

POSSIBLE WORLD CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION

The consequences of military action may be considered under two headings: First, the effect on our alliances; and second, possible Sino-Soviet responses at various vulnerable points around the world.

1. Effect on Alliances

The effect of military action on our Alliances would depend to a considerable extent upon accompanying diplomatic moves, both prior and subsequent. The key elements would be the degree of consultation with our allies; the nature of the notice given to our allies; the opportunity given to both Castro and Khrushchev to take present military attack by making adequate concessions; and, finally, the nature of any measures taken simultaneously with military action or immediately thereafter to bring about consultation with the Soviet Union. Also relevant would be the character and severity of the military action itself.

If little or no opportunity were provided for consultation with our allies -- or alternatively if they were given only brief advance notice of our action -- the chances of damage to our alliances would be greatly enhanced. Moreover, if we were to act not only without consulting our allies but also without providing either the Cubans or Russians with an

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opportunity to avoid attack, we might put ourselves in the eyes of the world in a position similar to that of Britain and France at the time of Suez -- with irrevocable harm both to NATO and the OAS.

A. Effect on NATO

Unless adequate political preparations were made prior to military action we could not expect to receive sympathy or support from any of the major NATO powers. If the Soviet Union were to respond vigorously -- for example, by moving against Berlin -- the United States might be held responsible in European eyes for having endangered its allies in a reckless manner.

European nations are clearly not sympathetic with the United States position regarding Cuba. They regard our reaction to the recent Soviet buildup as hysteria; many have argued that our national preoccupation with Cuba proves that we are not fully responsible and should not have such a large influence in deciding the fate of the Free World. Since the Europeans live with 400 MRBM's pointed at them every day, they cannot be persuaded that the location of a few batteries of MRBM's in Cuba is a serious military threat to the United States. For us to respond to that threat by unilateral military action

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would seem to them, therefore, out of all proportion to the provocation and a reckless act endangering the peace of the world.

We might expect Khrushchev to seek to capitalize on this European reaction. He would try to increase the division and disarray of the West.

To an extent, of course, the European reaction would depend on the speed and decisiveness of the military action as well as on its character, i.e., whether limited or general. It would also depend to some extent upon the steps we might take to follow up that action -- that is, whether or not we would seek immediate discussion with the Soviet Union.

B. The OAS

The shock of United States action against Cuba might well result in the Communist takeover of several Latin American Governments. (Develop).

2. Possible Sino-Soviet Responses

A. Berlin

If we were to take military action against Cuba, Khrushchev might well respond with direct military action against Berlin. His temptation to do so would be affected by

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two circumstances. First, the extent of the apparent disarray in the NATO Alliance; and second, the degree to which we had committed United States forces to Cuba. If the effect of our action were to produce a considerable appearance of division within NATO, Khrushchev might well believe that he could safely move against Berlin -- particularly if he joined this action with some diplomatic gestures toward West Germany and possibly Britain and France. If we should have -- as it is estimated we might have in the event of an invasion of Cuba -- 90 to 150 thousand men immobilized, Khrushchev could well feel that he could move against Berlin without danger of effective American military resistance.

B. Turkey

Khrushchev could argue, in a manner that might persuade a substantial part of world opinion, that if the United States found it intolerable to have MRBM's near its borders in Cuba, he could not accept to have MRBM's on Soviet borders in Turkey. He might, therefore, attempt a quick strike at Turkey.

C. Iran

Khrushchev might also attempt to justify some aggressive action against Iran on the ground that it also contains US

installations

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installations on the borders of the Soviet Union. Iran would be a much smaller bite since it is not a NATO member and does not itself possess a military capability comparable to that of Turkey.

D. North Korea

(Develop)

E. Quemoy and Matsu

With or without goading from Khrushchev, the CHICOMS might well regard an American action against Cuba as providing the excuse for a movement against Quemoy and Matsu -- or possibly even against Formosa.

F. Other Possibilities

One cannot rule out the possibility of Soviet action against Pakistan or a Soviet move against Finland and even Norway.



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POLITICAL ACTIONS

There are few political actions remaining to be taken with respect to Cuba or the Soviet Union that are both possible, likely to have an effect on their policies, or that would look too meaningful to the public.

Brief comments are given on seven possibilities. There are various ways in which they might be combined; in other words, they are not mutually exclusive alternatives; nevertheless, in combination or individually they are unimpressive. They are not listed in any order of priority.

1. Attempt to negotiate coexistence pact with Castro on basis renunciation by him of ties to Soviets and aggressive designs in Latin America in return for return to OAS, inclusion in AFP and resumption of sugar purchases.

While over time there may be developments which would lead Castro to consider such a deal, the time has not arrived. Nor is it likely that the U. S. people or those of many other Hemisphere countries are prepared to forgive and forget as soon. A trial period is not practicable because Castro cannot afford to cut off Soviet bloc economic support until he has a sure and ~~alternative~~ alternative.

2. A stepped up campaign to isolate Cuba from non-bloc trade and air and sea contacts.

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While this new development will certainly help secure cooperation from both OAS and NATO countries in this regard, there is still no prospect of unanimity, and anything short of that has limited ~~your~~ practical and political effect. Moreover, even complete isolation would not add intolerably to Soviet costs for Cuba, costs which she may be expected to be more willing to pay than in the past, now that Cuba will have become a major issue in the cold war.

3. Call a meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Pact to authorize unilateral or collective military action against Cuba in view of the new threat there against the whole Caribbean area, and urge constant and open surveillance of military bases in Cuba from air over Cuba.

Such action might be possible, but hardly by unanimous votes, and hemispheric solidarity might be strained. Substantially it adds relatively little to authority already possessed. It would have value primarily as a preliminary to military actions and there would be disappointment if it did not follow. Hence it is more a price of a military program than a political action.

4. U.S. missiles should be targeted on key points in Cuba, military primarily, but perhaps also Habana, and U.S. should threaten to fire unless MRBM capability eliminated.

