

SECRET

DDP 4-1396

Executive Registry
10-6373

22 AUG 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
Chief, Psychological and Paramilitary Staff

SUBJECT: Proposed Acknowledgment of Receipt of the
Free World Review

1. This memorandum suggests action on the part of the DCI. Such requested action is contained in paragraph 2.
2. Attached are two letters for the DCI's signature acknowledging receipt of a copy of the Free World Review.



International Organizations Division

STATINTL

STATINTL

Attachments:

- 1 - Letter for DCI signature to Mr. Stephen Sisa
- 2 - Letter for DCI signature to Dr. Charles Lowry
- 3 - Letter to DCI from Dr. Charles Lowry - (ER 10-6373)

cc: DDCI

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Signature Recommended:

STATINTL

[Redacted Signature]

for Chief, PP

27 August 1958
(Date)

STATINTL

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[Redacted Signature]

(for) Deputy Director (Plans)

25 Aug 58
(Date)

SECRET


Dr. Charles Wesley Lowry, Chairman
Foundation for Religious Action in
the Social and Civil Order
112 Dupont Circle Building
Washington 6, D. C.

Dear Dr. Lowry:



Mr. Dulles has asked me to thank you for
sending him the copy of the Free World Review
which he found interesting and informative.

Attached is a copy of the acknowledgment
we sent to Mr. Sise.

Sincerely,


Executive Officer

STATINTL

- Enclosure
 IO/3/  (22 Aug 58)
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"To make religious truth an effective force for the promotion of ordered freedom and the common good in every nation and in the family of Nations."

FOUNDATION FOR RELIGIOUS ACTION



IN THE SOCIAL AND CIVIL ORDER

CHARLES WESLEY LOWRY, PH. D. (OXON)
CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
EDWARD L. R. ELSON, D.D., LITT. D.
CO-CHAIRMAN

1112 DUPONT CIRCLE BUILDING
WASHINGTON 6, D. C. DU. 7-4100

August 12, 1958

Executive Registry
10-6373

Mr. Allen Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I am sending you herewith the current number of a magazine in which I am very much interested and which has, I believe, a large and as yet unrealized potential in the battle of the Free World for freedom.


The editor and founder of the Free World Review, Stephen Sisa, is a naturalized Hungarian with an extraordinarily rich set of contacts around the world. In fact, I have come to see through his editorial correspondence, which is still far from thoroughly developed, that there is in existence a worldwide network of talented individuals from "behind the iron curtain". I believe that with even a limited cultivation and direction we could develop an effective force for the ideals of freedom and the cause of human dignity, to paraphrase the fine words of President Eisenhower to the new Envoy of Egypt quoted in today's news.

In this connection, particular attention is called to the article The Untold Story . . . by Jorge Romano. An editorial presenting a depth-interpretation of Khrushchev's recent "sharp zag" is believed to be of more than passing interest.

If you would have an assistant acknowledge receipt of this Summer-1958 issue of the Free World Review, addressing Mr. Stephen Sisa, Editor, 16 Beaumont Place, Newark, N. J., I would be greatly obliged.

With high personal regard,

Sincerely,


Charles Wesley Lowry


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from Charles Lowry*

FREE WORLD REVIEW



A QUARTERLY JOURNAL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

VOLUME IV

SUMMER - 1958

NUMBER 2

The Untold Story Behind the Nixon Ordeal

JORGE ROMANO

...

Aspects of Cambodian Neutrality

PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK

...

The German Phoenix Rises from its Ashes

COLEMAN KONKOLY

ARTICLES - REPORTS

Book Reviews

CAPTIVE EUROPE Bulletin

FREE WORLD REVIEW

A QUARTERLY DEVOTED TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING AMONG FREE NATIONS

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NOTES ON NEW CONTRIBUTORS

PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK, former ruler of the Cambodian Kingdom (between 1941-1955), has been the leader of the Sangkum National Movement since 1955. He also holds the post of the Premier Minister of Cambodia.

JORGE ROMANO, a journalist-historian of European origin, has been living and traveling in South America for the last fifteen years. He is a specialist on international problems in general and on Communism in particular.

COLEMAN KONKOLY, journalist and author who lives in West Germany. Chief-reporter at Radio Free Europe between 1952-1957. His book, *Ungarn in Flammen*, a first-hand account of the Hungarian Revolution has become a bestseller in Germany. Mr. Konkoly is a regular member of the West German Television Panel on international affairs.

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This Review is the official organ of Free World Forum Inc., an educational, non-profit organization established to promote better understanding among free nations; to analyze American foreign policy, and to further the cause of freedom for all peoples.

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CHARLES W. LOWRY

EDITORIAL

KHRUSHCHEV RIDES THE WAVE OF NEO - STALINISM

The presupposition of this article, dealing with events that have not only shocked, but surprised and pained large sectors of the non-Communist world, is that two *Ks* are interchangeable. *Kremlin* equals *Khrushchev*, and vice versa.

Party First Secretary and now Premier Khrushchev has been in command decisively since late June, 1957, — four years, three months, and three weeks from the day Stalin gasped his last. The chronological parallel with the rise and accession of Stalin is remarkable, and the comparable absence of violence is noteworthy.

With the betrayal and dismissal of Marshal Zhukov nine months ago, there was no effective and concentrated power left to threaten the new dictator. He had not only reached the topmost pinnacle of the ancient towers of Muscovy's citadel. He had succeeded in toppling over and flinging into outer space all rivals.

This was clear from the dictator's bearing and actions last fall and through the winter and early spring. Reinforced by the sensational success of Soviet science in the launching of huge *Sputniks*, he exuded confidence and even jubilation. His attitude to the West hardened. Impetuously reaching for a summit meeting — he nevertheless refused to make the slightest concessions and for a considerable period literally sought to browbeat Mr. Dulles and President Eisenhower into a speedy and unrehearsed convocation. Here he had surprising assistance from skeptical but helpless Western governments whose peoples were easily stampeded by nuclear panic. Some dent was certainly made on the American public. Congress, however, proved staunch and responsible, on both sides of the aisle in both houses; and Mr. Dulles during this time of ordeal was at his very best. Whatever may be thought of some of his judgments and actions in the past, no statesman of this generation has turned in a better performance than our Secretary of State during the past year in out-waiting and out-maneuvering the diplomatic chess masters of the Kremlin.

Nor should the President be omitted in this recital. By nature a man of good will and pacific, benevolent instincts, he is constitutionally and temperamentally less well suited to play in a game as tough and as crafty as the diplomacy of the contemporary colossi, the USA and the USSR, with the future of humanity at stake. The President has, however, in this difficult period shown notable firmness and intellectual fortitude. He has not let the cause of freedom down; and at the same time he has shown patience, tact, and prudence in relation to the world scene.

*

The Khrushchev who succeeded Stalin as top dog and unchallenged master of the second power in the world was the First Secretary who at the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1956 had put on a mantle of liberality and had denounced the dead tyrant as a sadistic and psychopathic monster. The liberal tide which he thus unloosed was a roaring flood which very nearly broke up the Communist empire. At the same time the shrewdness and intuitive capacity which had reckoned, following Stalin's death, that both the USSR and the world had moved on to a phase which required far more mobile and flexible tactics, were crowned by what almost amounted to a halo in the eyes of the uncommitted nations and many elements in the world of the West. Even the brutality and treachery of the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution did not permanently alter or affect the hope which he had aroused in the hearts of millions round the world.

Even after Khrushchev became humanly omnipotent, and despite much truculence and proud boasting, he moved mildly and increased rather than diminished the hope that he would prove the liberalizer of Communism. Then, suddenly and without warning, Khrushchev moved and moved far toward placing himself in the path and footsteps of the desanctified highpriest of absolutism who had been his predecessor.

He denounced Tito and the Yugoslavian nationalistic schism, taking up almost the identical position and attitude of Stalin on the same issue in 1948. The extent and gravity of this zag can be gauged, if we recall not only the trek of the barefoot Kremlin pilgrims to the Belgrade Canossa in late May, 1955 but the words Khrushchev spoke into the loudspeaker on arrival. He said: "We ascribe the aggravations to the provocative role played by Laurenti P. Beria and other recently exposed enemies of the people. We are ready to eliminate all obstacles standing in the way of complete normalization of relations between our states."

The reversal on Tito disturbed the uncommitted peoples and the liberal and hopeful elements in the anti-Communist nations. But the real flinging down of the Red and bloody gauge was still to come.

On Tuesday, June 17 the Free World awoke to learn with shocked surprise that terror walked again openly and brazenly in Hungary and that Nikita Khrushchev had indeed crossed the Rubicon of re-Stalinization. An official release from the Hungarian Justice Ministry (the avoidance of irony is not the Communists' long suit) announced that Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter, with two associates, had been executed after a secret trial and "*without confessing their guilt*". (Italics ours.)

*

The resulting impact on leaders and people in the Free World was predictable and was surely taken into account in the calculated decision to destroy the Hungarian heroes, not for senseless vengeance which would

have been a piece of thoroughly un-Communist sentimentality, but in the implementation of high policy. Khrushchev must have known also that his already rent and soiled robe of liberality and comparative righteousness would now be torn to tatters. From motives of both inclination and foreign policy he would have preferred to hold on to the image of reason and reform. Yet he hesitated no more than he did on November 3, 1956 when orders were given to annihilate without mercy the revolution in Hungary. Only, in 1958 his power was absolute, whereas earlier the form of authority at least was collective.

Why did Khrushchev elect the liquidation of his liberal image in turning on Tito and in making martyrs of Nagy and Malerter? Why did he zag so sharply just at this time, with so much to lose on the Free World front? We shall set down the answer, for purposes of brevity, in a series of numbered theses.

1. From a general and theoretical standpoint, Communism believes in quick crises, sharp turns, abrupt swings, contradictory developments. This is in accordance with the principle of dialectic which is the key to history. Communists are less afraid than normal people of inconsistency, and are reassured rather than frightened by a sharp alteration of direction, accompanied by violence.

2. It is a fundamental axiom of Communism, a theory hammered out in revolutionary practice and adversity, that internal problems must be dealt with realistically irrespective of opinion, pressure, and even threat of loss in the external sphere. Internal power and prestige considerations have at all times the highest priority.

3. The current sharp zag is a reflex of Khrushchev's failure to gain a quick and easy summit meeting. Prestige and hurry were his primary motives in reaching so avidly for such a meeting, augmented by extreme confidence. Had he scored a sufficiently spectacular summit success, the Soviet dictator would have had a short-cut to the perfection of his absolutism, would have had the heat taken off in relation to criticisms of his policies in agriculture and industrial decentralization, and could have afforded a longer period of lingering toleration for mild dissent and variety.

4. The USSR, save for war on its own people and the will to continue the reality of cold war while urging in words peaceful coexistence, is at peace and is incomparably stronger and more confident than at any previous time in her forty-year history. Khrushchev desires to resolidify the domestic and satellite situation after a partial thaw for five years, and has decided after apparent hesitation and weighing of alternatives to reStalinize.

5. Khrushchev, despite Western hopes and Asiatic illusions, is a total Communist. He is a product of the toughest, most brutal, most grueling, and most sheerly Machiavellian political school known to history — Stalin's own school lasting a quarter of a century. He was a top henchman and came up the hard way — the way of murder, mass liquidation, obedience and rivalry to the point of swimming in rivers of blood. The drastic de-Stalinization, of which Khrushchev became the symbol, was partly accidental, partly the result of the basic political situation and power vacuum left by Stalin's demise. It represented, in other words, a combination of shrewd calculation and impromptu tactic, not a position based on principle. As such it was bound to be a passing phase.

6. *The logic of Communism, which is absolute totalitarianism, is a Stalin-like dictatorship.* Collective rule is a temporary expedient. Tolerance of dissent is self-defeating. The admission of a little liberty is like a spike driven through a steam boiler under high pressure. This is the dreadful *built-in-terror of Communism* — a system based on naked force, contempt for law, the denial of God, and *the artificial organization of inhumanity.*

7. There was strong pressure on Khrushchev from Red China — the result primarily of the storm of freedom created by deStalinization. Hungary had a profound effect on China — on the people, the intellectuals, and the hierarchy. There is evidence that more than one revolt on the scale of the Hungarian revolution may have taken place in the vastness and isolation of the land behind the Bamboo Curtain. In any event Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi are at the moment having no picnic and know, with the icy clarity of Marxist, materialist reasoning, that the only hope of industrializing their immense domain and appropriately imitating and even surpassing the Russian ascent to world power is *via the Stalinist route.* In the face of this decision and its forceful if veiled communication to the Communist world, Khrushchev has chosen not to resist publicly but to ride the wave in his own person and to lead aggressively in the resolidification process. Thereby he may hope to kill two birds with one stone: eliminate any fishing by Mongolian rivals in troubled satellite waters and avoid any risk of loss by Moscow in prestige or clear primacy as the center of universal Communism.

*

What conclusion should be drawn from recent developments and their enactment into hard policy decision by the successor of Stalin and Lenin? The answer surely is clear. There never was any genuine prospect of gradual, Communist devolution toward sincere peaceful coexistence based on the renunciation of dogmas and dreams adding up to the inevitability of a Communist global revolution and a Communist world order directed and dominated by Moscow. Now, however, this is evident even to the most confirmed illusionists. The strongest feature of Communism, next to its sensational power and material success, is its continuity. Its hostility to the West and its rejection of ideals of reconciliation and genuine peaceful cooperation are revealed as unaltered and unalterable save by events and counter forces that have not yet come into being.

This is a severe and unpleasant conclusion to reach and to record. Would that it could be otherwise! As it is, we are somewhat comforted by the stout remark of the Anglican Bishop Butler out of the *Age of Reason*: "Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be; why then should we wish to be deceived?"

JORGE ROMANO

The Untold Story Behind the Nixon Ordeal

Buenos Aires, June 1958

The Changed Scene

It may be true that the humiliating insults Mr. Nixon and through him the United States of America suffered during his South American tour were mainly the work of unscrupulous Soviet agitators, but the courageous, young Vice-President of the U.S.A. must also have seen during his ill-fated "good-will" trip the other side to the coin: the almost complete failure of Anglo-American propaganda which proves to be appallingly ineffective against Moscow's methods, especially on continents having a colored or mixed population. All over the world the awakening consciousness of colored-mestizo peoples is producing a kind of nationalistic fever, which surpasses by far in dynamic and extremism the behavior of European nationalists a century ago, when the so called romantic nationalism was born on the old Continent.

In November, 1956 this writer had inadvertently participated in a night-demonstration organized spontaneously by the people of Buenos Aires, outraged by Soviet brutality against the revolting Hungarians. The passionate outbursts of the Argentinos produced almost incredible scenes on that night. To prevent the Soviet Embassy from holding a reception on November 7, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, the demonstrators, representing a cross section of Argentine society from simple laborers to fashionable ladies of the upper class, used autos, street cars and even fire ladders to build road blocks in the streets around the new Soviet Embassy (the old one was burned down by other demonstrators earlier). From the upstairs windows refuse paper was thrown into pyres burning in the middle of the streets. Hundreds of policemen armed with fire-hoses and gas-bombs were unable to restore order. Dignified old matrons were threatening the police from the balconies, hysterically shouting that the latter should not allow murderous Bolsheviks to desecrate the Argentine capital with their presence.

Those living in Buenos Aires in these days could also witness a touching, non-violent demonstration of human emotions: the long queues formed by thousands of Argentine men and women around governmental buildings waiting patiently for hours to donate blood for the bleeding people of Budapest or to register for adopting refugee Hungarian children. It looked as though the soul of this continent had opened its heart as never before to save the heroic Magyars from the brutal grip of Soviet Communism.

Twenty months after these unforgettable scenes, just preceding Mr. Nixon's arrival in Buenos Aires, a different kind of demonstration took place on almost the same premises. To celebrate the imminent inauguration of the new Argentine President, a picturesque and impressive parade was held on the Avenidas attended by the delegations of about fifty nations. The famous San Martin mounted Guards opened the procession amid fanfares and martial musique. Behind the Guards marched the long line of delegations, headed by a dark-haired, decorative looking, tall man, who as the virtual center of attention was happily receiving the cheers of the same Argentinos who less than two years ago had seemed to want death for every Communist in the world.

This time, however, the situation was very different, for the tall man heading the parade was no one else but the *head of a Communist State*: Comrade Joan Gheorge Maurer, the President of the Rumanian Peoples Republic, the highest dignitary in the crowd, surrounded by Rumanian, Hungarian and Czechoslovak Communist ministers, some of whom had been active in the suppressing of the Hungarian Revolt in 1956.

