Low

The Honorable Thomas L. Hoghes Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Pen:

The project on the Himmleyen borderlands outlined in your letter of 4 June is indeed a timely one which could prove of real value in the future. Some basic work on certain aspects of the problem has already been dome, and other projects are under vay. (I have attached a list of these).

On the other hand, there are some aspects of the problem which are virtually untouched and for which we do not now have the information necessary for a study.

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Taking these factors into consideration, along with what we understand to be your requirements in terms of time, we propose the following solution:

We would masign a full-time senior researcher to the project for at least two months. His job would be to extract from existing material that which is pertinent to your requirements, fit it into your outline, and fill in some of the gaps by original research; we would expect you to indicate which gaps had priority. At the end of two months, the project would be jointly reviewed and a decision made as to what should be done next.

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State Dept. review completed

KK

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would be our representative on the project; he is ready to discuss this proposal with your representatives at any time.

Paithfully yours,

ILLEGIB

Mershall E. Carter Lieutement General, USA Deputy Director

Attachment

CONCUR:

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18 June 1963

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH WASHINGTON

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June 4, 1963

Dear Pat:

I am writing to ask on behalf of our Department whether CIA would be able to undertake a project for which we understand the Agency to be particularly well equipped. We believe it is time for a careful analytical review of the situation in the Himalayan borderlands, and we hope very much that you will see your way to undertaking the project.

Our picture of the scope needed is along these lines. Each segment of the area might be dealt with separately, to include (a) Ladakh, (b) U.P. -Tibet frontier, (c) Nepal, (d) Sikkim, (e) Bhutan, (f) NEFA, and possibly (g) Nagaland.

Among the relevant considerations for each might be these:

(1) An analysis of vulnerability and strengths:

geographical and topographical characteristics; leadership strengths and limitations; ethnic, religious and other social differences; historic jealousies; the desire for non-Indian alternatives; indigenous capabilities for conventional and counter-insurgency defense; other factors.

(2) Indian policies and practice:

a summary analysis of Indian policies and practice toward each area, with particular reference to Indian efforts to deal with these vulnerabilities.

(3) Communist Chinese strategies:


Communist Chinese strategies for dealing with the borderlands, including strategies already visible and those which are plausibly within Chinese capability and intention.

(4) Conclusion:

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Washington.

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(4) Conclusion:

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identification of the most important vulnerabilities and an estimate of Indian capacity to deal with them.

We should be very glad to help in any way we could. It might be specially useful if the executors of the project and appropriate INR staff were to exchange notes on the elements of items (2) and (3), which deal with Indian and Chinese strategies and policies.

Perhaps as a first step you would care to designate some representative who knows the field and who could talk with our staff on further elaboration of the details. The project would, I think, be eagerly received and it would be a most creditable product for the Agency.

Sincerely,

Thomas L. Hughes

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