

PRESS

Evening Star, "Why Fly There?" 26 July 1960

Reference to the RB-47 which was downed on 1 July:

"A larger question, it seems to us, has to do with the reasons for sending American planes and American crews into such dangerous areas. This plane was supposed to be mapping magnetic currents as part of a long-standing program. Assuming no espionage activity, why was this work important enough to risk plane and crew 30 or even 50 miles from Soviet territory?"

New York Herald Tribune, "resents Spy Plane Lie," by Leo Sillard,  
10 May 1960

"To me it seemed that political considerations are more important in this case than either legal or military considerations and several years ago, when the issue first came up in private conversations, I pleaded the need of taking them fully into account."

New York Herald Tribune, "The U-2 Again," 9 September 1962

"Another U-2 incident touched off a flurry of diplomatic correspondence Tuesday when the Soviet Union charged one of the high-flying American planes had violated its Far Eastern frontier. The Russians said a 'provocation' had been committed by a U-2 flight over Sakhalin Island, north of Japan off Siberia's Pacific coast.

"The State Department, indicating there were to be no echoes of the Francis Gary Powers flight, fielded the Soviet protest with decision and expedition. Within four and a half hours the United States had a reply ready. Its substance: That this country had not altered its policy that bans overflights, that the violation was unintentional and caused by high winds, that it was an Air Force aircraft, and that precautions would be taken in the future. Washington termed the reply an explanation and not an apology, but it was obvious that an extra effort had been made to tone the matter down."

Tab C  
Page 2

Mission 3101 was considered from 10 to 12 October. The weather was checked daily but there was no alert.

On 12 October operational control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was transferred to SAC. Weather precluded a mission on 13 October.

Mission 3101 was flown by SAC on 14 October. This was the flight that discovered the presence of MRBM's.

New York Post, "Setback in the Sky," 9 May 1960

"The intimation that some subordinate officer would sanction so hazardous an adventure without the awareness and approval of the President is perhaps the most appalling aspect of the event. What has happened has hurt us badly enough; but the excursion might have produced a far more fateful accident if some zealous Bolshevik had identified our intelligence agent as a carrier of atomic bombs. Who would be around to analyze the misunderstanding?"

New York Post, "Mr. K's Circus," 13 May 1960

"Free-wheeling intelligence spooks, nervous military strategists, single-minded physicists and just garden-variety know-nothings with fingers itching for the panic buttons are numerous on both sides, which makes the world infinitely more accident-prone than ever before in history."

New York Times, "Red China Raises Mystery Over U-2,"  
11 September 1962

"The Peiping radio continued to announce the shooting down of the plane. The wording was similar to a statement issued by Hsinhua, the new China press agency, which said:

"A United States-made U-2 plane of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit group intruded into the airspace of East China on the morning of Sept. 9 and was shot down by the air force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army."

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "Investigate!" 9 May 1960

"It is easy enough to say that everybody engages in espionage and that the only misfortune is in getting caught. But aerial mapping of bombing targets is something different from the ordinary run of espionage. It is the kind of action we would bitterly resent if applied to us. It is the kind of action that is appropriate to wartime, or brink of wartime, but is highly provocative at any other time. Congress ought to find out whether the results obtained justify the hazards run."

Wall Street Journal, "Review and Outlook, Playing with Matches,"  
9 May 1960

"Sending a cloak-and-dagger operative into Russia to pick up papers is one thing. Sending an unidentified plane far into Russia is quite another. A cloak-and-dagger operative could hardly start retaliatory missiles on their way. A plane, even unarmed, might."

"So while we are as mindful as anyone of the need for intelligence about what goes on inside Russia, it still seems to us that somebody is playing with matches. There may be reasons having to do with national defense that require us to do that. But when you start striking sparks around a tinder box you run a grave risk of starting a fire."

Wall Street Journal, "Review and Outlook, Reflections on an Incident," 16 May 1960

"The next world war, if it comes, can come as well from bungling as from design. An adventurous American, a trigger-happy Russian, a moment of panic-- these can easily be the seeds of holocaust. And just because we can understand the panic that would come from Russian planes over Kansas City, we need have anxiety about American planes over Sverdlovsk."

Washington Post, "Iron Curtains Are Obsolete," 10 May 1960

"All such activities are provocative. Those conducted with aircraft, however, contain an exceptional element of danger, and for that reason the incident of the espionage plane is particularly serious. There is always the possibility that aerial excursions of this sort will trigger a clash through misunderstanding or even set off a major retaliatory attack."

Washington Post, "Distasteful but Necessary," 12 May 1960

"Such flights, from whatever source, are perilous and provocative."



ALBRIGHT, ROBERT C.

Washington Post, "Secret Session About Plane Reflected Calm  
Earnestness," 11 May 1960

"It was suggested that the local area men made their decision on the flight purely on the basis of good weather conditions -- without any thought of the impending summit meeting or the international havoc a miscarriage might cause."

KROCK, ARTHUR

New York Times, "In the Nation, The Enigmas in the Pilot Powers Case," 10 May 1960

"The final corollary conclusions sufficiently supported by this record are that coordination of policy and act has not yet been attained by the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board, even in connection with procedures involving the peril of initiating nuclear war; and that there are vital missing links between the President and his authorized agents."

New York Times, "In the Nation, Has Mr. K. Heard of an Old English Proverb?" 13 May 1960

"The situation included incidental demonstration to the American people that espionage flights have become so much a matter of routine that Washington intelligence authorities permit them to continue without regard to their potential impact on such contrary policy gestures as the oncoming summit conference. And it was compounded for our allies by the State Department's retraction and 'confession.'"

LIPPMANN, WALTER

Washington Post, "Today and Tomorrow, The Spy Plane,"  
10 May 1960

"Why, then, knowing that such flights were being made, did the President fail to realize the risks of continuing them right up to the meeting at the summit?"

RESTON, JAMES

New York Times, "Washington, How to Make Things Worse Than They Really Are," 8 May 1960

"The reason for this is that the element of accident in this kind of world is frightening. Few people believe in a calculated nuclear war. What worries our allies and many of our own officials is the accidental incident touched off by some human failing of mind or character or judgment."

New York Times, "Washington, What Kind of President Do You Want? -- III," 11 May 1960

"Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, lies the explanation of the spy-plane confusion. The field operator was given 'maximum scope.' There was an 'agreed strategy' in Washington, but the specific operation was not authorized by the President, or even on the President's mind until the crash.

"The President, in short, was loyal to his subordinates and to his principles of administration, but the tragedy is that he 'did not impose his own insights, his own sense of direction in the nation's policy.'"

New York Times, 18 May 1960 (Found in Congressional Record - Senate, 19 May 1960)

"Nevertheless, the lack of control and discipline over the Central Intelligence Agency by General Eisenhower, and the failure of the State Department to retain civil authority over the administration's intelligence-gathering activities have inevitably shaken the confidence of the allies in the judgment of the Nation that is their primary line of defense."

TAB