This is a bluff which might well be called, with disastrous
fired
results. If we/~~that~~ we would at most start a nuclear war, at least be denounced by three-fourths of the world for nuclear barbarity toward

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Cuban

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7. Arrange immediate summit talks.

While there can be no guarantee that such talks would accomplish the elimination of MRBM's in Cuba except at the expense of concessions we would be unwilling to make, and Cuba might not even be the major subject of discussion, the unusually provocative behavior of the Soviets in pushing this program despite our warnings and despite assurances they were doing nothing of the kind, suggests the desirability from a global standpoint of some plain and direct talk. In terms of our world posture and ~~prestige~~ prestige as well as our position at home, such talks would be no substitute for some action with respect to the new military threat from Cuba, but, initiated by us as our sole response, could well be regarded by many as appeasement.

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COURSE A.

(POLITICAL ACTION IN SUPPORT OF MAJOR MILITARY ACTION)

SCENARIO

1. Send senior American official emissary to Castro.
(This could be done by Pan American flight from Miami with prior notification through Swiss Embassy here.)

Emissary would:

make clear to Castro our willingness and ability, despite any Soviet threats, to destroy bases;

point out to Castro Khrushchev is playing him for a sucker by using Cuba as a pawn in the Berlin situation;

make clear to Castro only non-negotiable points with him are presence of Soviet offensive bases directed at Cuba and United States, and his support of revolution elsewhere in Latin America;

give Castro 48 hours or other suitable period in which to announce and begin liquidation of Soviet missile bases, to be accomplished under close U. S. air surveillance;

accept OAS team for observation incoming cargoes assure further offensive weapons are not brought into Cuba.

2. Simultaneously transmit message from the President to Khrushchev generally informing him of approach being made to Castro,

pointing

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pointing out direct violation these bases of Khrushchev's personal assurances, and asking for Khrushchev's "cooperation" with Castro. (It will be important that this message leave Khrushchev "a way out".

The two foregoing actions are essential to demonstrate to American people and to the world that maximum effort has been made to liquidate problem without hostilities and to provide best possible political base if hostilities nevertheless ensue. It is believed importance of these advantages override whatever military disadvantages these steps may cause.

3. Shortly after (perhaps not more than twenty-four hours) taking foregoing steps President should issue a public statement which would include the following elements:

- a. Facts on bases, emphasizing nature of threat to all of Caribbean area;
- b. Precautionary military steps that have been taken to neutralize threat. (This should imply but not specifically state that nuclear weapons are deployed for immediate use against bases if necessity arises.)
- c. Fact of emissary to Castro and message to Khrushchev.
- d. Regret at hazard to which ~~Latin~~ Cuban people exposed by rash Castro action.

4. Immediately prior to issuance of President's statements:

a. Unilaterally

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a. Unilaterally inform key NATO countries (Germany, U.K., France) and key Latin American countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil) of action taken, seeking their support. A special effort should be made to have Venezuela, Colombia, and Central American countries issue prompt public appeals for effective action keyed to threat bases represent to them.

b. Inform NAC of action taken.

c. Seek appropriate action in OAS. (This needs to be spelled out.)

5. Immediately undertake evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo.

6. Quietly put all U. S. forces on appropriate alert status and seek similar action by NATO.

7. Issue call-up orders for Reserve.

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POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

This memorandum is an attempt to set down the full spectrum of possible actions -- beginning with pure political moves having no military aspects and progressing, in an ascending order of intensity of military commitment, to action involving an invasion of Cuba. Obviously there are many variants possible, and common elements may be differently mixed to produce different results.

I

Pure Political Action

There are several kinds of political action that might be taken -- counterplays in other parts of the world designed to harass or threaten the Bloc, an increase of the hemispheric pressure against Castro, the organization of economic pressure by the NATO countries, or even efforts to buy off Castro. It is highly doubtful that these actions, taken either individually or collectively, would by themselves produce the desired result.

A. Possible Counterplays

1. Threat to put MRBM's in Germany

Advantages:

The Soviet Union has long been obsessed with the fear that Germany might acquire nuclear capability.

Disadvantages:

- a. We are in no position to implement this threat inside of a year or more.
- b. The Soviet Union would be more likely to respond by aggressive action against Berlin than by relinquishing its arrangements with Cuba.

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c. This action would upset our other NATO allies.

2. Threat to put MRBM's in the Republic of China

Advantages:

Giving MRBM's to the Generalissimo would present a serious threat to Red China and might well cause concern in Moscow.

Disadvantages:

- a. The most probably immediate effect would be increased pressure by the CHICOMS for increased nuclear capacity of their own -- a development that could be of real concern to the West.
- b. The Generalissimo would interpret such an act as American support for an invasion.
- c. Our NATO allies would be inclined to consider this as an act of irresponsibility.

3. Threat to put MRBM's in Iran

Advantage:

The Iranian frontier has always been sensitive from the point of view of Russian policy.

Disadvantage:

- a. It would increase the Shah's blackmail capacity.
- b. The Soviet response might well be a military move against Iran which we would be in no position to counter.

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B. Actions to put pressure on Castro

1. The indication that we have targeted US missiles on key points in Cuba.

Disadvantage:

There is no evidence that this would cause Castro to yield his own MRBM capability. He would know that we could not fire our weapons without great danger of starting a general nuclear war.

2. Action by the Organ of Consultation Under the Rio Pact to authorize unilateral or collective military action against Cuba and to urge open surveillance of military bases.

Advantage:

The principle utility of this action would be as a preliminary to a military move.

Disadvantage:

If such action were possible it could hardly be achieved by unanimous vote. Hence, hemispheric solidarity would be strained. Moreover, having taken the action the United States would almost certainly be committed to follow it by a military move of some sort.

3. Effort to intensify economic isolation of Cuba.

Advantage:

The sealing off of Cuba from non-Bloc trade would increase the difficulty and cost of Soviet support of the Cuban economy and perhaps decrease the effectiveness of that support.

