of the book is that American cities are burdened with built-in obstacles to innovation that can be overcome, if at

all, only through durable, activist leadership in command of the resources of a strong political party machine. Without this combination, Wolfinger assures us, urban renewal and central city revitalization would never have occurred in New Haven. Yet, according to Wirt, they did occur without this combination in San Francisco. There, Wirt informs us, political parties are evanescent and political leadership virtually impotent. Nevertheless, the city experienced one of the most massive central city revitalization and renewal efforts in recent American urban history.

How are we to make sense of these diverse findings? Indeed, on what basis can we compare these—and other—case studies of individual cities so as to develop a more coherent view of the urban scene and a better comprehension of its dynamics? The case studies by themselves cannot do this. What is needed, clearly, is a set of conceptual tools to organize the facts and identify the patterns that emerge, "a basis," as Lowi put it, "for cumulating, comparing, and contrasting diverse findings."³ Yet if such a basis was lacking in the literature on national politics, it is even more lacking in the urban field. As one student of the subject recently noted: "Aside from the various frameworks provided by the pluralists and anti-pluralists (e.g., executive centered coalitions, non-decisions, etc.), we lack concepts and categories for understanding and evaluating the character of urban policy making."⁴ The appearance of the Wolfinger and

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BOOK REVIEWS

Wirt books thus provides an opportune occasion to assess the adequacy of our existing analytical categories and, more importantly, to begin the task of adding to them. Although we harbor no pretensions to scaling the theoretical heights that Lowi attained, it is the purpose of this article to pursue both of these goals.

Existing Concepts in Search of Reality

No field of inquiry can proceed very far without a basic conceptual framework, a set of "leading questions" that can guide research and alert scholars to the range of facts that are relevant to the process under scrutiny.⁵ In the field of urban political inquiry, two such conceptual frameworks have been dominant during the past two generations. The first is the dichotomy between "reformed" and "unreformed" city governments that grew out of the municipal reform movement of the early 20th century. At base, this dichotomy concentrates on the *structure* of urban governmental institutions and electoral arrangements. The central concern embodied in the framework is the extent to which local institutions facilitate technical efficiency and the representation of presumably disinterested communitywide concerns in city politics. Work proceeding within this framework has consequently focused heavily on the institutional arrangements of local government, and has searched for a set of electoral and governmental structures (e.g. nonpartisan elections, at-large districts, city manager government) that would minimize narrow neighborhood or political party influence and maximize the impact of purportedly disinterested professionalism.

As it became clear that what really affected the success of technical criteria and broadly defined public goals in city government lay beyond the confines of the institutional structures emphasized by the reform-non-reform paradigm, however, scholarly attention turned to the less formal aspects of urban government, to the exercise of political power by non-governmental as well as formal governmental actors. And to organize and structure this new research, a new conceptual framework soon gained currency, the so-called "community power" paradigm, differentiating pluralistic from elitist structures of community power. The leading question embodied in this new paradigm was the question of who governs, and research focused on the relative influence of

non-governmental (chiefly economic) elites as compared to formal governmental officials in community decision making. Though scholars have come to widely differing conclusions about which of these elites are more powerful,⁶ their disagreements should not distract us from the fact that both schools of thought are in basic agreement about what the central questions in urban political inquiry are and what portions of urban reality are consequently theoretically relevant.

Though generating some immensely fruitful empirical research, however, the community power paradigm itself is now under serious attack as a theoretical guide. One line of criticism challenges the paradigm's basic fruitfulness. Exactly what have we learned, after all, once we discover that power is significantly dispersed in a particular community? The more basic questions of politics have to do with the outputs of the political system, not the inputs. Yet, the community power paradigm really has little to say about outputs. It does not even provide us with meaningful language to differentiate cities in terms of their policy activity. As James Q. Wilson correctly noted in 1968, community power research has enabled us to learn "a great deal about who governs but surprisingly little about what difference it makes who governs."⁷

In addition to neglecting the output side of politics, moreover, the community power paradigm also stands accused of neglecting some vitally important inputs as well. For example, Bachrach and Baratz have criticized the community power approach for treating "decisions" as the ultimate reality and thus ignoring the power that is embodied in those "settled" matters of policy that comprise a local political culture or "Mobilization of bias."⁸ Similarly, the community power paradigm has been criticized for overlooking the power of administrative processes and institutional routines in its explanations of local politics, and thus of ignoring the bureaucratic dimensions of local politics and policy.⁹

Equally troublesome has been the focus of community power research on the whole city, rather than on separate policy arenas. What this has done is to drain the pluralist-elitist distinction that lies at the heart of the paradigm of much of its theoretical substance by making it necessary for adherents to the elitist school to establish economic elite dominance in *all* spheres of policy in order to verify their position, whereas those adhering to the pluralist school need show only

that multiple elites shape decisions in at least one significant arena in order to verify theirs. Given the disjointed character of the policy process in American cities, however, this has the effect of transforming the elitist position into a "straw man" and virtually guaranteeing the ascendance of the pluralist view. But if a model is this ubiquitous, does it really have theoretical value as a guide to understanding?

Reality in Search of New Theory

These problems with the community power paradigm, as well as some of its strengths, are nicely reflected in the Wolfinger and Wirt books under consideration here. Wolfinger's book, for example, is written well within the pluralist-anti-pluralist framework.¹⁰ Indeed, the book originated as a Ph.D. dissertation prepared in conjunction with Dahl's New Haven project, and it betrays these origins not only in the familiarity of the terrain it covers (essentially the same 1950s urban renewal and charter revision stories recounted by Dahl), but also in the thesis it pursues. Simply put, that thesis attributes New Haven's success in executing purportedly progressive policies to the consummate skill and extended tenure of a singular political leader, Mayor Richard Lee, who is credited with overcoming the severe institutional barriers American politics places in the way of innovation, and doing so without the aid of a unified and dominant economic elite. What Wolfinger adds to the story is some fascinating detail on how Lee actually exercised his influence. This time through, therefore, we learn how Lee placed himself astride the patronage-dispensing apparatus of the New Haven Democratic Party machine and how he manipulated the political boodle available to him through this channel to pursue his ambitious goals.

Wolfinger takes pains to note, however, that this fruitful combination of an innovative politician and a powerful political machine is the exception rather than the rule in American cities—but not, as most scholars have concluded, because political machines are on the decline. Rather, claims Wolfinger, it is because machines do not by nature perform the policy coordination functions attributed to them by recent revisionist accounts, and because most mayors lack the tenure in office or the inclination necessary to turn machine politics to this felicitous end. "One of the ironies of American city government," he thus argues, "is

that machine politics provides the strongest resources for innovative mayors, but at the same time, in its weak emphasis on issue appeals, is unlikely to attract such leaders or develop a popular demand for them" (p. 121).

To reach this conclusion, however, Wolfinger must adopt a definition of a political machine that is so loose as to be analytically misleading.¹¹ Beyond that, however, his line of argument here leads him into a curious logical dilemma that illustrates well the limitations of the "community power" paradigm. For if, as Wolfinger claims, political machines are alive and well in American cities, and if they normally work as he says—to impede innovation, protect the status quo, and serve the needs of local men of wealth ("where money talks, the poor are silent," p. 120)—then we are left with the conclusion that economic elites may be in command of local affairs after all, even in places (which Wolfinger claims are numerous) where party machines remain strong. At the least, we are led to believe that local government in such places serves dominant business needs, even though the economic elites may rarely take part in the day-to-day process of government decision making. This is precisely the pattern that historian Sam Bass Warner found in Philadelphia, which he characterized as a "private city," i.e., a city that adhered to the tradition that "the business of a city was business."¹² But where does such a pattern fit in the community power paradigm, especially if, as in Philadelphia, local business elites came to play only a minor direct role in local decision making?

Similar difficulties arise in evaluating the extended urban renewal case study that forms the heart of Wolfinger's book. The lesson of that case study is clear enough: it is that New Haven had a pluralistic power structure since the mayor, and not a covert business elite, was "the primary cause" (p. 263) of the mammoth local policy initiative represented by urban renewal. But even if we accept Wolfinger's depiction of the New Haven urban renewal story, what have we learned about the overall character of urban politics and policy in this city, let alone elsewhere? As the title of his book suggests, Wolfinger contends that the urban renewal story is typical of a class of policies he terms "progress." But he neglects to demarcate this class very carefully. To the contrary, he uses the term "progress" quite loosely to refer to any "major changes in the social and physical aspects of urban life produced through government

action" (p. 1). What the general political configurations of this range of policy are, and how urban renewal compares to other representatives of the genre, however, Wolfinger leaves essentially unanalyzed.

This is especially important since there is some evidence to suggest that the politics of urban renewal in New Haven differed significantly from the politics of some other closely related policy issues. In one of the most fascinating chapters in his book, for example, Wolfinger contrasts Lee's success in achieving control over urban renewal policy making with his failure to do so over land use zoning policy generally—a failure Wolfinger attributes to the role the zone change process played as a source of favors needed to sustain the local party organization *qua* organization. But is it not likely that other parts of the New Haven governmental structure—the police department, the public works department, etc.—had maintenance and enhancement needs that also ran counter to Lee's influence and imposed their own tilt on government policy? If so, Wolfinger neglects to reveal it. As a result, we have little basis for deciding whether the pattern of policy leadership Wolfinger discovered was really a product of the policy arena he investigated, or whether it was typical of some larger class of cases, and, if so, what that class looks like. Lacking this, it is difficult to decide what to make of Wolfinger's findings so far as our general comprehension of urban politics is concerned.

These conceptual problems are thrown into even sharper relief in Wirt's book, though for different reasons. Like *The Politics of Progress, Power in the City* is firmly rooted in the pluralist-elitist frame of reference. Thus Wirt begins his analysis with an extended discussion of the San Francisco power structure based on interviews with 34 local knowledgeable who were asked such questions as whether one group in San Francisco "makes all the decisions." Not surprisingly, Wirt finds that "there is now no single 'power structure' working its way on an unsuspecting or apathetic public" (p. 63), that political power takes the form, rather, of "occasional" or "temporary" coalitions (pp. 48-59). But what quickly becomes apparent is that knowing this really tells us very little about the character of local governance—it begs more questions than it answers.

