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793

# UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES OVERSEAS

AN OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT SUBMITTED  
TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL APRIL 1958

NSC review(s) completed.

Volume II  
COUNTRY STUDIES

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ANNEX

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Glossary of Military Abbreviations  
Used in Volume II

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AFB ..... Air Force Base  
ARMISH ..... Army Mission  
JUSMAG ..... Joint United States Military Assistance  
Group  
KATUSA ..... Korean Augmentation Troops, U. S. Army  
MAAG ..... Military Advisory Assistance Group  
MAP ..... Military Assistance Program  
SETAF ..... Southeastern Task Force  
TERM ..... Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission  
USAFE ..... United States Air Force, Europe  
USAREUR..... United States Army, Europe

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CG ..... Commanding General  
CH ..... Chief  
CINC ..... Commander in Chief

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SECRETINTRODUCTION

In addition to the basic assignment of reporting the agencies' general administrative practices bearing on the improvement of foreign attitudes toward U. S. citizen government employees overseas, paragraph 6(c) of NSC Action 1752 indicated that detailed attention be given to the specific problems and the administrative practices developed to cope with them in certain countries designated "trouble spots." Subsequent action by the Board Assistants designated the following countries for specific examination as part of this study:

China (Taiwan)	Korea
Ethiopia (including Eritrea)	Libya
France	Morocco
Germany	Philippines
Greece	Saudi Arabia
Iceland	Spain
Indonesia	Thailand
Iran	Turkey
Italy	Viet-Nam
Japan	

This Volume II contains studies for each of the 19 designated countries consisting of a background statement, a table of the American personnel strength (not counting dependents), rationales for the agencies' changing force levels, and statements of the administrative practices developed by the agencies in the countries to cope with aspects of the problem of improving foreign attitudes toward U. S. citizen employees.

On compiling the agencies' practices, it was found that they could be grouped logically under six major categories, namely, Personnel Factors, Use of Land, Local Economy, Jurisdiction, U. S. Vehicles, and Community Relations. For each of these categories, there has been established a statement of the broad "problem" and the practices designed to cope therewith. The various factors and elements contributing to each "problem" and includible within it are covered extensively in Volume I, of this report.

The personnel strength data for the several countries include troop strengths and civilian U. S. citizens directly hired and contractor hired, as reported currently by the agencies which utilize the preponderant number of U. S. citizens overseas, namely, the three military

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departments, the Department of State, the U. S. Information Agency, and the International Cooperation Administration. A statistical summary of U. S. personnel stationed in the 19 designated countries as of July 1, 1957, and their estimated strength in those countries, as of June 30, 1958, is found in the Annex to Volume II. The numbers of dependents overseas in the 19 countries are not included because they are not currently available on a uniform reporting basis. However, such data are being obtained and will be presented to the OCB in the annual statistical report pursuant to item 6(a) of NSC Action 1752. When supplied, these data will be reported as of March 31, 1958. The data in the Annex to this volume omit also the relatively minor overseas employment reported by the other civilian agencies such as Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, Atomic Energy Commission, Veterans Administration, and General Services Administration, since worldwide, this employment as of November 1957 totalled only about 1339.

In September 1957 the "desk officers" of the Department of State were asked to prepare background statements for the 19 designated countries summarizing and updating the submissions from the Chiefs of Mission to ensure that the country studies would reflect the current facts. A further review of these background statements was made by the "desk officers" of State, USIA, and ICA on January 15, 1958, for the same purpose. The "background statements" were not intended to be "country papers" as in the normal context of the latter term.

CHINA (TAIWAN)

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 3,646

Civilian Personnel - 223

TOTAL 3,869

A. BACKGROUND

The attitudes of the Chinese on Taiwan toward the United States, its policies, and its citizens residing there are largely determined by the direction of U. S. foreign policy and its implementation. Apart from attitudes shaped in this manner, the presence of a sizeable group of Americans, concentrated principally in the capital city and enjoying a standard of living far superior to their Chinese counterparts, invariably produces certain irritants and generates some resentment among the native population. Despite the existence of these irritants, the Chinese would be greatly distressed at the withdrawal of significant numbers of American military personnel from Taiwan.

Unlike the situation in other countries, there are no large American bases in Taiwan. Care has been exercised to use as little arable land as possible for the few U. S. installations, and the presence of Americans on Taiwan has not caused a labor shortage nor has it resulted in a scarcity of goods. On the other hand, certain problems frequently associated with sizeable numbers of American troops have arisen, mainly connected with traffic accidents, bar room brawls, and drunkenness. Punishment in such cases has been imposed by U. S. military authorities but such action has not always come to the attention of the Chinese people nor has adequate compensation to injured Chinese nationals been proffered in all instances. Misbehavior by American military personnel, combined with exclusive U. S. jurisdiction over offenders, evokes the specter of "extraterritoriality." On balance, however, the record is favorable. Over a long period of years relations between Chinese and U. S. citizens have probably been more cordial than those of China with any other Western country. For policy reasons the Chinese welcome the presence of American troops and officials on Taiwan. There are good personal relationships and a high degree of

SECRETCHINA (TAIWAN)A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

cooperation between most Americans and Chinese on Taiwan.

The May 24, 1957 riot in Taipei must be regarded as a serious and disturbing event, not affecting so much the basic policy of cooperation but pointing up imperatively the necessity for taking precautions against similar occurrences. Assistance has been given to Chinese police in improving riot control methods. Both the Chinese and Americans are acutely aware of the danger of permitting frictions to develop and of the necessity for taking precautionary steps to avoid possible sources of resentment.

In summary, there is uniform awareness of and concern for the essentiality of maintaining good relationships. The attainment of this objective is dependent on continuing to make careful selection of personnel, insuring their effective orientation prior to and after their arrival in the area, and the enforcement of discipline where necessary to insure that American personnel will conduct themselves in such manner so as to avoid becoming involved in local incidents.

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

- (1) MAAG personnel are given a basic orientation program upon arrival in Taiwan, supplemented by further voluntary detailed orientation in lectures offered by the Asia Foundation and other cultural groups.
- (2) Basic language instruction is mandatory for the majority of Army officers and enlisted men assigned to the Army section.
- (3) ICA follows the practice of interviewing the dependents of ICA officers being assigned to Taiwan as an additional step to insure likely adaptability of the family to the local Chinese community.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

- (1) The U. S. civilian agencies and the military have voluntarily held to a standard wage pattern which has eliminated any serious labor problems.

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(2) All U. S. agencies are voluntarily participating in a housing committee in a successful effort to lower rents. The Chinese government, at the request of MAAG, has authorized construction of houses for U. S. personnel.

(3) Forty-five per cent of all military personnel have been assigned duty outside the Taipei area.

c. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

A fund for ex gratia payments to Chinese killed or injured by Americans has been established and insurance coverage on American automobiles has been broadened.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) The local American School accepts Chinese children on a space-available basis after the needs of American children have been met.

(2) The ICA Mission Director gives length-of-service awards to local Chinese employees in recognition of longevity of their service.

(3) Ex gratia payments for injuries or damage inflicted by Americans are made from a fund

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

created and controlled by the Embassy as the result of having placed a small surcharge on all liquor purchased at the commissary.

(4) USIS officers and their wives teach English to the Chinese on Taiwan, and USIS libraries are in constant use by local nationals from all walks of life.

(5) Procedures for prompt settlement of damage claims arising out of MAAG operations are being reviewed to insure that this does not become a source of friction.

(6) MAAG cooperates actively with Chinese government agencies to resolve differences between U. S. and Chinese personnel and to keep down the number of local incidents by and against U. S. personnel. Indoctrination efforts on the part of the Chinese government with its own people has had ameliorating effect.

(7) USIS activities have been redirected to emphasize the "local" approach, and relations with the local press have been bettered as the result of mutual efforts to explain U. S. views and differences in customs.

(8) There has been reasonable participation by American personnel and their dependents in such organizations and activities as:

- a. Local chapter work in the Women's Anti-Aggression League, the International Women's Club, and Rotary International;
- b. Joint Sino-U. S. Boy Scout activities; and
- c. A "Used Clothing Program," provided by

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CHINA (TAIWAN)

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

San Francisco civic organizations and administered by MAAG Taiwan.

(9) MAAG personnel are assigned duty with units garrisoning the offshore islands, thereby sharing in the danger and privations involved.

2. Problems Peculiar to Taiwan

None reported.

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SECRET\* ETHIOPIA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 1,024

Civilian Personnel - 204

TOTAL 1,228

A. BACKGROUND

Ethiopia is oriented toward the West, particularly the United States, to which it looks for political support and military and economic assistance. Although the Imperial Ethiopian Government has been disappointed with the magnitude of U. S. aid programs and our political support on certain issues, no appreciable change is anticipated in its friendly attitude or policy of collaboration provided the U. S. position in the Near East continues as at present and provided that sufficient military and economic assistance is extended to them in coming years.

It should be noted that existing U. S. military facilities (located in Eritrea, which is under the control of Ethiopia) are confined to a communications relay base operated by the U. S. Army Signal Corps. Since the primary mission of this base is communications, it does not boast a display of weapons of war or military planes such as are found at other bases, especially in Europe and North Africa. Thus, it does not give the local population an indication of the military might and power of the U. S.

The economic benefits are the primary reason for acceptance by the Eritreans of present U. S. operations in Eritrea. During the three year period 1954-1957 approximately U. S. \$3,600,000 (78% of the annual budget of Eritrea) was contributed annually to the local economy as a result of the construction and operation of the base. At the height of construction between 2,500 and 3,000 locals were gainfully employed. After the three year period it is estimated that approximately U. S. \$1,350,000 (30% of the Eritrean budget) will be contributed to the local economy and a total of 800 locals will be gainfully and regularly

\* See Footnotes of Part B

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SECRETETHIOPIAA. BACKGROUND (Continued)

employed. While the Eritreans thus accept these operations because of the economic impact they have on the country, the Imperial Ethiopian Government in Addis Ababa has also indicated its acceptance of these operations because of the stabilizing influence they have in an area where there is possible political dissidence against the Imperial Government.

There is no evidence of any general antipathy toward U. S. military personnel at the present time. "Incidents" have been held to a minimum and relations between U. S. troops and the local population are uniformly described as good -- sometimes excellent -- by local officials. A higher standard of living for the white man, including automobiles, is an accepted way of life in Eritrea as the result of 40 years of Italian occupation and 12 years of British administration. Rigid enforcement of traffic regulations by MP's has kept traffic accidents to a minimum and there is no present difficulty in this regard.

The base rights agreement in Eritrea gives the U. S. military exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases involving their personnel, but vests civil jurisdiction in the local courts. Relations between the military police and the local police are excellent and there have not been any serious jurisdictional problems. In fact, relations in this context are so good that even civil action cases are released to the military for settlement. A possible source of future trouble might reside in the Moslem population of the area who could become hostile to the presence of U. S. troops if our foreign policy brought us into open conflict with the Arab countries.

There is no evidence that the presence of U. S. operations in Eritrea has resulted in higher retail prices or an increase in the cost of living for the local population. The operation of a Post Exchange and a Post Commissary, coupled with duty-free APO privileges, make the local U. S. military operation pretty much self-sustained. There

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ETHIOPIA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

is no competition between the military and the local population for local consumer items. What friction exists in this sense with the local population stems from a feeling on the part of local merchants that military personnel do not personally spend enough in the local economy, even though military personnel probably spend more money in the local economy than most merchants realize.

Some competition for housing has existed in the past but will disappear completely in the future as new housing becomes available at the base. The withdrawal of Americans from the housing market may be a source of some resentment in the future. A total of 1,900 acres of land is under lease for U. S. operations in Eritrea. Only approximately 200 acres of this total are occupied exclusively by the military. The use of the remaining 1,700 acres for antenna fields has not interfered with their cultivation by the land owners. If these farming operations were not permitted the occupation of this land would pose a very real and serious problem in this country.

Though not found in government circles, some popular prejudice against American Negroes, particularly those in uniform, exists in Eritrea. Eritrean Coptic Christians and Ethiopians generally consider themselves to be of the Caucasian race and tend to look down on and resent the American Negro. Any influx of Negroes in numbers could therefore lead to difficulties.

There are no existing issues involving wages or rentals. Eritrean government officials have occasionally indicated in various ways a general resentment against the employment of Italian and other European nationals at the local base, in the apparent belief that only Eritrean nationals should be so employed. The hard facts are, however, that Eritreans are not qualified in the skills required for local operations. Eritreans are, however, given first preference in the filling of all positions for which they are qualified.





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ETHIOPIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

ICA's USOM has taken action to hire marginally-qualified Ethiopians and to institute in-service and on-the-job training programs to qualify them for continuing employment in the mission and in their government. Wherever possible, the military base at Asmara employs Eritreans. The Groove-Steers-Shepherd construction firm has with some success established a training program to develop additional skilled labor force. When the firm leaves, the local contractors and the Army will hire the better grade of skilled laborers.

b. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practice

The best of relations are maintained between the U. S. military and local Ethiopian troops. The latter are furnished training films and lent other assistance by the U. S. military. Pursuant to field recommendations, a Public Affairs Officer has been assigned and is now at Asmara. The base at Asmara operates both a radio and a TV station which have been instrumental in promoting good relations with the articulate part of the local population. More probably could be done by

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ETHIOPIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cont'd)

concentrating local charity efforts -- such as U. S. contributions to the Ethiopian Red Cross, the Ethiopian Women's Welfare Fund, and the Mt. Entoto Orphanage -- so that they would receive a maximum amount of favorable publicity. Dependents' membership in the International Women's Club of Addis Ababa, the YMCA, and in the local churches is a strong contributing factor to increased good relations with Ethiopian nationals.

2. Problems Peculiar to Ethiopia

Among some Ethiopians there is a feeling of prejudice against Negroes.

Practice

Civilian agency personnel officers are aware that there is some Ethiopian racial prejudice. The assignment of Negro personnel to Ethiopia is not precluded by the agencies as a matter of policy. The needs for the services of the individual are weighed carefully, however, in relation to the possible embarrassment of the employee, limitations on the effectiveness of the employee in accomplishing program objectives, and the possibility of the assignment presenting a further cause of possible friction with the Ethiopians. ICA's staff has some Negro employees who have served in Ethiopia until now without difficulty.

SECRETFRANCE

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957  
 Military Personnel - 55,300  
 Civilian Personnel - 2,893  
 TOTAL 58,193

A. BACKGROUND

There is neither enthusiasm for the American presence nor a strong emotional objection to it by the French. The situation is largely explained by the fact that there is relatively little contact between the U. S. forces and the local population in France. The French hold personal privacy high in their scale of values and live within a very close family circle. At the same time, U. S. forces have generally shown a definite tendency to isolate themselves from the French community. As a result, on a typical U. S. base -- with its schools, theater, post exchanges, clubs and sport facilities -- there develops a virtually self-sufficient social life for the men, the officers, the wives and the children. The United States-French-Canadian Inter-governmental Committee, known as the Inter-Allied Committee, has functioned since 1951 with the express purpose of breaking down these social barriers to improve community relations. Success has not been as great as hoped, but neither have tensions developed to the degree anticipated. On the contrary, since both groups involved seem to prefer only limited association, American presence is considered as a matter of course. "Incidents" have been few in number and superficial in nature. Post commanders have, in general, been perceptive and there are spectacular examples of encouraging developments, as in the region near the Chateauroux Air Base where the communist vote actually declined, apparently because of the presence of American forces.

The U. S. military forces employ approximately 25,000 French civilians -- nearly a quarter of the number of civilians the French Ministry of National Defense itself employs. The fact that the U. S. forces are a major employer in France generally has a favorable and direct

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FRANCE

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

impact on those segments of the French population directly involved economically. In the labor-management field, the Army and Air Force have generally had an excellent record.

