

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

5 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Resume of OCB Luncheon Meeting, 5 November 1958

PRESENT: Mr. Dulles, Adm. Foster, Mr. Gray, Mr. Harr,
Mr. Herter, Mr. Irwin, Mr. Saccio, Mr. Scribner,
Mr. Washburn, Mr. Melbourne

1. Soviet Nuclear Testing

The Board discussed the subject of nuclear testing at considerable length, with particular reference to the Soviet shots of November 1 and 3, and the action, if any, that we should now take.

Mr. Dulles informed the group of the preliminary steps which had been decided upon at the highest U. S. Governmental level, i. e. that the U. S. delegation at Geneva should tell the Soviet delegation that we were aware of these recent tests, that they should be asked to confirm or deny, and to say that the U. S. proposes to resume tests unless the Soviets say that they will cease their own testing. He said that in reply to this approach the head of the Soviet delegation had alleged that he had no information as to whether or not his country was continuing to test and that his instructions covered only the negotiations currently under way at Geneva.

Mr. Herter tabled a draft statement prepared by the State Department which was intended to be issued in the near future by either the President or the Secretary of State. Adm. Foster presented an alternate draft designed for the same ultimate purpose, which he described as representing his own and Chairman McCone's views. The AEC draft included a statement that unless the Soviets cease their testing activity within two weeks, the U. S. will resume its own program.

Mr. Dulles questioned the advisability of including this point in such a statement, arguing that the Soviets would construe it as an

NSC review(s) completed.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

270 205

SECRET - EYES ONLY

ultimatum and that the results might well be counter-productive. The other members appeared to be generally in agreement with this view.

It was agreed that within the next two days or so, unless a further response is forthcoming from the USSR delegation or from the Soviet government, the AEC would make a routine announcement of the November Soviet shots and that this would then be followed by the statement by the President or the Secretary of State, which will have been coordinated in the meantime. The drafts were referred to State, Defense and AEC to work out a final version. It was also noted that a copy of the State draft had been passed to the British for comment.

2. Speech by Paul Henri Spaak

Mr. Harr called the group's attention to a State Department report on a speech made recently in Antwerp by Paul Henri Spaak. In this speech, M. Spaak had been rather fulsome in his praise of American aid programs and of this country's general interest in assisting underdeveloped areas. He had pointed out that in the process of making a major contribution of this kind there are bound to be some aspects of the program which could be improved upon, but he had urged his audience to be patient and not to carp about details.

3. Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack

The Board was told that Mr. Foster, and the rest of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack, had conferred with the President the morning of 5 November.

4. Soviet Rejection of Joint Aid Projects

The discussion then turned to the recent statement by Khrushchev that the USSR would not participate in any cooperative aid venture with capitalist countries. There was no particular conclusion as to how this could be exploited other than through the normal kinds of propaganda guidances. An opinion was expressed that someone might disparage this Soviet position at the meeting of the Colombo Powers in Seattle.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

5. Special Study of Governments Vulnerable to Military Takeover

The DCI said that the joint State-CIA study which had been requested by the Board last week was not yet fully coordinated. He said that he hoped to have it available by the next meeting.

6. Pasternak and "Dr. Zhivago"

There was considerable discussion of actions which the U. S. has taken and might take to exploit the situation developing from the award of the Nobel Prize to Boris Pasternak and his subsequent reluctant refusal of it, together with the oppressive actions taken toward him in the Soviet Union.



25X1

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Distribution:
Orig - DCI files
1 - DDCI
1 - BA/OCB

SECRET - EYES ONLY