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Disadvantages

- a. Even with the new evidence of a Soviet aggressive intention in Cuba we could not expect the unanimous support of either the OAS or NATO countries in enforcing anything approaching a complete embargo.
 - b. The additional costs imposed on the Soviet Union even by a substantially complete embargo would probably not prevent it from continuing its Cuban build-up.
4. Persuade the remaining Latin American countries to break relations with Cuba.

Advantages:

If Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Bolivia were to break relations with Cuba it would have a damaging political effect in Latin America. In addition, it would have a slight but real effect on American public opinion.

Disadvantages:

Cuba, it self, would not be seriously affected by the breaking of diplomatic relations.

5. Establishment of Government in Exile in Guantanamo.

Advantage:

The effect on Cuban public opinion of the establishment of a government in exile in Guantanamo with United States backing might serve to encourage dissidence within Cuba, particularly if we coupled the establishment of such a government with a threat to help it move out into Cuban territory unless Castro took certain required actions.

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Disadvantages:

- a. We would have great difficulty setting up a reasonably representative provisional government.
 - b. The Cuban refugees would be unwilling to be used as trading pawns to bring about actions by Castro that might be useful for our purposes but not for theirs.
 - c. We would compromise our position in Guantanamo.
6. Attempt to reach some modus vivendi with Castro.

Advantage:

By separating Castro from complete dependence on Soviet support we might neutralize him as an aggressive force in the Western Hemisphere.

Disadvantages:

1. There is real doubt that Castro could survive if he repudiated any of his basic relations with the Bloc, particularly since he is surrounded by hardcore Communists.
 - 2/ The American public is in no mood to accept a deal with Castro and Congress would be unprepared to provide the means to make that deal effective, such as the restoration of the sugar quota, a program of foreign assistance, the relaxation of the embargo, etc.
7. A Summit Conference with Khrushchev.

Advantage:

In view of the great increase of tensions brought about by the Soviet action, some direct conversation between the President and Khrushchev might help avert a major conflict.

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Disadvantages:

The President would not have the full support of the American people if he talked without first acting.

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II

OPENLY ANNOUNCED RECONNAISSANCE OVERFLIGHTS OF CUBA

Scenario

A. This course could be instituted simultaneously with the despatch of messages to Khrushchev and Castro and the issuance of a public statement by the President on the presence of the MRBM bases. The President's statement could include:

- a. Facts on the bases, emphasizing nature of threat to all of Caribbean area.
- b. Reference to previous Soviet public and private assurances that basis would not be established.
- c. Reference to President's previous statements on establishment of offensive threat in Cuba and Congressional Resolution.
- d. Reference to OAS Foreign Ministers communique of October 6, including specifically surveillance of Cuba.
- e. Precautionary military steps that have been taken to neutralize threat. (This would imply but not specifically state nuclear weapons are targeted for immediate use against bases.)
- f. Fact of institution of surveillance making clear that orders provided aircraft were not to take offensive action but, if attacked, all necessary steps would be taken to protect aircraft.

B. **Other**

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B. Other actions that would be required:

1. Unilaterally inform key NATO countries (Germany, UK, France) and key Latin American countries (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil) of action taken, seeking their support. A special effort should be made to have Venezuela, Colombia, and Central American countries issue prompt public appeals for effective action keyed to threat bases represent to them.
2. Inform NAC of action taken.
3. Seek appropriate supporting action in the OAS.
4. Immediately undertake evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo.
5. Quietly put all US forces on appropriate alert status.

C. Possible Allied Reactions

Allied reactions would be mixed and would heavily depend upon our accompanying diplomatic moves. On the one hand, many would privately welcome apparently incisive action by the United States while being relieved that the action did not go further. On the other hand, there would be strong public recriminations on our lack of consultation and some allies might seek to divest themselves of responsibility for ensuing consequences. However, the nature of this would be tempered by the nature of the demands we made on Cuba and the Soviet Union.

D. Soviet and Cuban Reactions

Within Cuba, counter-reaction could include attacks on our reconnaissance aircraft both by fighter aircraft and SAMS and/or an attack on Guantanamo or on aircraft entering and

leaving

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leaving Guantanamo. This, of course, would require Cuba to "fire the first shot". On the other hand, it would be difficult for Cuba and the Soviets to permit such reconnaissance flights to go unchallenged. Apart from international prestige factors, such a demonstration of impotence on the part of the Castro regime would severely strain its ability to maintain its internal control. If such attacks against reconnaissance aircraft took place there would, of course, be American casualties and the public reaction would make it difficult for the United States to keep its responses within precisely defined military limits.

Outside of Cuba, Soviet responses might include overflights of such areas as Peshawar, Pakistan (designed to bring pressure on Pakistan to expel us from the installation), and the Jupiter bases in Turkey, our bases in Japan, etc. The Soviet Union could condition cessation of such flights on our cessation of flights over Cuba.

III

LIMITED ONE-TIME STRIKE (50 SORTIES) AGAINST MRBM SITES

Scenario

A. To be most effective politically, this action should probably be taken without any prior warning or consultation but should simultaneously be accompanied by a dramatic political move or moves that would seek to forestall Cuba from reacting against the United States or the Soviet Union from reacting either directly. Such a move could be a public call on Khrushchev for a bilateral summit conference. From a political point of view, such an action would demonstrate incisiveness on the part of the United States, thus reinforcing -- in the eyes of both our allies and the Soviet Union -- the positions we have taken elsewhere, particularly with respect to Berlin, while also indicating willingness to negotiate. Such an action should

be accompanied

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be accompanied mutatis mutandis by the steps listed under II above. The limited nature and objectives of the attack would be made clear both publicly and privately.

B. Cuban Reactions

In the absence of knowledge of command and control relationships between the Cubans and the Soviets in Cuba on the one hand, and between Moscow and the Soviet forces in Cuba, on the other, it is difficult to estimate the range of reactions. An action within the control of Cuba would be an attack on Guantanamo and/or attacks against aircraft entering and leaving Guantanamo. Depending on the nature of control arrangements between Moscow and the Soviets manning the MRBM's as well as the readiness of the weapons, the availability of warheads, and the success of the attack in promptly disabling all weapons ready for firing, the possibility that the Soviets crew, in the heat of action, might fire a missile or missiles against American targets cannot be excluded. However, this does not appear to be a high possibility. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that such an action, even if fully successful against weapons at the site, would not itself prevent the emplacement of additional weapons in the pipeline in Cuba or en route.

