

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003100300016-0

61-4728

7 June 1961

Noted by GCI
15 JUN 1961

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
A/DDP/A [redacted]

SUBJECT : Meeting with Alan Grant of the
Orlando Committee, Thursday,
1 June at 11:30 a. m.

1. At Mr. Grant's request^{*} I saw him on your behalf on Thursday, 1 June. He explained that he wanted this opportunity to tell me what he was doing in order to push the concept of the Freedom Academy which the Orlando Committee has been devoting time to for several years. He said that he hoped that the Agency and yourself would be able to back this proposal with the Congress.

2. Mr. Grant advised me that he had spent a half hour with Colonel Walmsley, presently working with General Maxwell Taylor, about two hours with Admiral Arleigh Burke, had also talked to Mr. Siegenthaler, in the Attorney General's office, and Leigh White, in the White House. He said that it had been his hope that General Taylor would put some recommendation on the Freedom Academy in his report.

3. Mr. Grant is highly exercised over the lack of research in depth in what he calls "non-military combat". He orated at some length on this particular subject, although acknowledging that he had little or no knowledge of what CIA did in this area. I did not enlighten him.

4. Mr. Grant also talked at some length about an individual named Bernard Fall, who fought with the Maquis in France and later with the French in Indo-China. Grant seemed to feel that Fall has unique qualifications in this area.

5. At the conclusion of our discussion, I thanked Mr. Grant for his courtesy in calling on us; told him that you regretted very much being unable to see him; and assured him of our continued deep interest in his efforts.

ER

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

IA

(*through Mr. James E. Smith, in Senator Mundt's office)

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R003100300016-0

CONFIDENTIAL

Suggestion: It seems to me that we could benefit considerably, public relations-wise, if we indicated deeper interest in this Freedom Academy and particularly in the so-called education in "non-military combat". In this regard, your VFW speech has attracted wide interest.

I would suggest that we set up a series of briefings for Congressmen and senior Government officials on the subject of what is being done in the Government in training in "non-military combat". I also think that we could benefit by assembling a compendium of all non-governmental education in this field. Our compendium would be more complete than anything done by a private organization like the Orlando Committee. It would be unclassified and we could use it as a public relations media.



25X1

Wyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

Attachment (w/orig. only)

cc: DDCI

ADDP/A
OCC/LC



25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Brief of Proposal on the Freedom Academy by Mr. Alan G. Grant
of the Orlando Committee

1. Mr. Grant, in his proposal for a Freedom Academy, points out that in the non-military area the Communists are assulting the free world with an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments. Guerrilla warfare, subversion, propaganda, blackmail, culture, aid and diplomacy are all intermixed in a thousand pronged offensive. It is conceivable, according to Mr. Grant, that the Communist Bloc can substantially isolate the United States and a few allies in a hostile world in a few years unless we develop, and quickly, a far greater capacity in the range of countermeasures potentially available to us.

2. Mr. Grant recommends first, the public must have greater understanding of Communism, especially Communist conflict technique, and the nature of the global struggle. Second, the private sector must know how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping solve our cold war problems. Third, policy makers and cold war agency personnel at many levels must understand Communism, and again with special emphasis on Communist conflict technique. Fourth, policy makers and those who advise them must understand the full range of measures potentially available to us in the public and private sectors to meet the entire Communist attack and to work toward our national objectives systematically. Fifth, at all levels, agency personnel must be trained to understand and implement this sophisticated strategy.

3. Mr. Grant feels that 80% or more of the research and training program needed to develop fully the capacity of this country in the non-military conflict area has not been instituted. He claims that we are on dead center and that no one below the President and his close advisers has the responsibility to consider non-military conflict whole. The FSI and War Colleges can't do it. They are primarily training institutions. No university or research institution, including RAND, has the combination of expert knowledge and experience to cope with it in the necessary breadth and depth. Mr. Grant also points out that there is no government operated school or private institution where personnel are sent which gives coverage in any real depth to Communism and Communist conflict technique. A partial exception may be one CIA school about which he has only sketchy information.

4. According to Mr. Grant the Freedom Academy seems the best organizational setup to give us a badly needed conceptual framework for non-military conflict within an acceptable period of time.

5. On Page 5 of the attached proposal, Mr. Grant makes mention of your VFW talk.

In the non-military area, the Communists are assaulting the Free World with an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments. Following Lenin's admonitions, they have mastered all methods and means of conflict and these have been integrated into a many directional strategy. They are using every promising avenue to approach their objectives and are demonstrating exceptional organizational capabilities in penetrating and manipulating a wide range of political parties, institutions and organizations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Far East.

Even today few of our people appreciate the remarkable research, development and training program in conflict technique and management which has been in high gear in the Soviet Union for nearly forty years. This program has enabled the Communists to develop and integrate the full spectrum of conflict instruments and to train "conflict managers" capable of orchestrating all of these instruments in carefully patterned and calibrated aggression in which the widest possible range of non-military weapons and weapons systems are used against us in an intelligent, sustained and systematic manner. Guerrilla warfare, subversion, propoganda, blackmail, culture, aid, and diplomacy are all intermixed in a thousand pronged offensive.

It is not only the ability of the Kremlin leaders to orchestrate the cold war. They have also carefully developed the many organizational means and especially the trained, motivated cadres which enables them to implement their strategy in all of its dimensions.

The well developed nature of Soviet conflict technique makes our problems of defense and offense in the non-military area extremely difficult. Forty years of intensive preparation are now paying off. The situation is beginning to develop rapidly. It is conceivable the Communist Bloc can substantially isolate the United States and a few allies in a hostile world in a few years -- unless we develop, and quickly, a far greater capacity in the range of countermeasures potentially available to us. This is the greatest challenge to the Administration and will determine its place in history.

When we speak of developing a greater capacity to meet the Communists in the area short of hot war, what must be done? What are the requirements for preparing a pluralistic society to meet the Communist cold war attack on a global basis? It is only by keeping these requirements in mind and the difficulties of meeting them that the present bill can be understood.

At the risk of dwelling on the obvious, let me list these. In doing so it is assumed the global struggle is indeterminate -- that is, it may go on for decades, and that the present capabilities of the Communist Bloc are such that we cannot rely on half measures but must develop our full capacity to engage in the new dimensions of conflict.

First, the public must have greater understanding of Communism, especially Communist conflict technique, and the nature of the global struggle. This is necessary to maintain the will to victory and to overcome apathy in a long and tedious struggle. It is necessary if the public is to support wholeheartedly the difficult and often distasteful things we must do in the coming years. In a free society, policy, to be effective, must have public support. A widening fissure between public knowledge and policy can spell disaster. For defensive purposes alone this knowledge is essential, if public opinion is not to be confused and manipulated by the deceptions and blandishment of skilled propogandists who understand us and our desire to be left alone too well.

Second, the private sector must know how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping solve our cold war problems. A wide range of interrelated programs can be implemented, if certain preconditions are met. Whether these things are done or not done can be the difference between victory and defeat in a close contest in which the enemy has mobilized his entire society to win the cold war, as well as to prepare for hot war.

Third, policy makers and cold war agency personnel at many levels must understand Communism, and again with special emphasis on Communist conflict technique. It is not enough to have experts available for consultation. This is basic "battle knowledge" which must be widely disseminated in the agencies, if planning and implementation are to be geared to the conflict we are in.

