

25 YEAR
RE-REVIEW

*Background Material
of 2 November*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum



THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

2 November 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

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2 November 1962

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Soviet offensive missile units are closing down their launch sites in Cuba and removing their equipment, but the assembly of IL-28 bombers is continuing.

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missiles and basic launching equipment have been removed from all the MRBM launch areas. Camouflage has been taken down and support vehicles assembled for movement. The launch sites have been partially destroyed, apparently by bulldozing.

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Construction at the IRBM sites has stopped and some of the installations at Guanajay have been destroyed. Work on the probable nuclear warhead bunkers apparently has also ceased.

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None of the Soviet cargo ships now in Cuba has hatches and holds suitable for handling IRBMs or MRBMs. The seven ships which we believe delivered the missiles to Cuba could return to Cuba between 16 and 25 November. Loading of the missiles after the ships' return would probably take about a week.

in contrast to the dismantling of the missile sites, there has been further progress in the assembly of IL-28 bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield.

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Monitors agree that Castro appeared nervous and hesitant last night during the major portion of his radio-TV speech, reading a transcript of his talks with U Thant. He was somewhat more confident and forceful in the concluding part when he spoke in his customary extemporaneous manner. Throughout the speech he appeared to belch frequently. As reported in the press, Castro reiterated his "five points," stressing the demand for evacuation of Guantanamo; announced the USSR had "some time ago" canceled all Cuban obligations for arms; and claimed Cuba still has "powerful means of

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defence since all but "strategic weapons" were to remain in Cuba. He said Khrushchev's decision gave his regime "reason for discontent," but added: "We respected the decision since these weapons were not under our command." He confined Cuban refusal of inspection to the transcript of his talks with U Thant.

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During the entire crisis period, there have been only scattered and minor

internal resistance or sabotage activities.

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One instance,

involved the cutting of a telephone wire from a Soviet "base" in Camaguey province, possibly a SAM site or related barracks area.

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reported the Cuban population is "inert, depressed, and pessimistic."

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indicates that the hopes and expectations of anti-Castro Cubans showed some tendency to rise with the failure of the U Thant mission.

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that officials in the Cuban foreign ministry were "subdued," and very sensitive to any mention of the Soviet role in recent events. said three middle-rank officials in the Ministry of Industries appeared "outraged" at the ridiculous role Cuba had played and considered the offer by Khrushchev to trade Cuban for Turkish bases especially humiliating. They felt the whole episode showed the bankruptcy of Castro's policies, and said Cuba would sooner or later have to come to terms with the US under a modified leadership. noted, however, that less well educated Cubans are being influenced by Castro's propaganda, which is seeking to make recent events look almost like a Cuban victory.

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Cuban exile leaders report the Cuban community in Florida to be depressed, heartsick, and convinced that the only hope is to provoke Castro "into some mad action."

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[redacted] in the Communist parties of Chile and Uruguay report continuing evidence of a decline in Soviet and Cuban prestige among Latin American Communists and other pro-Castro groups as a result of the events of the past week.

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[redacted] indicates that Castro might modify his rejection of international inspection in Cuba if such inspection were also to cover other territories in the Caribbean area where Cuban exiles might be training.

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BLOC DEVELOPMENTS

We have no reports as of 0700 EST on the New York conversations of Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan.

There has been no significant change in Moscow's propaganda treatment of the situation. Soviet media continue to emphasize that the USSR is strictly honoring Khrushchev's pledges to President Kennedy. Moscow claims Cuba is ready to cooperate with the UN in working out a peaceful settlement, and continues to show sensitivity to foreign views that Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missiles was a sign of weakness.

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Moscow has denounced the resumption of the US quarantine and charged that "unprecedented war hysteria" still prevails in the US.

Soviet commentators yesterday became markedly warmer in support of Castro's five demands, but they carefully avoided any suggestion that a settlement is contingent on US acceptance of these demands. A Moscow broadcast to Cuba endorsed Castro's position that the US must halt the quarantine, economic sanctions, subversive activities, and overflights. Moscow hedged, however, on Castro's demand for the return of the Guantanamo naval base, saying only that this question "should be decided by negotiations."