While a noisy, antagonistic group of students was at hand when Mr. Nixon visited the local University, Comrade Maurer was accorded a dignified reception at the University of Cordoba where, as elsewhere, he was treated with all the ceremonies and courtesy reserved for heads of States. The flock of Communist journalists always trailing him could not complain either: while enjoying immensely the sunshine of hospitality and quasi popularity with their Red boss, they were even given opportunity to visit the editorial offices of a respected newspaper in the Argentine capital. They used their visit to sing high praises of the 'freedom of the press in the Soviet orbit' while scoring the same time the American press as the slave of capitalists. The views of these journalists were given wide publicity and no effective protest was raised against their propaganda.

The softening attitude toward Communists can be detected almost all over South America — even in Chile which was counted as perhaps the number one anti-Communist stronghold on the Continent, due to its severe restrictive laws against the Reds. The Chilean government, reversing its earlier stand, now makes preparations to assure the Communists all the political rights the other parties enjoy.

On the other hand, anti-Americanism is on the rise; President Ibanez has become almost a popular hero

since he had refused to pay a visit to Washington. If one starts conversation with Chilean students, as this writer did, they are ready to blame "American capitalist system" for the present economic troubles which beset their country, forgetting the fact that the economic imbalance plaguing many countries is mainly a result of a world divided by artificial and violent means into two parts and that Soviet imperialism bears the direct responsibility for this as well as for the poisoned world atmosphere.

Dynamic Anti-Communism Absent

South America has always been the continent of emotional extremism and of quickly changing popular mood. However, the above described, strange phenomenon cannot be explained by this circumstance alone. The comments and reports in the U.S.A. press gave an incomplete story when they put the blame for Mr. Nixon's ordeal on Communist machinations and deteriorating economic conditions in Latin America. Communists still represent a numerically small fraction of the population here. As for economic conditions, they are not the decisive factor, either, in the growing anti-Americanism among the Latinos. *After all, if allegiance and faithfulness to Western Christian ideals and social order were to depend on foreign aid or dollar loans alone, then our Christian civilization based on two thousand year old ethical values would cease to have its "raison d'etre" and might as well surrender to the other alternative, Moscovite materialism, right now. . .*

It cannot be denied that a very serious, almost fundamental breach has been revealed in the Christian *Weltanschauung* of South American society, which in this critical phase of the cold war could do no better than play the role of an indifferent spectator when Vice President Nixon, one of the most attractive leaders in the Western World, was attacked and insulted repeatedly by a mob representing a small minority. Graver than the incidents in Montevideo, Lima, Bogota and Caracas themselves, was the sad fact that the better elements of Latin American society were not willing or able to suppress *a priori* the voices of glowing hatred, fanned by professional agitators, and failed to counteract them when the disturbances had broken out. Had the South American public displayed a more dignified, genuinely solemn atmosphere fit for the good will visit of Mr. Nixon, these agitators would have almost certainly refrained from trouble-making.

Where, one could ask for example, were those students whose studies were and are made possible by the numerous scholarships given by U.S. institutions. Due to U.S. generosity, a great number of exchange students go every year to North America. Upon their return they are supposed to be better acquainted with U.S. customs and the American people and saturated with the political ideas and ideals of the Western world. Yet, there was an astonishing silence and inaction even on the part of these elements who apparently failed to regard it as their moral obligation to pour in protests and raise

their voices – and their protective arms – against the scandalous behavior of their colleagues.

Does that mean, one is compelled to ask, that these exchange-students *have not been* educated properly politically in the United States and have not been *made immune to Communist ideas*? Or, are the universities in the U.S.A. themselves unable to imbue their students even in these critical years of American history with the proper amount of *antidote* against poisonous, Red 'Socialistic' ideas? In the wake of Mr. Nixon's ordeal, it would be an interesting and certainly illuminating task to prepare a survey of the *present* political allegiance of those South American individuals who have received their education in American universities. Are they reliable political allies of the West or not? Whatever the answer may be, it remains a disturbing fact that the attitude of the South American public during Mr. Nixon's tour has revealed a deep ignorance, unawareness and indifference of the masses toward the great struggle of our era between two world-concepts – a struggle in which they cannot and should not remain neutral.

During the Hungarian Revolution they had a chance – for a short period – to look into the infernal depth of violence and brutality inherent in the Soviet system. The thunders and lightnings of the Hungarian struggle for freedom, the vision of human suffering and heroism, and the barbarity of the Russians in suppressing the Revolution provoked an immense response and an unprecedented outburst of emotion in the masses against the Communists.

Still, in the absence of repeated and continuous anti-Communist impulses, the whole Hungarian tragedy has remained but a distant and fading vision in their minds. Communism continues to remain an unrecognized danger even after Hungary and part of the blame for that should be put on the American attitude and propaganda, which failed to exploit this historic occasion. Had the West had the courage and foresight to take some demonstrative action – short of war – on behalf of the Hungarians (a massive parachuting of food or medicaments, immediate dispatch of U.N. observers to the battered Hungarian capital, the recognition of Hungary's neutrality, etc.) they could have turned the table on the Soviets in East Europe by evoking simultaneously indescribable enthusiasm among the peoples of the world, including Latin America, for the United States.

As matters stand now, many South Americans have disturbing thoughts when thinking of the Hungarian Revolution in retrospect. 'If people like the Magyars were so utterly abandoned during their fight, the fault must lie either in themselves or in those powers who have betrayed them.' Thus *things have begun to backfire from an American point of view*: the bloody suppression of the Hungarian Revolt which could have turned the whole world against the Soviets permanently, is being attributed largely to the *weakness of Western democracies*, led by the U.S.A., who lack faith, courage and determination to defend their friends, principles

and their own ideals.

Facts often act in a subliminal way in the minds of the masses, and history metes out punishment for blunders committed, sometimes with surprising speed. It is certainly not a coincidence that since the tragic Fall of 1956 American prestige and President Eisenhower's popularity have been declining steadily. Mr. Nixon and his entourage had ample opportunity to measure the frightening depth of that decline in Lima and Caracas.

American Propaganda Soft, Uninspiring

The failure of American propaganda in South America is all the more arresting, because the public here receives the news and reports on international events almost exclusively from Anglo-American sources. The newspapers are served mainly by U.S.A. news agencies and Soviet cold war activities are reported through a filtering Anglo-American news network. *American propaganda, paradoxically, is being defeated on a field where it enjoys an almost absolute monopoly in influencing the masses not only by the news media but by cultural means also.* Russian culture and art are almost unknown to South Americans who from their childhood on are exposed to an overwhelming North American impact and influence. The thousands of South American movie theaters from Panama to the *Tierra del Fuego* present mainly American films. The little indigenes in Caracas, Lima, Bogota or Buenos Aires are better acquainted with the Wild West, with the stars and splendor of Hollywood and the familiar figures of comic strips than with the history and the heroes of their own native country. Spanish language editions of U.S.A. magazines are widely read all over the continent.

All in all, Americans here enjoy a unique position to develop an intimate and friendly relationship to South Americans and to generate a favorable atmosphere toward the United States, thus creating a common spiritual front against the common enemy: Communist imperialism. After Mr. Nixon's ordeal one cannot but ask the painful question: Why cannot the U.S.A. cultural export and propaganda cope with Communist penetration and why has it failed thus far to exploit the tremendous potential it enjoys on this continent?

One of the main reasons for the failure is that the material flowing from Anglo-American propaganda springs have rather a cooling than an inspiring or exciting effect, supplying something undrinkable for such passionate, ardent people of vivid imagination as the Latins. A dry, rational, colorless approach, disdain for using emotional and dramatic effects, lack of proper psychology, linguistic weakness and lack of intuitive sensitivity on the part of U.S. officials should be put high on the list of the causes for American failure. But there are other important causes also rather unnoticed by the American press.

While the Russians and their accomplices are employing every means and use every opportunity to hurt and discredit America, there is a noticeable disinclin-

ation in American propaganda to hit back at the Russians and Communism with equal vigor, imagination and determination.

Apart from a few best sellers like Kravchenko's "*I Choose Freedom*" or Gheorghiu's "*The Twentieth Hour*" very little has been done to depict Communism in its real, horrifying reality to South American intellectuals, not to speak about the masses. Up to the Hungarian Revolution not a single anti-Communist exhibition worthy of the name was organized in Argentina or elsewhere on the continent, except by the feeble efforts of Iron Curtain emigre groups, whose voices are weak and means insufficient to create wide attention. The notable absence of anti-Communist exhibits and the lack of hard-hitting publications devoted to the struggle against Communism is a serious negative factor helping the advance of the Soviets. The only so-called anti-Bolshevist League of South America is a rather passive gathering of conservative intellectuals, which lacks the characteristics of a forceful popular movement. It is hardly noticed by the press.

The movie theaters all over the continent still present numerous well-made and touching films based on second World War and illustrating the horrors of Nazi cruelty. *But Hollywood has yet to produce a really moving, great anti-Communist film written and played with the same devotion to stir up human sentiments on a grand scale.* (And dozens of such films are needed!)

The same film industry which gladly spent hundreds of millions — and rightly so — during World War II to depict the crimes of the enemy and to glorify the heroic deeds of the Allies shows a strange reluctance to turn its powerful psychological weapon against Communism, an enemy more dangerous than the Nazis were. The few half-hearted, alibi efforts in making cheap anti-Communist films did more harm than good. In this respect the sub-standard film made about Cardinal Mindszenty is a glaring example. This writer attended the South American premiere of that film made in Hollywood and it is enough to mention that at the scene which was supposed to be a tragic climax the spectators could not but burst into laughter.

The new *Katonga*, the persecution of the Churches, the fate of millions of Europeans deported into Siberia, the uncounted deeds of individual heroism behind the Iron Curtain, the horrors of Katyn and the GPU prisons, the great purges within the Soviet Union and the satellites, the mysterious deadly chain of Soviet concentration camps from the Arctic Circle to the Mongolian deserts, the deeds of Soviet espionage in stealing the atomic secrets, and, last but not least, the unforgettable events of the Hungarian Revolution could offer dramatic settings and colors to produce spectacular and monumental films fit for *Cinemascope* and *Technicolor*. Such films would not only serve the cause of America and the free world but would certainly result in excellent box-office returns. The failure of Western studios to exploit these themes, to capture the imagination of hundreds of millions in and outside America and creating at the same time permanent revulsion a-

against the only existing colonial slave Empire of our era, has contributed a great deal, in the negative sense, to the attitude of the South American masses manifested during Mr. Nixon's visit here. These masses should and could have been influenced to hate *Red colonialism* instead of an imagined "Yankee imperialism".

Masses Unaware of Communist Danger

The cool and objective tone of Anglo-American sources may suit the temperament of Anglo-Saxon peoples but hardly has any propaganda value in South America where people can be impressed only by colorful, dramatic reportage and interpretation of world events. South American readers or radio listeners just don't react and don't appreciate *the policy of understatement* as practiced in America and Great Britain. On the contrary, this is the continent of heated political arguments where the use of overstatements is an almost imperative necessity to attract attention. The soft American approach, appealing to reason rather than to emotion, cannot match the ruthless and unscrupulous Soviet propaganda which knows that a moderate and sophisticated approach is easily misinterpreted here as weakness.

This is the world of almost childish credibility, a fertile breeding ground for wonderdoctors, astrologues, fortune tellers and spiritists, a world where *emotions prevail over reason*, boldness over cautious compromise, forceful, colorful presentation of views over 'prudent', routine approach.

It would be too much, of course, to expect from Americans to adopt in their official propaganda an entirely new tone and style not in harmony with the cool Anglo-Saxon temperament and objectivity, but which nevertheless would suit better the tastes of colored people lacking political maturity and balanced temperament. *The gap could and should be bridged, however, by encouraging independent, private agencies and institutions (including Iron Curtain exile groups) and by organizing a large scale cultural export toward the countries to the South.* Films, books, exhibits, performers, writers should emphasize and describe not only the values of Western civilization but also educate their readers and audiences about the Communist enemy menacing the Western way of life. The views of intellectuals and artists are more sympathetic and palatable to the South American public than those coming from political sources. Unfortunately, the utterances of American and European intellectuals who are given some publicity here, seem to be contaminated by leftist views and by the spirit of coexistence with Communism and seldom, if ever, condemn Communism. Still these views are given more credence and circulation than the routine anti-Communist statements of Western political leaders.

Thus, the inability or unwillingness of American propaganda to make the masses aware and afraid of the destructive character of Communism reduces the present life-and-death struggle between freedom and slavery in the eyes of South Americans (and probably of the

Arabs and other Afro-Asian peoples as well) into a mere rivalry between two giant powers. It will not make much difference — they think — whether Moscovite imperialism or Yankee imperialism triumphs in the cold or a hot war at the end. This state of mind of South Americans — though not general yet — is more harmful to America than to the Soviets. After all 'Yankee imperialism' seems a more acute 'danger' to them, because the Yankees are in their immediate neighborhood and can inflict by their overwhelming power and influence more damage to Latin American economies and are more in the position to exploit South American workers than the Russians who are far away.

As to the Kremlin, it knows well that South American workers and employees are not much interested in Marxist and Leninist theories. To become owner of a home with a little garden around, to acquire a small workshop or a store, to travel around on a motorcycle or in a small car — these are the dreams of the average citizen here and not an unknown new system of government or a Socialist state. They sympathize with revolutions but not with the kind that would basically alter the present private ownership and free enterprise system. From a Marxist point of view these represent a typical small-bourgeois and capitalist attitude, the only socialist element of which is the desire of the common people to see a curb put on the excessive fortunes of the very rich, and to have some social security. They dislike rich men and skilled agitators can generate this dislike into hatred not only against individuals but also against the wealthiest nation on earth, the United States. The omnipotent "*Dollar*", the so coveted and envied dollar, has become in a strange way the magic word by which hidden passions of the masses can easily be stirred up at the time of an economic crisis.

II

In South America, as in other countries where Communist penetration is in its beginning phase, the Reds have one basic instruction which might be formulated as follows: "*No nonsense now! Be good boys, go along well with the others, don't boast of your strength, and try to capitalize by supporting popular issues.*" The Communists, adapting themselves to the prevailing circumstances and atmosphere, did not speak a word during the whole election campaign about collectivism, kolkhozes, socialization of production, or other Communist objectives. Instead they presented themselves as defenders of the natural riches (like oil) of the country who are guarding jealously the independence of national industry against the "*North American sharks.*" The Reds, protagonists of internationalism elsewhere, bear here the toga of nationalist champions struggling against any kind of foreign intervention and "*colonial or semi-colonial dependence.*"

Their agitation on South American universities reflects an alarming picture. The so called "refugee students" are here the primary tools of penetration, representing the *avant guard* of the Kremlin on the Con-

continent, though sometimes involuntarily. Exiled or chased away from other Latin American republics in the wake of a revolution or a new dictatorship, these dark-colored, bushy-haired, glowing-eyed fanatics represent ideal material in Moscow's hands. They appear as persecuted victims and romantic heroes in the eyes of their fellow students. Usually they are not from the immediate neighbor states but from farther countries, mainly from Central America (like Guatemala) where revolutions and dictatorships are more fashionable than toward the South. Often wandering from one country to another, they are soliciting "brotherly refuge", loudly proclaiming themselves persecuted champions for the cause of world liberty. Wherever they succeed in settling down for a while, they jump into political activity at once, snooping for 'reactionary elements' in every corner of their adopted country. They are divided into numerous political sects including trotskysts, stalinists, leninists, national marxists, and heaven knows how many other kinds. The majority are not paid by Moscow but keen observers can easily detect the trained agitators among them at political meetings. These have seen many countries and possess a vast repertoire of anti-reactionary, anti-Church, anti-Yankee and anti-capitalist slogans.

The Communists are playing a very wicked game in the overthrowing of dictators in Latin America. The rise of dictators is helped here, as in other parts of the world, by a political atmosphere in which the ideas of democracy and liberty are misused and the impotence and corruptness of the prevailing regime cause a drift toward political chaos. The different parties and politicians involved in petty politics and personal feuds are moving around in their own political "microcosmos" without paying due attention to popular mood, which fed up with a regime seeks for a "strong hand" able to clean up the political scene and restore order.

