

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS MADE IN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
OR RAISED CONFIDENTIALLY WITH US BY OTHER MEMBERS

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I. In Committee I (Regulation of all Armaments and Armed Forces).

1. USSR Proposal (DC/2, 7 February 1952).

- a. The Disarmament Commission should recommend to the General Assembly that it consider the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and mass destruction, to be at variance with the conscience and honor of peoples and incompatible with UN membership.
- b. The Disarmament Commission should recommend that the General Assembly proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, prohibition and the institution of control to be put into effect simultaneously.
- c. The Disarmament Commission should prepare and submit to the Security Council by 1 June 1952, a draft convention providing measures ensuring implementation of the General Assembly decision on prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes and the establishment of strict international control over observance of this convention.
- d. The US, the UK, France, China and the USSR should reduce armaments and armed forces by 1/3 within one year from the date of the adoption of this recommendation.
- e. International control organs should be established, within the framework of the Security Council, to supervise implementation of the decisions on prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to verify data submitted by states regarding armaments and armed forces.
- f. In order to establish an appropriate system of guarantees for observing the General Assembly's decisions on prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments, the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of states.
- g. All states should be convened in a world conference, not later than July 15, 1952, to consider the question of substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also practical measures to prohibit the atomic weapon and establish international control over observance of such prohibition.

State Dept. review completed

2. USSR

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2. UNSR Proposal Contained in their suggested plan of work for the Commission, calling for consideration of the question of violation of the prohibition of bacteriological warfare, the banning of the use of bacteriological weapons, and calling to account those who violate such ban (DC/4, 19 March 1952, II)

3. French Suggestions Made on April 4, 1952.

a. Atomic weapons prohibition could not be effective without strict international control.

b. A tentative definition for "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" was such weapons comprised either those capable of destroying at one blow a total of human lives substantially exceeding losses brought about by conventional weapons, or those which destroy the enemy without the use of metal or explosive substances.

c. In the conventional armaments field, armed forces and armaments might be limited for a certain period of time on the basis of a level determined by the disclosure and verification process. As for reduction, the goal is to reduce armed forces to a minimum recognized as necessary, utilizing three possible methods:

(i) Agreeing upon a priori criteria and establishing a reduction formula taking into account demographic, geographic and economic factors.

(ii) The method of absolute values, consisting in assigning states to different groups and deciding arbitrarily the maximum figures for each group.

(iii) The method of tasks to be performed, analysing the forces strictly necessary to states when a collective security system is finally established, and taking into account forces needed for the security of metropolitan territory and dependent territories, and forces to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. On a temporary basis, during the interim period prior to finally establishing the collective security system, to the above elements might be added those armed forces needed for this interim period. In calculating total forces required for a state, the metropolitan forces might be 25 or 30 percent of the population, and "doubled for the over-seas territories" (it is not clear whether this means 50 percent or 60 percent of the over-seas population, or 12½ to 15 percent of this population). In any event, reduction must be balanced so that countries would go from the maximum to the minimum level without jeopardizing or lessening their national security.

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d. An initial balance might be struck between atomic and conventional arms, by which prohibiting the atomic weapon would require disbanding, say, 100 divisions on the Soviet side, assuming an initial surplus of 100 atomic bombs for the West and 100 divisions for the Soviets. (EC/C.1/77.1, 4 April 1952, pages 11-35).

4. US Proposal of "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program"
(EC/C.1/1, 24 April 1952).

This document is contained in the disarmament book prepared for the members of the Panel of Consultants.

II. In Committee II (Disclosure and Verification of all Armaments, Including Atomic, and all Armed Forces).

1. USM Proposal (EC/2, 7 February 1952).

a. Not later than one month after the General Assembly adopts decisions on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the 1/3 reduction of armaments and armed forces of the Big Five Powers, all States should submit complete official data on the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including data on the atomic weapons and military bases in foreign countries as of the time of the General Assembly decisions referred to above.

b. An international control organ should be established within the framework of the Security Council, to supervise implementation of the decisions on prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and to verify data submitted by states regarding the situation of their armaments and armed forces.

c. The international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, but shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of states.

