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26 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Report on Handling of Intelligence Information During the Cuban Arms Build-Up (Revised), dated 20 November 1962

REFERENCES : A. Subject report

B. Memo for the Special Group from Thomas A. Parrott, dated 11 September 1962; Subject: "Reconnaissance of Cuba"

C. Memo for A/DCI from James Q. Reber dated 9 September 1962, Subject: "Next U-2 Mission Over Cuba" [REDACTED]

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1. On 21 November you asked me to consider two additional conclusions for my report.

a. That the U-2 incidents in Sakhalin and China had caused a timidity in CIA and the intelligence community which affected the planning of Cuban overflight reconnaissance.

b. That CIA analysts failed to give sufficient weight to ground observer reports indicating offensive weapons in Cuba and that this lack of credence dulled CIA alertness to the threat.

2. As a result of the U-2 incidents in Sakhalin and China, extreme caution did exist in the community, which affected the planning of Cuban overflights. This caution was expressed by the Secretary of State at the 10 September 1962 meeting in Mr. Bundy's office (Reference B).

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3. We have been told by several Agency officers that there was a widespread understanding in CIA that overflights of known SAM sites were forbidden by the Special Group. I believe this understanding stemmed from the desires which Secretary Rusk expressed at the 10 September 1962 meeting in Mr. Bundy's office which was not in fact a duly constituted meeting of the Special Group. However, the records do not reveal that CIA pressed for additional missions or changes in coverage of overflights approved for September 1962.

4. The result of the Secretary's concern was the decision to give CIA approximately what it asked for in the way of overflight coverage but to require four flights instead of one in order to keep overflights separate from peripheral flights.

5. The aim of the mission for which CIA sought approval was a search for more SAM sites / [Redacted]

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[Redacted] (Ref. C., paragraph 1.) Targeting for the requested mission was based on evidence available on 10 September. The approvals granted were responsive to this aim. CIA had authority for four missions, and they were flown as rapidly as weather permitted. [Redacted] reports suggesting offensive missile preparations began to come in on 20 September, but there were not enough of them to permit sound analysis on which to base new targeting until after 1 October.

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6. Because of bad weather, the first mission after 10 September to bring back readable photography was flown [Redacted] By this time you had returned to Washington, and it was due to your request to the State Department that the [Redacted] mission was allowed to [Redacted]

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7. If the single mission proposed by CIA on 10 September had been approved it could not have been successfully flown until at least [Redacted] because of weather. (A [Redacted] mission was flown, but the photography was useless because of cloud cover). Even if a mission had been flown [Redacted] on [Redacted] that date was probably too early for the detection of MRBM preparations, as was also possibly [Redacted]

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8. [Redacted] reports accumulate which showed need for re-coverage of [Redacted] Cuba, which had not been photographed since [Redacted] This need [Redacted]

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was recognized in the COMOR recommendations of 5 October which resulted in the [] flight. (Ref. A, Annex D)

9. As noted in Paragraph 2, above, and as documented in Reference B, caution on the part of the Secretary of State did affect planning of overflight reconnaissance of Cuba from []

[] The effect was this: splitting the proposed mission into four separate segments lengthened the period of time necessary to accomplish the approved program. Weather further contributed to this delay. The period of time during which the western part of Cuba was not covered by aerial photography was greatly lengthened.

10. Therefore I am adding the following conclusion as Paragraph 12l, d., of my report:

d. That extreme caution with regard to U-2 flights following the incidents in Sakhalin and China, affected the planning of Cuban reconnaissance overflights during

11. In paragraphs 74 et seq. of the 20 November Inspector General report (Ref. A), we said that some CIA officers found the [] reports of offensive build-up hard to believe. In paragraphs 85 et seq. we cited one example in which editorial interpretation intruded at the reporting level. In one of our conclusions (para. 12l. b.), we stated that analysts were skeptical of CIA reporting. I believe the evidence justifies our strengthening this conclusion.

12. Paragraph 12l. b., of the 20 November report stated (we conclude):

b. That limited use was made of the information available because of publication restrictions, aggravated by coordination problems, and because analysts were skeptical of CIA reporting.

We are replacing this sub-paragraph with the following:

b. That limited use was made of the information available because of publication restrictions, which were aggravated by coordination problems, and, because officers, in CIA as well as other agencies, were skeptical of [] reporting,

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that this skepticism may have delayed the community's realization of the true significance of the Cuban arms build-up.

13. A page incorporating the new sub-paragraphs has been placed in your copy of the report.

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J. P. Earman
Inspector General

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
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
11 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP


SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of Cuba

At a meeting in Mr. Bundy's office yesterday, attended by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence and others, the Secretary expressed concern at the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage 

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 He felt, however, that it is unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters, with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the U. S. in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

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Taking these views into account, the Agency plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts 

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


Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority is currently outstanding. (Priority will be given to the two overflights.)

/Signed/
Thomas A. Parrott

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Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
General Carter



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


9 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Next U-2 Mission Over Cuba


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1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has now reviewed the information obtained from the last U-2 reconnaissance of Cuba . Unfortunately weather precluded photography of the 

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2. The Committee recommends that another U-2 mission be flown as soon as weather permits to cover  other targets mentioned above and identified on the attached map.

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/signed/
James Q. Reber
Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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- 1-A/DCI
- 2-A/DCI
- 3-AD/OSA
- 4-DD/R
- 6-RI/OSA
- 7-C/SRS

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