Fortunately, Wirt is a bold enough scholar to venture out beyond where the conventional theory leads him, and he therefore sets about answering

some of these begged questions. The result is some fascinating empirical work. In a lengthy section on the San Francisco "political economy," for example, Wirt documents the extensive community of interest that exists within San Francisco's economic elite on the question of regional development, and records the success this elite had during the latter 1950s and 1960s in forging a coalition with labor and with Democratic politicians to promote the "Manhattanization of San Francisco." In a subsequent section, Wirt details the extensive lower class ethnic and minority participation in local political life, but notes that this participation was largely channeled into a symbolic exercise that he charitably terms the "politics of deference" to differentiate it from "the politics of income" that the economic notables more nearly dominated. Along the way we learn how the seemingly neutral operation of the formal governmental institutions delivers advantages to the business and professional groups that alone have the resources and skills to operate effectively and consistently in a fluid, no-party political system, and that stand to gain most from a polity that puts even more than the normal barriers in the way of government action to alter the existing distribution of resources. Finally, in a lengthy section detailing the impact of other levels of government and national corporations on local political life, Wirt suggests that the local structure of power may not really be that important anyway since local decisions are decisively affected by external forces.

By following the facts where they lead him, in other words, Wirt reaps a rich harvest of detail about San Francisco political life, a harvest that easily overflows the shallow theoretical containers available to hold it. Yet, although he makes some progress in fashioning new containers—for example, by differentiating between the "politics of income" and the "politics of deference" and by emphasizing the importance of history and outside influences on local governance—Wirt does not formulate a new set of concepts capable of organizing the vast store of material he presents. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to determine what Wirt's conception of San Francisco politics really is, for it is variously described at different points as "a kaleidoscopic decisional process" (p. 54), "a system of public and private segmented structures" (p. 345), "a set of multiple fiefdoms which gives the impression of a monolithic elite" (p. 345), a "government by clerks" (p. 12), "a politics

of acute sensitivity to the demands of both great realty investment and small neighborhood groups" (p. 62), and a "local game of residual decision making" (p. 344).

This conceptual confusion finds particularly revealing reflection in Wirt's treatment of the San Francisco bureaucracy. As we have seen, the community power paradigm barely acknowledges a role for the local bureaucracy in the exercise of influence, and Wirt follows suit by neglecting to introduce us to the San Francisco government outside the mayor's office and a few independent commissions. To be sure, we learn how many civil servants there are, and what their electoral strength consequently is. But aside from a truncated discussion of the budget process (pp. 133-137), we learn little about internal administrative dynamics, standard operating procedures, characteristic bureaucratic practices, or even patterns of public servant organization. What makes this especially curious in Wirt's case, however, is that his analysis of other political forces leads him to conclude that the bureaucracy really dominates San Francisco decision making across a broad range of issues. As he puts it: "the normal process of local governing rests in the hands of the bureaucracy of the city agencies (p. 137)... What San Francisco has, then, is government by clerks" (p. 12). In short, confronted by a political reality in which the administrative agencies exercise considerable autonomous influence, yet equipped with a set of concepts that has little to say about the role of such agencies, Wirt seems to have split the difference, emphasizing bureaucratic politics and administrative processes in all his summary observations, but neglecting to treat them explicitly in the body of his book. Clearly, when a theoretical framework produces this kind of paradox, it is time to begin searching for a new one.

Regimes and Arenas: Toward a New Framework for Urban Political Analysis.¹³

From what has been said already, any new conceptual framework for urban political analysis must do at least two things not done by the existing frameworks: first, it must acknowledge the possible existence of different types of policy arenas within a single city; and second, it must make the substance of policy, the role of government, and not just the structure of institutions or the pattern of power, a major focus of attention

and conceptual treatment.¹⁴

Fortunately, the building blocks of such a scheme are already available in the existing literature on urban politics, though mostly in the form of ad hoc insights and fragments of interpretation. What is needed is to pull these fragments together into a coherent framework organized around a few central concepts.

One way to do this is through a conceptual framework that differentiates cities, or policy arenas within cities, according to two basic criteria: first, the set of interests at work; and second, the role government plays in relation to these interests. Using these criteria, it is possible to distinguish three types of urban political arenas, three "models" of the urban polity: (1) the private city model, (2) the bureaucratic city model, and (3) the democratic (policy planning) city model. While a book review essay is admittedly not the ideal place to elaborate such a scheme, it should be possible at least to outline its basic contours and to suggest its utility by showing how it helps us understand the two books here under review.

The Private City

The first image of the urban polity in our proposed typology borrows heavily from historian Sam Bass Warner's notion of the "private city." According to Warner, Philadelphia and, by implication, many other American cities, have historically been characterized by a tradition of "privatism" that confines the city government to a largely passive role as the facilitator of private economic activity. As Warner points out, the "private city" is not necessarily an inert city, a mere caretaker. The process of physical development, for example, necessitates a host of governmental actions—the construction of roads, the provision of water, the extension of city services—many of which require remarkable effort. What distinguishes the private city, rather, is the ad hoc character of these governmental actions, and the extent to which governmental power is put at the disposal of business elements in their private pursuit of wealth. As Warner puts it:

Privatism suffered and abetted a system of politics which was so weak it could not deal effectively with the economic, physical, and social events that determined the quality of life within the city... In general the municipal corporation responded to its predicament of costly demands and weakened power by meeting the requests of business and industry and by attempting a cheap uniform service to all the neighborhoods of the city. This low-cost solution hastened the decay of both

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slum and suburb by failing to keep up with their expensive needs.¹⁵

This image of local government is evident in a considerable portion of the literature on urban government. It constitutes, in fact, probably the classic model of American city government. In his summary of the massive New York Metropolitan Region Study of the 1950s, for example, economist Raymond Vernon justifies his neglect of urban politics on just these grounds: that "local governments were largely a passive force in the environment."¹⁶ So, too, Norton Long once depicted local government as "a highly limited affair in which the officeholders respond to demands and mediate conflicts." According to Long, local public officials:

... play politics, and politics is vastly different from government if the latter is conceived as the rational, responsible ordering of the community Intervention in the really important economic order is by way of piecemeal exception and in deviation from the supposed norm of the separation of politics and economics. This ideal of separation has blocked the development of a theory of significant government action and reduced the politician to the role of registerer of pressure rather than responsible governor of a local political economy.¹⁷

While the "private city" model has applicability to all spheres of city policy, it is likely to be most evident in those spheres in which private economic interests are most dependent on governmental action. Hence, the policy arena dealing with physical growth and community development has historically been the natural domain of the "private city," for the development of the urban space economy has depended critically on the public provision of roads, water, utilities, bridges, and other similar services. Moreover, since physical development issues dominate a city's policy agenda at particular periods in its history, the "private city" model probably also defines a stage, or stages, of city political history. According to historian Samuel Hays, for example, physical development was "the major concern of urban government" in much of the latter 19th century.¹⁸ The result was a distinctive stage of urban political history, a stage characterized by the emergence of party machines that dispensed the requisite franchises, contracts, and services needed by pro-growth business elements in return for kickbacks and campaign contributions. As sociologist Robert Merton has put it, party machines performed an important "latent function" in thus converting the requests of expansion-minded busi-

ness elements into government policy, thereby facilitating urban expansion, albeit along lines defined by the businessmen.¹⁹

But the "private city" is not associated exclusively with the period of machine rule. To the contrary, when the machines violated their tacit agreements with local business elements and either failed to deliver the needed goods or made the price prohibitive, business elements turned on the machine. The reform movement of the early 20th century can thus be seen, in part at least, as an effort to perfect the "private city," to eliminate the political middleman and incorporate urban government more directly into the business system. Moreover, the period of the 1950s and early 1960s can probably also be seen as another era in which physical development issues dominated the urban agenda and in which new efforts were made to perfect the "private city," this time through the creation of autonomous, business-like redevelopment agencies and regional authorities equipped to provide the crucial public services needed for expansion without the accompanying complications of a unit of general government.²⁰

As an analytical tool, the "private city" model thus directs our attention not simply to the question of who governs or what institutional structures are in place, but also to an analysis of the broader dynamics of the local political economy, to the nature of the stakes different economic interests have in local government actions, and especially to the way local governments respond to these stakes. In the sphere of physical development policies, for example, the key empirical question becomes the price that government is able (or willing) to extract from private interests (in the form of good design, provision of amenities, avoidance of leap-frog development, etc.) in return for the approval of subdivision plans, and the provision of streets, drainage systems, lighting, access routes, and other prerequisites of development. In broader theoretical terms, the central issue is who receives the benefits of the positive externalities produced by public investment (e.g., the higher land values resulting from the extension of transportation arteries), and who pays for them. Similarly at issue is the question of who bears the cost of the negative externalities (pollution, congestion, blight) produced by private investment. In these terms, the private city is one in which public authorities extract little price for the provision of crucial development services, place the cost of these services on taxpayers generally while captur-

ing few benefits from the positive externalities that result, and shift the cost of dealing with whatever negative externalities ensue from the developer or the beneficiary of development to the public at large.

As a pattern of urban politics, the "private city" is likely to appear wherever governmental structures are severely fragmented, popular pressures dormant or inattentive, economic interests cognizant of their stakes in local decision making, electoral institutions either weak or in the hands of persons disinclined to promote issue-politics (except along pro-business lines), and administrative autonomy in check. This seems to describe the pattern Wirt found in the downtown development arena in San Francisco, at least prior to the emergence of neighborhood groups that have managed to slow some of the renewal effort. It is also a pattern characteristic of urban development politics in other cities, including New Haven. Indeed, given the structure of American economic life, the character of prevailing traditions, and the fragmented pattern of local government, the "private city" is easily the dominant form of city politics, present to a greater or lesser extent in most urban places.

The Bureaucratic City

While the "private city" may be dominant and ubiquitous, however, it is not universal. At a minimum, its dominion has been challenged by the emergence of increasingly autonomous urban bureaucracies, giving rise to a pattern we will term the "bureaucratic city." Unlike the private city, in which government responds to the needs of local businesses, in the "bureaucratic city" or sub-city the maintenance and enhancement needs of the city's line departments predominate. The image here, in other words, is that of a city whose policy is shaped in significant areas more by the internal operating procedures, professional norms, and organizational ethos of the bureaucracy than by the conscious choices of the public, elected officials, or even economic elites. Theodore Lowi thus expressed the essence of this model well when he likened the urban civil service to a "new machine," insulated from outside control by civil service regulations, seniority procedures, and a host of similar protective devices. Notes Lowi:

The career bureaucrat is the new Boss. He is more efficient, honest and rational than the old amateur Boss. But he is no less political . . .

The New Machines are machines because they are relatively irresponsible structures of power. That is, each agency shapes important public policies, yet the leadership of each is relatively self-perpetuating and not readily subject to the controls of any higher authority.

The consequence is to make cities "well run but badly governed" since their governments come to consist of "islands of functional power before which the modern mayor stands impoverished."²¹

This image of the urban polity is nicely illustrated by the case of Oakland, California, as depicted by Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky in their recent book, *Urban Outcomes*. According to this account, the key determinant of the distribution of street, library, and school expenditures in Oakland is not conscious political choice but the bureaucracy's freedom to operate according to a set of internal procedures that Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky characterize as "Adam Smith rules," and that they summarize as follows: "When a customer makes a 'request,' take care of him in a professional manner; otherwise, leave him alone."²²

The impressive bureaucratic autonomy that lies behind the appearance of the "bureaucratic city" has a variety of origins. One is the sheer complexity of modern urban government, which makes it impossible for elected political leadership, let alone powerful economic elites, to keep track of more than a minuscule fraction of relevant administrative decisions. A second is the peculiar expertise that administrators come to command about the internal procedures for agency task accomplishment, and which they use to help maintain existing agency directions. A third is the professionalization of the urban civil service and the rise of unionization, both of which insulate agency recruitment practices, promotion criteria, and internal procedures from control by political leaders or consumers of agency services. A fourth factor is the enlargement of state and federal urban programs, which have given local administrators crucial allies among their counterparts in higher levels of government, and produced a pattern that has been labeled "picket-fence federalism" or "cooperative feudalism."²³ Finally, bureaucratic power is rooted in the support agencies are able to muster among crucial client groups, in the political clout they can generate through their voting power in low-turnout municipal elections, and in the general weakening of urban political parties resulting from the reforms of the progressive era.²⁴

But bureaucratic dominance is not equally

likely in all policy arenas. To the contrary, given what we have just suggested about the sources of bureaucratic autonomy, it is most likely in arenas involving substantial service delivery functions, relatively weak client groups, extensive professionalization, and substantial involvement along functional lines with other levels of government. Hence education, welfare, and law enforcement are prime candidates for this kind of pattern. And where these activities bulk especially large in municipal operations, it may be reasonable to think of the "bureaucratic city" model not simply in terms of particular policy arenas but in terms of a type of city political regime more generally. Such, at any rate, seems to be the conclusion of Norton Long, whose image of the major, older U.S. cities as Indian reservations occupied only by the poor, the deviant, and their keepers in the service bureaucracies corresponds well to the "bureaucratic city" model depicted here. Notes Long: "The picture of Mayor Gibson facing the teachers' union (and all its union allies) over the well-picked bones of the city of Newark is an almost ideal type of the future that faces many older American cities."²⁵ The more fragmented and stalemated local decision making is, in fact, the more likely is the "bureaucratic city"; for, by curbing political leadership, stalemate frees the bureaucracy to respond to its own internal needs and procedures. The intense politicization of the urban policy process that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s may thus paradoxically have increased bureaucratic power by paralyzing government decision making and hence opening the way for agencies to operate more fully on their own initiative. Only where protest groups have succeeded in gaining control over bureaucratic procedures through such devices as policy-setting community boards and decentralization has this outcome been mitigated.

Thanks to the neglect of the administrative dimensions of power in the frameworks that have heretofore guided urban political analysis, our comprehension of the "bureaucratic city," or the agency-dominant spheres of city policy, is extremely incomplete.²⁶ Fortunately, however, some recent research has begun to fill this gap, though more at the empirical level than at the conceptual one.²⁷ Hopefully, however, by articulating the "bureaucratic city model" as part of a more general framework of urban political analysis, it may be possible to integrate the insights generated by this research into our general com-

prehension of the urban polity so that we can weigh how important such factors as agency drives for self-preservation and growth, inter-agency competition, standard operating procedures, agency recruitment, and promotion mechanisms and the like are in shaping local policy compared to the factors traditionally emphasized in the prevailing community power framework.

The Democratic (Policy-Planning) City

Yet a third image of city politics applies to those cases where the city government, instead of adapting itself to the uncoordinated and particularistic demands of private economic interests or the maintenance needs and standard operating procedures of city agencies, performs a more conscious steering role, taking the initiative to alter or anticipate existing trends in pursuit of some broader vision of the public good. The appearance of this type of urban polity reflects three relatively recent changes in American urban life. The first of these is the general expansion that has occurred in the role of government in American urban places. Rare is the aspect of modern urban life in America that does not now involve some interaction with public authority. As planner Lisa Peattie has put it: "Our cities . . . are more and more publicly managed environments. Private actions take place within a generally narrowing network of public intervention, public policy, and public planning."²⁸

Accompanying this expansion of governmental activity, moreover, has been a growing confidence that government can (and should) consciously shape the direction of our urban destiny. This confidence emerged originally in the early city planning movement, with its stress on human perfectability through careful planning. But it has been amply nourished in more recent years by the development of new decision-making techniques like systems analysis that permit better analysis of complex social realities and thus afford decision makers better comprehension of the trade-offs involved in the decisions they make. The upshot has been the emergence of what Alan Schick calls a new type of politics, "systems politics," which is more encompassing in its sweep and more analytical in its approach than the group-oriented "process politics" of yore.²⁹ Even so reserved an observer of the urban scene as Anthony Downs has been prompted to predict a "revolution in city planning" as a consequence.³⁰

Whether this expansion of governmental activ-

ity and of the ability to use government to shape the urban environment actually yields a new pattern of urban politics, and not just a warmed-over version of the "private city," however, depends on who controls the new planning tools and what uses they put them to. Historically after all, city planning grew as much—if not more—out of the concerns of city business interests eager to protect their investments as it did out of the disinterested pursuit of more humane living environments and a more equitable distribution of resources. Moreover, planning has never been more effective than when it was harnessed to the goals of that powerful coalition of progressive business elements and activist chief executives that took shape in city after city following the Second World War and that exploited the potent planning tools made available by the federal urban renewal and highway programs to lay claim to the decaying urban core for the administrative activities required in an increasingly technological society.³¹ In short, despite the avowed expectations of early reformers, planners have typically been forced to choose between impotence and co-optation, between splendid isolation and service to the goals of the city's economic powers-that-be.

The rise of citizen activism in the 1960s, however, changed this situation quite dramatically, and this constitutes the third element leading to the emergence of the "democratic policy-planning city." Suddenly planners confronted a new constituency of neighborhood groups and the poor, who forced the planning process into the open and onto the civic agenda through such devices as "advocacy planning" and "community control." Reacting to these same pressures, the federal government encouraged the trend by making mandatory provision for broader community participation in the major federal community development programs. The result, in many places, has been not to eliminate planning, but to democratize it substantially—a prospect that Norton Long saw a decade and a half ago as "a sign of returning health for local democracy."³² At any rate, this has been a basic thrust of the new urban politics of the 1960s and early 1970s: to make use of the expanded powers of government and the new techniques of planning, but to make use of them to promote greater equality and to arrest the social and environmental damage produced by the private development process. While this pattern hardly dominates the current urban political scene, it is widespread enough to deserve recognition as a

distinctive model of urban politics, and a tangible alternative to the "private city" and "bureaucratic city" models depicted above. What it seems to require in political terms is a weak or divided business community, an activated citizenry, and a political leader with the will and capacity to mobilize a pro-redistributive electoral coalition sufficient to neutralize the bureaucracy and promote activist policies.

Reality from a New Perspective: The Framework Applied

Armed with the set of concepts outlined above, it should now be possible to locate the Wolfinger and Wirt books in a broader frame of reference, and to specify more precisely their contributions to our general comprehension of urban politics. In particular, in terms of the framework developed above, Wolfinger is essentially arguing that New Haven under Mayor Lee was transformed from a "private city" to a "democratic policy-planning city." His evidence for this is the story of urban renewal in New Haven. As Wolfinger tells it, urban renewal represented a bold effort to reverse existing economic trends that succeeded only because an activist mayor managed to mobilize sufficient popular support to overwhelm the opposition of key business elites and then to stick with the program through the lengthy and complicated implementation process that followed.

Even if we accept this picture of New Haven urban renewal, however, the general image Wolfinger draws from it is still open to question. Nowhere, for example, do we find a detailed analysis of the real impact of urban renewal, especially on the poor. Nor does Wolfinger effectively demarcate the limits of the presumed policy-planning approach he finds in the urban renewal sphere, or specify the conditions that made it possible. This is especially important in view of recent research that indicates the extent to which New Haven's younger businessmen and planners had mobilized themselves to push redevelopment well before Lee's election as Mayor. Without taking anything away from Lee's ability as an effective coordinator, fixer, and popularizer, these materials raise questions about the extent to which Lee's innovations in the urban renewal sphere were significantly conditioned on the availability of support from important business interests—support that would probably not have been available for other types of policy-planning

initiatives. To the extent this is so, what we have here may be something closer to a sophisticated "private city" model than a true "democratic policy-planning" pattern.³³

Interestingly enough, Wirt's book seems to verify such a suspicion. According to Wirt, formal governmental authority was even more splintered in San Francisco than in New Haven. But unlike New Haven, San Francisco lacked a durable party organization or any other similar institution that would have permitted an entrepreneurial chief executive to assemble the clout needed to produce a "democratic policy-planning" city. Yet something quite similar to urban renewal in New Haven took place in San Francisco nonetheless. But it took place there largely on the initiative of certain business elements who were eager for city aid to pursue some dramatic development efforts, and who organized a variety of semi-public regional planning bodies through which to pursue their vision of the future of this city. During the 1960s, these elements forged an alliance with local Democratic politicians, an alliance that was consummated with the aid of support from powerful construction trade unions whose members stood to gain considerably from the building boom anticipated from the new approach. Reflecting its origins, however, this activist approach was not extended throughout San Francisco government. Rather, it was restricted to those measures required to put San Francisco businesses in a position to dominate the regional economy (e.g., through the construction of a regional transit network) and to lay claim to a substantial share of the growing national and international trade and finance activity (e.g., through the upgrading of port facilities and the clearance of central city turf for high-rise office structures). In other arenas, not even this degree of coordinated planning took place. In these arenas, therefore, a simple private city pattern, or, where substantial bureaucracies were in place, the agency-dominant or bureaucratic city pattern, apparently prevailed.