In countries where the state has weak traditions and the system of government lacks a firmly established basis and political organism, this process of rotating regimes is much faster than in countries having a more stable heritage. In most Latin American states even originally sound regimes tend to degenerate in a rapid tempo, thus paving the way for dictatorships, which in turn, after a "honeymoon period" with the people, follow the same path toward corruption as their precessors. In other words, *political remedies are prone to become poison with the passing of time*. Nowhere in the world can dictatorships rise and fall so quickly as in Latin America.

Communists know how to play both ends of the game. On the one hand, they are active in pushing a democracy toward anarchy, and on the other, they are masters in infiltrating the growing opposition against a dictator, after he has taken over the reins of the country. *The more rapid the rotation of regimes around this vicious circle the greater are Moscow's chances to get a controlling hand at the center of "the devil's wheel"*. Moscow needs dictatorships in South America be-

cause in the inevitable revolutions which overthrow them, Communist agitators can have real field days fishing in troubled waters and inciting mobs, intoxicated by a sudden overdose of political freedom, to commit excesses. Venezuela offers a good example in this respect.

Church and Army Are Main Red Targets

Moscow needs such rapidly rotating political situations for other reasons also. The subsequent turmoil produces an ideal atmosphere for undermining – helped inadvertently by bourgeois elements – the two main institutional pillars of South American republics which – in contrast to the unstable political regimes – are not only well organized but also have firm traditions of their own. These institutions are the *Roman Catholic Church* and the *Army*.

The opinion is often expressed that Communist infiltration cannot be successful in South America for the simple reason that the Latin Americans are 'deeply religious people' while Communism professes atheism. This is not a new argument. The same could be heard in Italy after the Second World War. Yet, in Italy the Reds have succeeded in creating the most powerful Communist party outside the Iron Curtain.

As to South America, foreign travelers are impressed here by the romantic colorfulness of Spanish Catholicism which is rich in ancient features, still using in some primitive regions – especially in Central America – strange rituals and ceremonies inherited from pagan Indian tribes. Anglo-Saxon novels about South America depict old families with almost fanatical religious fervor.

But there is another side to the coin. Perhaps nowhere in the Christian world are the anti-Church passions so deep though hidden, as in the Spanish world, despite the devotion of the Latinos to mystical-religious formalism. These anti-Catholic passions flared up in their shocking reality during the civil war in Spain and Mexico and in various disturbances in South American republics during which priests and nuns were killed in large numbers and churches and religious shrines were destroyed and burned down by raging mobs. The explanation of these phenomena lies in the fact that the *anti-clericalism of the Jacobins still enjoys a hidden virulence in Spanish America*, perhaps more so than elsewhere. Jacobinical atheism was a strong ally of England in its fight against the Spanish Empire and played an important role in the disintegration of Spain's overseas possessions into smaller, independent republics. The Spanish Church of that era with its rigor and hierarchy formed the cementing force among the hundreds of nomadic tribes on Spanish-ruled territories. In the only 150 year old tradition of Latin American republics one can easily detect a suppressed though latent animosity over the obstructive role of the Church in the creation of these republics. In a subconscious way the mulattos still consider the Church an obstacle in their drive to achieve unlimited liberty.

Anticlericalism and anti-Church sentiment are potent weapons in the Kremlin's hands. "The Church should keep out of politics, she must not intermingle in state affairs" – say the Communists. When the Roman Catholic hierarchy withdraws from politics and fails to take a stand against a dictator, she automatically becomes the target of another accusation: "*Look, the Church is a servant of the dictatorship!*"

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Almost the same pattern is used in the agitation against the *military*. 'Why do we need strong armies here? Wars between South American states are hardly imaginable; they belong to the past. And we have no intention whatsoever to send our boys to far away continents to battle the wars of imperialist great powers.' Such are the arguments voiced even by middle class elements who cannot be accused of being Communists. This skillfully planted anti-military propaganda is helped by the way of living of the officers. In most South American republics the Army is a well-organized and quasi-exclusive institution which guards jealously its tradition and spectacular means of power.

When driving North from Buenos Aires, the auto-strada soon reaches a prosperous looking suburb with ultra-modern apartment-houses and villas, beautiful monuments, churches and parks, the latter giving protected refuge to exotic flowers and well-trimmed bushes among which Patagonian ostriches and fat rabbits criss-cross in gay carelessness, giving delight to the observers. This community is reserved exclusively for the military who enjoy a living standard surpassing that of the common citizens by far. Similar 'dream cities' have been established in other South American capitals and the good salary of the officers coupled with many benefits even during the present economic crisis make them easy targets of Communist agitation.

As stated above, the agitation against the military follows about the same line that is used against the Church. '*The Army should not interfere with politics.*' Yet it is expected from the armed forces to use their power in overthrowing dictators. If the Army fails to do so, as it often does, it draws the blame of being subservient to tyranny. Thus the prestige of the military is hurt either way and it is needless to say that whenever the Army intervenes it inevitably draws the ire of a number of middle class elements who thus become unwitting allies of Communist propaganda.

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An editorial in the *New York Times* criticized President Eisenhower's order alerting some paratrooper and marine battalions in the Caribbean for the possible protection of Mr. Nixon in Caracas. According to the *Times*, the Marines and the American Navy are symbol of 'U.S. imperialism' in the eyes of Latin Americans and therefore the President's order was an ill-advised display of force.

This is a mistaken view. It was not a psychological blunder at all to send some U.S.A. units to the Caribbean. A firm attitude and a show of force never hurt the prestige of a country, especially when it is dealing with younger and less mature nations. *It would be a fatal miscalculation to believe that the ideals of liberty and democracy are able in themselves to stem the tide of Communist imperialism without showing and applying physical force or displaying death-defying courage against the enemy.* Courage and heroism are not and never will be outmoded virtues. It is also an error to believe that the democratization of the world can be achieved while Moscow's agents are ready to infiltrate and penetrate into even the slightest cracks caused by the inevitable play of political forces in free countries.

Yes, the U.S.A. press and propaganda agencies do the right thing when they generate dislike toward the little dictators in South America or elsewhere. But they commit a grave historical blunder by omitting to imbue the heterogeneous masses of Latin America with fear and hatred of the most dangerous and terrifying dictatorship the world has ever produced.

There is not the slightest doubt in this writer's mind that the fabulously effective U.S.A. economy will succeed in putting the South American countries back on their feet within a short time. But to be bitterly frank, the inevitable question should be raised: *How long can things go on like this?* Moscow is able, by investing a few million dollars in trouble-making, to compel the United States to spend hundreds of millions to amend its own position in the various trouble spots of the world. Is this the only way, *are dollars the only recourse to heal the wounds inflicted upon suffering humanity by an unscrupulous enemy?* Is there not a fatal mistake in the order of priority in our handling of international problems?

Sooner or later – and the sooner the better – Western leaders will have to realize the bankruptcy of their materialistic methods in a world struggle that cannot be won by the West without renewed ideals, courage, determination and a *militant crusade* against the enemy that is out to bury us.

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PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK

Aspects of Cambodian Neutrality

In writing this article at the request of *Free World Review*, I hope to better inform the American public on the real situation of my country since the acquisition of total independence in November, 1953.

I write with candor, certain to be understood by the majority of my readers. The great Western press often discusses our neutrality, but few journals seem to understand the problems involved.

It has been said and written that Cambodia, in accepting aid from countries of the Communist bloc risks becoming, within a short period, not only a new "satellite", but also endangers the security of the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia. This judgment is erroneous and cannot be supported by the facts.

Having less than six million inhabitants, of which 400,000 are Vietnamese and 350,000 are Chinese, whose sympathies lie partly with the West and partly with the East; squeezed between two countries, Thailand and South Vietnam, which belong to the Western bloc and whose interests and policies are entirely different from ours; facing in the North the enormous state of People's China, and having at our disposal only an army of 25,000 men, it was difficult for us to adopt any other policy. To maintain the balance between the two blocs becomes a vital necessity for Cambodia. Being neutral, we had to entertain diplomatic and commercial relations with the countries of the two blocs. Nobody wonders that Thailand has an ambassador in Moscow. Why should it be different for our country.

Cambodia, an old Buddhist monarchy, does not afford a toehold for foreign ideologies. A sincere democrat, convinced that only national socialism in conformity with the humanitarian ideals of Buddhism is possible, the Cambodian can not accept the Marxist doctrine postulating class warfare. It is true that a Cambodian Communist party exists. But its membership is so insignificant and its role so negligible that I mention it purely "for the record". Moreover, it is the best proof of the impermeability of Cambodia to Communist doctrine in particular, and foreign ideologies in general. Under such circumstances one can understand that all attempts at "corruption" and "subversion" coming from the outside are doomed to certain failure.

In both the recent and distant past, we have reacted strongly against the powers belonging to opposing blocs who, by their propaganda, menaced our national unity. The allegiance of the people to the Monarchy and their absolute loyalty would defeat all attempts of this nature should they be repeated in the future.

We have been reproached for receiving aid with the same open mind from Washington and Moscow and from Paris and Peiping. From the moment one admits that our neutrality is a necessity dictated by our geographic position, why should we refuse aid which is given by countries without obligations?

The concession of aid from Communist countries has never been the excuse for the massive arrival of "technicians" and "experts". This we would have steadfastly resisted. The majority of the experts who work by our side in order to transform Cambodia into a modern state are French and American. This suffices, I think, to discredit the fable that we are "favoring the Reds".

The 500 bed hospital donated by the U.S.S.R., the cornerstone of which was laid last May 16th, is a case in point. This hospital will be built by a small group of Soviet technicians, and then turned over to Khmer medical personnel, assisted, if necessary, by specialists of our own choice.

Without doubt, the most important assistance we receive comes from the United States. For the year 1957-58, it amounted to \$40 millions offered without conditions. Thanks to this aid, we can maintain our army, build a highway connecting Phnom Penh with the seaport of Kompong-Som which is being constructed by France, educate an élite teaching corps in the ultra-modern center of Kompong-Kantout and finally, we can undertake important agricultural hydraulic projects.

I regret that this aid sometimes lacks flexibility. In particular, it does not make allowance for meeting unforeseen situations which create immediate further demands which obviously could not be planned for in the budget.

In this respect, the \$25 millions of aid which, for a period of two years, was given to us by People's China, permits us to deal with these hardly foreseeable situations. We receive free merchandise from China corresponding to our needs. Then this merchandise is sold by us and the product of the sales is used freely by our Government.

Since we are talking about foreign aid, France's assistance should also be mentioned as she maintains a military and economic mission in Cambodia. France furnishes the advisors and instructors for our army and grants scholarships to our students of military science. She builds a seaport at Kompong-Som, enlarges the landing-field at Phnom Penh and constructs a modern airport. Other projects are also being studied.

All this foreign aid is complementary. The aid of each individual country would not be sufficient. But taken as a whole, it permits us to build the foundations indispensable to a modern state. Most of our efforts are directed toward the development of our educational system and our economy.

More than 22 per cent of our budget is devoted to education at all levels. The school population, 490,000 students, receive instruction from 8,500 teachers and professors. This represents considerable progress if one realizes that in 1945, school teachers numbered

around 700 and the school population did not exceed 35,000.

As to our economic policy, it is dictated by the objective of raising as rapidly as possible the living standard of the people while reducing our dependence upon foreign countries.

As a country predominantly agricultural, producing rice, rubber, corn, fish and raising cattle, swine and poultry, we still depend upon foreign countries for our supply of industrial products.

In order to reduce this dependence, while modernizing our agriculture, we are trying, thanks in part to American and in part to Chinese aid, to set up diverse industrial enterprises which correspond to the vast and varied needs of our country.

Foreign capital, desiring to invest in Cambodia, finds important guarantees, and will not risk untimely nationalization like in certain other countries which are subject to changes of policies.

The stability and continuity of our domestic and foreign policy are in themselves solid guarantees. Our efforts in this field have not been in vain since numerous foreign companies have responded to our appeal.

The opening of the port in the near future, and that of the highway to Kompong-Som will permit the exploitation of a vast territory, only a few years ago covered by an enormous virgin forest.

Already numerous companies have undertaken the study of this rich region which is particularly well adapted to the production of rubber and palm trees, oil,

fruits (especially citrus fruits) and to cattle breeding.

Forest exploitation will be opened, while deep-sea fishing will also prosper.

The port of Kompong-Som itself, which may have the status of a free port, will facilitate the creation of light industries and contribute, through the important flow of merchandise, to the economic prosperity of our country.

I believe that despite the brevity of this article, I will convince my readers that we do not constitute a "gap" or a "void" in the Western bloc. A country united like ours, which does its best to build a prosperous state, does not offer a foothold to Communism which is only attracted by disunity and poverty.

The realistic policy which we have adopted has only one purpose: the vital interests of the nation. In removing all pretext to a potential aggressor, we are confident in the knowledge that we have done everything to protect the future of our country.

But if, unfortunately, we were to become victims of aggression, in spite of our actions, be assured that we would fight to the bitter end. Our army, however brave, could not hope to resist successfully an infinitely stronger adversary. But it would conduct dreadful guerilla warfare, sheltered in the deep forests and mountain ranges of our country. At that moment, but at that moment only, the question of neutrality would no longer exist, and we would not hesitate to request the help of our friends.

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IS REAL NEUTRALITY IMPOSSIBLE ?

(A short editorial, reproduced below, appeared in the January 18, 1958, issue of the leading French-language Cambodian newspaper, *Realités Cambodgiennes* without signature and was generally interpreted as a correct restatement of the Prince's position on Communist subversion in Cambodia.-Ed.)

"The committed Great Powers have not renounced their intention to attract Cambodia to their ideologies and political systems. Their local representatives are making tireless efforts in this direction. Sometimes these efforts fall within acceptable limits, but at other times they transgress these limits. The Prince, who wants his country to follow "the middle of the road", reacts to these efforts by warning those who are going too far. At the Fifth Congress a certain power received such warning. At the Sixth Congress it was another power. Our faithful readers know perfectly of whom we are talking so that we can avoid being more specific.

At each warning, the opponents of the accused country experience great joy. Monsignor (Norodom Sihanouk) received congratulations from outstanding diplomats which, we are told, he does not consider he merited. The foreign journals, as the case may be, either call him "pro-Communist", or insist with great serenity

that he has denounced neutrality and "has declared war on the Reds."

Is a real neutral like the Prince unimaginable? Samdech (Norodom Sihanouk) feels no hostility against any nation or any system. But he is the leader of a monarchist, Buddhist and national socialist people, and he knows how to stop foreign propagandists, come what may.

As long as he lives, Samdech will continue to denounce without any bias the abuses of foreign propaganda. There are very grave abuses at present. A subversive effort directed by a certain power (People's China -Ed.) is aimed especially at the young intellectuals, the schoolmasters and the future schoolmasters in the Teaching Corps. The Prince possesses evidence to this effect. He cannot tolerate the undermining of the confidence of the youth in the Monarchy and the Khmer institutions.

It should be well understood that Cambodia has no intention of surrendering to any foreign doctrines, no matter how powerful the countries are which espouse them. Our neutrality does not mean surrender or complacency."

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COLLEMAN KONKOLY

The German Phoenix Rises from its Ashes

The German soldier who, now equipped with modern weapons, participates in the Western defense system has indeed had a unique historical career. He is part of the generation which, driven by hunger during its childhood years more than a decade ago, looked for potato peels on the pavement or the meat of dead horses among the rubble. Their parents were often victims of the war, and their Fatherland, its concept ridiculed by the Occupying Powers, was a pile of ruins without any hope of reconstruction. Yet today the same generation is an equal and well-honored member of the defense community of the Free World, a respected comrade-in-arms of those American, British and French soldiers who earlier devastated their country.

This generation, in a manner hitherto unknown to history, has experienced everything. Its story forms one of the most important military and political events of the past decade.

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The aim of the Western Allies in the Second World War consisted of the unconditional surrender, disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. These aims were accomplished, and the June 5, 1945, declaration of the victorious Allies stated that Germany would be in no position to resist the will of the Allies in any way. The declaration stated the naked truth. With the capitulation, all of the military and political authority of Germany's sixty million citizens ceased. The Eastern provinces (114,032 sq. kilometers) were administered by Poland and the USSR; the central provinces (107,861 sq. kilometers) became the Russian occupation zone, while Western and Southern Germany, (247,906 sq. kilometers) was occupied by American, British and French troops.

At the Conference of the Four Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed that the period of disarmament and demilitarization be extended to *forty years*, if Allied agreement could be attained.