C. Soviet Reactions

Soviet reactions would somewhat depend on the degree to which the action was presented as directed against the Soviet Union and to what degree it was kept confined to action against Castro. The Soviet Union, having denied it had established, or intended to establish, bases in Cuba, could disassociate itself from the matter if it so chose. On the other hand, there is a wide range of possible Soviet counteraction -- which might include action against the lines of communication of our forces in Berlin, a similar attack against the Jupiters in Turkey, and some aggressive action against Iran and/or Pakistan based on our installations there.

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IV

Blockade

A. Basis for Blockade

A possible alternative to a single limited air strike would be the institution of a full or limited naval blockade. A limited blockade might be conceived of as inspection of vessels for offensive weapons or possibly for military materials of any kind. Under principles of international law -- accepted and stoutly supported by the United States -- blockades of any kind cannot be imposed or enforced except under conditions of a formal declaration of war. It is extremely doubtful whether we could obtain the sanction of the OAS and Rio Treaty for such a declaration of war. It is, therefore, likely that such a declaration would have to be unilateral on our part. Having declared war there would not be a major political difference, either in terms of allied or Soviet reaction, between confining our military action to a blockade or taking direct military action against Cuba. In any event, enforcement of such a blockade would require action, including the use of force, primarily directed against Soviet and Soviet bloc vessels.

B. Soviet Reactions

It is certain that the Soviets would not acquiesce in, or observe, such a blockade. It could be presumed that, at the minimum, they would seek to escort their vessels so that enforcement of the blockade would eventually result in a situation where action would be required against Soviet warships or submarines. In any event, an obvious countermove on their part could well be the imposition of a blockade against only American forces in Berlin. Together with all the other circumstances, this could produce a condition of great allied disarray.

C. Cuban reactions

Cuban reactions could include an attack against Guantánamo.

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V

ONE-TIME AIR STRIKE RANGING FROM 100 SORTIES TO INCLUDE AIRFIELDS
AND IL-28 CRATES TO 500 SORTIES AGAINST ALL MAJOR TARGETS

A. Politically, there is little difference, in terms either of allied or possible Soviet reactions whether the attack is at the top or the bottom of the range. If this action should be taken without prior consultation with our allies and an opportunity for both Castro and Khrushchev to avoid attack by making reasonable concessions, the effects on our alliances, particularly NATO, could approach the catastrophic. If the Soviet Union were to respond vigorously -- for example, by moving against Berlin -- the United States would, in the eyes of most Europeans, be held responsible for having endangered its allies in a reckless manner, and many would probably be relieved at the opportunity for disengaging themselves from the embarrassment of Berlin.

B. European nations are clearly not sympathetic with the United States position regarding Cuba. They regard our reaction to the recent Soviet buildup as hysteria; many have argued that our national preoccupation with Cuba proves that we are not fully responsible and should not have such a large influence in deciding the fate of the Free World. Since the Europeans live with 400 MRBM's pointed at them every day, they cannot be persuaded that the location of a few batteries of MRBM's in Cuba is a serious military threat to the United States. For us to respond to that threat by unilateral military action would seem to them, therefore, out of all proportion to the provocation and a reckless act endangering the peace of the world.

C. We might expect Khrushchev to seek to capitalize on this European reaction. He would try to increase the division and disarray of the West.

D. On the

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D. On the other hand, prior consultation is most unlikely to produce any consensus and most of our allies would seek to bring to bear the strongest possible pressure to deter us from the action. Prior approaches to Castro and to the Soviet Union would also open to the Soviet Union the possibility of making such strong threats of nuclear retaliation against the United States as to make it difficult for the Soviet Union to fail to implement the threats if indeed we subsequently took such action against Cuba. It would also give Cuba and the Soviet Union sufficient strategic warning to enable them to ready the MREM's in Cuba for prompt firing against US targets with or without action from the Soviet Union against the United States.

VI

**FULL-SCALE (2,000 sorties or more) AIR ATTACK WITH OR WITHOUT
SUBSEQUENT INVASION**

A. Such action is subject, in an increased measure, to all of the political disabilities and dilemmas of prior consultation and notification set forth in V above.

B. Cuban reactions would probably include, subject to their capabilities, an attack on Guantanamo and the possibility of an attempt to use MREM's against American targets. It is difficult to foresee Cuban domestic reactions and much can depend on the political context of the attacks. A high rate of civilian casualties would, of course, produce strong sentiment. National feelings would be highly aroused. The attitude of the "July 26 Group" would in part be determined by its estimate as to the reprisals it might expect from the Cuban people or from the United States if it lost control. It is possible that an air strike in itself might produce such a condition of disorder within Cuba as to require US ground intervention, whether or not we desire to undertake such intervention.

C. Soviet

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C. Soviet reactions.

Many lines of retaliatory action would be open to the Soviet Union. These include a military take-over of West Berlin, which Khrushchev might well believe he could safely undertake, particularly if he joined the action with some diplomatic gestures towards Western Germany and possibly Britain and France. Other possible actions include a quick Soviet strike against the Jupiters in Turkey, action against Iran on the grounds that it also contains US installations on the border of the Soviet Union, renewal of the action in Laos, etc. With or without Soviet concurrence the Chinese Communists might well seek to take advantage of what they could regard as an opportunity for a movement against Quemoy and Matsu.

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PLAN I

LIMITED ONE-TIME STRIKE (50 SORTIES) AGAINST MRBM SITES

Action Contemplated

A. Basic Features

The target of the single strike contemplated by this plan would be limited to the known MRBM site, including the MRBM's and launchers, the warheads and the suspect nuclear storage sites. Presumably this strike could be accomplished in a matter of minutes.