Fourth, policy makers and those who advise them must understand the full range of measures potentially available to us in the public and private sectors to meet the entire Communist attack and to work toward our national objectives systematically. This means they will have to master a broad range of non-military measures which have yet to be thought through and systematized. They must be able to organize and interrelate these measures in an integrated strategy in which our national objectives are approached from many directions, using every promising method and means and fully utilizing our national capacity to compete in the new dimensions of struggle.

Fifth, at all levels, agency personnel must be trained to understand and implement this sophisticated strategy. Unless there is a substantial "common fund of knowledge" about the nature of the enemy, the global conflict, and the vast array of negative and positive measures available to us, there cannot be the integrated team play necessary to carry out a complex strategy with vigor and elan against a dedicated and skilled enemy.

There are other requirements, but the above are basic. By and large we have failed to meet these, because we have not understood that the necessary capacity can only come about through a systematic, large scale research and training program. This generalization irritates some people in the agencies and universities who have devoted much of their lives to solving cold war problems. I do not intend to depreciate work already done, nor to imply that in all areas it has been inadequate. I do say that our research and training program in the area of non-military conflict, considered as a whole, is grossly inadequate and has failed to achieve to a substantial degree any one of the above five requirements. This should be self-evident, but there is a built-in ability within the agencies to resist this fact and the conclusions to be drawn.

Actually an increasing number of people in the agencies are aware of this. Nevertheless, when a group of outsiders state these things in generalities, they assume we do not know of much work that is being done, and suspect we are unsophisticated in the complexities of many problems.

Of course, no small private group, like the Orlando Committee, can know everything the government is doing, some of which is classified. However, over the years, we have collected considerable data on what is being done and not being done, with emphasis on research and training in non-military conflict. We have been over the curriculum of the War Colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, the USIA training program and the research and training programs of leading university centers dealing with international affairs, and area studies. We have checked our findings with various experts across the country and within the agencies. We have done heavy reading in the area. We have reviewed all cold war legislation. And, I expect we may have given as much thought to what the private sector can contribute as anyone else.

The conclusion is inescapable that the problem of formulating and implementing an adequate research and training program in non-military conflict has been approached on a piecemeal basis. Fifteen years ago, when we realized we were entering a cold war, our policy planners began formulating some rather minimal ideas and programs for meeting the non-military challenge. As the crisis deepened and the massive nature of the Soviet assault on our civilization became evident, various research projects were instituted at our universities, RAND and within the agencies; there was a beefing up of language study at the Foreign Service Institute and greater emphasis was placed on the non-military area at the War Colleges. However, I can find no evidence that anyone sat down and thought out the overall research and training program which would be necessary to fill systematically and adequately the five fundamental requirements I have listed. Rather, the problem was considered in bits and pieces, and the programs instituted met bits and pieces of the problem. Possibly 80% or more of the research and training program needed to develop fully the capacity of this country in the non-military conflict area has not been instituted.

Let me be specific.

Take something as basic and fundamental as Requirement No. 3 -- the need for wide understanding of Communism and especially Communist conflict technique in our agencies. There is little evidence of a comprehensive, organized effort to fill this requirement.

The War Colleges may devote two weeks to a month to coverage of the Soviet Bloc. Within that period the specific treatment of Communism and Communist conflict techniques rarely exceeds two or three days. Yet this is a difficult subject which requires considerable, systematized study, and it is absolutely essential to an understanding of the conflict we are in. It is true, of course, that the rest of the instruction is related to the Communist threat. But this is an indirect tie which in many cases presupposes a more complete understanding of Communist operations than the student actually possesses.

The Foreign Service Institute has a two-week seminar on Communism and the Soviet Union. This is a broad survey course, which can give only light treatment to Communism and Communist conflict technique. By trying to cover everything in ten days of actual training, the course is necessarily superficial. For example, it provides 1 1/2 hours of lecture-discussions each on Communism in the Far East, South Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the United States. There is one lecture-discussion on such involved, encyclopedic subjects as subversion and "coordination of forces" to stop the Communist advance. Considering the very few points even a first class lecturer can get across in one lecture, the superficiality of the course is self-evident. This is no criticism of the teachers -- they just don't have enough time.

The Basic Foreign Service Officer's Course (8 weeks) required of all junior officers on appointment and the Mid-Career Course in Foreign Affairs (12 weeks), which are the mainstay of FSI training (outside language training), offer almost nothing. The Basic Course has six hours of lectures by CIA experts "covering" the Soviet Union, the international Communist movement, the organization and strategy of Communism, Soviet global propaganda, and how to answer criticisms abroad originating from Communists. (In Orlando we considered seventeen hours on the same subjects too skimpy for high school seniors.) The Mid-Career Course includes only a two hour lecture on Communist doctrine and practice, two hours on the role of behavioral science in Soviet strategy, and two hours on Soviet political organizations. (There is time, however, for five hours on "Philosophy of Administration" and four hours on "Origin and Diffusions of Myths and Rites.")

In 1958 FSI inaugurated the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, a nine months course, for about twenty senior officers at a time which appears to be the FSI counterpart to the War Colleges. This devotes five days to "Communist Strategy," and a good part of this time is spent in discussion groups or attending optional films. Actually there are just five lectures by four guest lecturers, who are, however, top men, and several short training films. Thirty-one books are recommended to the students, together with certain classified material, but this lengthy list must have been drawn up with tongue in cheek for a five-day course. Again, much of the remainder of the course relates to the Communist threat, but as in the case of the War Colleges, this is an indirect tie which presupposes more knowledge about Communism than the student usually possesses.

The USIA training program has no course on Communism, but makes use of the two week FSI Seminar.

The FBI, I am told, has a one week course for its internal security people.

A limited number of agency personnel are assigned to various universities taking courses, practically all of which, insofar as they are connected with Communism, are of the area study type devoted to the Soviet Union or China rather than study in depth of Communism and Communist conflict technique.

The various Russian research centers are not suitable for instruction but are devoted to research. (This is also true of RAND which in this field has gone to sleep.) A person attending these institutions does so in order to write a research paper or a book. Research on specific operational matters is rarely done by these institutions which are overly academic. This should be obvious from their literary output.

None of these programs provide an adequate coverage of Communism. Furthermore, only a small fraction of our agency people have had even this minimal, formal exposure. Nor is there any systematic follow-up with those who have graduated. Much of what little is offered is more concerned with area studies and the history and philosophy of Communism than Communist conflict technique, though the latter is the pay-off phase.

Minor exceptions are seminars run by Kissinger at Harvard and Possony at Georgetown. These are small seminars with a handful of agency personnel, but I understand they do give a little more coverage to Communism and non-military conflict problems.

As far as I can determine, there is no government operated school or private institution where agency personnel are sent which gives coverage in any real depth to Communism and Communist conflict technique. A partial exception may be one CIA school about which I have only sketchy information.

When I checked this with Dr. Stefan Possony of Georgetown University, a leading authority on Communism, lecturer at the National War College and FSI, and adviser on Soviet affairs to the Department of Defense, he advised, "there is, to the best of my knowledge, no school within the government which specializes in Communism, let alone operational Communism."