Not even a decade had passed, however, before responsible statesmen of the West recognized their grave errors and changed their policies fundamentally toward Germany and the USSR. Western leaders realized that, in the long run, there would be great need for the military resources of Germany. In the British Parliament, Sir Winston Churchill stated:

"There is no reason to deny equality to German soldiers if they are willing to participate in the Western defense community on the side of their American, British and French allies."

Charles de Gaulle stated that Germany could not be prevented from defending herself by military means, should an attack from the East occur. The American semi-official newspaper in Germany, *Die Neue Zeitung*, editorialized on November 4, 1950:

"It is unimaginable for the American people that in the struggle between free and slave nations Germany could or would remain neutral. The United States will only contribute substantially to the Atlantic defense community if Germany, too, will participate in the defense of her territory."

In the face of a common danger, the victorious Western Powers offered not only to forget the past, but an equal share in their alliance. One well-known historian remarked about this change: "If it had not occurred then, I would not be able to deal with the topic, for I would be doing forced labor in a Siberian concentration camp."

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The generous initiative of the Allies was immediately accepted by Chancellor Adenauer. In August, 1950, he addressed a so-called *Sicherheitsmemorandum* to the Western governments, in which he accepted the idea that Germany should contribute her share to a new European Army. Five years later, after false starts and parliamentary delays, the Paris Agreements which formed the basis of the present rearmament of Germany, were ratified. Though the great diplomatic work was herewith accomplished, the difficulties have only begun. The basic obstacle was of a psychological nature, for the Germans, after losing a war and suffering misery and national humiliation, had to be persuaded to join those who, as the victors of the last war, had insisted upon unconditional surrender and had imposed draconic measures after the capitulation on the German people.

Public opinion in West Germany between 1950-55 could be best characterized by the two words: "*ohne mich*" (without me), an expression of the disillusionment of the veterans toward any military duty, which soon became a political slogan of great explosive potential.

This unfriendly atmosphere was also partially a result of the regulations decreed by the Military Governments between 1945-49. Some of the rules, based on Allied fear of a rekindling of the flames of German nationalism, were of a slightly ridiculous nature. Their comical components have only increased the bitterness and humiliation felt by the German masses. For example, members of the village fire departments were not allowed to march in closed formation at parades, for the rhythmically marching uniformed men would "recall

the reminiscences of the *Wehrmacht*." The fire helmets had to be repainted red, as field grey or khaki helmets might easily remind the spectators of the glory of the German Army.

The five years which elapsed between the first negotiations in Petersburg, through the mistaken attempt of the EDC, to the Paris Agreements gave the Federal Government an opportunity to deal with the seemingly insoluble problem of how to create a public opinion which would support the enactment of a conscription law. The only effective, but fundamental argument of the Chancellor's Party was that it was of vital importance to create a defense community and that everybody working against the establishment of a German army was actually rendering a service to the Communists.

The Christian Democratic and German Parties were consciously aware of the importance of the rearmament issue and did their best to convince the apathetic public to adopt the idea of a new German Army. Under such circumstances, despite political difficulties encountered in the debate over the *Wehrgesetz*, the first 1000 German volunteers began their military service on January 1, 1956. Chancellor Adenauer addressed them as follows:

"Our people see in you the incarnation of their desire to participate in the defense of the Free World. We are already equal members of this camp with the same rights and duties. The cooperation with our Allies is for us more than a contractual duty. It is for us a necessity dictated by our conscience."

Developments proved the validity of the Chancellor's words. The *Bundestag* finally enacted with a great majority a conscription law on July 6, 1956. Four months later the Hungarian Revolution swept away the apathy of the German public toward rearmament. As a result, the number of volunteers rose to ninety per cent of all the manpower needs of the incipient army. In reply to small newspaper ads, 68,645 men applied to become enlisted men and non-commissioned officers. Minister of Defense Franz Josef Strauss announced recently that 6400 draftees want to enter military service before their official call to arms, and one-third of the volunteers have already re-enlisted.

Thus, the former slogan "*ohne mich*" has gradually changed into its opposite, "*mit mir*". Twelve years after the capitulation at Rheims, the successor to the *Wehrmacht*, the *Bundeswehr*, is one of the main components of the Western defense in Europe, and General Speidel, the former chief of the General Staff of Field Marshal Rommel, is the commander of the NATO army units in Central Europe.

"Citizens in Uniform"

The new German army is guided by a spirit different from that of the *Wehrmacht* in 1945. The best example can be found if the personnel and the principles of the *Bundeswehr* is analyzed.

The *Oberkommando* of the *Wehrmacht*, which exercised supreme authority in the past, has not been re-

surrected. *The General Staff office became one of the divisions of the Ministry of Defense*, headed by a civilian, Dr. Franz Josef Strauss, a former professor of history. He was reared in Southern Germany, unlike the strict Prussian leaders of the old army. His first aide, the *Inspektor des Heeres* General Hausinger is already a military man, as his position is equivalent to that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. military establishment. He comes from Hannover, the home of the famous hussars of the First World War.

Both the Army and Navy commanders, General Hans Roettinger and Admiral Friedrich Ruge, were educated in the Hanseatic city of Hamburg, while the commander of the air force, General Josef Kamhuber, hails from Bavaria.

These leaders and their assistants started the reconstruction of the German armed forces from scratch. There was a ten-year gap between the *Wehrmacht* and the *Bundeswehr*, and ideologically hardly any ties remained. This does not mean that the German army is moving in a political vacuum. It retained the necessary and useful traditions of centuries and eliminated many harmful excesses. At the same time, German military leadership pays close attention to technical developments and adjusts its tactics accordingly. Thus the basic thinking of the German army can now be summarized as respect for noble military traditions and full exploitation of the opportunities provided by modern technology.

A new line of thinking can only be found in the new concept of the German soldier: "*the citizen in uniform.*" According to this concept, the difference between the military and civilian members of the society consists of the fact only that the former carry arms. The 'citizen in uniform' incorporates the American military spirit: "*While we put on the soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen.*"

The new soldier also requires adequate provisions during his term of service. The task is fulfilled by the most interesting new institution of the German Army, the *Innere Führung*. This form of military guidance and discipline has never existed before in Germany.

The best omen of a thorough synthesis of traditional and progressive thinking is the fact that the concept of *Innere Führung* (internal discipline) was proposed and implemented in the *Bundeswehr* by Count Baudissin, a descendant of an old-line Prussian military family. This proves a happy transformation of the '*Baukastensystem*' of the Prussian military regulations under the impact of Western ideas.

The basic concept is that the foundation of successful military action is the use of appropriate language toward the troops. The modern army has the same requirements as industry, the household and the travel business. The enlisted man cannot be treated as in the First and Second World Wars. Modern war is not simply a battle of armaments. Psychological persuasion of the soldier, reinforcing his belief that he is fighting for the right cause is of equal importance. The most suc-

cessful strategic trick employed by the Communists has been to attack the opponent only after he had been softened up by subversive propaganda. A promising antidote of this tactic is contained in the *Innere Führung*. For it is not sufficient to have a solid anti-Communist conviction. The soldier ought to know what the values are that he is supposed to defend and what the consequences of their loss would be to him personally.

The Russians have already recognized the importance of this factor. But it is only the cocked pistol of the political officers which can induce the retreating Red Army man to fight for Communist ideology. The order and discipline based on inner conviction is a more stable foundation of the Western armies.

The plan has already been implemented successfully in the new German army. Within the framework of the *Innere Führung*, the members of the *Bundeswehr* receive a clear picture of their relationship to the state and their fellow-citizens. Care is taken of their psychological and economic difficulties. Their future occupation in or outside the army receives attention, and their education is broadened by the *Allgemeine Information* and the *Aktuelle Information*. The latter is a news service for daily events and the former a detailed political commentary on them. Within the framework of cultural services (*Truppenbetreuung*), the cultural and entertainment requirements of the soldier (music, theater, movies, arts, etc...) are also provided. Personal problems of the enlisted man receive special attention, and he always knows to whom to turn for help.

Modern equipment and organization

To solidify the psychological and ideological position of the Army is one of the most important goals of its organizers who know well that a solid ideology represents a most potent weapon in the arsenal of the German army. But its equipment and organization are also very modern. On June 20, 1958, Minister of Defense Strauss elaborated on the organizational and tactical basis of the new Army which had already turned over three infantry and two armored divisions to the NATO command, with a paratrooper mountain infantry division to follow early next year, and another two divisions to be activated later in 1959.

While explaining that equipping the Russian army in Central Europe with tactical atomic weapons, the decision taken by the Federal Government to procure the same equipment for the *Bundeswehr*, and the resulting concept of 'graduated deterrence' makes reorganization necessary, Strauss emphasized the following new measures:

(a) The units of the army shall be able to use both conventional and nuclear weapons for defense and undertake defensive and offensive tasks without prior reorganization of the units during combat;

(b) All units should possess the highest degree of motorization, but at the same time should be in a position to fight under the most primitive conditions.

Thus, they should be able to fight for several days without connections to the supply units.

(c) All units should be centrally organized so that a maximum of fighting capacity can be attained with a minimum of manpower resources.

In military training, too, motorization has been stressed from the beginning. Every soldier must be a licensed driver and the era of specialists is coming to a close in the *Bundeswehr*. The modern German soldier is getting an all-round basic education in technical and military tasks, while the old traditional survival and basic training principles are still meticulously maintained.

The German army is now being reorganized somewhat on the American concept of combat teams (*Brigade*). The division is now the unit which provides the strategic and tactical leadership rather than functioning as the smallest self-contained combat unit. The new *Brigade* has 3-4000 men, armor infantry, conventional artillery, pioneers, patrol and signal troops, field intelligence, anti-armor and supply units for immediate combat necessities. The manpower of the companies will be reduced by 25 per cent, while their firepower will remain the same. This will increase the fighting capacity by about twenty per cent, given no over-all manpower reductions. The fact that the *Brigade* is being provided with supply units will enable it to fight for several days without new supplies if encircled, or if in an atomic battle connections with higher commands are broken. Atomic armament will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the army and exercised by the division or corps commander.

The German *Air Force* is still small, but all of its planes are jet-powered. In addition to about 500 reconnaissance and fighter planes, it has just received fifty F-86's from the United States.

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Another important factor is the development of friendly relations with the other Allied units. In this respect German-American cooperation has been most successful. The United States Army in Germany created two training units (GETAG and MAAG) to teach its German comrades all the knowledge gained during the tremendous technological changes of the last decade and in the Korean War. Of similar importance is the USAREUR schools in the Federal Republic and the many courses given to German officers and pilots in America.

Cooperation on a practical level remains excellent among the British, French and German armies as well as the German-French common armament research program proves.

Thus, despite some political bickerings within NATO, militarily the German army by its fighting potential helps to fulfill the old principle to be observed by the democracies:

Vigilia pretium libertatis.

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M. STANTON EVANS

The Soviet ICBM: A Paper Tiger?

America's missile program is a complex and diversified system of weapons comprising approximately 40 types of missiles, subdivided among five operational categories. Testimony before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate, while pointing up a large number of flaws in the program, has affirmed that it is fundamentally sound, and proceeding close to optimum rates in most of its phases. Testimony also established that any drastic efforts to alter current programs would, by reason of dislocated effort, have harmful rather than beneficial effects.

The fact that the U.S. program is proceeding at anticipated rates – or even more rapidly in some cases – does not establish its adequacy. This can be determined only by comparing it to the corresponding program of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, factual information about the Soviet missile program is almost nil.

The sources from which our knowledge of Soviet progress is derived are principally two: 1) announcements from Moscow that the Soviets have launched three earth satellites of extraordinary size and weight; and 2) the revelation that U.S. radar installations in Turkey had tracked Soviet missile tests, indicating that the USSR possessed an ICBM.

Taking the second of these first, there are serious grounds for questioning how much it establishes concerning Soviet progress in ICBM development. The radar did not track the missiles over intercontinental distances. Its range is only 1000 miles. It tracked missiles which, by mathematical projection, are deemed to have intercontinental capability. The missiles thus tested, it is generally assumed, have a powerful thrust capability, far possessing any at the command of the United States. The maximum distance on the Soviet testing range, however, is 4000 miles. Any "intercontinental" missile fired along this range would have a capability of between 3000 and 4000 miles. Yet the United States, as long ago as September, 1956, fired a *Jupiter-C* missile a distance of 3600 miles – a performance which, no matter how often repeated, would not have demonstrated that the United States then had an ICBM in its arsenal. The Soviet missiles tracked – like the *Jupiter-C* – were multistage rockets. *Jupiter-C* carried a light payload. Were the payloads carried by the Soviet missiles any heavier? In considering such questions, it is noteworthy to recall that the Soviets, who knew about our radar installation in Turkey, made no attempt to jam it while it tracked their weapons tests. *The New York Times'* missiles specialist, Richard Witkin, commented on this strange fact as follows: "An obvious question is why the Russians have made no attempt to jam the radar apparatus in Turkey? Informants believe the answer is equally obvious: they want us to know how well they are doing; they hope their powerful posture will stand them in good stead diplomatically."

This answer does seem obvious; however, it raises still another question: if the Soviet purpose is to see that we have an accurate idea of how well they are doing, why is it that they conduct their missile project in such absolute secrecy, never showing us one of their ICBM's (being fired or otherwise*), but instead leave our estimate of their strength to surmise and fallible deduction based upon the findings of our 1000-mile radar? Aren't they afraid that we will fail to appreciate how strong they are? Or is it possible that they fear a low estimate of their strength will result from full disclosure of the facts, whereas a higher estimate can be induced only by partial disclosure?

The comment of Charles Bartley, President of the Grand Central Rocket Company, manufacturer of the third stage of America's *Vanguard* rocket, is to the point:

"If the Russians have an ICBM, the easiest and most final way of proving it would be to fire it, photograph it – and then show the pictures to the world; but as usual, they prefer propaganda to fact. Propaganda creates mystery and suspicion. Facts leave nothing to the imagination."

The evidence of Soviet ICBM capability which can be derived from such U.S. radar monitoring as has been made public to date is slight, and would have meaning only if it could be shown as part of a pattern of substantive proof that the Soviets had made strides toward the development of an ICBM.

There is, however, no such proof – according to the testimony of those best in a position to know. The only evidence of any kind which has been brought forward to support Soviet ICBM claims is the weight attributed to the three Soviet earth satellites. Yet we have no reason to believe that these three objects were of such formidable dimensions, other than the fact that the Soviets tell us so.

While many of those commenting on the earth satellites have accepted Soviet claims *at face value*, there have also been some doubters – including such eminently qualified persons as Rear Admiral Rawson Bennett (U.S. Chief of Naval Research), Mrs. Anna T. Mashevich (Vice President of the Soviet Astronautical Council), and Dr. Richard van der Riet Woolley (Britain's leading astronomer). Professor W. J. Reeve of Fordham University summed up the crucial point:

"...Have we so quickly lost our reasonable distrust of Soviet methods that we accept everything they assert – especially in regard to a question that we have no available scientific means of checking without Soviet cooperation."

The point is that we simply do not know what the Soviet satellites weigh; and we likewise do not know whether the Soviets have an intercontinental ballistic missile, or whether they are even equivalent to us in the development of one.

Nevertheless, Western opinion leaders have felt compelled to accept Soviet claims at face value – not on the basis of objective evidence, but on the basis of the so-called “safe-assumption”. The “safe assumption” school of thought holds that we must proceed on the belief that the Soviet Union is substantially ahead of us in the development of missiles, in order to assure a maximum effort in our own project, and to create a “sense of urgency” among the American people.

Reflection indicates, however, that the “safe assumption” is not in fact safe. This is so because there are dangers other than that of complacency, which the “safe assumption” and its near-relative, the “sense of urgency” are designed to override. Principally, there are the quite opposite dangers of panic and fear psychology, which are promoted by constant representations of Soviet might and U.S. futility. Such efforts, as General Nathan Twining, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has pointed out, may bring about “fatal compromises” and foreign policy “retreats” in U.S. dealings with the Soviet Union.

Insistence upon supposed Soviet superiority and the ‘fact’ that Soviet missiles will allegedly be able, in the near future, to blast American cities has had an observable effect on some elements in this country. It can hardly be considered a coincidence that a renewed demand for a Summit conference with Nikita Krushchev has followed close upon the Sputnik announcements, or that, in discussions of such a conference, little or no mention is made of the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

Harry Schwartz, a respected student of Communist technique, identifying the principal elements in the post-Sputnik Moscow line, put the promotion of belief in Soviet armed might at the top of the list. “A major effort – he wrote – is being made to create the stereotype of the Soviet Union as being now the world’s strongest military and scientific power.”