B. Advantages of Plan

This plan has one major advantage. The military action it contemplates can be launched without prior warning or consultation with minimum damage to American interests. The action is of a severely limited nature. It should thus appear in the eyes of the world as not incommensurate with the danger. It could be executed quickly with relatively few casualties. By coupling it with some dramatic diplomatic gesture, the emphasis might well be shifted to the American desire to achieve a political solution rather than to the military action itself.

C. Accompanying Diplomatic Moves

I. Message to Khrushchev

The President would send a message to Khrushchev to be presented in Moscow simultaneously with the military action. The tone of the message would be more sorrow than anger. It would:

- (a) underline the President's shock at discovering unchallengeable evidence of

an MRBM

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an MRBM installation in Cuba;

- (b) point out that the President had been assured by Khrushchev that the Soviet Union would put no offensive weapons in Cuba;
- (c) recall that the President had stated publicly that, in the event the Cubans showed any offensive capability (?), he would take appropriate action;
- (d) recite that the President was taking action to eliminate the specific MRBM's so far identified and that similar action would be taken against any additional nuclear installations as soon as they were discovered; and
- (e) meanwhile, the United States would, as a matter of self defense, fly low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba.

2. Message to Castro

The message to Castro, which would be made public at the time of the attack, would:

- (a) point out the prior warning given by the President;
- (b) the determination of the United States to act for the defense of its own interests and those of the Latin American nations; and

(c) the

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- (c) the decision of the United States to take action against this specific target. The message would point out that the action was limited to the target but that it would be repeated against any other offensive installation that might be later identified, and that in the meantime the United States would fly close surveillance missions.

3. Public Statement Justifying Attack

The President would at the time of the attack also issue a statement pointing out:

- (a) that limited military action was being taken in defense of the security of the United States and the other American States;
- (b) recalling the President's prior warning on this subject and emphasizing that the operation was being so designed as to result in the minimum jeopardy of human life;
- (c) making clear that the mission had to be undertaken on an emergency basis so as to assure that the installations would not become operational;
- (d) referring to Chairman Khrushchev's assurances that no offensive weapons would be placed in Cuba;
- (e) recalling the President's prior warning that, in the event Cuba were armed with offensive weapons, the United States would take necessary action;
- (f) pointing out that this action was taken reluctantly and that no prior consultation was possible because of the imminent danger

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of the weapons becoming operational;

- (g) emphasizing that the operation was limited to the narrow objectives of destroying the particular weapons and that it was designed to minimize casualties;
- (h) making clear, however, that the United States would feel compelled in the future to take similar action against any further offensive weapons that might appear; and concluding
- (i) that for purposes of its own defense and in fidelity to its treaty obligations to the other American states, it would find it necessary to fly close surveillance missions.

4. Call for Summit Conference

The message would point out that the introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba in violation of the assurances of Chairman Khrushchev had created greatly increased tensions to add to the other problems between the Western powers and the Communist Bloc. Those circumstances made it imperative that an immediate conference be held at the summit -- presumably on a bilateral basis in order to permit the Chairman and the President to discuss the whole range of problems between the Communist Bloc and the Western powers. Otherwise the situation might rapidly deteriorate.

D. Possible Cuban Response

The major defect of this plan for a military point of view is that, in providing for the elimination merely of the known MRBM installation, it leaves intact other Cuban offensive capabilities. Thus there is a danger that Castro

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might respond to our attack by a counter-strike against a Florida city, such as Miami, or an American military installation in the Southeast, such as Cape Canaveral.

In answer to this, it can be argued that Castro would be unlikely to risk the almost certain destruction that would follow an offensive action against the United States -- particularly if it were made clear at the time of our air strike that it was limited to the known MRBM installation.

Another objection to the plan is that it would leave intact other possible Cuban nuclear capabilities, such as airborne nuclear weapons or MRBM sites not disclosed by aerial reconnaissance.

E. Soviet Response

It is possible that, in view of the speed with which the attack could be concluded, it might pass as a relatively minor incident. In that event, Khrushchev could treat it as of no more importance than his own shooting down of our U-2 in 1960. On the other hand, one cannot rule out the possibility that he would feel it necessary to make a military response against Berlin or possibly Turkey.

F. Attitude of NATO and the OAS

While there might be some disposition on the part of certain of the NATO countries to suggest an impolite analogy to Suez, the fact that the United States was compelled to act quickly in order to prevent the missiles from becoming operational would tend to blunt the indignation that might result from a failure to undertake prior consultations. Indignation would be further blunted if the President were to make a simultaneous call for a summit conference, which would meet the expressed or unexpressed wishes of a number of the NATO countries.

The effect

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The effect on the members of the OAS would undoubtedly be mixed. There would be an unconscious resentment against United States intervention in Cuban affairs. Certain of the Caribbean countries might feel regret that the action was not more definitive. Other Latin American countries would be relieved that the air strike was so limited.

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II

Blockade

Note: This alternative contemplates the end result of a full or limited naval blockade with a maximum objective of bringing down Castro and a minimum objective of preventing the further introduction into Cuba of offensive weapons. Such a blockade can, both under international law and politically, best be imposed in connection with a formal declaration of war. It would be important that such a declaration be made within the framework and with the sanction of the OAS and the Rio Treaty.

Scenario

1st day

1. Immediately communicate privately with Khrushchev and Castro on presence of MUN's, implying that, if satisfactory answer not received, further unspecified action would be taken.

2. Simultaneously inform key Latin American Governments (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, and selected Central American countries) of facts, including showing of photographs here to Ambassadors, of communications to Castro and Khrushchev and of contemplated OAS action.

3. Simultaneously inform key NATO countries (Germany, France, U.K. and Italy) of facts, including showing of photographs to Ambassadors here.

