

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

24 October 1961

PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES OF OFFICE OF NATIONAL
ESTIMATES IN LAST HALF YEAR

1. The past six months has been a period of exceptional productivity in the Office of National Estimates, reflecting the many and varied crisis situations and matters of international concern which have required estimative judgments. The total of 54 estimates completed exceeds the production of any similar period and actually exceeds the annual production of two earlier years.* The increase in the production of formal estimates has been accompanied by a large demand for estimative memoranda on a wide range of intelligence and policy questions. These memoranda have been prepared in response to specific requests of the DCI and of high officials of the new Administration.


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2. The changing pattern of high policy formulation coincident with the beginning of a new Administration has taken place in the midst of an almost unprecedented series of crisis situations. As the policy-making procedures of the new Administration emerged, the intelligence community, through O/NE, has been called upon for a large number of coordinated estimates on a wide variety of subjects, often with extremely short deadlines. In addition, through the less formal "Memoranda to the Director", the Office has been able to provide the DCI and, through him, responsible policy-making officials, with judgments and evaluations on matters of urgency. Finally, through participation on various Task Forces or participation in the preparation of Task Force papers, O/NE personnel have provided direct support and assistance in the policy-making process.

3. Obviously, a major preoccupation has been the Berlin situation. Two estimates were produced on probable Soviet tactics and timing, one on the stability of East Germany, and five on probable Soviet reactions to proposed US courses of action. All these estimates have been produced upon White House, State, or Defense Department request.

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*A list of estimates completed 2002/07/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003400010001-5
Approved For Release 2002/07/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003400010001-5



4. Bloc military developments is another major estimative field which has been given much attention during the past six months. This is due in part to continued change in the Soviet armed forces and in part to the acquisition of new information. In addition to the semi-annual broad study of the entire range of Soviet military capabilities, individual estimates have been produced on Soviet technical capabilities in guided missiles and space vehicles, Sino-Soviet air defense capabilities through mid-1966, and Soviet capabilities for long-range attack. A new estimate was also produced on the probable intelligence warning of Soviet attack on the US.

5. In addition to its primary function of producing and coordinating National Estimates, O/NE has a number of other closely related tasks. During the past six months O/NE has been assigned the responsibility for a new publication - the "Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations," six editions of which have been issued to date. The Board of National Estimates also has the responsibility for preparing and coordinating Priority National Intelligence Objectives which provide guidance for the intelligence community in the allocation of research and collection efforts.

6. Because of the special qualifications of its small staff, O/NE is frequently called upon to loan individuals, sometimes for extended periods, to other activities. For example, during most of the past six months, O/NE's Deputy Assistant Director has been Intelligence Advisor to the International Conference on Laos at Geneva. Another senior officer of O/NE is a full-time member of the Staff of the Net Evaluation Sub-Committee of the NSC; another has just returned from a year's assignment to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. A member of the Board of National Estimates has been Director of the Policy Staff of the Disarmament Administration and of necessity, devoted virtually all his time to this activity. Another Board member has just returned from an important assignment with ICA. The Naval member of the Board serves as CIA Representative to the NATO Standing Group Ad Hoc Committee.


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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (NIE's) AND
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (SNIE'S)
PRODUCED DURING THE PERIOD 1 APRIL - 19 OCTOBER 61

<u>ESTIMATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE PUBLISHED</u>
SNIE 13-61	The Economic Situation in Communist China	4 April
NIE 4-2-61	Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament Issues	6 April
NIE 11-61	Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US	6 April
NIE 60/70-61	Probable Developments in Colonial Africa	11 April
NIE 11-5-61	Soviet Technical Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles	25 April
NIE 11-7-61	Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany	25 April
SNIE 11-9-61	The Possibility of Soviet Nuclear Testing During the Moratorium	25 April