Criminal and civil jurisdiction problems could be the most serious single cause of friction with the local population. However, remarkable success has been achieved in this field and no serious jurisdictional problems are currently reported.

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
FRANCE

E. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA


	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	55,300	54,198	- 1,102
Total Civilian	<u>2,893</u>	<u>2,760</u>	<u>- 133</u>
Grand Total	<u>58,193</u>	<u>56,958</u>	<u>- 1,235</u>

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	55,300	54,198	- 1,102
Civilian Personnel	<u>2,367</u>	<u>2,258</u>	<u>- 109</u>
TOTAL	57,667	56,456	- 1,211




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ICA 100 48 - 52



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FRANCE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

Among State, USIA and ICA personnel there is greater linguistic ability in French than in many of the other languages, and it is a requirement for assignment to top-level positions. In addition to the Foreign Service Institute and other training facilities, a French-language school has been established at Nice. Mandatory French language instruction is conducted at certain military installations. Voluntary language instruction is available at most others. The practice is to employ native teachers.

b. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

State, ICA and USIA have established no special administrative practice directed toward this problem. To counteract the feeling against American automobiles--all easily identified by special "CF" license plates--the U. S. military has conducted the following programs: a driving safety courtesy campaign, a U. S. Army Traffic Safety Advisory Council which includes French civilian community representatives, a command-wide participation in "Back the Attack on Traffic Accidents," a production

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FRANCE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

of "Highway Follies of 1956" based on driving conditions in Europe, driver training classes, annual vehicle inspections, and the "Operation Lifesaver" program. These efforts have reduced the number of traffic accidents and established the beginning of a real understanding on the local levels.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

- (1) The Embassy has a special Housing Advisor and the military a Special Housing Office to assist new American personnel in obtaining housing and arranging rental agreements. To further ease the housing shortage, a family housing construction program has been started under the Surplus Commodities Act.
- (2) In order to prevent U. S. goods from appearing on the black market, French customs officials are now permitted to inspect receiving records at the PX's and commissaries to verify actual receipt of goods forwarded from APO's.
- (3) There is some resentment over the use of PX's and commissaries. Recent agreements providing for the sale of French products in PX's and commissaries at export prices should improve this situation.
- (4) Security regulations permitting, programs which encourage the advancement of French personnel to supervisory positions are being carried out. To counteract further the language barrier between local employees and U. S. supervisors, local personnel are taught the English language.

FRANCE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) To develop better local relationships an inter-allied committee was formed. The committee encouraged joint school programs; joint youth activities and arrangements for U. S. personnel to visit French homes. The U. S. military now employs French nationals as Civilian Community Relations Advisors. Installation commanders select the advisors subject to the approval of the French Liaison Mission.

(2) Efforts are being made to improve Franco-American relationships by: reaching French and American military youth through an exchange of material between the U. S. Armed Forces Information Service and the French Army newspaper "Le Bled"; increasing emphasis on the integration of Boy and Girl Scout activities, French and American; responding to requests for appearances of U. S. military bands throughout France.

2. Problems peculiar to France

None reported.



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GERMANY

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957  
Military Personnel - 250,340  
Civilian Personnel - 5,648

TOTAL 255,988

A. BACKGROUND

The United States has a large complex of bases in Germany and a greater number of troops there than in any other foreign country. Despite this fact the problems involved in stationing these troops are not as acute as in many other countries. It can be generally stated that most Germans are just as desirous of having U. S. forces in Germany as Americans are. Although this situation may change, it is more likely to do so in a framework of shifting international developments so broad that many of our basic concepts would have to undergo concurrent revision. The Federal German Government is well aware of the dependence of German security on the presence of U. S. forces in Germany and on U. S. nuclear retaliatory power. A prime object of German policy is to insure that U. S. forces remain with them and there is no substantial public pressure for their withdrawal. In fact a sizeable reduction of these forces at the present time would produce an adverse reaction among Germans.

The U. S. economic aid and refugee relief programs and our occupation responsibilities in Germany have either been completed or very largely removed from the scene. Hence, primary considerations are the attitudes and frictions involving U. S. military forces stationed in Germany.

The presence of U. S. forces in Germany has not created unmanageable problems in terms of emotional impact on the population. The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and USIS conduct extensive and active public relations programs to facilitate harmonious relations between the troops and the population. Although there was an upsurge of serious incidents in 1956, the number of such occurrences has subsided following corrective measures taken by the Army. Current opinion polls in

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GERMANYA. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Germany (reported as recently as December 30, 1957, in the New York Times) reflect a relatively favorable public attitude toward the behavior of U. S. troops. There are of course isolated unfavorable situations but the picture can be said to be good. Incidents will continue to occur where there is the greatest concentration of U. S. troops, notably in the Kaiserlautern area. The German public does seem to be developing a sensitivity to the presence of Negro troops. Competition for women represents little problem, primarily because there is a marked shortage of men in Germany. There is some envy and resentment created by the higher standards of living of Americans but it is of no great significance.

The Federal Republic continues to pay support costs to the United States and other visiting forces justified by the delay in building up Germany's own forces. The Bundestag and the general public reluctantly acknowledged the necessity of paying such costs through March, 1958. If further support costs are insisted upon, it can be assumed that the matter will be a most sensitive one as regards German political and public opinion.

In summary, German public sentiment and government attitude will be largely conditioned by the German sense of security. As long as a Soviet threat exists and German forces are weak, there will be no basic change in German attitudes to the continuation of U. S. forces at present levels.

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
GERMANY

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	250,340	242,521	-7,819
Total Civilian	<u>5,648</u>	<u>5,514</u>	<u>- 134</u>
Grand Total	255,988	248,035	- 7,953

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	250,340	242,521	- 7,819
Civilian Personnel	<u>4,968</u>	<u>4,899</u>	<u>- 69</u>
TOTAL	255,308	247,420	- 7,888




<u>STATE</u>	485	446	- 39
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<u>ICA</u>	8	8	0
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<u>USIA</u>	187	161	- 26
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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) An extensive indoctrination program for troops is begun on shipboard and continues throughout a soldier's tour in Germany by means of films and the Troop Information Program. "The Commander's Call" provides the base commander the opportunity to talk to individuals and point out changing local conditions.

(2) USAFE has established a mandatory language program. Instruction is also available in military educational centers, as well as in elementary and high schools.

(3) Army has undertaken a program to transfer those with low IQ's and past records that might indicate proneness to crime and accidents.

(4) USAREUR conducts an active publications program. Titles of pamphlets designed to assist troops in adjusting to a foreign environment are: "Travel and Recreation in Europe," "Germany and Western Defense," "By Our Acts," "Your Rights and Obligations in Germany," "Maneuvers-Rehearsal for Victory," "As Others See Us," "Taxis without Trouble!" and "Your Weapon Can Kill."

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GERMANY

PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES - continued

(5) USAREUR has an effective off-duty language program which includes USAFI courses, University of Maryland courses and encouragement of individual study through publication of typical words and phrases. On-duty language training is made available to officer personnel meeting language aptitude qualifications. Limitation of funds and military training requirements preclude compulsory on-duty language training for all military personnel.

(6) Commanders encourage troop use of educational facilities available. These include: 159 Army Education Centers in USAREUR, a branch of the University of Maryland (48% of its enrollees study languages), and dependent schools which offer language training for all age groups. Formal study is supplemented by short on-duty vocabulary drills in troop units, and a coordinated radio and newspaper program offering language training helps.

(7) Extensive troop and dependent orientation is given to encourage community relations objectives. Three or four hours of orientation are given in the United States, three or four hours upon arrival in Europe, and approximately twenty hours yearly thereafter. Subjects include host country history, customs and traditions, rights and obligations of troops stationed abroad, NATO organization and programs, and advice on use of local transportation, payment of debts, and other personal problems.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U.S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution and do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Practically all Army training team personnel live on the economy in proximity to German Army

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

installations to which they are assigned. These persons must patronize German stores, rent German housing, and live, in general, as do German military and civilian personnel.

(2) Heavily taxed items, like liquor, cigarettes, gasoline and coffee are rationed by U. S. forces to comply with German requests in return for German cooperation regarding taxes on importation of items for armed forces use.

(3) Armed forces regulations have withdrawn commissary privileges from many classes of non-governmental personnel, thus eliminating a potential source of complaint because of local tax loss. This practice also applies to PX facilities.

(4) In general, the wages of local employees and their social and fringe benefits are comparable to those paid by local business, with rare and minor exceptions.

(5) On-the-job training is provided for local personnel, with mobile training units brought in if necessary. The object is to raise the skill level as high as is practicable. English lessons are given the workers to facilitate communication with U. S. supervisors. There is room for considerable improvement in training these local employees but progress is being made.

c. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practices

Command-wide participation in the "Back the Attack on Traffic Accidents" campaign which includes:

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Use of graph presentations and driver manuals to acquaint drivers with European driving conditions and rules.

Increased suspension of licenses following offenses.

Remedial driving classes.

Vehicle safety inspection (military and private).

Radar speed check by military.

Driver proficiency contests.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U.S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) USAREUR has an extensive and effective community relations program throughout communities adjacent to their facilities in Germany. The Commander-in-Chief has called upon all Commanders to give emphasis and personal attention to community relations activities. The Commander-in-Chief himself participates in numerous activities and gives endorsement to others. Fifty-five Community Advisory Councils have been established in cooperation with civilian communities to discuss problems and plan joint activities.

Local commanders are given maximum latitude in determining activities best suited to local communities. All Staff Agencies responsible for development of policies and procedures are required to give full consideration to possible impact of actions on the community.

Close coordination is maintained among the three Services, USIS, host governmental agencies, the Bonn Council, and the German-American Troop Community Relations Working Group.

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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(2) U. S. servicemen are encouraged to accept invitations to visit European homes, and American families are encouraged to invite Europeans to their homes. This cordiality is especially appreciated during the Christmas holiday season. At this time in 1956 over 6,000 American servicemen visited homes of Europeans. Visits are also exchanged between European school children and U. S. Army school children. Private organizations in the city of Hamburg on two occasions have invited large groups of American servicemen for weekend visits as guests to their homes. Such visits have been very successful and civilian agencies have promised assistance in expanding the idea. The USAREUR-wide Christmas community relations activities labelled "OPERATION GOOD CHEER 1957" included Christmas parties for orphans, visits to homes, and assistance to refugees and the aged in the form of charitable activities.

(3) The USAREUR command maintains close working relationships with the European press at all levels. USAREUR headquarters recently initiated a press tour program for selected editors and publishers of the German press association, radio, weekly news magazines, major dailies, and other publications circulated widely throughout Germany. Monitors at USAREUR headquarters select daily and weekly newspapers from which they prepare daily press summaries and studies of reaction to the presence of American troops. Press relations are generally excellent.

(4) USAREUR endorses and encourages voluntary contributions by Army personnel; during 1956 gifts were estimated at \$175,000. Recipients included hospitals, orphanages, refugee camps, religious and civic organizations and homes for the aged. Dependent women's groups are especially active in this type of work.

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Individual participation in local clubs and hobby groups -- sports, stamp collection, cultural and scientific pursuits -- is encouraged. Participation in local festivals and holiday celebrations is widespread. For the past five years, German-American friendship week has been celebrated in the Federal Republic annually, sponsored by 34 German-American groups. Thousands of American servicemen participate with German neighbors in this event,

Bands are especially good emissaries, and twenty U. S. Army bands have conducted numerous public concerts or participated in public events during the past year. The all-soldier 7th Army Symphony Orchestra has played ninety-eight concerts to an estimated audience of 84,825 Europeans during the past year. The U. S. Army Field Band completed a tour of European countries in which forty-three concerts were given.

Competition between U. S. and German clubs includes basketball, soccer, fencing, boxing, field hockey, and track and field events. Such activities are limited, however, by the degree of proficiency of one country's team in sports typically associated with another country.

(5) The Chief of MAAG has developed excellent relations with the local press through periodic interviews and participation in public ceremonies in connection with turn-over of U. S. equipment.

(6) Aside from the organized efforts of the military commands, extensive activity is carried on by USIS through all media, stressing personal participation by Americans -- speakers, musical groups, orchestras, bands, glee clubs, inspection flights and visits, and open house days at military bases.

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(7) Damage to public facilities caused by U. S. troops is promptly handled by the U.S. Command by reimbursement or whenever possible repair of the damage.

(8) In anticipation of increased noise from newer airplanes, extensive community relations programs have been implemented including:

- (a) Establishing aviation committees with base and local personnel;
- (b) Showing films explaining the noise to communities;
- (c) Briefing community leaders and explaining the noise;
- (d) Giving jet familiarization to the press and opinion leaders;
- (e) Giving children tours of jet bases;
- (f) Issuing directives to commanders stressing noise control and directing booming at altitudes high enough not to affect the community; and
- (g) Emphasizing the greater security provided by new aircraft.

(9) Community relations are best where there is a maximum of contact between the local population and troops. Troops are encouraged to join local clubs and cultural societies, participate in athletics, and attend concerts. Conversely, American athletic contests, concerts, and base open houses are well attended by Germans.

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES(Continued)

(10) German officials, U. S. military leaders, and State and USIA representatives supervise the over-all community relations program. Working with this group are councils of mayors. On the community level there are also three Area Command-level Councils and forty-three sub-area or post councils. These last groups meet monthly or bi-monthly to plan constructive activities. There is also a European Community Relations Working Group, meeting quarterly and composed of representatives from the USA, USAF, USO, State, and USIA.

(11) The German Red Cross and the USAF jointly sponsor "Operation Kinderlift," which annually flies 10,000 German refugee children out of Berlin for vacations in West Germany.

(12) Service personnel and dependents contribute time and make substantial contributions of money to local charity activities for benefit of orphanages and refugee camps. Wives of all Army personnel are encouraged to belong to the local Women's Club which is an international organization and sponsors monthly teas and luncheons.

(13) CINCUSAREUR has declared community relations to be second in importance only to military defense. Both troop and public information programs, utilizing all available media, have been intensified in the interests of community relations.

(14) Individual U. S. professional groups periodically invite their German counterparts to visit American installations and act as hosts during such visits. Examples of such group activity are:

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GERMANY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES(Continued)

- (a) Sixty German nurses were invited to the U. S. Army Hospital to visit with American nurses;
  - (b) In recognition of the anniversary of the U. S. Army Medical Corps, the U. S. Army Hospital was host to 110 German civilian doctors for a half day; and
  - (c) With the introduction of the new NAC DIAL system on the telephone exchanges, a tour was arranged for officials of the Deutsche Post (German Government Communications Department) to visit the nerve center of the system and inspect the modern innovations.
- (15) Widespread interest is taken in German orphans and school children and all commands arrange for them to make occasional visits to American installations. The following two programs exemplify this interest:
- (a) Two hundred fifty Frankfurt elementary and high school German children were invited to be guests at a visit to a U. S. Army airstrip near the city. The children had the opportunity to examine various types of aircraft and equipment.
  - (b) Thirty-five German orphans from West Berlin were taken on a day-long excursion to visit the U. S. Rhine River Patrol Headquarters in Wiesbaden.

2. Problems Peculiar to Germany

None reported.

GREECE

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 1,038

Civilian Personnel - 203

TOTAL 1,241

A. BACKGROUND

The attitude of Greece toward the United States is conditioned by a long history of friendly relations between the two countries. The continuing emigration of many Greeks to the United States and the large number of Americans of Greek extraction provide close continuing ties. Historically, the United States is recognized as having been sympathetic toward Greece in its long struggle to achieve national independence. In the post-war years, relations between Greece and the United States have become particularly close because of the large scale program of U. S. military and economic assistance which many Greeks believe kept their country from falling under Communist domination. Consequently, the basic attitude of the Greek Government and people is friendly and well disposed toward the United States.

