

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
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64-1754

**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR**

Action Memorandum No. A-365

10 MAR 1964

Date \_\_\_\_\_

TO : **Deputy Director/Science & Technology**  
**Attention: Assistant Director for Computer Services**  
**Deputy Director/Support**  
**Attention: Director of Security**

SUBJECT : **Security Compartmentation of Computer Data**

REFERENCE:

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1. The centralization of considerable amounts of Agency control information and machine processes under your direction raises the fundamental issue of security and compartmentation.

2. Would you please take steps to develop a security procedure in concert with the Office of Security which provides for defined areas of compartmentation. This procedure should establish limited access to information programmed into OCS machine systems on a need-to-know basis. These restrictions apply both within your own office as well as between and among Deputy Directorates. I would envisage a list of authorized persons who may request data. Such a "bigot" list should be rigidly enforced to obtain the desired compartmentation.

3. Please prepare for my approval the necessary instruction and ground rules to effect the foregoing by 1 April 1964.

(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

**Lyman B. Kirkpatrick**  
**Executive Director-Comptroller**

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Rewritten/ Retyped O/ExDir:lh (10 Mar 64)

Distribution:  
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SUSPENSE DATE: 1 April 1964

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875-64-303-1  
4-18-64

DD/ST# 1183-64

9 APR 1964

Executive Registry  
64-2786

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director - Comptroller

SUBJECT : Security Compartmentation Within  
OCS, DD/S&T

REFERENCE : Your Action Memorandum No. A-365,  
dated 10 March 1964, same subject

This memorandum submits  
recommendations for your approval;  
these recommendations are con-  
tained in paragraphs 4 and 5.

1. In response to the referenced Action Memorandum,  
attached are:

- a. Staff Study on Security Compartmentation  
Within OCS, DD/S&T, which covers in some  
detail present and possible compartmenta-  
tion practices for OCS.
- b. Attachment A to the Staff Study, which  
contains for your approval instructions  
for OCS on security compartmentation  
procedures--as you requested in Your  
Action Memorandum.
- c. Attachment B to the Staff Study, a list  
of OCS projects, which gives some idea  
of the present range of OCS tasks.

W/A # 365

EXECUTIVE

2. We have reviewed the Staff Study and its attached Instructions and believe the procedures outlined are adequate for the safe handling of data processed by OCS.

3. Security procedures within OCS will surely be further refined as the Office consolidates its resources and procedures and as security practices for all CIA machine processing are delineated by the Handbook, already in process, on Security Procedures for Automatic Data Processing in CIA, the preparation of which is recommended in the Staff Study.

4. We recommend your approval of the attached Instructions for Special Compartmentation of Data Within OCS, DD/S&T. If approved, the DD/S&T will instruct the AD/CS to proceed in accordance therewith for the safeguarding of materials processed by OCS which require special compartmentation.

5. We further recommend that the Office of Security, with the assistance of OCS and other components as appropriate, prepare a Handbook on security procedures for automatic data processing in CIA.

[Redacted Signature Box]

ALBERT D. WHEELON  
Deputy Director  
(Science & Technology)

(signed) H. Gates Lloyd

*for* L. K. WHITE  
Deputy Director  
(Support)

Attachment:  
Staff Study on Compartmentation w/attachments - *filed in OCS*

(SEE PAGE 2 FOR CONCURRENCES & APPROVAL)

**CONCURRENCES:**

15/ G.S.F \*  
**Deputy Director (Intelligence)**

9-4-64  
**Date**

\* Attention is requested to the points raised in the attached memo from OCK.

16 APR 1964

**Deputy Director (Plans) \***

**Date**

\* AS MODIFIED BY ACCOMPANYING MEMO. TO EX-DCI-COMPT. IS/

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**THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4 & 5 ARE APPROVED: \***

(signed) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

16 APR 1964

**Executive Director - Comptroller**

**Date**

\* *with modifications indicated.*

**Distribution:**

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the DD/I (Administration)

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ATTENTION:

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation Within OCS, DD/S&T

REFERENCE: Staff Study, same subject, dated 26 March 1964

1. Referenced study represents a good approach to a problem with which this office, particularly Special Register, is most familiar. There is, I think, one major omission which we can only flag now and attend to in detail as  develops, viz., the control procedures involved in OCS support (via computer) to OCR central reference activities. For that matter, there are implications which pre-date  implementation in that certain OCR card files have now been converted to magnetic tape, and others will be converted if it appears that this will result in more efficient service.

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2. In other words, OCR has by regulation certain dissemination responsibilities (of with distribution limitations on pg. 9, para. 3.e.,f.) and all-source information retrieval responsibilities, and these, plus USIB Community agreements on the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information (DCID 1/7,  etc.) must be taken into account in prescribing ground rules for access to data stored in computer memories. In computer-based information retrieval, OCS is backstopping OCR and the tapes are/will be one other medium (in addition to hard copy documents, microfilm, abstracts, dossiers, etc.) on which information is stored for retrieval. Of course, this information must be protected, but access, at least by information specialists, to general information files across sources is mandatory. I'm sure OCS agrees, but the absence of this kind of consideration in what may become a security bible needs to be noted.

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3. The paper does not refer to indexers or data analysts on page 8; it seems somewhat weak on the subject of contractor access; and it might be strengthened by proposing the establishment first of a basic pre-agreed use or distribution plan with production offices, to be followed by name lists for special controls or exceptions to the basic plan.

4. Finally, I feel quite strongly that since OCR will rely for some undetermined and possibly prolonged time on OCS equipment to assist in performance of its mission, and decisions concerning access to information stored on OCS computers are and, to a greater extent, will be of direct concern to OCR, future discussions on this subject should involve direct OCR participation.

[Redacted]

Executive Assistant

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cc: Mr. [Redacted]  
CSS

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4-18-64

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation of Computer Data relating to Clandestine Services Personnel

REFERENCE: Staff Study on Security Compartmentation within OCS, DD/S&T, dated March 1964

Executive Registry

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1. The "Instructions for Special Compartmentation of Data within OCS, DD/S&T," (attachment A of reference), will significantly improve the security of sensitive information handled by OCS. I believe that the procedures set forth therein should, with some slight changes, be put into effect without delay. I cannot concur fully with the "Instructions," however, because they do not appear to go far enough towards providing for the compartmentation of information about Clandestine Services personnel. It is my view that data which reveals the identities of Clandestine Services personnel should be separated from that concerning the rest of the Agency. This information should be on separate tapes and those tapes should be under the security control of the Clandestine Services. I recommend that immediate steps be taken to accomplish the above.

2. My concurrence in the proposed "Instructions" is qualified by the following:

- a. The handling of information relating to Clandestine Services personnel and activities shall be accomplished or determined by the Clandestine Services and not the office of origin if the office of origin is not the Clandestine Services.
- b. All Clandestine Services data processed by OCS shall receive special compartmentation, (See para. 6 of the Instructions).
- c. As soon as it becomes feasible to do so, the

Clandestine Services, instead of the office of origin will provide special storage for tapes or cards containing CS information (See para. 6.b.(2) of the Instructions).

- d. The Clandestine Services will approve authorization lists naming individuals who require access to CS data, (See para 6.C.(1) of the Instructions).
- e. A representative of the CS will monitor the printout of CS data (See para. 6.C.(4) of the Instructions).
- f. The dissemination of printouts of CS data will be effected by the Clandestine Services (See para. 6.C.(5) of the Instructions).

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans