

Executive Registry
77-9506

Approved For Release 2004/03/16 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001100090006-8

17 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Lack of Notification on State's Request
for P-3 Flight in Connection with BRILLIG

Sir:

1. I have just received your note (Attachment A) and concur completely that you should have been consulted by the SDO before he agreed on behalf of CIA not to press for such a flight. In his behalf, however, I am including (Attachment B) his explanation of how he approached the problem. On the positive side, this is an excellent example of getting to know at what level you wish to be involved. I accept complete responsibility for the practice up until now which allowed our very capable Senior Duty Officers wide judgmental sway in these things. With the emergence of a broader and more tightly knit community organization under your leadership, it is clear that these procedures must be amended.

2. In order to insure that this is more closely controlled in the future, and until the arrival of a fully staffed and functioning NITC organization whose mission this probably will be, I have instructed the SDOs that henceforth any issue which involves the taking of a CIA position, particularly in the fast breaking field of manned reconnaissance flights, ~~that~~ you are to be immediately consulted. Where doubt exists in the mind of the SDO he is to immediately consult with me via secure phone and together we will bring in the other parties as appropriate, i.e., NFAC, Reconnaissance Group, RES, the DDO, the DDS&T and if appropriate other community parties. This consultation is simply a way of insuring that if there is any doubt in the minds of the Senior Duty Officers concerning further notification or coordination, I could then be a point of clarification on that particular issue.

3. In the past this role has been played variously by the DDI, the DDCI et al., during times before the Operations Center had reached its present status. With the emergence of NFAC, and its much greater emphasis on longer term analysis, we have naturally become more active in the current intelligence field. Additionally, with the arrival of NITC, the Center and myself, become the natural brokers between the producing and collecting worlds after hours in your behalf.

21 OCT 1977

*File - no
real complaint with
Art's action - we're
just setting it
ST*

[Redacted Signature]

Vincent J. Heyman
Director
CIA Operations Center

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21 Oct 77

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

0-5

DCI

ATTACHMENT A

OPERATIONS CENTER MORNING SELECT

14 October 1977

US/VIETNAM

14 OCT 1977

I. Although UPI reports that the US is pressing Hanoi for information about the yacht "Brillig" and the three Americans on board, we still have little information about the ship or its crew and passengers.

A. Although State sent an immediate message to Paris asking our embassy to contact the Vietnamese and advise them that we intend to fly a recon mission over the area where the ship's emergency radio has been located, the cable was not slugged for night action, and no response has been received.

II. A State request for a P-3 flight over the area--which would have flown within 15 miles of the Vietnamese coast --was withdrawn after DIA, Navy and CIA agreed that such a flight stood a good chance of provoking Vietnamese reaction unless the Vietnamese were advised that such a flight was planned.

A. The Vietnamese air force is on a high state of alert, probably because of the Cambodian border clashes and Vietnamese tracking of US flights has been noted in the past.

B. State will probably renew its request for a flight today.

*Go back to hand
see consulted*

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17 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CIA Operations Center

In regard to the circumstances surrounding the incident Friday early AM in which CIA was asked to give concurrence to a P-3 mission off the coast of Vietnam, I have the following comments:

A. I was informed by [redacted] that CIA concurrence in a P-3 flight was routine as long as there were no other objections;

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B. When I discovered that there were indeed other objections, I talked with those who voted no. I also checked with [redacted] who told me much the same thing as I got from DIA;

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C. I decided to inform JRC that CIA's evaluation of DIA's position was one of agreement. That is, we agreed with DIA that such a flight, without notification, would indeed pose a question of risk to the P-3.

D. Since State withdrew its request on the basis of DIA's objection, before I took any action--before I informed them of our agreement with DIA--I decided that no notification prior to OOB was necessary. I informed the DCI by sending him the Select at 0600, since he was leaving on a trip. In retrospect I should have consulted him immediately.

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[redacted]
[redacted]

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SDO

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		21 October 1977
TO: D/CIA Operations Center		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 (7)
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.