


7 January 1963


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
Director, Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff

1. On 3 January the United States Intelligence Board, in executive session, concurred with a proposal by the Director of Central Intelligence that he advise the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that the report on the Cuban arms build-up (14 April through 14 October 1962) submitted on 26 December should be considered the final report.
2. A copy of the DCI's memorandum to the Chairman of the President's Board is attached.
3. The page designating the report as a draft should be removed from each copy in your hands.


Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Attachment
DCI memorandum to Dr. Killian

S E C R E T



C-O-P-Y

7 January 1963


Memorandum for: Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

The report which you requested on 14 November concerning the U. S. foreign intelligence effort in connection with the Cuban arms build-up (14 April through 14 October 1962) was forwarded to you on 26 December.

On 3 January an executive session of the United States Intelligence Board concurred with my proposal that the report be considered final. Therefore the page designating the report as a draft should be removed from each copy in the hands of your board.

/signed/

JOHN A. McCONE



S E C R E T

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

25X1



7 January 1963


MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT : Interim Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated
December 28, 1962

Attached is a copy of a memorandum on the subject from the
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
requesting the coordinated views and comments on the six recom-
mendations in the subject report of the President's Board.


In accordance with the attached memorandum, I would appreciate
your consideration of those aspects of the subject report which
fall within the areas of your respective responsibilities, in order
that I may obtain an appropriate contribution by your departments
in the preparation of a response.

Since the subject report stems from the report regarding
Cuba which I submitted to the President's Board on 26 December 1962,
I propose that the response to the attached request from Mr. Bundy
be developed by the same Steering Committee which prepared that
previous report, composed under my chairmanship of the CIA, State,
DIA and NSA members of USIB. As in the preceding case, I am
asking General Carter to establish a working group in CIA with
assistance from other agencies (including NRO) to provide the
staffing required in the preparation of the response for consider-
ation by the Steering Committee and coordination with you.


JOHN A. McCONE
Director

cc: USIB Principals
Director, NRO


Attachment



25X1

25X1

Copy 15 of 50



THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Interim Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated
December 28, 1962

In the enclosed interim report to the President dated December 28, 1962, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has submitted six recommendations growing out of the Board's study of general problem areas concerned with the future direction of certain aspects of the over-all foreign intelligence effort of the United States.

Before taking action on the Board's recommendations, the President would like to have you present the coordinated views and comments of the departments and agencies primarily concerned. Accordingly, it is requested that the desired views and comments be provided to this office and to the President's Board by January 21, 1963.

Upon receipt of the views and comments I intend to bring up for discussion in the Special NSC 5412/2 Group those aspects of the Board's report which appear to fall within the particular interest of that Group, including Recommendation No. 3 and No. 5.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

25X1

TOP SECRET

ILLEGIB

25X1

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

December 28, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board first learned on October 22 of the positive identification of the Soviet offensive ballistic missile threat in Cuba, the Board has been conducting an extensive review of the adequacy and timeliness of the collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence on the Cuba buildup by the United States intelligence community in the months preceding your address to the Nation on October 22. While the Board is making substantial progress in this review, it will not be in a position to draw final conclusions or to make final recommendations to you until it completes the review of a report from the Director of Central Intelligence which it requested on November 14, and which calls for a comprehensive all-source, community-wide study by the several intelligence agencies concerned. Although the Director of Central Intelligence supplied an advance draft of his report on December 26, 1962, the final report has not as yet been received by the Board. When we have received the final report and have had an opportunity to complete our own study, we will submit the results of the Board's detailed analysis.

25X1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9

In the interim, on the basis of information we have had an opportunity to consider, we have identified certain problem areas which we suggest are deserving of your attention. Our observations and recommendations regarding these problem areas are concerned more with the future direction of certain aspects of our over-all intelligence effort than with any after-the-fact assessment of specific intelligence community activities relating to the military buildup in Cuba. Our observations and recommendations are made in clear recognition of the success thus far achieved in effecting withdrawal from Cuba of selected elements of Soviet offensive weaponry.

1. Great uncertainties about present Soviet efforts in Cuba indicate the necessity of a continuing, aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate information to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontations in Cuba. We must resist any tendency toward a let-down in our intelligence effort against Cuba in the wake of intelligence successes resulting from our military reconnaissance missions over the island. In making this observation we are mindful that, in a quite different atmosphere, the Central Intelligence Agency did not mount effective clandestine intelligence collection operations in Cuba for an eight-month period following the Bay of Pigs invasion.

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9

2. We recommend intensified, hard-hitting efforts to increase our capability for obtaining significant intelligence through clandestine collection operations (espionage). Despite noteworthy intelligence results obtainable through scientific and technical means, we still have as great a need as ever for carefully selected, human-resource espionage operations, professionally executed on the basis of the soundest planning judgments and the most competent target selection processes which the intelligence community can achieve.

25X1



TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9

Events of the past few years suggest that dramatic advances in advanced intelligence methods such as high altitude and satellite photography have obscured the role of human beings as collection and transmission media, trained and equipped with the most sophisticated technical aids, and supported by essential logistics and communications. We are gravely concerned about the progressive

25X1

3. We recommend, while it is still possible, continued high-level and low-level (as required) aerial reconnaissance of Cuba as one means of acquiring photographic and signals intelligence concerning the military installations, the military forces, the modern military weaponry and the highly sophisticated communications facilities which the Soviets retain in Cuba. This surveillance effort must be accompanied by priority planning for the development of acceptable substitutes (such as drones, improved satellite reconnaissance, etc.) in lieu of present aerial reconnaissance coverage, when and if such coverage is denied us by air defense systems now being installed by the Soviets in Cuba on a scale

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800050001-9