NIE 15-61	Outlook for Yugoslavia	23 May
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SNIE 34-2-61	Short-Term Outlook for Iran	23 May
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<u>ESTIMATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE PUBLISHED</u>
SNIE 42-2-61	Short-Term Prospects in South Korea	31 May
NIE 11-8-61	Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack	7 June
SNIE 86.1-61	Short-Term Prospects in Haiti	7 June
SNIE 2-61	Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action Regarding Berlin	13 June
NIE 24-61	The Outlook for Italy	13 June
SNIE 27.2-61	The Outlook for the Renewal of the Azores Base Agreement	20 June
NIE 43-61	Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China	20 June
SNIE 10-2-61	Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeast Asia	27 June
SNIE 27.2-2-61	The Outlook for Retention of US Azores Base Rights in the Event of Certain Courses of US Action	27 June
NIE 36-61	Nasser and the Future of Arab Nationalism	27 June
SNIE 32-61	Prospects for Pakistan	5 July
SNIE 58-2-61	Probable Reactions to Certain Courses of Action Concerning Laos	5 July
SNIE 2-2-61	Soviet and Other Reactions to Possible US Courses of Action with Respect to Berlin	11 July

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<u>ESTIMATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE PUBLISHED</u>
NIE 11-3-61	Sino-Soviet Air Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1966	11 July
NIE 38.1-61	The Outlook for Nepal	11 July
SNIE 2-3-61	Probable Soviet Reaction to a Western Embargo	18 July
SNIE 42-3-61	The Current Regime in the Republic of Korea	18 July
NIE 80/90-61	Latin American Reactions to Developments in and with Respect to Cuba	18 July
SNIE 86.2-61	The Dominican Situation	25 July
SNIE 56-61	Consequences of the Re-Election of President Garcia	1 August
NIE 10-61	Authority and Control in the Communist Movement	8 August
NIE 93-61	The Outlook for Brazil	8 August
SNIE 12.4-61	Stability of East Germany in the Berlin Crisis	15 August
NIE 14.3/53-61	Prospects for North and South Vietnam	15 August
NIE 11-4-61 (Military Annexes)	Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961-1966	24 August
SNIE 11-10-61	Soviet Tactics in the Berlin Crisis	24 August
SNIE 2-4-61	Reactions to Certain US Measures in the Berlin Crisis	31 August

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<u>ESTIMATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE PUBLISHED</u>
NIE 60/70-2-61	The Probable Inter-relationships of the Independent African States	31 August
SNIE 11-11-61	Implications of the Soviet Resumption of Nuclear Testing	7 September
NIE 14.2/42-61	The Outlook for Korea	7 September
SNIE 2-5-61	Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action	14 September
NIE 4-3-61	Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries other than the US and UK	21 September
NIE 11-8/1-61	Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces	21 September
SNIE 13-2-61	Communist China in 1971	28 September
SNIE 58-3-61	The Situation and Short-Run Outlook	28 September
SNIE 10-3-61	Probable Communist Reactions to Certain SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam	10 October
NIE 11-3-61	The Soviet Atomic Energy Program	5 October
SNIE 11-10/1-61	Soviet Tactics in the Berlin Crisis	5 October
SNIE 11-12-61	The Soviet Threat to Iran and the CENTO AREA	5 October
[REDACTED]		
SNIE 53-2-61	Bloc Support of the Communist Effort Against the Government of Vietnam	5 October

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<u>ESTIMATE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>DATE PUBLISHED</u>
SNIE 2-6-61	Probable Soviet and other Reactions to Certain US Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis	19 October

Mr. McCone

Mr. Kent left this paper and said it is
the third paper in which you may have an
interest - particularly the attachment.

10/25/61

25X1

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

NAME	TITLE	BACKGROUND	INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE
Sherman Kent	Assistant Director and Chairman of Board	Professor of History at Yale University; 1941-46: Chief, Europe-Africa Division, R&A Branch, OSS; Acting Director, Office of Research and Intelligence, Dept. of State; author of "Strategic Intelligence".	16 years total 11 years - CIA //
25X1 [redacted]	Deputy Assistant Director Member of Board	Faculty member, New York University; member of Planning Staff of Lt. Governor of [redacted] served with OSS in Far East; CIA Representative to [redacted] Staff Asst. to National Security Council Planning Board; Chief, Estimates Staff, O/NE.	25X1 25X1 25X1 18 years total 14 years - CIA ± 5
25X1 [redacted]	Vice Chairman of Board	Rhodes scholar. Professor of History, [redacted] University; US Naval Reserve, 1943-48, European Theatre.	25X1 13 years total 13 years - CIA ± 8 25X1

