

TOP SECRET

*Fdu*

21 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

1. The USIB in Executive Session expressed grave concern at the apparent decision to plan a strike against the ballistic missile bases only and not to follow this up or coincidentally hit MIG's and IL-28's and to include the SA-2 sites. They pointed out that in accordance with SNIE 11-19-62 (paragraph 22), this course of action would be the one most likely to result in immediate Soviet retaliation outside Cuba.

2. Furthermore, they were concerned that the Government was apparently losing sight of the necessity to direct our actions, insofar as possible, against Communist Cuba and Castro, especially in our public proclamations and in our interface relationships with our Allies.

3. The third point of concern was the length of time between the President's statement, the initiation of the blockade and, more importantly, the initiation of any strikes against missile bases. I personally have the feeling that we are about to talk ourselves right out of any possibility of military action against Cuba, other than the blockade, and that the pressures from our Allies will be so great that we will be unable to move. I would even conjecture that the phraseology for this is being injected by the "doves" or others who favor no military action and are even reluctant on the blockade.

*[Signature]*

MSC

*DCI:*

*Probably overtaken by events - 1700 - now.*

*[Signature]*

TOP SECRET