Greece is a weak country, economically and militarily. As a result, it has traditionally sought the support and protection of some great power or group of powers. Greek foreign policy is based on cooperation with the United States, membership in NATO, and opposition to Soviet communism, but future attitudes depend largely on progress toward a settlement of the Cyprus question. The degree of cooperation will also be dependent upon the level of U. S. economic and military aid. Any termination or substantial reduction of aid levels to Greece could lead to a review of U. S. operating facilities and to Greek claims that the United States was not adequately supporting its NATO ally. In addition to political and psychological effects, there could result a reduction of Greek military effectiveness through internal budget cuts.

Personal relations between U. S. personnel and the Greek populace have been uniformly good. There are

SECRETA. BACKGROUND (Cond't)GREECE

sufficient numbers of Greeks who speak fluent English that no serious language barrier exists between Americans and Greeks. The two nationalities share a common religious background and a cultural heritage of independence and freedom. The extrovert personality of the average Greek has readily responded to the normally outgoing approach of the average American. As a result of these factors, there have been no particular problems encountered in establishing good personal relations with the Greek public, notwithstanding the recent unfortunate incident where certain extremists bombed the USIS library.

The principal friction between Greece and the United States relating to the presence of U. S. personnel in Greece arose over the question of privileges granted by the Greek Government, which gave all U. S. military personnel in Greece the same complete immunity from Greek civil and criminal jurisdiction as is enjoyed by diplomatic personnel. In this situation U. S. immunity, translated as "extraterritoriality" by the Greeks, became widely resented and developed into a local political issue and eventually into friction between the two countries. After long negotiations, a bilateral understanding based on the standard NATO Status of Forces Agreement was signed on September 7, 1956. The document provides that (a) U. S. personnel would be liable under Greek law for criminal actions occurring in non-duty status, and (b) jurisdiction would be relinquished in cases involving civil matters. However, Greece agreed to waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction under Article 7 of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in all cases except where Greek authorities determine that it is of 'particular importance' that jurisdiction be exercised by Greece. The status of the joint U. S. Military Aid Group, however, was not affected by the bilateral agreement and it remains a potential source of friction. Any economic impact of U. S. military facilities in Greece has been minimal.

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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

U. S. military and U. S. civilians receive mandatory thirty-hour language courses on duty. An additional thirty-hour course is available off-duty. Dependents are urged to take both.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

In expropriating land for use of U. S. Defense Forces the host government was allowing long intervals between acquisition and payment. Informal intervention by U. S. authorities sped local administration practices so that landowners could be paid more quickly by the host government.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.



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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

Practices

(1) Ration quotas have been imposed on the sale in PX outlets of soap, cigarettes, Kleenex, toothpaste, soap powder, etc. In the interest of better control, a new series of gasoline coupons has been issued. Liquor purchases are prominently marked. Household effects brought in are inventoried, and changes must be reported. Punitive action has been taken against violators.

(2) Current policy is to use Greek contractors exclusively, and all current contracts are with Greek firms, resulting in the exclusive use of Greek labor for construction. In addition, approximately 50% of the supply contracts are awarded to Greek firms (the remainder go to third country bidders).

(3) On-the-job training is offered to local personnel, along with English language instruction, military instruction, and management training for supervisors.

(4) Local labor is used insofar as possible for maintenance and operation of machines, buildings and grounds, for food service and retail sales.

d. Problem -- Jurisdiction

To ensure that the rights of U. S. personnel under the Constitution are safeguarded, without creating resentment by needless challenge of the basic sovereignty of the host country.

Practices

(1) Absence of authority for the Greek Government to exercise any criminal or civil jurisdiction over American forces was an increasing source of ill will among the local population. The problem was resolved by a Status of Forces Agreement.

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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

(2) To counter unfavorable publicity in the local press, USIS sometimes releases courts-martial results.

(3) U. S. military police patrols, accompanied by Greek military police, are sometimes sent into areas outside of bases for the purpose of maintaining order among the U. S. personnel.

e. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practices

(1) While liability insurance is not compulsory under Greek law, it is required for U. S. forces personnel who have private vehicles registered under the XA series of Greek license plates.

(2) The Air Force has assigned a non-commissioned officer as full time safety technician. When the accident rate was high in 1956, all private driving was suspended for four days by the Air Base Commander. A midnight curfew was inaugurated, which is still in effect for lower grades. Those under twenty-five must have approval to buy a car, and disciplinary action is taken against negligent drivers. Accident prones have been deprived of driving privileges.

f. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

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GREECE

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Cond't)

Practices

(1) Dependents are very active in several fields which have produced concrete results. American women's clubs participate in many charitable and cultural activities which create good will. Boy Scout and Girl Scout organizations in Greece have very comprehensive programs designed to promote better relations and their activities outside the metropolitan area have been most effective in reaching an element of the Greek population which does not usually come into contact with Americans. Charitable work done by Scout organizations, particularly during the Christmas season, has received very favorable publicity in the Greek press. In nearly all adverse newspaper publications the target has been U. S. policy (Cyprus issue is a case in point) rather than U. S. personnel actions.

(2) USIS publicizes humanitarian acts of U. S. Armed Forces, such as delivery of emergency vaccine from Germany by jet plane and evacuation of disabled children from mountainous area by Sixth Fleet helicopter. USIS is notified of "incidents" involving U. S. forces often before Greek journalists learn of them and this helps minimize adverse news-treatment. Wives of American personnel cooperate in a range of community welfare and humanitarian projects.

2. Problems Peculiar to Greece

None reported.

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SECRETICELAND

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 5,326

Civilian Personnel - 252

TOTAL 5,578

A. BACKGROUND

Iceland's strategically important geographic position and its membership in NATO is well established and sufficiently accepted by the majority of the population to have given a moderate, limited sense of collective security to the populace as a whole. Moreover, suspicions of Soviet motives have grown in proportion to the growth of Iceland's economic dependency on the East. The prestige of the United States in Iceland is generally high. Tempering this, however, is a suspicion that the United States with its tremendous power and influence might tend to overwhelm their little island unless the Icelanders are extremely careful in all their dealings with Americans.

The Icelandic Communist party received nearly 20% of the popular vote in recent elections and makes every effort to exploit Iceland's feeling of isolationism and dislike for certain aspects of American culture to encourage resentment against the United States. Its concentrated propaganda efforts have been only moderately successful. While Communist and some nationalist elements often display hostility toward Americans, a substantial majority of Icelanders are receptive to friendly relations with Americans if they are treated as equals and especially if Americans display an appreciation of Icelandic history and culture.

World War II and the Air Age have brought Icelanders into immediate contact with many previously unknown aspects of Western culture. As a result, Iceland has had to assimilate rapidly certain aspects of an alien culture, particularly those of a material nature. Although U. S. military personnel are generally restricted to the base area, it has been impossible, under the circumstances, for Iceland to prevent many members of its population from coming into contact

SECRET

SECRETICELANDA. BACKGROUND (Continued)

with Americans and thereby absorbing some aspects of Western civilization. Some irritation and resentment of American culture, especially among older elements of the Icelandic population, has been inevitable.

There is some Icelandic jealousy of American PX and commissary privileges on the military base but this is not an important issue. More important to Icelanders working at the base is the attitude of American personnel, especially U. S. civilian construction personnel in supervisory positions, and it is therefore imperative that this attitude remain sympathetic and comprehensive.

USIS carries on a tailored program through its press, motion picture, information center, exhibits, exchange of persons and visiting artists activities. Each of these activities has shown favorable tangible results.

ICA has a small but active technical assistance program with an annual budget of about \$100,000, operated presently under direction of the Economic Counselor of Embassy. Approximately 50% of these funds are used for training Icelanders for special skills required for the construction and maintenance of the defense facilities, thereby making possible additional employment of Icelanders on the military base. The ICA programs are considered highly effective in promoting understanding between Icelanders and Americans at Keflavik. They provide Icelanders with a feeling of pride that they are able to take on greater responsibilities in connection with construction and maintenance activities at the base. In addition, since March, 1956, the United States through ICA has made available to Iceland in direct dollar loans and indirect credits of other currencies the equivalent of \$18.6 million for major projects.

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ICELAND

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	5,326	4,983	- 343
Total Civilian	<u>252</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>+ 21</u>
Grand Total	5,578	5,256	- 322

DEFENSE


Military Personnel	5,326	4,983	- 343
Civilian Personnel	<u>231</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>+ 19</u>
TOTAL	5,557	5,233	- 324



25X1

STATE 17 17 0

ICA 0 2 + 2



25X1

USIA 4 4 0

SECRETICELANDC. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICESI. Common Problemsa. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Reports from the country indicate that the U. S. Government agencies are not giving adequate recognition, in making their selections of personnel to serve in Iceland, to the unusual nature of the Icelandic people. The latter, with a highly developed sense of self-reliance, are extremely sensitive to any form of guidance or direction that may be construed as interference. This characteristic calls for the selection of individuals possessing the utmost tact and skill for dealing with Icelanders. All agencies must therefore use extreme care in selecting personnel assigned to Iceland. In view of the isolation, darkness, and unfavorable climate, which exists during most of the year, greater than normal emphasis must be placed on the physical and psychological strength of all personnel assigned to this country.

(2) All military personnel, immediately upon arrival, receive a two-hour indoctrination lecture. A second indoctrination program is received upon reporting to the assigned unit. These programs cover Icelandic laws, customs and agreements, together with the policies of the Defense Force regarding conduct.

(3) There is an Icelandic language program on the Base TV. Voluntary language classes on the Base

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ICELAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

are conducted by an Icelandic civilian at a cost of \$20 per person per course of 10 weeks duration.

(4) There are weekly guided tours by bus during the summer months to nearby areas of scenic or historical interest. These are sponsored by the Base Service Club from non-appropriated funds. Food and lodging are paid by the individual.

(5) Military personnel who prove to be undesirable are removed from the host country through military procedures. Civilian personnel who prove undesirable are removed at the employer's expense, provided they have completed the prescribed overseas tour, otherwise they are removed at their own expense.

b. Problem -- Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Indigenous labor requirements are made known to the local Icelandic Hiring office, a government operated agency, which in turn refers applicants to the prospective employer for interview.

(2) There are present in Iceland certain dependents of U. S. civilian and military personnel entirely on the responsibility of the employee, that is in an "unauthorized status." These persons are not permitted to enter the "Agreed Area." Icelanders who work and live "on-post" (the "Agreed Area") get commissary food at special prices, not over the counter, but through agreed-upon procedures relating to payment of wages.

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ICELAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(3) All U. S. consumer goods are contraband outside the "Agreed Area"; all vehicles are therefore searched upon departure.

(4) Responding to the Icelandic Government's desire that U. S. dependents not be permitted to live on the economy, the U. S. Army restricts assignment of dependents to the number that can be accommodated on the military installation.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) At the insistence of the Icelandic government not more than 6% of Army unit's population (including dependents) may be outside the "Agreed Area" at any one time.

(2) Curfew imposed upon U. S. Forces personnel and their dependents who reside in the "Agreed Area" reflects the general attitude of the Icelandic Government, i. e., keeping social contact to the absolute minimum. Further, the Government has made it clear that it does not desire support of charities, or charitable acts, from U. S. military agencies or individuals. The Defense Command, therefore, forbids participation in such activities.

(3) Army personnel are required to be in uniform when outside the "Agreed Area" for ready identification and to minimize the prospect of undefined charges.

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ICELAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

2. Problem peculiar to Iceland

Problem -- Assignment of Negro Troops

The Icelandic Government has requested that Negro troops not be assigned to that country.

Practice

Although it is Department of Defense policy to make overseas assignments without regard to race, creed, or color, the request of the Icelandic Government is honored.

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INDONESIA

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 33

Civilian Personnel - 254

TOTAL 287

A. BACKGROUND

With the exception of the common revolutionary experience, historical and cultural ties between the United States and Indonesia have not been strong. A 300-year period of Dutch colonialism precluded any significant intercourse between the American and Indonesian people until after World War II. Personal relations between the two peoples are still relatively restricted. Only about 2,000 Americans are presently in the country.

Indonesia is intensely anti-colonialist in outlook and therefore remains suspicious of Western powers as it strives for a neutral and nonalignment position between the Communist bloc and the Western powers. Indonesia lacks political maturity, administrative and technical skills, and has a very low standard of living. Indonesians are eager for the assistance of the United States and other advanced nations in improving these conditions. An effective propaganda program against the United States and Western powers is being carried on by the Indonesian Communist party and by the Communist diplomatic representation in Indonesia.

Private American enterprises, particularly oil installations and rubber estates, make a substantial contribution to the Indonesian economy. Although the problems of these companies have been many, they have managed to maintain reasonably good relationships with the Indonesian government and people. The U. S. economic assistance program to the country has demonstrated

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INDONESIA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

U. S. willingness to help Indonesia improve the living standard of its people. Such assistance has been eagerly sought and well received by Indonesians.



SECRETINDONESIAC. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES1. Common Problemsa. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Because of current strained relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands and the hostilities and sensitivities created during the colonial and post-colonial period, care must be taken in assigning personnel to Indonesia. State, USIA and ICA carefully screen all individuals. Recently-naturalized citizens of Dutch origin and those whose spouses are Dutch by birth are not usually selected. Americans who are fluent in the Dutch language are counselled against general use of the language. A Dutch name, or recent service in the Netherlands, is not considered as necessarily militating against service in Indonesia.

(2) The agencies concentrate efforts on orientation at headquarters and at the post, stressing the history of Dutch-Indonesian relationships and the importance, particularly at this time, of adjustment to these relationships.

(3) In view of the high tide of nationalism and Indonesian sensitivity (comparable to a national inferiority complex), it is considered very desirable to have American personnel in the country who can speak Indonesian. It is reported that all officers assigned to the Soviet Embassy can speak the language

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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

at the time of their assignment. Courses in the language have been scheduled by the Foreign Service Institute for Fiscal Year 1958 and 1959; both State and USIA have assigned personnel to take these courses. ICA's post report includes a selection of the essential sentences and phrases which all assignees are urged to learn before arrival at post. The three agencies encourage all officers to obtain a working knowledge of Indonesian as soon as possible after arriving at the post.

b. Problem - Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

The Indonesians resent employment of resident Chinese by the civilian agencies, who in the past have hired them in clerical, maintenance, and other administrative functions because of the lack of skilled Indonesians to fill such positions. The agencies are attempting to confine their employment of locals to native Indonesians wherever possible, even though pre-service and in-service training slows down the work of the missions.

2. Problems Peculiar to Indonesia

None reported.

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IRAN

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 477

Civilian Personnel - 582

TOTAL 1,059

A. BACKGROUND

Despite an historical basis for suspicion of things "foreign," the Iranian Government has willingly entered into mutual security and aid programs with the United States. These programs contribute to the strength of the Iranian forces charged with the maintenance of internal security and national defense, to the capacity of the Iranian people for economic and social development, and to the political strength and quality of the Iranian Government. As a result, U. S. agencies having activities in Iran have been fortunate in enjoying a generally close and friendly association with the government, the people, and the press.

It is difficult to assess which of the various programs has had the most favorable impact insofar as U.S. policies and the presence of U.S. citizens are concerned. The military assistance program, particularly that portion devoted to equipping Iranian armed forces with modern weapons, has attracted the interest of the Shah and top government leaders. The relationships of the general public with Americans have been largely through the country-wide U.S.-sponsored agriculture, education, and public health programs.

Since Iran shares a common problem with many other countries, a dearth of technical and managerial skills, the technical assistance program may be expected to have a significant effect over the years and engender an increasing volume of good will for the United States. Every U.S. technician involved in a technical cooperation project has been specifically requested and accepted by the Government of Iran. The USIA public information program is of particular value in making U.S. programs and motivations fully appreciated.

