

**SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS**

By

**Mr. Allen Dulles**

"This is an official document of The National War College. Quotation from, Abstraction from, or Reproduction of all or any part of this document is NOT AUTHORIZED without specific permission of the Commandant of The National War College."

**Presented at  
The National War College  
Washington, D. C.  
14 January 1955**

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

By

Mr. Allen Dulles

(14 January 1955)

GENERAL CRAIG: Every year about this time we always seem to be fortunate enough to have the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to come down to the colleges and talk to us about some aspect of the threat to the security of our own country in the Free World. What is this threat; how strong is it; and what is its nature?

In our discussion today we have called this aspect of the threat "Soviet Strategic Concepts". Mr. Dulles is probably the best qualified man in the country, and perhaps the world, to discuss this subject. He lives with it on a daily or perhaps on an hourly basis. I know that what he has to tell us this morning is going to be both valuable and interesting.

It is a very real pleasure for me to welcome back to our platform Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and to introduce him to the members of both colleges.  
Mr. Dulles.

MR. DULLES: General Craig, Gentlemen:-

I always enjoy this annual meeting with you here. I don't predict how much longer I will be making these annual pilgrimages, but I have said that I would be in this job from now on as long as they will keep me. So I may be with you for a year or two more,

~~TOP SECRET~~

subject to the exigencies of life, politics, health and a few other things. Except for a bad cold, health is reasonably good at the moment.

I find it hard to meet all the specifications which General Craig has set forth. I approach this subject with a good deal of modesty, in part because I find that every time I sit down with a group of our own people there, that are fairly wise, I think, on this subject -- at least they are spending a lot of time on it and a certain amount of "dough" -- that there are some differences of views among us. I asked them to give me a few notes as the basis for my talk this morning, and so they gave me some notes. I pretty well tore them up and then wrote my own notes. So that I may find when I go back this morning later to my own shop -- I may find some indignant colleagues of mine, who - some of them, I think - may be here today -- who listened to what I have to say, will tell me that I am quite wrong.

I always enjoy particularly the question period afterward. I find that I get the most penetrating and sometimes the most difficult questions right here. And without giving away any secrets, I just had a cup of coffee with General Craig and his associates and they tell me that this is about the most belligerent class they have had for some time. So I am looking forward to the post-prandial question period.

I always find that when I come here you always give me a nice easy subject to discuss, although I must say that this year,

TOP SECRET

for some reason or other, in discussing the "Soviet Strategic Concepts" I find maybe less divergence of opinion than I have in the past when I have discussed related subjects here and at other of the military schools that I address from time to time during the year.

I will start out by giving a certain number of principles that I would consider guiding for Soviet strategy, with certain comments; then I will indicate how I think they are going to apply this stratification; and then a brief word at the conclusion as to its impact on American strategy in various parts of the world and where we stand:

1. The Communist leaders of the U.S.S.R. consider their basic objectives to be the consolidation and expansion of Soviet power. (Nothing very new to you in that.)

Their goal is the ultimate elimination of any power centers capable of competing with or threatening the U.S.S.R. Their objective is based in large part upon their interpretation of history derived from the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, doctrines which they used as a broad guide to their actions. The basic elements of this interpretation are:

- (1) the belief that significant social developments result only from forces in conflict; and
- (2) the belief that the final conflict will occur between capitalism and communism

TOP SECRET

and will result in the world-wide collapse of capitalism and its replacement by communism.

2. The key factor here is continuous conflict between opposing social systems.

It has been made clear by the Soviet spokesmen that while this may eventually take the form of open military war, there will be long periods between military wars. These periods Lenin calls "partial war". This is no less war to them; it is just a different kind of war. It involves using means other than full-scale military forces. Here is the area of operations to which they have devoted most of their attention since 1917, except, of course, when they were forced into war against their will in 1941. This is true because in their own view they have at no time possessed adequate military strength to invite open world-wide conflict with a world power, such as the United States is today and Germany was in 1940-'41.