He further commented, "without detracting in the slightest from the value of the War Colleges and the agency trade schools, it cannot be seriously argued that these schools provide an adequate coverage of Communism. There is indeed a coverage in broad outline, but no intensive study and there are large gaps in the coverage. This cannot be otherwise because literature dealing with Communism also shows wide gaps; furthermore, there are no textbooks which allow a student to tackle the whole problem matter within two covers. Instead, anyone who wants to be knowledgeable on Communism is compelled to read a minimum of two or three dozen books, and such an undertaking simply is not in the cards within a ten-months course (length of War College courses), most of which deals with other subjects, let alone courses lasting only a few weeks. The very fact that there is no textbook on Communism is a good enough illustration for the necessity of a Freedom Academy."

Please note the above deficiency deals only with instruction about Communism, not the deficiencies in political warfare, etc.

Consider Requirement No. 1 -- adequate public knowledge about Communism and the global struggle. Again there is no evidence of an organized effort which can hope to fill the gap.

It should be emphasized here that even adequate generalized knowledge about Communism and Communist conflict technique can only be obtained through a systematic training program or a heavy amount of organized reading. It is no answer to say that our news media give excellent coverage of world events. They present a hodgepodge of uncorrelated facts which leave the untrained individual with a blurred image of Communism. Nor is it any answer to say there are many good books about Communism in our libraries, when no significant number of people are reading these books, or reading them in sufficient quantity.

It should be kept in mind there is little in the experience of our people to prepare them to understand the present struggle. The type of enemy we face, the dazzling and confusing array of methods and means used against us, the skillful deception, the ambiguous nature of enemy moves, the misleading vocabulary, the slow and often concealed erosion of our position, the seemingly disconnected events in all parts of the globe, subversion raised to the level of a science, are all foreign to our experience.

Our secondary schools and universities are an obvious place to make a beginning in organized instruction about Communism and the world conflict. Yet by and large they offer almost nothing. Allen Dulles, in his speech last August to the VFW commented:

"In our schools and colleges we can find many courses in ancient history, in philosophy, courses on the great movements of the past, the conquests of ancient times from Alexander the Great to Napoleon. Courses on Communist theory and practices are few and far between.

* * * * *

"By and large, however, in our educational institutions, except in the graduate field or in specialized schools and seminars, these subjects are not generally taught.

* * * * *

"There is a real urgency to build up our knowledge on the entire background of the Communist thrust against our civilization.

* * * * *

"The people of this country are and will continue to be basically opposed to Communism in general. This opposition is based more on instincts than on knowledge. This is not enough. Our people should be sufficiently educated in all of the ramifications of communistic intrigues and its historical background, its purposes and programs adequately to contribute toward an effective answer.

"The initiative for new knowledge comes more often from those of us who want to learn than from those who teach. But let us also call on our educators, and on those in authority who have influence over the development of our educational system to begin to expand the realistic teaching of the history and policies of Communism."

Mr. Dulles was overly generous in his reference to the graduate field. Dr. Possony, in a recent letter, advises, "I do not think there are more than half a dozen courses in the entire country that cover Communism as such and, if so, discuss operational technique rather than political philosophy and history. If there are more such courses they would be outside regular degree curricula." A course covering political philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries in which the student reads the Communist Manifesto and State and Revolution, does practically nothing to prepare him to understand the conflict we are in. Nor do a few chapters on Russia since 1917 in a Modern European History course. Yet this is about all that most colleges offer.

As Dulles emphasized, this instruction should begin in our secondary schools. Here the gap is almost complete. Actually some public pressure is developing to institute courses on Communism versus Democracy in our high schools. However, even if our schools wanted to do this, and some now do, they are stymied, because no teachers have been trained to give such courses, or to include the subject in adequate form in social science and history courses.

Nothing demonstrates our research and training failure better than this failure to teach the teachers. Again and again civic organizations, the American Bar Association for example, have urged such instruction. And each time they run up against the same roadblock. There is little evidence our teachers' colleges and state universities are doing anything to remedy the situation or that they have instructors themselves, in many instances, who are prepared to teach these things. In the coming years, here and there, something may be done, but there will be no organized effort to fill this appalling gap without the Freedom Academy. It is unrealistic to expect our busy teachers to educate themselves in this difficult subject. Under mounting pressure, courses will begin to appear in our high schools, but their quality, in the absence of systematically trained teachers, will leave much to be desired.

There are a few bits and pieces, small scale attempts to overcome public ignorance. The War Colleges bring in a few private citizens, mostly reserve officers, for one or two week Strategy Seminars. These range over such a wide area they can provide only the skimpiest coverage of Communism. Some private groups have initiated schools on Communism, usually of two or three day duration. These have been given in only a few cities and there is no systematic follow-up, so the initial impact is soon dissipated.

It is when we come to Requirement No. 2, however, -- not merely understanding Communism but knowing how the private sector can contribute to winning the global struggle that the extent of the research and training gap really becomes apparent.

Let me emphasize this. The Orlando Committee, after years of considering the problem, is convinced that many of our most difficult cold war problems are susceptible of partial solution, at least, through a wide range of method and means which can be implemented by the private sector -- provided that our private institutions and civic organizations have among their members some who have received at least a little systematic training about Communism, the global conflict, and what the private sector can contribute. Without such trained and motivated people, what the private sector can do is limited. With them, even in comparatively small numbers, the range of activities is almost unlimited. Yet, as in the case of school teachers, we have neglected to provide anywhere a training program which would enable any significant number of private citizens to learn about these things.

Today the private sector wants to participate. From personal experience, and this has been confirmed by others I have talked with, I can testify a marked change has occurred recently in the public's attitude toward the cold war. Responsible citizens who showed little concern even a year or two ago, are now crowding forward to ask "what can we do?" They are worried. They sense that the business as usual civic projects now engaging their time, are a little silly in terms of the present world situation. Many display eagerness to involve themselves and their organizations in worthwhile projects that have some real bearing on winning the cold war. These are responsible civic leaders, who understand the battle must be won in Latin America and Africa as well as Hoboken, and by a combination of positive as well as negative programs.

By and large, however, this increasing desire to participate has been frustrated by lack of trained leadership at the community, state and national levels and advanced knowledge on what the private sector can do.

This is disturbing, because every day opportunities are slipping by, some never to reappear, where the private sector could make an important contribution. But our civic leaders lack the training to enable them to visualize these opportunities, or the methods and means their organizations would employ to take advantage of them.

The little training that is available, like the Strategy Seminars and the short schools on Communism, have one common failing. They get the student all stirred up and then suggest little or nothing he can do.

There is a good reason why. The things the private sector can do are not as obvious as some imagine. Knowing something about the enemy is not sufficient preparation for making an effective contribution.

This is a tough and complex struggle. It will require a concentrated, systematic research program involving a broad cross-section of experts with a maximum cross fertilization of ideas and experience to think through the many methods and means the private sector can employ -- if the private sector is to participate on a sustained and systematic basis.

A number of private organizations are making some contribution here and overseas. Certain foundations are spending substantial sums over-seas on a range of projects that have at least an indirect bearing. The AFL-CIO has done considerable work in Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia attempting to build up free labor against the Communist onslaught. Several universities offer short courses to businessmen going overseas. If you go through the whole list of private participation, at first glance it appears impressive.