Apart from its effect on opinion in this country, the “safe assumption” has had a profound impact on thinking abroad. It has to a great extent impaired West European confidence in United States’ leadership and conferred upon the Soviet Union that kind of prestige which is born of terror. Similarly, insistence upon the “safe assumption” confirms the terror-stricken reaction of the so-called neutralist nations. When they see the Soviet Union being acknowledged as the world’s foremost power – even by some highly vocal elements in the United States – these nations are drawn even closer to the Communist orbit.

A report on the impact of the Soviet Union’s alleged might on neutralist nations states: “Until now, the Asian and African neutralists (in the United Nations) have urged the United States, because of its superior strength, to compromise with the Soviet Union. Now that the balance of power is altered, these same countries are beginning to insist that this is all the more reason for the United States – they do not expect compromise from the Soviet Union – to make concessions. With the neutralists, and particularly the Arab countries, nothing succeeds like success.

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It is true that “safe assumption” thinking may have some good effects, in the way of producing more armament somewhat faster – although, on the basis of testimony by expert witnesses, the degree to which this can occur is open to question. *It should be remembered, however, that the U.S. has been pre-eminent in armed power since the end of World War II. In that same period, Communism has extended its reach until it rules more than one-third of the world’s population, while America and its free-world allies have staged repeated strategic withdrawals. Such a record would seem to indicate that our shortcomings have not been in the area of military hardware. The record discloses, in fact, that we have failed to meet the Communist challenge because we have lacked sufficient determination and clarity of purpose; our failure has been a failure of will and of the ability to analyze the danger confronting us.*

Our inadequacy has been manifest in the lack of consistent high-level policy directed to the *destruction of Communist power*, and in our unwillingness to recognize that we are engaged in a life-or-death struggle where such things as *earth satellites*, whatever their direct military bearing, should be looked upon as *psychological weapons* to be used against our enemy.

When he testified before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate, General James H. Doolittle cited what he believed to be the advantages possessed by the Soviet Union in the present struggle. He began his list as follows: “One is that she has a definite, clear-cut objective. This objective is world Communization and world domination. She has a long-range, flexible, consistent plan for the achievement of that objective.”

The absence of such a consistent objective in America’s strategic thinking means that there is no high policy which unifies our scientific and military exertions. Thus there occur innumerable failures to understand what must be accomplished at the tactical level. Officials are unable to appreciate the significance of decisions demanded of them, because higher policy has not accustomed them to think of their responsibilities in relation to a single defined national goal. In the satellite controversy, the clearest example of such a failure at the tactical level was the decision not to allow the *Project Orbiter* people to put a satellite aloft, as originally proposed, but to turn the U.S. program over to the Navy’s *Vanguard* team. Some experts believe that the Orbiter plan could have placed a U.S. satellite aloft as early as 1955. This opportunity for a large-scale psychological victory was bypassed because the officials involved did not focus consistently on the fact that we are locked in a struggle where every such enterprise is a weapon.

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WILLIAM SPENCER

Middle East Development: A Reappraisal

The average American of 1958, even if highly attuned to the shifting currents of modern political history, and able to evaluate them from a thorough knowledge of the past, may be forgiven for the intent to wash his hands of the Middle East. It is a commonplace to observe that Western sins of omission (or commission) have redounded to Western discredit, to criticize Versailles diplomacy for creating Arab nationalism, yet failing to recognize the later consequences of certain ambiguous promises made to Arab and Jewish leaders. The reader, even if unaware of this background, is well-informed, however, on the maneuverings of General 'Abd al-Nasir and his confreres, who work disruptively (no other word will suffice) to create total Arab unity. This unifying action, it is repeatedly maintained, will under Egyptian leadership swallow those islands of pro-Westernism — Iraq, Jordan, now Lebanon — in a sea of mistrustful Arabs, oriented if not committed toward the Soviet Union.

Can we look for any improvement in the apparently endemic sickness of the Middle East? Or have these grievances — Israel, refugees in tents, Suez invasion, and the broader issues mentioned above — festered to the point of gangrene? One way to answer this question is to expand the narrow limits of this region: another to look beyond political troubles at those components of the regional scene which, for obvious reasons, are not stressed in the newspapers of America. Behind the headlines are people, working and suffering, and we have to seek them out and study their motives.

One fact to remember is that the Middle East is a *sharply divided area economically, as well as politically*. The "have-not" nations, lacking adequate resources for a sound development program, bitterly resent the "haves". Consider Egypt, a poor country, its one-crop economy dependent on the Nile. The bitter feud between Egypt and Iraq over leadership of the Arabs is caused to no small extent by Iraq's advantage in natural resources. One hears little of the ambitious developments promised by Nasser when the Revolutionary Command Committee ousted King Farouk. The abrupt dismissal early this year of the Government — appointed director of Nasser's "Liberation Province", that Western desert area which was to be the showcase of Egyptian cooperative development to benefit the fellah, appears in retrospect a clue to Egyptian behavior toward its Arab neighbors. Leadership in a united Arab World by Iraq would cost that country a large portion of income now

devoted to internal development, assumption of hegemony by Egypt would cost that country nothing.

A unified Middle East — that is, Turkey, the Arab states, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and possibly the Sudan and the Arabian sheikdoms — would unquestionably serve the best interests of the Free World in the long run. Aside from removing an irritant in world politics, and solving most of the crucial interstate conflicts extant, Middle Eastern unity would result in economic developments presently impossible. The oil pipeline across Jordan is now useless, because its outlet is in Israel, and pipelines for Iraqi oil must transit the Syrian portion of the United Arab Republic, exposed to careless Syrian dynamiters. But one cannot use Western logic in dealing with the Oriental mind; one can only suggest and then await consideration.

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Recently two different schemes for regional economic development have begun to take shape. They are both divorced from politics, while now premature, and may eventually become the freeways to unity so ardently desired by friends of the Middle East. The first one of these is the Baghdad Pact, or rather its economic secretariat. From its conception, the Pact stressed economic as well as military objectives. The obvious increase of Russian military power may have outdated the Pact as a defensive military alliance, but economic health, as an Iranian official observed at the Council's 1956 meeting, is the only assurance of stability and peace.

Pact achievements until the present in regional economic development read better on paper than in reality. The obstacles to schemes involving the cooperation of member nations remain immense. Britain, the only non-Middle Eastern member, is non-contiguous and heavily committed on other fronts. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the Pakistan, the four Moslem members, do not constitute a natural trading area, like the Nile Basin. Vast distances and natural barriers separate them; communications are primitive. The emphasis on military planning at first led the members to subordinate cooperative planning to strategic projects.

The survival of the Pact's Economic Committee, is a good omen, however. Not unexpectedly, its chief progress to date is in the communications field. Development of a common market or a free trade area awaits adequate road, rail, and telecommunications network.

The Eisenhower Doctrine pledged \$12,750,000 for four major regional projects linking the Pact capitals, and others are underway. Some cooperation has also developed between some countries in specific fields: Pakistan and Iran (timber and mineral resources), Turkey and Iraq (Tigris-Euphrates waters), Iran and Turkey (roads and railways).

The other regional scheme for development in the Middle East is more recent, ambitious, and in its composition more fortunate than the Baghdad Pact Economic Committee. It is called MIDEC and was chartered on March 17, 1958. MIDEC stands for "Middle Eastern Industrial Development Corporation." It forms the most interesting countermeasure the West has yet devised to Soviet economic penetration into the region. Originally conceived as a joint American-European non-governmental organization to assist in Middle East development, it has been modified to allow direct participation in the corporation by interested Middle Eastern investors and companies.

MIDEC's Chairman is Dr. Paul Rijkens, head of the vast Unilever Soap enterprises. The Board of Directors and the Executive Committee are composed of industrialists and business leaders from England, France, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany and the United States. Its aim is to include Lebanon, the United Arab Republic, the Iraq-Jordan Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Kuwait and Iran, in a 20-nation private development group. Following the report of a study group which visited the area, MIDEC opened an office in Beirut, coordinated with its present main office in The Hague. According to Dr. Rijkens, the ma-

majority of equity capital will be held by local investors, the minority capital by European and American industry.

MIDEC will act in the role of a catalyst in the fields of industry and commerce, investigating suitable projects in the various countries with a view of establishing operating companies for their development. For its services, MIDEC would receive a five per cent participation in the equity capital of any local operating company, in the establishment of which it has been influential.

Any predictions of the future usefulness of MIDEC to regional development would be, of course, premature. Nevertheless the corporation starts life with certain advantages. It has not been labeled imperialist by the Communists, or colonialist by Arab nationalists. It is starting modestly with a survey in Lebanon. The best brains and business acumen of American and European corporation leaders are directing it - American participants include First Boston Corporation, the Rockefeller Center, International Basic Economy Corporation, H. J. Heinz Co. and others. It has no prior record of political or military activity. From time to time Middle Eastern businessmen have expressed a desire to cooperate with their Western counterparts but without surrendering control over projects which they want, because of lack of managerial or technical skill. The advisory role of MIDEC would preclude a non-regional 'take-over' of any projects and would serve to spur local participation in regional development to an extent hitherto unknown.

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Book Review

TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, edited by Philip W. Thayer. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 350 pages.

Asked to summarize his impressions of this four-day conference sponsored in August 1957 by the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, a representative of *Newsweek* began by remarking that the menu had been 'varied and well-balanced, packed with proteins and vitamins and containing very little fat.' This does indeed distinguish this volume from many recent symposia on the Middle East, each of which has contained one or two good articles but also some hardly worth the publishing. Here the student may particularly be recommended to read the excellent papers on the United States and the Middle East, problems of Arab political behavior, technical assistance in the Middle East, recent developments in Islam, the Cyprus problem (both political and economic), and the Suez crisis from both its legal and United Nations aspects.

U.S. policy had the approval, stated or implied, of only three contributors: the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Emeritus Professor Quincy Wright, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Middle East who contributed the delicious identification of 'a policy based squarely on moral considerations and upon the American national interest' (p.94). As against this solemn pronouncement Mr. Dean Acheson is quoted for his comment on the 'combination of phony law and fuzzy morals' demonstrated at the time of Suez (p. 248). It is as if the city

umbrella, which Neville Chamberlain carried when he signed away Czechoslovakia's future to Hitler twenty years ago, had suffered a transatlantic sea-change into a golf umbrella.

Professor Bernard Lewis points the moral (p. 60): "Western rule in Asia has indeed gone, and a distinguished Indian scholar was right in speaking of the end of 'the Vasco da Gama era' in Asian history. It would be both tragic and ironic if it were to be succeeded by a Khrushchev and Bulganin era."

Professor P.J. Vatikiotis was prescient in remarking on the recent 'steady revival in the concept of an Islamic community (umma), especially in Egypt' and on the tendency 'to reject the Western origin of nationalism and to base it on Islam' (pp. 174-5): for these tendencies were to be emphasized in Gamal Abdul Nasir's speech of 5 February 1958 proclaiming the United Arab Republic; and T.R. Little has done well to comment (*The World Today*, March 1958, xiv.96) that Abdul Nasir 'finds himself... in the role of a secular "caliph" - except that the word 'secular' is a misleading projection from a European context. The caliph was always more of a Holy Roman Emperor than a Pope, and Saladin (with whom Abdul Nasir is being increasingly compared) displaced the last of the Fatimid caliphs in Cairo much as Abdul Nasir has displaced Faruq.

The reader should finally be warned against a series of chronological and factual errors of detail in R.N. Carew Hunt's article, between pp. 317 and 321, that disfigure an otherwise impeccable piece of editing.

GEORGE KIRK

GABRIEL GERSH

The 'Peaceful' World of Soviet Magazines

It would be superfluous to point out that every Russian magazine consists of propaganda. There is no magazine, like *Life*, which enables the Soviet reader to escape into a world of make-believe. Yet, in a way, the technicolor South-Sea island paradise which is presented to the American public has its equivalent in the Soviet press, and perhaps by dint of musing on it, the Russians have come to regard this vision as their paradise. It is the vision of the perfect future Communist state.

The romance lies in the thrill and adventure of its gradual construction. All over the world, often as martyrs, the glorious army marches forward. The romanticized version of Communist progress all over the face of the earth might in itself be called escapism. The Russian is taught to forget the dead of this era and to have faith in the future of his children. The strange, unromantic symbols of this future are usually grotesque machines; they are a symbol of peace, plenty and happiness. This is how the vision is presented in the Russian magazine *Aganyok*. "The wind blows clouds of white dust across the Stalingrad steppe... the peasants remember the 'dead fields' of the scorched earth... but now, where the dead once lay, where the tanks and cannons were thrown, they see arising the mighty Volga-Don shipping canal."

And with this vision must the bereaved be consoled, for progress of this sort is to the Communists the ultimate truth in life, and therefore transcends all suffering.

We, in the West, continually return to the past for our epics, and we see them as isolated things, ranging from the Battle of Trafalgar to the defeat of the last of the Indian chiefs on the warpath. To the Soviets their epic is a long and continuous battle for progress and the 'liberation of mankind'; there is only one war, and it goes on all the time. The construction of the Volga-Don Canal, the Stalingrad siege, and the international peace campaign are all incidents in the same war.

We Americans have sometimes asserted our national heritage by making films on the pioneer construction of our railroads. For the Russians, too, the railroad is a symbol of what they are striving for, but their attitude is different. They weave haloes of glory around the railroads of the present. Nor are they national railroads, but the "*railroads of mankind*". A few years ago the Soviet press was crammed with articles about Tito's Youth Railroad. This spirit of endeavor in an embryonic Utopia was calculated to stir the hearts of the elder Soviets and spur them on to new efforts. Albania has now taken the place of Yugoslavia as the embryonic Utopia. With distance lending enchantment to the eye,

articles glorifying the achievements of Albania are always to be found in the Soviet press. They give a practical illustration to the Soviet people that man achieves what he wants in this world only with his own hands, and that the only faith he requires is faith in his Communist future.

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The Soviet press continually picks out its ideal type of human being from the "new" places, like Albania, or even Korea. The ideal woman is of two types. One is the woman of strength and talent whose prime duty in life is to put her qualities at the direct service of the State. Such a woman is Dora Leka of Albania, as portrayed in *Sovyetskaya Zhenshchina*. At first she is a negative heroine, her merits consisting of the opportunities she never had. She loved music but her greatest merit was that, even if there had been a school of music in Albania, she could never have afforded to attend it. At a tender age she joined an underground organization that operated against Mussolini's colonizers. In 1941, she "took to the hills", and there, between battles and heroic deeds, she started her musical life in earnest, composing "Hymn of Albanian Youth", "Hymn of the Albanian Army", and "Song of the First Division", which the Partisans sang as they marched into Tirana. After the war she went to the Moscow conservatorium. She was thus now equipped, emotionally, technically, and by general upbringing to be a woman pioneer in the field of music.

All the women, of course, cannot be like Dora Lenka. Most must be tender mothers. The Soviets do not believe in sentimental portrayals of woman, unless there is a twist to it. Soviet propaganda heavily accents the tenderness of Russian woman. The mothers are always put to the foreground in the campaign for peace. On the cover of *Aganyok* we see in technicolor a pugnacious peasant mother standing before her daughters with clenched fist, while the caption reads, "*We stand for Peace!*" Or in *Soviet Woman* we find the photo of a North Korean mother, dressed in white, in springtime, with her babe in her arms, and underneath a poem that reads, "I remember you like that, Korean mother, in forty-five as you thought of the happiness ahead. There will never be any forgiveness for the swine who levelled guns at your babe." This tender springtime mother is thus transformed into a symbol of revenge.

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It is a tribute to the Soviet internal propaganda system that, if war comes, very few Soviet people will think even a small share of the blame falls on the Sov-

et Union. If we look through Western magazines, we often find pictures of troops, new weapons and airplanes. We see, in fact, our half of the world preparing for the eventuality of war. But in the Soviet Union one seldom sees pictures showing Soviet preparations for war. There are only pictures of Western rearmament and the occasional communique or speech saying that Russia must be prepared to defend itself. Instead, there are pictures of folk-dancing in traditional dress; gigantic portraits of peaceful peasants and noble steel-workers; of Chinese popular pageantry, mass choirs, and sunlit maternity wards. The Soviet magazines portray the hard-working, song-loving Communist peoples marching to their glorious destiny. Peace and plenty is on everybody's lips in these magazines, so that, naturally, the Russian people can only conceive of war as something that might be thrust upon them by an iniquitous outside world.