The mere presence of relatively large groups of Americans in Teheran and other urban population centers has not resulted in controversy either in the political milieu or in the press. Competition for housing, which in the urban areas has been unavoidable, has not resulted in any serious displacement insofar as the marginal housing and low income groups of Iranians are concerned. Significant labor shortages have not occurred, although foreseeable build-ups of some aspects of the military construction programs may have limited and localized effects.



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Relations between individual Iranians and Americans have been limited by the cultural and language differences. USOM and Embassy personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated regarding the importance of strict observance of local customs, particularly as they pertain to religion. Realistic rates for currency exchange minimize the likelihood of black market activities.

Some concern has recently been expressed over the absence of any formal jurisdictional arrangements for U.S. military personnel in Iran. The present informal, exclusive jurisdictional arrangement enjoyed by the United States in Iran has not resulted in any embarrassment or problems, and any endeavor to achieve formal underwriting of existing informal arrangements could well prove to be retrograde in effect.

In summary, an unusually favorable climate now encompasses the presence of U.S. personnel in Iran. The Shah points to this American "presence" as indicative of U.S. support and as justification for his abandonment of Iran's traditional neutrality in favor of joining the Baghdad Pact and orienting the country to the West. The concern of the Iranians is directed toward any actual or apparent withdrawal of U.S. personnel from the area. Offers of technical assistance from the Soviets have been refused on the grounds that such assistance was already being given by U.S. technicians. The Iranians are a mercurial people, however, capable of complete reversals of attitudes should any development occur which affects their strong sense of nationalism or their pride of race and independence. A serious political crisis in the Middle East involving Iran could, therefore, bring about a precipitous change of attitude not only toward the United States, but also toward the West.

IRAN

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	477	470	- 7
Total Civilian	<u>582</u>	<u>647</u>	<u>+ 65</u>
Grand Total	1,059	1,117	<u>+ 58</u>

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	477	470	- 7
Civilian Personnel	<u>123</u>	<u>152</u>	<u>+ 29</u>
TOTAL	600	622	<u>+ 22</u>



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
<u>STATE</u>	117	117	0
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<u>ICA</u>	310	350	<u>+ 40</u>
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<u>USIA</u>	32	28	- 4
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IRAN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Elimination of the language barrier is a basic problem which receives special emphasis. Courses in both English and Farsi are offered by the Iran-American Society. Stressing joint study, lectures are given which deal with such topics as the social, scientific, literary, cultural, industrial, public, commercial, and educational programs of Iran and the United States.

(2) At six-month intervals, orientation courses of one-week duration are conducted. Attendance by Army personnel is mandatory. Iranian customs, culture, commerce, and beliefs are emphasized. Courses are conducted by fully qualified American and Iranian lecturers. Semi-annually a four-hour ARMISH-MAAG lecture is presented which is devoted largely to proper American conduct in Iran. The lecture-orientation course program is considered to be effective.

(3) U. S. Army personnel are urged to read the following:

Iran, Past and Present (Wilbur)  
Introduction to Iran (Groseclose)  
Pageant in Persia (Filmor)  
I Sing in the Wilderness (Surafgar)  
The Unveiling (Payne)  
Hadji Baba of Isfahan (Morier)  
Strange Lands and Peoples (Douglas)

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IRAN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES(Continued)

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

Competition for scarce housing, a potential irritant for ARMISH and MAAG personnel, is alleviated by strict rules requiring the utilization of the American Embassy's housing service. Iranian personnel are employed to assist in appointments with landlords, inspections, and preparation of leases. This is considered by the Army to be an effective practice in avoiding misunderstandings that could undermine otherwise satisfactory community relationships.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) USIS coordinates all official American press releases, and other agencies do not maintain direct relations with the Iranian press and radio. ARMISH-MAAG maintains an Armed Services Radio Station having an estimated audience of 35,000.

(2) A proposed U. S. radio station at Teheran will be a factor in increasing Iranian understanding of the American way of life.

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IRAN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(3) Participation in local civic and charitable organizations is extensive. For example, the proceeds of a recent movie were presented to two orphanages at Tehran. ARMISH-MAAG publicizes and supports all charitable events. All military personnel are encouraged to seek membership in the Iran-American Society, a Teheran civic organization established to develop understanding and friendly relations between Iranians and Americans.

2. Problems Peculiar to Iran

None reported.

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ITALY

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 10,221

Civilian Personnel - 795

TOTAL 11,016

A. BACKGROUND

The popular impression of the United States in Italy is still one of almost legendary wealth, power, freedom, and generosity. Most Italians view the United States as a country not to be feared but as a friendly one from which many benefits have come. This attitude stems somewhat from the large emigration from mainland and insular Italy to the United States since the turn of the century, but also is due in part to a substantial majority of Italians who want at all costs to preserve Italian freedom and therefore to avoid absorption into the Soviet bloc. Italian foreign policy is based on reliance on NATO and close bilateral collaboration with the United States. With Yugoslavia considered committed to the East and with Soviet bases in Albania, only a few miles from the Italian coast, Italian governments and the democratic parties which support them require the physical presence of U.S. forces as a stabilizing force and guarantee.

There is public esteem for U. S. military forces and the U.S. civilians who work for U.S. Government agencies in Italy. The Italian Government minimizes incidents that occur. Public relations are excellent. Our troops, by their behavior, their wearing of civilian clothes off duty, their pursuit of family interests in the company or under the open scrutiny of Italians, have all caused feelings of mutual understanding to develop. On the negative side, the automobile accident rate among U.S. forces in Italy is high enough to cause concern, although not higher than the general average for the areas in which they are stationed. Though the Communists (numbering more than 1,500,000) sometimes criticize the U. S. presence in Italy, our role is generally accepted and has never been a real issue.

On the economic side, the presence of U.S. military forces has not caused shortages of local goods or labor. On the contrary, because there are, 1,500,000 unemployed in Italy, hiring local labor gives the Italian economy much needed and appreciated relief. There have been few problems connected with the utilization of land by U.S. forces. The most important individual problem was settled when the persons whose livelihoods would have vanished with the absorption of the land into an American base were promised employment on the base. Special arrangements were made for the development of a non-Communist labor cooperative, La Portuale, in Leghorn to handle the cargoes received by American troops

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in Italy. The American Embassy at Rome has made clear the U. S. political interest in retaining La Portuale in operation, and the U.S. Government, through other programs in Italy, has promoted the cause of free trade unions against their Communist competitors.

In addition to the extensive activities of USIS, which have been recognized as especially effective, the following other U. S. programs and activities have maintained or improved a favorable attitude toward U. S. citizens in Italy:

(a) The Military Defense Assistance Program, under which some \$1.6 billions of military equipment, supplies and training have been invested in Italian defense forces in order to bring the forces up to agreed NATO force goals.

(b) The Off-Shore Procurement Program, designed to provide in Italy a source of supply for NATO forces and a military production base capable of expansion in time of war and to render a degree of economic assistance.

(c) The Facilities Assistance Program, which has sought to develop in Italy plant production or repair facilities which could be used for the benefit of all NATO forces.

(d) The PL-480 Programs. These have made possible assistance in two ways. They have provided needed surplus agricultural commodities without expenditure of foreign exchange and have generated substantial lira funds for economic development loans. The programs also have provided surplus agricultural products to supplement the Italian school lunch program which is now progressing through its third year. The latter phase of the PL-480 program has not only been beneficial to the children of Italy but has provided some of the best and most widespread publicity the U. S. has received in Italy. The distribution of surplus commodities through voluntary agencies under the PL-480 Title III program has also been worthwhile because it has appreciably relieved the burdens of a significant segment of the poorest classes of Italian people.

In summary, U. S. prestige in Italy has been well established over a long period of time. The Embassy at Rome however states that events occurring during the fall of 1957, such as the Soviet ICBM, Sputnik, and Soviet penetration of Syria on the one hand, and the Little Rock affair, the Vanguard failure and the President's illness on the other, produced a

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genuine if temporary falling off in the Italian public's confidence in U.S. leadership. During recent months the Italian Communists have attempted to develop a strong press campaign in an effort to gain popular support for the Soviet proposals for a general arms reduction, a ban on nuclear tests and the ouster of all foreign troops from national territories. Despite the fact that the Italian people are strongly opposed on ethical and humanitarian grounds to the use of nuclear weapons, and despite the fact that the Communists' campaigns have had an opportunity to deepen Italian concern and anxiety over atomic warfare, they have not developed enough force to alter drastically Italy's present defense and foreign policies and favorable attitudes toward the United States.



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
ITALY

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	10,221	10,372	+ 151
Total Civilian	<u>795</u>	<u>878</u>	+ <u>83</u>
Grand Total	11,016	11,250	+ 234

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	10,221	10,372	+ 151
Civilian Personnel	<u>467</u>	<u>575</u>	+ <u>108</u>
TOTAL	10,688	10,947	+ 259



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<u>STATE</u>	260	256	- 4
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ICA	20	7	- 13
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USIA	48	40	- 8
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ITALY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) SETAF conducts an orientation and indoctrination program in Italian history and customs for military personnel.

(2) Italian language is taught in all SETAF schools, through clubs, University of Maryland extension courses, private tutors, and on duty for selected personnel.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Free trade unions complained through the Ministry that the authorities at Camp Darby were anti-union and had refused to discuss legitimate complaints with representatives of the unions. As a result of discussions between the Embassy and SETAF, the official Army position was made clear. While prohibited from organizational activities during working hours, free unions are permitted to function at Camp Darby, and personnel officers are available at all times to discuss grievances with their representatives.

(2) Local Italian labor is paid in accordance with wage rate surveys which establish parallels with local wage rates for similar types of work.

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(3) The black market exists in the Naples area but is considered to be almost non-existent elsewhere. Rationing and periodic surveys are effected to insure control.

(4) Contractors are all local. Construction supplies are approximately 90% local. The remainder are essentially special U. S. materials. All labor is local.

(5) Training films of a technical nature having civilian application to various local labor groups are provided.

c. Problem -- Jurisdiction

To ensure that the rights of U. S. personnel under the Constitution are safeguarded, without creating resentment by needless challenge of the basic sovereignty of the host country.

Practices

(1) A study of incidents in Naples showed that many occurred because of the language barrier. A joint Italian Police and Navy Shore Patrol was set up, backed by a bi-lingual Italian Police Officer, and where possible, English-speaking Italian policemen were put on the beat with the SP's.

(2) The legal officers maintain close contact with local prosecutors on problems of the military commands in maintaining discipline and morale. The commands cooperate fully with police in the maintenance of discipline. This includes specific local arrangements for the use of military police and dual patrols of the Carabinieri and the Military Police.

d. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practices

(1) The automobile accident rate is no higher than the general average for various areas, but accidents involving Americans receive disproportionate press play. The impression is given that a great many such accidents occur involving Americans'

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driving "luxurious" cars. All commands have instituted automobile safety inspections, special traffic courts, severe penalties and careful indoctrination.

(2) All installations conducted press tours to demonstrate the vehicle registration program. Volunteers from among the news media representatives were invited to have their cars go through the inspection procedure.

(3) Italian drivers are employed to the maximum practicable extent for operation of official vehicles. This definitely reduces criticism of the U. S. Army deriving from vehicle accidents.

e. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) U. S. commands in Italy act under the general direction of the Embassy in developing their local programs of troop-community relations. USIS consults periodically with the military representatives and appropriate Embassy elements on problems affecting troop-community relations, assists in the development of projects to resolve difficulties and whenever advisable, concentrates its activities in areas where American military forces are located. Specific USIS activities include the distribution of publications on U. S. history and present American issues, the establishment of centers of American studies and courses of American studies in Italian universities, the distribution of American periodicals, and the exchange of persons.

(2) SETAF accepts invitations to participate appropriately in community activities. Band concerts are given frequently for Italian audiences as a part of religious and civic celebrations, particularly in small towns.

(3) American personnel participate frequently in both official and personal relationships with their Italian counterparts -- teachers, students, doctors, dentists, chaplains, law enforcement officials, lawyers, and judicial authorities.

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(4) In order to gain Italian understanding and support for SETAF, NATO, and the United States, the information program is based on four factors:

- (a) Intensive indoctrination of SETAF personnel and extensive publicizing of these activities to the Italian public;
- (b) Specific programs -- releases, conference, and press tours -- for specific problems, letting the Italian public know what is being done by Americans to correct or alleviate unpleasant situations;
- (c) Public and private charities which almost automatically result in good public relations and publicity; and
- (d) Development of "People-to-People (personal contacts) relationships in fields of common interests.

(5) In September 1957, "People-to-People" councils were established at each installation, with military, civilian employee and dependent membership. The councils report and exchange ideas on what can be done voluntarily to increase personal contacts in fields of common interest. This program is an extension of existing community relations programs.

(6) One of the major contributors to the SETAF community relations program is the SETAF Army Band. It is a command policy to have the band participate in Italian community programs when invited to do so and when the programs are not of a commercial nature. Once the band is scheduled for a program the band leader contacts the local sponsor and requests that the local band, if any, be invited to attend the event. The local maestro is also given a personal invitation to conduct the SETAF Band in any number on the program.

(7) U. S. military and their dependents participate in local civic and charitable organizations:

- (a) Officer, NCO, EM Wives' Clubs invite Italian Women's groups to social and cultural events. All U. S. military families live in Italian neighborhoods; there are no "Little Americas."

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- (b) Italian military, ecclesiastical, and civic officials are invited to attend social events and demonstrations, such as Organizations Day, and Armed Forces Day.
- (c) Units, clubs and youth groups engage in year-round charitable activities, particularly for institutions such as orphanages, Boys Town, and "old folks" homes. Many units have "adopted" orphanages for monthly support, and their Christmas activities expand their monthly charity programs. Such charities to orphans and old people are channelled through recognized Italian agencies. The latter, rather than the command, publicizes the practice. This makes a more palatable and acceptable contribution to understanding in the public press.

(8) CG, SETAF, directed the organization of a Community Relations Council at each installation for free exchange of thought on mutual problems. Cash incentive awards are paid to Italians for ideas, suggestions, and efforts toward improvement of community relations.

(9) The U. S. forces and individuals are always willing to assist the local government and disaster stricken individuals and make a practice of acceding to requests for or volunteering assistance. For example, the command assisted in recent snow disasters in Italy, and when called upon by a local editor to assist a paralytic who was in dire need of a wheel chair, a chaplain contacted members of his congregation and a donation was made.

(10) Full advantage is taken of the opportunities for developing good community relations through press briefings and news releases. For example:

- (a) Daily releases are made in the Italian language and journalistic style to Italian media on command activities such as troop information orientations being given, ceremonies, American holidays and customs, cultural activities and hobbies, Lira expenditures in Italy, awards, construction projects, safety campaigns and charities.

SECRET

- (b) An "open door" policy is practiced for all unclassified material to permit Italian media to obtain material with which to tell the American story to their readers and thus satisfy natural curiosity existing in Italy. Press conferences, and tours are set up for special programs, particularly those pertaining to "problems." Italian communist media representatives are excluded from information furnished to other media representatives.
- (c) Press tours are conducted of the dependent school system, with particular emphasis on the Italian language classes. This is a continuing project throughout the school year. Also, a press tour of the construction program was undertaken. This tour and its accompanying briefing stressed the expenditures being made by SETAF and how that money was flowing into the local economy. The utilization of local labor was also emphasized.
- (d) Prior to the move of Hq SETAF from Camp Darby in Leghorn to Verona, the local Verona newsmedia representatives were given a detailed briefing on the move. It was pointed out that the move would cause no large-scale dismissals of Italian personnel. It was further explained that each employee affected by the move would have the opportunity to transfer to Verona if they so desired and that they would receive salary protection (salaries in Verona are generally lower than in Leghorn). Not one Italian employee lost his position through this move. Employees desiring to stay in Leghorn were absorbed in the SETAF Support Command. The move to Verona was planned with all public relations aspects carefully considered. The move to Verona was conducted in two stages, each a week apart. Making the move in this manner avoided overcrowding of Italian highways, undue alarm to the Italian populace, and the effects of a sudden influx of U. S. military personnel in Verona.