In fact it is not. Only a tiny fraction of the ingenuity, talent and strength that could be brought to bear here and overseas is being utilized. The great majority of our civic organizations are uninvolved. Much of what is being done is mediocre in terms of what it could be, if we had trained, motivated people to carry out these programs.

To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive, organized effort going on anywhere to research and think through the full range of methods and means the private sector can properly employ. Nor does any existing center have the staff, funds or directive to undertake this enormous and challenging job. Yet, until the problem is considered whole, until a wide range of expert knowledge is focussed on the problem, we can never know what the true capacity of the private sector is.

In planning our strategy in the non-military area, we tend to downgrade the role of the private sector and this is realistic, considering its present limited capacity.

The point is that we can very likely develop a tremendous capacity to participate with the right research and training program. Instead of bemoaning the lethargy, indifference and seeming incapacity of the private sector, we should recognize these are the natural and expected results of our neglect to institute an adequate research and training program.

Today no one (not even the Orlando Committee, we must confess) really knows what that capacity can be. No one can know until the type of research and training program envisioned for the Freedom Academy is undertaken.

Requirements 4 and 5 are again especially illustrative of the inadequacy of our research and training program in non-military conflict.

In approaching our rational objectives, we are employing only a fraction of the methods and means potentially available. Again and again an objective is approached along a few well worn avenues, when a whole complex of access roads lead directly or indirectly to the same goal. Ours has been a limited approach to strategy, while the Communists have mastered and employ all methods and means.

Possibly our greatest weakness is that we continue to plan too much in terms of present capacity rather than in terms of systematically developing capacity in the new dimensions of global conflict. This means developing the full range of operational knowledge and then training people to use it.

At the higher levels we need conflict managers on our side who have assimilated a wide range of background knowledge and operational knowledge and can visualize, organize and manage the whole range of interrelated measures and countermeasures by which the global conflict will be determined. The field is so vast, the interrelationship between programs so sophisticated, that it cannot be mastered except through systematic and intensive study. Yet today there is no training program or combination of training programs which can produce rounded cold war strategists. Of course there cannot be, in the full sense, until a much wider range of operational knowledge has been researched and systematized.

Lacking an adequate training program, our cold war strategists have had to learn on the job, with tragic consequences. Furthermore, in coming up the ladder, the conceptual thinking and experience of careerists is often limited to one agency. While they may serve on various inter-agency boards and even attend one of the other agency schools, they are short on operator knowledge outside their agency. There are exceptions -- non-careerists like Robert Lovett and Gordon Gray come to mind, who have moved around quite a bit.

This stands in marked contrast to the preparation of Soviet conflict managers who have been schooled in political warfare throughout their careers and have been known, particularly in recent years, to serve successively in the KGB, the Army, the AGITPROP, and the foreign service.

Henry Kissinger, in his remarkable study, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, commented on this (page 434):

"Whatever the qualities of Soviet leadership, its training is eminently political and conceptual. Reading Lenin or Mao or Stalin, one is struck by the emphasis on the relationship between political, military, psychological and economic factors, the insistence on finding a conceptual basis for political action and on the need for dominating a situation by flexible tactics and inflexible purpose. And the internal struggles in the Kremlin ensure that only the most iron-nerved reach the top. Against the Politburo, trained to think in general terms and freed of problems of day-to-day administration, we have pitted leaders overwhelmed with departmental duties and trained to think that the cardinal sin is to transgress on another's field of specialization. To our leaders, policy is as a series of discrete problems; to the Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing political process. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviet system has had many of the attributes of any contest between a professional and an amateur. Even a mediocre professional will usually defeat an excellent amateur, not because the amateur does not know what to do, but because he cannot react with sufficient speed and consistency. Our leaders have not lacked ability, but they have had to learn while doing, and this has imposed too great a handicap."

The nearest thing we have to a multi-dimensional training program is at the War Colleges. Originally designed to emphasize military subjects, the Colleges have reoriented their courses to give to national and international affairs something approaching a co-equal role. Their primary purpose is to give the officer, often insulated from non-military matters prior to World War II, a grasp of the broader aspects of national strategy. Tiny quotas are also assigned from State, USIA, CIA, ICA, Treasury and Commerce.

Many factors which go into formulating national policy are considered. In terms of providing a broad survey of our cold and hot war machinery, an understanding of the interplay between existing programs, and a survey of current political, economic, military matters around the world, the War Colleges do a reasonably good job and they enjoy considerable prestige.

However, the War Colleges, despite their excellence, fall far, far short of training rounded conflict managers. Their purpose is more modest. Such central subjects as Communist conflict doctrine are, as noted, given only the lightest coverage. The all important subject of psycho-political warfare is mentioned, but not really studied, and so forth. The same is true of the Senior Officer's Seminar at FSI. They hardly begin to open the students' eyes to the whole new range of operational methods and organizational forms which we must develop and master, if we are to successfully resist Communist protracted conflict from the student organizations of Latin America to the jungle villages of Viet Nam.

Dr. Possony in a recent letter summarizing some of the gaps that exist in present government cold war training programs, says:

"If we look at specific gaps, we find that there is nowhere any instruction on political warfare. Sometimes the word is used but the speaker usually has no solid background of information nor is documentation handy. Nowhere, to my knowledge, is the subject treated comprehensively, and even if one agency does devote some attention to this, I doubt that there is enough competence throughout the government. Hence not only our own operators, but also those large segments of the U. S. Government who are the very target of political warfare, are left in ignorance about the matter.

"Similarly, there is no place where ideology is being studied. Ideologies are studied in universities, of course, but only in terms of Hegel, Marx, etc. In a deeper operational sense, notably in view of offensive or defensive manipulation, ideology is not on the instructional map. I

would go so far as to say that there is no instruction throughout the government designed to protect us against hostile propaganda. It is naively taken for granted that our people understand propaganda techniques and have no trouble distinguishing propaganda from genuine communications.

"Going beyond propaganda, I am unaware of any government effort dealing with psychological warfare including such important features as motivation, will, perseverance, conversion, anxiety neuroses, and other factors from the area of psychology and personality.

"There is unquestionably some pragmatic experience in economic warfare, but there is no agency where this problem is studied comprehensively.

"With respect to technological warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces has been making some progress, but, essentially, this school continues to deal with economics in the traditional sense.

"The inter-relationships between psychological and technological warfare such as they manifest themselves in the test-ban agitation are studied nowhere. The many scientists who are called upon to advise the U. S. Government on technological matters are kept in blissful ignorance about the most essential points on which their advice has a bearing.

"Academic instruction is one thing and operational training another. The operational training the U. S. Government has been providing, even in its trade schools, is quite inadequate, partly because operational records are kept highly classified and are withheld from instruction. Once a particular operation is terminated, the data and the lessons learned could be incorporated into the instructional materials, but this is not done, possibly with the occasional exception of one trade school.

"There are several efforts to acquaint reserve officers and civilian leadership groups with communism and other strategic problems (Strategy Seminars). But these programs are intermittent, improvised, and have too broad or narrow an audience base. No effort is really made to give the facts to such key segments of the American people as the communications industry. Nor is a real effort made to acquaint public opinion with the facts of life. Add to this the unfulfilled or largely unfulfilled need to increase the knowledge on communism in allied countries, and to give a proper instruction to exchange people and foreign students, and you have a good list of the many things we are not doing."

