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
4 November 1963

MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NESC Staff Study: The Management and Termination of War with
The Soviet Union

1. The attached study is to be submitted to General Taylor on 15 November to be forwarded through Mr. McNamara to Mr. Rostow, the latter in his role of chairman of the Inter-Agency Panel.
2. The terms of reference for the study were derived from the report of the Schelling Study Group and were approved by the Inter-Agency Panel. (A list of the members of both groups together with background memoranda and a copy of The Schelling Report are attached). Mr. Rostow requested that Mr. McNamara approve the study be done within the Department of Defense. Mr. McNamara approved and requested that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Studies Group do the study. In a subsequent meeting of the Joint Chiefs it was suggested that the staff of the NESC would be a better group to do the study; General Taylor agreed and obtained approval from the White House for this change.
3. Because of the interest you evinced in this study at the time I briefed you on its terms of reference, I thought you might like to see the results before it is put in final form. We have discussed the study with General Burchinal, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, USAF, General Emerick, J-5, and General Goodpastor; within the week we will meet with the Operational Deputies from the other two services, and Mr. Rostow to get their views on the subject, and in particular on how best to phrase the recommendations.
4. I believe the subject is of importance to the Agency in that it has an important contribution to make should the broadened approach to war and contingency planning as recommended in this study be approved. The Agency has a similar interest in the concept of a National Command Center. I would appreciate obtaining your views on the conclusions, and, to the extent you approve, on how best to focus the recommendations properly on the most effective manner for accomplishment of political-military planning.

Attachments



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COPY 20 OF 35
Staff Draft
31 October 1963

THE MANAGEMENT AND TERMINATION
OF WAR
WITH THE SOVIET UNION (TS)

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of the
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THE MANAGEMENT AND TERMINATION OF WAR
WITH THE SOVIET UNION (TS)

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THE PROBLEM

The Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, by direction of the Chairman of the NESC, was to examine and report on the problems inherent in the concept of management and termination of war. The terms of reference given to the NESC were as follows:

"It is U.S. policy to develop a capability so that, in the event of war with the USSR, military force can be used in a discriminating manner, to bring about a cessation on terms acceptable to the United States, to deter Soviet anti-population attacks on the USA and its allies, and to avoid unnecessary damage in enemy countries. Terms for cessation could be both political and military. The U.S. war aim would not be 'unconditional destruction.' The conduct and termination of war should be responsive both to the circumstances of initiation and to post-war security and political objectives.

"There would consequently be basic policy decisions to be taken during the course of the war and during the transition to truce and settlement. These decisions would have to be taken on the basis of information then available, possibly in communication with enemy and allied commanders or political leaders.

"Detailed plans for the coordination of military force with war objectives and negotiations appear neither feasible nor desirable. Detailed planning can help to assure that military forces, information and communications, operational plans, decision procedures, and possibly enemy expectations, are adapted to this concept of war conduct. The ways in which this concept might be carried out should be expected to vary over time. The following planning tasks are essential to this concept."

"1. The possible stopping points in war with the USSR."

* * * *

"2. The information and communications that would be available, and that can be developed, to support this concept."

* * * *

"3. Criteria for targeting."

* * * *

"4. The forces best suited for the terminal stage of war, for secure policing of a truce, and for post-war security and support of war aims."

* * * *

"5. Decision and negotiation in war." 1/

* * * *

1/ The full terms of reference are appended to the report, see p. _____.

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The terms of reference were developed by an interagency panel headed by Mr. Walt Rostow, Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, and were based on the report of an interdepartmental group under Thomas C. Schelling which examined certain long-range aspects of politico-military planning.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Military planning for general nuclear war has focused on the application of bomber and missile delivered nuclear weapons to targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The prime concern has been to insure that even under the worst circumstances of a Soviet initiated nation-killing attack, US forces would be able to deal an even heavier retaliatory blow to the USSR. Within the limits set by this requirement certain attack options have been developed by the US to provide some flexibility in the execution of strategic force strikes. In addition, war plans to govern the commitment of conventional or tactical nuclear forces in contingent situations have been prepared. Less attention has been directed to the means of limiting and terminating nuclear war under conditions favorable to the US. These are the problem areas which have been brought to the fore by the concept of controlled response in nuclear war.

This study is intended to direct attention to those elements relating to nuclear war which would appear to warrant an increased planning effort, and to recommend the manner in which this planning might best be accomplished. The study is focused on four subjects: (a) the interaction between intra-war events and national objectives and the probable effect in the bases for negotiation to end a war; (b) the relationships between targeting, characteristics of future weapon systems, and war objectives; (c) the special requirements for military forces imposed by the possibility of successive nuclear strikes,

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intra-war deterrence, and policing of a cease-fire or an armistice; and (d) the complexities of decision-making at the Presidential level.

To provide a war environment for analysis, three prototype wars between the US and the USSR were developed-- (1) a massive all-out nuclear exchange, (2) a nuclear exchange initiated by a discriminate pre-emptive attack, and (3) a war which escalated from a conventional-weapon period to a limited intercontinental exchange.

The initiation of war by massive intercontinental exchange not preceded by other forms of warfare, was included to present the worst case which the US would have to face. The discriminate pre-emptive attack permitted an evaluation especially of the formulation of decisions as to subsequent actions and how pressures could be brought to bear on the Soviet Union to cause it to limit its actions. In the escalation scenario, the analysis focused on the several critical decision points that could emerge at varying levels of war intensity.

The events described in these stylized wars have provided points of departure for an examination of situations during and at the end of a war which might require special political or military actions, command decisions and the exercise of control at the national level relative to war management and termination, and potential bases for political negotiation during and at the close of the war. These questions are discussed in subsequent portions of the report which lead to the Conclusions and Recommendations.

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II. AN ANALYSIS OF WAR

War in several of its most probable forms is analyzed in this section in a manner which emphasizes the problems of management and termination in terms of (a) the circumstances of initiation, (b) the reactions of the protagonists in terms of decision points and responses, and (c) the evaluation of terminal aims at the decision point.

The wars are presented in schematic fashion and are not linked to any specific year, or particular force level or combination of weapon systems. However, on the basis of the forces used and results obtained in a series of recently completed war games covering most of the years from 1964 to 1972, it is valid to assume that the generalized events portrayed in the following wars could occur at any time during this period.

In each of the scenarios we postulate certain conditions which lead to nuclear war, but the international framework within which these events take place is generally that existing today. The preponderance of military power is held by Washington and Moscow; there are continuing improvements in weaponry but neither side achieves a technological break-through of such magnitude as to create an entirely different balance of power. Moscow and Peking continue their rivalry for leadership of the world Communist movements. There is no rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the US or Western Europe. And as the diffusion of power proceeds, there remain nations non-aligned with either of the two military giants.

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A. WAR INITIATED BY A SOVIET MASSIVE INTERCONTINENTAL
NATION-KILLING ATTACK

A war initiated under conditions of strategic surprise by a massive Soviet strike against the continental United States and against US and allied nuclear capable forces elsewhere in the world would be one in which the least management is possible.

The effects of the initial Soviet missile salvo would depend on the specifics of the particular attack for example: the total Soviet missile force available, the allocation of Soviet missiles between military and urban-industrial targets, and the reliability and accuracy of the missile systems. Specifically in regard to the degree of industrial destruction, it might depend upon the extent to which the US had deployed an ABM system proven by the event to be effective despite Soviet penetration aids. US casualties could range from 30 to 150 million and industrial destruction from 30 to 70 percent. At least for the next few years it is probable that it would be a matter of many hours before the surviving Presidential Authority would have more than the grossest estimate of the actual damage.

To set the stage, it was assumed that severe external and internal reverses had plagued the Soviet Government to the point where the desperate leadership was giving a serious hearing to those ideologically oriented political leaders who were arguing that the Soviet Union could only fulfill its historic role as the apostle of communism if the Western Powers and China were devastated by nuclear war. They argued that the USSR had a socio-economic base which would permit it to recuperate at a much faster rate than its competitors. Moreover, the geographical situation of the Soviet Union would permit it,

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with a minimum of force, to establish post-war spheres of influence in the Near East, Southeast Asia, and, hopefully, Western Europe, while the US would have to pull back to the Western Hemisphere. A younger generation of military leaders also began to side with the pre-war faction, particularly when it became evident that economic difficulties might result in severe shortcomings in planned force postures over the next several years.

When a majority of the Presidium accepted the rationale for war, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Defense Minister saw no choice but to order a build-up for a possible all-out attack, but without setting a date. This included feverish diplomatic activity to persuade the US that a new solidarity had developed between the Soviet Union and Communist China, a move designed to provoke a US attack against the latter. The final decision to attack came after the United States threatened to use force (1) to prevent the USSR from forcibly reversing a Polish decision to renounce membership in the Warsaw Pact and (2) to prevent the USSR from removing from office the East German Premier and Parliament for having moved to the verge of federal union with West Germany.

1. Initiation--The Soviet Attack.

Attack Against the US. The initial phase of the Soviet attack, was carried primarily by missiles, was completed by H+60 minutes.^{1/} The Soviet bomber force was assumed to penetrate the DEW line at about H-hour to avoid giving warning inadvertently. These bombers could begin to attack Alaskan and Canadian

^{2/} Throughout the scenario, H-hour will be taken to mean the time of the impact of initial Soviet warheads.

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targets within minutes but would not be over CONUS for three or four hours. The Soviets might have available in approximately six to twelve hours a second salvo of those reload soft missiles surviving the US retaliatory attack. They would also have those missile-launching submarines which had not reached their launch positions at H-hour or were initially uncommitted. However, some of these weapons would not be available for commitment for several days.

Attack Against NATO Europe. To maximize the destruction of NATO military forces, the Soviets initiated the war in Europe with an IR/MRBM strike against all major NATO airfields, troop concentrations, and other prime military targets. To minimize damage to Western Europe all weapons were airburst. The launch time coincided with the first ICBM penetrations of BMEWs to avoid giving early warning of the attack on the US.

To reduce further the possibility of warning, the Soviet ground forces in East Germany received no reinforcements prior to the missile launch. However, the Soviets considered these forces were sufficient to seize Rhine River crossings during the first several days of the war when confusion would be at its height. The ground force attack was begun at the same time as the launching of Soviet IR/MRBMs and troops in the Western USSR were ordered to begin their move into Western Europe.

Initial Soviet Termination Plan. The Soviet leaders intended to offer to negotiate a cease-fire but not, in fact, to agree until after their bomber strike. They had hopes that the initiation of discussion could cause the US to withhold or even to recall its bombers. Their objective was maximum damage to the US even at the risk of terrible damage to the USSR. To bolster their bargaining position they had also retained a small nuclear intercontinental reserve (primarily missile submarines) and a reserve

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ground force armed with tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets planned to gain a substantial advantage in post-war recuperation by establishing control of the virtually undamaged European industrial base. They believed that because of its problems at home the US would be unwilling or unable to take effective military or political action in Europe for a prolonged period of time.

2. The US Response--Decision Point 1

The Situation. The Soviet attack assumed herein poses the most difficult task to the US national command system, the most important elements of which are the survival of Presidential Authority and communications systems by which he can direct the military to carry out his decisions. The time the President might have had to reach a decision on the US response and, if deemed necessary, for moving to an alternate secure location could have varied from zero minutes if the Soviets had detonated a nuclear device placed clandestinely in their embassy, to perhaps four minutes if Washington had been targeted by SLBM, to about 15 to 20 minutes if BMEWS warning had been received. It could have been substantially longer if Soviet plans were implemented in less than a perfect manner, or if these plans had included restraints against immediate attack of national command and control.

For the purposes of this paper, it was assumed that BMEWS warning was received, and Washington was not attacked until H-hour. Thus, the President had time to consider the following courses of action and to move to an alternate command center.

Possible Courses of Action^{3/}

1. A maximum retaliatory strike against the USSR, the Satellites and Communist China

^{3/} These courses of action are illustrative and it is recognized that other variations in response would have been possible. In order to permit consideration of subsequent situations and decision points it was necessary to assume that regardless of the course of action chosen that hostilities did continue and thus provide opportunities to analyze the decision-making process at various intensities of conflict.