## 2. Problems Peculiar to Italy

None reported.

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JAPAN

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 98,196

Civilian Personnel - 6,825

TOTAL 105,021

A. BACKGROUND

In Japan the size of the U.S. military installation overshadows the U. S. civilian agencies' personnel. Hence the usual problems of U. S. presence are mainly those involving military personnel. U. S. bases exist in Japan as the result of the World War II peace treaty arrangements and not by the invitation of the Japanese. In the five years since the occupation ended Japan has become a full-fledged member of the international community and evidences strong desires to chart its own independent course in world affairs. Increasingly, Japanese nationalism, neutralism, and atomic theories are contributing to growing pressures for disengagement and for revision of the present unilateral treaty arrangements. These pressures have eased since the announcement last June of the 40% reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Japan (from almost 100,000 on July 1, 1957, to a planned level of about 60,000 on June 30, 1958).

The economic impact of the presence of Americans in Japan is a positive factor for better relations as indicated by the fact that in 1956 U.S. base personnel and their dependents accounted for the conversion of \$273 million into Japanese yen. Our presence there also provided employment for 200,000 Japanese and contributed to an over-all favorable balance of payments of \$293 million. The negative aspects of the economic impact are measured in terms of 267,848 acres of land which are utilized for U.S. facilities in Japan.

Although frictions are virtually unavoidable in a situation where large numbers of Americans have been transplanted into a country with which they were largely unfamiliar, our military authorities have acted wisely and effectively to minimize sources of friction. There is organized opposition from a hostile press, the Socialist party, the country's largest labor federation, and from the Communists to the presence of U.S. personnel in Japan in their present numbers and to our military bases and the lands they withhold from needed agriculture production. Recent articles in the American press, however, indicate that in general relations of American personnel with the local population in Japan are among the best of any country where U. S. personnel are stationed.

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There are four areas in which administrative improvements would serve to minimize the reaction to the presence of U. S. forces and bases in Japan. These are: (1) an expansion of community relations programs; (2) the prompt settlement of claims and the provision of immediate solatium where warranted; (3) liberal retirement allowances and concessions for Japanese employees reduced in force; and (4) easing of restrictions against Japanese entering housing and other non-operating facilities occupied by U. S. personnel.

In the much publicized "Girard" case, the American Embassy reported on November 20, 1957, following Girard's conviction and release on suspended sentence, that "particularly pertinent in the court's thinking was recognition that U. S. military authorities had shown anxiety about the future of the bereaved family and have formulated measures of consoling them and have completed arrangements to give the family a sum of money as soon as the acquiescence of the family is received." (This has now been done.)

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JAPAN


B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	98,196	61,030	- 37,166
Total Civilian	<u>6,825</u>	<u>5,683</u>	- <u>1,142</u>
Grand Total	105,021	66,713	- 38,308

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	98,196	61,030	- 37,166
Civilian Personnel	<u>6,503</u>	<u>5,379</u>	- <u>1,124</u>
TOTAL	104,699	66,409	- 38,290

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
	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
ICA	42	45	-/ 3

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USIA	66	50	- 16
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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, mores, and laws of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Orientation of incoming service personnel and dependents includes information on Japanese customs, legal requirements connected with the joint administrative agreement between Japan and the U. S., and a discussion of individual problems. For the past year, as military personnel depart the United States, they have been given a special edition of Stars and Stripes containing important points for their orientation to life in Japan.

(2) Military personnel assigned to MAAG Japan are given a mandatory on-duty orientation and Japanese language course 5 days per week for 30 days. Facilities also are available for more advanced language instruction.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) The Japanese Government is concerned about unreported sales of second-hand appliances by U.S. personnel, since this results in a tax loss for Japan. Stringent military rules have been established to prohibit this practice.

(2) PX goods are rationed, dollar limits are prescribed on total grocery bills at commissaries; the sale of liquor is rationed, and PX patrons are identified to avoid implication of U.S. forces in black market activities. Also, spot checks are made and stiff penalties given offenders.

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(3) The Japanese custom is life-time employment, with a single employer, at one job. To ease the effect of reductions in force, the U.S. gives as much notice as possible of impending reductions, assists in job replacement, and pays liberal separation allowances.

(4) Grievance machinery has been established and greater local influence has been allowed in personnel policies especially regarding working conditions of large numbers of Japanese on U.S. bases.

c. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

More extensive bodily injury and property damage insurance coverage is required for privately owned motor vehicles of U. S. security forces personnel. This has had a good effect upon Japanese-American relationships.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) Basic community relations activity is centered in community relations advisory councils located at each Army installation. Twenty of these councils are currently active and meet at least once each month with joint U. S.-Japanese representation. Chairmanship alternates monthly between Japanese and U. S. senior representatives. The program is carried out in accord with DOD Directive 5410-7 except for provisions applicable only to the continental U. S. The program includes pertinent provisions of the President's People-to-People Program. These councils jointly sponsor meetings of cultural groups, sports events, music concerts, exchanges of visits by groups of dependents and Japanese ladies to each other's homes, meetings of professional groups, tours by Americans to Japanese points of interest, open houses at Army installations, celebrations of Japanese festivals and Army special occasions, classes in languages, flower arranging, cooking, art, crafts, customs and judo. Information about the United States and

SECRET

Japan is exchanged, especially for publication in local government-sponsored papers such as Kanagawa Community News. These joint activities are in addition to the primary function of the councils which is to adjust and reconcile points of possible difference or friction at the local level. Indirectly the council operations produce additional benefits by providing important Japanese personalities with an insight into U. S. attitudes and methods of operation which could be had in no other way.

(2) To facilitate relations with the Japanese press, U. S. military headquarters maintains a liaison office in the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan in downtown Tokyo. The liaison officer and members of the Public Information Division are members of the Correspondents Club, participate actively in its functions, and are on intimate professional and social terms with individual representatives of the Japanese and international press. The liaison office provides press representatives with ready access to Army communication facilities for the transmission of queries and replies and serves as a distribution point for Army press releases.

(3) Commanders at all levels are encouraged to participate in local community life. These include use of bands, color guards, or troops in local festivals, conducted tours for groups, especially children, donations of time and service to community engineering and building projects, support and maintenance of orphanages by cash, goods, and services, assistance in local disasters, participation and attendance at sport events and other community activities. Reported donations to charitable institutions in the form of goods and services on the part of units, individuals and Chaplains' funds averaged approximately \$40,000 per quarter in FY 57. In addition, withdrawal of elements of this command from outlying stations has permitted the donation of buildings to various charitable and non-profit organizations. These donations have been amply covered in English language and vernacular press with credit to the U. S. forces. Extensive publicity is given in troop information media, and in the English and vernacular press to citizenship courses conducted at Army installations for Japanese wives of service personnel. This is considered to be indirect but valuable community relations activity in the demonstration of official concern for the welfare and successful assimilation of prospective U. S. citizens.

(4) Continuing support and professional assistance are furnished the Eighth Army Memorial (Severance) Chest Surgery Hospital. This project is of inestimable value in maintaining favorable attitudes toward the United States.

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- (5) Subordinate commanders meet with prefectural Governors on a continuing and regular basis. Similarly, the Commanding General, USARJ, meets periodically with all the prefectural Governors to discuss requirements on a case-by-case basis.
- (6) Condolence calls are made by USAF personnel on the families of people killed in accidents involving Air Force personnel. Cash collected from Air Force personnel is given; appropriate prayers are offered; and emergency medical care and housing, as needed, are provided. Effort is made to secure local press cooperation.
- (7) Although isolation from the local community by using compound-type housing has posed no particular problems, opportunities for living in the local communities are stressed as a matter of command policy.
- (8) All USAF commands recognize promotion of favorable community relations as a vital factor in the accomplishment of their missions. For Example:

- (a) Aside from professional agitators, many of Fukuoka's half-million Japanese did not like our airmen and the sound of our screaming F-100's. The Fukuoka City Council had already implored the USAF to get out -- to move our base. The Communists and the Socialists had gone to the central government in Tokyo with their evacuation petitions. The Air Base Commander acted by having "open house" for various groups of townspeople including students, housewives, newspapermen, police, and politicians. To each group he explained that the USAF was at the base for the benefit of the Japanese as well as the Americans.

A series of town-base community programs was started. During these meetings the Japanese were quietly told that if the base went so would go \$38,000,000 a year in local spending. Local papers were kept advised of such new developments as USAF rules to cut down jet noise. Keeping newsmen posted of developments, plus providing them with a direct telephone line to the city, resulted in a vastly improved press. Airmen pitched in to build an orphanage in town. Base fire engines pumped water for drought-stricken farmers. American wives made friends among Japanese wives.

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Just when everything seemed to be going smoothly, a jet smashed into a C-47 over the city, demolishing 12 Japanese homes. This incident could well have been the end of Japanese-American friendship in this area. The Base Commander averted disaster by personally rushing to the spot, ordering perimeter tents for the homeless Japanese, providing them with three weeks basic supplies, and expediting claims for financial settlement.

The success of this all-out effort can best be judged by the fact that instead of blasting our airmen for wrecking Japanese homes and endangering Japanese lives, the mayor, governor and newspapers expressed sympathy for the three airmen killed in the plane crash. A Communist attempt to stage an anti-American demonstration at the scene of the crash the next day collapsed when the Japanese crash victims refused to cooperate.

(b) Over 200 children from Fussa-muchi Jr. High School toured Yokota Air Base at which time they made sketches of the base with water colors. The teachers selected eight outstanding paintings to present to the Base Commander who had the pictures hung in the headquarters building.

(c) When fire razed nearby Furumaki, the personnel of Misawa Air Force Base quickly went to the aid of their Japanese friends. Three and one-half truckloads of clothing were gathered for the destitute families. Sixteen mattresses, 86 blankets, and a number of quilts were gathered from the salvage yard and were distributed to the people through the church.

SECRET



SECRETKOREA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 69,823

Civilian Personnel - 1,054

TOTAL 70,877

A. BACKGROUND

The Republic of Korea is firmly allied and closely identified in its national interest with the United States. In general there is fundamental agreement on basic policies between the two countries. The favorable Korean attitude toward the United States is conditioned by the following factors:

(a) the U. S. position as a leader of the free world with which the ROK identified its national survival; (b) the U. S. role and contributions in the military action against the Communist aggression of June 1950; (c) post-hostilities U. S. economic aid; (d) U. S. military aid and assistance which has built up a strong Korean defense force; (e) U. S. support and sponsorship of the ROK in the United Nations and in international relations.

There are, however, four major areas of disagreement between the two governments. Korea advocates force while the United States advocates peaceful means to achieve unification of Korea. Korea disagrees with U. S. policy with respect to the armistice agreement. Korea frequently attacks the United States for its policy towards Japan and accuses the United States of being pro-Japanese. Lastly, Korea strongly desires a "status of forces" agreement, which the United States is unwilling to enter into, under an armistice situation.

U. S. economic aid is of such magnitude that it overshadows the economic benefits generated by the presence of American personnel. Since under-employment exists in Korea, U. S. presence has not created a labor shortage. Relations between U. S. troops and the local population have been greatly enhanced as a result of the American Forces Assistance to Korea Program (AFAK). By assisting local communities under this officially-sponsored program in the rebuilding or construction of schools, orphanages, hospitals, community buildings,

SECRET

SECRET

KOREA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

churches, irrigation projects and the like, U. S. military personnel have gained the friendship and sympathy of the Korean people. The AFAK has been evaluated as being the most effective means thus far used for maintaining favorable local sentiment towards U. S. personnel in Korea.

In general, friendly relations exist between Koreans and Americans. There is no evidence that the higher standard of living enjoyed by American civilians and military forces causes any resentment. Indications of Korean discontent and frustrations over their economic and social lot are increasing but they are related to the basic political, economic and social problems of the country itself rather than to an unfavorable comparison with the standards of U. S. citizens.



SECRET

KOREA

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA (Continued)

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
<u>ICA</u>	511	648	+ 137



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<u>USIA</u>	24	20	- 4
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KOREA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

A special training film and brochure have been prepared for orientation of all U. S. soldiers on arrival in Korea. This film covers Korean customs and ways of life.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least possible problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

U. S. forces have taken care to use as little arable land as possible for their installations.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

- (1) The institution of the Korean Augmentation Troops,

SECRET

SECRETKOREAC. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

U. S. Army (KATUSA) was effected during the Korean hostilities under the stress of military necessity. Use of KATUSA remains a vitally important factor in the U. S. Army's capability in Korea. Twenty percent of these quasi-military individuals serve with combat elements. U. S. Army supporting elements frequently contain as high as forty-four percent KATUSA. At the present time only food, clothing, and certain items such as cigarettes and soap are provided KATUSA. The U. S. soldier on a purely voluntary basis usually contributes small sums each month toward providing their KATUSA comrades with such items as haircuts and theater admissions or other recreation fees.

(2) The shortage of adequate family-type housing has seriously restricted civilian agencies, particularly ICA, in the assignment of an adequate number of qualified personnel to Korea. Most of the civilian personnel assigned to Korea are single or serve without dependents at post. The Korean public therefore does not see most Americans in their normal cultural and social family setting. Opportunities for Koreans to see Americans in normal family settings will increase as more housing becomes available. Both military and civilian agencies are working to resolve the housing problem as rapidly as possible within the financial resources made available for house construction and renovation.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) The United Nations Command, the Embassy, and the USIS established a Joint Community Relations Committee which held its first meeting on November 20, 1957. Basic activity is centered in community relations advisory

SECRET

SECRET

KOREA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

councils located in communities in areas where there is a substantial population of U. S. personnel. Seventeen of these councils are currently active and meet at least once each month with joint American and Korean representation. Chairmanship alternates monthly between Korean and U. S. representatives. The program is carried out in accord with DOD Directive 5410-27 except for provisions applicable only to the Continental United States and modifications to suit local conditions. The community relations advisory council provides an effective channel for notification of proposed military actions affecting the community; provides the command with advance information concerning problems and situations which affect the military; fosters improvement and understanding of relations between the military and civilian community; and aids in eliminating possible areas of friction. Through this medium the commander and the troops under his command are publicly identified with the interests of the local community and establish and maintain cordial working relationships with the civilian officials and local population.

(2) The following Army activities have been and are continuing to be effective in shaping and maintaining attitudes:

- (a) Individual and Army unit support of orphanages by donations of cash, food, and clothing;
- (b) Individual and Army unit construction of school facilities from scrap material;
- (c) Free medical treatment to as many as 500 Koreans per month;
- (d) Provision of the services of Army surgeons to Korean hospitals for special and emergency cases; and
- (e) English classes are being held by U. S. soldiers on a voluntary basis. Korean social groups

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SECRET

KOREA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

and Korean soldiers associated with U. S. units participate enthusiastically.

(3) A press liaison office has been established in downtown Seoul which eases transportation difficulties for news media representatives. All releases and other items of interest are disseminated through the liaison office which furnishes a very effective contact point between the information office and local media representatives. Regular visits are made to news media offices by the information officers and members of their staffs, and social contacts during off-duty hours are encouraged. Due to a shortage of local transportation, all possible assistance is given in transporting media representatives to front-line units and other newsworthy areas. Close liaison has been established with the ROK Office of Public Information and effective exchange of information is carried on.

(4) On completion of a TV studio in March 1958 arrangements will be made for joint Korean and U. S. presentations. Arrangements have recently been made with the ROK Office of Public Information to exchange cultural literature and films.

(5) Commanders at all levels are encouraged to approve their organization's participation in local community life in such activities as local festivals. They have permitted community engineering use of troop labor and equipment on such activities as playground construction. Reported donations to charitable institutions, in the form of goods and services on the part of units and by individuals' and Chaplains' funds, have averaged approximately \$2,000 per month.