In this respect, Wirt's analysis is far more complete than Wolfinger's. Especially valuable is his depiction of the way expanded federal involvement in the 1960s paradoxically enhanced agency dominance in certain spheres of city life, by giving local bureaucrats higher level allies and new fields of conquest. Wirt also shows, however, how many of these same federal programs simultaneously mobilized low income and community group opposition to the business-oriented development

efforts. Regretably, however, he gives us little basis for determining whether this political activation of lower class and community groups that he portrays so well has led to what we have called democratic policy-planning politics, or whether it has simply intensified bureaucratic dominance of the policy process.

Wolfinger, by contrast, fails to take account of the evidence of extensive business support for urban renewal prior to Lee. Nor does he provide any analysis of the basic dynamics of the local political economy so that we could judge which interests stood to gain from Lee's program and which to lose and hence what the limits were to the activist coalition Lee assembled. Finally, there is little effort to depict the bureaucratic agencies that functioned outside the urban renewal sphere, and thus little basis for determining whether it was significant that Lee's initiative occurred in a new arena where no other agency already existed. Taken together, these shortcomings raise important questions about Wolfinger's thesis that New Haven fits the model of a "democratic policy-planning city." The most we can say on the basis of the evidence he provides is that the issue is still open.

Both *The Politics of Progress and Power in the City* thus provide detailed accounts of significant aspects of political life in two American cities. However, neither book provides a framework for interpreting this detail and identifying its significance for our overall comprehension of urban government, even though each easily overwhelms the meager conceptual categories available in the existing literature.

The value of the framework outlined here is that it puts these books in a common theoretical perspective. Viewed from this perspective, it becomes clear that both books underline a single theoretical point: the difficulty of moving beyond a "private city model" towards what we have termed a "democratic policy-planning model" of city politics. Wolfinger's book does this by suggesting what remarkable political skill and tenacity is required to pursue bold policy initiatives in American cities even when ample business support is available and few bureaucratic rivals are encountered. Just to move from a politics of drift to an active "private city," in short, requires a struggle. Wirt makes the same point in a different fashion, by showing the crucial role that business interests play in the few bold policy initiatives that have survived and by suggesting the durability of an

essentially "bureaucratic city model" in most other spheres of San Francisco political life.

The conceptual framework outlined here thus seems to provide a reasonably useful language or set of images for comparing and contrasting these two new additions to the urban politics literature, and for deciding what to make of them so far as the general analysis of urban government is concerned. However, the real test of this framework will lie in its utility to other scholars engaged in comparative urban political analysis. It is interesting to note, therefore, that students of Soviet cities have recently described Soviet urban politics in terms quite similar to our "bureaucratic city model," and distinguished this image from the one portrayed in prevailing party doctrine, which resembles our "democratic policy-planning model."³⁴ Whatever the merit of the conceptual equipment offered here, however, this article will have amply served its purpose if it has at least demonstrated the need for greater attention to conceptualization and theory in urban political inquiry, and made some progress in advancing the search for appropriate conceptual tools.

Notes

1. Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Poole, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963).
2. Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, Vol. XVI (July 1964), pp. 677-715.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 688.
4. Douglas Yates, "Urban Government as a Policy-making System," paper prepared for delivery at the Midwest Political Science Association Convention, May 1-3, 1975, p. 1. See also: John P. Kotter and Paul R. Lawrence, *Mayors in Action: Five Approaches to Urban Governance* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 19.
5. For further elaboration of this point in a different context, see Lester M. Salamon, "Comparative History and the Theory of Modernization," *World Politics* (October 1970), pp. 83-103; and Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
6. Basically, two schools of thought quickly emerged: one arguing that community power was highly concentrated in the hands of a unified economic elite, and the other arguing that it was dispersed among a multitude of different political elites, each with its own base of power. Classic statements of these two views can be found in: Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, Anchor Edition (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963 (1953)); and Robert Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). For an excellent sampling of the work undertaken in the community power framework, see: Willis Hawley and Frederick Wirt, *In Search of Community Power* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974).
7. James Q. Wilson, "Introduction: City Politics and City Policy," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), *City Politics and City Policy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 2. Theodore Lowi is even more severe in his criticism, charging that neither the pluralist nor the elitist position is anything more than "a self-validating standpoint," not a true analytical model, Lowi, p. 686.
8. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," in Bachrach and Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 376.
9. See, for example: Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1973), p. 7; and James Q. Wilson, p. 10.
10. Wolfinger claims in the Introduction to his book (p. 9) that he is *not* writing a book about New Haven's "power structure." Yet it seems to this reviewer that the book does operate within the community power frame of reference. At a minimum, Wolfinger formulates no alternative framework of his own.
11. For a fuller development of this point, see Lester M. Salamon, "The World As New Haven: Miracle City, U.S.A.," *Contemporary Sociology* (April 1976).
12. Sam Bass Warner, Jr., *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp. 208, 202.
13. I am grateful to Gary L. Wamsley of the University of Kansas for numerous, invaluable discussions that helped me refine the concepts outlined here. In important respects, he thus shared the authorship of this scheme.
14. Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian developed one very suggestive typology based on the "role of government" in their book *Four Cities* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963). As will become clear, however, the typology developed here differs markedly from theirs.
15. Warner, pp. 202, 175-176.
16. Raymond Vernon, *Metropolis 1985: An Interpretation of the Findings of the New York Metropolitan Region Study* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1963), pp. 214-215.
17. Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," in Norton Long, *The Polity* (Chicago: Rand-McNally and Co., 1962), p. 146.
18. Samuel Hays, "The Changing Political Structure of the City in Industrial America," *Journal of Urban History*, Vol. I, No. 1 (November 1974), p. 16.
19. Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, revised edition (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 71-81.
20. John Mollenkopf, "The Postwar Politics of Urban Development," paper prepared for the Conference on

- Urban Political Economy, New School for Social Research, February 15-16, 1975. On the role of regional authorities as expressions of the "private city" model, see Hays, "The Changing Political Structure of the City," 1974, pp. 29-30.
21. Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (Chicago: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 200-201.
 22. Frank Levy, Arnold Meltsner, and Aaron Wildavsky, *Urban Outcomes* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 229.
 23. Terry Sanford, *Storm Over the States* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967); and Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 161.
 24. On the sources of bureaucratic power generally, see: Lester M. Salamon and Gary L. Wamsley, "The Federal Bureaucracy: Responsive to Whom?" in Leroy Rieselbach (ed.), *People vs. Government: The Responsiveness of American Institutions* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975).
 25. Norton Long, "The City as Reservation," *The Public Interest*, No. 25 (Fall 1971), p. 33. For a similar argument, see George Sternlieb, "The City as Sandbox," in the same issue of *The Public Interest*.
 26. James Q. Wilson makes this point in his Introduction to *City Politics and City Policy*, p. 11.
 27. See, for example, David Rogers, *110 Livingston Street: Politics and Bureaucracy in the New York City Schools* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); Paul Jacobs, *Prelude to Riot: A View of Urban America from the Bottom* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); and James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (New York: Atheneum, 1970).
 28. Lisa Peattie, "Reflections of an Advocate Planner," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (March 1968), p. 80.
 29. Allen Schick, "Systems Politics and Systems Budgeting," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (March/April 1969), p. 145.
 30. Anthony Downs, "The Coming Revolution in City Planning," in Edward C. Banfield (ed.), *Urban Government*, revised edition (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 597.
 31. This point is forcefully presented in Robert Goodman, *After the Planners* (New York: Simon Schuster, 1971); and in Mollenkopf.
 32. Norton Long, "Politics and Planning," reprinted in Norton Long, *The Polity* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), p. 195.
 33. Robert Salisbury depicts a similar pattern in "Urban Politics: The New Convergence of Power," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (November 1964), pp. 775-797. However, like Wolfinger, Salisbury neglects to specify the policy spheres in which this "new convergence" will operate, though he implies urban renewal tops the list.
 34. William Taubman, *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

ON TERRORISM

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*International Terrorism: National, Regional, and
 Global Perspectives*, Yohan Alexander (ed.).
 New York: Praeger, 1976. Pp. 392.

Transnational Terror, J. Bowyer Bell. Washington,
 D.C.: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1975. Pp.
 91.

Black September: Its Short Violent History,
 Christopher Dobson. New York: Macmillan,
 1974. Pp. 179.

This review essay was prepared with support from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Contract No. 76-N1-99-0108. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not reflect policies or opinions of the National Institute, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, or the U.S. Department of Justice.

Armored personnel carriers and M-16 rifles are among the weapons newly issued to those who patrol the defense corridors of the nation's nuclear plants. Electronic surveillance of airline passengers and their luggage has become commonplace. American businessmen abroad are rapidly and quietly being replaced with local executive talent. Those Americans who must remain on foreign location are learning that security precautions are a necessary component of their private and professional lives. All of these procedures are responses to the rising tide of terrorism as a political weapon of global proportion and consequence. And if those with some claim to expertise on the subject are correct, the incidents of terrorism are going to become more frequent and more devastating.¹

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Why is terrorism due to increase? Some scholars maintain that in an atmosphere of post-industrial alienation, a new quest for ethnic attachments as a buffer against personal isolation is being sought. As ethnicity is used as a vehicle of personal integration, it can become socially and politically disruptive. Irredentism becomes resurrected in new-found ethnic attachments. In this atmosphere not only does one find the emergence of ancient and active hostilities, but also those that were considered to have been long laid to mutual accommodation, if not to rest.

Political styles of every variety are also contagious. They spread all the more rapidly when the environment is conducive to their growth and development. Before a group of Croatian separatists boarded a Trans World Airlines flight bound out of New York for Chicago and diverted it across the Atlantic, who but a few specialists in Eastern European history ever heard of Croatia? Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yassir Arafat might have made it to the United Nations supported solely by the price of oil, but a considerable body of observers sees his new status in world affairs as a triumph of the tactics of terrorism.

As a tactical measure, terrorism was most successfully used by the Symbionese Liberation Army, which we must continually be reminded was never an army — having at most a dozen or so members — and liberated no one. Yet, the SLA received considerable and continual media coverage disproportionate to its strength, effectiveness, and importance.