2. US Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments (EC/C.2/1, 3 April 1952).

~~This document was originally EC/C.2/1/a, a copy of which is attached as Annex 1.~~ *Included in Background Book I, under "D"*

3. French Views on Disclosure and Verification, May 9, 1952.

4. Moch gave his general views on disclosure and verification, withholding submission of detailed proposals until agreement could be reached in principle, although noting that the French Government had approved the details.

a. Disclosure and verification should be progressive and continuing, in three stages:

(i) information

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- (i) information on the general volume of armed forces.
- (ii) information on the organization of the armed forces.
- (iii) information on the operational value of armed forces.

b. In regard to verification, there are five principles:

(i) each phase of disclosure would be followed by a period of verification.

(ii) verification should be positive or negative. Positive verification would enable establishing the exactness of information supplied, and negative verification would ensure no important disclosure had been omitted.

(iii) verification, at the choice of the controllers, should be carried out on evidence or on the spot, or both on evidence and on the spot;

(iv) verification should include every opportunity for corroborating information by whatever means the controlling authority might consider appropriate;

(v) verification in a particular stage would refer only to the objects included in that phase or prior phases, but not in future phases.

c. The principle of verification on the spot implies complete freedom of movement throughout national territory and free access to any place, including the right of aerial inspection when indispensable.

d. Disclosure and verification cannot be isolated from the regulation of armaments as a whole. Thus, disclosure cannot be exclusively applied before the agreements covering regulation are applied.

e. Each phase of disclosure, once completed and verified, should lead to the automatic putting into force of a procedure of limitation, reduction or prohibition.

f. Atomic disclosure should be adapted to the phases dealing with conventional armaments. Disclosure dealing with conventional armaments should correspond to the disclosure dealing with atomic weapons, and the total of disclosures on conventional weapons should be equal to the total of disclosures on atomic weapons. (DC/C.2/W.4, 9 May 1952, pages 6-17, 28-30).

III. Confidential

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III. Confidential Proposals.

1. French draft disarmament treaty submitted to US Delegation on April 23, 1952.

This treaty made references to the composition and functions of the control organ, expansion of the control organ to control types of conventional armaments and atomic energy, and a plan for reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. However, the Annexes covering these points were not included. The principal provisions of the treaty called for:

- a. Prohibiting manufacture of atomic weapons on completing the first stage of disclosure and verification but prior to establishing any international control of atomic energy and prior to reducing armed forces and conventional armaments.
- b. Destroying existing stocks of atomic weapons at the end of the third stage of disclosure and verification and prior to beginning the reduction of armed forces and armaments.
- c. Prohibiting all scientific research intended to create or develop mass destruction weapons and publicity of all scientific research, at the end of the third stage of disclosure and verification.
- d. Substantially equating verification or inspection with control over atomic energy.
- e. The Annex concerning disclosure and verification did not contain the section dealing with atomic energy. So far as armed forces and non-atomic armaments are concerned, unlike the draft treaty, these proposals have been approved by the French Government. The first stage calls for information on the general volume of the power of states, including personnel in the armed forces (active and reserve), materiel information, supporting facilities and munitions factories, over-all budget of the armed forces, and general structure of the defense ministry. The second stage calls for information on organization of air, sea and ground forces and their supporting equipment; itemized defense budgets; and detailed structure of the individual armed forces ministries. The third stage involves information on the operational worth of personnel and materiel, including standards and nature of training, performance of supporting equipment, as well as order of battle. The information called for by this three-stage disclosure is substantially less than that called for in the US proposals.

2. UK comments regarding the US proposals for disclosure and verification, submitted on April 28, 1952.

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a. The US preferred eight stages of disclosure and verification: (inspection of basic training establishments; army, navy and air force reserve units; arms training units, elementary and intermediate flying schools, and corresponding navy establishments; schools of instructions; examination of field units and formations; operational squadrons and ships in service; ordnance depots; armaments factories; and experimental establishments).

b. It would be better to make the early disclosures involve less sensitive matters than proposed in stages one and two of the US plan, so that verification would be correspondingly easier and possibly more acceptable to the Soviets.

c. The most arguable feature of the US verification proposals is the use of aerial survey in the first stage, which will obviously be objected to by the Soviets. It is essential to the success of Western proposals that they should appear to the rest of the world to be so reasonable that the Soviet Union can have no excuse for rejecting them.

d. The US disclosure and verification proposals should be related as closely as possible to concurrent proposals for reduction, since disclosure and verification is an essential part of any plan for reduction.