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

NAME	TITLE	BACKGROUND	INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE
25X1	Member	Professor of History, [redacted] World War II, Secretary, JIC; senior Army member, Joint Intelligence Staff; CIA Representative on Net Evaluations Subcommittee of NSC; holder of Legion of Merit and Order of the British Empire.	25X1 21 years total 14 years - CIA
25X1	Member	Practiced law in New York City; served with OSS and State Department; former General Counsel, [redacted]	11 10 years total 10 years - CIA
25X1	Member	Faculty member, Cornell University, Williams College, and Wells College; member, Current Intelligence Staff, OSS; Chief, Publications Division, ORE/CIA; National War College; Chief, Far East Staff, O/NE; CIA liaison with [redacted] [redacted] DCI representative on Net Evaluations Subcommittee of NSC.	10 25X1 15 years total 14 years - CIA
25X1			± 5 25X1

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

NAME	TITLE	BACKGROUND	INTELLIGENCE 25X1 EXPERIENCE
25X1	[Redacted] Lieut. General, USAF (Ret.)	[Redacted]	25X1 Service familiarity. 4 years - CIA
25X1	[Redacted] Admiral, USN	[Redacted]	4 = Service familiarity 10 months - CIA
25X1	[Redacted] Major General, USA (Ret.)	[Redacted]	25X1 Service familiarity 7 months - CIA 2

BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

NAME	TITLE	BACKGROUND	INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE
25X1	Member	Reporter, [redacted] faculty member, Western Reserve and Princeton Universities; editor, German Foreign Office Documents, Department of State; Chief, EE/USSR staff, O/NE; US Navy, 1942-46, Southwest Pacific and Japan.	25X1 13 years total 9 years - CIA ± 2
25X1	Member	Practiced law, New York City; War Production Board; economic asst. to European Bureau of State Dept. in charge of UK and Irish affairs; Special Asst. to DCI for OCB; detailed to White House Staff.	10 years total 10 years - CIA ± 8
25X1	Member	Faculty member, [redacted] [redacted]; staff member, Brookings Institution; Military Intelligence, War Dept., GS, 1944-47; CIA Representative [redacted] Fellow, Center for International Affairs, Harvard; DCI Representative on Net Evaluations Subcommittee of NSC; Chief, Estimates Staff, O/NE.	25X1 17 years total 14 years, CIA <i>sum</i> 25X1
25X1			

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KEY O/NE STAFF PERSONNEL

NAME	TITLE	BACKGROUND	INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE
25X1 [redacted]	Chief, Estimates Staff	Former writer and editor. World War II Army combat intelligence officer. Attended National War College, 1957-58.	17 years total 14 years - CIA
25X1 [redacted]	Chief of Eastern Europe Staff	Graduate work in economics; pre-Agency experience as newspaper reporter and editor. Served in [redacted] 1958-60 with special assignments at 1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference and 1960 Summit Meeting.	25X1 10 years - CIA
25X1 [redacted]	Chief of Latin America-Africa Staff	Former history professor at Williams, Oberlin, and [redacted] [redacted] World War II Naval intelligence officer. Special liaison assignments to [redacted] 1955-57 and 1959-60. [redacted] [redacted] Council on Foreign Relations.	25X1 25X1 25X1 12 years total 9 years - CIA

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KEY O/NE STAFF PERSONNEL (Page 2)

NAME	TITLE	BACKGROUND	INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE	
25X1	[REDACTED]	Chief of Near East Staff and Staff Officer in charge of Weekly Survey of Cold War Crisis Situations	Trained as historian and archivist. World War II communications intelligence officer. Special liaison assignment to [REDACTED]	25X1
25X1	[REDACTED]	Chief of Far East Staff	1957-58 and intelligence aide to US UN Delegation during Suez crisis.	11 years total 8 years - CIA
25X1	[REDACTED]	Chief of Far East Staff	Former international relations professor, [REDACTED] Council on Foreign Relations, and author of book on Southeast Asia.	25X1 25X1 8 years - CIA
25X1	[REDACTED]	Chief of Western Europe Staff	Former professor of political science at [REDACTED] and author of two books on French government and politics	25X1 4 years - CIA

KEY O/NE STAFF PERSONNEL (Page 3)