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2. A counterforce strike against the USSR, the Satellites and Communist China

3. Either of the above, but withholding the attack on specific Satellite countries or Communist China.

It was assumed that the President selected the second of the above courses of action since he knew a large-scale Soviet attack was underway but did not immediately know the nature of the Soviet attack. He delayed his decision only long enough to be sure that there was no mistake about the existence of a major attack, since he was concerned by the probability that further delay would lessen the effectiveness of the US counterforce attack. Accordingly, the execution order was passed to operational units at the time the first Soviet missiles began to detonate in the US. Strategic bombers, theater quick-reaction aircraft, had earlier been launched on BMEWS warning.

Intercontinental Exchange. US missiles began to detonate in the USSR some 30 minutes after the President's launch order covering a period perhaps of from 60 to 90 minutes after the initial launch of Soviet missiles. Airborne alert bombers could begin arriving over the Soviet Union in about three hours, with the remainder of the bomber force arriving over the USSR in seven to seventeen hours.

War in Europe. Most of the alert aircraft in Europe and the Far East and on carriers in the 6th and 7th Fleets had survived, and began arriving over target areas within minutes after take-off; the attack by these aircraft, however, would continue for a number of hours depending on the distance to target. Non-alert tactical aircraft together with ground force units would have suffered heavily from the initial Soviet attack.

3. The US Response--Decision Point 2 (H to H+30 Minutes).

The Situation. Within a few minutes after he ordered a counterforce attack, the President had received a Soviet offer to

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halt the intercontinental exchange which made no mention of the war in Europe. He had been receiving reports showing that the Soviet attack was clearly a composite military urban-industrial strike. He was told that the initial US retaliatory attack had been launched. He had received no reports that any of the major West European cities had been attacked.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Accept the Soviet offer to halt the exchange and negotiate armistice terms.
2. Withhold the urban-industrial attack and counter the Soviet offer with a threat that the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack at times and places chosen by the United States unless the Soviet Union immediately recalled its bombers, ceased its attacks on the US and Europe, withdrew all its forces to within the USSR, and destroyed its major weapons systems and undertook to honor any and all US requests for reparations.
3. Refuse the Soviet cease-fire offer and extend the retaliatory option to include an urban-industrial attack against the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The President opted for alternative three sometime between H and H+30 minutes. His decision was conditioned by the fact that US bombers were already in the air and some were on their way to military targets in the Soviet Bloc. To call back all these aircraft would degrade the US strategic position. In the meantime, there was no assurance that Soviet bombers would be recalled.

As to delaying the urban-industrial attack in the hope of using US strategic superiority to force a peace on US terms, the President rejected this alternative on the recommendation of his military advisors, who warned that: (1) the continued survivability of US forces under Soviet attack could not be assured, (2) even in the absence of enemy attack, the US could not be sure that

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its forces would for long remain in a war-fighting posture, in part because of the uncertainty of the human factor under the stress of nuclear devastation, and (3) it was essential to destroy the war-making base of the USSR. All of the President's advisors asserted that even if the USSR submitted to US terms, recuperation at a more rapid rate than the USSR was out of the question in a situation wherein Soviet urban-industrial centers had suffered much less damage than those in the US. Furthermore, it would be taking the greatest kind of risk to assume that the US could enforce delivery of goods and services from the USSR over a prolonged period.

The President was aware that in making his choice he might be raising substantially the risk of increased damage to cities of European Allies as the Soviets tried desperately to seize control of the continent. In the end, he decided that US interests demanded maximum destruction of the USSR regardless of the risk to Western Europe.

It should be noted, finally, that the decision-making process took place in haste and under unimaginable psychological stress, and that emotional factors would have pushed the decision in the direction of a maximum retaliatory attack. It is unlikely that under such conditions the decision would be reached strictly on the basis of ad hoc gain/loss calculations.

4. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 1 (H+60 minutes to H+18 hours).

The Situation. The surviving Soviet leaders were aware that the USSR was sustaining tremendous damage, that their urban-industrial attack on the US had been successful, and that Communist China had been very hard hit. In Europe, it appeared that Soviet military forces would not be able effectively to seize Western Europe. Even though the Soviets retained a residual force, they estimated that remaining US forces were more powerful.

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Possible Courses of Action

1. Seek a cease-fire without further military action.
2. Launch an attack against European capital cities to destroy the political framework of Western Europe and then seek a cease-fire.
3. Continue the war with attacks against both the US and Europe.

The Soviet leaders decided on course two. They hoped the destruction of the European political framework would lay the groundwork for a subsequent political takeover in Europe or, at a minimum for post-war exploitation, to assist in Soviet recovery. It was reasoned that further attacks against the US would not be a useful expenditure of limited strategic resources and that further military action in Western Europe was not feasible.

Accordingly, the Soviet leaders ordered nuclear attacks against all West European capitals. They declared this to be justified by European cooperation with the US during the war. Immediately after this order was executed, the Soviet Union announced that it was accepting a cease-fire and was beginning to withdraw all its forces to within the frontiers of the USSR. Unannounced was the fact that agents of the Soviet Union were being left behind throughout Western and Eastern Europe who would pose as patriot leaders in the reconstruction process.

5. The US Response--Decision Point 3 (H+24 hours).

The Situation. The military situation had changed very little despite the Soviet attack on West European capitals. The few surviving elements of British and French strategic nuclear forces were launched at Soviet targets. The war in Europe, which had been grinding to a halt before the Soviet capital-city attack, became even more chaotic. It was apparent, however, that

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Soviet forces were beginning to retreat to the east as best they could. The Soviet SLBM fleet was known to be at sea but the whereabouts of individual submarines was unknown.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Agree to the cease-fire subject to Soviet withdrawal of forces to homeland.
2. Agree to a cease-fire only if the Soviets accepted terms which amounted to unconditional surrender.

The President decided to accept course one. More stringent terms were deemed to be unenforceable, given the condition of the US military posture. He did so on the advice of his military advisors, that the US had more to gain by negotiating from a position in which the strength of US residual forces were much greater than that of the Soviets. Accordingly, the President used every available means of communications again to get word to the Soviet leadership that the US would recognize a cease-fire provided all Soviet land, sea, and air forces withdrew to within the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

6. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 2 (H+24-26 hours).

The Situation. The military situation was essentially unchanged since the Soviet attack on West European cities and the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal from Europe. Western and Soviet forces in Europe had virtually ceased fighting.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Accept the cease-fire on US terms.
2. Reject the cease-fire so long as the US threatened to attack Soviet submarines.

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The Soviet leaders decided to accept the cease-fire despite the risk of US attacks on their submarines. They felt this was a risk worth taking, especially if the US tied up a substantial part of its naval forces searching for Soviet submarines. The important thing now, in the judgement of the Soviet leadership, was to enter into negotiations while they still had residual forces in being and deployed.

7. Immediate Tasks in Armistice Period.

The US military would have tasks of an enormous and complex nature in the armistice period. It would be called upon to help re-establish order in CONUS and to initiate rehabilitation efforts. US forces would also have to provide immediately means to observe Soviet compliance with the terms of the agreement. The Soviet withdrawal from Western Europe would be an initial problem. Continuing surveillance of the Soviet Union would be required to determine the strength and disposition of remaining Soviet forces. US forces at sea could be used to gather up essential shipping. Residual US forces must be readied for further action as they might have to be used to threaten Nth countries which were reluctant to give full assistance to the US and its Allies. As a general proposition, it would seem probable that the more rapid the reorganization of residual units into effective forces, the greater would be the pressure on the Soviets to comply with the armistice. Moreover, it would place the US in a better position from which to renew the war should the Soviets not live up to the agreement.

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B. WAR INITIATED BY A US DISCRIMINATE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE

To develop a second prototype war, it was assumed that as the Soviet military forces made the final preparations for their massive first strike described in the preceding War A, the US gained conclusive information of the Soviet intent through a high-ranking Soviet official who was convinced that a war would be a tragic mistake and was hoping to avert it. This information was supported by independent evidence received at 0800 Washington time, the day before the USSR had planned to attack.

1. The US Response--Decision Point 1 (0800-0900)

Possible Courses of Action

1. With no warning, launch a counterforce attack against the USSR.
2. Same as 1, but also attack urban-industrial targets in the Satellites and Communist China (or withhold attacks on specific Satellite Countries and Communist China).
3. Communicate with Soviet leaders in an effort to induce them to call off the attack; at the same time, take actions designed to improve US alert posture and to impress Soviets with US strategic capabilities (such as increasing airborne alert).

Based on reconnaissance which indicated that the Soviet forces were not yet fully prepared, the President decided on the third alternative. At 0900, he warned the Soviet Government not to attack and, at the same time, informed the

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NATO allies of the situation and ordered US forces to take the necessary precautionary alert measures. While he recognized that the Soviet Union might take military advantage of this warning, the President concluded that the national interests of the US demanded that he do what he could to prevent the war.

2. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 1 (0900-1200)

The Situation. The Soviet leaders realized that surprise had been lost but, otherwise, the conditions which had impelled them to decide on attacking the United States had not changed. However, their attack in Europe might now suffer and the US top command would probably now survive.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Call off the attack permanently or until a more auspicious time.
2. Launch the attack immediately.
3. Proceed with preparations for the attack while attempting to throw the US off guard and hope to launch on schedule; if the deception efforts failed then the attack would be launched on warning of a US attack.

The Soviet Government decided on the third alternative. There had been no basic change in the circumstances which had led the Soviet Government to decide that a nation-killing attack against the US was in the Soviet interest. A postponement of the Soviet attack could give the advantage of initiative to the US; but on the other hand, the US forces might still be caught by surprise if the deception worked. Accordingly, the Soviet Government issued public and private denials of any aggressive intent, called for a UN Security Council meeting to consider the US threat to the peace, and suggested a summit meeting to settle outstanding issues. At

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the same time, the Soviet Government publicly called a nationwide civil and military alert "in view of the US threat."

3. The US Response--Decision Point 2 (1200-1500)

The Situation. Between 1200 and 1500 hours, reconnaissance and other intelligence information indicated that the Soviets were intensifying their attack preparations.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Withhold any US attack until a Soviet attack had been launched.
2. Launch a counterforce attack, and again to call upon the Soviet Union to desist from its plans.
3. Launch a composite military and urban-industrial attack.

The President decided on course 2--at 1530 he issued orders for the execution of a counterforce attack to commence at 1600, seven hours after his first decision to communicate with the Soviet leaders.

In the face of certain knowledge that the Soviets were about to launch a massive intercontinental attack including a strike at NATO, the US objective became (1) at best, to cripple Soviet strategic capabilities so badly that such an attack would become worthless relative to Soviet aims, or (2) at worst, to blunt to a substantial degree the Soviet strategic strike capabilities so that even after a Soviet retaliation the total residual strength of the US and NATO would be relatively superior.

Since it was critical that the US decision to attack be protected, it was decided not to give NATO forces notice of the attack order. The seven-hour period since NATO was first alerted permitted US forces to clear their barracks area and be enroute to defensive positions. **Most US units**

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would be clear of their barracks area in three hours.) The reaction time of other European-based Allied ground forces would depend on the alacrity with which SACEUR and the several governments could reach a decision and issue appropriate orders. In some cases the initial action might take longer than seven hours.

The US counterforce attack was launched, as ordered, at 1600. The President's message demanding the Soviet agree to desist from their plans was communicated at 1620.

4. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 2 (1600-1630)

The Situation. While not yet peaked, Soviet forces were close to being ready for launch when the Soviet leaders received agents' warnings of US missile firings.

Possible Courses of Action. Previous decisions had ruled out any course of action other than to launch the all-out attack. Having already considered the alternative of a US pre-emptive strike, a change to a counterforce strategy offered no solution. The launch of Soviet missiles against the US and military bases in Western Europe began shortly before US missiles impacted in the USSR. At the same time orders were issued to ground forces in Europe to begin rolling westward.

