October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF T	HE
NSC, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1962, 10:00 a.m.	
ALL MEMBERS PRESENT.	

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During the intelligence briefing, McCone distributed intelligence memorandum of 10/30, and read the attached summary, emphasizing that only three Bloc ships had left Havana in the last 36 hours, they being an East German passenger ship, the Soviet tanker BUCHAREST, and the Soviet tanker BAUSKA. McCone emphasized continue to report sabotage in Latin America, mentioning the Santiago bomb incident of yesterday in which a bomb was being manufactured to blow up U.S. Embassy but exploded prematurely killing the saboteur. Also	25X 25X
McCone specifically recommended that the guard corps at all U.S. Embassies and Consulates be alerted and increased and that an additional message of warning go to Ambassadors, station chiefs, and military attaches, alerting them to the danger.	
McCone reviewed the Watch Committee report of 10/30, and read the summary of the 9:00 a.m., 30 October report of the JAEIC/GMAIC Committee.	
McCone then reviewed attached notes covering Laos, South Vietnam,	,
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
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John A. McCone

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29 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the NSC - 29 October 1962 10:00 A.M.

All members present

In addition McCone reported on four items in the attached Special Intelligence report of 10/29.

During the meeting there was some discussion Castro would remain in Cuba with a greater, tather than less, security and this was a situation we must be careful of. After the meeting McCone met briefly

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with the President and Secretary Rusk and emphasized this point. I believe there is an alertness to this situation but the anxiety to get the missiles out of Cuba seems to overshadow the importance of the over-all Castro problem and of the Soviets' determination to pursue their attempt to subvert all of Latin America.

John A. McCone Director

Attachments:

2 pgs. penciled notes CIA Memo Watch Committee Report of 10/29 N. Y. Times article 10/29 Cline hand-written memo 10/29 Special Intell. Report 10/29

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26 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the NSC Executive Committee, 26 October, 1962

10:00 A.M.

IN ATTENDANCE: All members plus Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy

McCone gave an intelligence briefing which included reading the Watch Committee report of 10/26, distributing and highlighting an Intelligence Agency Memorandum of 10/26, copy of which was distributed; reviewing summary conclusions of GMAIC, JAEIC, NPIC Supplement #6; summarizing report on the prisoner exchange (OGC 62-2597); summarized CIA report on non-Bloc ships enroute to Cuba 10/26; and pointed out that non-Bloc ships could quite possibly carry Soviet arms and they would be just as secure as Soviet or Bloc ships if engaged on bare-boat charter; reviewed briefly Cuban internal reaction to the U.S. quarantine as contained in report of 10/26.

McCone also advised the President that plan for political organization of Cuba in event of an invasion was under study and would be considered at the 2:30 meeting.

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There followed an extended discussion of operational matters, details of which are covered in the attached notes.

McCone brought up the problem of the USS OXFORD as covered by Blake memorandum of October 25th, Serial N 1623. It was decided that the location and the security of the OXFORD should be part of the responsibility of the blockade operation and therefore should be considered by Admiral Anderson and his staff.

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JOHN A. McCONE Director

Attachment to original:
DCI's notes - 3 small sheets on
White House note paper

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