

Executive Registry
10-4616

June 12, 1958

over

Mr. John Richardson, Jr.
Twenty Five Broad Street
Eighteenth Floor
New York, New York

Dear John:

Many thanks for your note of June 10, 1958.

Through Karl Harr I was quite familiar with your interesting Polish project. It seems to me you have done an outstanding job in a very useful field.

Sincerely,

AWD:at

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JUN 14 8 40 AM '58

POLISH MEDICAL AID PROJECT

TWENTY FIVE BROAD STREET

NEW YORK 4, N. Y.

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CONFIDENTIAL

The purpose of this letter is to invite your firm to participate in a program of medical aid to Poland. Initiated by our industry, this is a program which can advance the national interest of the United States and the cause of freedom in general while it saves life and relieves human suffering.

The members of this committee have come together because we are convinced of the critical importance of this project. Cooperating organizations are the International Rescue Committee, CARE and the Committee on Medicine and Health of the People-to-People Foundation.

Our proposal concerns a people who are at the very center of the East-West conflict. After ten years of complete suppression and following the revelation of Stalin's crimes and the Poznan riots, the fiercely proud and patriotic people of Poland brought about political changes in 1956 which, to this day, make Poland by far the freest country within the Soviet sphere. Collective farms have been broken up; religion has been granted tolerance and respect; political arrests no longer take place; there is even limited freedom for private enterprise. The example of this relatively liberal political order in a strategically vital area constitutes a serious threat to the Soviet control system throughout Eastern Europe. This provides a deterrent to Soviet aggression worth many divisions of men in terms of our own national security.

For over a year now, the Gomulka regime has walked a political tightrope, pressured by the Kremlin toward the reimposition of Communist police discipline on one side, and resisted on the other by the Polish people, grimly determined to maintain at least the measure of individual liberty already secured.

In recent months the balance has tilted ominously in favor of Moscow. With Soviet prestige enormously increased by Sputnik and with the memory of Hungary growing dim in the world at large, the U.S.S.R. and its satellites have launched a systematic campaign of pressure and harassment against the Polish "revisionists." Mao-Tse-tung and many other Soviet bloc luminaries have publicly warned the Poles against the perils of accepting further American assistance.

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So far, Gomulka has apparently not conceded anything with respect to American aid. Our government has recently agreed with Poland to provide further credits, primarily for the purchase of agricultural surplus, machinery, etc. Acute though the economic problem is in Poland, however, the crux of the matter is not money but morale. In order to maintain their present limited degree of freedom, individuals in Poland -- writers, churchmen, doctors, teachers, politicians and ordinary people -- must constantly speak out, risking eventual punishment. We in America must find ways to demonstrate to such people that we care about them and what they stand for. Once the outspoken are silenced, once hopelessness takes the place of daring, there is little doubt that police terror will return to Poland, as it has to Hungary. If that time comes, America will have lost a great opportunity.

We believe that this situation provides the American drug industry with a unique challenge. There is today a critical shortage of medicines in Poland and a keen public awareness of the need. Until the time when domestic production can begin to meet minimum needs, Poland must rely on imports, principally from the West -- imports drastically limited by the shortage of foreign exchange.

A program of private aid amounting to \$2 million, at manufacturer's prices, in the form of acutely needed medicines supplied over a twelve-month period, would go far toward meeting minimum needs. It would also constitute dramatic and tangible evidence of American public concern for these 28 million allies in the struggle for freedom. We ask your help in making this possible.

Medicines donated will be shipped by CARE to its warehouse in Gdynia, Poland, and from there to recipient hospitals under the supervision of committees of practicing physicians of outstanding character and reputation, already established in Warsaw, Poznan and Cracow. The Polish Ministry of Health has agreed (1) not to reduce the level of imports of pharmaceuticals from the West, (2) to cooperate fully with CARE and the committees of physicians and (3) to authorize "Gift of the American People" labelling.

The appropriate departments in Washington, including the White House, have given this project enthusiastic support.

A list of needed drugs, marked to indicate the most critical items, is enclosed, together with a memorandum covering certain technical phases of the project. Contributions of medicines may be made immediately or at any time during 1958. We sincerely hope that your total contribution will constitute a generous proportion of the \$2 million over-all objective. This is a big order, but we are convinced that the success of this program is important enough to our country to justify it. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

Francis Boyer Theodore G. Klumpp

P.S. In view of the fact that this letter deals with sensitive areas of public policy, may we ask you to treat it as confidentially as possible.

Enc. Approved For Release 2002/02/13 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003800180035-6

POLISH MEDICAL AID PROJECT

Supplementary Information

1. Safeguards. The principal safeguards against misuse of the medicines are: (a) direct shipments to using institutions under supervision of CARE personnel; (b) allocations of medicines among institutions in accordance with needs by committees of prominent physicians; (c) shipments to Poland to be made over a period of twelve months, so that they can be interrupted at any time if any doubt arises.
2. Public Relations. There will be no public announcement of the program in the United States until after it is well underway. Thereafter, information will initially be released only in response to inquiries based on reports in the Polish press and from American correspondents in Poland. Any such comment will be very restrained, stressing the humanitarian aspects.