The Communist people of the world are represented as being perpetually on the defensive — from the military point of view. The persecution mania of the individual Communist has become the government-sponsored mania of hundreds of millions of people in the East. The Americans produce stories and films in which war is accepted as something inevitable, (e.g. *Walk in the Sun* and *Battleground*); we imply that groups of people must fight for survival against rival groups of people. Soviet magazine stories make war synonymous with Fascism and capitalism, and peace synonymous with Communism.

Max Polyanovsky has written a story in *Aganyok* called "*His Fate*", which corresponds to the sort of story we might read in any of the popular larger weeklies of America. It relates how Capt. Gasilov, during the Stalingrad campaign, found a child amidst the wreckage of a train, kept him during the war, and finally adopted him. This symbolism of the Red Army captain thinking of the citizens of the future in the heat of battle, leads up to a sort of peace petition in the last paragraph: "There are rogues in the world who would annihilate everything for their own gains. To them the happiness of mothers means nothing. But all honorable people believe they will have the strength to prevent another war."

As we think of the aggressive and imperialist character of the Communist Chinese government, we find vaguely ludicrous the Utopian story *New Things* translated into a Russian magazine from the Chinese *Gu Yui*. It is the story of two Chinese peasants who get married. The girl refuses to waste money on a trousseau; the groom refuses to send for his bride in an expensive *palankeen*. He tells his outraged mother that the old, feudal customs are unworthy of "activists". The bride is given away by the President of the Woman's Union. The village elder makes a wedding speech in which he explains away the young couple's romance by saying that they had worked together harmoniously in the fields, that they had liked each other, and that, because of the government drive for economy, she had not wasted money on a trousseau. Presumably they live happily ever after or perhaps the groom is sent to one

of the southern coastal cities where his government is building up its military forces for an invasion of Formosa. The story does not say.

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The Russians are considered a fundamentally religious people. Their feelings run deep and their outlook on life is simple. It has been a comparatively easy matter for the government to channel these qualities of the masses into the official, simplified pattern of life. This pattern is imprinted on their minds by consistent exaltation of qualities which, while they may be of intrinsic value in themselves, cannot mean the beginning and end of life, as the Soviet propaganda system would have its millions of subjects believe. The danger to the rest of the world comes not so much from what the Soviet propaganda includes as what it *excludes*. To build a railroad or a hydro-electric station will always be a laudable desire; to imagine oneself as part of a great army struggling for peace and progress is enough to put any man's conscience at rest. *But the Russian people have been led to believe that all these fine ambitions stop dead at the frontier of Communism, and that on the other side people have completely reversed these aims of life, i.e., they struggle for war and reaction.* Thus the twin aims of Soviet internal propaganda have been rather successfully achieved: the Russians have complete belief in their own way of life, and disbelief in anybody else's.

The Russians have thus been forged perhaps the most formidable single fighting force in history. When Hitler's troops marched, the Nazis put their faith mainly in their own strength; they made no pretenses of being concerned with human rights. But, due partly to the Russian apocalyptic temperament, and chiefly to the overwhelming internal propaganda machine, the messianistic Russians, if they attack Europe and America, will not only have material strength, but the quasi-religious conviction that they are fighting to save humanity. And they might overrun Europe with the slogan "*We stand for Peace*" still fluttering from their banners.

The Soviet popular outlook has been exalted to an almost religious level. The Russian magazines parroting the official line refer to the internal situation in an almost medieval manner, as if it consisted of a clear-cut battle between 'God and Devil'. The 'God' is Marx, Lenin is his son, and the present rulers are their apostles. Their mission is the 'salvation of mankind.' They are all love and kindness but implacable when aroused. A flood of poems, articles and songs about these qualities are printed in the Soviet press. Take, for instance, a song written by Akim Samar in *Soviet Woman*. It is called *Our Great Friends*:

Their minds are clear and broad
broad as the meadowlands
Their minds are shining and deep
deep as the deep blue seas.

They have mighty hearts
There are no hearts like theirs.
Almighty are their wills,
Stronger we cannot find.

(Continued on page 23.)



LETTERS - REPORTS



FROM THE CAPITALS OF THE WORLD

TEL AVIV

EUGENE HINTERHOFF

ISRAEL PREPARES FOR THE THIRD MILLION

Many tens of thousands of tourists, mostly Jews, will be arriving in Israel almost from all parts of the world - except Russia - during 1958 for the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the existence of Israel as an independent State. Most of the 80,000 expected tourists will come from the United States and Western Europe. The achievements of Israel in its first decade have brought on a growing interest in the country and draw more and more tourists each year. The number of tourists has already more than trebled, as compared with 1950, and the growing interest is manifested also in the waves of non-Jewish visitors.

The achievements of Israel during that turbulent period, since the end of the British Mandate, have been impressive indeed. In the political field, Israel established diplomatic and commercial relations with seventy five governments in all five Continents; membership in the United Nations, won 9 years ago, became the foundation of Israel's status in international law.

Israel has won the friendship of many nations, some of whom were quite reluctant to vote for its independence or recognize it. The most significant achievement in the diplomatic and political field is Israel's warm relations with the U.S., South America, France and the rest of the Western European countries. Not less important are its cordial relations with Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia, Japan, Burma, etc., - all members of the Afro-Asian bloc.

Elsewhere in Europe, a deep communion of spirit and policy had arisen between Israel and France, a reminder of the fact that both countries are inseparably linked by history and geography to the Middle East. Members of the *Commonwealth*, whose memories of pioneering immigrant days are still fresh in their memories, have been sustaining Israel's progress from its earlier days.

In the military field, as a result of her victories over her Arab neighbors in 1948/49, and, above all, of the

spectacular victory during the Sinai campaign, Israel established herself - with the exception of Turkey - as the strongest military power in the Middle East.

The Arab World and some of the Moslem countries persist in their hostility towards Israel. Yet, even the Arabs are today aware of the impossibility of annihilating Israel. Internal difficulties and competition between Cairo and Baghdad on the hegemony of the Arab World, stand in the way of peace. Israel is still offering a friendly hand to its Arab neighbors and is ready for a peace conference. A significant fact is the absence of grave incidents along Israel's Egyptian border. While Israelis recognize that Nasser has not yet openly relinquished the idea of having another "round" with Israel, they are happy to have this relative peace which enables them to carry on their development projects.

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The most important achievement is the absorption of one million refugees, most of them remnants of the Nazi holocaust, and refugees from the Middle East. Their economic and social integration into a highly civilized society is a real victory in a human venture and also a test in Israel's future. This process of integration of different groups, coming from various countries with different standards, is called in Israel "a pressure cooker", and, indeed, every visitor in Israel hears this expression almost immediately after his arrival.

The growth of its population has been coupled with the growth of its agriculture - which has been more than trebled -, the building up of a modern and versatile light and heavy industry, and development of scientific institutions of the highest standard.

In short, Israel during her first decade has established herself as a modern nation, militarily strong and politically stable, with a wise and dynamic leadership. This tiny country, with a territory smaller than that of New Jersey, is a true democracy where the dignity of

The individual has not been sacrificed to the overriding interest of a Moloch-state.

Even after a very short visit one can grasp the spectacular achievements of Israel—a land of striking contrasts between a Biblical past and an imaginative, somewhat futuristic building up of a tomorrow—which still has to face an enormous task, made more difficult by the tremendous military necessities in view of the Arab threat. Spending even a short time in Israel enables one to notice the feeling of a quiet pride shared by all citizens of Israel in various walks of life, from a humble taxi driver to her Prime Minister.

And indeed, when one sees the modern port of Haifa, busily bustling with life, with various brand new factories rising up in its outskirts; or Tel-Aviv, which only 50 years ago was nothing but sand dunes and is today a modern metropolis with well over half a million inhabitants, gleaming blocks of apartment houses and modern hotels and streets crammed with American cars, establishments like the Weitzman Institute of Science and the Haifa Technion (Israel's M.I.T.), one feels rather in danger of contamination with this sort of exuberance prevailing in the blossoming air of Israel.

Not all, though, is rosy in Israel, and its leaders do not ignore the difficulties still lying ahead of them. The question so often asked in the West whether Israel is a viable state, simply does not exist either for Israel's leaders or for her people. For all of them Israel has come to stay, and they also believe that this fact is being gradually accepted in the Arab world. They consider the inflammatory tirades by Nasser against Israel either as a routine rhetoric for the masses or, perhaps, as manoeuvres against his Arab rivals in his bid for leadership. They are worried about these tirades but they do not get hysterics. They warn against Nasser's ambitions but they are sure of their might to curb them, if necessary.

In appraising the recent events in the Arab world, the Israeli political and military leaders believe that this present process of fermentation could give them a valuable time to develop and build up their country, and, above all—and this is the most important problem now—to absorb the third million of immigrants into the existing borders.

Consequently, it goes without saying, that Israel

would never agree to any return to 1947 frontiers, though a mutual border adjustment is not excluded.

For a British subject it is comforting to see that Israeli attitude toward Britain has been changed considerably and several Israeli politicians or diplomats in a frank chat are ready to admit that they won't mind to see Britain's eventual return to her traditional position in the Middle East as a stabilizing factor. Such views of course, do not affect their sentimental ties with America.

The blueprints of a plan to absorb that third million of immigrants have been almost completed, and a great importance has been attached in these plans to the development of the Negev, which reminds a visitor of the films of romantic American Wild West. Its vast empty spaces need water for irrigation, and, at the same time, it awaits the results of various geological research missions which will attempt to find some untapped natural resources. All these ambitious plans need for their realization a tremendous amount of creative energy, practical science, and, above all, foreign investment.

This brings us to a fundamental problem which preoccupies the minds of Israeli leaders today. They realize that in 1964 German reparations will come to an end and it will be also necessary to begin to repay Israeli Bonds sold in the United States. They also realize that in order to achieve an economic independence Israel will have to treble its export within the coming decade. The progress of the first ten years may be a promising sign. Exports in 1949 amounted to \$30 million and in 1957 to \$140 million; production has been trebled and so has industry and the merchant marine. There is still considerable gap to close between exports and imports and the country is working relentlessly and feverishly towards this goal.

The enthusiasm of the people of Israel (Mr. Ben-Gurion is reputed to have said that *economic laws do not apply to Israel*) and their devotion and energy may well shatter the doubts of some economists. Given a few years of relative peace, Israeli leaders are deeply convinced that Israel can survive as an outpost of Western civilization and achieve economic stability. Peace with its Arab neighbors will, no doubt, help Israel and them alike.

THE 'PEACEFUL' WORLD OF SOVIET MAGAZINES

(Continued from page 21.)

Their 'God' is constant but the 'Devil' has many forms. Once it was Churchill, but Dulles now far overshadows him. Once the Devil has been identified, he receives the full scorn and abuse of the Soviet magazine press, so that his grotesque, caricatured figure haunts the soul of Soviet citizens. The enemy is thus given a concrete shape. The Soviet 'humorous' periodical, *Crocodile*, is a positive nightmare of devils.

The impression, then, that we derive from reading even the less official press is that in the land of smiling faces and sunlit maternity wards, there is no thought but of peace. Coupled with this is the important corollary that each citizen must be made in Lenin's image in order to beat off the Western devils when they attack. And devils always do attack.

CANBERRA

DENYS JAC...

PEKING'S DRIVE FOR RECOGNITION

The campaign for expansion of Australian trade with Communist China is the main current propaganda line of the Communist Party of Australia and of the Australian Labor Party, which since 1954 has pursued a pro-Communist foreign policy.

This campaign has received an impetus on two fronts in Australia in recent weeks. In the first place, a trade delegation from Communist China has been touring Australia. The newspapers have been conspicuously silent about its whereabouts while the trade delegation has been pursuing private talks with representatives of primary producers' organizations in particular. The obvious idea is to build up influential contacts quietly so that when the next public campaign on the Communist China trade issue develops a number of influential persons of impeccable non-Communist antecedents will have been involved already.

The second instance was the return of the Federal President of the Australian Labor Party (Mr. J. Chamberlain) from a visit to Communist China where he was a guest at the May Day celebrations. He too repeated the same line on the necessity for trade relationship with Communist China and accompanied that line with the usual inspired reports concerning the "progress" of China under Communism and of the existence of relative religious freedom under the Communist regime.

Repeated in identical phrases by spokesmen of both the Australian Labor Party and the Communist Party, the line is by now familiar enough to Australians. It is:

- (1) Recognize Communist China.
- (2) Increase trade with Communist China.
- (3) Give Communist China a seat in the United Nations.

Currently a Red Chinese trade delegation is in Australia, beating up business.

Trap for the Unwary

The plea is, on the surface, a reasonable one, designed to appeal to the uninformed and the unthinking. Refusal to give diplomatic recognition to the Peking regime is, we are told, a needless insult. By recognizing the Communist government, we lay the foundations for friendship instead of enmity; these foundations will be strengthened by increasing trade with mainland China.

By giving Red China a seat in the United Nations, we would be enabling her to put her case before the councils of the world, without recourse to methods which could possibly involve a threat to peace.

But it is no mere coincidence that finds the Communist Party putting forward such "reasonable" proposals, just as it is no mere coincidence that finds the Australian Labor Party and the Communist Party speak-

ing with a single voice. The "reasonable" proposals, would, if implemented, greatly further the imperialistic designs of Red China in Asia. They are being advocated, not to strengthen world peace, but to enable the Peking regime along its road to conquest.

The Overseas Chinese

Recognition of Red China is important to Communist plans for Asia – and South East Asia in particular – for with it is tied up the whole question of the allegiance of the overseas Chinese. There are more than 11 million Chinese living in SE Asian countries like Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia. In many of these countries they are numerically powerful, comprising a third of the population or more, and in all they exercise an immense influence on the national economy. In fact, of Malaya and Thailand it can be said that the Chinese community virtually controls the economy of the country.

They are in every way *key people*. If their allegiance goes to the Peking government, it is only a matter of a relatively short time before all South-East Asia follows suit. The important thing to remember is that Chinese emigrants in SE Asia seldom, if ever, sever their ties with their homeland. They are not usual colonists, like the Japanese for instance. Their aim is not so much to find a new life abroad, as to make money, then return home to spend their old age. They are very responsive to pressures and influence, from home, and their allegiance is generally given automatically to the leaders of the local Chinese community – who are invariably the representatives of the Chinese government. Thus, the Peking regime sees in the Overseas Chinese a vast, potential fifth column.

However, the best they can count on at present is a divided allegiance. While the Free Chinese government exists on Formosa, it stakes a prior claim. The Overseas Chinese are naturally anti-Communist. They are business-men; the plight of their friends and relations in mainland China has not endeared the Communist regime to them. But, where the Peking regime is locally recognized, the natural pressures tend to make them follow the Red lead. It can be said with reasonable accuracy that, where the Free Chinese Government is recognized, the local Chinese are anti-Communist. Where the Peking government is recognized, its representative commands local allegiance.

A priority-target for Communist diplomatic offensives and Communist propaganda is to bring about the overall recognition of the Peking regime, and the complete discrediting of the Free Chinese government. If this is done, the whole of South-East Asia must inevitably fall, like a ripe plum, into the Communist net.

CAPTIVE EUROPE

Bulletin

SELECTED ARTICLES, VIEWS AND FACTS ON CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN PROBLEMS

Mr. Hammarskjold's Strange Record

The General Secretary of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold gave a press statement in connection with the murder of Imre Nagy. In this, he declared that he will "consider the event and investigate whether Hungary's membership in the United Nations should not be revised."

The statement cannot be criticized on formal grounds. According to the rules of diplomacy, the General Secretary of the United Nations cannot call a murder a murder or make promises in the name of the organization he is working for, nor is he allowed to use passionate words in a public statement, though he might feel moral indignation. Thus, it does not matter that Mr. Hammarskjold said only so little. What hurts us is that even the tenor of his statement is false. For Mr. Hammarskjold will even now not consider the facts and draw from them the obvious political and diplomatic or moral consequences. Or, to put it plain: *he will continue to do nothing.*

This bitter prophecy is based upon the sad record of almost two years. The Soviet leaders and their Hungarian puppets have in the past twenty months exhausted the repertoire of all the crimes, for the prevention of which the United Nations were organized. They crushed the independence of a nation, and imposed on it by the power of armor and artillery a form of government against which this nation was struggling and protesting to the bitter end. Mr. Hammarskjold did not fly with his usual quickness to Budapest, as he does when the fate of an oilpipe is at stake. First, he promised to make a visit, then he withdrew his promise. After all, only the freedom of ten million people was involved. Though his appearance might have decisively influenced the attitude of the still vacillating Russians, he did not come. Later, when thousands of Hungarian freedom-fighters were being deported, and new hundreds and thousands were brought before the firing-squad, Mr. Hammarskjold kept calling thousands of witnesses to inquire whether there was a revolution in Hungary and whether it was really Russian power which crushed the fight?

