



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

Executive Registry
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IN REPLY REFER TO
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2 FEB 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR Vice Admiral W. F. Raborn, USN (Ret.), Director of
Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Subj: Recent news media articles on the importance of our interests
in South Asia (U)

Encl: (1) DNI Conf Memo of Info Ser 012253P92 of 1 Feb 1966
(2) DNI Unclas Memo for SECNAV dated 1 Feb 1966

1. The enclosed two memoranda drawing attention to certain recent articles on South Asia in general and Vietnam in particular are considered of interest and well worth reading. I think their importance lies in the implications they contain of Communist objectives in that area and what the consequences might be to us if those objectives were achieved.
2. I think discussions of this sort help us orient our thinking so as to read through the ambient noise that always plagues the intelligence analyst in times like these. I would recommend that those of your people that are concerned with estimates on this subject and with analysis of information bearing on Communist interests and objectives read these articles.

Very respectfully,

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Director of Naval Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Neue Zurcher Zeitung Article on North Vietnam (U)

1. The Washington Post of 28 January under a byline of The Chicago Daily News correspondent in Bonn carries a summary of an article in the Neue Zurcher Zeitung, generally considered to be one of the world's most reliable newspapers. The views of the researcher on Communism of that newspaper are summarized as follows:
 - a. The US campaigns may have been more successful than they sometimes appear.
 - b. There is resistance among the youth and defeatism among the general public. There probably was an upsurge of patriotic enthusiasm when US bombings commenced but this gave way quickly to discouragement. Party officials have warned repeatedly against the belief that the US cannot be defeated and that a long war simply means additional suffering for the people.
 - c. The economy of North Vietnam is probably stagnating. The harvest may have been good but as late as last December stern measures were ordered to assure its collection. There are complaints that the peasants are black-marketing and paying more attention to private plots. Last summer there was a major switch to local industries and handicrafts to relieve damaged transportation facilities. Big factories not converted to war production are probably idle. The exodus to the countryside may have diminished Hanoi's controls.
 - d. The intransigence of Hanoi's leaders is the result of a false estimate of their own capabilities and of the international power relationships. Hanoi appears to be still equating both the military power and domestic situation of the US in 1966 with that of a weakened and divided France in 1954. Moreover, it appears that Peking has assured Hanoi that "volunteers" would be sent to North Vietnam when necessary, as in Korea.
2. ONI Comment. The Neue Zurcher Zeitung views on the above subject are of interest in the light of that newspaper's customary careful approach to such analysis, and

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the fact that they represent a longer, more detached and more comprehensive approach than we are getting in our news media. ONI would caution that the author of the article, although stressing weaknesses, probably believes that North Vietnam was beginning to hurt before the stand-down rather than being critically affected at that point. His statement that Hanoi appears to be equating both the military power and domestic situation of the US in 1966 with that of a weakened and divided France in 1954 is considered correct and in fact the core of the problem. For this reason, Hanoi is probably misreading our signals concerning peace to reinforce their basic and miscalculated estimate.

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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Op-92/ell

1 February 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Recent articles on the importance of our interests in South Asia

1. The January 1966 issue of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE contains an article which, in my opinion, is an excellent statement of reasons as to why, one, sea power is a vital factor in today's world, and, two, the Indian Ocean area is of strategic importance to the United States. The article is entitled "The Afro-Asian Ocean Heartland" and is written by Dr. Rocco M. Paone, who is a Professor of International Relations at the Naval Academy. One of the reasons why the article is of particular importance at this time is that it could well be titled "Why We Can't Afford to Lose in Vietnam".
2. A second article of major importance, in my view, is one in the January 27, 1966 issue of THE REPORTER magazine. The article is entitled "Back From Vietnam" and describes the author's dismay over what he terms "diplomatic professionalism breaking free from the gravitational field of twentieth century political reality and orbiting in a universe of pure fancy". The burden of the message in the above article is that we should "mobilize all the power necessary to crush the enemy's resistance and achieve a rapid, clear-cut victory". The author also points out that any betrayal of our mission in South Vietnam cannot fail to deny us any future Allies in Asia.
3. Inasmuch as both the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and THE REPORTER magazine articles deal with the consequences of Communist domination of South Asia, they are complementary and make good reading together.

Very respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Rufus L. Taylor".

RUFUS L. TAYLOR
Director of Naval Intelligence

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OP-06

Encl. (2)