




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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



6 February 1964

S-154/AP-3

SUBJECT: (U) DIA/CIIC Briefings Before Congressional Military Reserve Groups

TO: Brig. Gen. Ernest C. Hardin  
Office of Secretary of Defense

1. In response to your request with respect to frequency and content of briefings presented to Congressional Military Reserve Groups by the DIA Current Intelligence and Indications Center, the following information is supplied:

a. DIA/CIIC presents 15-20 minute current intelligence briefings to three military reserve groups on Capitol Hill as follows:

(1) 9999th Air Reserve Squadron. Each Tuesday at 0800 for the period January through August.

(2) The Army Reserve Group. Each Tuesday at 0830 for the period January through August.

(3) Naval Reserve Group. Intermittently. No regular schedule. Briefings, when given, are usually of 30 to 40 minutes duration.

2. Briefings to the 9999th Air Reserve Group were commenced under ACSI/USAF jurisdiction in 1960. Upon the establishment of DIA and the centralization of all current intelligence resources the responsibility was assumed by DIA's Current Intelligence and Indications Center. [redacted] Chief of the CIIC, has been the normal briefer over this entire period. DIA, in the instance of this and other reserve group briefings, is merely providing current intelligence support to a departmental program. Briefings for the Army Reserve Group were commenced late in 1962 while presentations have been made before the Navy Reserve Group beginning in 1962.

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DIA and DOS review(s)  
completed.

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DIA

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3. All briefings are provided as part of the readiness training of the reserve officers enrolled and at the SECRET level. No sensitive intelligence is used.
4. Insofar as the briefings for the 9999th Air Reserve Squadron are concerned (and this applies equally to similar briefings provided to the Army and Navy reserve groups), only routine intelligence items classified up to include SECRET levels are used. Some effort is made to tailor the briefings to reflect the weapons systems orientation of the particular group being briefed. However, major developments on the world scene at any particular time are covered insofar as routine, non-sensitive intelligence availability will permit.
5. In the recent briefings before the 9999th Air Reserve Squadron (specifically those presented on 4 February; 28, 21 and 14 January) some references to routine intelligence provided U.S. Ambassadors on various current intelligence subjects (as normal content of intelligence produced) were used as in the past. On 4 February the following extract was used from a CONFIDENTIAL report from the American Embassy in Leopoldville:

"The Kwilu crisis has been threatening since last August when it was first reported that Pierre Mulele, Parti-Soldaire African Deputy and strong supporter of Antoine Gizenga and later Gizenga Stanleyville Regime's Foreign Representative at Cairo, had returned from Peking. Concern increased through succeeding months in GOC and Leopoldville western diplomatic circles. With New Year reports that Mulele forces, generally known as "JEUNESSE" because of adolescent age range of ranks, had opened reign of terror against provincial authorities in Eastern and Southern Kwilu by increased attacking and burning administrative posts, cutting bridges and sinking ferries. However, it was murder of three Catholic priests at Kelembe and appeals by Belgian Embassy and American Protestant missionaries to UNOC for help in evacuating mission stations under attack which brought current crisis to head and to world attention.

## II. PRESENT SITUATION:

UNOC and missionary sources with whom Embassy is maintaining close contact, both in field and Leopoldville, report situation roughly as follows as of early Jan. 30 before impending large-scale and counter-attack has been mounted.

**SECRET**

"JEUNESSE forces are operating over area approximately 15,000 sq. kilometers (Kikwit, Kintshua, Loanji River and Kisanji). They are armed with spears, bows and home-made steel head arrows capable of killing. Unknown number captured weapons are in their possession and on one occasion automatic weapon was used against UNOC reconnaissance plane and rifle was fired at ANC plane. At Kisanji, JEUNESSE made first reported use of truck to haul away mission furnishings. There are reports from varied sources that weapons are being moved into area via river and overland routes.

"JEUNESSE are presently convinced by teaching of Mulele himself that they are invulnerable to bullets shot at them from ground by ANC and others. Using standard Bantu philosophy Mulele teaches that his forces come from land on which they are fighting and receive support from vital force of that land; that mercenary ANC does not benefit from vital force and will soon run out of foreign manufactured bullets and be vanquished. Occasional youth who is actually killed by bullets is, they say, not following all the rules. One taboo which if broken will remove invulnerability is eating peanuts and water. They do believe, however, that bullets shot from air will kill them, peanuts or not. Although bulk of JEUNESSE range from 14-19 or 20, some are as young as 11 and leaders range from around 25 to 40."