2. Problems Peculiar to Korea

Local Economy -- Black Market Activities

There is an extensive black market ring operating in Korea. It is so effective that U. S. equipment and supplies

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KOREA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

are frequently offered on the black market at prices lower than PX and commissary prices. All agencies in the country have been well aware of the black market problem for a number of years and have been concentrating on the problem but as yet no complete solution has been found.

SECRET

SECRETLIBYA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 5,539

Civilian Personnel - 510

TOTAL 6,049

A. BACKGROUND

Libya is an extremely poor country which relies to a very large extent on foreign assistance. There is little historical or cultural connection between Libya and the United States although Libya was important as a Barbary Coast state in the early 1800's. There has been practically no emigration from Libya to the United States and few U. S. tourists or missionaries have ever gone to Libya. There has always been a high degree of acceptance of U. S. operations in Libya mainly for economic reasons, since the Libyan budget is entirely dependent upon "invisible exports" in the form of foreign financial grants earned by entering into military base agreements, treaties, and other aid. There is at present a high degree of Libyan government support for continued U. S. operations, as this is a lever for obtaining increased U. S. economic and technical assistance. The Libyan-American Base Rights agreement runs until 1971 and there is no apparent desire to curtail U. S. operations. Rather, Libya has encouraged an expansion of the facilities under the agreement. This acceptance of U. S. operations for economic reasons has been confined, however, to the educated and informed groups. The man in the street has no knowledge of nor interest in military matters and does not realize the extent to which his individual economic well-being depends on foreign -- especially U. S. -- subsidies to his government.

Developments in the whole of the Middle East and North Africa rather than specific U. S. actions in Libya will determine future trends of local Libyan sentiment and the Libyan's government's attitude toward U. S. operations. It is probable that any reduction of U. S. forces in Libya would cause grave official misgivings, since the personal spending of U. S. military personnel and their dependents is a factor of real importance in maintaining the local Libyan economy. This is especially true in Tripolitania. The current spending rate of

SECRET

LIBYA

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Wheelus Air Base and its personnel and dependents in the Libyan economy is estimated conservatively at about \$8 million a year. Considerable unemployment would be caused by curtailment of activities at Wheelus Air Base, since large numbers of Libyans are employed there as laborers and lower-grade clerks and in the city of Tripoli as household servants. An unusual opportunity to better community relations has been offered the United States in the recent Libyan appeal for assistance in teacher training and in higher education in order to make it possible to reduce the number of Egyptians now in these fields.

The problems of American-Libyan adjustments are the usual ones attending any large U. S. military installation in a foreign country. In Libya these have to do principally with taking agricultural lands for the airbase and other military installations, the noise of jet aircraft in the vicinity of the airbase (near the city of Tripoli, which like many American communities in the vicinity of busy airfields, is most unhappy with the noise and risk), and problems involved in the entry and operation of American automobiles.

LIBYA

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	5,539	5,063	- 476
Total Civilian	<u>510</u>	<u>445</u>	- <u>65</u>
Grand Total	6,049	5,508	- 541

DEFENSE


Military Personnel	5,539	5,063	- 476
Civilian Personnel	<u>348</u>	<u>262</u>	- <u>86</u>
TOTAL	5,887	5,325	- 562



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ICA


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USIA

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SECRET

LIBYA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

In addition to the usual range of administrative problems affecting U. S. civilian personnel serving in Arabic countries -- Pan-Arab spirit and intense nationalism, strict religious and social customs, etc. -- the inability of most Americans to speak Arabic is resented by Libyans, who believe that we consider their culture unimportant. Also Libyan officials find it difficult to comprehend the tour of duty policy used in the past of keeping personnel at post only about two years especially in view of the time it takes Americans to adjust to the cultural differences.

The civilian agencies recognize the problem of necessity for Arabic language training but cannot report any satisfactory solution other than encouraging and facilitating their personnel's obtaining a rudimentary ability in Arabic when serving in Libya and other Arabic-speaking countries. They emphasize teaching English to local employees, and where interpreters are used they try to obtain the most reliable and non-objectionable (i. e., those of non-Italian descent). ICA and USIA are encouraging a second tour of duty in Libya where feasible. State does not differentiate tours of duty in Libya from those elsewhere in the world. State personnel who have completed a tour of duty in Libya, as elsewhere, may be either returned after home leave or assigned to another post.

SECRET

LIBYA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

b. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

The hazardous traffic situation on the crowded two-lane highway between Wheelus Air Base and Tripoli causes many accidents, always blamed on the American -- civilian or military -- who is involved. In addition the American's large showy automobile itself emphasizes the already painful discrepancy between the Libyan's transport standards -- a donkey or on foot -- and the American's standard practice of using his car to go everywhere. This has created a serious community relations problem.

Even in the principal cities, public transportation is extremely poor and is seldom used even by resident Europeans and well-to-do Libyans and officials. Hence the American personnel have to use automobiles. The military have taken strong measures to control traffic and curtail accidents through an extensive traffic safety program.

c. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Since the government opposes the importation of skilled labor or the use of resident foreigners, the U. S. civilian agencies, wherever possible, employ Libyans as local employees even if it means breaking a single position

SECRETLIBYAC. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

down into its several smaller components and hiring more people. ICA's program is directed extensively toward training in the teaching, public administration, health, and agricultural fields.

(2) Unemployment and underemployment have been large problems in Libya. U. S. labor requirements - contribute substantially to the alleviation of this problem, since USAF policy gives preference to Libyan nationals. The Commissioner of Labor of Tripolitania refers candidates for positions and they are hired if found qualified. If Libyan nationals are not available foreign nationals are hired, with the consent of the Government.

(3) An informal council of personnel officers, in constant contact with the Libyan Government, coordinates labor policies and practices and keeps wages in line with local scales.

(4) Training programs for Libyans are developing skills useful to USAF operations and for the Libyan economy generally.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) The effect of a Soviet -Egyptian campaign in 1956 to inspire resentment of noise and fear of off-base accidents was blunted by tours and lunches on the base for officials and notables of surrounding villages.

(2) MAAG Libya, only recently activated, has not yet formulated an accurate objective analysis of the effects of its community relations program. A formal program

SECRET

SECRET

LIBYA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

is being developed. In the interim, personnel of this headquarters strive constantly to win popular acceptance of American objectives in Libya.

(3) Base tours, press conferences, and briefings for community leaders are being held to offset community criticism of jet noises and jet familiarization rides are given to show why the noise exists and why it will increase. Directives have been dispatched to commanders stressing the control of noise and restricting booms to altitudes where there will be no effect.

2. Problems Peculiar to Libya

None reported.

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MOROCCO

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 12, 511

Civilian Personnel - 1,105

TOTAL 13, 616

A. BACKGROUND

Moroccans feel that their newly won independence is compromised by the presence on their soil of numerous French, Spanish, and U. S. military forces, without the restraint of detailed agreements having Moroccan acquiescence. The French military have incurred deep-seated hostility in Morocco in recent years due to vigorous continued repression of the Algerian rebellion. The Spanish military have become increasingly unpopular as a result of their military action in defense of the enclave of Ifni. Also, the Government of Morocco regarded as a threat to itself the joint French-Spanish military operations in February 1958 against irregular armed elements in the areas near Morocco's southern frontier. The Government of Morocco has recently called upon both Spain and France to agree in principle to withdrawal of their military forces from Morocco. While the United States enjoys the good will of most Moroccans, and its economic assistance is welcomed, the presence of American troops is felt by many to be an obstacle to Moroccan efforts in obtaining withdrawal of European forces.

On the whole, U. S. forces in Morocco are not directly objected to by the local population and do not constitute a social irritant. In fact, the U. S. forces employ about 5,000 Moroccans and many others benefit indirectly from U. S. presence. But since few Moroccans regard the Soviet Union as a threat to Moroccan independence or as a potential aggressor against Morocco, the presence of U. S. air bases in a strategic sense is seen more as conveying a danger of Moroccan involvement in world war than as a measure for the common defense. And, more immediately, nationalist political leaders are reluctant to grant "special privileges" to any aliens, including U. S. troops, without compensating advantages for Morocco. In this atmosphere negotiations for a detailed base agreement have continued in Rabat since May 1957 without agreement on many of the issues involved in a status of forces treaty. The visit of

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MOROCCO

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

King Mohamed V to the United States between November 25 and December 13, 1957, has however contributed to better understanding between the United States and Morocco and resulted in a joint statement in which the Governments of the United States and Morocco expressed their desire to proceed, by means of provisional solution, to the appropriate adjustments of present conditions regarding the armed forces of the United States in Morocco.

The economic impact of the U. S. presence is the major factor supporting an amicable relationship. A bilateral economic agreement in April 1957 and \$20,000,000 in economic assistance made available in FY 1957 tended to create a favorable climate among the Moroccan people, even though it may not as yet have resulted in tangible economic benefits for the average Moroccan.


In the area of community relationships there is relatively little intimate personal contact between U. S. citizens and Moroccans. Inter-marriage is extremely rare and competition for women is almost non-existent. Particular attention has been given by military commands to the importance of briefing newly arrived personnel on local customs and mores. Provision of government housing on U. S. bases also has tended to minimize opportunities for inter-cultural relationships. The civilian agencies have so few employees in Morocco that their problems of adjustment are minimal vis-a-vis those involving military personnel.

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MOROCCO


B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	12,511	10,963	- 1,548
Total Civilian	<u>1,105</u>	<u>932</u>	- <u>173</u>
Grand Total	13,616	11,895	- 1,721
=====			
<u>DEFENSE</u>			
Military Personnel	12,511	10,963	- 1,548
Civilian Personnel	<u>1,017</u>	<u>823</u>	- <u>194</u>
TOTAL	13,528	11,786	- 1,742



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ICA 7 27 -/ 20



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USIA 27 27 0

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MOROCCO

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

I. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) Voluntary language classes are conducted on most military installations in Morocco. Also, USAFE has a mandatory program which requires the participation of all Air Force military and civilian newcomers in a six-weeks, one-hour-per-day French language course.

(2) Under pertinent regulations the overseas commander has authority to return military dependents to the United States when their conduct is prejudicial to American interests.

(3) Troops and other military personnel are housed on-base insofar as possible. Official social contact is maintained only on the Base Commander level. All personnel are indoctrinated to show good conduct in visits to settlements and cities.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least possible problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

On much of the agricultural land taken for U. S. bases, Moroccans are allowed to continue cultivation, although the

SECRET

SECRET

MOROCCO

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

land is within the confines of the base. At Novasseur, for example, 2,000 acres are cultivated under such arrangements.

c. Problem -- U. S. Vehicles

To minimize resentment against U. S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

Practice

In addition to command-wide programs such as the SAC "Operation Life Saver," a vigorous program of enforcement of on-base traffic safety rules and systematic indoctrination on driving hazards and requirements is presented to all military, civilian, and dependent personnel.

d. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practices

(1) Of economic benefit to Morocco was construction in 1951 of a \$380,000,000 complex of air defenses. Previously inexperienced Moroccan laborers, under tutelage of Army engineers, became craftsmen and operators of heavy construction equipment, and good working relationships were established.

(2) Field reports indicate that a significant problem would arise if sudden reductions in U. S. base operations or technical aid were to occur, thereby requiring curtailment of employment opportunities for approximately 5,000 Moroccans. Reductions, if required, would be phased so as to minimize the economic impact on the local economy.

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MOROCCO

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(3) Until recently the scarcity of housing had been a windfall to French and other European landlords. The building of considerable on-base housing has removed much of the competitive pricing. This is a source of disappointment to the landlord group, but of satisfaction to the European renters who had been priced out of the more desirable housing.

2. Problems Peculiar to Morocco

None reported.

SECRET

PHILIPPINES

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 9,730

Civilian Personnel - 969

TOTAL 10,699

A. BACKGROUND

The long and close association of the United States with the Philippines has left there a unique depository of good will and understanding. During the period of U. S. rule American administrators, teachers, and missionaries were active throughout the country. Their enthusiasm and idealism engendered a profound pro-American sentiment which remains undiminished particularly in the rural areas. The Philippines are solidly allied with the democratic free world and support the same positions as the United States on most questions concerning world affairs. The country's policy is strongly anti-communist and has not yet been seriously affected by fellow travelers or the self-styled "Asian neutralist."

It must however be recognized that the Filipino's native pride and sensitivity, together with the desire for the equality of status that is considered attainable only through greater independence, have given rise to a spirit of nationalism which has increasingly complicated relations on the government level. Also, certain powerful local politicians have utilized problems arising out of U. S. military bases in the Philippines to stir up public feelings and have organized a number of important press and intellectual figures into a political force motivated by chauvinist nationalism.

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PHILIPPINES

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Social relations between members of urban American business groups and their Filipino colleagues are fairly active. The same is true of U. S. civilian agencies personnel and their counterparts in the Philippine government. Relations between U. S. military personnel and Philippine nationals, however, are unfortunately more restricted, particularly in rural areas where differences in language, customs, and levels of income are social barriers.

Without question the most obvious current irritant to good U. S. -Philippine relations is the administration of U. S. bases. Collective security to the average Filipino is a vague and ambiguous concept because the contribution of the Philippine armed forces has been seriously limited. Largely for this reason the Filipino does not identify his country with the American installations nor does he perhaps fully understand the U. S. defense activities as elements of the area collective security system.

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
PHILIPPINES

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	9,730	9,265	- 465
Total Civilian	<u>969</u>	<u>1,079</u>	<u>+ 110</u>
Grand Total	10,699	10,344	- 355

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	9,730	9,265	- 465
Civilian Personnel	<u>561</u>	<u>658</u>	<u>+ 97</u>
TOTAL	10,291	9,923	- 368



25X1

<u>STATE</u>	161	181	+ 20
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25X1

<u>ICA</u>	187	185	- 2
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25X1

<u>USIA</u>	60	55	- 5
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SECRET

PHILIPPINES

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practice

Each newly assigned employee is furnished a brochure outlining the Philippine cultural, economic, political, and religious background. In addition, military personnel and their adult dependents attend a 12-hour orientation course conducted by the U. S. Embassy, in addition to a JUSMAG orientation.

b. Problem -- Use of Land

To ensure that U. S. requirements for land are held to the absolute minimum consistent with U. S. programs and that withdrawal of the land from local use creates the least possible problem for the local government and minimizes the impact on the local economy.

Practice

Filipino farmers are allowed to cultivate lands which are inside the boundaries of U. S. bases whenever this is possible without compromising the security of the base.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

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PHILIPPINES

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

Practices

(1) Military commands participate in local civic and charitable organizations and events both by monetary contributions and voluntary personnel services.

(2) Wherever security requirements permit, the activities of JUSMAG are planned and coordinated with the armed forces of the Philippines. This stresses the concept of teamwork between the two nations.

(3) JUSMAG participates extensively in representational and hospitable activities with personnel of the armed forces of the Philippines. Extensive use is made of the JUSMAG officers' open mess and the JUSMAG non-commissioned officers' open mess for this purpose, and both official and non-official civilian groups are frequently included in these activities.

(4) Since early 1957 a U.S. Public Information Officer has been attached to the Clark Air Force Base. This officer is attempting, with the cooperation of the base commander, to develop the local Filipino's sense of responsibility for the base system and to create an appreciation of the true mutuality of the defense arrangement.

2. Problems Peculiar to the Philippines

None reported.

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SAUDI ARABIA

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 195	
Military Personnel -	1,369
Civilian Personnel -	67
TOTAL	<u>1,436</u>

A. BACKGROUND

Although Saudi Arabia's emergence as a significant entity in international affairs and the United States' assumption of a major role in the Middle East are of recent date, U. S. -Saudi Arabian cooperation extends back to the mid-1930's when U. S. oil companies obtained the concession now held by ARAMCO. In the intervening two decades relations have expanded into many fields, but oil operations and military affairs have been dominant. Since World War II approximately 7,000 American private citizens have been residing in the ARAMCO communities in the Dhahran area in addition to some 1,400 U. S. government personnel and dependents, largely concentrated at Dhahran Airfield.