NAME	TITLE	BACKGROUND	INTELLIGENCE EXPERIENCE
25X1	<div data-bbox="167 1150 375 1184" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 128px; height: 16px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> DCI Representative on Net Evaluations SubCommittee	Doctorate in international affairs and pre-Agency experience in economic research at Brookings Institution. Attended National War College 1958-59	9 years - CIA
25X1	<div data-bbox="167 1356 388 1390" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 136px; height: 16px; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> On leave from duties as Chief of Far East Staff for study of Sino-Soviet affairs at St. Antony's College, Oxford University.	Doctorate in Russian diplomatic history.	11 years - CIA

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
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File

Executive Registry
68-3679

17 May 1960




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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U-2 Incident

1. Attached is the statement which Mr. Dulles said would be distributed for guidance to the members of the Senior Staff for subsequent briefing their subordinates as appropriate.

2. Also attached for convenient reference are the unclassified statements of the President, the Secretary of State, Senator Johnson, and Representative Cannon.



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Distribution:

- DCI (1 copy of each)
- 25X1 S/Asst. to DCI, Col. Stanley J. Grogan
- 25X1 S/Asst. to DCI,
- EO/DCI, Mr.
- Asst. to DCI,
- Asst. to DCI, r, Jr.
- Asst. to DCI,
- DDCI
- 25X1 IG (Acting),
- DDS
- A/DDS
- SSA/DDS
- 25X1 SPS/DDS(Acting),

S-E-C-R-E-T

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

ONE)

D/Commo
D/Personnel
D/Security
D/Training
Comptroller
D/Logistics
Gen. Counsel
Med. Officer
DD/I
A/DDI
D/PIC
C/OO
OCR
ONE
ORR
OSI
OCI
OBI
C/OPS/DDP
C/I&R
TSD
SA/CA/DDP
C/CA
AC/DPD
C/FI
C/CI Staff (Acting),
C/IO
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Background on the U2 Incident

1. All of you are well informed on the reports in the press of the last two weeks involving this Government and in particular CIA in high altitude reconnaissance of the USSR. The extent of such reconnaissance intel- and the amount of information has not been revealed and will not be revealed. The quality of the material is high.
2. Arrangements have existed for technical exploitation of the materials procured by these means, as well as for the use of the information derived, in furtherance of the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to the President and the NSC and the responsibility of other intel- ligence chiefs to their superiors.
3. Because of what has happened, some may feel that the materials we have acquired and the information derived therefrom should now be made widely available in the Intelligence Community. This is not yet possible. However, a study is under way to devise, if possible, the practical means of making the maximum possible amount of information available on a need-to-know basis as in the case of other highly sensitive materials. In this study we are faced not only with the problem of maintaining essential control of the products of reconnaissance but also of not jeopardizing future efforts.
4. You are requested not to discuss this information with persons outside of the Intelligence Community.
5. You are further requested to use caution in discussion of this information within the circle of Intelligence and with others officially concerned.

SECRET

President Statement on U2 Incident at News Conference, 11 May 1960

I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident.

A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say, with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say---for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time.

The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

'Below the Surface'

These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, "below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.

-2-

President Statement Cont'd

These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force---with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities.

We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure---just as in the Soviet allegations there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

Third point: How should we view all of this activity?

Distasteful but Vital

It is a distasteful but vital necessity.

We prefer and work for a different kind of world---and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which I was ready instantly to put into effect---to permit aerial observation over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal again at Paris---since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.

My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation today.

This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed non-military plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy.

-3-

President Statement Cont'd

The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the summit---
disarmament; search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and the whole
range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.

Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great
issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."

And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this
matter.

The New York Times
Washington, May 9, 1960

HERTER STATEMENT ON U-2 FLIGHT

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the United States Government

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to post-war conflict in 1946, and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful take-over of Czechoslovakia and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Vietnam, the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions.

The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

Western Proposals Recalled

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union.

The President's "Open Skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the United States, the U.S.S.R. and other nations that might wish to participate. For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis. More recently, at the Geneva disarmament conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament.

NY Times, Washington, 9 May 1960, Herter Statement on U-2 Flight
(continued)

It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West, but this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of object surrender or nuclear destruction.