These gaps in political, economic, psychological, technological warfare and propaganda, as well as operational Communism, could hardly be more critical, for they are in the very subjects which are essential to an understanding of the conflict we are in.

Without intensive, systematic study of these subjects, how can a cold war strategist possibly hope to develop strategy attuned to the world conflict? To say that specialists are available to advise him on these matters is like saying experts on strategy and tactics are available to a field commander who has never gotten around to studying these things himself. Washington advised Braddock about those unconventional Indians and well before the ambush. Unless the policy maker has himself mastered these central subjects and can think conceptually about the conflict we are actually in, the availability of specialists will not make a strategist out of him.

When these grave deficiencies are pointed out, the stock answer is, we know government training programs are inadequate, but this is supplemented by sending regular quotas to the better schools of international studies at our universities. As one State Department official put it to me, "we like our people to get the Harvard viewpoint, the John Hopkins viewpoint, the MIT viewpoint, rather than just the viewpoint of a Freedom Academy." (No one has suggested the Freedom Academy would replace these centers.)

The point is that our universities are concentrating on language and area studies and not on developing or teaching non-military conflict. Whoever heard of a course in political warfare? Yet it is total political war in which we are engaged. Their programs are weak in essentially the same areas as government training programs. Possony's comments apply equally to our universities.

I do not argue against the desirability of exposing agency personnel to many viewpoints. I do say that when these training programs, in sum, skim over or bypass the subjects most essential to an understanding of the war we are in, they are in no sense a substitute for the Freedom Academy. Language studies and area studies are important. But until the strategist has also studied in depth Communist doctrine and political, ideological, psychological, organizational, economic, para-military conflict from our viewpoint, as well as the Soviets, he cannot relate the other knowledge to the conflict we are in.

The urgent need is for rounded cold war strategists. Our universities are attuned to developing scholars and specialists. The urgent need is for operational-organizational know-how in the new dimensions of struggle. Our universities are attuned to language and area studies, or to international law and diplomacy in a more conventional context.

There is another most important reason why our universities fall short. This has to do with motivation and the will to victory. Motivation is the most essential element we must instill in our people at all levels. We are constantly told that the Communists work harder with more dedication than their opponents. This is true because the Communist training program, the whole process by which they mold their cadre, concentrates on achieving a complete personal commitment. We naively assume motivation. Our armed forces understand its importance. Paratroop, Marine Corps, and Ranger cadres have it, and it has been carefully cultivated in training, because their tough combat missions require it. Yet non-military conflict tests the human will in more subtle and deadly ways than military combat, and the will to win is crucial. The university atmosphere is simply not conducive to developing a complete personal commitment. Sometimes it will, but this is by accident rather than by design.

Many of the programs which are potentially available to us are conditioned on highly motivated as well as trained personnel to implement them. Men and women ready to accept any financial sacrifice or physical rigor if it contributes to victory; who will not permit themselves to be affected by the apathy of their associates, or the psychological pressures of the enemy.

Our training program is, of course, severely handicapped by the grossly inadequate research and development program in non-military conflict. This has kept us from understanding our true capacity and instituting a training program oriented to this capacity.

Much work has been done at our universities on area research, especially on the Soviet Union. The Russian Research Center at Harvard has produced a number of books going into many facets of the Soviet state. There is an increasing awareness of the need for African, Latin American and Eastern studies, and many area studies are underway at our universities. Language training is being stepped up. Hundreds of books have been published in recent years on the Soviet Union and Communism.

Yet we must keep constantly before us the distinction between studying Communism and the languages, institutions, economies and histories of foreign countries on the one hand and researching and developing the operational-organizational know-how and the conceptual framework for non-military conflict which makes it possible to understand the conflict we are in in all its dimensions and to apply the full range of methods and means potentially available in an integrated, sustained and consistent fashion.

It is this operational-organizational knowledge and a realistic conceptual framework for a global struggle between Freedom and Communism which is neglected at our universities.

The Soviets also engage in extensive area and language studies, and in African studies they are probably ahead of us. But it is not this which gives them their great advantage. Rather, it is the systematic way in which they have thought out and mastered all the organizational forms and operational techniques which are possible in a total power struggle and the way in which they apply these flexibly yet systematically and consistently with clearly understood purpose within an all encompassing conceptual framework.

I do not mean to imply that nothing is being done about these things in our universities. Here and there an individual professor, or a small group is doing some work.

By and large, however, we have hardly more than begun to think through the full range of methods and means we can employ in the government and private sectors. We are far from achieving the capability of applying all of these methods, when and if they are developed, flexibly yet consistently. We simply do not know what our capacity for non-military conflict is.

Take a specific case.

One of our major problems is the deep Communist penetration of Latin American universities and student organizations. Keeping in mind our policy of non-intervention, what operational methods, organizational forms and programs are possible in the public and private sectors which can help solve this serious problem? The conventional methods of cultural programs, student exchange, USIA libraries immediately come to mind, but these are entirely inadequate.

From how many directions can this problem be attacked? What can the private sector contribute now -- what could it contribute if the Freedom Academy had been in operation the last few years and many of our civic organizations and universities had Academy graduates? What direct or indirect methods are possible in the government sector other than those employed now?

I suggest that if three intermediate level graduates of the Freedom Academy, with experience in Latin affairs, were locked up with this problem over a weekend, they would find there is an almost limitless range of inter-related programs in the public and private sectors which could be brought to bear -- and with minimum risk of successful accusations of Yankee Imperialism and with no violence to our democratic ethics -- provided again that the activating organizations possessed a few Freedom Academy graduates.

Today there is almost no chance these things will be done. There is little awareness of the infinite variety of operational-organizational possibilities inherent in a total political-ideological struggle, and we do not have the trained, motivated people deployed where they could plan and implement these things, especially in the private sector.

The President's recent speech indicates the Administration has turned a corner in its comprehension of the inadequacy of our strategy and the means of implementation in non-military conflict. I was particularly struck by these sentences:

"We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it, whether in Cuba or South Viet Nam. And we dare not fail to realize it is this struggle which is taking place every day without arms or fanfare, in thousands of villages and markets and classrooms all over the globe . . . No greater task faces this nation or this Administration . . . Too long have we fixed our eyes on the traditional military needs. . . . We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics and our institutions here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war."

If I understand the President right, he is saying what I have been saying -- we must fully develop the capacity of this country in non-military conflict and we must do this rapidly with a sense of urgency. Previous administrations never turned this corner.

So the question now is how.

Does the Administration yet understand this capacity can only be achieved in time through an intensive, systematic, large-scale research and training program?

Capacity in non-military conflict does not come easily or quickly. If the enemy is given enough lead time, as in missiles, we may never stop him. Further, we can pass the point of no return, without this country being aware of it. We can leave the enemy uncontested in the villages, the classrooms, the markets, just so long, when he has the capacity the Communists have demonstrated, then the trend may become irreversible short of a nuclear spoiling attack.

Already the OAS has been partially neutralized by Communist penetration of student organizations, intellectual groups, labor and the peasantry. Africa, considered safe a few years ago, is now in doubt with a strong tide running against us in Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Ghana, Somalia and within the FLN. There is deep though hidden penetration of the Nationalist parties in most of the new African nations. The guerrilla-political attack now inundating Laos and Viet Nam seems destined to spread across the remainder of Southeast Asia. A serious guerrilla-political potential is building in the backlands of Columbia and in the northeast provinces of Brazil. The Japanese Teachers' Union remains captive and the government seems helpless to prevent the systematic subverting of large numbers of school children. With every day's news the net is pulled more tightly around us.