The Gap Between Academic Research and the Information Needs of Decision Makers

If terrorism is increasingly utilized as a political tool by disgruntled groups, then public administrators, business executives, and decision makers, generally, are going to find the real and potential threat of terrorism will become an important component of their decision-making functions. As terrorism becomes a more prominent threat, decision makers will have to look for new and innovative ways to deal with it. Questions of the various trade-offs between freedom and efficiency on the one hand, and security on the other, will have to be confronted. Judgments will have to be made about the effects of putting resources into security that could go into other areas. Most importantly, there will be the decisions where no

quantitative and objective considerations are likely to be useful — the decisions directly involving human life.

It is most unfortunate that the books reviewed here and most of the current academic work on political terrorism appear to find such policy-related questions as something unrelated to the problem of terrorism. Indeed, the gap between the academic work on terrorism and the information needs of decision makers is so great that it appears that even the necessary research agenda for policy issues has not yet been formulated.

In some instances where government has contracted for applied research directly related to policy concerns, the results have been substantively interesting, but the methodological basis for the results is generally left as an article of faith.² This is not to dismiss such work out of hand. Indeed, much of what we do know about terrorism in a direct policy sense ensues from this work, but unfortunately information that would assist us in comprehending the reliability and validity of the findings is absent. The assumption appears to be that policy makers are only interested in findings, and any concerns about the quality of the findings can be assuaged by the imprimatur of the research group. Contract researchers may soon find that a new and more sophisticated generation of policy makers equipped with an understanding of research methods will not be so readily propitiated on questions of methodology.

Of course, in terms of the books reviewed here, it is fitting to raise the question of whether one can appropriately judge these works by the criterion that they have not engaged policy questions directly related to the needs of decision makers. After all, this is not what any of the authors set out to do. Nonetheless, I would argue that the questions of policy are so entwined in the subject matter that it is incumbent on the authors to engage them. It is perhaps this kind of oversight that has made policy makers increasingly impatient with and disheartened by the refusal of academic research to directly confront policy issues. One of the results of this disillusionment has been the systematic movement by federal funding agencies away from grants and toward research contracts. (The wisdom of the policy of course is a subject which transcends this article.)

Assessment of the Works Against Traditional Academic Standards

Policy issues aside, how good and how useful

are these works as measured by traditional academic concerns and against the tasks the authors themselves set out to accomplish? Yonah Alexander's *International Terrorism* is an edited collection of 11 original works covering the subject in a variety of geographical and historical contexts. If the primary functions of an editor are to recruit works which are original, diverse, and based on solid scholarship, then Alexander gets high marks. Generally the essays are well-researched and well-written, and several are indicative of painstaking scholarship. The volume would serve equally well as a supplemental text in any of a number of courses dealing with political violence, as a starting point for anyone undertaking serious research in the area, or for anyone simply desiring to become better informed about the subject. For their part, the contributing authors have demonstrated that solid scholarship does not necessarily require an immersion into jargon and obfuscation — characteristics increasingly evident in an academic community wishing to communicate exclusively with itself, and then only with difficulty.

A Question of Value

An especially laudatory aspect of the book is the general sense of dispassion that runs through the essays. Terrorism is not only a trendy subject, it is an emotional one, and, as such, it tends to bring out the worst in scholars. These essays are generally free of the ideological barbarism that too frequently passes for scholarship in this field. I would sense that cries of "bias," which inevitably must be forthcoming against works in this area, will be solely indicative of an accuser not having his particularistic axe ground.

This is not to say that the essays are completely value free. It would be appropriate to say, for example, that J. Bowyer Bell is sympathetic with the plight of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland and that Saleem Qureshi is not particularly enamoured with imperialism. Nonetheless, these values do not appear to interfere with Bell's depiction of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Qureshi's delineation of terrorism on the Indian subcontinent. Both researchers maintain their scholarly integrity.

Some Examples of Insightful Scholarship

Three pieces, those by Robert O. Freedman, Yonah Alexander, and Edward Weisbaum and Damir Roguly, deserve considerable merit as

scholarly work. Freedman's piece on the public Soviet position toward international terrorism is an exacting piece of scholarship tracing the ebbs, flows, and inconsistencies in the Soviet position. The Soviets are caught between an increased dependence on the Palestinian Liberation Organization for a foothold in the Middle East, and yet find themselves, as a global power, vulnerable to the same type of terrorism for which they are providing military assistance. Prior to the hijacking of a Soviet airliner by two Lithuanians, which resulted in the killing of a stewardess and the wounding of the pilot and copilot, the Soviets tended to depict the Palestinian hijackers as freedom fighters. Lithuanian hijackers, however, instantly became "criminal murderers," and the Soviets underwent an aboutface on hijacking which resulted in their support of the November 25, 1974, United Nations resolution that called for the criminal punishment of hijackers. Such stirrings in the moral conscience of the Soviets are, however, highly selective.

Freedman's paper taken with Alexander's essay on the background of the Palestinian situation and the piece by Edward Weisbaum and Damir Roguly form an accomplished section for understanding terrorism in the Middle East. Israel's tough policy with regard to Arab terrorism, for example, can not be completely appreciated without an understanding of the collaboration between the Mufti of Jerusalem and the Nazis during World War II. Indeed, this reminder of Israel's past goes a long way toward explaining why Israel's tough policy on terrorism is politically feasible. Many administrators to whom I speak would like to see U.S. policy move more strongly in such a direction, but fail to realize how distinctly different our own political climate is.

The article by Weisbaum and Roguly is actually a companion piece to the essay by Alexander and looks at post-1948 Middle East terrorism. Most important is the depiction of the PLO's attempts to change its public image and to deny responsibility for terrorist activities. Significantly, the article deals with the implications of terrorism for diplomatic activity. In assessing the importance of terrorism, it has become fashionable to measure the cost in lives lost and property destroyed as a result of terrorist activities. Even when taken on a worldwide scale, these appear trivial when compared to the cost of crime in any medium-sized American city. But as Weisbaum and Roguly point out, terrorism in the Middle East was increasingly

directed at impeding the peace-making objectives of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Students of the cost/benefit school might wish to ponder the ultimate cost of terrorism in terms of a lost opportunity for peace.

Theoretical and Empirical Considerations

Although of sound academic and reference value, Alexander's volume falls short of developing any theoretical formulations from the collection of essays. If the testing of theory is perhaps premature at this stage of our understanding of terrorism, the formulation of theory is not.

Similar limitations are to be found in J. Bowyer Bell's short but widely noted *Transnational Terror*. Although the book provides a well-written and concise description of the problems of terrorism and examines some of the major terrorist operations, it is not comparative in any systematic sense of the word, nor is it theoretical. The section on the American response to terrorism is simply a description of the current officially espoused policy of non-negotiation. The implications and difficulties of the policy, as well as its rather selective adherence, is not confronted. Professor Bell knows his way all too well through the corridors of Washington to leave us with this superficial portrayal.

There is an intellectual bias in this work that appears to have predetermined its research orientation. Bell notes in the preface, "... any study of terrorist activities must be largely qualitative and, since conventional academic approaches do not work in this field, dependent on less than rigorous sources." Now I will applaud Bell's personal immersion into his subject matter and concede that a fixation on the "law of the instrument" has provided us with a plethora of useless and mindless studies where form has replaced substance. But to categorically state that conventional academic approaches and quantitative methodologies have no relevance to the study of terrorism is a self-serving pronouncement which is probably based more on Bell's personal disinterest in such methods than on any impartial assessment of their utility. Save for some precious few cases, such tools have simply not been applied to the study of terrorism. Indeed, Bell's own wealth of substantive knowledge would more than likely have been enhanced and amplified by some cross-fertilization from empirical investigation. But despite these faults, the book stands as a solid, descriptive piece reflective of Bell's penetrating knowledge.

Christopher Dobson's *Black September: Its Short Violent History*, as its subtitle indicates, is an excursion into current history. Dobson, a journalist, has written an exciting and vivid account which shows a feel for language that most academicians should envy. Dobson's work, like Bell's, reveals the depth and insight that only comes from personal immersion into the subject. Dobson has covered the Middle East on assignment for the London *Sunday Telegraph*, an experience which made possible the cultivation of unique personal contacts and sources. Dobson, like Bell, has also been exposed to problems of personal safety as a result of his work. Clearly, this approach to the study of terrorism is not for the faint-hearted. Working in libraries and computer centers is eminently safer than plowing the back streets of Beirut and Amman and the "no go" areas of Catholic Belfast. Dobson has been threatened as a traitor to the Arab cause, and Bell is perhaps one of the few academicians who was ever taken at gun point to an interview.

Anyone remotely familiar with the study of terrorism in the Middle East will recognize the scope and depth of Dobson's special knowledge of the subject matter. If Dobson has "exposed secrets of Black September," it is in the fine nuances of detail and only there. Dobson's revelations about Black September being the handmaiden of Al Fatah, the guerilla organization, will only come as a shock to apologists for the PLO.

While Dobson carefully demonstrates the cooperation between Black September and the various splinter groups which — until the secessionist crisis of August 1974 — made up the PLO, his concentration on recruitment into Black September clouds the important differences between the various terrorist groups. Nonetheless, Dobson's work provides a clear, insightful, and vivid account of the operations of Black September and its role in the Middle East crisis.