It is believed that this approach will not only minimize any risk to the success of the program but will also ultimately produce the optimum impact in the United States through editorial comment, magazine articles, etc.

3. Tax Status. Contributions will be made to CARE and as such will be fully deductible for Federal Income Tax purposes.
4. Shipping. Contributions should be shipped to CARE, c/o Mack Warehouse, Pier 38 South, Delaware Wharves, Delaware and Queens St., Philadelphia, Pa., marked "Polish Medical Aid."
5. Additional Information. All inquiries with respect to technical and other aspects of the program should be addressed to Mr. John Richardson, Jr., 18th Floor, 25 Broad Street, New York (HANover 2-5540) or to his associate in the medical aid project, Miss Barbara Nagorski, International Rescue Committee, 255 Fourth Avenue, New York (OREgon 4-4200). Mr. Richardson, a director of the International Rescue Committee, travelled to Poland to explore the feasibility of the program last fall.

POLISH MEDICAL AID PROJECT

Medicines Needed in Poland
(Capitalized items are most urgently required)

<u>Name</u> (Generic or Trade)	<u>Amount Needed</u>	<u>Suggested Dosage</u>
ERYTHROMYCIN USP	1,200 kg.	0.1 gm. & 0.2 gm tabs
AUREOMYCIN	2,300 kg.	0.25 gm. caps
TERRAMYCIN	2,000 kg.	250 mg. caps
VIOAMYCIN	400 kg.	1 gm. vials
NEOMYCIN	450 kg.	0.5 gm. tabs
SIGMAMYCIN	400 kg.	250 mg. caps
Tetracycline	unlimited	
Chloromycetin	"	
Neomycin Sulfate USP	"	
Streptomycin	"	
Combiotic	"	
Achromycin	"	
Myostatin	"	
Dihydrostreptomycin Sulfate Injection USP	"	
Furadantin	"	
Furacin Ointment	"	
Furacin Soluble Dressing	"	
SEROMYCIN	1,200 kg.	0.25 pulvules
P A S	unlimited	
I N H	"	
Rimifon	"	

Medicines Needed in Poland - 2

<u>Name</u>	<u>Amount Needed</u>	<u>Suggested Dosage</u>
IRGAPYRIN (or butapyrin)	1.5 million	5 ml. amps
	1.5 million	0.2 mg. tabs
BUTAZOLIDIN	600 thousand	3 ml. amps
Solganol	unlimited	
PREDNISONE	3 million	5 mg. tabs
HYDROCORTISONE	120 thou.	5 ml. amps
Prednisolone	unlimited	
ACTH	"	
Sigmagen	"	
Proloid - Thyroglobulin extract	"	
Oxytocin Injection	"	
Depo-Testadiol	"	
Protamine Zinc Insulin injection USP	"	
Isophane Insulin injection USP	"	
Insulin injection USP	"	
Orinase	"	
MEPROBAMATE	4 million	400 mg. tabs
FRENQUEL	4 million	20 mg. tabs
ATARAX	600 thou.	tabs
Meprolone	unlimited	
Thorazine	"	
Sparine	"	
Ultran	"	

Medicines Needed in Poland - 3

<u>Name</u>	<u>Amount Needed</u>	<u>Suggested Dosage</u>
HYDERGINE	250 thou.	amps & vials
APRESOLINE	700 thou.	tabs
RESERPINE	3 million 10 million	0.1 mg. tabs 0.25 mg. tabs
DIAMOX	1,300 thou.	tabs
Diuril	unlimited	tabs
DIGITALIS GLYCOSIDE	1,400 thou. 200 thou.	0.25 mg. tabs 2 ml. amps
ACYLANID	2 million 80 thou.	0.2 mg. tabs 10 ml. vials
Digoxin	unlimited	
Digitoxin USP	"	
Levophed	"	
Aminophyllin	"	tabs
Theophyllin	"	amps
KHELLIN	650 thou.	25 mg. tabs
Phenergan	unlimited	
Benadryl	"	
Chlor-Trimeton	"	
Sandostene	"	
Heparin Sodium	"	amps
VITAMIN A	2 million	caps
VITAMIN A+D	40 million	caps
VITAMIN D ²	400 thou.	vials, amps
VITAMIN B COMPLEX	90 million	tabs
MULTIVITAMIN	150 million	tabs
AMINO ACIDS	100 thou.	500 ml. vials

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MR. FRANCIS BOYER

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SMITH, KLINE & FRENCH
LABORATORIES

