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
65-7685

22 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

- 1. Director Raborn will have in Peter Jessup's hands tomorrow copies of the cables on which the attached memo is based.
- 2. He believes that you will find these cables of interest and may wish to show them up the line.
- 3. The Director wishes to remind you that this survey was undertaken in response to a specific request.



WE:blp

Original - Addressee w/attachment (handcarried)

1 - WE Chrono w/o att

1 - DCI Chrono w/o att

1 - DCI White House File w/cy att

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The rule was

22 June 1965

	SUBJECT:	Estimate of Attitudes of News Media and General Population in Certain Countries, to U.S. Policies as Ememplified by our Actions in Vietnam and	25X1
		s is a narrative tabulation of the general thrust of the sceived from our field stations to the question posed:	
		In and the	25X1
25X1		our policies, particularly on Vietnam, receive	:
	general	understanding and support. Our policies on] 25X1
	are clo	arly of less interest and contern. The minority opposition	
	to our	policies, where it exists in these countries, takes full	:
	ad yeats	ge of our domestic opposition as it finds expression in our	
	owa ac	re media. (This factor is prevalent generally, in varying	
	degree	, in the countries we queried.)	
		In reactions to	25X1
	out left	icles are mixed and confused.	
25X1		(i) In divided opinion among the population and	!
		major newspapers, which favored U.S. policies slightly a	
		r months age, has shifted to a more prenounced attitude of	
	•	etioning and disfavor as a result of the bombings of North	
	Yk	tnam and the possibility ofin a dis-	25X1
	_	resable conflict of doubtful outcome. Here again, interest	
		high on the Victnamese situation and on a low order of	
	3838	guitude and declining on the question.	25X1
25X1		(2) In which is generally sympathetic to the U.S.	
	•b]	ectives, there is apposition to our policies both in the press	
	40	smong the people, caused mostly by concern over the	
	bre	eder possible consequences of escalation, with particular	
ì	rei	erence to the fact that	25X1
25X1	√		
1		<u> </u>	

2574	193 8m maline no se	
25X1	(3) In while our policies in Vietnam on the	
25X1	whole receive general support, and are understood, our position in is not adequately understood and	
25/1	position in is not adequately understood and is therefore criticised.	
25X1	(4) In although there is much ambivalence of	
	attitude and vocal criticism, the estimate is that strong	
	moves in Vietnam or Latin America would ultimately be	
	viewed rationally by the and receive their political	25X1 25X1
	support.	25X1
25X1	c. In the press and the public generally	
	are unsymptometic trace strongly critical of our policies, and in	
25X1	a measure of public support of our firm stand in Vietnam	
25X1	is being eroded by anti-U.S. position and press	0574
	criticisms of our policies in both Vietnam and the	25X1
25X1		
25X1	d. In very little interest is shown in either Vietnam	
25X1	or The local government papers are generally	
23/(1	sympathic to the U.S. policy and difficulties, and the Communist	
	press highly critical.	
	2. On a world-wide basis, we can draw the following generalizations	
	from the field responses:	
	a. In many sectors of the populations there is a basic apathy	
25X1	toward both Victuam and the except as various	25X1
	forms of local colf-interest are affected, in terms of local elections,	
	present commitments in the areas concerned, or national survival.	
	The situation in Vietnam is far better understood and the issues	
	more clear, although there is doubt about the future. There is some	
	frustration over the fact that modern technology has not prevailed in	
ĺ	a jungle war. The most prevalent fear is that the bombings of North	
	Vietnam could lead to further escalation and perhaps a general war.	
	b. On the other hand, the questions are in many	25X1
,	instances tee remote to stimulate any real concern, or are con-	
	sidered to be localized. The rationals behind the U.S. action is	
	often releunderstood, and our "intervention" regretted or vilified.	

25X1

- c. Where there is strong opposition to U.S. policies, it is eften lead by the left-wing media and organized leftist or Communist front groups. _______ is an exception, where their role is secondary.) A disproportionate advantage is taken of U.S. news media and news services coverage of domestic U.S. dissent to the Administration's policies.
- The tener of the stations' contributions guggests that in all our policy statements, news releases, and guidances to receptive journalists and editors, the U.S. must project the image of a nation mindful of and willing to exercise its responsibilities as a Free World leader. The U.S. must show that we are ready to take positive initiatives -unilaterally or in concert with other nations as time and circumstances permit -- to expose the true character of Communism, to oppose Communist subversion and aggrandisement in any form, and to employ force judiciously when the Communist side proves unreceptive to negotiation and consultation and persists in its subversive efforts. The U.S. needs frequently to reliterate its objectives and to express them in terms understandable and acceptable to the roan in the street here and abroad. The U.S. must avoid giving the impression that it is we who are afraid of the Communist bogeyman; we must make clear the implications of Communism and our objectives to each country or region. Above all, it is imperative that the other nations of the Free World understand our policies, and retain full confidence in our interests and capabilities.