Policy Limitations and Policy Needs

These works, thus, illustrate a strong core of solid, descriptive, and interpretive information on terrorism. They do instruct the policy maker that the problem of terrorism is likely to get worse. However, they leave their audience with the distinct impression the issues of public policy, which will become all the more salient as terrorism increases, are either removed from their concern or beyond their experience. It is difficult to discern

from these works even an agenda for policy issues — and that most unfortunately is not simply a commentary on this particular set of works but of most work in the area. Nor should policy makers optimistically expect assistance from most government contract studies. There one will find that policy concerns are addressed, but the scholarship appended to recommendations is at best unconvincing and at worst simply fatuous, leaving one to hope that the same rigors applied to the descriptive studies reviewed here might at some point be applied to the genuine and legitimate issues of public policy.³

What is called for is a merging of the methodological sophistication of traditional academic work with an agenda of policy-related questions. At a macro level, such questions might deal with the areas of international and domestic conflict that are likely to foster terrorism and the means for either defusing the conflict or containing it. Vitaly linked to this concern is a renewed understanding of the political role of terrorism. In the academic rush to say profoundly insightful things about terrorism, there has been an overbearing concern with terrorism as a means to communicate, while forgetting, in the process, that the ultimate concerns of terrorists are to seize political power and not to make the six o'clock news. Terrorism is another point on the distribution of political violence as determined by what Ted Robert Gurr calls “the balance of coercive control.”⁴ Viewing terrorism in this way incorporates it into a larger theoretical mold that at a minimum provides some understanding of the circumstances under which terrorism, instead of turmoil or revolution, for example, will become the dominant mode of political conflict. This type of theoretical incorporation permits us to expand our understanding of terrorism as we increase our understanding of political violence generally. If we can, through empirical measures of social instability, predict revolution, the same type of orientation should enable us eventually to develop an empirical predictor of political terrorism. At the macro level, we need a *Why Men Terrorize* as a companion to *Why Men Rebel*.⁵

Such intellectual efforts would confront the broad dimensions of where on the geographical horizon terrorism is likely to occur. The most salient policy questions ensue in response to such occurrences and are usually at the micro level of organizing and appropriating resources to deal with acts of terrorism. At this level, we are

challenged by such policy questions as: What types of procedures will deter terrorism? What types of training and reorganization must law enforcement operations undertake to deal with terrorism? What are the costs of capitulation vs. the costs of non-negotiation? Do terrorists present new problems concerning jurisdictional relations between law enforcement departments and between these departments and other governmental agencies? Are new types of jurisdictional arrangements required? Can the agreement between the Federal Aviation Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation serve as a model for resolving such jurisdictional problems?

Such questions are illustrative and certainly not exhaustive of the types of problems terrorism raises. And, of course, such considerations do not begin to approach the problems I observe when interviewing decision makers who have had to make life and death decisions in dealing with terrorism. While there are no aspirations of ever being able to draft a set of probability statements that can be substituted for the roles of innate sensitivity and experience in dealing with such matters, there is hope that adequate organization, training, and preparation will at least prevent other things from encroaching on the attention and energy of decision makers when they face difficult choices.

The previously noted set of issues do not engage the larger policy choices challenging society: choices between freedom and security; between First Amendment freedoms and the unwitting collaboration between the media and the terrorists' desire for sensational publicity. These are policy choices that are not only to be derived from experience but from a set of judgments about the ultimate political route paved by different conceptions of political ethics.

It is most unfortunate that the works reviewed here face none of these questions of public policy. Government research has confronted some of the micro policy issues, but often in a fashion that makes the recommendations something less than confidence inspiring. So, the chasm that separates policy concerns from research remains open and continues to demand closure as the ominous spectre of terrorism increasingly appears on the political horizon.

Notes

1. From remarks made by J. Bowyer Bell and Nicholas Kittrie at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice

- Conference, "Terror: The Man, the Mind and the Matter," October 15, 1976, New York City.
2. See the various Rand Corporation papers by Brian M. Jenkins in this regard. Although they present fascinating, substantive findings, almost no attempt is made to present the methodological underpinnings of these findings. This is not to reject or question the findings, but simply to point out that the methodological buttressing commonly found in academic research is absent.
 3. See, for example, National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *Disorders and Terrorism: Report of the Task Force on Disorders and Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).
 4. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 237.
 5. *Ibid.*

Book Notes and Notices

This section includes books and monographs of interest to the general public administration community. Brief annotations are provided where titles do not indicate the contents clearly. Listing here does not preclude a later review in the journal. Send books and monographs for note and review to Thad L. Beyle, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514.

American Politics

- American Political Institutions in The 1970s**, Demetrios Caraley (ed.). New York: Columbia, 1976. Pp. 407, \$17.50 cloth, \$6.95 paper.
- Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America**, Lawrence Goodwyn. New York: Oxford, 1976. Pp. 718, \$19.95 cloth.
- The New Presidential Elite; Men and Women in National Politics**, Jeane Kirkpatrick. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976. Pp. 605, \$20.00 cloth.
- Poverty Profile USA**, Mariellen Procopio and Frederick Perella. New York: Paulist Press, 1976. Pp. 88, \$1.65 paper.
- Power Inc.: Public and Private Rulers and How to Make Them Accountable**, Morton Mintz and Jerry Cohen. New York: Viking, 1976. Pp. 659, \$15.00 paper.
- Social Inequality: Class and Caste in America**, Lucile Duberman. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976. Pp. 314, \$4.95 paper.
- The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945**, Jack Bass and

Walter DeVries. New York: Basic, 1976. Pp. 527, \$15.95 cloth.

Energy/Environment

- Cleaning Up America: An Insider's View of the Environmental Protection Agency**, John Quarles. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. Pp. 255, \$8.95 cloth.
- The Economics of Refuse Collection**, Peter Kemper and John Quigley. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976. Pp. 181, \$12.50 cloth.
- The Electric War: The Fight Over Nuclear Power**, Sheldon Novick. San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1976. Pp. 376, \$12.50 cloth.
- Energy Impacts on Public Policy and Administration**, Walter Scheffer (ed.). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976. Pp. 241, \$4.95 paper.
- Energy Supply and Government Policy**, Robert Kalter and William Vogely (eds.). Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1976. Pp. 356, \$18.50 cloth, \$5.95 paper.
- Oil Resources: Who Gets What How?** Kenneth Dam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. 193, \$11.95 cloth.

Foreign Affairs

- Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power**, John Stoessinger. New York: Norton, 1976. Pp. 234, \$8.95 cloth.
- Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy**, Bruce Nazlish. New York: Basic, 1976. Pp. 332, \$10.95 cloth.
- Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations**, I.M. Destler, Hideo Sato, Priscilla Clapp, and Haruhiro Fukui. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. Pp. 209, \$9.95 cloth, \$3.95 paper.
- R I O: Reshaping the International Order, A Report to the Club of Rome**, Jan Tinbergen (ed.). New York: Dutton, 1976. Pp. 325, \$10.00 cloth, \$4.95 paper.

Health

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
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COMMUNICATIONS

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Public Avoidance – The Great Inferential Leap

To the Editor:

In his article on "City Managers, Public Avoidance, and Revenue Sharing," Timothy A. Almy provides us with an analysis of the city manager's role in the conduct of public hearings relating to the revenue sharing program. Our purpose here is to suggest that Professor Almy's analysis suffers from several major flaws in terms of both logic and methodology.

Professor Almy begins his report with the admonition that "the concept of public avoidance is one deserving more attention in city manager studies." We might agree, had he ever defined the concept. What he does tell us is something about the "professional bureaucrat" whose intent is to keep "the revenue and budgeting process hidden from public view." Yet, the absence of a definition and the "avoidance" of any operational measures serve as an important constraint.

Apparently the phenomenon of public avoidance as a major concept is based on a single case study focusing on the city manager in Oakland. Before one is ready to reach the conclusion that it is a generalized phenomenon, it may have been fruitful to first conduct some preliminary empirical studies. Rather, Professor Almy finds a haven in another article in PAR which never mentions the "concept" of public avoidance.

Professor Almy notes the need for such research when he argues that attention should be directed towards the "personal attributes," "professional values," and "personal beliefs" of managers so as to examine "the inclinations of city managers to support and encourage citizen participation in budgeting and other decisions." Yet, the remainder of his study is largely devoid of any direct evidence and most of the conclusions are based solely on dubious inferences. Indeed, his only direct evidence is basically contradictory in nature.

Professor Almy rests his case on a survey questionnaire in which he asked managers to indicate their preferences for the expenditure of revenue sharing funds and a follow-up questionnaire on how funds were actually expended. He then makes the rather untenable suggestion that a "close fit" between the two would be "indicative of significant city manager influence on budget deci-

sions." One could also conclude that a "close fit" would indicate the city manager is good at predicting what the city council and community will accept, and that the manager will tailor his recommendations along these lines. While it was expected that a "close fit" between what the manager recommended in the budget and what the council adopted would indicate influential managers, our research in Texas cities finds just the reverse. In many cases "weak" managers would gauge the political winds and recommend a budget which was incremental and non-controversial. On the other hand, the budget submitted by the strong, "professional" manager was frequently "adjusted" by the city council.

While the correlation coefficient between the preferences of managers and actual expenditures looks nice, it only explains slightly more than half the variation and essentially means that managers had about a 50-50 chance of having their preferences translated into reality. This is hardly a "confirmation of the important influence exerted by city managers over revenue sharing uses."

Professor Almy makes another logical jump when he claims that the manager's influence over other types of budget might be even greater. He points out that the revenue sharing provisions concerning citizen participation were highly publicized, but that other budget processes are more obscure. If, indeed, managers do exercise greater control over other types of budget decisions, it is hardly a function of publicity but a function of fixed costs. The literature on budgeting tells us quite clearly that for all practical purposes there is only a small portion of revenues which can be spent freely, and Professor Almy even recognizes this point. To equate fixed spending with a manager's influence, however, is rather a perverse definition of "influence."

Although Professor Almy acknowledges that this study failed to identify the decisional source for holding public hearings, this failure appears to be no barrier in his assumption that the manager is the key factor. Indeed, throughout his essay, one gets the feeling that the manager *is* the city, and that city councils are rather harmless appendages in city government.

Since public avoidance is previously defined as an attribute peculiar to the professional manager, Professor Almy next turns his attention to the personal characteristics of professional managers to see if there is any relationship between these characteristics and the incidence of public hearings. Although the relationship between personal attributes and manager performance has been debated by many, some managers must have found their status in the profession somewhat undermined by Professor Almy's assumption that "years of experience" combined with educational level are *the* salient personal characteristics of the professional manager.

On what basis Professor Almy claims these to be the salient background characteristics is not known, but previous studies should have provided him with a clue. In his study of the bureaucratic personality,¹ John W. Soule examined some analogous background characteristics of governmental employees, including age, education, and number of prior jobs. He contends that "no single background characteristic is strongly related to a person's bureaucratic perspective,"² and that, indeed, low education is positively associated with a bureaucratic orientation, which is diametrically opposite of Professor Almy's assumption.

Even if one accepts this rather tenuous definition that *both* experience and education are the salient personal characteristics of the professional manager, Almy proceeds to ignore his own definition and examines the incidence of public hearings by separating experience and education. In other words, if experience *and* education are the critical aspects, why not construct an elementary scale of the two measures? On the contrary, Professor Almy seems to imply that experience *or* education can be considered independently as personal characteristics of professional management. What do we do with the young manager who has served in a city for only two years but holds a master's degree? Or, how about the experienced city manager who completed high school some 30 years ago? The reader can only presume that no such types can be found in the city management profession, since Professor Almy deftly deals them out of the picture.