U. S. Responsibility Noted

The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact, the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense.

Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization.

Soviet Motives Questioned

The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership, and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

NY Times, Washington, 9 May 60, Herter Statement on U-2 Flight (continued)

This Government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the heads of government in Paris, Chairman Khrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from the minds of people everywhere.

Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

Congressional Record, Vol. 106, No. 85, May 10, 1960

Senator Johnsons Statement on the U2 Incident

Mr. Johnson of Texas. Mr President, this is certainly a time in which Americans--and people everywhere---must keep their heads. We cannot afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action.

There are many unanswered questions about the incident of the American plane that was shot down over the Soviet Union. These are serious questions which will have to be considered very carefully by Congress and by the American people.

But it is doubtful whether the answers will be forthcoming immediately. There are too many facts which are not available and which will be available only when the Soviets permit a cool and realistic appraisal of what happened in their airspace.

Furthermore, it is always difficult to come to objective conclusions in an atmosphere of sanctimonious statements and threats against other nations. It is ridiculous for Nikita Khrushchev to profess such shocked surprise over efforts to gather information.

When Mr. Khrushchev visited this country last year, I do not think he impressed any of us as being a man who is naive. By that, I mean naive about what his own country has been doing for many, many years.

The incident, of course, will be assessed with great care and all of its implications will be explored carefully. But meanwhile, we cannot lose sight of the overriding reality which confronts us immediately.

It is whether this incident will become an excuse and an alibi for sabotaging the summit conference.

Within a very few days, our country is going to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to relax the very tensions that have brought about this kind of an incident. It is difficult to imagine those negotiations as having much success if they are to be conducted in this kind of an atmosphere.

If Nikita Khrushchev is going to spend his time taunting the United States over what he considers the blunders it has made and threatening other countries on the basis of facts which have not been clearly established, there will be little time to talk about the real problems which divide the world.

-2-

Senator Johnsons Statement on the UZ Incident (Cont'd)

Those problems cannot be traced back to the fact that nations seek to extract information from each other. Espionage and intelligence gathering are not something that cause the cold war. They are merely by-products of the cold war---something that follows logically when nations cannot trust each other.

Whatever may be his motivations, it is obvious that Nikita Khrushchev has handled this incident in such a way as to draw attention away from the real problems. We must get back to those problems--of people, of armaments, of respect for the integrity of smaller nations---if the summit conference has any meaning.

If blunders have been made, the American people can be certain that Congress will go into them thoroughly. But this is something that should be done objectively and not merely as a panicky reaction to Soviet charges.

And I think that one point should be crystal clear. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms and we are not going to be shaken from that course, or we are not going to be divided in this critical hour.

Congressional Record
Vol. 106, No. 85, 10 May 60

**STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE CANNON
ON U-2 INCIDENT**

Mr. Chairman, on May 1 the Soviet Government captured, 1,300 miles inside the boundaries of the Russian Empire, an American plane, operated by an American pilot, under the direction and control of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now holding both the plane and the pilot.

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

The question immediately arises as to the authority of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the floor.

The answer of the subcommittee is--absolute and unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.

During the Second World War the United States succeeded in breaking the Japanese naval code. Through this incredible good fortune the U.S. commanders were able to read every order transmitted from

Statement by Representative Cannon continued

Tokyo and all interfleet communications. This advance and intimate information had much to do in preparing the way and increasing the effectiveness of our great victory in the battle of Midway which broke the power of Japan in the Pacific. But some incautious member of a congressional committee or its staff leaked the information to a reporter, and 30 minutes after the next edition of his newspaper hit the street Japan changed her naval code and all further advantage was lost.

This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum which finally totaled more than \$2 billion for the original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.

Espionage has been throughout recorded history an integral part of warfare. Before occupying the Promised Land Moses "by the commandment of the Lord" sent out from the wilderness of Paran 10 men under the direction of Joshua to spy out the land.

And no nation in the history of the world has practiced espionage more assiduously than Russia. The United States and every other allied nation today literally swarms with them. Within the last few weeks we sent to the Federal penitentiary at Atlanta a Russian spy convicted in Federal court who was regularly transmitting information directly to Moscow every night. Their spies stole from us the secret of the atomic bomb. Every Russian embassy and consulate has today time and again the number required for routine diplomatic and consular service. When we were at Oak Ridge we were told there were so many Russian spies there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentalism were they able to maintain the integrity of their work.