MEMORANDUM

April 22, 1958

Co-Chairman

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President

WINTHROP LABORATORIES

DR. LOUIS H. BAUER

Secretary General

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1. We feel that you should have the benefit of the enclosed article on Poland which appeared in the April 12 issue of THE SATURDAY EVENING POST. It is an interesting and provocative account of the current political and psychological situation in Poland -- the situation which makes private American aid so extraordinarily significant.
2. Also enclosed is a memorandum of questions and answers on the Project which it is hoped will be helpful in your consideration of the Project.
3. Some firms have asked whether they can make a contribution even though they do not have available any of the products on the list enclosed with the Committee's letter. The answer is that in many cases this is not only possible but could be very helpful. The basic list of needs is not exhaustive. If such firms could make available other items, preferably in the same general categories as those appearing on the list, they should let the Committee know and we will be happy to advise them whether particular items they wish to offer can be usefully employed in Poland.
4. Initial response to the Committee's letter has been most encouraging. It would be helpful for planning purposes if those firms which intend to participate in the Project, but have not yet communicated with the Committee, would do so as soon as they conveniently can, even though the precise form and amount of the contribution may not have been determined. This is of special importance since Mr. John Richardson, Jr., Secretary of the Committee, intends to leave for Poland at the earliest possible date to supervise final arrangements for the distribution of the pharmaceuticals.

Theodore G. Klumpp, M.D.
Co-Chairman

Enc.

Why Russia Has Poland Trouble

For generations the Poles have hated the Russians, and they still do. Even now, they make threatening noises at their conquerors. A Post editor reports from Warsaw.

By James P. O'Donnell

"The gentle French dreamer Fourier predicted
That one day the oceans would run with lemonade.
Our leaders drank the sea water,
And they shouted: 'It tastes like lemonade.'
Then quietly they crept to their homes
To retch and vomit."

(Comment on Communism by Polish Communist poet, Adam Wazyk)

WARSAW.

It's late winter, Warsaw, and cold outside. In one spacious midtown square, where the rough cast-iron statue of Dzerzhinski glowers down on shivering passers-by, it always seems ten degrees colder. Dzerzhinski, the ice-cold revolutionary, is a half-forgotten ghoul today. But once he was a dread name that made even Lenin and Stalin wince.

Why Dzerzhinski, and why here? The Poles are loath to admit it, but Bolshevik Feliks Dzerzhinski was born a Pole. He was the first secret-police chief of the Cheka, which became the O.G.P.U., which became the N.K.V.D. and now is the M.V.D. This ugly statue, like the nearby skyscraper Palace of Culture, is a gift from the Soviet people to the Polish people. In the same sense that the wooden horse was a gift from the Greeks to the people of Troy.

This monster monument is as popular in Warsaw as would be a memorial to Oliver Cromwell in Dublin, General Sherman in Atlanta, Georgia, or Benedict Arnold at West Point. If there is any form of humanity patriotic Poles despise more than Russians, it is Poles who do the dirty work for the Russians—Dzerzhinski a generation ago or Marshal Rokossovsky just yesterday.

In the sullen, restless climate of opinion in Poland there are many elements and emotions neither clear nor simple. It would be false to try to make them so. It is best to begin this report with an accent on simple glandular hatred, the historical Polish hatred of all things Russian except vodka, come Cossack or come commissar.

To miss this simple truth is to miss everything. It boils up in every discussion, has provoked one recent explosion and threatens another. Often it hits the visitor in the face like a spanking breeze off the Vistula. Recently, trying to mend some prestige fences, the Soviet Ministry of Culture sent to Warsaw one of the best plays in the Moscow repertory, a modern problem drama by the poet Mayakovsky. Up went the opening curtain, revealing the fine living room of a well-heeled Moscow citizen—leather-bound books, a warm fireplace, a TV set and a resplendent new electric refrigerator. Peals of mocking laughter swept the Warsaw first-night audience. When the perplexed Russian director came out front to discover what had gone wrong this time, the haughty Poles were only too keen to tell him:

"Today, we may be too poor to afford that icebox, but we are civilized enough

to know it belongs in the kitchen, not the parlor."

Almost all Polish jokes about the Ivans have this lace-curtain fringe, variants on the basic theme that the Russian pig is unwanted in the Polish parlor.

As an American reporter, only in Turkey have I ever before met such violent revulsion against the Russians as a people, a popular vocabulary in which the words "Soviet," "Russian" and "Communist" are a single anathema. The Poles, the Irish of the Slavs, are much more volatile and loquacious than the Turks, and Turkey at least lies outside the Soviet sphere of influence. But geography keeps Poland within that sphere, semi-demi free. This is the terrible danger. Poland is a satellite wobbling on its own axis, propelled by an intense desire to seek a national orbit of its own, to explode itself into freedom.

In the Polish rebellion of October,

1956, what Radio Warsaw called "Our Springtime in October," the wrath of the people demanded, and got, the removal of the pseudo-Pole Marshal Rokossovsky as Commander in Chief of the Polish Army. Students and workers in Warsaw almost toppled Dzerzhinski too. They scaled the pedestal and smeared his hands with paint, blood red. The despised statue, like the whole Communist regime in Poland, teetered, but it did not fall. Why it did not fall is already part of the modern legend of Warsaw.