In my conversation I had just before I came here I was discussing the interesting precedent of the Soviet-German relations in the period '39, '41, early '41, before the war. I imagine most of you or a great many of you have read the secret German documents that were found and published covering that period. I think myself that those documents are probably the most instructive papers that we have as a guide to the interpretation of Soviet policy.

I don't say that Soviet policy today is necessarily exactly what it was in 1940. I think the Soviets feel that their power position today is considerably better than it was in 1940 and that

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

therefore they could, if necessary, take risks that they would have shied away from in 1940. But I think that the general pattern of their policy of those days is reflected in many of their attitudes today. And I certainly recommend that you study those documents. I think the State Department has published them. What are they called? Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1940-'41? Something of that kind. If you haven't read them, I think all of you ought to read them.

The U. S. S. R., August 1939, concluded a treaty of non-aggression with Nazi Germany to buy additional time to strengthen their armed forces, and through the secret protocols with this treaty they established certain territorial spheres of interest in the Baltic, Poland and Southeast Europe.

While the Soviets looked upon Germany as the extreme capitalist or fascist state, with which war would be ultimately unavoidable, they felt that by establishing a modus vivendi between the U.S.S.R. and Germany they were in effect taking advantage of the possibility that Germany would be seriously weakened in a war with the other western capitalist powers. In this cause the U.S.S.R. has shown itself willing to enter into spheres of interest agreements in order to avoid the risk of open military conflict.

In a recent statement, 10 January -- just about four or five days ago -- Otto Kuusinen, a high ranking member of the CPSU likened the present policy of the United States to that of Hitler Germany; i. e., he pointed out we were anti-Communists; we were building up our armaments; we were, he said, seeking world domination;

TOP SECRET

and we hated the Soviet Union. In those respects he felt we were comparable to Nazi Germany.

This may be rather significant treatment of the U. S. position, and I think it contains certain clues to the present Soviet attitude toward the U. S. It reflects the belief of the Soviet leaders that the U. S. will become involved in capitalist wars or at least in capitalist depressions and that by establishing a modus vivendi with the United States for the short run the U.S.S.R. will be able to legitimize its control over the satellites and then take further advantage of wars and depressions of capitalist states to increase its area of expansion.

3. When the Soviets speak of peaceful coexistence, to them this is synonymous with partial war.

Despite their recent protestations, there is no reason to believe that they actually accept a concept of permanent or even continuing coexistence. They regard coexistence only as a situation of equilibrium forced upon them, that is, upon the U.S.S.R., by the international power balance which must eventually be replaced by another situation in which they have developed a more favorable power position.

I have a feeling that the Soviets' clever use of slogans has been about as damaging to us as their use of guns and explosives. Of course, they have taken our own symbols, words, such as "democracy", "freedom", and "freedom loving", and so forth and so on, and twisted and turned them. Now they are using "coexistence"

TOP SECRET

in the same way. It doesn't appeal so much on this side of the Atlantic, but it has a tremendous appeal, as you all realize, in certain parts of Europe and in certain parts of Asia. Goodness knows it is a very meaningless term. As long as we are on the same globe we have to be always fighting or always coexisting, and even when we fight we have to coexist to some extent because we can't push the other fellow off the globe.

But I don't know what we can do to sort of blot the edge of this weapon of sloganizing us into a defensive position in that field of propaganda.

In connection with this peaceful coexistence idea, I just want to give you a little quote from a speech that Joe Stalin made in 1927.—this was at the 15th Party Congress — which I think it is well to keep in mind so that you can quote back the Soviets from time to time as needed. Here is what Stalin said on that occasion:

We cannot forget the saying of Lenin to the effect that a great deal in the matter of our construction depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist countries, which is inevitable, but which may be delayed either until the proletarian revolution ripens in Europe or until colonial revolutions come fully to a head or, finally, until the capitalist countries fight among themselves over the division of the colonies. Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task with us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists of admitting the coexistence of the two opposing systems.