4. On

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2nd day

4. On the following day inform the NAC and OAS of the facts without spelling out contemplated action in detail.

5. On the same day, following conclusion of NAC and OAS meetings, the President issues a public statement including the following elements:

- a. Facts on the bases, emphasizing nature of threat to all of Caribbean area.
- b. Reference to previous Soviet public and private assurances that bases would not be established.
- c. Reference to President's previous statements on establishment of offensive threat in Cuba and Congressional Resolution.
- d. Reference to OAS Foreign Ministers' communique of October 6, including specifically surveillance of Cuba.
- e. Precautionary military steps that have been taken to neutralize threat. (This would imply but not specifically state nuclear weapons are targeted for immediate use against bases.)
- f. The fact that we have immediately instituted consultation with the OAS members on further steps to be taken to meet this threat to hemispheric security.

6. Without prior announcement but without attempting to conceal the fact, undertake evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo.

7. Make

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7. Make a special effort to have Venezuela, Colombia and Central American countries issue prompt public appeals for effective action keyed to threat bases represent to them.

3rd day

8. Await replies from Khrushchev and Castro and gauge domestic and international reaction.

9. Call for meeting of "Organ of Consultation" of the OAS for following day.

4th day

10. Dependent on assessment of reactions and replies received from Castro and Khrushchev, convene "Organ of Consultation" of the OAS seeking a resolution authorizing armed action against the threat to the security of the Hemisphere.

5th day

11. If and when OAS action (which requires two-thirds' vote) is favorable, immediately seek a special session of the Congress to obtain a declaration of war. In the presentation of the resolution to Congress, the limited objectives of seeking the prevention of installation in Cuba of offensive weapons through a blockade should be expressed.

12. Immediately following favorable action by Congress, impose blockade.

A. Soviet Reactions

It is certain that the Soviets would not acquiesce in, or observe, such a blockade. It could be presumed that, at the minimum,

they

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they would seek to escort their vessels so that enforcement of the blockade would eventually result in a situation where action would be required against Soviet warships or submarines. In any event, an obvious countermove on their part could well be the imposition of a blockade against only American forces in Berlin. Together with all the other circumstances, this could produce a condition of great allied disarray.

B. Allied Reactions

While the major European maritime powers have vigorously resisted the presently proposed limited prohibitions on the shipping trade with Cuba, they can be expected to take quite a different position when they are once informed of the nature of the Cuban threat to the United States and the seriousness of the American response. Particularly if there is a formal Declaration of War by Congress, the Governments of the Allied Powers can be expected to cooperate with the United States in enforcing the blockade and in imposing the necessary discipline on their own shipowners. Under these circumstances it is not believed that the blockade itself would result in serious problems for the NATO alliance; however, other actions taken by the Soviet Union in response to the blockade might prove divisive as indicated above.

C. Cuban Reactions

Cuban reactions could include an attack against Guantanamo.

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ATTACK 3 - INVASION

1. It is assumed that an attack of the magnitude of Plan 3 will almost inevitably escalate into an invasion of Cuba through either attacks by air or sea on US territory, attacks on Guantanamo, or internal uprisings of the Cuban people to which we would be compelled to respond.

2. There might be some advantages in minimizing negative reactions by both Soviets and free world by initiating only an attack on offensive capabilities in Cuba and letting escalation take place in response to Cuban initiatives.

~~However,~~ we should make our military plans on the assumption that we would have to continue the air assault into the pre-invasion softening-up phase and at the appropriate time land in force.

3. The effectiveness of Plan 3 in achieving its military objective of knocking out offensive capabilities in Cuba would be seriously diminished without strategic surprise. Opportunities would be given to disperse and camouflage targets and alert air defense forces. Therefore, there is a strong argument against either Congressional actions,

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private exchanges with Soviets or Castro, or consultations with our major allies.

3(a). There are also possible political advantages in surprise. A sudden attack, over in a day, would become so quickly a fait accompli, that foreign ministers would have no time to develop attacks on the action but would be busy with its aftermath. On the other hand failure to give notice is subject to the charge of sneak attack or reverse Pearl Harbor, which is not considered really cricket in some quarters.

4. If the initial decision is for invasion, this is no longer a problem as invasion preparations would deprive us of strategic surprise in any case. In addition the intensive and continued air attacks incident to invasion should make possible the destruction of most priority ^{removal} targets. The ~~removal~~ of the Castro Government would deprive any remaining ^{targets} of their threat.

5. It should be noted that if invasion does not take place Plan 3 cannot be assumed to be a one-time affair. As new targets are discovered or arrive in Cuba, prompt new strikes will become necessary to eliminate their threat to the US and maintain the integrity of our public ~~construction~~ ^{construction} Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001700130007-5

may be difficult to adjust their timing to the current

international situation. We will still have given the Soviets the power to force us into military action in Cuba at times of their choosing.

6. Plan 3, itself, involves no sure threat to the Castro regime. It therefore involves some risk of our having undertaken a warlike act which will displease many people in the free world without unseating Castro's regime and thus pleasing all the others, particularly our best friends in Latin America.

7. At the ~~xxxx~~ same time it would be difficult for the Soviets to resist pressures to retaliate, preferably in kind as in Turkey. We would have killed Soviets in Cuba certainly, in addition to many Cubans, and an attack on Turkish bases is almost sure to involve killing Americans. It would then be very difficult to ~~not~~ avoid an escalation into general nuclear war as feelings would be high among both peoples. A retaliation by major moves in Berlin would be equally difficult for the West to accept.

8. If NATO were forced to choose between defeat in Berlin or disgrace in Turkey, on the one hand, or nuclear war on the other, because of 200 corlies against Cuban facilities which might have become a nuclear threat against the US of the

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sort the Europeans have long lived with, the alliance would be put under serious strain indeed.

9. Similar issues might be raised for the US if instead of Soviet retaliation in Europe, our bombing was not wholly effective, some of the MREM's were operational, (much less likely that MIG's would have nuclear bombs) and in the heat of combat Soviet crews with poor connections to Moscow, perhaps believing the attack on them was only part of a general first strike by the US on the Soviet Union, should launch nuclear missiles on the US. It would be exceedingly difficult to prevent US retaliation on the Soviet Union. Their ability to do this might be enhanced if they had several days warning of a possible attack.