On 28 January another extract from a State Department report from Leopoldville was used. It related to an earlier CONFIDENTIAL description on the same subject--the Kwilu Province uprising.

While notes used for the 21 and 14 January presentations have been discarded, it is quite likely that items used had some reference to routine non-sensitive information supplied by the Department of State which had been incorporated in DIA/CIIC published material.

6. A copy of the briefing used on 4 February is inclosed.

7. All briefings before these groups employ graphic aids and the lead graphic (used just prior to commencement and upon conclusion of the briefings) points out that the top level of the briefing is SECRET, and the Commanders, in introducing the intelligence briefers, point out that the


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

information provided in the briefings is given to the reservists only in their capacity as Reserve Officers in a training readiness program and is governed by pertinent military security regulations. No notes are made by any of the attendees at the reserve meetings and no recording is made of the briefing.

8. Intermittent "one-time" current intelligence briefings are given to other Reserve Groups such as the Armed Forces Reserve Policy Council. Similar rules relating to security levels apply, except on occasion a specific group may be cleared for TOP SECRET. DIA/CIIC has never presented a TOP SECRET briefing, however, to any of these groups.

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Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Current Intelligence  
and Indications Center

1 Atch:

4 Feb Text - 9999th Air Res  
Sq, SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 February 1964

S-160/AP-3

**SUBJECT:** (U) DIA/CIIC Briefings Before Congressional Military Reserve Groups

**TO:** Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll  
Director, DIA

Brig. Gen. Ernest C. Hardin  
Office of Secretary of Defense

1. Reference is made to memorandum, subject as above, dated 6 February 1964, and forwarded as original to Brig. Gen. Hardin and as info copy to Lt. Gen. Carroll.

2. I have conducted further research into the material which I have used in current intelligence briefings before the 9999th Air Reserve Squadron in an effort to ascertain precisely what may have been extracted from State Department non-sensitive cables at the SECRET or lesser classification levels. Other than the two citations mentioned in the memorandum referenced in paragraph 1 above, the only other instance in which such material was used or in which specific reference was made to a U. S. Ambassador occurred during the presentation on 21 January. On that date, in connection with a discourse on the Soviet arms reduction, I cited some points relating to the relationship of arms reduction to the state of the Soviet economy. I used a few extracts from a State Department CONFIDENTIAL message from the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow, a copy of which is inclosed.

3. As I have reconstructed the pertinent portion of the briefing and the use of this information, I believe it was developed as follows:

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**SECRET**

"Relative to the question as to whether or not there is any sincerity in the Khrushchev remarks relative to reduction of the USSR's armed strength, I would like to bring you the view of our Ambassador in Moscow who has reported that Western economic counselors have shown surprising unanimity with respect to the CIA analysis of the current status of the Soviet economy. The most generally held view is that the Soviets have too long hypnotized the world including own citizens with space accomplishments and industrial growth figures which avoid realities of backward agriculture, antiquated factories, planning inadequacies, 19th century services, and eastern living conditions.

"The optimistic believe that Khrushchev's program to shift to more balanced and progressive economy may this year reverse abrupt deceleration of past two years, particularly since plans call for reallocations of resources rather than usual shifts in organization.

"Majority, however, foresees 1964 as extension of economic recession which has apparently hit most of Soviet bloc. Reasons include:

- a. repetition of freeze-thaw cycle which struck Soviet agriculture last winter;
- b. time required to introduce fertilized program and overcome dust-bowl problems;
- c. impracticalities of fertilized program;
- d. depletion gold surplus for grain purchases;
- e. complications of crash shift to progressive industry in Soviet Union;
- f. continuation of internal competition for scarce resources;
- g. cut-back in most productive industrial sectors;

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

h. anticipated fall-off in normal trade due wheat-chemicals priority;

i. apparent absence to date of resurgence of revisionism which essential to produce growth of incentives."