5. The US Response--Decision Point 3 (1630-1645)

The Situation. A few minutes after 1630 the US received BMEWS warning of Soviet missiles enroute to the United States.

Possible Courses of Action.

1. Immediately fire at Soviet urban-industrial targets.
2. Withhold decision until the nature of the Soviet attack is clarified.

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The President decided to select course two. While there would be a risk that US forces would be degraded, nevertheless the possibility that the Soviet leadership had chosen to limit the exchange by not targeting cities, at least in the initial attack, made the risk worthwhile.

6. The US Response--Decision Point 4 (1645-1715)

The Situation. It became quickly apparent that the Soviet Union had launched a large-scale attack on US cities.

Possible Courses of Action.

1. Launch an urban-industrial attack as in War A.
2. Exercise the attack option as in 1 but do so over an extended period of time.
3. Withhold any further attacks.

It was assumed that the US adopted course 1, for the same reasons cited in "War A." To attempt to withhold forces to pressure the Soviets to capitulate on US terms contained too many risks, both in terms of forces survivability and long term insurance of Soviet compliance. The attack was launched at approximately 1715.

The US objective in this scenario, however, was assumed to differ from that in War A. The fact that the US had time to prepare and launched a pre-emptive counterforce attack persuaded the President that it was feasible to expand US war aims to include the destruction of the Soviet government and empire, and the partitioning of USSR into several independent countries. To this end, all communication resources were ordered to so inform the Soviet people and to announce that the US was willing to agree to an armistice with the government of any republic or other sub-division. US military leaders were directed to draft plans to assist in securing the above war aims.

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7. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 3 (1745-1900)

The Situation. Even though the Soviet attack had commenced before the US counterforce strike had landed, the Soviet force was degraded. As a result while the Soviets had suffered as badly as in War A, the US suffered somewhat less damage and destruction. However, the Soviets had still achieved a good measure of their war aim, namely, the destruction of a large part of the US.

Possible Courses of Action.

1. Ignore the US proposal, continue the war, but suggest terms for a cease-fire based on a withdrawal of Soviet and US forces to homelands.

2. Ignore the US proposal and continue the war with residual forces available.

The Soviet leaders decided on the first course of action. Acquiescing in the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a political entity was out of the question. Taking the initiative in proposing cease-fire terms would both stress continuity of Soviet central government leadership and unite internal factions behind the government. Moreover, the leadership doubted that the US was in a position to do much about any offers of surrender which it might receive from dissident elements within the Soviet Union. Finally, the Soviets were aware that it was unlikely that Soviet residual strategic forces could be destroyed by the US.

The Soviet government, therefore, announced at approximately 1900 that it would agree to a cease-fire and withdraw all its forces to within its frontiers.

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8. The US Response--Decision Point 5 (1900-2400)

The Situation. It appeared that the Soviet government still maintained its authority within the USSR and that there was probably little hope of expecting a change in this situation, at least in the short run.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Continue to press the objectives initially declared.
2. Accept the Soviet cease-fire offer, but not the provisions for the withdrawal of US forces.

The President decided that US national interests would be served by a cease-fire which he expected would permit all of NATO countries to begin the urgent task of reconstitution and recuperation. Accordingly he announced that the US would agree to a cease-fire effective at 2400, by which time the US strategic attacks would have been completed. The US would not, however, agree to a permanent peace treaty unless the Soviet government was replaced by one which would accept international obligations to guarantee that the Soviet Union would never again become a threat to the peace.

9. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 4 (2400-0200)

The Situation. The military situation was essentially the same as at the end of "War A."

Possible Courses of Action.

1. Accept the cease-fire despite the US intention to interfere in Soviet internal affairs after the cease-fire and refusal to withdraw its own forces.
2. Reject the cease-fire and continue sporadic missile launchings in order to improve its bargaining terms.

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The Soviet leaders decided to accept the cease-fire and take their chances on improving their position in the armistice and peace treaty negotiations. They counted on their residual strategic forces to give them a reasonably good position at the conference table.

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C. WAR INVOLVING ESCALATION

The two scenarios developed in this section provide a context for analysis of management and termination in a war begun with conventional weapons which escalates to nuclear conflict. It was assumed that the world situation in which the war occurred was generally as described above. But rather than attempting to destroy the US by direct attack, the Soviets are portrayed as exploiting a political situation with conventional military forces as a means to turn the tide in their favor.

Though in each war there are points at which either side might have agreed to end hostilities, the conflicts were carried to the point of a limited intercontinental exchange to sketch out the kinds of situations which could be expected in a prolonged escalation. Because of the much greater variety of possible courses of action available at the lower levels of intensity, alternatives to the option selected are generally not described in these scenarios.

WAR IN EUROPE

1. Initiation

The Italian Communist Party had gained sufficient political power to topple Italian governments and had organized a para-military force in northern Italy. The Communists had infiltrated the leadership of the Army to some degree and as a result believed they could sabotage NATO forces in Italy to such an extent that Italy could be taken with little or no fighting.

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Communist Insurgency. In late March, the Italian Communist Party fomented a paralyzing national transportation strike followed by other strikes throughout the industrial plants of north and central Italy. These led to sporadic civil conflict and by the end of a month the Italian Communists exercised full control in Milan, Venice, and Genoa.

On 1 May, the Italian Communist Party withdrew from the Parliament in Rome and proclaimed the birth of the "Italian Peoples Republic" with a provisional government located in Milan. This was immediately recognized by the USSR/^{European Satellite,} and Communist China.

Initial Soviet Termination Plan. The Soviets supported the Italian party action with the maximum objective of establishing a Communist government in Italy and a minimum objective of forcing Italy to become neutral and withdraw from NATO and the EEC. This latter situation would prepare the way for eventual achievement of the maximum goal.

2. The US Response-Decision Point 1

On 2 May, the Italian government asked the US and West European governments for military forces to help put down this rebellion. The US response to the Italian request for military assistance was to land the 6th Fleet Marine brigade in Naples harbor and to air transport a US Army brigade from the US to the Rome-Leghorn area.

Both Italian and US-West European tactical air units engaged in the fight against the Communists in the North. A number of localized air battles occurred with Soviet aircraft flown by Soviet "volunteers" from Hungary bases, resulting in an Italian declaration of war against Hungary.

US Termination Plan. US objectives at this point included defeating the Italian communists, thus ending the threat to the legally constituted Italian government, and exploiting the

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diplomatic values to be gained from denouncing the aggressive Soviet support of the Communist uprising in Italy.

3. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 1

The intervention of the US and West European Governments as well as the Italian declaration of war against Hungary caused the Soviet leaders to conclude that the insurgents would fail. Moreover, on the basis of "hot pursuit" US and Italian fighters had attacked Hungarian bases and destroyed Soviet aircraft and personnel, thus broadening the war further than the Soviets had intended. The apparent failure of this Communist thrust had resulted in increasing unrest in the Satellites culminating in the outbreak of a revolt in Hungary. Deciding the best course was to gamble for larger stakes to overcome their current losses, the Soviets launched a conventional attack against NATO forces in Germany on 15 June.

Starting from a high state of military readiness, the USSR concentrated on a major conventional attack against Western Germany, and air/ground units were committed to seizing the Baltic exit and the Turkish straits.

Soviet Termination Plan. The primary political and military objective of the USSR now became the rapid seizure of Western Germany and the destruction of NATO forces there. In addition, they planned to continue support of the Italian communist effort to establish a new government.

4. The US Response--Decision Point 2

NATO forces had been at an alert posture from the beginning of the fighting in Italy, but the Soviets by using low level fighter-bomber attacks achieved tactical advantage.

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NATO forces were forced to withdraw, though slowly, but were able temporarily to halt the Soviet drive short of the Rhine River.

Since it did not appear possible to turn the tide of battle with conventional weapons alone and since the USSR showed no inclination to terminate the conflict in Europe, the US, with NATO concurrence, chose to escalate by initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield and against interdiction targets in the Satellites. This attack on 17 June was accompanied by a Presidential statement outlining the conditions of a cease-fire and of the West's objectives in subsequent armistic negotiations.

US Termination Plan. The Presidential decision to authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons resulted from the belief that not only would this action reverse the local military situation but would put serious pressure on the Soviets to close out the war. The stated objective of the Allies now became to compel the Soviets to withdraw to the borders of the USSR. This would permit the establishment of freely elected governments in the Satellites. To reduce the risk of Soviet miscalculation, the President ordered these objectives relayed to the people of Europe by all means of communication. The armistice proposal sought clearly to limit NATO objectives to the aim of permitting choice by the people of Eastern Europe and to avoid any explicit threat to the Soviet homeland. It was anticipated that in this way the Soviets would not be forced into a corner and would agree eventually to this proposal rather than escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

5. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 2

The Soviet responded to the NATO tactical nuclear attack on the afternoon of the same day (17 June) with a nuclear strike

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against NATO military bases carried out by MRBMs, IRBMs and medium bombers.

Soviet Termination Plan. The Soviet objective was now to attempt to establish a more favorable situation in which to agree to negotiate. The Soviet attack was followed by an offer to negotiate a cease-fire. The note contained a tacit threat to destroy Europe city by city.

6. The US Response--Decision Point 3

The Situation. The Soviets, by committing missile and bomber forces based in the USSR, initiated a critical situation in the war. If the US attacked the bases from which these weapons were launched there would be a substantial escalation in the intensity of war. There would be a risk that the next Soviet response might be an attack against the US. This risk would be substantially increased if the weapons had been launched from the US. On the other hand, if the US did not attack them, the Soviets would be encouraged to believe that the US was so fearful of attack against the US that it would continue the fiction of sanctuaries and, therefore, they could continue to employ these weapon systems with impunity. Continued Soviet use of these systems would seriously jeopardize the NATO military position in Europe, and thus substantially weaken the NATO position in any negotiations with the Soviets.

Possible Courses of Action. In this situation, it would^{appear} that the US could have taken one of the following courses of action.

1. Launch an attack with US based ICBMs to destroy the MRBM and medium bomber bases.
2. Same as one, but use Polaris missiles.
3. Same as one, but use theater fighter bombers.

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4. Same as one, but use theater MRBM forces (if available).

5. Send an ultimatum that unless use of these systems is not discontinued the US would destroy a limited number of military targets in the Soviet Union.

6. Not respond, but permit continuation of the Soviet sanctuary.

It is assumed that the President decided on course five. It was decided that possibility of forcing the Soviets to close out the war under threat of US attack against their homeland would be of greater value than the military gain from an attempt to destroy the medium bomber and IR/MRBM bases.

The US and NATO sent an ultimatum to the Soviet Union on the evening of 17 June demanding discontinuance of missile and air attacks from the USSR. The threat was made that six military targets in the USSR would be destroyed unless the Soviet attacks ceased.

US Termination Plan. The US and NATO objectives remained the same as before. The ultimatum's aim was to make clear to the Soviets their use of weapon systems from bases within the USSR had destroyed the concept of sanctuary and that their actions had substantially increased the threat of an uncontrolled nuclear war.

7. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 3

The Soviets refrained from further IRBM strikes, seeking to defeat NATO with tactical forces. However, this attempt failed and the Soviets resumed nuclear strikes against Western Europe from the USSR on 19 June following several reverses suffered by their ground forces.

Soviet Termination Plan. The overall Soviet objective remained as it had earlier been. However, Soviet leadership had decided to accept the attack on six Soviet targets and respond by a return attack upon the BMEWS sites believing that this evidence of Soviet willingness to expand the battlefield would cause the US to seek quickly to close out the war,

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accepting a lesser goal than the total elimination of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

8. The US Response-Decision Point 4

On 19 June, in retaliation for the resumption of Soviet nuclear attacks from bases within the USSR, the US executed attacks on six Soviet military targets.

9. The Soviet Response-Decision Point 5

On the same day--19 June--the USSR declared that it would not accept the US terms, although it was prepared to call a halt to the hostilities. Any attack on the Soviet Union, however, would be met in kind. Thereafter, the Soviets retaliated by attacking BMEWs sites.