The Chinese Communists have, in effect, urged Castro to resist Soviet pressures for an early settlement. A note delivered to the Cuban chargé in Peiping rejected as an "imperialist viewpoint" the suggestion that Cuban demands should be ignored in a settlement between the "big powers." Peiping promised resolute support "regardless of how complicated the circumstances may be."

At a meeting of the presidium of the World Peace Council in Stockholm, the Chinese delegate [redacted] characterized Soviet behavior in the Cuban crisis as "cowardly."

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BLOC MILITARY STATUS

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No significant changes have been noted in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces.

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Although much of the military force probably remains in a state of precautionary readiness, some signs of normalcy have been noted. Western attachés now have traveled through key rail junctions in Belorussia and from Helsinki to Moscow through Leningrad without observing any unusual military activity or rail movements. Some military personnel may be on leave in the Leningrad area. Elements of two Polish army divisions probably are continuing to aid in the harvest. There are continued indications that the Soviets may proceed with the normal year-end release of GSFG military personnel.

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There are indications that a relatively large-scale exercise is impending in the Sea of Okhotsk, where submarines have deployed.

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SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

Two bloc ships which have been lying dead in the water near the quarantine line have resumed their courses and now are within the quarantine zone en route to Cuba. These are the Soviet dry-cargo ship BELOVODSK, which is being

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accompanied by a US destroyer, and the Soviet tanker GROZNY. The Czech dry-cargo ship KLADNO, which stopped near the line for several days, has not returned from her rendezvous off Bermuda with the East German passenger ship VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT. The Soviet tanker MIR crossed the quarantine line at about 0100 EST.

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There now are 13 bloc ships en route to Cuba. The latest additions are the Soviet dry-cargo ship ZYRYANIN, with general cargo from the Black Sea, and the tanker BALAKLAVA, with a cargo of crude oil from the Baltic.

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ANNEX

NUMBER OF SHIPS REQUIRED TO REMOVE
SOVIET WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM CUBA

1. We believe the main components of the Soviet offensive weapons systems now in Cuba (as defined by Presidential Proclamation 3504 of 23 October) could be returned to the USSR in a total of 20 to 25 shiploads.

2. The MRBM and IRBM equipment presents the most formidable shipping task. We do not know exactly how many trips were required to deliver the missiles now in Cuba, but believe that their return will require between five and eight trips with ships having hatches large enough to permit stowage of the ballistic missiles. The principal components of the missile systems probably would amount to about another four shiploads. Some of the supporting construction equipment such as bulldozers, trucks, and cranes probably would be left behind, inasmuch as Cuba is receiving such equipment as economic aid.

3. The 29 BEAGLE (IL-28) jet bombers known to be in Cuba probably were delivered by three ships, and could be returned by the same number.

4. The 12 KOMAR guided-missile boats now in Cuba arrived as deck cargo on four separate ships, two carrying two each, and two others carrying four each. Thus three or at the most four trips would suffice to evacuate this equipment; the missile and support gear would fit easily in the holds of the ships carrying the KOMARs on deck.

5. We believe the three identified cruise-type coastal defense missile installations could be sent back in three shiploads.

Missiles:	5	to	3
Missile installations:	4		
Jet bombers:	3		
KOMAR ships:	3	to	4
Coast Defense Missiles:	3		
Total:	18	to	22 shiploads

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Summary

THE SITUATION IN CUBA

1. [redacted] Soviet missile units in Cuba are in fact closing down their launch sites, removing equipment, and bulldozing the installations. We don't know yet just where the equipment which has been removed is being taken.

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[redacted]

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3. Castro seemed nervous during a large part of his speech last night, but this could be because he was reading instead of speaking extemporaneously as usual.

[redacted]

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5. Regime Cubans are so angry over the withdrawal of Soviet missiles that three officials in one ministry told [redacted] Cuba is going to have to come to terms with the US under a modified leadership.

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[redacted]

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7. [redacted] reported Cuba might consider international inspection if it applies to possible Caribbean training sites of Cuban exiles as well.

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8. Soviet propoganda is giving some support to Castro's demands for broader guarantees from the United States, but is weaker on his demand for Guantanamo, Moscow claims Cuba will cooperate with the UN in working out a peaceful settlement.