10. It is difficult to be persuaded that these difficult dilemmas are worth creating unless the military posture of the US vis-avis the Soviet Union were to be seriously impaired in the absence of this action. But from the standpoint of relative nuclear balance it is most difficult to make this argument. The basic justification must then be the need for the US to act to support the creditability of the word and firmness of the

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Soviets and of its partners. If other actions could come close to satisfying this criteria, they would deserve careful consideration.

11. It seems unlikely that in over-all terms our allies will be any more concerned by invasion than by substantial air attacks with prospects of their continuation. The immediate reaction would, of course, be tempered by the nature of the Soviet response. Most of our LA allies would prefer invasion and the remainder would see no difference. While they might not say so, many of our European allies are bored and bothered with our constant concern about Cuba and would be happy to have us take care of the problem and remove it from the world scene, even if that meant invasion. But their public posture would, of course, be strongly influenced by Soviet reaction, and somewhat less so by the nature of our advance consultations. These would, of course, be better from their standpoint in the invasion situation.

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SCENARIO

1. With Plan 3 alone the need for surprise is so great that no advance consultation can be recommended. Preferably action would be as follows:
 - a. D or Decision day.
 - b. D + 24^{hours} Notification and justification delivered in personal letters from President to MacMillan, DeGaulle and Adenauer, and from Secretary Rusk to heads of state or Foreign Ministers of Latin American countries and Canada.
 - c. D + 24-25 Dependents leave Guantanamo on no alert notice basis, while reinforcing ships stand by.
 - d. D + 25 Castro and Mr. K. notified and reasons for and limits of intended action explained.
 - e. D + 25 Attacks commence, and Pres. announces what we are doing and why.
 - f. D + 48 Action explained and current situation discussed at NATO and OAS Council meetings by senior State Department representatives and position presented to world by Stevenson in speech at UN. OAS requested authorize meeting of Organ of Consultation to consider action to be taken in light of new situation.

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- g. D + 48 In accordance with notice given in all these forums US planes start overland surveillance at such levels as may be necessary, with fighter escort to protect them from MIS's.
- h. D + 48 + Follow-up actions as necessary to defend Guantanamo, protect significant rebel movements in Cuba and eliminate new offensive weapons as discovered.
- i. D + 24 + US forces throughout world on 24 hour alert until called off and special units and stocks of riot control equipment available in Canal Zone for air transport to assist in maintaining friendly governments of Latin America in power against possible attacks by Castro-Soviet sympathizers.

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2. If it should be decided from the start to invade, the time and activities required to prepare for it will permit consultation rather than notification.
 - a. D - Decision to invade.
 - b. D + 1^{day} Letter sent to Castro and Mr. K. along lines of present drafts.
 - c. D + 3-4 If no favorable responses, President announces facts and calls for Organ. of Consultation meeting and special NATO meeting to consider situation, dependents pull out of Guantanamo and behind Curtain, some reserves called up, NATO and Guantanamo forces strengthened.
 - d. D + 5-6 Organ. of Consultation authorizes necessary measures to defend Hemisphere against threat of aggression, including armed attack, US announces total blockade of Cuba in framework state of war.
 - e. D + 6 US position presented by Stevenson in UN. Latin American allies alerted to possible internal disorders, US support on standby basis in Canal Zone.

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- f. D + 7 US preinvasion air attack starts provided no political moves have made it unnecessary, all US forces around world on 24 hour day alert.
- g. D + 12-14 Invasion starts, provided no new political developments have made it unnecessary, with help some OAS forces.

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CEBohlen
October 17, 1962

POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES:

1. Air Strike. Without any political notification, if the strike was a one-time affair, was in general successful, and completely over before there would be any chance for reaction, it is probable that the Soviets would confine themselves to political action in the United Nations propaganda, and attempt to exploit any divisions which might appear in the Western Alliance. They might conceivably take some action in Berlin, but would be unlikely to initiate any form of military action.
2. Communication with Khrushchev and following negative reply, air strike as in 1. Soviet reaction would depend, to some degree, upon positions Khrushchev took in his reply. Assuming a completely negative reply, i. e., a denial that MRBM bases were under construction in Cuba, which conceivably might indicate a physical retreat from the construction of these bases -- which we could only ascertain through photographic reconnaissance -- or he might, in his reply, take a very tough line, drawing the analogy between our bases in Greece and Italy and the Soviet bases in Cuba, he might threaten general nuclear war in the event of any United States action. If such were the reply, the situation would obviously become more dangerous, although it would not be conclusive evidence of Soviet willingness to respond militarily to an air strike. We would have to wait to judge the temper, as well as the text of his reply.
3. With or without political soundings to initiate larger strike, which would, in all probability, entail expansion into an invasion. From the point of view of Soviet reaction, this would probably be the most dangerous course of action which we could take. An expanded operation against Cuba would no longer be merely to eliminate the MRBM bases and would confront the Soviets with a series of very difficult choices. It is possible that limited military action against some of our NATO bases or direct action in Berlin might be the Soviet response.
4. A political communication to Khrushchev following in the event of a negative reply, by a declaration of war and the institution of a blockade of Cuba. While there can be no certainty in any of these

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estimates of Soviet reaction, there is a very good chance that the Soviets would confine themselves only to action in the United Nations propaganda, etc., and not institute any military action under this course of action.

The foregoing analyses deal only with probable Soviet reactions and do not deal with the general effect on the United States position throughout the world.

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To: Mr. F.C.