10. The US Response-Decision Point 6

Now convinced that the war could not be halted on satisfactory terms short of a large-scale nuclear exchange, the US decided to launch a limited counterforce attack against the Soviet Union. The attack was executed on 20 June and was carefully constrained to reduce urban-industrial damage. Attacks on Moscow's government control centers were withheld.

US Termination Plan. The US action was designed to increase pressure on the Soviet leaders to accept a cease-fire based on a Soviet withdrawal of all its forces in Europe to behind Soviet frontiers and the freeing of the Satellites from Soviet domination.

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~~TOP SECRET~~11. The Soviet Response-Decision Point 6

Though
desperate to close out the war before an all-out exchange should take place, the Soviet leaders decided to follow their announced policy of responding in kind. The Soviet strategic forces, although badly damaged by US counterforce attack, were ordered on 20 June to fire a minimum counterforce attack against US military targets.

Soviet Termination Plan. As this attack was being executed, the Soviet Union declared that it was withdrawing to the USSR and would cease its strategic attacks on the US and Western Europe. Any further attacks on the Soviet Union would be met by Soviet attacks on US and West European cities. The objective was to end the war on the basis of US terms previously announced, but to enhance the Soviet position at post-war conference tables by virtue of having attacked the US and by possessing strong residual strategic forces.

12. The US Response-Decision Point 7

The US decided not to press the war further after realizing that the Soviet attack had done far less damage than, in fact, the Soviets were capable of inflicting. A cease-fire was thereupon agreed to on the morning of 21 June.

US Termination Plans. The withdrawal of Soviet influence from Eastern and Western Europe and the destruction of a portion of the Soviet strategic force were deemed to be satisfactory outcomes of the war. Further attacks on the Soviet Union would place at risk US and West European cities without the prospect of corresponding gains.

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13. War Management--Post Nuclear Attack Military Tasks

In this escalatory NATO war, major US military tasks following the counterforce exchange on 20 June would be:

- a. To gain fast, accurate information on enemy residual battlefield strength and movements.
- b. To be ready for immediate execution of the remaining SIOP tasks.
- c. To be prepared to carry out surveillance missions to insure Soviet compliance with cease-fire terms.

WAR IN THE FAR EAST

This section broadens the war environment by adding a Far Eastern conflict in the same time period as that of the European scenario just considered. The assumed pre-war situation is modified to include a political soft spot in Thailand in addition to the situation in Italy. The Chinese Communists, together with their Allies in North Korea and North Vietnam, have decided to exploit the Thai situation with the ultimate objective of seizing most of Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communists believed the planned Soviet actions in Italy would divert the US attention from the Far East. While the Chinese Communists did not explicitly coordinate their moves with the Communists in Europe, sympathizers in the Italian Communist party kept Chinese Communist leaders fully informed of Soviet plans.

Insurgency to Chinese Communist Attack. In February and March, the North Vietnamese (DRV) leaders committed large numbers of their regular forces to guerrilla action in Laos, to open up attack routes to the south and southwest, and in South Vietnam. Toward the end of the month guerrilla action

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had spread to Thailand itself. All three governments, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, requested assistance from the US and the other SEATO powers. But as SEATO forces began landings to establish airheads in Laos and northern Thailand, and to bolster South Vietnamese forces, a "Thai" group raised the flag of a government in revolt which was immediately recognized by the three Communist Far Eastern governments. Charging that SEATO was seeking to crush the local Asian government, major units of the DRV and Chinese Communists overtly crossed the borders into the three non-Communist countries.

Chinese Communist Termination Plan. The Chinese Communist objective was to establish Communist governments in Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand responsive to direction from Peking.

1. The US Response--Decision Point 1

In late March and early April, at the same time that the civil disturbance was beginning to take shape in Italy, the US was faced with the decision of how best to defend its interests in Southeast Asia. At this early stage the US had a choice of several courses of action.

1. Continue to commit sufficient of its own ground and air forces in conjunction with other SEATO forces to defeat the three-pronged conventional Communist attack.
2. Commit increased tactical airpower to blunt the Communist drive, and eventually to cause the Communists to return to their borders;
3. Combine both of these, plus the launching of conventional air strikes against military bases in North Vietnam and in South China.
4. Use BW/CW or radiological weapons to incapacitate the Communist field forces in Southeast Asia.

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5. Or finally, use tactical nuclear weapons to destroy the Communist war-making potential in DRV and South China, coupled with occupation of key areas in North Vietnam.

It was assumed that the second course was chosen. The first course was eliminated on the grounds that it would call for too great a commitment of SEATO ground forces and that the courses three and five were not acceptable because they would carry too great a risk of broadening the scope of the war, especially at a time when the threat of a major war in Europe was growing. Nuclear weapons as well as BW/CW weapons in course four were ruled out because it was desired to avoid crossing either threshold unless absolutely necessary. Also the US did not want to give the appearance that it was always easy to decide to use nuclear weapons against Orientals.

US conventional air strikes caused serious casualties among the Communist forces. However they were not sufficient to stop the forward movement of Chinese Communist reinforcements.

US Termination Plan. The US objective was to defeat the Communist forces and support the legally constituted governments, while minimizing the extent of commitment of ground forces.

2. Chinese Communist Response--Decision Point 1

The Chinese Communists interpreted the US action as giving sanctuary to their air bases and committed fighter bombers to attacks against US bases in Southeast Asia and US carrier forces in the South China Sea. In addition, they pressed forward their attack in Southeast Asia.

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3. War Management--Decision Point 3

US Response. During May, as a result of fighting in both the European and Far Eastern theater demands for conventional equipments began to exceed supply; yet the SEATO campaign had not succeeded in forcing the Chinese Communists and DRV to withdraw. In fact, their guerrilla elements were still infiltrating forward, deeper into Thailand. Arguments in the US government to use tactical nuclear weapons in the Far East were gaining ground; the decision in their favor was reached, however only after the Soviet attack in Germany on 15 June when it became imperative to close out the war in the Far East.

It was decided to destroy all major elements of the Chinese Communist military forces to prevent air and, possibly, missile attacks against US bases on Taiwan, Okinawa, and South Korea, or the initiation of a ground attack against South Korea. The US attack was to be carried out with a minimum of civilian casualties.

The attacks against Chinese Communist targets were carried out by US strategic forces. Theater forces had suffered considerable attrition and the balance of these forces were to be held in reserve to mop up surviving Chinese Communist forces, to be prepared to retaliate if the Soviets should attempt any action, and to be available to reinforce US forces in the Mediterranean. Chinese Nationalist forces were transported to landing areas on the mainland and given US air support.

US Termination Plan. The objective was to force a Chinese Communist withdrawal from Southeast Asia and to prevent their forces from attacking elsewhere. It was also intended that this action would convey to the Soviet Union

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the seriousness with which the US viewed its strategic objectives and that the US would take whatever action was necessary to support them, even though it involved the risks inherent in the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, it was hoped that the eventual destruction of the Chinese Communist regime could be achieved by a successful war waged by the Chinese Nationalists.

It was assumed that the US attack effectively destroyed the capability of the Chinese Communists to wage large-scale modern war.

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We have discussed three war situations against which the concept of management and termination can be examined. In the massive, all-out nuclear exchange, most of the damage would have occurred within 24 hours. The concept of a sophisticated response capability, war management to limit the total effects of the war and a negotiated termination of the war, would have very limited meaning in such a war. Vital to US interests in such a situation would be a mix of weapon systems which gave high assurance of the survivability of a force sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union in a retaliatory attack, no matter what the degree of surprise. In addition, there must be a command and control system which would permit Presidential Authority to order the attack and to initiate actions of reconstitution.

There is not much that can be said about the bases for ending this kind of war, except that the objectives of both sides will start with the issue of survival. The focus of surviving resources, military and civilian, would be on the immediate task of assisting surviving populations, reestablishing a national political fabric, initiating a program of rehabilitation, and preventing any Soviet attempt to capture control of undamaged areas beyond its borders.

A post-nuclear exchange environment in which both the US and the USSR lie shattered would certainly encourage other countries to exploit the prevailing world-wide instability to promote their particular interests. These efforts could be inimical to US interests, and together with predictable Soviet efforts at reconstitution, constitute an added post-war task with which US forces must be prepared to cope.

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At the other end of the scale, we have discussed a war situation in which a prolonged escalation takes place. At the lesser levels of intensity which do not threaten national survival the deterrent effect of strategic nuclear forces on both sides will act to keep the war limited. The management of such a war is exceedingly complex; it is influenced heavily by political considerations which are difficult to foresee. Nevertheless, an analysis of this kind of war shows that there will be many points at which it can be terminated--especially if the war develops in a manner which permits the governments to find acceptable settlements which are less than total victory for either side. And basic to this is the ability of all parties to the conflict to control their strategic nuclear forces under periods of prolonged and intense crises, and to make explicit the intent of their actions.

The dynamics of such conflicts in terms of intensity, objectives and locale, suggests that pre-war as well as intra-war planning should include continuous evaluation of military actions relative to political aims. Contingency planning which takes into account only the application of military forces to achieve a single objective would be inadequate for decision-makers, who require an integrated analysis of the military-political alternatives in assessing the probable outcome of any available course of action.

The other war situation we have described is the case where general nuclear war takes place with at least one side following the doctrine of "controlled response." Questions of management and termination relate initially to the response to a discriminate attack. It must be noted that unless there is a considerable change in US targeting philosophy and force application, it is problematical whether Soviet civilian and military leaders could be made

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to believe that US targeting was confined to military targets only. The blurring of the attack outlines resulting from the varying times on target of the different weapon systems, together with the proximity of numerous military targets to urban-industrial centers, might well cause the Soviets to deduce otherwise. However, by the 1970s improved CEPs, enhanced reliability of missiles, an improved capability for simultaneous lay-down of warheads, greater assurance of the survivability of weapons and command systems, achievement of flexible targeting capability and means for the rapid assessment of the character of the enemy attack may give ~~both~~ the US and ~~the USSR~~ the tools ~~they~~ need² to await evidence of enemy intentions and then to respond appropriately.

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~~TOP SECRET~~III. WAR MANAGEMENT: POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The preceding scenarios have shown that terminating a war varies radically in its connotations depending on the nature of the conflict. In the extreme case of the massive intercontinental nation-killing exchange, the war might end because one or more of the nations involved had ceased to exist as an organized society. At the other end of the spectrum, a war might never emerge from the "sub-limited" category because of political and military counter-actions below the level of actual combat. In the case of the war which began in Italy, for example, stronger internal security measures and rapid deployment of powerful US and other West European forces to the area of northern Italy might have stifled the communist insurrection at the outset.

Despite the wide range of situations described in the analysis of war, the definition of national political-military objectives in every case has to consider how US objectives would be affected if the ultimate threat of large-scale nuclear war should become a reality. The ^{section} immediately following

(A) will, therefore, examine how some traditional war aims stand up under conditions of full-scale nuclear war, while the next section, (B) will examine political-military objectives in an escalating general war.

It is assumed that the basic US national security objective is to ensure the survival of the United States as a sovereign nation with the continued ability to develop our institutions as we see fit. To this end, with regard to the Communist world, US operational objectives include containment of international Communism

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through preservation of the freedom of threatened nations;
 the solution of international problems below the major crisis
 level by increased participation in international organizations
 designed for timely application of community pressures; ^{and above} all
 the maintenance of the necessary military forces to deter the
 Soviet Union from a direct attack against the United States
 and its allies.

The US does not have as an objective the destruction by
 overt military force of Communist nations or the Communist
 system. Nor do its policies support the initiation of military
 action in the support of diplomatic action, other than to
 avoid a forceful change in the status quo.

The Soviet basic national security objective is con-
 sidered to be identical to that of the US. Soviet operational
 objectives are described as
 the deterrence of military attack against the USSR and other
 Communist countries while they are seeking to communize the world.
 To this end

Soviet leaders appear to intend to limit actions
 to subversion, support of wars of "national liberation,"
 and political action. They appear not to have ^{sought to} design
 strategic intercontinental forces of sufficient strength to
 ensure Soviet success in a war with the US; however, the
 Soviets continue to maintain large conventional forces as
 well as extensive theater-oriented nuclear forces for commit-
 ment on the Eurasian land mass.

