

10-4558

October 20, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Theodore C. Sorensen
Special Counsel to the President
The White House

On the attached copy of draft number two of the speech I have indicated some suggested changes.

On page 3, the reference to Polaris and Minuteman is questionable. The Minuteman is not operational, and being intercontinental could not be transferred elsewhere. Our attempts to turn over Polaris submarines to NATO under some appropriate arrangement has been given wide publicity. On the other hand, we have transferred Thors to England and Jupiters to England and Turkey under our operational control. An important point is that everything we have done in this connection has been done openly and the public has been fully informed.

On the same page, I suggest dropping out the last sentence.

Numbered paragraph 2 on page 5 does not seem to me to meet its purpose. In serving notice that we reserve the right to take military action of an appropriate nature if our surveillance indicates that the Cubans and Soviets persist in the build-up of this missile capability, I think the President should through this speech place himself and this country in a position to be absolutely free of the accusation or indictment of a "surprise attack", if we are forced to act in our own interests after the blockade has run for a limited period, and this period might be very short indeed. My views are expressed in the attached final paragraph of my talking paper which I used in today's meeting. The final sentence may suggest some wording.

Theodore C. Sorensen
The White House - (1962)

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

Along this line I think numbered paragraph 4 on page 4 nullifies the above, for I could envisage the OAS and the United Nations very quickly appointing inspection teams to investigate and report back at their leisure, and once this action has been taken, then it seems to me our hands are tied with respect to any unilateral action we might wish to take.

You will see some suggested wording in numbered paragraph 3 on page 6, as the present text would cover everything including surface-to-air missiles.

Page 7 should be carefully studied. We must not establish a condition which would lead to the closing out of Guantanamo, nor should we lose sight of the fact that Castro and his government are avowed Communists with a stated purpose of spreading Communist revolution throughout Latin America, and while we do not wish to mix the Castro problem and the missile problem up in this operation, nevertheless let us be sure we do not insert wording that forecloses necessary actions to carry out our intent of helping the Cuban people replace Castro with leadership of their own choosing.

I know the speech will go through many drafts. I therefore have not attempted to deal with other points which to me do not seem as important as the ones mentioned above.

Signed

John A. McCone
Director

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