The time was early November, 1956. The whole world had tuned in on the turbulent October in Warsaw, the stirring and heart-lifting spectacle of a captive people clanking loose many of their shackles. Suddenly, world attention and Soviet malice were directed south, to the more dramatic and bloodier revolt of the Hungarians.

In those days, Warsaw and Budapest were quivering on almost the same frequency—it was sympathetic vibration. The rebellious spirit of Posnan and Warsaw had inspired the Magyars to try to go farther, faster. During the whole Hungarian upheaval the telegraph and telephone lines from Budapest to Warsaw remained in full operation. Polish reporters—three of whom fought with the Hungarians—filed the fullest running stories. Poland was first to hear the bad news from Budapest, when it finally turned bad.

As Soviet tanks moved on that bitter November fourth to crush the Hungarian freedom fighters, all Warsaw seethed with frustrated fraternal fury. By midnight a menacing crowd had assembled downtown, determined to do something, anything, to let off steam. They started to warm up by chanting patriotic songs

laced with virulent anti-Soviet slogans: "Russian SS!" "Ivan Go Home!" "Katyn, Katyn, Katyn"—in memory of the 10,000 Polish officers murdered in Poland's Katyn Forest, in 1940, by the Soviet secret police. Soon the idea of toppling Dzerzhinski was broached. As one group moved on the statue, another set off to get crowbars and battering rams to storm the Soviet Embassy.

About midway between these two magnets of popular wrath stands a small Roman Catholic church. Word of the crowd's daring but hare-brained purpose was relayed to the archepiscopal palace of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, himself just out of prison. A cool churchman in a nation of born hotheads, the awakened cardinal hopped quickly out of bed, slipped into his red-piped cassock, was driven hastily to the church, and began saying one of the most unorthodox low masses in ecclesiastical history. (The time was now 3 A.M.) This symbolic and mollifying act, by a cardinal with a native knowledge of Polish psychology, managed to deflect and calm the maddening crowd. By such a thin thread did fearful decisions hang in the balance, and the thread is still thin today. Luckily, the cardinal is still as cool.

Recently I stood with a group of Warsaw students in front of the statue of Dzerzhinski. It impressed me as an awkward object for anyone to topple. But engineer students of Warsaw Polytech hastened to assure me to the contrary. After a measured study of stress and strain, they have decided "the weak spot is in the ankles." These Warsaw students—there are 27,000 in the capital city—use their slip sticks and logarithm tables for more than academic homework. It is inspiring, but more than a bit frightening, to realize with what crazy courage these young Polish Davids gaze straight into the eyes of the Soviet Goliath.

While the rest of the world marvels at the triumph of Soviet technicians in launching the Sputniks, and Khrushchev boasts of shooting the moon, it is time perhaps to take a good inner look at this nagging satellite problem right on the ground. Poland is not on the moon. And today more than engineers ponder the question: "How strong are Dzerzhinski's ankles?"

Which is another way of asking: "How long can Gomulka last?" For eighteen swiveling months now, this plucky little Communist has been defying all the laws of political gravity, still aloft as the boss of a bankrupt Communist Party and state apparatus, buoyed up by the known anti-Communist sentiments of 95 per cent of the Polish people. Washington is coy about underwriting him, Moscow hesitates to shoot him down.

When a plodder becomes a tightrope walker, the suspense can be nerve-racking. Wladyslaw Gomulka was born to be lonely. Today he still walks alone, the tightrope over a chasm, and the end of the act may well be sudden and tragic. When he looks around today in Warsaw at his own nine-man Politburo, he sees the faces of six men who betrayed him once before—when Stalin ordered his purge in 1948—the craven faces of men waiting for the cock to crow a second time. He speaks for the Poles on one issue only, sovereignty, a curious compact blessed by a Roman Catholic cardinal. Gomulka, coming out of jail, met the Polish people on the march toward national freedom. Both made a deal in the middle of the road. Poland today is a halfway house, but the middle of the road is a perilous place to build a house.

Poland today is half slave, half free, a twilight paradise for those who enjoy paradox, but a dismal day-to-day purgatory for the Polish people themselves. On the economic front, which many regard as critical, things are not much better—or worse—than in 1956; which is to say, they are desperate.

Poland is still a police state, but with the cops at the moment engaged in arresting their former chiefs and bringing them to trial, in a legal manner, for "crimes against the people," which were exactly that. Atheist Communism is still the official state doctrine, but the state has thrown open school doors for voluntary instruction in the Catholic religion. Let the church, as Gomulka put it dourly, "go its doctrinaire Roman way." The press is still hobbled, but the censor spends most of his time blue-penciling anti-Russian and pro-American nuggets that wily Polish journalists and cartoonists work all day to slip into their copy.

Elections are still rigged, but Western reporters covering last year's *Sejm* (Parliament) election called it the most honest phony election ever held in Communist Eastern Europe. Marxist-Leninism is still the official economic religion of the state. Yet the Ministry of Agriculture is busily engaged in dismantling collective farms—fewer than 1700 of some 12,000 remain—and this year the Polish peasant has more freedom to plant what crops he chooses than many peasants in Western Europe. Freedom of speech, which for several giddy months was universal, is still substantial. Nobody today can mount a soapbox in Constitution Square and denounce Gomulka, Khrushchev or even John Foster Dulles. This must be done in a café or cabaret, and before fewer than 100 listeners.