Despite the fact that neither the US nor the USSR con-
 templates resort to large-scale war to support their operational
 objectives, both are prepared for the contingency of war if
 their own national security is at stake.

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~~TOP SECRET~~A. POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR

It is highly unlikely that any plan could be devised which would relieve an American President of the responsibility of deciding at the time which of several contending national objectives deserved priority in a nuclear war. It is apparent that in an all-out nuclear war survival as a sovereign nation would take precedence over all other objectives. Whether the President would choose to expend national power to achieve other objectives would depend directly on his judgment of whether this contributes to the attainment of the primary objective.

The manner in which US objectives would be sought in any particular war would be evolved during its course. The possible effects of selected war aims are discussed below, and suggest that the formulation of war aims is an area where continuing study during peacetime would be of considerable value.

Unconditional Surrender of the USSR and its Co-belligerents

Given the history of the Russian people and their governments it is unlikely that unconditional surrender or, indeed, surrender of any kind would be accepted by a Soviet Government without resistance to the limit of its resources. The examples of the invasions of Russia by Napoleon and by Hitler suggest that when a Russian government and its people are reasonably at peace with one another, and when the means of resistance are at hand, surrender is no more congenial to the Russian character than it is to the American.

In particular, under the condition of a large scale nuclear exchange it is dubious whether the US could impose unconditional surrender on the USSR unless we seized and occupied key control

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centers in the USSR. There is considerable room for doubting that the United States would be physically capable of supporting the latter operation.

It is barely conceivable that in a situation where a countermilitary exchange had occurred, the prime concern of the Soviet Government might be the preservation of Soviet cities -- a concern which might lead the USSR to accept unconditional surrender. However, even after a counterforce exchange the USSR would still possess a residual force, unless unforeseen developments gave the US a more effective counterforce capability than we now envisage. Therefore, the USSR would still hold US cities at hostage and would be no more at a disadvantage than the US in a negotiation to end the war.

Unilateral Disarmament of the USSR

Total and unilateral disarming of the USSR as a war aim would probably require about the same degree of effort as unconditional surrender of the USSR. The Soviet Government would probably regard unilateral disarmament as a more acceptable arrangement than unconditional surrender if it stopped at that. But the Soviet leadership would have to conclude that after the Soviet Union disarmed, the United States could and probably would present demands tantamount to unconditional surrender. The conclusion one reaches is that total unilateral disarmament of the USSR as a war aim is just as unobtainable as unconditional surrender, and perhaps as a physical matter even harder to accomplish.

Variations on the theme of disarmament or arms control might be advanced as war aims in a less than all-out exchange with a greater chance of their being accepted by the USSR without the need for first going through a broken-back war.

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Ideally, we would like to eliminate the remaining Soviet strategic forces, including M/IRBMs, ICBMs, bombers and SLBMs.

Given a US capability to retarget its residual force on the remaining Soviet missiles (and this would be difficult for SLBMs), the US could demand that the Soviet force be dismantled. It would probably be safer, however, for the United States to launch another disarming attack, for the Soviet Union might well calculate that it had nothing much to lose by firing its remaining missiles instead of stripping itself of the last means of defense. This is the essence of the problem of unilateral disarmament; there comes a point where continued resistance is preferable to placing one's self at the mercy of the enemy.

For this reason, lesser measures of disarmament might be considered alternative war aims. As examples, these might include assembling weapon systems at given locations for ease of surveillance, or of on the spot observers at strategic force bases and launch sites. Schemes for freezing Soviet forces at the level existing after an intercontinental exchange could also be devised.

The purpose of this discussion is not to canvass all the possible disarmament arrangements which the US might seek to impose on the USSR. The kind of disarmament which might be sought would be too heavily dependent on the relative level and quality of residual forces available to the two sides to permit

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recommendation of a specific formula at this time. What does seem clear is that (a) total unilateral disarmament of the USSR is so close to unconditional surrender that planners should consider these aims to be one and the same in terms of expenditure of force, (b) when we scale down our war aims to something less than total unilateral disarmament, a variety of arrangements is conceptually possible, each of which has the potential of involving us in complex and prolonged negotiations. To amplify this last statement: If the Soviets had residual forces in an amount which caused us to be concerned about their destructive potential, their bargaining position would not be so very much inferior to our own. We would, moreover, be caught between the two risks that the USSR might choose to fire its remaining weapons rather than give them up, while every day that passed would make the resumption of hostilities by US initiation increasingly improbable. In short, an effort to negotiate anything more than a very simple disarmament arrangement under something like ultimatum conditions could result in an inconclusive de facto armistice.

De-communication of the USSR

This would probably be one of the by-products of unconditional surrender. As an independent objective -- and if construed to mean complete revision of the socio-economic system of the USSR -- this objective would be akin to total unilateral disarmament in the level of effort required to accomplish it, both during and after the war. Yet conditions might exist which would make it feasible to demand replacement of the Soviet Government by a government which would conform to accepted norms of international behavior and which would relax ideological controls over the Russian people. Even if the Soviet Government apparatus had collapsed, this would be an exceedingly

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delicate operation, requiring an intimate knowledge of the political forces at play within the Soviet Union. Targeting Soviet Government control centers to cause the maximum disruption might be helpful to an extent but we have to recognize that people who might constitute a successor government are quite likely to be located at government control centers, too.

Since we are always interested in promoting evolutionary changes in the USSR, as a matter of course we scrutinize closely those trends, cliques, and individuals whose encouragement we judge to be in our interest. Knowledge of this kind would be valuable in a war situation and we should consciously and continuously assess the information available to us from this viewpoint. In the period before a war escalated to ultimate intensities nothing would be more critical than a knowledge of how to handle our relations with the Soviet Union so as to maximize the possibilities that a "peace party" would control the levers of power within the Soviet Union. Even after a major exchange it would be essential that we do all in our power to bring to the fore those elements in the USSR who would be willing and able to guide that country down paths of peaceful cooperation. This is a role for which American diplomacy should be fully prepared and which it should play even after a U.S.-Soviet war had begun. The American ambassador or special U.S. emissaries in Moscow would thus have a war-time mission of unparalleled importance -- realizeable, however, only if plans were made for this contingency.

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To sum up, de-communication in its literal sense is a war aim whose achievement would be immensely difficult. The prospects for a change in Soviet Government personnel and policies might, on the other hand, be quite good. The United States should regard this as a feasible war aim and adapt current practices to that end.

Punishment of the Aggressor

This possible war aim is mentioned because it is, in essence, the concept underlying pure deterrence. Superficially it appears to be a response rather than an objective; yet certain tasks are accomplished in the act of making good on the deterrent threat. This has been recognized in our targeting policy for many years, most explicitly and authoritatively in the annual SIOP guidance.

The tasks now set forth in SIOP guidance, it should be noted, are no mean ends in themselves. If the military and the urban-industrial attacks were executed, we would have caused a substantial amount of disarmament of the Soviet Union and have gone a fair way towards reducing that country to a subsistence economy.

What needs to be recognized is the distinct possibility that the tasks defined in the SIOP guidance will be the principal objectives which the United States will seek through force of arms in a nuclear war. We might not wish to, or we might not be able to, use our residual military force to accomplish anything more than the objectives attained by our exercise of one of the SIOP options. In short, in drafting future SIOP guidances we should have it in mind that we may well be defining those war aims of the United States which can be accomplished through the use of military force.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Territorial Demands

Under this heading might be considered: freeing of the satellites from Soviet domination; regaining independence for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; restoring Polish, Finnish, and Japanese territory to their former sovereignties; giving independence to the ethnic republics of the USSR. The first-mentioned possibility should be regarded as a feasible war aim. The war itself might accomplish this for us by reducing the Soviet Union's ability to project its influence beyond its borders. The others mentioned might be feasible under certain conditions and probably would be items for negotiation if the war left us in a strategic position vastly superior to that of the Soviet Union. In varying degrees, however, all of these latter possibilities strike at the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union; we would probably find a settlement on such terms very difficult to come by and the gain not worth the cost.

On the other hand, any settlement should provide that territory occupied by the Soviet Union during the course of the war would be freed of the Soviet presence. We should probably make this requirement public knowledge very early in a general war for, while seizure of territory by the USSR need not always be strategically significant, it would be vital in the case of Europe.

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~~TOP SECRET~~The Impermanence of Objectives

Implicit in this discussion has been an assumption that, while the basic consideration in a nuclear war would be national survival, the US would want something more out of a war: We would want conditions in the post-war world to be favorable to the growth of a community of free and independent nations. In other words, we would hope that the war might yield us some of the same results we are now seeking through peaceful means. The preceding discussion of bases for terminating a war with the Soviet Union has been biased in this direction. And this bias needs to be recognized for what it is, namely, a projection of present values into a vastly different future.

It is probable that a nuclear war would drastically alter the premises on which our national security policy is based and consequently would alter the basic character of our relationships with the rest of the world. Not just the fact of the war but also the enemy's war aims would be influential in altering our view of the world. The scenario of the "massive inter-continental nation-killing exchange" suggests that this kind of a war would destroy not only a good part of our physical plant but also could effect our national aspirations and scale of values. The United States might in that extremity

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resort to actions unimaginable to us today. Actions which we might now label as defeatism, imperialism, or even barbarism might seem quite reasonable. For example, the destruction of a nation to keep it out of enemy hands might be no more unrealistic than allowing it to fall to the enemy intact in hopes of later recovering it. Establishing American dominion throughout the world might be as reasonable an aim as dividing the world with our enemies. And mass extermination of the remaining populations of the Communist countries with biological and chemical weapons might seem *justified to guarantee the* territorial integrity of their neighbors against incursions. In short, there may be another order of war aims which will emerge because of what has happened in a war. These aims are likely to be more "unreasonable" in terms of present values than those discussed previously in this paper.

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B. POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN AN ESCALATING GENERAL
WAR

As is shown by the scenario on prolonged escalation, one of the more likely ways in which a nuclear war -- especially a European war -- might develop is from battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons, to interdiction attacks close to the Soviet frontier, to nuclear attacks on bases and supply lines in the USSR. It is quite conceivable that the explosions of NATO nuclear warheads on Soviet soil would result in an instantaneous all-out Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe and the United States. But this cannot be assumed. The Soviets know as well as we do what the effects of an all-out nuclear war would be. The deterrent effect of the threat of an all-out nuclear exchange would, therefore, appear to apply even after there had been an escalation to use of nuclear weapons. In such a war, the political-military objectives would vary widely but one objective would always be to terminate the war before it escalated to a large-scale intercontinental nuclear exchange. This objective does not preclude escalation; rather it means that escalation is managed to enhance the probability of closing out the war.

It can be seen from the scenario on prolonged escalation that US war aims in an escalating situation would not be the same as those possibly obtaining in a general war situation. War aims in an escalating war would arise out of conflicts generated at specific pressure points and the principal war objective of both sides would presumably be to relieve the pressure in a manner satisfactory to both parties. If one party had a more radical war aim to begin with or its war aims escalated, the conflict could quickly depart from the limited category.

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The scenario on the escalating war in Europe indicates that the immediate objective of the USSR was seizure of NATO territory, while the US objective was to hold on to this territory. This produces an imbalance in the situation which would tend to make limitation difficult since the Soviet Union was evidently prepared to risk nuclear war to gain an advantage at the expense of US vital interest. As the European scenario states, the US would be faced with the problem of defining the limits to objectives and military actions which it might take. The US chose to escalate to tactical use of nuclear weapons and then to limited strategic use of nuclear weapons; its objectives were also raised from the restoration of the status quo ante to the freeing of East as well as West Europe of Soviet forces.

In an important sense, decisions about objectives will not be free but will rather be determined by the means of making war. The art of managing war, therefore, should include the application of force in a manner designed to create stopping points short of an all-out nuclear exchange in circumstances favorable to the US. Generally, this is a problem of controlling escalation. Under ideal conditions there would be a concentration of efforts to terminate hostilities at points where weapons systems not previously introduced into the war are about to be used or where target systems not previously hit are about to be attacked. Calculations of gain or loss will be made just before and after a large quantum of force is applied.