The economic impact of the U. S. official presence is very small compared to that of ARAMCO. There is little resentment of the higher American standard of living, and a friendly "live and let live" relation obtains between U. S. citizens and indigenous people. This is due principally to ARAMCO's assiduous efforts over many years to maintain good relations between its American employees and the local population, including the company's Saudi employees.

The traditional Saudi restriction on foreign activity in Saudi Arabia has precluded American missionary or educational activity in that country, as well as any exchange-of-persons programs. A gradual breakdown of these barriers may be indicated, however, by the fact that some 35 or 40 Saudi Arabian students, 15 of whom have official support from the Saudi Government, are currently in U. S. educational institutions, and a number of Saudi air cadets are being trained in the United States.

The physical, cultural, and religious characteristics of Saudi Arabia virtually eliminate certain problems which are commonly encountered in other countries, though a number

SECRET

SECRET

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

SAUDI ARABIA

of special problems affecting the U.S. presence are caused by these same characteristics. The puritanical Moslem social customs generally limit social intercourse between Americans and Saudis. Saudi Arabia's strict religious and social customs and political sensitivity raise unique problems in selecting personnel for service in that area. The non-acceptability of persons of Jewish faith, prohibition of any drinking, difficulties related to the position of women in the local society, and the necessity of living entirely separate from the local population but subject (in theory) solely to Saudi jurisdiction are typical problems.

Saudi religious law also has an important bearing on the problem of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Saudi Arabia has not recognized U.S. jurisdiction over U.S. civilian employees and dependents or U.S. military personnel. These persons are theoretically subject to Saudi law which provides harsh punishments for even minor offenses. In practice, however, Saudi officials have always agreed to sentence Americans to either a fine or deportation in lieu of a more severe punishment. The jurisdiction question nevertheless remains a serious potential problem.

A further source of difficulty is caused by the contrast between the highly developed political and administrative system with which Americans are familiar at home and the rudimentary institutions of the Saudi Arabian absolute monarchy. Saudi officials often seem to be uncooperative or dilatory in their dealings with Americans, though much of this can be explained by the poor organization and lack of qualified personnel which characterize the Saudi bureaucracy at nearly all levels.

Communist propaganda is not a serious problem in Saudi Arabia, but nationalist and frequently anti-West propaganda emanating from Egypt and other Arab states does have an important impact. Saudi Arabia is the site of the holy shrines of Islam and in a real sense is the religious center of the Moslem world. As yet overt public sentiment has followed the Government's official line of cooperation with the United States, but there is much sympathy for Nasser's "positive neutralism." This may become a factor to reckon with, particularly if official U.S. -Saudi relations become cool.

SECRET

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

SAUDI ARABIA

Basically, future popular attitudes will depend to a large extent on the issues that affect Saudi Arabia's interest: U. S. arms to Saudi Arabia, the effectiveness of U. S. training programs and other activities in the country, the fortunes and influence of Nasser, the Baghdad Pact, Israel, Aqaba, and the like. These issues loom large in the minds of a growing portion of the Saudi people. The attitude of Saudi officialdom at nearly all levels tends to fluctuate with the political atmosphere. For example, a U. S. move which is interpreted as favoring Israel in the Arab-Israeli dispute will frequently be reflected in an uncooperative attitude on the part of Saudi officials and occasionally in unfriendly gestures by private citizens.


B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	1,369	1,696	+ 327
Total Civilian	<u>67</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>+ 3</u>
Grand Total	1,436	1,766	+ 330

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	1,369	1,696	+ 327
Civilian Personnel	<u>28</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>- 3</u>
TOTAL	1,397	1,721	+ 324

25X1



STATE

39	44	+ 5
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25X1

SECRET

SAUDI ARABIAB. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA (Continued)

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
<u>ICA</u>	0	0	0
<u>USIA</u>	0	1	+ 1

25X1

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES1. Common Problemsa. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) The civilian and military agencies have scrupulously avoided selection of any but the most qualified personnel for assignment in Saudi Arabia. Intense indoctrination is conducted at headquarters and at the post for personnel and dependents.

(2) U.S. personnel live somewhat isolated in Embassy or Consulate compounds and in the Eastern Province obtain most of their shopping needs through Dhahran Airfield or ARAMCO facilities. Perforce, especially in the Eastern Province, they maintain little social exchange with Saudis except for requisite official representation. U.S. agencies, however, encourage their personnel to expand their social contacts with the local community wherever possible.

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SECRET

SAUDI ARABIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Civilian agencies limit the tour of duty and insist on the maximum use of local leave out of the country for employees' morale and health reasons.

(3) Language barrier has been the greatest obstacle. Recently 18 positions have been designated as requiring language mastery. This measure is designed not only to increase the on-duty effectiveness of the Army element, but to lay the groundwork for more responsiveness to repeated overtures from natives for purely social (off-duty) and community-type activities. Concurrent language instruction has been made mandatory.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

The Dhahran Airfield occupies only desert, hence the problem of taking agricultural land has been avoided. A modest agricultural project has been started which it is hoped will not only supply vegetables for local consumption but also contribute towards the spread of knowledge of scientific methods of agriculture.

c. Problem -- Jurisdiction

To ensure that the rights of U. S. personnel under the Constitution are safeguarded, without creating resentment by needless challenge of the basic sovereignty of the host country.

Practice

American military personnel in Saudi Arabia are under strict instructions to avoid trouble of any kind with Saudi officials and other indigenous personnel with whom they come in contact.

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SAUDI ARABIA

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

- (1) Most important on the U.S. side as a measure of allaying resentments is full recognition that the Dhahran Airfield is "His Majesty's Airfield." The base is unmilitarized (arms for any purpose being prohibited) and police jurisdiction is cooperatively shared (U.S. jurisdiction, when exclusive, being limited to areas, notably buildings, exclusively used by American personnel).
- (2) There are occasional requests for U.S. military participation in civic and charitable events in Saudi Arabia. Worthwhile requests are supported extensively but the scarcity of such requests amounts to a virtual absence of U.S. military participation in these functions.
- (3) Saudi Arabian natives are invited to attend U.S. military social functions. Off-duty English classes are made available to Saudi Arabian employees, and continuous efforts are made to establish solid friendships at all social levels.
- (4) In all joint activities, Saudi officials are clearly indicated as the officials in charge. At Dhahran the passport and customs formalities and many aspects of the daily operation of the airfield are conducted by Saudi officials. These activities bring a fairly large number of U.S. personnel into close working contact with local officials whose attitudes and working methods often make severe demands on the patience and good humor of U.S. personnel.
- (5) Buffet luncheons for local officials and evening activities of a quasi-official nature are periodically held.

2. Problems Peculiar to Saudi Arabia

Persons of the Jewish faith are excluded.

Practice

No attempts are made to assign persons of Jewish faith to duty in Saudi Arabia.

SECRET

SPAIN

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957	
Military Personnel	- 2,769
Civilian Personnel	- 679
TOTAL	3,448

A. BACKGROUND

The principal United States objective in Spain is the construction and utilization of a complex of naval and air bases which are approaching operational readiness. Although not a member of NATO, Spain has a commitment to collective security deriving from its bilateral agreements with the United States and its older bilateral alliances with Portugal for the defense of the Iberian Peninsula.

While the Spanish Government is committed to a course of increasing cooperation with the United States and the West, the term "Spanish Government" cannot be equated with "Spanish people". Adherence to this commitment is thus faced with what is in reality neutralism on the part of the "Spanish people." Only a few Spaniards identify themselves completely with their Government, its actions and objectives, and there exists an under-current of resentment toward United States activity in Spain.

With the possible exception of the Portuguese, the Spanish standard of living is the lowest in Western Europe. This means that American non-commissioned officers are better paid than fairly high-ranking Spanish commissioned officers. The increase in the number of privately owned vehicles belonging to Americans further emphasizes our presence and serves as a symbol that makes glaringly apparent the great difference between Spanish and American standards of living. In this connection there has recently been an increase in slashed convertible tops, flattened tires, and scratches on American owned automobiles. Spanish driving habits are different from and even dangerous by American standards, and this has contributed to several accidents involving U.S. personnel. Though some of these have been significant and troublesome, it is, nevertheless, true that the number has been comparatively small to date. At present there are fewer than 110,000 privately owned passenger vehicles in Spain, most of which are small and antiquated, a fact that will make the increasing number of American automobiles stand out in greater contrast and will undoubtedly produce accompanying irritations.

SECRET

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SPAINA. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Another important point of potential friction in Spain relates to religious differences. Though there has so far been no evidence of resentment over the marriage of American personnel to Spanish girls or against the competition for women, as the number of young unmarried Americans increases with the manning of the bases and the periodic rotation of SAC combat wings, the religious differences between Catholic Spain and large numbers of Protestant U.S. personnel may eventually become a more serious issue.

Envy of Americans has so far been directed mostly toward the comparatively higher standards of living, the existence of commissary and post exchange privileges, and exemptions from payments of taxes and import duties. These, however, are reactions common in all foreign countries where the United States has bases, and it is not believed that the Spaniards have been more emotional than have others at the time such bases were established.

In summary, there are signs that Spain, after a period of involuntary isolation, is gradually becoming more accustomed to the presence of foreigners. This is particularly true in the case of tourists who for the past two years have constituted Spain's largest source of foreign currency earnings. However, as long as Spanish economic problems remain pressing and the Spanish standard of living so low, it must be concluded that the emotional impact of increasing numbers of Americans there will continue to constitute a potentially serious difficulty requiring sensitive handling.

Civilian and military authorities have recommended the following administrative actions, many of which have been carefully planned in advance of the build-up:

1. Stationing a minimum of United States personnel in the country;
2. Careful selection and indoctrination;
3. Rigidly enforcing discipline and promptly punishing violators;
4. Discouraging the wearing of uniforms in public; and
5. Attempting to anticipate potential sources of difficulties.

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SECRET

SPAIN

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	2,769	8,186	+ 5,417
Total Civilian	<u>679</u>	<u>794</u>	+ <u>115</u>
Grand Total	3,448	8,980	+ 5,532

DEFENSE

Military Personnel	2,769	8,186	+ 5,417
Civilian Personnel	<u>527</u>	<u>646</u>	+ <u>119</u>
TOTAL	3,296	8,832	+ 5,536



25X1


STATE	94	89	-	5
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25X1




ICA	40	45	+ 5
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25X1



USIA	18	14	- 4
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25X1



SECRET

SECRET

SPAIN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U. S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U. S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) In the case of the military, only persons who want to be assigned to Spain are sent there, and they are carefully selected. The result has been exemplary behavior.

(2) Military personnel are given periodic briefings and civilian dress is mandatory off-base and after duty.

(3) The military "Sponsor System" is considered to be an important morale factor in community relations in Spain. When personnel first receive their orders to Spain, they hear from an opposite number already in Spain, generally of the same rank, type of work and family status. Living and working conditions are thus explained before the man leaves for Spain. Upon arrival, he is met, billets are arranged and local conditions are explained. Since it is in the beginning that basic attitudes about the host country are formed, the Sponsor System can materially aid during this formative period.

(4) Mandatory 60-hour Spanish-language instruction is given to all military personnel, as well as realistic, intensive indoctrination on Spain, its customs, ways of life, and troop responsibilities.

(5) State has a Spanish language facility at Mexico City to which personnel of all agencies may be assigned for language instruction.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

SECRET

SECRET

SPAIN

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

Practice

A U. S. Housing Board has been established to control rents and rental contracts are examined for legality. Inflationary impact is minimized.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

- (1) Prior to activation of new facilities, JUSMAG establishes a Field Liaison Officer to lay groundwork for good troop-community relations. At three bases, SAC assigned base commanders approximately one year prior to base activation for this purpose.
- (2) Local press representatives have been invited to inspect MAAG supplies and military construction in an attempt to keep them up-to-date.
- (3) In the face of potential difficulties, it is essential that every effort be made to establish a close personal relationship between senior program officials and influential Spaniards. This is viewed as particularly important by USIA, which must conduct an effective program of public relations with the Spanish people regarding the United States presence. The impending military build-up in Spain, which will multiply problems in the troop-community relations area, indicates that the agencies should review current allotments of representation funds to determine whether those allocated to program and diplomatic officers in Spain are sufficient.

2. Problems peculiar to Spain

None reported.

SECRET

SECRETTHAILAND

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 403

Civilian Personnel - 520

TOTAL 923

A. BACKGROUND

Historically the Thai populace has been most friendly to Americans. The United States, unlike France and England, has never exhibited ambitions regarding Thai territory. American missionary efforts in Thailand, and study in the United States by many Thai students, have contributed to the good relationships. The past two years, however, have seen recurring opposition expressed in newspapers and by politicians, attacking the United States and its programs as well as Thailand's foreign policy of close association with the United States. The cost of Thailand's contribution to the joint military support program has proved to be a matter of concern to the Thai Government and is a ready subject of criticism for opposition newspapers and politicians. Until now direct Communist propaganda is not believed to have widespread appeal. It is probable however that repetition of such propaganda will have an adverse effect.

Personal relations between Americans and Thais are probably the most significant factor in Thai attitudes toward Americans. Unsympathetic, overbearing, or discourteous behavior by Americans (or Occidentals taken for Americans) creates a pronounced reaction among Thai observers. There is also considerable suspicion that Americans look down on Thais as colored people.

Because of the relatively few unmarried American personnel in Thailand, inter-marriage or competition for women has had little effect as a source of friction. Likewise, automobile accidents have played only a small part. It should be noted that American military personnel in Thailand are not permitted to import American automobiles. The Thai Government has provided smaller European cars at its own expense, which has caused some internal criticism of the Thai Government since it adds to the cost of the nation's total defense budget. Economic factors -- such as American competition for scarce goods, land, or labor -- as well as the difference in living standards appear to have had little effect on Thai attitudes to date. The principal criticism pertaining to scarce housing comes not from Thais but from foreigners in Thailand with whom Americans are in competition for the better types of housing.

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THAILAND

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

To maintain the present good relationships, USIS has assigned first priority to supporting the "American presence" in Thailand. Despite leftist-inspired criticism of U. S. aid programs, the economic assistance rendered by ICA in the fields of public health, agriculture, education, and communications has had an important influence on Thai attitudes toward the United States. The malaria-eradication program is an outstanding example.

In summary, relationships of Americans in Thailand have been historically good and have been successfully maintained. The newspaper and political opposition to a foreign policy which identifies itself closely with the United States has resulted in one incident of significance in which Americans were attacked by a Thai mob. If this opposition continues to be expressed it may bring about a change in the present favorable climate for acceptance of American personnel in Thailand.

SECRET



SECRET

THAILAND

B. PERSONNEL STRENGTH DATA

	July 1, 1957 Strength	July 1, 1958 Estimated Strength	Net Change
Total Military	403	391	- 12
Total Civilian	<u>520</u>	<u>526</u>	<u>+ 6</u>
Grand Total	923	917	- 6
=====			


DEFENSE

Military Personnel	403	391	- 12
Civilian Personnel	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>+ 1</u>
TOTAL	408	397	- 11




25X1

<u>STATE</u>	95	87	- 8
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25X1

<u>ICA</u>	383	401	+ 18
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25X1

<u>USIA</u>	37	32	- 5
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25X1

SECRET

SECRET

THAILAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practice

Scrupulous adherence by JUSMAG personnel to their roles as advisors and not commanders has lessened Thai-expressed resentment at the allegedly despotic air assumed by some JUSMAG personnel. This expression was particularly common among Thai officers being instructed by JUSMAG enlisted personnel and has led to the assignment of JUSMAG enlisted personnel to the training of only the Thai lower military echelons.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U. S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

Practice

JUSMAG has made great effort to reduce expenses, particularly Thai-borne JUSMAG support expenses.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U. S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) All JUSMAG officer personnel associate extensively with the Thais, who are very sociable and hospitable. The families of U.S. enlisted men find it difficult to mix socially with their Thai counterparts because a common meeting ground is usually lacking.