Professor Almy modestly suggests that "individual attributes are not in and of themselves the major elements influencing these managerial positions." The reader is forewarned that we are not getting down to the heart of the matter — that we are about to tap the attitudes and opinions of managers.

By this time, however, the reader should not expect too much, but he or she might have expected more. What the reader gets is the responses to *two* survey questions which "tap the underlining dimension" of public avoidance. It is difficult to imagine what one can legitimately conclude about the world with data based on two survey questions, but Professor Almy makes the most of it.

He first tells us that almost 60 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement that "most residents in this community do not get actively involved in local affairs because they are satisfied with the way things are going." In almost 80 per cent of the cities in which city managers agreed with the statement, no public hearings were held. Whether the responses are a realistic appraisal of the community or whether it taps some inner, psychological dimensions of the manager is not clear.

Yet, on the one and only other question asked of city managers, the responses are quite different, although the questions are logically related. On the second question, managers were asked their opinion concerning the extent of the consensus over values and issues in the community. Presumably if the managers perceive that there is satisfaction with the way things are run, they would also perceive a high level of consensus in the community. Yet the results are almost contradictory compared with the first question in that public hearings are more likely to be held in those cities where consensus is high.

Looking more broadly at the ritual upon which this

study focuses — public hearings — many important questions remain which were not addressed. Why are hearings at every level of government so often an expensive, ill-attended charade? How can a principal objective of this process, representative involvement in policy making, be better obtained? What are the real motives for public avoidance among local public officials? And finally, are there some mechanical and behavioral treatments which might contribute to broadened policy participation without threatening a reasonable degree of planning and policy-making continuity?

Taking pot-shots at city managers is now a popular sport. In many ways managers deserve to be critically examined. Indeed, our own studies have voiced some uncomplimentary conclusions. Yet, if scholars are to serve as responsible agents for assessing the city management profession, they would be well to heed the canons of their own profession, including rigorous conceptualization, logical and consistent methodologies, and a healthy skepticism of our own findings.

D. A. Taebel

S. M. Wyman

*Institute of Urban Studies
The University of Texas at Arlington*

Notes

1. John W. Soule, "The Bureaucratic Personality in Public Administration," *Governmental Research Bulletin*, Vol. V, No. 5 (November 1968).
2. *Ibid.*

Rebuilding Public Confidence in Government

To the Editor:

PAR No. 1 for January/February 1977 contains an excellent article in "Currents and Soundings," beginning at page 83, written by Alan L. Dean, entitled "Reestablishing Confidence in Government."

Mr. Dean discusses a number of factors contributing to the poor image of government in the eyes of the public. Too many programs are not carried out effectively. He cites as illustrative examples Medicaid, Urban Renewal, and the War on Poverty. Mr. Dean suggests more selectivity in launching new programs, systematic evaluation and adjustment of programs, better administrative planning, Executive Branch modernization, and the strengthening of the Civil Service.

Reflection on the items and remedies suggested by Mr. Dean brings to mind several other matters which influence the public's perception of government. Many frustrated citizens have a deep feeling of futility caused by their inability to influence a seemingly remote and insulated government. The ordinary layman who is caught up in the red tape of applications for governmental aid and benefits experiences an acute feeling of confusion in trying to settle his claim. The regulations and procedures of many agencies need some streamlining. A taxpayer would have a much better feeling of belonging if he/she could be assured that his/her concerns will receive a fair hearing by the bureaucracy and that some sort of satisfactory action

will be taken in the case. We need to do away with the defeatist attitude of "Why Fight City Hall?"

The above-mentioned negative factors unfortunately aggravate an already existing apathy exhibited by many persons toward government. In addition, a feeling of distrust and hostility brought on by catastrophes such as Vietnam and Watergate, coupled in some cases with a deterioration of discipline and dedication to good government, compounds the problems facing those who would rebuild public confidence in government.

F. Louis Valla
Long Beach, California

True to the Spirit?

To the Editor:

I am pleased to see that *PAR* has provided a basic description of zero-base budgeting as developed by Peter A. Pyhrr. Although the article consisted principally of material which appeared in Pyhrr's earlier publications, the wide distribution *PAR* receives among public administrators probably justifies this deviation from normal practice. It is unfortunate, however, that Pyhrr is promoting a reform effort which is not true to the name "zero-base budgeting" nor to the spirit of the ZBB movement. Several comments will make this clear.

As early as the 1920s there were those who demanded that budget decision makers refrain from taking current expenditures as minimum levels for future years. British budgetary instructions explicitly cautioned against this. Important then, and to many reformers throughout the last six decades, has been the desire to install systems which require justification of public programs — systems which demand that administrators consider program effectiveness. The spirit of zero-base budgeting is true to this reform tradition. Advocates of continued or increased funding are to be required to demonstrate program effectiveness, to justify each program by showing that its accomplishments contribute appropriately to agreed-upon public purposes.

The particular label with which Pyhrr denotes his reform, "zero-base budgeting," seems to have an easily understandable meaning. Many candidates for elective office have incorporated it into campaign rhetoric. (A few have persisted in calling it "zero-budgeting," which prompted one university administrator to ask, "Does that mean that we won't get any money next year?") The suggestion is, of course, that expenditures for a particular program (or agency) will be examined "from zero." The very existence of the program will be questioned, with a variety of possible funding levels considered.

Mr. Pyhrr's proposal is not true to the *spirit* of ZBB simply because his system fails to adequately encourage judgments of effectiveness. Appropriate considerations of the effectiveness of a program require that objectives be clearly specified. The ZBB system Pyhrr suggests does not emphasize this necessity, although his writings frequently refer to effectiveness. His understanding of effectiveness, however, is that programs are measured against quite low-order goals. The article's example of an Air Quality Laboratory indicates this in that the objective is "testing

air." His system does not encourage managers to ask, "should we test air at all?" or "to what objective does air testing contribute?" Examination of budget forms used in Georgia indicates that reviewers receive little information about contributions of programs to higher order objectives. Slight emphasis is placed upon long-range goals — even those one or two years beyond the budget year. These failings make it possible for Pyhrr to say that ZBB will "not add to management's burdens" or may even reduce them. His system requires very little of managers.

The proposed ZBB system is unfaithful to the *name* "zero-base budgeting" in that the emphasis is primarily upon seeking ways to more efficiently perform present tasks rather than upon questioning the need for that performance. Although Pyhrr says that failure to adopt one or another decision package would eliminate a program, little effort is made to encourage systematic consideration of elimination. If ZBB does not do this, then just what does the label mean? I have some doubts that zero-base budgeting can be implemented in both name and spirit, even if Mr. Pyhrr sincerely tries. Perhaps the weakness of his proposal indicates that he shares these doubts. I am concerned, though, that he is encouraging us to undertake procedures that will accomplish little and will result in considerable disappointment to those (elected officials and citizens) who expect large savings.

F. Ted Hebert
Department of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

A Reply from Mr. Pyhrr

To the Editor:

I am continually amused by the variety of comments that zero-based budgeting has been receiving, especially from the academic community. In his letter Professor F. Ted Hebert said that the reform effort that I was proposing "is not true to the name zero-base budgeting nor to the spirit of the ZBB movement." Several comments were to make this clear, but the following paragraphs stated nothing but a total misconception of what has been written and what in fact is in practice.

The Air Quality Laboratory example in the *PAR* article was an illustration of the zero-base analysis on this particular operation. The Air Quality Laboratory would be one single operation in a program of air quality control. At the program level, the zero-base analysis would ask the broader and more significant questions relating to the purpose of testing the air in the first place or the objectives expected to be accomplished.

In theory, but unfortunately not always true in practice, the zero-base approach directly attacks both the broader questions (termed "higher order objectives" by Professor Hebert) as well as the operational questions (termed "low-order goals"). Unfortunately, in the real world these "higher order objectives" are frequently broad motherhood statements, which provide some generic benefit, and are frequently ill-defined, unmeasurable — and quite often unaffordable. The somewhat "low order goals" are certainly more easily understood and measurable, and there are many more managers involved in evaluating operations than there are in

determining "those broad objectives required in the public interest."

We therefore have the proverbial chicken and egg question — which comes first — effective long-term goals which are understandable, quantifiable, doable, and affordable, or operating goals by which we can evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation?

In theory, we should have a zero-base review of the broad program objectives, then zero-base budget the operations within this initial review framework, and finally modify our initial program goals and objectives based on the realities of operating and funding capabilities. In practice, especially for operating managers faced with the practical management of an operation and with little time for academic contemplation, the initial analysis is frequently focused on the evaluation of operating effectiveness and efficiency. This analysis will quite often lead to the conclusion that the overall program objective is not meaningful or affordable.

In my book, in my critique of Georgia's first year's implementation, I criticized the lack of an effective program structure and evaluation. The zero-base effort in Georgia led to the development of a refined program structure, and the zero-base process was proceeded in subsequent years by an effective long-range planning process. It would be nice if those who write about Georgia or any other experience would personally visit and evaluate the process as it actually exists in total instead of spending their time in university libraries.

I will strongly disagree that the zero-base process will accomplish little. However, I must unfortunately agree that those who will expect large savings will undoubtedly be disappointed. Although program effectiveness may be dramatically increased in some instances, and programs reduced or eliminated in other instances, the political will does not exist to significantly reduce costs for health, education, welfare, defense, etc. I would happily have zero-base budgeting replaced by a new process which would prohibit any congressman from voting on an expenditure bill which would impact his/her district and prohibit any lobby from promoting a bill that would benefit their financial supporters.

Peter A. Pyhrr
Vice President
Alpha Wire Corporation

A Misinterpreted Theory

To the Editor:

The article entitled, "Humanism in Organizations: A Critical Approach," by Kaplan and Tausky, PAR No. 2, March/April 1977, surprises me to a great degree that two authors, who are obviously so well educated, should have such a shallow grasp of the humanism concepts espoused by Maslow.

On page 176 they use the argument that scientists, etc., are self-actualized through their work, while lower-level salaried employees are self-actualized out of the work place, to show that self-actualization is learned. But, if one looks at Maslow (*Motivation and Personality*) it will be seen that this very argument supports the contention that all individuals seek self-actualization. The individual who finds his/her reward off-the-job does so because of

the deficiencies of the job. The further argument that even scientists, etc., are interested in extrinsic rewards does not counter Maslow's theory, but enforces it in that the hierarchy of needs is not a firm and mechanical presentation of man's motivational needs but a flexible structure with many individual variations.