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The major stopping points in a war, as indicated by the types of forces or targets, might be as follows:

- (1) Transition from conventional to tactical nuclear weapons
- (2) Transition from tactical use of nuclear weapons to strategic use of nuclear weapons
- (3) Transition from a small and limited target system (defined by geography or type of target) to a broader target system
- (4) Transition from the use of theater based to non-theater based weapon systems.
- (5) Transition from counterforce to urban-industrial
- (6) At various points along the scale, the launch and recall or commitment of bombers could also create possible stopping points.

Perhaps one of the most difficult situations to analyze would be the probable outcome of a result to limit strategic war. The management of such a war would be heavily concentrated on doing the least amount of civil damage in the enemy's homeland, on making the target list clearly relevant to specific objectives, on demonstrating an intent not to escalate without restraint, but at the same time raising the level of coercion to a point which would promote the attainment of national objectives. A prime purpose of the limited

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strategic war would be to convince the enemy that continuation of the war at the existing level was not profitable, that it would continue unless US demands were met, and that escalation would be even more unrewarding.

Somewhere at the boundary between limited and general war, US objectives would begin to shift from local and limited aims to those discussed in the earlier part of this section. National command would become more alert to the possibilities of securing these broader objectives. And this is where a political hazard in the limited strategic war would come to the fore. The transition from local and limited objectives to more sweeping ones is quite likely to be made earlier than it should be. Both success and discouragement are apt to have their effect on the national commands of the two sides, with the result that one side would proclaim sweeping objectives in the flush of victory or the other would enlarge the war with the abandon of despair.

This presents the problem of managing changes in objectives -- a problem which is as important to the termination of a war as managing military escalation. In the scenario on prolonged escalation in Europe, it is probable that the war could have been ended quite early if the Italian Government, concerned by the failure of its NATO partners to declare war on the Soviet Union, had withdrawn from NATO and declared itself to be neutral. Alternatively, the US might have escalated its objective from status quo to neutralizing or making an ally of one or more of the Satellites since, as the scenario notes, there was considerable unrest in the area at the time. Possibly this would have had a deterrent effect on the subsequent Soviet decision to broaden its own objectives. The point is that when one party to a conflict is unwilling to modify its objectives in the interests of closing out the war the other party may be obliged to escalate not only its military actions but also its political objectives. ^{In a war involving possible escalation} There are, in short, no political

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aims which should be regarded as immutable and military planning which does not go forward side-by-side with planning for management of changing political aims will lack an essential dimension.

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~~TOP SECRET~~C. POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES: SUMMARY

The prospects are that in an all-out nuclear war with the USSR, US efforts would be focussed on securing the basic US objective of survival as a sovereign nation. Some war aims, e.g., elimination of a large percentage of Soviet strategic forces, would, of course, be achieved by the destructive processes of the war itself, and we should bear in mind that the guidance for strategic target planning in a very real sense defines war aims. Additional aims which might be attainable in an all-out war and which might be the bases for terminating such a war could be: the liberation of any territory seized by the Soviet Union during the course of a nuclear war, especially in Western Europe; the withdrawal to their homeland of any Soviet forces deployed abroad at war's end; the end of Soviet political domination of Eastern Europe. The institution of inspection procedures might be regarded as essential to the securing of the foregoing war aims and to provide warning of any Soviet intent to resume hostilities. Our chief political task, for which we should be well prepared in advance, would be to exert all the influence and skill we possess to bring to power those elements in the Soviet Union who would be disposed to cooperate with us in restoring world order. However, it should be recognized that nuclear war is likely to bring with it changes in the domestic and international fabric which are so radical that pre-war objectives established by pre-war values will be altered or discarded in favor of new war aims.

In an escalating situation, war aims would arise out of conflicts generated at specific pressure points and, if the war were limited, the principal war aim of both sides would presumably

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be to restore the power equilibrium at approximately the same level as that which existed before the conflict. Hazards are encountered when objectives begin to shift from local and limited aims to broader objectives. Thus, management of changing objectives and management of forces should proceed hand in hand.

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IV WAR MANAGEMENT: SELECTED REQUIREMENTS
FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY PLANNING

A. COMMAND AND CONTROL AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL

All of the preceding sections have indicated that war aims would be modified and redefined under wartime conditions, as choices are made between alternative courses of action. Decisions on methods of securing national objectives would also be made during a war. The importance to the nation of every major decision relevant to the conduct of nuclear war means that the President must play the role of Commander-in-Chief in a manner unparalleled in US history. Especially in a large-scale nuclear war, unless surviving Presidential Authority is in prompt, continuous, and authenticated communication with key military and civilian leaders, there will be doubt as to who is in charge. This is a matter of grave concern since the time pressures could be such that even a temporary lapse of Presidential command might produce severe degradation of the US response or even an undesired response.

Survivability of Presidential Authority. A review of actions now under way to increase the survivability of alternate National Military Command Centers shows that we may have some confidence that at least one will survive the heaviest nuclear attack. The same cannot be said for the survivability of the Presidential Authority. Under present plans, even though one of the alternate command centers would be almost certain to survive, the really knowledgeable decision-makers probably would not survive a surprise attack.

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Yet unless we can insure a survivable effective Presidential Authority, we must fall back on the undesirable policy of providing for a doctrinal response by the strategic retaliatory force.

It would appear that one solution to increase greatly the survivability of a Presidential Authority would be a survivable national command center in the immediate Washington area, to which the President and his key advisors could relocate within time available from tactical warning. It is likely that the President would be reluctant to leave Washington during a crisis short of imminent missile attack because of his continuing responsibilities as Chief of State and of the possible adverse impact on public opinion of his departure. Workable, tested plans must be included to insure that the key people can reach the command post within the time allowed by warning.

Concept of a National Command Center. The present concept provides for a National Military Command Center supported by several alternate hardened and mobile military command centers. Other agencies of the government outside of the Department of Defense furnish representatives to the NMCC and the NMCC provides the Military Command Center from which advice and recommendations can be made to the Presidential Authority. It would appear that instead of a National Military Command Center, it would be much more efficient to establish a National Command Center in which would be located all of the functions and key advisors needed by the President in time of emergency.

Information Required

A National Command Center must have that information on which the Presidential Authority would base decisions. This

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information concerns status and deployment of enemy and US and Allied forces and weapons, as well as enemy and Allied political situations. Centralized control requires that this information be available to the National Command Center in considerable detail and, to permit timely decision when seconds count heavily, It must be real-time information. Because such a Center cannot possibly have the staff available to analyze the raw data there must be provision for its being reduced to manageable proportions and displayed for the decision-maker.

In the event of a nuclear attack on the US, the first information needed by decision-makers would be confirmation that such an attack had taken place. Examples of detailed information needed are: Origin of the attack? Are the attacking forces aircraft? Missiles? Is the attack continuing or does it seem likely to continue? What is the nature of the attack? All-out? Counterforce? Ambiguous? Are national command, control and communications systems being attacked? What is the pattern of attack world-wide? In the case of a discriminate US pre-emptive attack, the critical information needed for decision-makers would be the extent of damage to Soviet retaliatory forces and indications of the probable type of Soviet response. And, finally, evaluation of all possible information concerning the post-attack situation on both sides would be required in order to plan for the use of pre-planned reserves, reprogramming of forces, and use of other residual military forces.

An important difference between escalation at low levels of intensity and the major strategic nuclear exchange is that in the former, much more time would generally be allowed for collection and analysis of information prior to decision. At each critical decision point--of which there would be many in an escalating war--information on the situation of US forces which would require or justify escalation would be essential as would an intelligence estimate of the probable results of escalation, including the attitude of Allies.

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Acquiring Information

Prior to hostilities and up through heightening tensions, the flow of information through regular channels would continue. Naturally as tensions grew, the already closed nature of the Soviet Union would become more and more a barrier to the gathering facilities, and some communication channels would be severed. It is likely that, after the outbreak of a nuclear war, most time-sensitive information required for decision-making would be primarily obtainable through reconnaissance, and other types of intelligence information would diminish.

Post-attack reconnaissance will also be extremely important to the decision-maker. It probably should be completely overt and would provide an indication to the enemy of our continued presence and demonstrate to them our ability to operate over their territory.

Though a wide range of intelligence would be available, it would come from a variety of sources and would be fed to a number of different agencies. If Presidential Authority is to make effective use of all such intelligence, the data must be correlated, analyzed, sorted and fed to this Authority in a useable form. Under present plans, this is to be done in the NMCC, but a great many problems must be resolved if a completely integrated picture is to be available for the National Command Authority.

In the management of war, no amount of automation can replace the human element. In the field of intelligence, for example, the study of "indicators" demands trained evaluators.

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systems with existing ones to insure coverage as well as insuring that separate source data is compared wherever possible to enhance accuracy.

Communicating With the Enemy

Managing and terminating a nuclear war is, at the minimum, a bilateral affair. More typically it involves several nations on both sides of the conflict. In the interest of limiting and terminating a nuclear conflict, direct plain or coded language communications between the warring sides and within the alliances would be essential. All the war scenarios in this report assumed uninterrupted tele-communication facilities between enemy and Allied governments. Today, should a general nuclear war occur, communications lines between the US and the Soviet government would very likely not exist. Yet it is crystal clear that any breakdown in communications between the central authorities of the countries involved, even for a temporary period, would probably result in a prolongation of the war and possibly in an unnecessary escalation. Uninterrupted tele-communications channels would permit negotiations in general war which would otherwise be impossible.

Communication, of course, involves more than verbal exchanges. Impressions will be transmitted by the target system attacked, the rate of escalation, the magnitude of the attack, the types of weapons systems employed, and by virtually every other characteristic of a nuclear attack. What must be recognized, however, is the potential for mis-interpretation of signals and the hazards this presents in managing a war or trying to induce the opponent to play the game by our rules.

It may be true that, in the future, improvements in weapons and command and control may provide the discrimination we need but it is apparent that a nuclear

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war, or even an incipient nuclear war, probably cannot be managed, much less terminated, unless there is continuous direct contact with enemy authorities and an unprecedented absence of ambiguity.

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B. TARGETING

Previous sections have brought out the special importance to war management and termination of discriminating use of nuclear weapons, of conserving strategic forces for post-war requirements, and of having flexibility in attack options. This section reviews the role of targeting as it relates to these three areas and identifies specific problems which the planner should explore. It is recognized that there may be important effects on existing targeting.

Recent guidance in JCSM 686-62 established broad strategic objectives. "United States plans for nuclear offensive operations in the event of general war will be designed to achieve, in concert with other US and allied offensive and defensive operations, the objectives listed below:

" a. Destruction or neutralization of the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, survivable, effective, and controlled US strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of US military superiority over the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war.

" b. Minimum damage to the US and its Allies, and in all events, limitation of such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.

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"c. Bring the war to an end on the most advantageous possible terms for the US and its Allies."

Utilizing these objectives, a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is developed under the guidance of the Director of Strategic Target Planning. This plan results in five basic attack options. It also utilizes all strategic nuclear forces against targets arranged in a priority list. A strategic reserve is not explicitly specified for retargeting or striking new targets due principally to stringent associated criteria for high probability of target destruction. A strategic reserve could result from withholding attacks on certain countries or by use of a lesser option than an all-out attack.

Planning Concept

A concept of facilitating war management and termination through target planning should take account of SIOP as the starting point. The target options prescribed by JCS policy guidance have been developed to provide some targeting flexibility for the onset of hostilities, but previous sections of this report suggest that the war management problem requires a close look at a wider spectrum of war intensity, including the execution of strategic attacks in the periods before and after the execution of any of the present SIOP options.

The following considerations are pertinent to target planning as a tool of war management and termination: The war scenarios show that, ^{as a general rule,} the amount and degree of ad hoc target planning possible will be inversely proportional to the degree of intensity of hostilities. In an escalating situation or low intensity war, ad hoc target

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planning in support of war management decisions may be extensive; at the high end of the scale a massive exchange would severely reduce targeting flexibility. Rapid escalation of the kind described in War "B" could, of course, reduce greatly the time available for shifts in targeting plans.