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SECRET

THAILAND

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

(2) Public relations for the Country Team in Thailand are coordinated under the direction of the U. S. Ambassador by a central committee under USIS.

(3) CHJUSMAG Thailand encourages participation by military personnel and their families in organizations aimed at promoting Thai-U. S. understanding; e.g. American Association Thailand, American University Alumni Associations, Women's Clubs, and charities such as an International Bazaar to create funds for crippled Thai children.

(4) CHJUSMAG Thailand promotes attendance by U. S. military families at Thai formal functions and informal parties and provides for thorough indoctrination of U. S. families on Thai-U. S. relationships.

(5) CHJUSMAG has established a reciprocal language instruction program for selected Thai military personnel and for U. S. military personnel and their dependents. Thai military personnel instruct the Americans in Thai, and U. S. military dependents instruct the Thais in English.

2. Problems Peculiar to Thailand

None reported.

SECRET

SECRETTURKEY

## STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 4,210

Civilian Personnel - 469

TOTAL 4,679

A. BACKGROUND

The Turkish attitude towards the United States is conditioned by a strong distrust of Russia and all things Russian including Communism, a realization that the United States can through its military, economic and technical aid programs strengthen Turkey's security vis-a-vis the Soviets, and a desire to be of the West. Thus, the Turkish public and government are generally prepared to accept without an attitude of distrust or suspicion the presence of large numbers of Americans.

U.S. aid is not viewed as the principal reason for Turkish reliance on the collective security concept and Turkish identification with United States foreign policy. Turkish leaders have been convinced since the end of World War II that only by identification with the United States can Turkey expect to achieve the degree of security to which she aspires. Native leaders are aware of Turkey's shortcomings in the field of security which arise principally from an insufficiency of technically qualified and skilled personnel for her armed forces. They are aware that Turkey would not be able to defend herself in a nuclear war in her present state of military development. It seems clear that Turkey will welcome the stationing of friendly foreign troops on her soil until her military capability constitutes a deterrent to foreign aggression. This is despite the fact that the Turks, through many years of exploitation by other nations, are naturally inclined to be suspicious of foreigners.

Most of the Americans in Turkey today are military personnel and their dependents. Their assignments include for the most part service in connection with the military assistance program, support activities and the NATO command headquarters at Izmir.

The individual Turk, like the individual Frenchman, could hardly be expected to like the higher standard of living enjoyed by U. S. military or official civilian personnel. Until recently there had not, however, appeared in Turkey any articulate or organized resentment against Americans there fostered by the higher standard of living which the Americans enjoy. Many Turks, while recognizing that Turkey is still an underdeveloped country, believe that Turkey is on its way toward achieving a higher standard of living and government leaders do not discourage this belief.

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TURKEY

A. BACKGROUND (Continued)

Recent reports indicate that the generally favorable state of relations may be changing adversely. Urban Turks are showing resentment of the PX facilities, free import privileges, and the favorable exchange rate which, until recently, permitted the American to enjoy a high standard of living while the Turks' economic situation constantly weakened. The number of "incidents" involving American military personnel is growing, largely as a result of an increase in the number of Americans and particularly a more than proportionate rise in the number of youthful airmen and soldiers. These "incidents" more often than in the past are testing the patience of a great number of Turks in all walks of life.

In summary, while there was a generally favorable climate of acceptance of Americans in Turkey until recently, there has been noted over the past year some latent "anti-American" feeling which has at times caused real concern to U. S. authorities. The need for continuing precautionary measures is apparent and cannot be over-emphasized.

SECRET



TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES

1. Common Problems

a. Problem -- Personnel Factors

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

Practices

(1) ICA reports that biographic data on all its personnel being assigned to Turkey are cleared with the Turkish Government. Persons of Armenian descent are not proposed. Extensive and specialized orientation for newly assigned personnel is conducted in Washington and supplemented on arrival at Ankara. ICA reports that a good number of its personnel request return for extra tours of duty in Turkey.

(2) Shortly after arrival in Turkey, Army personnel assigned to JAMMAT, DA civilians, and dependents attend an orientation period which emphasizes the necessity for continuing satisfactory Turkish-American relationships and outlines the actions which Americans may take to assure attainment of this objective. This orientation is given either by the Chief, USA Element, or his Chief of Staff.

(3) Army officers and enlisted personnel of JAMMAT are required to attend a 20-hour course of instruction in Turkish. This course is conducted by the USA Element. Military personnel assigned to Ankara are required to participate in an additional 60 hours of Turkish language instruction.

(4) Army personnel are required to attend a one-hour lecture once each month devoted to Turkey and her customs. These periods are presented by American and Turkish guest lecturers.

b. Problem -- Local Economy

To ensure that U.S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain,

SECRET

TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

Practices

- (1) The agencies have changed to use of the "tourist rate" of TL 5.75 per \$1.00 exchange for Turkish currency instead of the open market rate of about TL 12. While this caused some objection, particularly by the clerical personnel in the American colony, it has alleviated somewhat the hardship on the civilian agencies' local employees, who were also included under the new rate of exchange.
- (2) CINCUSAFE has sent personal letters warning against black market activities in U.S. currency. U.S. dollars are used only in U.S. facilities, while Turkish lire are used in the local market.
- (3) A survey was made to determine comparability of wage and fringe benefits and job requirements. The new wage and benefit scale equalizes U.S. standards and the general average.
- (4) On-the-job training is difficult because of the newness of many of the U.S. organizations. Emphasis is on training locals to assist in immediately performing established jobs. Classes are also planned in English, typing, military correspondence, and shorthand.
- (5) To make best use of the large numbers of illiterate and unskilled Turkish laborers, jobs are "engineered" -- that is, they are broken down into small components that can be learned through the acquisition of a single, simple skill.
- (6) A helpful step in Izmir was the USAFE crackdown on PX privileges. These privileges had been a subject of severe criticism and a source of alleged black market activities.

c. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U.S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

- (1) The following organizations and administrative practices work toward continuation of the good relations existing between Americans in Turkey and their Turkish hosts:
  - (a) The Activity Coordinating Committee, which is composed of representatives from military organizations and major civilian U.S. Government agencies in Turkey, considers all aspects of American-Turkish relations and develops

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SECRET

TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

programs and makes recommendations to the Country Team. For example, the committee recently developed a Troop-Community Relations Program entitled "Operation Good Neighbor." It has also established a rental control board, and deals with local officials on questions such as the setting of uniform rates for taxi fares.

- (b) The Activity Coordinating Committee reacts immediately to information received on any major disaster occurring in Turkey. Arrangements are made for the prompt initiation of clothing collections and fund drives among the American community. Recent examples are the contributions made to victims of the earthquake which occurred in southwest Turkey and the flood in the suburbs of Ankara.
  - (c) The Community Relations Program is reviewed continuously by the Country Team.
  - (d) All incidents involving Americans which may affect adversely Turkish attitudes are reported promptly, and necessary investigations and corrective action are initiated without delay.
- (2) Membership is encouraged in the Turkish-American Association, a social and cultural activity. The Board of Governors of this organization is comprised of both Americans and Turks. A particularly important activity of this organization is the English language training program for Turkish members.
- (3) A bi-national sports program is conducted between U. S. Service teams and Turkish teams.
- (4) A most important activity is the considerable amount of entertaining of Turkish people in the homes of Americans. This provides a means for the development of a better understanding between host and guest.
- (5) Although the Army has no unilateral program in this area, its personnel participate in the following activities as members of the American community in Turkey:

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TURKEY

C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (Continued)

- (a) Unit and individual donations to Turkish charitable organizations.
- (b) Support of Turkish orphanages.
- (c) Contribution of Braille typewriters and other equipment to the Turkish School for the Blind.
- (d) Organizing and conducting a rodeo for the city of Ankara that permitted a contribution of approximately \$4,600 for the relief of victims of the Ankara flood.
- (e) Christmas parties for Turkish children.

(6) USIS is expanding its program to emphasize people-to-people contact through the expansion of its Bi-national Center and by working with a newly established University Association in Istanbul.

2. Problems Peculiar to Turkey

None reported.

SECRET

SECRETVIET-NAM

STRENGTH ON JUNE 30, 1957

Military Personnel - 726

Civilian Personnel - 452

TOTAL 1,178

A. BACKGROUND

Today the principal emotional factor affecting relations between U.S. citizens in Viet-Nam and the Vietnamese is the local pride of independence. There is a general recognition throughout Viet-Nam that the United States has been an important if not an indispensable force in the achievement of Vietnamese independence. Viet-Nam takes a very realistic attitude toward and is highly appreciative of American assistance because of the immediate and continuing threat to its own security. Although not a member of SEATO (as such membership would violate the Geneva Agreements) Viet-Nam is one of the states included in the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty, and the Vietnamese Government and the educated people are well aware of the importance of the U.S. military protection afforded them through SEATO.

There are no U.S. "forces" in Viet-Nam as such but only a small number of MAAG and TERM personnel. A substantial reduction in the size of these missions would be viewed with concern by the Vietnamese government and well-informed Vietnamese citizens. In spite of the presence of thousands of French troops in the past, the average Vietnamese does not appear to dislike foreign servicemen nor to resent their presence in the country. Among the educated classes there is some antipathy toward the idea of foreign forces being stationed in Viet-Nam, but the total number of American military in the country is so small and it is so relatively inconspicuous that the total impact has been negligible. The relationship of MAAG personnel with the local population and with the Government of Viet-Nam is generally good. The most obvious measure which could be taken to allay local resentments is to send only high quality personnel into Viet-Nam. All personnel to serve in Viet-Nam should be selected with greatest care after a thorough examination of their records. It would also be wise to keep the operation as inconspicuous as possible but at the same time to develop effective public relations and to seek ways by which MAAG might contribute support through existing facilities to local civic and social activities.

Americans in Viet-Nam generally enjoy a vastly higher standard of living than the average Vietnamese, but there is likewise a great difference between the standards of living of well-to-do Vietnamese

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and the European community on the one hand and the average man on the other. The difference in standards of living is not believed to be a significant cause of resentment against Americans as a group. Many Europeans and wealthy Vietnamese and Chinese also drive American cars, and the Americans have not been singled out for criticism on this point. Fortunately, there have been few traffic accidents involving U.S. service personnel and consequently few opportunities for local critics to use this as an issue.

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SECRETVIET-NAM**C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES****1. Common Problems****a. Problem -- Personnel Factors**

To ensure that U.S. personnel and their dependents stationed overseas are positively motivated and sufficiently knowledgeable of the language, culture, laws, and mores of host countries to create a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. Government and its people.

**Practices**

(1) An orientation course has been established for official members of the American community and for their dependents.

(2) Agencies have exercised care to select only the highest quality personnel for service in Viet-Nam and to give them and their dependents all possible orientation before departure and on a continuing basis in Viet-Nam.

**b. Problem -- Local Economy**

To ensure that U.S. personnel and operations superimposed on the local economy make a reasonable contribution or do not cause an undue strain.

**Practice**

American agencies have tried to maintain wage schedules for Vietnamese employees based on local rates, but there has been unavoidable competition for employees of all kinds with a resultant rise in wages. The expanding Vietnamese economy is perhaps as much responsible for this as the presence of MAAG.

**c. Problem -- U.S. Vehicles**

To minimize resentment against U.S. personnel created by their ownership and use of American-made vehicles.

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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

Practice

Military vehicles used by U.S. agencies have been repainted in non-military colors, and steps have been taken to reduce the number of U.S. official vehicles carrying diplomatic license plates.

d. Problem -- Community Relations

To ensure favorable relations between U.S. personnel and the local community.

Practices

(1) CHMAAG encourages U.S. personnel to take an interest in Vietnamese children, to compete in sports, and to cooperate in a variety of charitable activities. Examples of these activities are:

Vietnamese children's parties in military messes.

Sports competition in volley ball and soft ball.

Charitable contributions of military families to hospitals, flood disaster victims, orphanages, and leprosariums.

(2) Attendance by U.S. officials at Vietnamese official ceremonies.

(3) Promotion of better adjustment between U.S. personnel and the Vietnamese is directly related to the effective lowering of the language barrier. French is widely used, especially in official circles and the upper social strata, but the rise of nationalistic spirit in this newly independent people has created an intense interest on the part of the local population in learning English. The agencies have organized and conducted English courses, principally for Vietnamese military personnel and local employees of the agencies. In FY 1956 over 1,000 officers and men took a three-months MAAG-sponsored course. Instructors are for the most part American community wives, and the program is administered by the Vietnamese-American Association. In addition, MAAG advisors in the field are encouraged to conduct informal English classes on a voluntary basis during their off-duty hours.

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C. PROBLEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES (continued)

(4) Display of the U. S. flag on buildings and vehicles has been restricted to a minimum.

(5) Metal property signs bearing facsimiles of the U. S. flag which were posted on residential property during the war years have been removed.

2. Problems Peculiar to Viet-Nam

None reported.

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SECRETSUMMARY OF OVERSEAS PERSONNEL IN DESIGNATED COUNTRIES 1/

	July 1, 1957			Estimated July 1, 1958			Net Changes		
	Military	Civilian 2/	Total	Military	Civilian 2/	Total	Military	Civilian 2/	Total
<b>GRAND TOTALS</b>	532,681	23,704	556,385	476,487	23,245	499,732	-56,194	- 459	-56,653
<u>COUNTRY</u>									
China (Taiwan)	3,646	223	3,869	3,760	308	4,068	+ 114	+ 85	+ 199
Ethiopia (including Eritrea)	1,024	204	1,228	1,031	251	1,282	+ 7	+ 47	+ 54
France	55,300	2,893	58,193	54,198	2,760	56,958	- 1,102	- 133	- 1,235
Germany	250,340	5,648	255,988	242,521	5,514	248,035	- 7,819	- 134	- 7,953
Greece	1,038	203	1,241	740	191	931	- 298	- 12	- 310
Iceland	5,326	252	5,578	4,983	273	5,256	- 343	+ 21	- 322
Indonesia	33	254	287	31	283	314	- 2	+ 29	+ 27
Iran	477	582	1,059	470	647	1,117	- 7	+ 65	+ 58
Italy	10,221	795	11,016	10,372	878	11,250	+ 151	+ 83	+ 234
Japan 3/	98,196	6,825	105,021	61,030	5,683	66,713	-37,166	-1,142	-38,308
Korea	69,823	1,054	70,877	55,119	1,365	56,484	-14,704	+ 311	-14,393
Libya	5,539	510	6,049	5,063	445	5,508	- 476	- 65	- 541
Morocco	12,511	1,105	13,616	10,963	932	11,895	- 1,548	- 173	- 1,721
Philippines	9,730	969	10,699	9,265	1,079	10,344	- 465	+ 110	- 355
Saudi Arabia	1,369	67	1,436	1,696	70	1,766	+ 327	+ 3	+ 330
Spain	2,769	679	3,448	8,186	794	8,980	+ 5,417	+ 115	+ 5,532
Thailand	403	520	923	391	526	917	- 12	+ 6	- 6
Turkey	4,210	469	4,679	5,886	593	6,479	+ 1,676	+ 124	+ 1,800
Viet-Nam	726	452	1,178	782	653	1,435	+ 56	+ 201	+ 257

1/ Excludes dependents which will be reported on June 30, 1958.

2/ U.S. citizen employees of State, ICA, USIA and Defense, including those employed under agency-financed contracts.

3/ The majority of Department of Defense personnel have been relocated elsewhere in the Pacific area, notably Okinawa.

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