What, then, is Gomulkaism? Certainly it is something new under the sun. When this stubborn Pole was wafted back into power in October, 1956, his cheeks still pale with the pallor of Stalinist prisons, many in the Western world welcomed Gomulka as a second Tito. But this analogy is in many ways false. Poland is enveloped in Soviet military power, like the ham in a sandwich.

First and foremost, there is geography. The rebel Tito twitted Stalin from the relatively safe side of the Iron Curtain, from outside the post-1945 stamping grounds of the Red Army. Gomulka's Poland lies right across the supply lines of the powerful Red Army in East Germany. Politically, Tito at home is the most orthodox and leftist of Marxist-Leninists, running a tight, personal satrapy perhaps more monolithic today than Big Brother, the Soviet Union. Finally, there is the utter contrast in character. Tito is a blend of the Balkan bandit with the peacock strut of a Mussolini and the wassailing ways of a Hermann Goering. Gomulka is a frank, plodding, almost ascetic man. Nor is Gomulka's Poland today a tyranny. Citizens and writers complain openly about restraints on freedom, itself a real freedom.

In terms of world Communism today—that secular religion—Tito is only a schismatic, taking advantage of his own geography, whereas in the colorless but courageous Gomulka we may be seeing the emergence of an authentic Communist heretic. Viewed in this light, many of the paradoxes of Poland today, many of Gomulka's seeming strange actions, are not so much strange as agonizing. What is often forgotten is that this man Gomulka is not a Pole who just happened to be a Communist. He is a lifelong Communist who happens to be a Pole, and sat ten years in four Polish jails for his beliefs. What makes Gomulka interesting, indeed what makes him possible at this stage of history, is precisely his Communism.

What is unique in Gomulka's career is that he is the only prominent Communist in the Soviet sphere who had the anathema of heresy hurled at him by Stalin himself (1948), survived by the skin of his teeth, and returned to a position of power. Hence the high drama of his violent dialogue with Khrushchev and Company. Gomulka, Gomulka, for that was a name that belonged in the same East European dead-letter box with the Czech Slansky, the Hungarian Rajk, the Bulgarian Kostov—those long-gone East European martyrs.

Yet there he stood. Wladyslaw Gomulka is the wily cat of the Communist movement, who has used up only seven of his nine lives. He is also the true example of Nikita Khrushchev's parable: "A man takes on the dignity of the job to which he is elected." In October, 1956, heretic Gomulka had just been elected by the terrified Polish Politburo to tell the visiting Moscow cabinet the facts of life about Soviet imperialism. Gomulka took off both gloves and threw them down as gauntlets.

The full text of Gomulka's philippic has never been published, but enough is known in Warsaw today to make it one of the most damning indictments of Soviet rapacity ever uttered. Khrushchev himself, earlier that same year, had denounced Stalinism, but with dialectical precision he was most careful to portray Stalin not as a product of the Soviet system, but as a perverter of it. Nor was there any mention of Stalin's crimes beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. On this crucial point, Gomulka turned Khrushchev's flank. He argued that as far as the Polish nation was concerned, Stalinism was not a perversion of the system, it was the system itself and for several hours he read from his long, cost-accounted list of cross Soviet violations of Polish sovereignty:

The U.S.S.R. had cheated Poland out of her 15 per cent share in German reparations, promised at Potsdam, but carted off to Russia.

Soviet factory and industrial removals from Polish Silesia, claimed as German assets, were flagrant industrial piracy.

Forced exports were a third form of plunder. Millions of tons of coal, Poland's most precious national wealth, had been paid for by Moscow at \$3.00 a ton when the world price had risen to \$20.00.

Soviet trade officials had invented rubber rubles, a two-way stretch allowing

Russia to buy cheap and sell dear in Poland.

The Polish Six Year Plan, written in Moscow, distorted Polish heavy industry to serve the Soviet war economy. Polish plants had to produce steel plate for North Korean tanks, hence no cranes were available for the rebuilding of Warsaw.

Stalinism had brought utter madness to the Polish countryside. Soviet designs were forced on Polish tractor plants, as if Polish small holdings could be farmed like steppes. Poland's once-rich fields became bread factories to feed the mouths of the resident Red Army, while Poles in towns and cities had to import grain from Canada.

And finally, crimes against humanity. Russia's "little Berias" had taken over the Polish police, kidnaped, jailed and murdered tens of thousands of Polish citizens in purges ordered by the paranoid Stalin. The prominent victims of this terrorism included Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces Marian Spychalski, and Gomulka himself—then Deputy Premier, now First Secretary of the party. Gomulka ended the confrontation scene on a note of eloquent modesty: "Our Polish cup has been filled to the brim, and over."