~~24 hour notice starting Friday~~
~~MRBM - less three days attack~~
~~5 days~~

1. The US has full info on the missile bases being constructed in Pinar del Rio province. Medium range missiles capable of reaching a substantial portion of US territory and most of the countries in the Caribbean area are being installed at three sites. They obviously have no use except with nuclear heads. It also seems clear that they can only be operated by Soviet military, not Cubans.
2. Their presence raises grave issues of national security for the US and the Western Hemisphere as a whole as the President and the Congress have made clear. They represent Soviet offensive bases in Cuba as well as a ground-to-ground missile capability capable of attacking the US and many of the Caribbean countries. In Soviet hands they are clearly offensive and not defensive weapons.
3. By putting these in Cuba the Soviets have also raised grave issues for Cuba. To serve their interests they have justified the Western Hemisphere countries in making an attack on Cuba which would lead to the immediate overthrow of your regime. At the same time

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the Soviets have quietly suggested to others that the threat these weapons represent may make it worthwhile to the US to trade concessions on Berlin for Soviet abandonment of Cuba.

4. The US will have to inform its people of the threat which now exists in Cuba within the next day or so and what it and its allies intend to do about it in conformity with the requirements of our security as previously made plain in various public documents and statements. Unless it can receive assurances from you prior to that time, by public or private channels, that you will not tolerate this misuse of Cuban territory, measures of vital significance for the future of Cuba will have to be initiated.

5. The US expects to continue to be well informed about the status of these facilities. If action does not follow immediately on the heels of such assurances as you may feel impelled to give, then we and our friends shall, of course, have to act.

6. If an attempt by you to deal with this problem should create difficulties within Cuba, I assume you will recall that President Kennedy said a year and a half ago that only two points were non-negotiable between the Western Hemisphere and Cuba- the Soviet tie and

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CASTRO RESPONSE TO US APPEAL

Few public figures have proven to be as unpredictable as Fidel Castro. We do not know whether he could take the decision alone, but would guess he would need to consult several of his associates including one or two old-line Communists. He would almost surely feel compelled to check with Moscow, especially if he had any thought of acceptance. Probably the missiles are there as part of a deal whose terms might be changed adversely for Castro if he could no longer provide MRBM bases.

He is unlikely on short notice to be able to accustom himself to the idea of help from the US for any internal struggles a favorable response might cause.

We must, of course, be prepared for a 4 hour TV appearance, revealing and denouncing our approach. He might also go to UN to charge interference in his internal affairs.

But it seems likely that he is aware that Soviet offers of support have not been made in categorical terms and that his internal position is not one of great strength. In this situation he might try to confuse the issue and stall for time, hoping for a solution to his dilemma to appear.

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Presumably the old-line Communist elements would plump for a flat rejection of the US approach. This might lead to a major flare up between the two groups, of considerable potential advantage to us.

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DRAFT

October 17, 1962

SECRET

Dear Mr. Chairman:

One of the advantages of this private and confidential channel of communication, which I believe you also recognize, is that matters of great seriousness which it is not desired to make public can be discussed between us in this manner. And this is the most serious communication that I have had to write to you.

My Government has recently obtained full and incontrovertible information that medium range ballistic missile bases are being constructed in Cuba, and that the missiles are already being assembled there. Heretofore, our evidence concerning the military assistance which you were rendering to Cuba has confirmed your repeated assurances that it was purely defensive in nature; but the MRBM missiles, with ranges adequate to reach the United States and many countries in Latin America are, of course, squarely in the offensive category.

I am informing Premier Castro that unless assurances are immediately given, and implemented, that these bases will be dismantled, my Government will be obliged to take appropriate steps to protect its vital security and to carry out its obligations under the inter-American system.

I am writing to you to request that you use your influence with Premier Castro to bring about the dismantling of these bases.

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These are clearly Soviet weapons and I must point out that such actions directly contradict the statement in your message to me of April 22, 1961, that you had no bases in Cuba and that you did not intend to establish any. It contradicts the Tass statement of September eleventh in regard to the character of weapons supplied to Cuba.

Ambassador Kohler has, of course, informed me of his conversation with you. While I understand your view that if NATO can maintain bases threatening the Soviet Union, we cannot object to Soviet Bloc bases threatening the NATO countries, including the United States. But, the NATO base in Turkey should be equated not with Cuba, but with your bases in the countries members of the Warsaw Pact. And I remind you that NATO has not protested these bases. You are familiar with the circumstances in which NATO missile bases were established in Turkey and Italy. There are no such bases in the other countries which you mention.

Without reviewing the matter in detail, you will recall that at the end of the last war, the United States demobilized almost completely and that the creation of our Alliances and their bases was directly and solely a result of the aggressive expansionist policy followed by Stalin.

In the present case, the precarious balance has been upset and we are challenged to honor our obligations in this hemisphere which are of

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long standing and well known to you. It is hard for me to believe that in spite of your prior assurances and my previous warnings, you have deliberately and thoughtfully put us in this position.

If your objective is to provoke negotiation about the continued existence of missile bases, I remind you that the United States has been, is, and will continue to be ready to negotiate in the context of the draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which are already before us.

Since I assumed office, I have endeavored, in every significant area, to resolve the problems which divide us and which threaten world peace. In the meantime, I have endeavored to avoid any action which would disturb the status quo, and I emphasized the importance of this to you in our discussions in Vienna. Recently, the United States acquiesced in the action of the Iranian Government in announcing that it would not permit the establishment of foreign missile bases upon its territory.

You will also recall the efforts which my Government has made to reach agreement upon atomic testing, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and our proposals to the disarmament conference for the removal of the awful threat of nuclear war. Elementary prudence requires me to assume that these missiles in Cuba are, or will be, equipped with nuclear warheads. (And I am bound in all candor to say in view of the contradiction between your recent

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statements and your actions, that I could not assume otherwise, even though you should assure me this were the case.)

It is always possible for each of us to misinterpret the other's actions, and it is for this reason that I am so frank in expressing to you the grave concerns as to your ultimate intentions which this action in Cuba has aroused. In view of what is at stake, I find it difficult to believe that you could have acted as you have done if you had fully appreciated the effect of your actions on the United States and its Allies.

I enclose a summary of my message to Premier Castro. I hope that you will take appropriate and immediate action with the Cuban Government to halt the construction of these bases in the interests of the preservation of the peace, the welfare of the Cuban people, and our mutual relations in order that we may get back on the path of peaceful negotiation. I regret to say that I must request a prompt reply.

Sincerely,