The documentary evidence was published in a book, and the United Nations formally condemned Kadar & Co. The Russians abducted the legal Prime Minister of Hungary and held him imprisoned for more than a year and a half. Despite all the facts and evidence, Mr. Hammarskjold considered no measures to be necessary against the violators of the U.N. Charter. Only after Imre Nagy's execution is the General Secretary considering what to do. It is not impossible that the United Nations will again pass a condemning resolution against Kadar and Co. Of course, without any sanctions. In order to prove that this murder, like all the other murders in Hungary were committed at the direct instruction of the Soviet Russian government, the United Nations might again need a thousand witnesses who can only be reached with great difficulty. It might also insist on new observers who then will be barred again from entering Hungary. Therefore, the name of the USSR will not even appear in this process.

Ten million Hungarians, until the fall of 1956, desperate of other hopes, nurtured exceeding confidence in the person and the office of Mr. Hammarskjold. Perhaps the unforgettable memory of *Gustavus Adolphus*, *Haakon VII*, *Folke-Bernadotte* and *Raoul Wallenberg* contributed to his image in the Hungarian mind. This was the image of a man who already in his life resembles to his later bronze-statue, and who fulfills his responsibilities without sparing energy or his personal security, following the commandments of his humanitarian and professional conscience.

Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, we are sorry to say, does *not* belong to this class of courageous, resolute statesmen. He is rather the spiritual successor to the old bureaucracy of the League of Nations at Geneva, who pushes files, creates committees and sub-committees without realizing that due to his position he had become a man of destiny on the scale of history. It is a tragedy that Mr. Hammarskjold turned out to be a short-weight on his place.

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(The foregoing article was published originally in the *Irodalmi Ujsag (Literary Gazette)*, the official organ of the Hungarian Writers' Federation in exile, in London, on July 1, 1958.—ED.)

The West's Greatest Weapon Against Moscow

(The following are excerpts from an interview given recently by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky to A.B.N. Correspondence, an anti-Communist paper published in Germany. Mr. Dobriansky is professor of Georgetown University and national Chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. He is also a member of the editorial board of Free World Review.—ED.)

Q. In what way do you think it would be possible to overthrow the Russian Bolshevik imperium, if the leading statesmen of the free world are not prepared to give active support to the national liberation revolutions as was the case in Hungary?

A. Rationally, in order to overthrow the Russian Communist Empire there is no other way possible than that of active Western support of all the national liberation movements in this vast and unprecedented empire and of the eventual revolutions which they necessarily imply. As entertained by Mr. George F. Kennan, the notion of transfiguration of this empire through cultural erosion is based on a *sophisticated miscomprehension of the totalitarian enemy and a dangerous misreading of contemporary history*. Mr. Kennan has been wrong so many times and with such uncanny consistency that truly, for those who have followed his thinking closely, he has become notoriously unreliable.

The equally unrealistic notion of evolution toward freedom in this last remaining empire, as advanced by C.I.A. director Dulles and others, is only a phraseological variant of the preceding one. Those who intellectually cling to either of these notions are obviously most susceptible to the perilous ideas of accepting the *status quo* of the Russian Communist Empire and permanently (if it were at all possible) dividing the world into two broad spheres of influence. With some calm reflection given to this ideational generation one cannot but conclude that the only alternative is a liberationist approach which in essence precludes these wishful intellectual steps that in the end can only spell disaster for the Free World.

Now, the possibility of being forced to adopt this liberationist approach is real and promising. The force of objective circumstance rather than reason may compel our statesmen to support actively the patriotic movements. This could occur in short time. For example, should the patriots of Poland reach a breaking-point and the entire population revolt, it would be well nigh inevitable that this revolt would spill over not only into Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union but also into East Germany and West Germany, whereupon the West could not but assume the inevitable stand. Especially in the light of the Hungarian revolt, it would be foolhardy for our policy-makers to ignore this short-run, real possibility.

Q. Do you not think that the passive attitude of the Western major powers towards the national revolutionary fight for freedom of the peoples subjugated by Russia is helping to hasten the outbreak of a nuclear war?

There is no logical doubt in my mind that this passive attitude maximizes the chances of a hot-war outbreak. By definition this passive attitude toward the liberation movements in the Russian Communist Empire, which fundamentally embraces Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and even Yugoslavia, means the absence of any implemented policy of liberation. This lack of implementation guarantees Moscow the freedom to consolidate its empire, to resolve almost any tension in the confines of its empire, to continue its long-range military planning at tremendous costs to the captive populations, to attain not only to military adequacy but even superiority in relation to the West, to incite at will and with initiative tensions in the Free World, and to *strike first against the United States* when the risks become well-calculated.

Taken in toto, these elements add up to the fact that *time is on the side of our enemy, assisted negatively by us*. Sheer containment and an arms race are no solution for the prevention of a third World War. On the contrary, at staggering costs they will build their own psychological momentum "to get the thing over with".

Aimless predictions of a cold war struggle for the next ten, twenty, and even fifty years are in the nature of mouthy utterances rather than results of reasoned analysis of the basic institutional factors at work. Again, the climactic paradox of our situation might well be the salvation of the passive West by the bold mass revolts of the patriotic populations in the Russian Communist Empire, as indicated above. If we are to drift with history, it might as well be along a right course determined by those who have least to lose materially....

... *The captive nations are the West's greatest weapon against Moscow*. Unfortunately, up to now only Moscow knows this best.

Q. Why does the free world not take part in the fight for freedom of the peoples subjugated by Russia, seeing that Russian Bolshevik colonialism represents a grave menace to its own existence, too?

A. There are several reasons accounting for the neglect of the Free World to actively support the national liberation forces in the Russian Communist Empire. One, as concerns the formidable forces within the Soviet Union itself, is *plain ignorance*. Many in high places are simply uneducated in regard to the primary empire of Moscow. Some have been misinformed and a few even disinformed by anti-Communist but pro-imperialist Russian emigres. *In the United States ignorance still is the chief enemy*.

The second reason is the understandable fear of precipitating a global hot war. Carried to the extreme, this fear would lead to *national self-paralysis* and, individually, many are already in their minds at this point. The way some argue, it seems that nothing positive and offensive should be done for fear that this would lead to a hot war. Coupled with the first reason, this one largely explains a *lack of understanding with regard to the aims, objectives, and art of the policy of liberation*.

An *unphilosophical materialism* is the third reason. Assuming the absence of the two preceding reasons,

it is evident that this third one, a reason of the will rather than intellect, is independently sufficient to account for the Free World's neglect. In brief, this reason holds life is short, let's enjoy what we have, just live and let live, and to do these things, let's be "realistic" and accept the status quo of Moscow's vast empire. This form of myopia and spiritual decadence is, of course, not new in history. Sufficiently generalized, it could again plunge a civilization into oblivion. However, it is a force today which must be kept constantly in harness.

Is it not true that the only guarantee for a lasting peace... lies in the disintegration of the Russian imperium into independent national states for all the subjugated peoples, all the more so since Russia is the last and most terrible colonial empire in the world?

Nothing is more powerfully true in the international realm today than the idea expressed in this question. Whether one reasons about this forward or backward, the predominant single guarantee of lasting world peace and security is the dissolution of the Russian Communist Empire. In point of fact, it is "the last and most terrible colonial empire in the world". To be sure, there would still be problems in the world - in Africa, the Middle East, in Asia and elsewhere. But with the decisive break-up of this Russian colossus, the environment and climate would be ideally compatible with the world's interests of lasting peace and security.

* * *

Call for a Danubian Cooperation

The following article was published in the February, 1958 issue of the *Czech Struggle*, an exile paper in London. Its author, Mr. Eugene Padanyi Gulyas is a well known personality among Hungarian emigrés. He was the Vice-President of the Chamber of Hungarian Architects and Engineers, and a Member of the Hungarian parliament (elected 1939).

Whenever I passed by the Chamber of the Delegations in the Houses of Parliament in Budapest, I sadly reflected how seldom this room was used for the purpose for which it was built. In my time the heavy oak doors were closed permanently. There were no longer any delegations to meet. It seemed to me that the doors had to be closed because the delegates did not use the room often enough when it was open to them.

This chamber was designed to accommodate the diet of the delegates of the Austrian and of the Hungarian Parliaments to discuss so called common matters: the financial, defense and foreign affairs of both countries, main components of the ancient Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. After all that happened to the respective peoples, I think they still have their common affairs even if they try to manage them separately. To put it more clearly we have to remember that the common affairs of the Austrian and the Hungarian delegations were actually common to not only the Austrian and the Hungarian people, but also the Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Rumanians, Ruthenes, Poles and the different groups of Germans; in short, all the peoples who composed the Monarchy.

This empire was not only an artificial product of treaties, charters, concordats and constitutions. These political instruments provided for fairly good management of those really common affairs, which brought the respective peoples together and kept them together for long centuries.... There were some *basic functions* which had to be carried out by these peoples in their God-given lands... The creation, flourishing and downfall of the Monarchy came about in strict accordance with its ability to carry out the duties originating from the same functions. The Monarchy fell but the historic old job still has to be done. Do the Danubian peoples realize this?

There are certain portents showing that they do. The portents may be weak as yet, but the art of statesmanship requires sensibility to discover the slightest signs of the changing times, and to foresee their importance. Hungarians, for instance, wish to refer to some events experienced during the October, 1956 revolution. On October 29, Radio Veszprem requested that the government should pursue the possibility of a Danubian confederation. On October 30, Radio Miskolcz broadcasts: "We noticed that in Slovak and Rumanian circles the idea of a Danubian confederation, as it was suggested by the Miskolcz Student-Parliament, was labeled as revisionist, irredentist and legitimist in character. We have to point repeatedly to the fact that our suggestion was aimed at a broad cooperation of independent countries along the Danube just to enable them to preserve their own independence. The federation of the countries along the Danube can be made voluntarily and with all respect for economic, cultural and geographical viewpoints." A representative paper of the active participants in the October, 1956 revolution, the *Nemzetőr* dedicates special columns to investigate the past efforts and the future possibilities for a federative Mid-Europe.

Another little sign of our times is a workshop of independent Hungarian scientists, experts and writers recently organized to study, to work out, and to represent a future Hungarian attitude toward national, European and world problems. This group of rather well-known personalities is honestly searching for the ways of a future understanding in the Danubian region and a number of them are noted protagonists of the federative idea. This writer also belongs to that group and personally is a strong believer in the prevalence of *function over form*. If forms of architecture, or forms of government no longer fit any more, it usually means that they do not truly express or fulfil any real function. It is not difficult to find proper form for any existing function.

Furthermore, we believe that it will not be too difficult to find, not only in Budapest, but also in other capitals of Mid-Europe, adequate rooms for rotating meetings of delegates, once there is a will to meet and there is a desire to discuss common affairs of the respective peoples - after their liberation from the Commu-

nist yoke. Sir Winston Churchill's beautiful dream of a common European currency, with coins bearing one symbol on one side and national symbols on the other side is still attractive to us and thought-provoking to numismatists. A united time-table for all railways of the Danubian region, with good connections to travel to any place without restrictions is not a bad idea either.

And how about actions or reactions of 50 million or more Danubian people in cases when strangers to this region try again to interfere with their lives? Would a common defensive action not be better than to fall into captivity one by one? Did the Ruhr Coal represent less trouble for those who finally settled this matter? Was the question of the Saar Region less delicate? If old enemies like the French and the Germans could establish workable agreements, the peoples of the Danube area should accomplish the same much easier, because they were more often fighting on the same side and very seldom against each other.

These are just a few of the questions worth discussing and there are many more. The only trouble is, that for some reason our discussion has come to a stand-still. The parties concerned seem to be too cautious. Some of them may think they would risk too much by disclosing how they really feel. We are of the opinion that the risks are made far worse by concealing our desires and plans. To keep the ball rolling, we offer *two suggestions*:

First, let us start a joint study concerning the function of the Danube region as we see it today. Each group shall provide an English-language copy of its views to the rest of the groups. Our group is ready.

Second, let us concentrate emphatically on the future.

Problems and their solutions are interesting only if they help to make happier not only political groups and their leaders, but the peoples themselves. An entirely new world is shaping up around us. We want to grow and evolve with this new world. We don't want to remain an island of relics or an old slum in a new development.

F.C.I. Ten Years Old

(F.C.I. stands for Free Czechoslovak Information. This is the name of the world's smallest news agency, founded and directed by Mr. Joseph Josten, an excellent Czech journalist and specialist on Iron Curtain affairs. This spring F.C.I. celebrated its tenth anniversary on which occasion Mr. Josten gave an interesting account about his agency's work and successes. Joining the numerous well-wishers, we reproduce here a few excerpts from his report. — ED.)

"Until the fall of Czechoslovakia, much news from Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and from the rest of the Soviet Orbit used to seep out through Prague, which was a sort of a listening post and an enclave of free information. But after the coup the new overlords were shy of witnesses and one by one, the Western correspondents either lost their credentials or were expelled and even arrested... In a few more weeks I stood on British soil as an exile. Mindful of Jan Masaryk's last words, "*Truth shall prevail, if we give it a clear chance*", within 48 hours I began operating a news agency called F.C.I..

In order to fill the vacuum, F.C.I. stepped in and there were periods when only the courage of its correspondents and couriers, besides sporadic travellers or escapees, brought exclusive news on life under Soviet domination to the West. And News it was! On the first Soviet atomic blast (36 hours in advance of the official confirmation in Washington and London);... or on the fall from grace of the CSR Foreign Minister Dr. Vlado Clementis who disregarding FCI reports, returned to Prague from the United States, only to be dismissed, arrested, tried and executed...

Since 1948 F.C.I. has issued in its press releases or through other media some 6550 news items and reports, of which at least half were exclusives. It has circulated over 300 features. With this material it has hit front pages, leading articles (See *Manchester Guardian 16.9.50*), and created banners at one time or another in many of the big journals of the world. About 170 of these F.C.I. reports appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* alone, just to mention one of its subscribers...

This was partly made possible, because F.C.I. can draw for its information and reports on a number of international experts engaged in permanent research of the Soviet orbit and on contributors of fame. H.E. Cardinal Bernard Griffin, the late Archbishop of Westminster, Viscounts Cecil and Jowitt, Prof. Gilbert Murray, Lord Vansittart, Wickham Steed, Arthur Deakin, Edouard Herriot as well as Lord Birdwood, Lord St. Oswald, French Generals L.E. Faucher and Julien Flipo, Sir Robert H. Bruce Lockhart... Senator Herbert Lehman, Alexander Bergman, Bjoern Hallstroem, etc... are some of the many who made their valuable contributions available to the F.C.I. news and feature service.

Already by 1951 the work of F.C.I. got on somebody's nerves and a man was caught who tried to destroy our Press Releases in the process of postal delivery... He had a definite political allegiance... The work has since gone on undisturbed. F.C.I., fully recognized as a reliable source of news, has grown in strength year by year. In 1954 it was formed into a Limited Company and since 1955 has operated from its own house in Kensington. The staff is not big and the technical possibilities are laughable when compared with its gigantic brothers and disters in the field of news distribution. But the "know how" is here, in the field of both gathering and disseminating news...

When the day comes that information can flow freely between East and West, then F.C.I. will be operating its news service from the other end too! "

ELEMÉR BAKÓ

Books on the Hungarian Revolution

(A BIBLIOGRAPHIC APPRAISAL)

The Hungarian Revolution, the culmination of a long period of hopeless searching for a better future and the natural accumulation of bitterness and hatred, erupted on October 23, 1956, and shook the world for nineteen days. The number of eyewitness accounts, battle reports, and documentary publications as well as fictional works is still increasing and contributing to an intimate and detailed description of the incredible uprising of a small nation against the ruling master of the Communist world.

The Russians lost out in every field of their forcibly imposed system in the economically exhausted, socially disturbed, and immeasurably degraded and humiliated Hungarian society. Marxism as a political doctrine, as well as the military capacity of the Russian occupation forces, was deeply affected. Well-trained party leaders, like Rákosi and Gerő were revealed as political greenhorns, and the great 'implications' of the Twentieth Party Congress, held in Moscow in February, 1956, were turned into instruments of self-defeat, causing deep splits in most of the Communist parties all over the world.