3. Tentative US Proposals for Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces (RAC (NS) 124, April 30, 1952).

These proposals, previously *discussed with* ~~approved by~~ the Consultants, are awaiting final clearance before submission to the Disarmament Commission as a working paper. The principal provisions of these proposals are as follows:

a. All states having substantial military forces should agree to reduce them to fixed maximum levels.

b. As a basis for discussion, the maximum level of armed forces should not exceed the lower of either 1% of population or a fixed numerical ceiling of, say, between 1,000,000-1,500,000. Relatively minor adjustments upward and downward should be made in some areas to avoid disequilibria of power dangerous to international peace. While states should not be permitted to exceed maximum levels, they should not be required to raise their armed forces to such levels.

c. The agreed reduction might commence when the international control organ responsible for regulation of armed forces and armaments finds that an appropriate stage of disclosure and verification had been completed.

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d. The initial reductions should be followed by appropriate further reductions, bearing in mind the obvious connection between solution of current major political issues, reduction of tensions, and limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

4. UK Suggestions for Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces and Armaments, May 3, 1952.

After being informed of the general outline of the US proposals for numerical limitation, the UK delegation suggested:

a. All states should agree initially to reduce their forces below a maximum limit of 1,500,000 men.

b. Within this maximum limit, forces should be reduced to:

(i) A force not exceeding 1/4 of 1% of the population of territories for the administration of which they are responsible.

(ii) A force not exceeding 1% of the population of metropolitan territories;

c. The British believe that dependent areas should be separated from metropolitan areas, so that emphasis can be placed on maintaining law and order and protecting inhabitants of dependent areas, without over-emphasizing interest in overseas territories and without giving the advantage to the Western Powers over the Soviet bloc which would be received by lumping together dependent and metropolitan populations as the basis for the 1% - 1,500,000 men limitation on armed forces.

5. French Views on Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces, May 7, 1952.

The French Delegation thought it difficult to accept the distinction between metropolitan and dependent areas proposed by the UK, as cited above. In discussion between the UK, French and US delegations, it was suggested:

a. The US, USSR and China might be limited to 1,500,000 men each.

b. The UK and France might be limited to 750,000 men each.

c. The number of forces to be allocated to other countries individually could be negotiated on a basis of 1% of population with adjustments to avoid disequilibria of power in certain areas dangerous to peace.

6. Pakistan

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6. Pakistan Draft Proposal of Essential Principles of Disarmament
Treaty, May 9, 1952.

The Pakistan Representative on the Disarmament Commission has suggested a means of tying together the general principles for disarmament submitted by the US on April 24, disclosure and verification, and reduction and limitation. The principal elements are as follows:

- a. A system of international control of atomic energy is to become effective at the end of the sixth stage of a seven stage disarmament program, and prior to eliminating existing atomic weapon stock piles and other weapons of mass destruction. The nature of the control organ is not described.
- b. There is to a draft convention on prohibition of bacteriological and chemical warfare, the terms of which are not set forth.
- c. Disclosure and verification is cut to three stages, utilizing the proposals made by the US by combining the five stages in the US plan to make three stages.
- d. Reduction of armed forces is based apparently on a "police component" idea, with a time-table for reduction by which armed forces are reduced at stage IV to $\frac{1}{2}$ of the difference between the present strength and the final permitted strength, and are reduced at stage VI to the final strength. No idea is given concerning the levels to which reduction should be brought, nor the means for reaching such levels.
- e. Manufacture of atomic and novel weapons should be suspended upon completing reduction of armed forces and armaments. While permissible categories of weapons are to be reduced, there is no suggestion regarding the levels to which they should be reduced nor the means for attaining such reduction. However, the reduction is to be made in the light of national security and the fulfilling of international obligations in accordance with the UN Charter.
- f. There is no provision for allocating permitted armed forces within national military establishments.
- g. The Pakistan proposal apparently considers disclosure and verification (particularly inspection) as substantially equivalent to control, despite the reference to the draft convention for international control of atomic energy. This interpretation is supported by the provision calling for suspending manufacture of atomic weapons and operations converting atomic

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raw or feed materials into fissionable or fusionable matter, as well as by the provision stopping expansion of atomic energy installations -- all this before a control system is put into effect.

b. No distinction is drawn between peaceful and military production of atomic energy, since there is to be stoppage of all physical expansion in installations directly or indirectly concerned with atomic energy production in Stage II of the Pakistan plan.

i. Manufacture of conventional armaments is suspended at the same time that armed forces and armaments are reduced to $\frac{1}{2}$ the difference between present and permitted strengths.

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