So that this term is a very old one and the idea is dragged

TOP SECRET



out from time to time as suits their theory.

4. While the Soviets have couched their program in the military terminology of strategy and tactics, they have always thought in much broader terms than the use of this terminology might seem to indicate.

Strategy has represented for them the general program of a long-range development of Communist power. Their study of tactics has provided them with the means for extending their power. Among these, direct military action has been only one among many tactics, and evidently a less desirable one as long as a formidable opposing power center exists. This is as true today as it was under Stalin, despite the many surface changes in the U.S.S.R. since the beginning of the Malenkov regime.

5. Neither their view of strategy or of tactics provide the Soviet leaders with any detailed blueprint for immediate policy decisions. They have to improvise on details, just as everyone else does, and they have had their reverses -- Korea, Tito, Iran, Greece, and others. But they do have guidelines to influence the shaping of general strategic planning and are ready to change their tactics as the power situation or the risks of war dictate.

I think we are far too inclined to attribute a kind of infallibility to the Soviet planners that they don't have. I think they have just about as much clay in their feet as our own planners do. In fact, I think if one looks over the past, it is hard to explain the stupidity of certain actions that they have taken --

~~TOP SECRET~~

why, for example, Stalin lashed out against Yugoslavia - I think it was in '48 - is almost incomprehensible. People talk today about Yugoslavia having left the Soviet Union. They didn't leave the Soviet Union; they were thrown out of the Soviet Union. And for a time they plead against the treatment that Stalin and Molotov were meting out to them. I don't see that they are going back; I don't think they are.

There was a mistake of policy, probably due to the vagaries of a stubborn old man who wouldn't be talked to, that is, Stalin himself. Obviously, they made a miscalculation in Korea. They were certain we wouldn't fight. They misjudged the Iranian situation, and, to some extent, the situation in Greece. They followed a technique with regard to the Marshall Plan which insured its passage in the United States, when, I have always felt, if they had adopted a suave, cooperative -- seemingly cooperative -- policy, they might have gone far toward defeating it.

At the present time I think that the Soviet maneuvers, their notes, the pressures they have put on have been our greatest aid in helping to push on the work of ratification of the Paris agreements. I think if the Soviet had kept quiet we would have had a much harder time. So that I don't think we need to get too discouraged on this business of the Soviet blueprint, if it exists.

I think they have, as I have indicated, their tactics under that, and I think maybe their overall strategy is sounder maybe than their particular tactics they are applying to reach their end

objective.

6. By and large, the broad aims of consolidation and expansion of Soviet power dictate at present a policy of perpetual probing to find weak spots in the non-Communist world and to exploit tactically, but by means short of general war, any weaknesses discovered.

This policy includes, as I have just indicated, a willingness, when they meet stiff opposition, to engage in tactical retreats.

7. As indicated, Soviet policy is tempered by the view that they are not yet ready to take on the United States and its allies in general war.

They recognize our nuclear superiority, as well as the fact that we have more effective means of delivering atomic attack. They have a healthy respect for our industrial capacity. They are unwilling to initiate any venture which might jeopardize their control over their own and the satellite governmental apparatus. I think that is very basic to Soviet policy. I may exaggerate, but it seems to me if we look at the course of their development in the field of aircraft production, particularly, that they started out recognizing the long lead that we had, they started out with a defensive type of plane, if one can call any plane defensive.

I don't believe much in the disarmament field. I am trying to separate arms into defensive and offensive. But certainly a MIG-15 is probably more defensive, except in tactical warfare, than a long-range bomber. In any event, it was somewhat surprising

to us that they did concentrate on the fighter interceptor and that type of plane for so long, until relatively recently -- the last two or three years -- they really turned to develop the long-range bomber. I think they were very worried about the possibility of an attack from the United States and consequently therefore in that type of weapon, as well as on radar, anti-aircraft and means to defend their old centers of power, political and industrial.