3. It is pointed out that the attached cable does not bear any extraordinary security controls, receives extensive distribution within State and Defense and related to a subject broadly discussed in the public press with major portions used already in the public domain. It is the type of information which DIA/CIIC would use in any normal intelligence reporting.

4. DIA/CIIC pursues a vigorous policy of extremely close control of all State Department and other intelligence which is even suggestive of sensitivity. No significant or sensitive State traffic is ever used in DIA/CIIC briefings or current intelligence publications without the specific permission of appropriate authority in the Department of State.

5. I do not question the propriety of other judgments that use of this information with attribution to Mr. Kolher before the USAF Congressional Reserve Group was improper. However, I do not feel that the information had a direct bearing to U.S. foreign policy.

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Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Current Intelligence  
and Indications Center

1 Atch:

Msg 17Jan64, fr Moscow to  
Paris for USRO and Embassy  
CONFIDENTIAL

**SECRET**

**TAB**



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

46  
Action

Control: 12418  
Rec'd: January 17, 1964  
7:15 p.m.

EUR

FROM: Moscow

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 2221

G

PASS TO

SP

INFO: Bonn 157

GEN CARROLL  25X1

L

Brussels 32

H

London 265

SAL

Paris 278

FE

Stockholm 19

E

Tokyo 44

P

DATE: January 17, 7 p.m.

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

CEA

COM

TRSY

RMR

PARIS FOR USRO AND EMBASSY.

Western Economic counselors in surprising show of unanimity endorse conclusions CIA analysis of current status Soviet economy, except for gold figures about which little known here.

Most generally held view is that Soviets have too long hypnotized world including own citizens with space accomplishments and industrial growth figures which avoid realities of backward agriculture, antiquated factories, planning inadequacies, 19th century services, and eastern living conditions.

Optimistic believe that Khrushchev's program to shift to more balanced and progressive economy may this year reverse abrupt deceleration of past two years, particularly since plans call for reallocations of resources rather than usual shifts in organization.

Majority, however, foresees 1964 as extension of economic recession which has apparently hit most of Soviet bloc. Reasons include, (A) repetition of freeze-thaw cycle which struck Soviet agriculture last winter, (B) time required to introduce fertilized program and overcome dust-bowl problems, (C) /impracticalities

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 2221, January 17, 7 p.m. from: Moscow.

impracticalities of fertilized program, (D) depletion gold surplus for grain purchases, (E) complications of crash shift to progressive industry in Soviet Union, (F) continuation of internal competition for scarce resources, (G) cut-back in most productive industrial sectors, (H) anticipated fall-off in normal trade due wheat-chemicals priority, (I) apparent absence to date of resurgence of revisionism which essential to produce growth of incentives.

All believe that economic problems, primarily billion-dollar wheat disaster, have had and will continue to have profound (and to date moderating) influence on Soviet internal and external policy. As consequence, most recommend closest coordination western economic policy at this critical stage. most deplore possibility of credit race on commercial and other grounds, e.g., "credits would force western taxpayer to subsidize Soviet economic aid to third countries". Because of seriousness Soviet economic situation and poor 1964 prospects for improvement, minority rationalizes that some liberalization credit terms could prevent serious cut-back normal trade and contribute to current east-west detente. Some believe economic situation so bad that Soviets may have to adopt some form of increased incentive system. None are "euphoric" about possibilities of trade increase with or without credits (Paris' 120).

GP-3.

KOHLER

ba:19.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Mr. Elder*

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

The attached package was handed to DCI by Carroll or Fitch before a recent USIB meeting. You will recall that Secretary Rusk has been very unhappy about DIA briefings given to military reserve units which include Congressmen and even talked at one point about resigning. The package as it relates to a hassle between State Department and Defense is passed to you by the DCI for your info. The DCI did ask Walt Elder, however, whether you had ever talked to Joe Carroll to find out how CIA information is handled by the DIA briefers.

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*DIA assured me that they do not use sensitive stuff and do not "source" CIA in stuff they do use -*

H. Knoche  
26 Feb 64  
(DATE)

*2/29/64*

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter *AM*

DCI noted your note without further comment.

*W. Elder* W. Elder

3 Mar 64  
(DATE)

~~SECRET~~

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)