To say that lower-paid employees are interested only in the financial rewards of the job is only to say that their basic needs have not been met, not that they do not seek self-actualization. Then again, what is individual self-actualization? One person may gratify his/her highest needs through the arts, literature, or science, while others may find this gratification in working with people or perhaps working with the hands, as a woodworker or farmer. Preoccupation with material rewards is not indicative of a pathological condition, but simply an indication that the basic needs, which are satisfied by money, have not been met. Of course there are those who seek financial rewards as an end in itself, rather than a means, and perhaps it could be shown that they have a pathological condition, but this label does not fit the masses who seek financial reward. A close reading of Maslow will bear this contention out. I feel that the authors have grossly misinterpreted the meaning of Maslow's theory.

Robert E. Rieck
Silver Spring, Maryland

The Authors Respond

To the Editor:

We were not surprised such an indignant letter would be sent in response to our critique of Organizational Humanism. True believers often take umbrage when their religion and guru are scrutinized, and we are glad to have this opportunity to respond to the charge that we grievously misinterpreted Maslow's need theory.

If Mr. Rieck would have read our article more closely instead of using selective perception, he would have found that there is no point of contention between us about a crucial fact of working life, namely, that people have diverse work orientations. We differ, however, in our interpretation of the origins of this diversity. First, we never said that lower-paid employees are exclusively interested in the financial aspects of their jobs. We tried to demonstrate that intrinsic job involvement may be a luxury afforded people who have had the opportunity to obtain higher education and more meaningful types of work. We then attempted to show that the Organizational Humanist position, predicated on the ideas of Maslow, is erroneous.

In *Motivation and Personality* and subsequent writings, Maslow contended the drive for self-actualization was a distinctively human and universalistic biological need. He went so far as to label it "instinctoid," i.e., akin to instincts. We reject this biological determinist perspective of human nature; one which has led some contemporary organizational theorists to label people who do not seek self-actualization in work as mentally ill. We contend that one's learning experiences and opportunities to obtain better paying and more interesting jobs is the primary determinant of the presence or absence of the drive to self-actualize, not some metaphysical pseudo-religious instinctoid urge.

Rather than refer to Maslow, it might be instructive for Mr. Rieck and other people enamored of his ideas to turn to his intellectual predecessor — Karl Marx — who anticipated his need theory by 100 years. In the *German Ideology*, Marx laid the foundation of a very similar conception of human needs arranged in a hierarchy from basic ones to the highest striving of people to maximize their potentialities, which he termed *selbstbetätigung*, translated self-realization.

The important difference between Marx and Maslow is that Maslow preferred to ascribe the need to maximize human potentials to biology, while Marx perceived that the drive was learned and its emergence dependent upon the opportunity structure in society.

Our position is that people must learn to want challenge in their work. We would hope that the social sciences are beyond the point of attributing human behavior to instincts. We are trying to look at the world as it is, not as wishful biological thinking wants it. The intent of our article was to direct our priorities toward understanding the social and institutional sources which influence the motivation of workers so we might come to grips with the real sources of satisfaction, commitment and stress in work. Perhaps if the adherents of Maslow's biological determinist perspective focused their energies more on achieving equality of educational and work opportunities, and less on searching for psychopathology ostensibly produced by inadequate instinctoid need development, we would be able to arrive at the humanistic society which they are searching for.

H. Roy Kaplan
Curt Tausky

More on the Public Interest

To the Editor:

The articles from the Symposium "Public Interest Representation and the Federal Agencies," reported in the March/April issue of PAR, set forth recent developments of major importance to decision making in the regulatory field. These experiences of the past decade are but an initial salvo of public interest rumbles which will shape the actions of many public administrators, in both regulatory and other agencies, in the years ahead. Thus, the symposium articles should be but the first wave of discussions in PAR of the rapidly growing array of procedural concerns surrounding the concept of "in the public interest."

Many important trends in the efforts of Congress and of some agencies to develop procedural approaches which

they consider more responsive to societal interests are not mentioned in the articles, but deserve attention. For example, with each new Congress there is a growing tendency to "legislate" regulatory actions directed to specific products and problems and also to increase the precision of the criteria to be used by the agencies in reaching other controversial decisions. The use of a wide variety of public witnesses at authorization and oversight hearings has become commonplace to buttress the judgmental calls which Congress wants to make. Also, Congress has seized on the concepts of legislatively mandated advisory committees, presidential commissions, and "independent" studies to reassure many interested parties that their views will be heard during the regulatory process.

Among the additional procedural requirements now being incorporated into some forms of regulatory legislation are (a) requirements for agencies to set forth in the Federal Register the basis for not taking regulatory actions, (b) time limitations for responding to citizen petitions, (c) opportunities for *de novo* judicial review of agency denials of citizen petitions, and (d) determinations that certain types of health and safety information cannot under any circumstances be considered proprietary. Meanwhile, some agencies are working hard to improve public input during the comment and hearing aspects of rule making. In this regard, an aspect of particular importance is the opportunity to structure informal hearings in a way that (a) reduces the length of hearings; (b) tempers the hostility and tension, and the accompanying inhibitions to develop the facts objectively, that frequently permeate these confrontations of conflicting interests; and (c) presents a better organized and hopefully more representative hearing record.

But can the Congress, the public interest groups, the so-called "corporate adversaries," the agencies, and the courts adequately represent the public interest? Clearly, state and local agencies do not believe their views are given sufficient attention. Will new federal assistance programs such as the Citizen Participation Program of the National Science Foundation be helpful? Or does the bureaucratic mind set which so often resists the sharing of decision-making authority or even the complicating of the process negate the possibilities for more responsiveness to broadly based interests? And as Harlan Cleveland has long recognized, is it possible to have everyone in on the act and still have action?

Glenn E. Schweitzer
Director, Office of Toxic Substances
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency



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15 August 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director for Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Turner,

I had the great pleasure of hearing your speech at the 20th annual Aerospace Luncheon sponsored by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel on Friday, 12 August 1977.

I would welcome receiving a written copy of your speech, so that I may insure that I do not misinform my associates here at Aerojet ElectroSystems Company of what you stated during your speech.

I wish to thank you in advance for your kind consideration of this request.


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May 13, 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

We are delighted you can join us on Friday, 12 August 1977, at our 20th Annual Aerospace Luncheon. We are indeed fortunate to have you as our honored guest.

The luncheon will be held at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel in Beverly Hills, California. There will be a VIP Reception in the Champaign Room at 11:30 A.M. hosted by the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce before we proceed to luncheon in The Ballroom at noon. At the Reception we will be joined by the community leaders who form our Advisory Committee as well as other distinguished guests.

I will keep you informed as detailed plans progress, meanwhile, I shall look forward to the pleasure of meeting you.

Sincerely,

Paul E. Sullivan
President
Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce

mr

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *Paul Sullivan*)

UNCLASSIFIED

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

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13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
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Executive Secretary
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
(703) 351-7676

Herbert E. Hetu
Assistant for Public Affairs

8-15-77

MFR

Told Mr. Richards

DCI is already booked
for Navy Day - sorry
but we are forced to
decline —

HEH

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE Public Affairs

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Re attached invitation: Doris received a call from J. Permar Richards on 11 August; she referred the call to me, but when I tried to get him back, I got no answer. I placed the call again on 12 August; this time Richards was out but I was referred to Mr. Dan Michie (215: 925-8300). I told Mr. Michie that we had received the invitation but that DCI was out of the city and had not yet seen the letter. I said DCI would not be back until 19 August, so we probably would not have an answer until the week of 22 August. Mitchie said a delay until 19 August gives them problems because they need ample time to get letters out to sponsors. I said the best I could do for them would be to have Mr. Hetu call them when he returns next week but that I was not sure whether Mr. Hetu would be able to give them a firm answer since DCI had not seen the letter. Mitchie appreciated this offer of assistance, and I have left word with Mr. Hetu's office, asking that he call Mitchie or Richards on Monday. Suggest you check with Hetu to see what action he takes.

Date Barbara (12 Aug 77)

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NAVY LEAGUE of the UNITED STATES

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Executive Registry

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Telephone: 215-925-8300

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August 5, 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Stan:

I would like to send my belated congratulations on your new assignment.

I have been asked by the Philadelphia Council of the Navy League luncheon committee to write to ask if you could find time in your busy schedule to come to Philadelphia again and speak to our Navy Day Luncheon. If you recall, you came down from Newport to speak to us shortly after your duty with the Sixth Fleet. (It was so well received.)

I believe the last time we were together was the Naval War College when I was a guest for a most memorable session.

The luncheon will be held on Thursday, October 20, 1977, at the Sheraton Hotel Ballroom with a reception at 11:45 a.m., luncheon at 12:20 p.m., and adjournment at 2 p.m. promptly. Our normal attendance at these affairs is between 450 and 500 persons. Your speech should be approximately thirty minutes.

It is our sincere wish that you will be able to be with us to help celebrate Navy Day. I do hope to hear from you soon.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

J. Permar Richards, Jr.
President, Pennsylvania State
Navy League



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Admiral Stansfield Turner
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Post Office Box 92957, Los Angeles, California 90009, (213) 648-5000

August 12, 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

On behalf of the Board of Trustees, I should like most cordially to invite you to help us mark a milestone in the history of The Aerospace Corporation, Friday, September 9, 1977. At its Annual Meeting beginning on that date, the Board of Trustees will elect Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin as President to succeed Dr. Ivan A. Getting, who is retiring.

Most recently, Dr. Rechtin has been Chief Engineer of the Hewlett-Packard Company and earlier had been Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) and Principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense. As you know, Dr. Getting has been chief executive officer of the Corporation since its formation in 1960. Under his leadership, the company has grown from a concept to a national asset supporting the Air Force and other agencies of government in scientific and engineering matters.

We should be honored if you and your lady could be our guests at a reception and dinner at the Marriott Hotel, Airport and Century Boulevards, Los Angeles, California, beginning at 7:00 p.m. on September 9th in the El Pequeno Ballroom. Dress is to be informal.

Please let us know, telephone (213) 648-6803, if you can be with us for this major event in the life of The Aerospace Corporation.

Sincerely,

R. T. Jensen
R. T. Jensen
Secretary

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

Pub Affs