As I said before, I think that the Soviets probably consider that today they are relatively stronger than they have ever been at any time in their history -- in modern times, that is -- and that over the years will give them maybe a little more freedom and elbow room in their selection of policy.

In our own work and in our estimating the future we have to consider very carefully, of course, what will be the trend over the next three or four years with the possibility that the Soviets will be at the end of that time relatively in a better position, vis-a-vis the United States and our allies, than they are even today.

That brings up the whole question of a situation of when we have atomic plenty on both sides of the ideological world and what one will do when that situation arises. But I think, at least in our shop we have reached the conclusion, that the Soviet Union doesn't want a shooting war at this time.

8. Since the death of Stalin, the day-by-day details of some of the Soviet strategy within the general framework I have described are influenced additionally by internal Soviet factors.

TOP SECRET

The factors I have been discussing before have been largely of a general nature. Among these factors are these: The development of the new collective leadership, the need for bringing to focus a more than one point of view in policy decisions, the possibility that a struggle for power within the oligarchy might break over some major issues of economic or foreign policy.

I have never felt that this committee form of government that was established after Stalin died was likely to be a permanent form of government in the Soviet Union. On that I think some of my observers differ from me. It may last some years.

The committee form of government was somewhat rudely shaken by the Beria incident and Beria found himself no longer a member of the committee.

We have a good deal of speculation going on today as to the relative position of Malenkov and Khrushchev. It is one of the most interesting studies. Malenkov has been quiet for a long while and allowed Khrushchev to do the talking. Khrushchev has also been signing a number of decrees, where one would expect to find the signature of Malenkov there also. How significant that is is very hard to tell. In the reports that we have had of conversations, where both Malenkov and Khrushchev have been present, it looks as though Malenkov was willing to let Khrushchev play the part of maybe Peck's Bad Boy and do the needling and the talking, and he sits there quite benevolently, quite happy, according to these reports, letting Khrushchev make a little bit of a fool of

TOP SECRET

himself from time to time and not worrying too much about it. That may be the case -- it may be that Khrushchev, who is a pretty dynamic fellow, isn't afraid to make mistakes, isn't afraid to say things, maybe pushing up.

That seems to be the possible center of friction insofar as the internal Soviet machine is concerned.

And then you have the problem as to what part the army might play in the event there is a conflict between these two major leaders, Malenkov and Khrushchev. So that whole picture, the internal political picture, may be one of the breaks upon the development of their foreign policy. They have to keep that always in mind.

I perhaps should mention Molotov. The impression we get is that Molotov is not taking a very active part in the domestic political area, that he is given within limits quite a few hands in developing his own foreign policies -- I say "within limits" -- and that he is content with that. There are questions from time to time as to his health. He doesn't seem to have quite the vigor he had ten years ago, but that is true of some of the rest of us too probably.

Word that has reached us has indicated that conferences like the Berlin Conference and the Geneva Conference, and some others, Molotov's attitude was very different than it used to be in the old days of Stalin. In the old days of Stalin he would debate and debate, avoid reaching decisions until he could get

TOP SECRET

a clear-cut cable from Joe Stalin in Moscow. Now he is perfectly ready, without referring to Moscow, to reach decisions on relatively important points that concern the Soviet Union. If the issue concerns Communist China, then he is pretty careful.

Going back now to the internal framework and its effect on Soviet strategy -- I have mentioned briefly the internal conflicts as one of the breaks on policy. I think there are certain economic problems too, the necessity for a new look -- economic policy which will give more recognition to consumer demand, the need for a better development of their agricultural program. And, of course, this new economic policy has some influence upon their military program. I don't think it has a great deal, however. It may result in a kind of leveling off, diversion of some steel maybe and some other things from the military to the internal domestic program. I doubt that it will have a very drastic effect in this field. But, however, this whole internal economic situation, plus their agricultural situation, which is one of their most serious problems, is another factor to be taken into account in the overall development of Soviet strategy.