Another consideration relates to the interaction of targeting criteria with the other war management tools. For example, a decision to assign priority to specified targets (or, conversely, withhold weapons) in the interests of war management could be subject to reversal or severe modification as the result of reconnaissance or offers to negotiate.

Finally, targeting exclusively to enhance achievement of war-time objectives would not necessarily complement actions relating to terminal or post-hostility phases.

The above suggests that target planning might be based on the following principles:

- a. Compatibility with existing strategic target options developed in support of national targeting policies.
- b. A retargeting capability of some weapons systems which will present alternatives at key turning points of a war.
- c. Timely application against pre-planned target categories to support decisions taken.

It is the intent of the last two points to put target planning in a more dynamic military-political framework than appears to be the case today.

Target planning along these lines can be useful in support of war management and termination. However, as a corollary to the preceding discussion of positive aspects for target planning, it seems necessary to deal with certain concepts which deserve critical appraisal. One is the idea

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of "communication by explosion," wherein the exclusion of some targets and the assault of others is presumed to convey special meaning. On a limited scale, this may be feasible. But, aside from the fact that a dialogue of this nature is inherently an ambiguous means of communication, there are some practical aspects of such action which invite attention. The collocation of many military targets to industrial installations and population centers on which the Soviets place values unknown to US planners is a case in point. Undoubtedly, in the future greater degrees of accuracy will obtain, but there will be some targets which cannot be destroyed without fogging the issue of US attack objectives.

Another related concept is that of demonstration to lend credence to stated or implied force capabilities. Again, on a limited scale, this concept may be feasible. It may even be extremely important after a large-scale nuclear exchange has occurred. However, in all instances it would have to be exercised with extreme discretion to preclude force attrition or unacceptable degradation of alert status. As an applied technique, demonstrations of capability also could introduce the ambiguity inherent in the concept of communication by explosion.

In short, it should be recognized that execution of pre-planned target options is not by its nature a very subtle tool of intra-war negotiation. To ascribe such virtues to targeting could be misleading to planners in this area. Rather it seems more desirable to base planning on the relatively simple principles listed earlier.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Planning Applications

The identification of target categories in the context of their sensitivity to war-management decision points may be quite helpful for target planners. It appears desirable to come to grips with the specifics of the targets themselves, and only incidentally with the specifics of what force application is appropriate for a given situation. The remainder of this discussion therefore probes primarily at relationships between war management decisions and various categories of targets, and secondarily, at the methods of force application to obtain war objectives.

As a starting point, the general characteristics of military targets deserve mention. SIOP planning is addressed to fixed targets of both soft and hard configuration. A proportion of these types now and in the future can be characterized as imprecisely located targets. Others may acquire operational mobility as technological advances overcome lessened reliability and slower reaction. These characteristics can have varying relationships to the types of wars and to decision points. Given relative numerical superiority of surviving strategic weapons, ^{after a Soviet attack,} US target planning would probably concentrate on precisely fixed, soft military targets and on surviving Soviet urban-industrial complexes to the exclusion of those imprecisely located targets to insure economy of force expenditures and thus to provide a credible deterrent during ensuing negotiations. Future weapon systems and better reconnaissance might require the provision of weapons for targets discovered during the course of the war and for categories of targets to be struck to bring pressure while negotiating for termination.

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In particular, wars of lesser intensity, scaled down through a US pre-empt situation to an escalation type, would seem to require a capability to attack imprecisely located and mobile targets as well as portions of total categories. For example, at one point in the escalation scenario the US decision was to threaten to destroy six selected Soviet targets as a condition for war termination. A political action of this type would rely heavily on assurances from the target planner that the selected targets were in fact highly vulnerable, i.e., fixed, soft, and/or located with high confidence and located away from population centers. Innumerable variations on the aspect of target characteristics can be constructed for each of the different decision points and war situations. From the above examples it seems reasonable to conclude that if such tactics were adopted,

pre-war consideration should be devoted to constructing options which could be meaningful in both a military and political sense.

An equally critical aspect of target categories is their relative sensitivity to negotiations and/or proclamations undertaken by the US Presidential Authority. Certain categories may be not only time-sensitive in a purely military sense, but also sensitive to political actions undertaken by the US in pursuance of intra-war objectives. One case is the Soviet IR/MRBM force, which is the primary Soviet force for strategic attack against Europe and, as such, would figure heavily in US decisions to escalate past the phase of tactical nuclear war. US estimates project this force into the 1970s with essentially a high proportion of soft, fixed launchers. Alternative field-type sites are also possible for back-up actions. For purposes of purely military targeting, this category presents relatively straightforward, though difficult, planning problems. But as a

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target of political negotiations which seek to limit or terminate hostilities at a low intensity of escalation, the force is extremely unstable. A US cease-fire ultimatum to the Soviets predicated on a threat against this target category might trigger Soviet employment of the force in the belief that the ultimatum was issued merely to screen or justify an inevitable US assault. On the other hand, a shoot first, talk later action might be convincing proof of US intent to escalate to the point necessary to impose its war aims.

In any case the target planner would be obliged to pre-plan the US/NATO capability, (or lack of capability) to back up such an ultimatum, to suggest alternative target categories which fit the ultimatum with a better probability of military success, or, in the event of a Soviet trigger response, to program weapon systems in anticipation of a new decision point.

Numerous other categories can be identified as sensitive, depending on the decision point reached, the substance of US military responses, and the form of US political pronouncements. Examples of such categories might be Arctic staging bases, regional nuclear storage sites, and USSR submarine bases, to name only a few. It can be concluded that even for a relatively few target categories it could be of value to develop a considerable number of options which might be used should escalation to limited strategic attack be required.

The foregoing has dealt with the problem of target category sensitivity to the threat or application of nuclear weapons as a lever for military/political management

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of US intra-war objectives. There remains, at least for an escalation type of war, an area of target planning which lacks the benefit even of SIOP-type preparations. It is conceivable that transition from conventional action to nuclear engagement of targets should take account of intermediate options possible with conventional, BW/CW, and other munitions which may be developed through time. As with nuclear weapon systems, target planning addressed to these types must rest solidly on a proven military capability to inflict destruction or neutralization. To the extent that this capability is limited, war management target planning based on the capability would be proportionately constrained. It is suggested that at least some of the decision points which could arise in the course of escalation deserve the target planner's attention for weapon system applications of conventional, BW/CW, and other munitions. The decision to use tactical nuclear weapons should consider the advantages to be gained in comparison to these weapons.

Summary

Using SIOP, both for back-ground and as a starting point, the feasibility of tasking the target function with an additional role of war management and termination support has been examined conceptually and, to a limited degree, in its possible applications.

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It makes a great deal of sense to develop a target planning capability for contingent war management and termination roles. We conclude that this capability can be achieved in advance of hostilities by a series of practical measures.

a. Revised SIOP guidance to require, within the present framework of options, a set of sub-options addressed to intra-war decision points.

b. Target planning which examines the capability of conventional, BW and CW systems against categories heretofore examined only as candidates for nuclear attack.

c. A continuing review of improved weapon system characteristics--CEP, yield-to-weight ratios, etc.--in the context of their usefulness to intra-war target planning.

d. Introduction of more comprehensive political inputs into SIOP guidance.

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C. FORCES FOR MANAGEMENT AND TERMINATION OF WAR

In the course of the study it became clear that some modification or improvement in US planning for the intra-war and termination phases and in capabilities of portions of selected weapon systems would enhance the US military capability to control the course of the war and to perform more effectively critical tasks during the terminal phase or initial post-war periods.

In the strategic nuclear phases of the three prototype wars in this study there are several illustrations of requirements for military actions not planned for in the SIOP. For example, in the all-out nuclear exchange scenario, it was pointed out that the most critical period for possible contingent action would occur at the "natural" point of termination--i.e., when the initial planned forces of both sides had completed their strikes. Even though both US and USSR (also, presumably Communist China, Western Europe and Satellite Bloc) homelands would be heavily damaged, both sides would have residual forces.

With its residual military forces the Soviet might continue its efforts to seize all of Europe. Or, they might seek to hold various countries hostage for economic reasons--and Communist China might endeavor at this time to seize much of SE Asia. The US also would have residual forces which could be used not only to assist with reconstitution of our homeland, but also to fight as needed. In such a

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situation, it would be essential that these residual US forces had the capability to defeat the Soviet efforts. Ensuring survival of adequate military force involves planning which includes pre-war, intra-war, and war termination tasks.

Review of current war plans in regard to post-SIOP exchange combat shows this to be a "grey" area which is largely unexplored. US plans call for regrouping of residual forces under the unified commanders to carry out orders of surviving national command authority. It is difficult to envision how to plan for this phase of war. Yet it is essential that planning take into account the requirement to locate and destroy, or neutralize remaining enemy forces.

With regard to weapon systems themselves, the study reemphasizes the need for survivable nuclear retaliatory forces. The study also suggests that effective war management requires selected elements of US strategic forces which have a capability to attack hard and soft military or civilian targets in a discriminate manner. As suggested in the European war scenario, a capability to attack in such a manner might be the only means to force the Soviet leaders to realize the time had come to accept an end to the war--the only alternative would be national suicide.

To accomplish the above, there must be a substantial improvement in accuracy in the selected system (or systems). Accuracy must be combined with a family of yields and adequate number of clean weapons to permit precise surface bursts against hardened targets without the consequent high fallout casualty effect. The system must have a high degree of reliability, especially if an effort is being made to impress the enemy with US capability. It is not self-evident that missiles would be the best systems in all cases; thus manned systems should be considered for a place in the discriminate attack role. This would probably be most apparent if such an/

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was called for on targets which were imprecisely located, or if a visual demonstration of capability to penetrate over enemy territory were believed useful.

A special problem in terms of managing escalation is the threat posed by the Soviet IR/MRBMs forces to US and Allied bases and urban-industrial complexes around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This is a special problem because the IR/MRBMs are theater-threatening weapons which are located within the USSR. Whenever they are used the principle of homeland sanctuary for the USSR is breached. And for the US to attack these Soviet missiles while the war was restricted to a theater would also breach sanctuary, doubly so if they were destroyed by US based ICBMs. Yet so long as these forces remained intact, they would represent a powerful pressure in any war termination or armistice negotiations.

Another problem highlighted by this study is that of countering the Soviet missile launching submarines. It would seem logical that a portion of this force might be withheld or at least not be committed to the initial phases of the war and would then remain a residual threat. Their destruction would be a very difficult task. However, with destruction of enemy submarine bases and communication links, the Soviet ability to control and support its residual submarines could be lessened. Concentrated use of surviving ASW forces, together with reconnaissance, denying use of any ports, destruction of Soviet trawlers could slowly tighten the noose on the Soviet submarine menace. Another approach to this problem in the terminal phases of a war would be to communicate with surviving Soviet national authority, informing it that unless their missile submarines were recalled to designated ports and disarmed, the US would continue nuclear strikes. The essential point is that without adequate US measures to reduce the SLBM threat, the USSR not only retains a capability to strike the US homeland, but is also provided with a potent tool at the negotiating table.

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Regardless of the type war the control of our forces through the terminal phase is of such importance that an opportunity for successful negotiation may be lost without it. Significant in this consideration is the control and redirection needed, particularly as weight is added to the attack. A command structure must extend out to the force elements, either directly, through Airborne Command posts accompanying the force as it approaches the Soviet Union, or indirectly, through communication between command and bombers or reconnaissance aircraft. The possibility of equipping some fraction of the force with automatic communications relay capabilities must also be considered.

Special Requirements for Reconnaissance Systems

Regardless of the course a war may take our knowledge of the enemy must continue at all stages from pre-hostilities to the long indefinable period of policing subsequent to termination. Reconnaissance then, in a variety of forms, becomes a vital factor in the problem under discussion. A quick look at the possible systems, their limitations, the data required in various phases of the war as well as the "state of the art" reveals that with proper emphasis, our capability in this regard can be definitely enhanced.

