did not choose to name at this time but a good man he had stolen from the Systems Command. I said since he had already selected this man

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NRO review(s) completed.

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without any consultation with DCI that I hoped he would be as objective as Colonel Leo Geary, who knew intelligence requirements and got along fine with our people, and would have been my nominee had we been asked. As to the furnishing to COMOR of the and CORONA ephemeris. Dr. McMillan stated that he was fully aware of General Martin's position and had approved it. He stated that COMOR was intellectually lazy and that all they were trying to do was have a machine do their work for them. He said what COMOR should do is furnish them a priority listing of targets and let the NRO do the flight program and other technical matters. I said I had a paper under preparation and did not want to talk about the matter substantively until I had gone into it in greater depth. I told him however that NRO did not seem to be able to get along with anybody including COMOR, CIA, and the Air Force Systems Command amongst others. Dr. McMillan stated that he could not understand our position on the President's Board report. He thought we were jousting at a windmill and that as far as he was concerned the report was fine and supported the 13 March 1963 agreement. I stated that the 13 March 1963 agreement was entirely workable but I had found no disposition on the part of anyone in the NRO staff to make it work in the manner intended.

3. Dr. McMillan brought up again his desire to turn the systems management of CORONA over to I reviewed the history of CORONA for him, laying particular stress on the long series of failures we had had during the spring and indicating that now that we seemed to be riding on the top of the wave with a number of successful shots, it certainly did not seem to me that this was the time to change management forces and to inject into an apparently successful operations a whole new team of people to muddy the water. I stated that it was essential that we get maximum reconnaissance during the next two months and that I would be most hesitant to inject any action which would disturb our present relationships. He then mentioned a contract S-1928 which was with Lockheed and which would expire on 1 July. He stated that this had been an Air Force contract until last year and that for convenience, as the CIA contract officer, had taken it over. He stated that he wanted this contract to go back into Air Force channels since that was where it had previously been. He stated that this was a small matter of about an administrative convenience. I told him that I was not familiar with it but that I would look into it. He asked me to approach the Director again about

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turning the systems management over to would do so but made no commitment as to what the results might be. I told Dr. McMillan that the Director had said he wanted no changes in contracts, no changes in management conceptions, and no changes in the NRO current operating procedures until the matter of the President's Board report had been determined or except with his own personal approval in each case.

> Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director

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