I suggest that, if you haven't already done so, one of the interesting fields of study would be the agricultural situation -- a study of the Soviets' agricultural situation. They are making desperate efforts to develop new areas of grain production, and their whole food situation will depend to some extent on the success of those efforts. A really serious crop failure in the Ukraine

TOP SECRET

would confront them with some pretty difficult problems. They haven't had any serious crop failures recently, however.

9. The Soviet leaders will continue to emphasize all other means of conducting what they regard as inevitable conflict with the non-Communist world; that is, all other means than of open warfare.

These other means may perhaps be labeled subversive activities, although many of them are carried in overt rather than clandestine fashion. This is an area of activity in which they have numerous tactical directions from Lenin and Stalin which they have long experienced and have had considerable success.

Their past successes in this area may in fact further support a decision on their part to make these, that is, the cold war techniques, subversive techniques; to make these the continuing key instrument of Soviet expansion, always firmly backdropped, of course, by this threat inherent in a strong military posture.

Those are the nine principles of Soviet strategy as I see them today.

Now very briefly I would like to go into some of the weapons they have in their arsenal to carry out this strategic concept and to use the weapons of their choice in this period of what you call either coexistence or partial warfare.

They, of course, as I have just indicated, will maintain a strong military posture. They will continue to concentrate on the defense of the homeland in every possible way and to protect the homeland against the potential danger of nuclear attack on our



part. They will, of course, continue now to build up their long-range bomber strength as a potential counter weapon against us, and they will try to reach that situation of nuclear enoughness or sufficiency which they believe would give them a further elbow room in policy.

Of course, this strong military base for carrying on their cold war activities is of a tremendous help to them. It is this which keeps the satellites in order, both through direct occupation in the case of countries like Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary. And in the case of Czechoslovakia it is the threat of Soviet power which helps to keep them in order. These, however, are the weapons that they hope they will not have to use at the moment. They will turn to the increased use of their cold war weapons.

I have mentioned their propaganda machine. This is well coordinated, and they select from time to time long-range objectives in the propaganda field which we have sometimes mistaken as stylistic, and I think in the future we will have to take some of them more seriously.

Going back to their bacteriological warfare charge against us in the Korean war -- when that first came out I think a good many of us were inclined to think: Well, this is of no importance, and so forth, and so on, and laughed it off. It would have been much better if we had hit it right from the beginning. And I think we have got to watch the Soviet propaganda machine and their theses and not let them start to run away around the right end with a propaganda

weapon of this kind. They got the bacteriological campaign pretty well going in many parts of the world before we woke up to the fact that it was a real danger. That is just an example.

Occasionally I think, as I mentioned before, their propaganda machine goes wrong. I think their whole attitude toward the Marshall Plan, as I mentioned -- I think they were very foolish from their own point of view. I think that \_\_\_\_\_ played their hand in connection with the Paris agreements and the rearmament of Germany. We, of course, know that the opposition to the rearmament of Germany is the one thing they want to block. I don't think their propaganda is directed to doing just that. I think, on the other hand, it is directed towards helping us and the world to get that particular thing through.

I think we have quite a lot of work to do to study more carefully the Soviet propaganda machine and to be a little more agile ourselves in meeting their propaganda drives right at the beginning.

Their second weapon in the cold war that I have listed is their satellites. As you know, they use the satellite organizations throughout the world very largely for their own ends. I am not including China here as a satellite. The Czech, Polish, and other diplomatic and consular installations are at the beck and call of the Kremlin. And the satellite armies, of course, would be available, as well as the satellite internal security forces and others. Despite that fact, I am personally more encouraged

by developments in the satellites in the last year than I have been in the many years since I have been in Washington.