Gomulka stood up to Khrushchev with his back to the wall, and for a while it looked as if there was no wall there. But at least there were 28,000,000 Poles there, like Gomulka himself filled from head to toe with a ferocious patriotism. It was Khrushchev who was forced to flinch. After this act of supreme courage is it likely that Gomulka, who won such a showdown victory over Moscow in 1956—"Accept the Polish road to socialism or accept chaos"—would willingly betray his own victory? It is not likely. Having crossed the Rubicon, what then made Gomulka hesitate to continue the march?

Realism and fear, fear of the iron Soviet shadow. As one pro-Gomulka member of the Polish Politburo put it, "We have no Himalayas." Gomulka himself, in a grim appeal for steady nerves, warned his people, "One false step and Poland will be crossed off the map of Europe." Everyone knew he was not talking of an invasion by the Swiss. Since October, 1956, Soviet policy toward

Poland has been shrewd and even sinister, but it has not been mysterious. The short-term policy has been to tolerate this heretic to prevent out-and-out anti-Communist upheaval. The long-term policy is to export Gomulka just enough rope so he can hang himself.

In this dreadful game of chess, being played over the prostrate body of the Polish nation, our Western response has been feeble and confusing. Common sense could have told us one thing about Gomulka. A hero does not bug out in the very next battle. If Gomulka has been bending his neck and sometimes his knee in the direction of Moscow, someone is twisting his arm. That someone is Khrushchev. Meanwhile our Western statesmen see a man wrestling with a bear, a bear we know is our mortal enemy, so from time to time they send the man peanuts. Poland has been given less aid than Fascist Spain, medieval Jordan or even Nasser's Egypt.

Today it may already be too late to save the Gomulka experiment. It is dismal to record the ebbing of the high tide of real freedom this country reached in October, 1956. Most symbolic, since a free press could have been the megaphone for broaching other reforms, has been the remuzzling of the press. And most ironic, because it was the very journal that sparked his own ascent to power, was Gomulka's decision to ban Po Prostu (Plain Speaking) for plain speaking. To avoid giving offense to the Soviets, Gomulka has taken to censoring his own speeches, and now releases trimmed versions through the official news agency, properly called PAP.

The drama of Po Prostu was perky while it lasted. In the bad old Stalinist days, Po Prostu had been just another turgid party-line weekly, circulation

28,000. It was edited by a group of young Communist students and intellectuals, an elite trained and subsidized by the regime. Slowly—and this was the true beginning of the October revolution—the editors became patriotic and angry young men, "the enraged ones." Circulation shot up to 150,000 as they turned their searchlights into the dark corners of the Polish national house. When Gomulka came to power, these young hot-shots looked like his boys, and as exciting as if the editors of the Harvard Crimson had taken over Pravda.

But with more courage than discretion the muckraking editors kept the searchlight burning. After a short honeymoon with the new regime, they went after Gomulka's failure to purge known Stalinists, his soft-talk on the Soviet Union, the mumgery in the Polish Parliament, crooks and plunderers in the national industries, universal black marketing, the national spree of drunkenness, wild inflation, the paralysis of production. Their last crack, in the issue that never hit the streets, was a true Parthian shot: "For Stalinist chaos, Gomulka has substituted pure Polish chaos."

The sad sequel shows perhaps the true mood of today's Poland, where the angry young men—called "Revisionists"—are left to gasp like mackerel on the strand, their brave ideas mouthfuls of air. When Po Prostu was closed down in October, 1957, the protests did not approach the intensity and fervor of the "bread-and-freedom" revolt that swept the major cities of Poland in 1956. It was only a straw blaze. This time the disgruntled auto workers at the Zeran plant did not march into downtown Warsaw. They are keeping their hidden arms for another day. Sydney Gruson, New York Times correspondent in Warsaw, wrapped up the whole story in one sharp lead: "The

same week that Po Prostu was banned, the price of butter shot up 25 per cent and all Poland grumbled. But only a handful of students protested the banning of the crusading journal." Freedom without bread or freedom without butter on the bread is not enough.

The Polish national mood today is neither wrath nor hope, but almost universal frustration. This is not so much hostility to Gomulka as glum realization that he and Poland are caught in a bind. In Warsaw student cellar cabarets, which a year ago were alive with brilliant political skits, the atmosphere today is weary and cynical. Most students have turned to American jazz and bop—"See you later, deviator"—imported French existentialism, and some droll skits of their own, including a gal philosophy student who does a mock strip tease while reciting pages from Spinoza's Ethics. Late in the evening, a student dressed as a clown comes on stage pulling a seeming endless rope. Asked if the rope has any end, he replies, "No, it's been cut off." A student next to me translates: "He means it's been cut off—like our Gomulka revolution."

But the story is not so simple as that. To any outsider coming here with experience of other Communist countries—the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia—the very air is different. The Poles may be leashed, but they have freedom to bark. Moreover, four major reforms remain to this day intact—the liberation of the Roman Catholic Church, the defanging of the secret police, the return of the land to the men who till it, the Polish Army under Polish command. These are not trifles.