The most alarming aspect of this snowballing situation is not Communist gains to date, but their capacity for non-military conflict vis-a-vis the West. The question must now be asked in all seriousness whether Communists capabilities are such that they can complete the isolation of the West before we can develop sufficient countercapabilities. The Communist research, development and training program, beginning with Lenin's three little schools of revolution in Italy and France prior to 1917, and expanding during the twenties into the most massive research and training program in all history has given them truly frightening capabilities.

We cannot hesitate or fall back on half measures. Only a crash program backed by the full weight and prestige of this government will be realistic in terms of the challenge we face.

I have noted the President's interest in guerrilla warfare. This is significant and encouraging. Guerrilla warfare is a substrategy of political warfare, as are ideological, psychological and economic warfare.

These substrategies cannot be developed in isolation. Rather they are so closely intermeshed that our concept of political warfare, or non-military conflict, must be developed as a whole. Otherwise, we cannot grasp the interplay, the nuances, the range of possibilities.

The Freedom Academy is attuned organizationally to the development of our overall capacity in the new dimensions of struggle. For the first time we will be able to bring under one roof the necessary range of knowledge and experience to consider non-military conflict whole. Only when considered whole can we take the measure of the challenge and generate an adequate response. Only in this way can we see clearly the extent of our research and training failure and define the many gaps to be filled.

The organizational structure of the Freedom Academy encourages maximum cross fertilization of ideas between the various substrategies and disciplines and with the least time lag, since our people will be under one roof. It maximizes the opportunities for synthesis.

The range of expert knowledge will enable us to consider all avenues leading toward our national objectives with relevant procedures from each substrategy and discipline brought to bear systematically. Strategic objectives now approached along a few routes will be seen to be approachable along a network of crisscrossing roads leading into the objective from every point of the compass.

Further, strategy will not be considered in a vacuum. There will be a concentrated effort to devise the organizational forms and the operational techniques which will make possible complete implementation of a multi-dimensional, multi-directional strategy.

The Freedom Academy seems the best organizational setup to give us a badly needed conceptual framework for non-military conflict within an acceptable period of time.

The development of a conceptual framework and thinking through the many interrelated methods and means available in non-military conflict may avail us little, unless this knowledge is rapidly incorporated into a training program designed to meet the requirements I have listed. Too much of the little we have researched and developed in non-military conflict has not been assimilated by our operators.

Let me reemphasize a few points.

At advanced levels the Freedom Academy would seek to train a rounded cold war strategist in non-military conflict. This, unfortunately, is going to take time, and the curriculum will be inadequate until we begin to get some results from the research side. The students will be mature individuals, many of whom already have substantial operator experience in some phase of the cold war. Two years is probably a minimum estimate of training time, with three years preferable for at least some advanced students. This may be cut down later, when the basic material is more widely taught in our universities and other government training programs.

This should be a prestige course. At this level the Freedom Academy will be operating as a National War College for Non-military Conflict. The graduate in the breadth of knowledge attuned to non-military conflict should be well ahead of almost anyone we now have. He should have deep knowledge of Communist conflict doctrine, a thorough understanding of political, ideological, psychological, sociological, economic, para-military conflict in all its dimensions, a knowledge of the wide range of tools in the public and private sectors which can be developed and utilized, a conceptual framework for non-military conflict so that these many tools can be employed flexibly yet systematically with clearly understood purpose, a grasp of the infinite variety of organizational forms and operational techniques inherent in a global struggle between Freedom and Communism, a grasp of the systemic revolution sweeping the world and an understanding of the range of positive and negative programs, many still to be researched and developed, which can assist the new nations toward freedom and an open society. No existing training programs, or combination of training programs, can even approximate these objectives.

It may also be desirable for a rounded strategist to have a variety of operator knowledge and study should be given to rotating promising personnel through several agencies, but this is outside the scope of the bill.

At the intermediate level, courses will probably run from six months to a year, and from a few weeks to several months at the basic level. Much thought should be given to developing these courses and to selecting students so as to meet Requirements 1, 2, 3 and 5.

Training of government personnel at the intermediate and basic levels is to create capabilities for implementing an advanced, integrated strategy in the non-military area with vigor and elan. A rounded expert, at the level to which we are trying to advance the art, can hardly be trained in six months or a year, although he may already have considerable operator experience. But he can acquire a working knowledge of operational Communism, a conceptual framework for a multi-dimensional, multi-directional strategy in non-military conflict, an eye-opening exposure to a wide range of positive and negative measures available to us, and practical, operator usable knowledge in a wide range of conflict situations with some detailed case studies.

The intermediate level training will provide major benefits up and down the line. First, an increasing number of agency people will acquire a broad "common fund of knowledge" in the central subjects of non-military conflict leading to a more general comprehension of our problems and commonly accepted premises enabling the various parts of our government to move in unison in planning and implementing a far wider range of programs. Second, the man in the field or behind the desk will be aware of a whole new range of tools available for problem solving and he will be far better equipped to diagnose and anticipate enemy activity. His reports and recommendations should be more imaginative and better attuned to the protracted conflict. Third, the graduate will be strongly motivated to think in terms of counter-measures and to seek out solutions. I have never known a man who has looked deeply into Communism whose life and attitudes have not been profoundly changed. The added stimulus of knowing there are answers to conflict problems which seemed insoluble before can do much to induce the complete personal commitment, the driving desire to seek out solutions and carry the fight to the Communists so essential to victory. Finally, a whole range of new operational-organizational methods and means will become capable of implementation and not as individual programs, but as part and parcel of an integrated strategy, as the agencies acquire an increasing number of graduates who understand these things.

Even the limited training in non-military conflict provided at the War Colleges is beginning to have a beneficial effect as the graduates of recent years rise in the hierarchy. This should be some indication of the benefits to be derived from the Freedom Academy.

The basic and intermediate courses for private citizens are to increase understanding of Communism, the nature of the protracted conflict between Freedom and Communism and how the private sector can contribute. Courses going no further than describing Communism and our cold war problems can accomplish more than is often recognized, particularly in maintaining the will to victory, understanding enemy moves, and supporting policies that call for real sacrifice. To stop here, after the student has been motivated to participate, would be to forego the biggest dividends. As the research side of the Academy gets into full swing, we will begin to understand the true capabilities of the private sector and I am sure a vast range of inter-related programs will open up which can play an important role in Latin America, Africa and the East, as well as the U. S. For the first time we will be in a position to develop the full capabilities of the private sector in an organized fashion. We can determine the type of institutions and civic organizations which can best implement specific programs; the availability of their members for training, the number of trained people they will need; the follow-up material to be provided by the information center; the type of training which can provide maximum capacity in minimum time, and so forth.

The Senate Committee and Senator Dodd have indicated some of the training programs and the areas from which we would expect to train private citizens. There is no point in repeating this.

So little thought has been given to what the private sector can contribute outside of the obvious that I believe the government is in for a pleasant surprise, provided the Freedom Academy is adequately staffed and funded. The Orlando Committee is prepared to make a separate presentation on this.

