# Approved For Release 2003/09/02: \$1/4-RDF8018014676R000700180004-4

# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 18, 1961

BY LIAISON

### FBI REVIEW COMPLETED 8/19/2003

Honorable John A. McCone Director Central Intelligence Agency Administration Building 2430 E Street, N. W. Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. McCone:

Material contained in the enclosed memorandum was supplied by sources who have furnished reliable information in the past. Information in this memorandum concerns relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Albanian Party of Labor.

Because of the sensitive nature of our sources, we have classified this communication and its enclosure "Top Secret." This information is being furnished to other appropriate officials of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

Approved For Release 2003/09/02: SAFROP 80 B0 1676R000700180004-4 173091

### TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000700180004-4



# UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 18, 1961

# RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ALBANIAN PARTY OF LABOR

The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was held in Moscow, Russia, in October, 1961.

# Briefing on "Albanian Situation"

At the outset of the above Congress, a detailed briefing on the "Albanian situation" was presented to the various fraternal delegations by representatives of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Individuals active in this briefing were V. Korianov, a deputy to Boris N. Ponomarev, the head of the International Department; Nikolai Vladimirovich Mostovets, the head of the North and South American Section, International Department; and Aleksei Andreevich Grechukhin, an assistant to Mostovets. This briefing was continued on a regular basis throughout the duration of this Congress.

While in the initial and many subsequent briefings on this matter these individuals spoke directly of Albania and the Albanian Party of Labor, the inference was clear that their remarks were also intended to apply equally to the Chinese and the Communist Party of China (CPC). The purpose of the briefings was to convey to the various communist and workers' parties the seriousness of the situation and to determine the attitudes of such parties toward the Albanians and the Chinese.

These individuals in their briefings pointed out that today Albania is mobilized and on a war footing. They claimed that the Albanians have surrounded the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, Albania, with tanks and that Soviet citizens could not move freely in Albania. Throughout Albania there is a continuing arrest of Albanian citizens who might express some sympathy toward the Soviet Union. They noted that the Albanians are still holding certain Soviet ships and will not release them.

### TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R0007001800043409/

Copy 10/1

### Revelations by Soviet Officials Concerning Other Communist Parties

These briefings also brought forth the following information furnished by the Soviet officials.

The Communist Party (CP) of Malaya, which now maintains headquarters in exile in China, is a virtual prisoner of the Chinese. The Malayan Party is split and some members are looking for a way out of the situation in which they now find themselves in China.

The CP of Japan is 100 per cent in the pay of the Chinese. Because of this situation, and due to the proximity of Japan to China, the CP of Japan fully supports the Chinese.

The CP of Indonesia is in the pay of the Chinese. Dipa N. Adit, General Secretary of the CP of Indonesia, is a "stooge" of President Sukarno of Indonesia.

The Workers' Party of Vietnam agrees with the Chinese due to the proximity of Vietnam to China.

Kim Il-sung, head of the Korean Party of Labor, is presently playing a dual role in this situation, attempting to maintain friendship with both the CPSU and the CPC.

The CPC became so loud and boisterous in its support of the Albanians that the Soviet Union contemplated sending an official delegation of protest to China.

#### Net Result

Throughout these discussions, the individual representatives from the International Department of the Central Committee, CPSU, did not make an outright request for the various communist parties to support the position of the CPSU, but they did influence these parties to take a position in this matter. The net result of the efforts of the CPSU was shown in the 100 per cent support of the Soviet position which was given by the communist parties located in North and South America.

· S				P SEC					
UNCLASSI to SECRET	FIED when blank — TO wikeppitiseethFiormRed								graded
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ND COAR	R SHI	SET F	OR TO	OP SECE	RET DOCUME	INT	
DOCUMEN							REGISTRY		
FBI						173			
DOC. NO.								UMENT RECEIVED	
DOC. DATE 18 Dec 61								9 Dec 61	
COPY NO. #1							LOGGED B		
NUMBER OF PAGES 1(3t) NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS								emg/er	
one									
transmitted or duties relate t and indicate p indicate the d	This form will be placed or fop Secret within the CIA utside of CIA. Access to To the matter. Top Secret (period of custody in the leate of handling in the righ	op Secret mat Control Officer	ter is li	mited to	Top Seci	ret Control	such time as it is personnel and thos	downgraded, destro e individuals whose	yed, o officia
REFERRED TO		D	RELEASED				SEEN BY		
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	/	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE
ER	/	12/17	/6/	12/2	1 <i>9/4)</i> 1/4,				-
									······································
				-					
NOTICE OF DE	TACHMENT: When this for to Central Top Secret Co	orm is detach	ed from rd.	Top Secr	et mater	rial it shall	be completed in the	appropriate spaces	below
0	BY (Sign	~	ESTROY	ED	P	DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)			
Y (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)				BY (Signature)			
PFICE	Approved For Pol	0FF1CE	ທດທາ	. СІЛ 🗆	DATE	201676D	0FF1CE	DATE	

FORM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

25X1