Consider Polish Communism's retreat in the battle with the Church for the minds of Poland's youth. True, a priest is not

yet free to preach that Communism is the opium of the people, but he can preach the 8th Commandment—"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor"—an effective way of saying the same thing. On Corpus Christi, Polish colonels now march the troops to Mass, banners high proclaiming the Virgin Mary "Queen of Poland." And, in the hearts of this most Catholic of peoples, she is.

Polish peasants—still 60 per cent of the population—are working today like demons to dismantle the collectives, plow under the state farms and build again their own fences around their rewon land. This was one of Gomulka's most daring gambles. He restored capitalism to the countryside, hoping to save socialism in the cities.

The third sweeping reform was the curbing of the secret-police spooks. No one in Poland today fears that knock on the door. By throwing away this instrument of persuasion, Gomulka, the Communist, abandoned what many people regard as the true fulcrum of Communist power. Since the economic history of man began, there have been but two known ways to get a rather donkeylike mankind to do a full day's work—the carrot or the stick, free or slave labor.

Gomulka, to loud popular hosannas, tossed away the stick, but he just did not have many carrots to go round. This is really what brought the Polish landslide toward liberty to a crunching halt. With strikes no longer a crime against the state, the public transport workers of Lodz soon voted to strike. They wanted to raise their wretched \$9.00 for a sixty-hour week to the national level of \$11.00. But this, in turn, would have touched off a general round of wage increases not matched by production increases, hence an even wilder inflation. Gomulka

resorted to desperate remedies. He broke the strike, then turned round and slapped a 15 per cent national tax on vodka consumption, creating a special fund to aid the Lodz workers. The workers' response was sardonically voiced by one of them: "Now when I throw a roaring drunk off my tram, he beats his breast and says he was just drinking for my social security."

In the west it is often asked whether Gomulka is moving to the left or to the right. From close up in Poland, it merely looks as if he is moving warily in a vicious circle. To his right are the old Stalinists, now called "Conservatives," not exactly House of Commons types. To his left are the "Revisionists," a blanket term for intellectuals ranging from left-Communists still arguing over the beard of the prophet Marx, to fallen-away Communists eager to move a long way toward social democracy. Most Revisionists want their former idol Gomulka to compound his heresy—put the state above the party, put the Parliament above both state and party, take this idea from Mao, that from Tito, ignore Moscow. Maybe, proposed Communist deputy Julian Hochfeld in all candor, it might be wise to wipe out the present Communist Party and form two new ones, so there could be livelier elections and debates.

After some months' hesitation, Gomulka decided he must continue to govern through the instrument of the party. This may have been an instinctive reflex out of his own past, but it was mightily re-enforced by his knowledge that Moscow would never tolerate a dismantling of the Polish Workers' Party (Communist). Yet as an instrument of power this party was just about bankrupt, and the people knew it. Watching Communists trying to operate without the bloodhounds of the secret police is like watching the New York Yankees trying to play baseball without bats.

At the top, including the majority of the Politburo and most of the ministers, are several old Stalinist nostalgics—called the Natolin group—whom Gomulka did not quite dare sack. What restrains them from mounting a *putsch* against the Gomulka New Deal is their memory of October, 1956, and the Polish people's memory. They would hang from lamp-posts.

At the bottom of the party, the rank and file, the situation is utterly laughable. Before 1945 the true card-carrying membership of the Polish Communist Party was about 20,000. In the next twelve years it swelled to 1,200,000. Gomulka has started a weeding-out process to locate the true believers. That should get the number down well below 20,000.

In the middle, as in all totalitarian parties, are the *apparatchiks*, the alleged backbone of the party. In Poland this type is best represented by the bully-boys who become "district secretaries," regional managers and sometimes mayors. These are the worst scalawags of all, today acting like hermit crabs in search of new shells. Born with two left hands, ever since they lost their power to flog the citizenry they have taken to milking them.

Even a random reading of the Polish press, social items that slip past the censor, reveals the mayor of Krakow up on a

charge of running a hot-car racket; the chief architect of Posnan selling public housing at Miami rates; the director of the meat-processing plant in Elblag and the Party Secretary of Gdansk running black-market resort-restaurants; the MOTOIMPORTI branch of the Ministry of Foreign Trade raffling off all imported motorcycles; the mayor of Olsztyn (Allenstein) cornering the dairy market and opening up a string of milk bars; the deputy mayor of Szczecin (Stettin) arrested as the chief of a holdup gang. The wife of a minister in Warsaw controls a bevy of what in wicked capitalist countries are known as call girls. Restoring capitalism in Poland someday should not be too difficult. The Communist Party faithful are already leading the parade.