Instead of finding the satellites easier to handle in the past year, 1954, I think it has been one of the worst years for the Soviets in the satellites, particularly in Poland and Hungary, and to some extent in Czechoslovakia. However, they have them as weapons and allies in the cold war, as yet.

China, as I say, is a junior partner, is not used, and cannot be directly used as a satellite. And one of the most interesting questions, I think, to follow will be: How far can the Soviets control Communist China's actions in Southeast Asia? Will it be possible for the Soviets to work out, in developing their cold war techniques, a common line of action in Indo-China, in Thailand, in Burma? How far would the Soviets like to see Communist China go there? How much restraining influence will they bring to bear? I just throw that out from the point of view of the tactics of the immediate future as a problem that deserves our most careful study.

Another important weapon in their arsenal is the Communist Parties in the Free World. These parties are the strongest in France and Italy. They are very influential in Indonesia, dangerously so. The coming elections in Japan are going to raise very interesting questions as to what progress the Communist Party there will make, and other parts of the world, including various areas in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Chile.

These parties are extraordinarily useful to the Soviets, and the Free World has nothing really comparable to them, because here you have what purports to be a domestic political organism, the hard core of which is really run from Moscow.

I have felt right along that in order to defeat Soviet strategy we should direct our attention to doing everything we can to destroy these Communist Parties. Of course, that has to be done working with and through the local political leaders in countries like France and Italy. I personally think that today we have a better chance to move in on the Communist Party in Italy than we ever had before; the Party seems to be split. And it would be a major step forward for the Free World and a major blow to Soviet strategy if that Party could be seriously weakened. And I hope that next year, when the French elections come along, similar steps can be taken with regard to the French Communist Party. But today these Parties are strong weapons in their hands in developing their cold war techniques.

Comparable to them are the Communist trade unions and the WFTU, the central organization of the Communist trade unions. Here is another major target, just as it is from the Soviet point of view a major asset in developing their subversive techniques.

They have in addition, of course, a wide variety of front organizations — the World Peace Movement that deceived a lot of our people in the United States with the Stockholm Petition. There are various youth groups, women's organizations, lawyers' organizations,

artistic organizations, and the like. They have dozens of front organizations with beautiful names that operate throughout the Free World, particularly at the present time in western Europe, and which serve the Soviet subversive apparatus.

We are learning more about all these front organizations and we are learning a great deal more about the hard core of the Soviet apparatus from the defectors that have come over in the last year or so. I think the time is coming when we ought to find some ways of publicizing far more than we do today just what these front organizations are, just how the Soviet apparatus works. They will change from time to time in their techniques, but I think there is quite a lot of educational work to be done there and that it would throw the Soviet off balance if we did more of this.

We are working now to get out a good deal of publicity with regard to the Soviet penetration of the Iranian military forces. That apparatus has been uncovered and the details of it ought to be made available, I think, over the next six months. That is just one small example, but I think we can go around the world and begin to debunk and disclose the nature of the Soviet machine.

Now assuming that our analysis, or my analysis, so far is reasonably correct as to the overall strategy, as to the fact that they will move in the field of subversive warfare, I think the next interesting question -- and this I will leave with you more as a question -- is: Where is this strategy going to be developed? That is -- Where are they going to attempt to use all these subversive

TOP SECRET

and cold war means of warfare.

I have listed what seemed to me to be the soft spots as far as this technique is concerned. This is, however, subject to debate. I have put down first: Southeast Asia; and in that area in this order: Indo-China, Indonesia, and Burma. Obviously, Southern Viet Nam is the most difficult situation we have to face today and the most critical from the point of view of maintaining it for the Free World. Indonesia follows it a little ways off, and Burma is an area that must be regarded as somewhat soft from the point of view of the Sino-Soviet strategy.

I have put down next: Japan as a problem child because of its very difficult economic situation, because of the over-population of the country, because of the great difficulty of finding outlets for that dynamic people, who can hardly be held on those small islands unless we can open up, or there can be opened up, some trade outlets. And while the Communist menace there is not serious, I think over the next five or ten years it is an area of critical importance.