Let me try to answer some of the objections or counterproposals which are being made.

I have not seen the agency evaluations of the bill, but from my talks with their representatives, I believe much of the debate centers around the question of whether the existing schools and research centers could do the job better with less confusion and overlapping.

From what I have already said, I hope it is clear the debate should be whether they could do the job better, and not whether they are doing the job.

I am fearful the Administration may be persuaded that some re-orientation or beefing up of the existing programs will do the job. This would be an easy way out. I submit it would also lead, inevitably, to a

continuation of our piecemeal approach to non-military conflict, both as to training and research with little hope of meeting the basic requirements enumerated.

An additional seminar at FSI, or a few more lectures in the Basic or Mid-Career Courses, or another month at the War Colleges on non-military conflict is no answer.

For too long non-military conflict has been a stepchild in institutions which take note of its existence, but do not study it in depth. May I repeat -- this is a vast and complex subject. What we need is a research and training institution designed from the ground floor up to concentrate on this.

This does not mean the existing programs -- training or research -- will be preempted by the Academy. The Academy would not take over language or area studies which are collateral to non-military conflict, and most certainly we would not want the Academy to be burdened with the special training functions of the agency trade schools.

On the research side the Academy would pull together in one place our existing knowledge in non-military conflict so we can see where we are, define the gaps which must be filled to meet the requirements I enumerated, make an organized effort to fill these gaps, interrelate, systematize, synthesize this knowledge to produce new ideas, new programs, new operational-organizational approaches, a new conceptual framework for non-military conflict.

Under present circumstances such an effort is practically impossible. Each agency has its assigned area of responsibility, and all are concerned with non-military conflict to some degree. As various problems materialize, these may be farmed out to this or that university or research group. But non-military conflict is never considered whole, and no existing research center is staffed or funded to consider it whole. Further, each problem can only be attacked within a limited conceptual framework because the supplementary and complementary material, the related sub-strategies and organizational-operational methods and means, have not been developed and brought forward together, and the new insights, the new approaches they would offer are not considered. The result is an ad hoc approach to research and development in which only pieces of the conflict spectrum are studied, and then within comparatively narrow limits.

At the Academy the development of the substrategies can be brought forward together with maximum cross fertilization and synthesis and within an ever expanding conceptual framework. There is no need to duplicate good work where it has been done, nor would it prevent the Academy from utilizing existing research facilities at our universities. Rather, by considering non-military conflict whole, we would be in a position to know and evaluate what has been done, to make maximum use of this in developing new knowledge, to know what still needs to be done and to go about the further development of this art or science in a comprehensive, organized fashion. Where adequate research is going on on parts of the problem, let it continue. Encourage more research rather than less at our universities. But let all of this knowledge be assembled at the Academy.

We are on dead center. No one below the President and his close advisers has the responsibility to consider non-military conflict whole. Obviously they can't do it. Who can? Where is the impetus to come from? Where is the organization which is staffed and funded and has the directive to organize and coordinate this tremendous research and development job?

The FSI and War Colleges can't do it. They are primarily training institutions. No university or research institution, including RAND, has the combination of expert knowledge and experience to cope with it in the necessary breadth and depth.

As things now stand the comparatively few who are qualified by expert knowledge and demonstrated motivation are widely scattered where, to the extent they are being utilized, they are working on bits and pieces of the problem. They simply are not in a position to make an organized assault on the total problem. Further, our agencies are fully engaged with immediate,

pressing day-to-day problems. They do not have the time or extra manpower to organize or coordinate such an effort.

There is another limiting factor often overlooked. Development should be practical. There is no point in evolving operational methods or programs which our people are not trained or organized to implement. Consequently, present development work in non-military conflict tends toward conventional solutions that can be implemented by available personnel within existing organizational patterns.

This brings out a key point in favor of the Academy. There training will keep pace with research. In determining, for example, what the private sector can contribute, practical considerations will not limit the inquiry to projects falling within the present narrow capacity of the private sector. Rather, the researcher knows the training program will create additional capacity attuned to new programs. This will unshackle research. Admittedly, capacity to implement will always lag behind research, but there will be the knowledge that capacity is being systematically built up on the training side.

In evaluating this bill, you must keep in mind there is a research gap and a training gap. If we establish just a training school, the training, with some exceptions, will be limited to existing knowledge. If we establish just a research center, then the production, again with many exceptions, to the extent it makes a breakthrough, will be in danger of being entombed in the stacks. It is of utmost importance that our research program and our training program move forward together.

Non-military conflict is so new to Americans that we lack a consensus on how to go about it or even what the term covers. Certain editorial writers and agency officials have jumped to conclusions, some completely unwarranted, as to what the bill proposes.

These might be summarized under three headings. Overt versus covert operations. Negative versus positive programs. Dogmatic, doctrinaire approaches versus a multiplicity of viewpoints reflecting a pluralistic society. Let me take these in order.

There is a tendency in some quarters to see political warfare exclusively in terms of covert operations in which we try to fight fire with fire. The nature of the struggle compels us to use covert operations in certain situations and we must guard against becoming inhibited about this when the nation's very existence is at stake. However, I believe that most of the methods and means a free, open society can employ most effectively are in the overt area and it is here that the Academy will concentrate.

Yet, even when this is understood, some still seem to feel the Academy proposes to wage the global struggle with "sterile," anti-Communist measures which may repel the leaders and people we are trying to impress, rather than positive approaches such as programmed long-term aid which will show up Communism and convince the uncommitted their best interests lie with freedom and the West.

Let me say that anti-Communism has never struck me as sterile. In the struggle for the minds of men we could make no greater mistake than to soft-pedal the crimes of Communism or to fail to point out at every opportunity what agricultural reform means behind the Iron Curtain. Let us not be manipulated into the inhibited, defensive attitude that these things merely exacerbate the cold war. And just because our inadequate programs of the past have permitted an atmosphere to develop which makes it difficult for the truth to be believed, is no excuse to throw in the oars and drift with the tide. Further, in preparing our people for the struggle ahead we must never forget that being against an evil has been as great a motivating force in history as being for something -- and we can be both. In the operational area recapturing a student organization or a labor union strikes me as a positive accomplishment, and developing the operational-organizational know-how to do this should be essential training at the Freedom Academy.

However, let me doubly emphasize that the authors of the Freedom Academy bill recognize the prime importance of affirmative, positive programs to win the global struggle ranging from the development of alternatives to Communism for the uncommitted nations and the ability to articulate these clearly to the use of technical assistance and aid programs.

The point is that we are still far from thinking through the range of positive and negative measures which can be implemented by the government and private sectors. Equally crucial we lack an advanced conceptual framework to permit us to employ these methods and means purposefully in the environment of the total political war being waged against us.

The philosophy of the Freedom Academy bill is that we must make an organized crash effort to research and develop these means, both positive and negative, and to think through organizational forms and operational techniques to implement them.

Yet we cannot do this effectively or realistically until we understand the new dimensions of warfare in which we are engaged. And the war we are in cannot be understood by area studies, international relations, and military studies with a smattering of operational Communism, and political, ideological, psychological, economic, para-military warfare thrown in.

When the latter subjects have been mastered, then, and then alone, will our strategists be able to interrelate the spectrum of positive and negative programs in a patterned strategy employing our resources to the best advantage. Then, and then alone, can they comprehend the range of means available to us.