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The need for espionage in this instance was exceptional and compelling. At the close of the world war in which we had saved Russia from complete subjugation we were surprised to learn that while all other nations were disarming and returning to a peacetime status as rapidly as possible, Russia was feverishly driving her factories and continuing to increase her armament at top speed. Simultaneously they announced that communism and free enterprise could not live in the same world.

Every effort has been made by American administrations to reestablish conditions under which we could discontinue excessive expenditures for armament and divert these vast sums to business and humanitarian purposes. But each year Russia has become more arrogant and threatening and more demanding.

Under our American ideals and system of government, a declaration of war against any nation, however provocative, is unthinkable. Our military authorities have no choice but to give any enemy the advantage of first attack and then depend on massive retaliation for defense. The Communists have taken every advantage of this situation.

In modern warfare surprise is a tremendous advantage. Less than a week before the Communist attack on Korea a congressional committee from this House returning from Seoul reported that permanent peace had been established and the land was returning to prosperity. There was no shadow of war; not the slightest cloud appeared on the horizon. The sudden rush of a vast army of well armed, well trained, and well munitioned Communists across the border made it necessary for us to throw precipitately into battle raw and untrained troops who were wholly unable to protect themselves or hold their positions. And there followed one of the most disastrous periods in the history of American arms.

During the hearings on this appropriation for the last 2 or 3 years, I have each year asked the CIA representative before the committee, "How could the enemy mobilize an army of such size and accumulate hundreds of tons of supplies and munitions and the transportation facilities necessary for its movement without our learning that such an attack was in prospect?"

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And each year we have admonished the Authority, the CIA, that it must meet future situations of this character with effective measures. We told them, "This must not happen again, and it is up to you to see that it does not happen again"; that the American forces must be apprised of any future preparation for attack in time to meet it. And the plan they were following when this plane was taken, is their answer to that demand.

And I want to take advantage of the opportunity to compliment and thank Director Allen W. Dulles and his remarkable corps for the admirable way in which they have met the situation through these later years.

They are entitled to the highest commendation by the Department, the Congress, and the American people.

We cannot permit another Korea. We cannot take the risk of carnage and national devastation which might involve every American city. We cannot take the risk of the consequences which would follow a similar attack from across the Russian borders. And since the Russians refuse to cooperate in our efforts to establish permanent peace--refuse even to agree to ethical standards of warfare--we have no choice but to protect our Nation and our people through the age-old methods of defense so long in use by the Communists themselves, lest we wake tomorrow, or do not wake tomorrow, as a result of our failure to know in time what they are plotting against us.

The world has been appalled by the vicious vindictiveness of Mr. Khrushchev's denunciation. He yesterday characterized the policy of the United States as stupid and blundering. His fury is incited by the fact that it is neither stupid nor blundering. On the contrary it has been infinitely successful and effective.

When we have answered his threats--and he has been very free with them on all occasions, even when he was here as our guest in our own country--When we have answered his threats by basing our Strategic Air Command in a position to defend ourselves and our allies, he has boasted that he could stop them at the border. That is why we are now so earnestly developing our submarines so that if he ever is able to neutralize our Strategic Air Command then we will have to take its place

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a fleet of nuclear-driven missile-firing submarines that will be just as effective a halter upon him as SAC is today.

His discovery that since 1956, for 4 years, CIA has been sending planes across his border--and as far as 1,300 miles into the interior without his knowing it--is the occasion of this outburst.

It completely disproves his vaunted ability to stop SAC at the border.

The only reason he was able to apprehend even this plane or its pilot was that it developed some unforeseen and unavoidable mechanical or physiological defect, the first in 4 years. He was unable to hit it or to overtake it at its cruising height of 70,000 feet. So in order to leave the impression that he captured this plane he distributed a picture of a pile of rubbish which those who know the plane recognized as absolutely spurious. The plane and the pilot were evidently taken comparatively uninjured. That completely destroys his claims of invulnerability against American attack. So he as usual resorts to subterfuge.

And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.

The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

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