Similarly, the existing weaknesses and shortcomings, the lack of preparedness and the ambiguous policy-planning of the Free World was demonstrated in the great hour of the unexpected Hungarian events. The question raised by the Hungarian freedom-fighters has remained unanswered.

*

The uninterrupted flow of research documents proves a continuing interest in Hungary. Those of all political convictions, including the Communists, have tried to evaluate their beliefs in the light of the revolution. Political scientists, leaders of great nations, and of spiritual and intellectual movements, as well as private individuals, have examined the moral, political, historical, educational and other problems reflected in this recent mirror of our age.

Characteristically, the most illuminating description of Communist party treachery in a subjugated nation was authored by a Communist, Hungary's former "new course" premier, Imre Nagy. His "dissertation" was intended as a weapon of self-defense against the repeated attacks of the party's ruling group. The manuscript, completed during the summer of 1956, was first published secretly in a state-owned Hungarian press. Its English edition was published by Praeger in New York as *On Communism, in Defense of the New Course*. In this occasionally incoherent flow of new, critical ideas and expression of uneasiness about the future of the Hungarian people, Nagy proves to be an excellent prosecutor of his political enemies and of Rákosi's highly ambitious plans of industrialization. In another publication, edited by György Pálóczi-Horváth, titled *One Sentence on Tyranny; Hungarian Literary Gazette Anthology* (London: Waverly Press, 1957), the foundation laid by the "writers' revolt" of Hungarian poets and novelists is emphasized in an appropriate way.

The West could not believe what every reader of the pre-revolutionary Hungarian press and periodicals foresaw. The best proof of such a vacillating attitude is the documentary *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe. A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February - November, 1956*, edited by Paul E. Zinner. This

publication of the Program on East Central Europe at Columbia University (1956) is a careful presentation of material which, with a few exceptions, was derived from Communist sources. Although the Communist point of view was the focus of research, it was not the only matter of interest.

"One will not find here the voice of the Hungarian people in their anger and defiance, only the voice of the Communists - Polish, Hungarian, Russian, Yugoslav - in a time of crisis."

This characteristic sentence might as well be the expression of the contemporary Western attitude which similarly listened only to Communist cries at a time of crisis.

Some works, giving first-hand accounts of the Hungarian events, fulfilled the mission of the first eye-witness stories, so eagerly sought after.

Andor Heller, an excellent photographer on the staff of the official Hungarian news agency, was commissioned by the revolutionary authorities "to use every means possible to tell the people of the world the truth." His pictorial reporting entitled *No More Comrades* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957), is well-documented, realistic and pertinent.

László Béke's (pseud.) *A Student's Diary; Budapest, October 16 - November 1, 1956* (New York: Viking Press, 1957), offers a good presentation of revolutionary preparations among Hungarian students, although the account was interrupted by the sudden departure of the author from Budapest preceding the second attack of the Russian army on November 4th. An original piece of contemporary literary documentation is the French edition of the November 2nd issue of the *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Literary Gazette), the official organ of the Hungarian Writers' Association. This "traduction complete", published by P. Horay in Paris, contains the declarations, poems and prose of seventeen Hungarian writers who supported the cause of the revolution. This first and only issue published in an atmosphere of political freedom, was presented in a Western language as a supplement to the January, 1957, issue of *Preuves*, a progressive French magazine.

To render the historical event memorable, numerous Western press representatives have extensively reported in words and pictures on the revolution. Among them, the special edition of *Life* magazine, *Hungary's Fight for Freedom* (New York, 1956) has been unforgettable.

The U.S. Information Agency prepared two motion pictures for public education. One, *A Nation in Torment*, reviews briefly the history of Hungary, in addition to the original shots on the Revolution, its repression by Soviet Russian troops, and the exodus of Hungarian refugees. The other, entitled *Hungarian Fight for Freedom* describes, as an additional feature, demonstrations of sympathy in various cities throughout the world. Both strips were prepared by Hearst Metrotone News in 16 and 35 mm editions and were released through the United States Office of Education.

James Albert Michener, well-known novelist, produced another bestseller with his book, *The Bridge at Andau* (New York: Random House, 1957). By using the method of composite characters, he wrote some interesting chapters on several types of refugees based upon hundreds of interviews which he held with them immediately after they had crossed the Austrian border. Michener's work, with surprisingly

few errors, offers worthwhile and fascinating reading.

The Revolution and its domestic and global effects are treated in a number of scholarly and political publications. The report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary of the United Nations General Assembly was published by Columbia University Press (New York, 1957), and was followed by a well-prepared condensed edition of Marshall Andrews (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1957). The Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, which describes the findings and recommendations of the five-member Special Committee constituted of representatives of Denmark, Australia, Uruguay, Tunisia and Ceylon, is the most important and most authoritative source. It states that the revolution was (1) a spontaneous national uprising, (2) it demanded democratic socialism, and (3) could be defeated only by the military intervention of the Soviet Union, and (4) that there was really a counter-revolution, prepared, however, by the Kádár group which established an oppressive regime to combat a broad revolutionary movement, supported by the vast majority of the people.

A similar edition, containing additional documentary material is *The Hungarian Revolution; The Story of the October Uprising as Recorded in Documents, Dispatches, Eye-witness Accounts and World-Wide Reactions*, edited by Melvin Lasky, published in England for the Congress of Cultural Freedom (London; M. Secker and Warburg, 1957) and in America (New York; F.A. Praeger, 1957). This monumental "White Book" on the Hungarian Revolution presents an excellent and well-organized documentation.

Other publications, such as the textual compilation of the Free Europe Committee: *The Revolt in Hungary*; a Documentary Chronology of Events Based Exclusively on Internal Broadcasts by Central and Provincial Radios, October 23, 1956–November 4, 1956 (New York, 1956), or *The Nineteen Days*, by George Orban, a broadcaster's account with a fine foreword by the eminent Spaniard, Salvador de Madariaga (London, Heinemann, 1957), may support those above-mentioned with more on-the-spot recording.

Two analytic essays written by leftist Hungarian emigrés provide delicate insights. Francois Fejtő, former Socialist representative of Hungary, now in Paris, published his thoughts under the impressive title, *Behind the Rape of Hungary* (New York, Douglas McKay, 1957), an English translation of the French original. Although written with a strong "pre-disposition" in favor of the "national Communists" whose very existence is doubted by many experts in the field, the author's informative book constitutes good reading on the history of the period preceding the revolution. George Mikes, *The Hungarian Revolution* (London: Deutsch, 1957), is another interesting and lively account of the "most glorious revolt of this century". Some hitherto unpublished information, obtained "from Hungarians in a position to know" certainly improves the value of the book.

Many highly publicized works have not contributed anything new to the information derived from the above sources. However, there are special studies, treatises and statements which deserve attention.

The historical message of the President entitled, *Immigration Matters* (Document 85, Washington: G.P.O., 1957) expressed the concern of the Free World with the situation of the Hungarian refugees. The U.S. Senate's Committee on the Judiciary's report, *Emigration of Refugees and Escapees* (7.S. 85th Congress, First Session, Senate Report 129) prepared legislation "to deal adequately with both the overall and Hungarian refugee problems." A Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe on Policy Toward the Satellite Na-

tions was published on June 4, 1957, by the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, dealing with the consequences of the Hungarian Revolution on American foreign policy and with the problems of Hungarian refugees in Austria and Yugoslavia. Two prominent Hungarian political refugees gave valuable information to the Un-American Activities Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives which published a study titled *International Communism: Revolt in the Satellites* (March 20, 1957). Representative Alvin M. Bentley and nine other congressmen reviewed the past and present struggle of Hungary for freedom and independence and paid tribute to the Hungarian nation in the House of Representatives. Their contributions, *One Hundred and Ninth Anniversary of Hungarian Independence*, were printed in the *Congressional Record* of March 18, 1957.

Other problems, such as the role of the Free Europe Committee in connection with the revolt, were studied and some "preliminary result of depth interviews and attitude scales" were published by the project chief, Edmund O. Stillman et al. in *Inquiry into Political and Social Attitudes in Hungary* by the Free Europe Press (New York: 1957).

Paul-Henri Spaak, distinguished leader of the Western European unity movement also wrote an original analysis of the Western position in connection with the Hungarian problem. Some of his surprisingly frank statements, published as "The West in Disarray", in *Foreign Affairs* (January, 1957) are herewith reproduced:

"It looks as if the United Nations had been able to prevent the extension of the war in Egypt but were powerless to block or end the Soviet aggression against Hungary. This difference fosters the fear that in an organization where impartiality was supposed to be the rule, power of cynicism actually has carried the day. This is the fundamental fault, but there is still another worse. The Charter signed at San Francisco aspired to be all-embracing... The San Francisco Charter seems to me dangerously incomplete and so ineffectual that I do not see how, in its present form, it can long endure."

Touching on the legal effects of the post-revolutionary situation, in both the domestic and global meaning of the word, two inquiries of the International Commission of Jurists, *the Hungarian Situation and the Rule of Law*, and *The Continuing Challenge of the Hungarian Situation to the Rule of Law*, representing the findings of this group of observers on the summary trials instituted by the Kadar regime, are of enduring value. The reports

"drew attention of lawyers throughout the world to the illegal character of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, and to the breaches of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of 1947 and of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which have followed the institution of the Kadar regime in Hungary."

Janko Musulin's "Austria After the Hungarian Rising", in the *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1957) evaluates the "impact of a revolution on a neighboring country", whereas A. Rossi's "Western Communists on the Defensive", in *Foreign Affairs*, (January, 1957) describes the catalytic effects of the Polish and especially of the Hungarian events on the latent crisis of the Communist parties of the West. The striking failures of Communist indoctrination and the basic ineffectiveness of Soviet Russian political education is briefly analyzed by Henry Gleitman in his *Youth in Revolt, The Failure of Communist Indoctrination in Hungary* (New York: Free Europe Press, 1957). To quote him:

"The events in October, 1956, bear striking witness to failure; the new Communist youth has not been materialized, and the political police remain an indispensable adjunct to the Communist regime."

Among the reports describing the development of the sev-

eral refugee programs following the exodus of 200,000 Hungarians after the Revolution, attention should be paid to the series of interim reports released by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Refugee Problems, the International Rescue Committee, the Coordinated Hungarian Relief and the several religious agencies, all of which participated in these activities. However, two highly interesting reports published in the **National Academy of Sciences News Report** (May-June, 1957 and January-February, 1958) provide us with a picture of the program resulting in the training and placement of 1,081 Hungarian refugee scientists in the United States. This "new type of activity" is ample proof of the practical sense and capabilities of the Academy.

To sum up these highlights of publications on the Hungarian Revolution and its effects, Hugh Seton-Watson's valuable studies on the East European situation should not be forgotten. One of them was "Eruption in East Europe, A Myth Destroyed and A Revolution Betrayed", in the **Commentary** (December, 1956). To quote him:

"It might be thought that the Hungarians behaved recklessly, that they were wrong not to follow the example of moderation set by the Poles. But this is a baseless criticism. The decisive difference between events in Hungary and in Poland lies in the different attitudes of the Communist leadership. Ochab and Cyrankiewicz were wise enough to make

way for Gomulka, and Gomulka was strong and clever enough to take and hold power. In Hungary the warty was built around the autocracy of Rákosi. In both countries Communism as such was detested by the vast majority of the nation. The Communist parties were small minorities, but while the Polish party was an intelligent minority, the Hungarian party was a purely one-man show. Three provocative blunders made an explosion inevitable: Gerő's Stalinist speech of October 23, the invitation to the Russians to intervene, and the massacre in front of the Parliament. After this, what could the Hungarians do but fight or surrender? There was no opening for moderation or maneuver. That they choose to fight is a proof not of recklessness, but of courage and national unity."

This analysis "sine ira et studio" provides ample evidence of the true nature of the great historical event, and it should be borne in mind by the researcher looking for new vistas and explanations for this unique struggle of the Hungarian people.

ELEMER BAKO

* * * *

EDITOR'S NOTE: The above study has been necessarily limited to works published in English on the Hungarian Revolution. At another time, we might publish a second article on the subject to be devoted to foreign language publications, the number of which well exceeds those printed in English.

COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By **Walter Z. Laqueur**. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956, Pp. xi, 362. \$ 6.50)

No serious reader of this book can escape a feeling of disappointment. Here is a study which indeed could have been "the first of its kind", but, alas, the author does not seem to have put his material to proper use.

His work is uneven both in organization and in quality. The unevenness is most striking in the number of chapters (15) the author devotes to Communism, while the parallel treatment of nationalism fills one small chapter; and even then the discussion is confined to extremist religious groups. This might be excused by the fact that several works have been published on nationalism in the Middle East, whereas very little has been done on Communism.

The book may be divided into two parts: factual and analytical. The factual material is contained on pages 31 to 217, which is a straightforward survey of the Communist movements in Egypt, Sudan, Palestine and Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. The pattern of Communist infiltration has been the same in all these countries: Communism in the Middle East is not a mass movement, but a movement led by the intelligentsia.

Laqueur's ability in securing his data (from newspapers, leaflets, tracts, brochures and underground sources in the major Middle Eastern as well as European languages) is astounding. Unfortunately, the author must have assembled this wealth of material in great haste; without a proper analysis and systematic organization. The result has been a detailed description of the several Communist parties and their activities (training cadres, infiltrating trade unions and student groups and establishing "front" organizations) which is more of a chronology than an interpretative presentation. Laqueur's scholarship is further impaired by the number of mistakes in transliteration and documentation which make his study appear slovenly. To mention only a few: Jumbalar's first name is Kamal and not Kamil (p. 163 and passim). The author of the **Muslim Brotherhood** is Ishaq Musa, and not Jamal-al-Huseini (p.342). The date of the Bludan Conference is given as the Summer of 1937 (p.99), and again as May, 1946 (p.111). The latter is correct.

Undocumented and unwarranted sweeping generalizations also appear. On page 16, the author states that "in the American University of Beirut the Communists, together with their sympathizers, would appear to be strongest, and the extreme nationalists a close second." To the reviewer this is absolutely erroneous. Nor is the author's judgement that

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"there was no opposition to communism among the intelligentsia" (p.272) which is based on the mere fact that a number of lawyers volunteered to defend a Communist before the courts, more tenable.

The analytical part of this study is rather unclear. Laqueur must be handicapped by a lack of understanding of the deeper cultural and political forces which underlie Middle Eastern life and thought, or by a pre-established attitude towards the Arab countries. "The Arab countries are now more likely than most others in the world to provide a favourable breeding ground for communism" he states (p.6). The reason, according to the author, is that Islam has lost its hold on the minds of the elites in the Arab world, leaving an ideological vacuum (the implication here is that nationalism is not an ideology) which Communism is only too happy to fill. There will be no resistance to Communism simply because the East (and not only the Arab world) lacks the tradition of "individual liberty" established in Europe by "the Renaissance, Protestantism and the Enlightenment." The "authoritarian" character of Islam makes it much closer to Communism than to democracy.

This kind of oversimplification is neither original with Laqueur nor does it follow from his study. His pessimism over the prospects of Communism in the Arab world is neither justified by the figures he quotes (p. 276) nor by his revelation that Communism is a Western doctrine introduced to the Middle East by non-Muslim minorities, Jews, Greeks and Armenians (chapter 17). "Communist success" in the Arab world has not been "easier than it was in Europe where it

had to face political and spiritual competition." There is in the West's approach to the Middle East problems a recognition that Communism breeds more on social and economic discontent than on an ideological or spiritual "vacuum". Communism is not necessarily the only alternative to democracy.

The trouble is that Laqueur never makes the distinction between pro-Russian sentiments and Communism. He mentions, but does not adequately interpret the recent shift in Soviet policy in the Middle East which has 'arranged' a *mariage de convenance* between Communism and "bourgeois nationalism", and for the success of which the West is to blame. Russia's change of policy from internal subversion as the method to establish Russian influence, to courting the favor of the "national bourgeoisie" and promising economic and technical aid, is the most important single factor in the orientation of Arab nationalism towards Russia or towards neutralism.

Laqueur has no sympathy for Arab nationalism which he often describes as "rabid", "fanatic", "extremist" or "xenophobic". Consequently, he could neither see the possibility of Arab nationalism becoming the strongest bulwark against Communism, nor suggest to the West a constructive approach to the persistent problems of the Middle East.

In spite of a number of shortcomings, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East is indispensable for any future study of Communism in that part of the world.

FAUZI M. NAJJAR

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