I have listed next: the Middle East, particularly because of the Arabic-Israelic situation and because of certain soft spots, particularly Syria. I think that overall we have made quite a little progress in the Middle East. The situation there is looking up, but still you couldn't take it entirely off the danger list.

I have put down next: Africa. This whole great area of black Africa will present for the Communists a fertile area of

TOP SECRET

operations. In my opinion they have not gone in there to any great extent up to the present time because they have not trained up the apparatus to do it.

The Soviets are fairly careful in their tactics. They don't send bubble puppies into these areas down there. They try to train people fairly carefully so that when they go in they will do a reasonable job. If they are not ready to do a reasonable job, they don't attack the particular area. We may have a few years before that will become serious, but I think we have to watch that very carefully, and we ought to get going on it now.

I have mentioned South America. There are certain areas of South America that are disturbing, particularly Brazil and Chile, at the moment from the point of view of the growth of the Communist influence. I put it fairly low on the list of immediate dangers, and I do not think it is yet one of the main targets of the Soviet covert apparatus. We must remember that these people aren't twelve feet tall. They train a great many workers. They have excellent schooling facilities, but it isn't easy to get a lot of people very quickly. When you go into this type of work, as I say, you have got to send carefully trained people. I can assure you that a few badly trained agents in a critical situation can do you an awful lot of harm. The Soviets know that very well, and so before they go into a country of Latin America they want to be sure that they have got some very able people to do it, carefully trained, who are not likely to defect or stub their toes and fall into the hands of the local

police. And in some parts of South America the local police are getting a little bit better than they were.

Maybe to your surprise I put Europe last on this list of soft spots. I think the situation over the last three or four years has been steadily improving. The economic situation of some of the countries of Europe is better than it has been for several decades. While I think the Communist Parties of France, Italy, and the Communist trade unions in those two countries are as I stated, menaces, I think they are menaces that could with courage and vigor be handled. And I put it rather low on the list because I think the mechanisms for handling the Communist subversive apparatus are being developed, and what our Gruenther and others are doing through NATO has had a great part in that happy development.

I have exceeded my time here and your subject didn't really call for conclusions; I was merely asked to indicate what I thought the Soviet strategy was going to be. But despite my cold and a few other things, I feel pretty optimistic as I look at this situation. We have made real progress.

I think there is far too much of a tendency to indicate we are on the defensive everywhere. We have got a hard fight in Southern VietNam; but taking the world as a whole, I think we are relatively in a better position in meeting the cold war techniques and holding our own and holding back in certain areas the Communist menace than we have been at almost any other time in the last few



~~TOP SECRET~~

years. And I think we are developing techniques, developing knowledge of what they are trying to do. I think with courage and vigor we can look to the future with a good deal of hope.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

**TOP SECRET**

**SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET**

<b>DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION</b>		<b>REGISTRY</b>
<b>SOURCE</b> <i>OCI</i>	<i>Feature presented National War College - 10 Jan 55</i>	<b>CIA CONTROL NO.</b> <i>103517</i>
<b>DOC. NO.</b>		<b>DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED</b> <i>8/18/55</i>
<b>DOC. DATE</b>		<b>LOGGED BY</b> <i>ER</i>
<b>COPY NO.</b> <i>104</i>		
<b>NUMBER OF PAGES</b> <i>25</i>		
<b>NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS</b> <i>7100-352-13</i>		

**ATTENTION:** This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of handling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY	
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE

**NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:** When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

<b>THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:</b>	<b>BY (Signature)</b>	
<b>DOWNGRADED</b> <input type="checkbox"/>		
<b>DESTROYED</b> <input type="checkbox"/>		
<b>DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO</b>	<b>OFFICE</b>	<b>DATE</b>

**TOP SECRET**