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9. A Chinese delegate at the World Peace Council presidium in Stockholm is supposed to have referred to Soviet behavior in Cuba as "cowardly." [REDACTED]

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10. There are no significant changes in bloc military readiness. Western attachés have done some traveling in Belorussia and through Leningrad without noting anything unusual.

11. Soviet ships are moving again. Three have crossed the quarantine line, and 10 more are en route.

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**SPECIAL DAILY WATCH REPORT
of the
USIB WATCH COMMITTEE**

No. 10

As of 0800, 2 November 1962

We conclude:

a. that, except for developments in Cuba, there has been no significant change in the readiness status or positioning of Soviet Bloc armed forces since our last report.

[Redacted]

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b. that the Soviets are dismantling the known strategic missile sites in Cuba. The present location of the removed missiles and equipment is unknown.

[Redacted]

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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER

NIC No. 2-0867

Room BC 956
Pentagon

Copy 26 of 45 Copies

1 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WATCH COMMITTEE MEMBERS

SUBJECT: Warning Problems During Soviet "Holiday" Period, 3-10 November

1. Monitoring and assessing activities of the Soviet armed forces, particularly Long Range Aviation (LRA), is a critical aspect of the Watch Committee's mission during the present period. In the coming week to 10 days, i.e., during the October Revolution holidays, our normal warning capability, such as it is, will probably be further restricted. If the Soviet forces follow past patterns there will appear a marked decline in military activity [redacted]

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[redacted] The LRA can be expected at times to reach the status of a virtual stand-down. During the holiday period we will in effect be "blind" for some days as to possible Soviet intent to prepare the LRA for rapid offensive action or to deploy heavy bombers (or other forces) under cover of what we are conditioned to accept as a "normal" holiday. Considering the pattern of LRA activity to date, and in view of the current critical situation, the possibility of such a move must be seriously considered by the Watch.

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2. It is recommended that all collection assets of the Watch agencies be alerted for particularly vigilant coverage of and rapid reporting on Bloc military activities during at least the period 3-10 November. The Committee should also consider the need for instituting extraordinary collection measures during this period.

[redacted signature box]

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Director

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[Redacted]

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We would anticipate from the pattern of LRA activity in previous years that a period of very low levels of activity can be expected during the October Revolution holidays, at times approaching a virtual standdown. Such a development, should it occur during the present period of tensions, will render it more difficult than usual to detect possible Soviet intent to utilize this period to bring LRA units to an even higher state of operational readiness, or to detect initial deployments under maximum communications security.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Since LRA normally maintains a certain degree of readiness and, therefore, could move into a high state of readiness with little or no detection, Soviet deception tactics could seriously affect our capability

[Redacted]

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McCone

General Carter asked that the attached paper from Pete Scoville be brought to your attention immediately.

W. Elder

2 November
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
AUG 62 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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
2 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: Executive Committee of the NSC - Meeting 11:00 a.m. on
2 November 1962**

The President opened the meeting by expressing concern of Roland Evans' article in the Herald Tribune of this morning and again reported that no one should talk to the Press except Salinger, Sylvester and State Press representative.

McCone reviewed the CIA Memorandum as summarized in the attached summary, the Watch Committee Report and the Memorandum for Watch Committee members NIC #2-0867




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This was followed by reports of Ball and Gilpatrick on developments in the UN which followed the telegraphic reports received in the DCI's office prior to the meeting.

Further actions and decisions of the meeting are covered in penciled notes attached.

The CIA was requested to prepare an immediate report on the effectiveness of the blockade, i.e. the number of ships which have been stopped or turned back, those boarded and allowed to pass and the shipping which has proceeded through the blockade unmolested. The purpose is to have an appraisal of the effectiveness of the blockade and some indication of its effect on the Cuban economy, if any.



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JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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Attachments to report of Executive Committee Meeting 11:00, 2 Nov. 1962

**4 pages penciled notes
1 page brief re Cambodia-South Vietnam
1 page brief re Laos**



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**Summary - Situation in Cuba 2 Nov. 62
Watch Comm. Report 2 Nov 62 (No. 10)
Memo for Watch Comm members NIC 2-0867**



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