This Gargantuan graft is but part of the Gomulka inheritance. Worse by far is the distortion of the fragile Polish economy. The Soviets, in their twelve years of economic tyranny in Poland, bled their anemic ally like vampires from the Dracula country. Cleverly, Russian experts linked almost every Polish factory, as supplier or supplied, with the master plan for Soviet industry. Ships the Poles have been building on the Baltic are designed for Russian engines and Russian waters; the textile industry of Lodz today gets its cotton out of Egypt via Russia; the Zeran auto plant was modeled on the Soviet Pobeda factory, and must get its parts from the east; the URSUS tractor plant produces giant tractors with Russian tank engines; the giant and cost-crazy steel complex at Nowa Huta—New Steel Town, near Krakow—gets 70 per cent of its iron ore not from Sweden, which would be better and cheaper, but from Krivoi Rog in the Soviet Union. The imperialism, in short, was built in. Every time Moscow wants to bring pressure on Warsaw the iron-ore shipments to Nowa Huta just do not arrive.

Two can play at this game. We Americans can help stymie the blackmail. Here indeed is a clue to the kind of American aid that would be most effective, most welcome to the Polish people, and which does not involve vast sums. We have as much obvious interest in shoring up the Gomulka experiment as Moscow has in undermining it. When they attempt to wring political concessions from Poland by holding up iron ore, or cotton, or grain, we can ship these items, quickly and cheaply. In this kind of economic warfare, we and our now prosperous Western European allies have most of the blue chips; we should be better at it than the Soviets. This is probably the only effective way to save the Gomulka regime—the alternative is an explosion that every sane observer here dreads.

History seldom offers ideal choices. To argue that Poland is still Communist or that Gomulka is not a white-vest democrat may be to miss the main chance. As far as today's Poland is concerned, it is a bit like standing on our lofty western bank, and telling a drowning man how much we dislike his gulping so much water. It would be a blot on the American record if that struggling Pole did drown.

THE END

CONFIDENTIAL

POLISH MEDICAL AID PROJECT

Questions and Answers

1. Why should we help a communist government?

The Project will not help the Polish government in any way. Medicines will be distributed outside of Polish government channels to public hospitals only under the supervision of CARE and committees of independent Polish physicians. The government will not reduce the level of imports as a result of the program. Unlike U.S. government programs of aid to Poland, the Medical Aid Project is not intended to have, and will not have, any effect on the Polish economy. As pointed out in the Committee's letter, the Polish people, although within the communist bloc, are in a position to influence directly events both within Poland and in neighboring countries.

2. What assurance is there that the Soviet Union will not crack down on Poland, making it impossible to carry out the program?

There can be no such assurance. One of the primary purposes of the Project is to contribute to Polish morale, thereby making it less likely that the Soviet Union will risk such a move.

3. How can we be sure that the medicines will not be diverted to the Soviet Union or elsewhere?

Shipments will be made over a twelve-month period with no large inventory in Poland at any time. Medicines will be distributed by CARE from its warehouse in Gdynia. If the slightest doubt arises as to the use of the medicines, shipments will be stopped pending investigation. CARE as well as certain Catholic agencies and others have been distributing relief of various kinds in Poland for some time with no problems of any consequence arising.

4. Won't the Project tend to cut into the market of manufacturers already selling or planning to sell in Poland?

No. No reduction in planned imports will be made as a result of the Project. On the other hand, since the Project is important for the public health of Poland, it is evident that the Ministry of Health will be favorably disposed toward participating companies.

5. What assurance is there that the Polish public will learn about the gifts?

Experience to date with the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation and CARE programs indicates that full press coverage in Poland is most probable. Even if there should be no press coverage, thorough investigation of this question in Poland makes it quite clear that word of mouth information from thousands of doctors and patients would be fully as effective. The shortage is so well known and the need so widely felt that the source of any relief could not be hidden. In addition, "Gift of the American People" or other appropriate labelling will be used on all packages.

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6. If it is so important, why doesn't our government provide medicines as part of its aid to Poland?

The government programs thus far have not included finished consumers goods. In the most recent program, \$1 million was, however, allotted to medical equipment. Our government feels, as does the Committee, that aid in the form of medicines will be far more effective if contributed on a people to people basis.

7. Will there not be a psychological reaction in Poland against America at the end of the twelve-month period of distribution?

In the first place, the Polish pharmaceutical industry is rapidly moving to fill minimum needs. Secondly, no one in Poland would expect American private firms to go on donating medicines for an indeterminate period. Incidentally, it is not unreasonable to expect that the Polish government will feel some incentive to increase its allocation of foreign exchange for purchases of pharmaceuticals when this program is completed.

8. What is the source of the list of drugs which the Committee says are needed in Poland?

The list has been built up from many Polish medical sources. The capitalized items are those which both individual physicians and Ministry of Health officials believe to be most important.

9. How are the transportation and other costs to be covered?

Efforts will be made to raise the necessary funds from private sources to reimburse the International Rescue Committee and CARE for costs incurred in the program.

10. Why should the pharmaceutical industry bear the whole burden of this program?

There is no one source of funds which conceivably could be made available to purchase medicines on the scale needed for this program. Furthermore, it is considerably less expensive for the industry to donate the medicines than it would be for anyone else to donate the money to purchase them.