In the pre-hostilities environment, satellites could perform a highly essential reconnaissance function. Use of satellites employing high resolution radar might improve the timeliness of the data by eliminating such limitations as day/night considerations, cloud cover and seasonal sun angles. Electronic readout capability combined with on-board processing of acquired data to reduce the volume of information required to be read out can also do much to improve timeliness.

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During periods of conflict or intra-war, the vulnerability of the satellite must be taken into consideration. Even with the improvements outlined above, unless the capability exists to vary ephemeris, vulnerability is extremely high. Here the manned vehicle may enter the picture or at least radical protective countermeasures must be investigated. In this situation, a multi-sensor vehicle would appear optimum to obtain the varied types of desirable information. Specifically, we will need to know such information as: Did our initial attack destroy assigned targets, are there any which survived (particularly time-sensitive targets), what forces remain, status and location of any such forces, bomb damage assessment, etc? In a theater war at the tactical nuclear level, there would be a continuing requirement for battlefield reconnaissance not only to locate targets but also to assess damage.

As war progresses to later stages including that following a cease-fire or an armistice, we might desire to obtain the following information: The degree of control being exercised over Satellite and Soviet forces, actions being carried out by other Bloc nations, Allied activities, availability of communications, extent of damage to Soviet cities, and indications of impending hostile acts. Are our stipulations being carried out, are Soviet submarines returning and disarming, etc? To the extent these require active reconnaissance, the vehicle might again be different. We might want our surveillance to be completely overt to demonstrate to the populace our ability to be present. A look-shoot capability may be necessary to police against hostile actions.

Finally, reconnaissance may prove to be the optimum method of determining our own residual capability or assessing damage to the US as well as Allied territory. In view of the rapid advances in the field of reconnaissance, this should be investigated, possibly as a back-up to other systems now contemplated for this task.

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The point to be made here is that a mix of systems is apparently indicated, and it is equally obvious that a coordinated effort will be required if such optimum systems are to be attained. In view of ever-present budgetary limitations, such coordination should also be aimed at investigating the capability of some systems to provide answers to several problem areas. Flexibility, coordination and coverage of all requirements are the keys to success. The needs of the military services and other governmental agencies, as well as Presidential Authority, must be kept in mind at all times, and the idea of problems attendant to the management and termination of wars must also always receive consideration.

Summary

In summary, three main points emerge--namely (1) there is a requirement for more comprehensive analysis and planning of the intra-war and terminal phases of a conflict, (2) the need for increased analysis and emphasis on characteristics of military force required to handle tasks in the intra-war and war termination aspects. In this respect, there is the need to war game a number of such war situations and thereby to attain a keener insight regarding the forces our nation requires in order to be as certain as possible that we actually can carry out such post-nuclear attack tasks. (3) a vital need for a mix of reconnaissance and of the information-gathering systems designed and built to handle pre-war, intra-war, and post-war tasks.

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~~TOP SECRET~~V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The concept of war management and termination is not new; it has been attempted with varying degrees of success in previous wars. What is new is the possibility that any war may now turn into a nuclear war and that the intensity of a nuclear war can rise quickly to unprecedented heights. Never have the stakes been so enormous, and never has it been necessary to make decisions of such irrevocable character in minutes rather than weeks and months.

It is the conclusion of this study that full consideration must be given to the problems of war management and termination in all planning for war. It is further concluded that such efforts will increase the likelihood of a successful application of political actions and military forces to deter the Soviet Union from intensifying a war should one occur, and to cause Soviet leaders to seek to end the war under conditions acceptable to the US.

The acceptance of the above conclusions would require that the interaction of anticipated war events on war aims and on the bases for war termination be analyzed and the analysis kept current with changing world situations. US planning must also take into account the likelihood that nuclear war would bring with it changes in the domestic and international fabric which were so radical that pre-war objectives established by pre-war values would be altered or discarded in favor of new war aims. Consideration would have to be given in these analyses to the role of strategic force targeting, the requirement for intra-war deterrence, the role of military forces in the terminal phase of war and to procedures to strengthen command and control at

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the Presidential level. And perhaps of most importance, political guidance to the planners would have to be more comprehensive.

Nothing in these proposed actions should be interpreted as suggesting that war plans should be formulated on other than sound military doctrine. What is sought is war planning which is more effective because national objectives and war aims are more precisely defined. What is also sought is a mutual understanding by political and military planners of the possible effects of alternative courses of action once war has begun. The latter process could be of most importance since it could be a means whereby the President and his principal advisors, in reviewing such plans, could be made aware of the nature of decisions which would confront them should contingency plans be implemented.

In the paragraphs which follow, certain conclusions are presented with regard to the applicability of the concept of war management and termination to the several most probable types of war. Also indicated are selected actions which must be accomplished prior to such wars if the concept is to have much chance of being effective. Consideration is likewise given to certain major factors influencing the bases for termination. Finally, there are specific recommendations to enhance the functioning of command and control at the Presidential level and the comprehensiveness and compatibility of political-military planning.

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The Role of War Management and Termination in a War Initiated
by a Massive Nation-Killing Nuclear Attack

In the consideration of the various general forms which war might take, one basic factor remained quite clear. The US must always be prepared for the worst case, namely, that of a Soviet initiated nation-killing attack. Vital to such a situation would be a high assurance of survivability of US weapons no matter what degree of surprise the Soviets might achieve. Because of the uncertainties which would always exist as to the precise capability of the enemy, such assurance could be achieved only with a mix of weapon systems. Of equal importance, there must exist a command and control system which would permit Presidential Authority to launch a retaliatory attack.

In the event of a nation-killing attack, the implementation of a sophisticated response capability, attempts at war management in order to limit the total effects of the war, or attempts to negotiate the termination of the war would have little chance of success. Any implementation of these concepts under such circumstances, therefore, must not be permitted to risk the degradation of our capability to destroy the Soviet Union. This is not to say, however, that there would not be important tasks which the military must be prepared to accomplish at the end of a nuclear exchange. These would include assisting in the initial national

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rehabilitation efforts, destroying residual enemy military capabilities, if required, and bringing its strength to bear against Nth countries should this be deemed necessary.

The Relationship Between the Capability to Use Strategic Nuclear Forces in a Discriminating Manner and Management and Termination

The US should develop nuclear weapon systems which can be used in a discriminate manner should war occur. This would provide a better deterrence at all levels of war intensity. At the same time the increased flexibility in the use of military force would enable the US to act boldly when national interests dictate an intensification of the war. Such weapons would be available should a circumstance occur which required a US pre-emptive attack--the degree of discrimination in a military strike might contribute to a Soviet decision to desist. The hope would be that the Soviets would come to their senses and, being practical men, opt to close out the war short of a nation-killing exchange. However, in the public enunciation of the policy of controlled response, care should be taken not to cause the Soviet leaders to believe either that the US is seeking to make nuclear war possible or that it will not use whatever force is required to defeat the Soviet Union.

There would also have to be improvements in weapon systems to give greater assurance that nuclear warfare could in fact be controlled. A portion of the strategic weapon systems should be highly accurate and reliable. National command would have to be sufficiently survivable to provide for

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continuity of control and have available near real-time data on the enemy. Targeting doctrine would have to go much farther than at present in minimizing civilian destruction during an attack on military targets. Finally, there must be communication available at all times for direct negotiation with enemy leaders.

It would appear that in a controlled exchange with the Soviet Union the US would have as its objective something substantially less than unconditional surrender or destruction of the Communist regime. Especially if the US escalated a war to this level, the intent would be to force the Soviet leadership to accept a cease-fire; it would seem apparent that Soviet leaders would find this more acceptable if the terms, ^{though favorable to the US,} did not call for an unconditional surrender or jeopardize their continued rule in the Soviet Union.

The Role of Management and Termination in a War Involving Escalation

In wars of lesser intensity the problems of decision between alternative courses of action at the important turning points would be complex. To be effective, they would have to be supported by an evaluation of military actions relative to political aims. Since the most critical of these decisions would involve consideration of changing the level or intensity of warfare they would require Presidential action. Continuous political-military review of the situation must be available to him at all times to make clear the probable outcome to a selected course of action. This would necessitate a continuous flow of data on US forces, Allied forces (whether engaged or not), and enemy forces. In addition he must be aware of the political situation in the US, in Allied countries, in enemy country or countries, and in important Nth countries.

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The management and termination of an escalating war is dictated to an extent by the types of weapons systems available. Several inherent stopping points are evident in an escalating war situation and these can be exploited to US advantage by deliberate war management practices. Both actions and words influence the enemy, but verbal contact with the enemy top command is essential to minimize the possibility of confusion. In contrast with past wars, continuous direct communication with enemy authorities will be important and an unprecedented absence of ambiguity will be necessary.

The Requirement for a National or Presidential Command Center

In all the situations examined it was clear that the President must exercise his role as Commander-in-Chief in a manner not previously required. The President must be supported by a mechanism which can bring to rapid focus those political and military factors which relate to the existing situation as well as to provide previously considered judgments of the possible consequences of the courses of action being considered. In particular he must have available his chief political and military advisors who can be supported at the command center by staff and a continuing flow of information. Such a mechanism should not be assembled on an ad hoc basis, but rather must have existed prior to the need arising and have been operating in an integrated political-military environment.

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Recommendation 1.

Adopt the concept of a National Command Center and alternates wherein it is understood clearly that the Presidential Authority and his key advisors, both civilian and military, will assemble for managing the war.

Recommendation 2.

Construction of a survivable national command center in the immediate Washington, D.C. area be authorized. Although such action would not guarantee the survivability of the Presidential Authority and key advisors, the chances of survivability would be enhanced by minimizing the time to relocate.

Recommendation 3.

The primary and at least one alternate general war Presidential Command Center be manned continuously by representatives of appropriate key Presidential Advisors.

Recommendation 4.

Present policy be revised so that confidential negotiations leading to survivable, direct, and rapid wartime communications to Soviet national leaders can be undertaken.

Recommendation 5.

Analyze reconnaissance tasks facing this country in the pre-war, intra-war and post-war environment to determine the optimum mix of systems required. Such an analysis must be made at the national level considering the needs of all segments of the military, all agencies of the government and especially that of the Presidential Command Center.

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Suggested Modifications in Process of National Planning for War

Increased sophistication in the control and management of wars involving the threat of nuclear escalation will require an extraordinary degree of anticipatory planning in order to ensure that the President is provided with the means to make timely, considered decisions and the assurance that a wide range of possible decisions can be properly carried out.

Such anticipatory planning would encompass specific actions such as the following:

a. Analysis of the application of US military power to the widest possible range of alternative national objectives from the foreign policy viewpoint in order to develop full appreciation of all of the political-military aspects of situations resulting from adoption of various course of action.

b. The subsequent development at national level of sufficiently detailed guidance to ensure that planning for the employment of US military capabilities is responsive to the full range of selected alternative national objectives.

c. The adoption, as necessary, of military forces and techniques to support the full range of political-military concepts of foreign policy implementation.

d. Adoption of procedures to acquaint the President with examples of the types of decisions he may be called upon to make under conditions of extreme urgency and adoption of means to ensure that his principal advisers are continuously able to provide the most accurate and timely joint evaluation of the military, political and economic consequences of alternative courses of action.

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The specific recommendations given below are directed to the problem of integration of military and political factors in the formulation and review of war plans.

Recommendation 1

That National Security Council, either directly or by means of a subcommittee, should provide comprehensive guidance for war plans, including SIOP, and review the plans when formulated, together with results which can be anticipated if they should be implemented.

Recommendation 2

To provide integrated staff support for the above functions, the agencies represented in the NSC should detail personnel to work under the command of J-5 of the Joint Staff.

Recommendation 3.

To provide for a testing mechanism, the J-5, in conjunction with the Joint War Games Agency, would work out a schedule for gaming the major war plans and those specific contingency plans, the possibility of implementation of which appeared increasingly likely. Again the JWGA would be augmented by personnel from those agencies represented in the NSC.

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