Last February the New Republic, in a remarkable example of editorial shooting from the hip, declared the purpose of the Academy is to "propound dogma."

The operative language of the bill, Section 6, reads:

"The principal functions of the Commission and Academy shall be-

"(1) to carry on a research program designed to develop an integrated, operational science that benefits and bespeaks the methods and values of freemen and through which the free world will be able to meet and defeat the carefully patterned total aggression (political, ideological, psychological, economic, paramilitary, and organizational) of the Communist bloc, and through which we, as a nation, may work in a systematic manner for the preservation and extension of freedom, national independence, and self-government. To achieve this purpose the full range of methods and means is to be thoroughly explored and studied including the methods and means that may best be employed by private citizens and nongovernmental organizations and the methods and means available to the Government other than the methods and means already being used. This research program shall include the study of our national objectives and the development of proposals for intermeshing and integrating the full spectrum of methods and means into a coordinated, short and long-range strategy for victory, seeking the utilization of our full potential in the public and private sectors; and

"(2) to educate and train Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign students concerning all aspects of the international Communist conspiracy, the nature and dimensions of the global struggle between freedom and communism and the full-range of methods and means that freemen should employ to meet and defeat the entire Communist attack in the non-military areas and to work systematically for the preservation and extension of freedom, national independence, and self-government."

Having participated in the drafting of this section, I can say categorically such was not the intent. It never occurred to the drafters that any reasonable person could arrive at such a tortured construction.

I have seen dozens of other editorials in liberal, moderate and conservative papers in support of the bill, and I am sure most of these would have been hostile, if they thought the intent was to propound and teach dogma.

The New Republic did not stop there, but stated the concept contained in the bill had originated ten years ago among exiles from Communist tyranny impatient with Americans' undogmatic approach to political matters and hopeful of creating opportunities for themselves in the policy apparatus! The idea, of course, originated ten years ago in Orlando, Florida, and all members of the parent Orlando Committee are native born and most, if they were so inclined, could qualify for the Sons of the American Revolution. (See my testimony beginning page 9 of the hearings for a history of the Freedom Academy idea.)

Ours is a pluralistic society. An attempt to arrive at a detailed consensus of our philosophy of government is probably impossible. Two high level government efforts have failed, as might be expected. Yet this does not mean we must continue to mumble when it comes to articulating the alternatives to Communism in Asia, Africa or Latin America, or in explaining our national purpose. These things should be studied and freely discussed at the Freedom Academy. The War Colleges have studied our national purpose for many years. I participated in one of these discussions at the Naval War College and it was a stimulating affair which I believe did much to crystallize the students' thinking. There was no attempt to impose a solution from above. The Senior Officers Seminar at FSI brings in a number of guest lecturers who discuss our ethical values and the national purpose. The New Republic, to my knowledge, has never accused the War Colleges or FSI of propounding dogma. Why is it assumed the Freedom Academy will go off the deep end?

Is it the use of the expression "operational science?" Our colleges have professors of political science and offer degrees in political science. Obviously our colleges do not intend to codify the principles of government and produce rigid, dogmatic solutions. Why the strained construction here? Do I sense a double standard?

The Communists have dominated non-military conflict for so long that many have been conditioned to think of political warfare in Communist terms. Since the Communists propound and teach dogma, that must be the function of the Freedom Academy, etc, etc.

The purpose of the Freedom Academy is to develop non-military conflict in accordance with the requirements and needs of the Free World. Those who think we cannot do this without sping the Communists have lost faith in themselves, this country and freedom. And those who are unwilling to even try are already defeated.

After fighting for a Freedom Academy for ten years the Orlando Committee is heartened to note that others are now calling attention to the gap in our training facilities.

The Sprague Committee established by President Eisenhower to study our information activities abroad included in that part of its report released by the White House January 9, 1961, this additional recommendation:

"Beyond these steps, there is need to provide high-level training in the interrelated economic, political, informational and military aspects of the present world struggle for more of the top officers of agencies dealing with international and security affairs. The Committee therefore recommends that consideration be given to the establishment of a National Security Institute for this purpose under the National Security Council, which among other things, would provide concentrated exposure to and study of Communist ideology, techniques and operations world-wide as well as our total governmental informational resources and how best to orchestrate and use them."

The members of the Committee were George V. Allen, Allen Dulles, Gordon Gray, Karl G. Harr, Jr., John N. Irwin II, C. D. Jackson, Livingston T. Merchant and Phillip Reed.

While such recommendations are encouraging, there are two serious weaknesses. First, the training would be limited to top officers of cold war agencies, so that Requirements 1, 2 and 5 are not met at all. Second, the research gap is not emphasized and I wonder if the Sprague Committee grasps

how far we still have to go in researching and developing non-military conflict. Unless the intent is broader than appears in the report, as released, this proposal would go little further than partially meeting Requirement 4. I say partially, because the training of top officers will be substantially in terms of existing knowledge unless there is a crash effort on the research side. Further, the report seems to emphasize government informational activities when it comes to countermeasures, and this is only one part of the spectrum of non-military conflict.

This recommendation is the type of half measure or quarter measure which I am fearful the Administration may consider an alternative to the Freedom Academy. It is too late in the game for such fundamental error.

Dr. Strausz-Hupe's group in their sequel to Protracted Conflict have come out for the Freedom Academy bill. At page 263 of this excellent new book, A FORWARD STRATEGY FOR AMERICA, they say:

"The United States has established academies to train men for war and a Foreign Service Institute to train diplomats. No comparable establishment trains Americans in the art of psychological warfare. Yet the need for professional competence in the field of psychopolitical warfare is just as great as that for military and diplomatic skills. It is in the field of revolutionary conflict techniques that the Communists hold a decisive margin of superiority over the Western powers Although these methods are studied closely by several agencies of our government, an Academy of Psychopolitical Studies should be entrusted with training career specialists."

In an accompanying footnote the authors note, "A major step in this direction was taken by the United States Senate during the 1960 Special Session of Congress when it passed, with no recorded opposition, the Freedom Academy Bill."

Of special interest may be the letter of then Senator Kennedy to Dr. Blair O. Rogers of September 9, 1960. Dr. Rogers in a letter to the New York Times had proposed that a Free University of the West be established on Ellis Island. In commenting on Dr. Rogers' proposal, Senator Kennedy said:

"You will likewise have read of a bill passed recently by the Senate proposing a Freedom University for training our people in techniques for fighting the Cold War. I feel certain that something will come of this proposal."

Those are heartening words indeed.

If the Administration and Congress will collaborate on the establishment of the Freedom Academy, this can be a turning point in the Cold War. At long last we will be able to set about systematically to understand and develop our national capacity for non-military conflict. At long last we can begin to graduate highly trained and dedicated men and women who will give their lives to our side in the global struggle between Freedom and Communism. These graduates can shatter forever the image of America as a complacent, self-satisfied, status quo power, unwilling to give up its soft ways to contest the Communists in the villages, the market places, the classrooms, the labor unions, and wherever else this total struggle is being fought.

The President has called on the American people for sacrifice. What better sacrifice can the private citizen make than to attend the Freedom Academy and learn how he can contribute?

Written by Alan G. Grant, Jr., and
submitted by The Orlando Committee